104-10263-10139 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

PROPER FILE NO.

FROM:

RID/
AC/WS

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/SR/CI/P		21 MAR 1962		[illegible]
2.				
3. IP/DMS -		5 Jan 77		MSJ
4. DW - (ln		5 Jan 77		
5. CI/RA/I				
6. CT-5				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				

NEWS

1 cy det for C/SR/10

C/CI/SI has advised that British officers handled these agents OG on (Wynne - Sellers) locally

[signature]
4 March 1962

RYBAT

15. RETURN THIS DOCUMENT TO RID FOR MICROFILMING BEFORE IT IS FILED. IF THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RESTRICTED, CHECK HERE [ ] RESTRICTED TO ______ Unit Designation

RID/MI 1085 L
RID/FI

201-099758

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT | FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET/RYBAT

CELA-35954

TO: Chief, WE

201-294855

FROM: Chief of Station, London

14 March 1962

SUBJECT: Operational/REDWOOD/LCIMPROVE/AELADLE (Michael WYNNE-ELLIS) 06

NO INDEXING REQUIRED: X

ACTION REQUIRED: See below

REFERENCES: OELW-19307, 23 January 1962

(SMOTH) appreciated the KGB document forwarded with Reference and have submitted the following comments and questions:

1. "We have a number of questions about this document on which we should be grateful for your comments, and as background to some of these we think it will be useful for you to have an account of (WYNNE-ELLIS) dealings with AELADLE:

a. "They date from June 1961 when he was considering a visit to the U.S.S.R. He mentioned this to the Soviet Ambassador, whom he met at the Queen's Brthday Celebration in Helsinki, (he did not realise at first that it was the Ambassador to whom he was talking). The Ambassador suggested that he should get in touch with Ivan Efimovich SERGEEV, an identified R.I.S. officer.

b. "Between 5th and 15th July 1961 (WYNNE-ELLIS) went to the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy to see about the visa. Apparently he did not see SERGEEV but met AELADLE who showed a good deal of curiosity about him and asked whether he had ever been to the U.S.S.R. before, whether he had applied in London for a visa, what he was doing in Helsinki etc. The possibility of AELADLE taking English lessons from (WYNNE-ELLIS) was mentioned and AELADLE said he would get in touch with (WYNNE-ELLIS) about this. He asked for a short biogrphy of (WYNNE-ELLIS).

c. "He brought the visa application forms and his biography to AELADLE two days later and although AELADLE was apparently very busy he asked (WYNNE-ELLIS) for clarification of various details. AELADLE did not take English lessons from (WYNNE-ELLIS).

d. "At the end of September, or beginning of October 1961, (WYNNE-ELLIS) received a letter from AELADLE asking for the address of his pen friend in Russia, Stanislav GALKIN, who had been concerned in (WYNNE-ELLIS) recruitment by the R.I.S. (WYNNE-ELLIS) telephoned AELADLE to say that he did not have the new address. AELADLE told him that if he wanted it, he could have a visa 'tomorrow' to visit Stalingrad (now Volgograd) and in the course of conversation said 'sometimes it is better to visit places but not old friends'. We wondered at the time, and ever more after AELADLE's defection, whether this remark had any special significance.

e. "On 16th November AELADLE invited (WYNNE-ELLIS) to attend a Soviet concert. AELADLE told him that he had been granted a tourist visa but that if he wished to visit his pen friend he would require a letter of invitation from him. AELADLE asked about his British friends in Helsinki and said that he would phone (WYNNE-ELLIS) next week to make a further appointment. He did not do this.

CLASSIFICATION

f. "A further development which may be of interest is that in early January 1962 (WYNNE-ELLIS) received a further letter from his Russian pen friend giving him a fairly pressing invitation to visit him. (WYNNE-ELLIS), who was not aware of AELADLE's defection, wrote to AELADLE telling him that he had now received the invitation, and inviting him to coffee at his house!

2. "We thought that the arrival of this letter (it was dated 25.12.61) so shortly after AELADLE's defection, and after a long gap in the correspondence between (WYNNE-ELLIS) and his pen friend, might indicate that the R.I.S. suspected that (WYNNE-ELLIS) had had a hand in AELADLE's defection. (WYNNE-ELLIS) was never aware that AELADLE was an R.I.S. officer.

3. "As you know from an earlier conversation about this case (WYNNE-ELLIS) is a most unsatisfactory character to deal with, and we believe that the R.I.S. have found him equally unsatisfactory! We have no reason to suppose that (he has double-crossed us since he was turned) but we would not exclude this as a possibility - or at least would not exclude the possibility that he might have considered this.

4. "Our questions on the (WYNNE-ELLIS) document supplied by AELADLE are as follows:

a. "What is the manuscript word at the top of the first page, and what is its significance?

b. "The two typed words, one immediately below the manuscript word on page 1 and the other to the left, are not legible on our copy.

c. "Is there any significance in the date 11th November being in inverted commas, thus "11"?

d. "We are puzzled by what at first sight appeared to be a date, 22.XII.1961, in the heading immediately above the text on page 1. In fact the Roman numerals 'XII' are the cyrillic letter XП, but we do not understand their meaning. Can AELADLE explain this?

e. "What is the name in which the document is signed, and does AELADLE know the true identity of this person?

f. "We are a little surprised at the cyrillic transliteration of (WYNNE-ELLIS)'s name. We should have expected the KGB to have a system which would enable them to get back to the correct English spelling. Admittedly (WYNNE-ELLIS)'s name is an awkward one to deal with.

g. "We should have expected that AELADLE would have sent a trace request to his Headquarters shortly after the first meeting with (WYNNE-ELLIS) in July 1961. Yet the reply was apparently sent only on 11th November. Can AELADLE comment on this?

5. "We do not wish to suggest by these comments that we suspect that this document might be a forgery, but we would be grateful for your confirmation that you do not consider this a possibility.

6. "You will no doubt in due course be questioning 06 AELADLE in detail on his knowledge of the (WYNNE-ELLIS) case. We do not at this stage wish to suggest detailed questions except to remark that we do not know the real names of any of the R.I.S. officers who dealt with him - including the man whom, it is stated in the AELADLE document, he met in the U.K. There is some mystery about this because (WYNNE-ELLIS) 06 denies having met any R.I.S. officer in the U.K., he did however have contact with various Russians here (including an R.I.S. officer) and we suspect that the R.I.S. officer never identified himself as such to (WYNNE-ELLIS.)" 06

James L. Griffiths
James L. GRIFFITHS

Distribution:

3 - Chief, SR ✓
2 - Chief, WE

3/PJ

104-10265-10118 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

20 October 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Highlights of Tape-Recorded Conversation in Miami Between Mr. William D. Pawley and an Unidentified Cuban during Period 17-18 October

1. On 20 October the undersigned and Owen Faust of WH/3 listened to the play-back of a tape, brought to Washington from Miami and given to Colonel King by Mr. Pawley on 19 October, which was a recording of Mr. Pawley's conversations with two Cubans during the period 17-18 October. The first conversation was with an unidentified Cuban, believed to be a member of a group of wealthy anti-CASTRO Cubans, members of which have talked to Mr. Pawley recently about their plans for sabotage of the coming sugar harvest as reported in UFWA-32 dated 2 October. The second Cuban was AMPACA-1, a Cuban journalist of operational interest to Station Habana, and a separate memorandum is submitted on that conversation.

2. The unidentified Cuban, who had somewhat of an accent and spoke indistinctly, was difficult to understand. He mentioned a meeting "with some of our people who came up from Cuba" to discuss plans. He said his group had been contacted by a representative of General Jose Eleutorio PEDRAZA, leader of Cuban revolutionary groups in the Dominican Republic, who wanted to know what action their group had taken and was told that they had a plan "to start sabotage". The Cuban said the PEDRAZA representative said their group (the PEDRAZA group) had four provinces organized in Cuba, mentioning Camaguey and Santa Clara, and that they had two provinces yet to be organized -- Habana and Matanzas.

3. The Cuban said his group needed two things -- moral backing and money; he pointed out that Cubans in Cuba are afraid to start an underground movement, and there was no way to raise funds, etc. Mr. Pawley gave him no encouragement on the money angle, saying that even if there were Americans willing to run the risk of becoming involved in Cuban revolutionary activities by furnishing money for such a movement, which he doubted, he felt that at the present time it would be like "putting money down a rat-hole" for the following reasons: (1) there is no unity among the anti-CASTRO groups, and there are at least 10 that he knows of who are working absolutely independently of one another; and (2) CASTRO is in control of the country and has the support of a large number of Cubans, especially the under-privileged. Mr. Pawley said he felt the Cuban economic situation was worsening fast and that if it gets bad enough, a large number of Cubans will turn on CASTRO; but until that time comes it would be dangerous to try to organise a revolutionary movement.

SECRET

201-773??

SECRET

4. Mr. Pawley asked the Cuban if his group felt they had moral support of the U. S. and the Cuban replied that they wanted U. S. moral support but whether they had it or not, they felt they were obliged to carry through with their plans. Mr. Pawley said he didn't know what to tell him -- would have to think about it and see if anything could be done. He said, "having been connected with the U. S. Government, I can't get involved in revolutionary movements". Also said he would hate to see the Dominican Government get involved, which might be difficult to avoid with so many Cuban exiles there, but commented that he understood "the Dominican Government hasn't given them a dime".

Martha Tharpe
WH/III/CARIB

SECRET

14-00000
104-10265-10141 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MICROFILMED
JUL 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

VIA: AIR

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HDCA-1382

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 12 June 1958

FROM : Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— PAWLEY Business Interests in the Dominican Republic

ACTION REQUIRED: For info only.

1. In addition to minerals exploitation in which Mr. William D. PAWLEY has substantial investments, negotiations are being concluded for the purchase by PAWLEY of the Hotel Hamaca in Boca Chica, a resort town near the almost-completed new international airport, about 30 km east of Ciudad Trujillo.

2. Another activity which is kept very much under wraps is the concession granted PAWLEY for procurement and world-wide sale of all new issues of Dominican postage stamps. This activity is managed by Edward F. PAWLEY, brother of William, whose office is in the Dominican post office building.

3. The source (considered sensitive) of the information in paragraph 2. is Mrs. Nora BRITZIUS, a U. S. citizen employed by PAWLEY in the stamp business. The source volunteered the information on a very confidential basis to Helene I. DAHLERUP at a social gathering.

Edward F. Stoneset
EDWARD F. STONESET

10 June 1958

Distribution:
3 - Hqs.

CS COPY

INDEX

FORM NO. 51-28A

CS COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

12 June 58

201-77378

104-10266-10026 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
When Filled In

SECRET

22 JAN 1975
(date)

Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen

In accordance with the DDO's notice of 9 December 1974, I have reviewed the 201 file on COBB (surname) (201 number indicated below), and have determined that it can most accurately be categorized as indicated below:

[ ] should be closed.

[ ] witting collaborator. OI Code A1.

[ ] potential witting collaborator; date opened ______________ OI Code A2.

[X] former witting collaborator (relationship terminated). OI Code A3.

[ ] potential witting collaborator never contacted (security reasons, derogatory information). OI Code A4.

[ ] counterintelligence case (i.e., involving a foreign intelligence or security service). OI Code A5.

[ ] all others. OI Code A6.

Signed Barry Gelton (name) Ops Officer (title) LA/M/F (component)

This assignment of category has been entered into STAR.

Signed [initials] (initials) 3 FEB 197_ (date)

This document is a permanent part of this file.

201-278841

SECRET
When Filled In
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 054979

SECRET

CASE OFFICER CHECK LIST

PROJECT

CRYPT/PSEUDO: LICOOKY/1 (Joyce H. PINEINCH) 201- 278841 (7 Vol.)
AREA/BASE : WH/New York C/O: aka

I. TRACES
Base: Req'd by Base: DO Base/N.Y.-3219, 1 Aug 67
(For local traces)
Other: Req'd by
(Specify)
Hqs: [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Reply to Base:

II. CLEARANCES
POA : Req'd DO Base/N.Y.-3219 Granted
PRQ I fw'd to CI/OA 3 Aug 67

PCSA : Green List # 182786- [illegible]
Req'd Granted

OA : Req'd Granted
Complete PRQs I & II fw'd

CSA : Req'd Granted

CNC : Req'd Granted

OTHER : Req'd Granted
(Specify)
SGSWIRL :

III. SPECIAL APPROVALS/CONCURRENCES
60-11 : Req'd Granted
A/WOMACE : Req'd Granted
LNERGO :: Req'd Granted
Field Office Coordination
OTHER : DCS: #039, 3 Aug 67
(Specify)

IV. CONTRACTS
Type: Eff. Date & Term
Secrecy Agmnt; Termination Date

V. ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS:
Describe briefly)

ACCOMMODATION TELEPHONE:
Describe briefly

VI DOMESTIC ASSETS INVENTORY
Fw'd Hqs. Rec'd

VII. TERMINATION OF INTEREST
Date: Hqs. Notified
Reasons for Termination:

Clearance Cancelled:
Secrecy Agreement:
Quit Claim:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
COBB, Viola June	2. RI FILE NO.		
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	4. DATE	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM	8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN	11. DATE	

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

THERE IS A RESTRICTED CI/OA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201 HELD UNDER C# 8341...

201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201-278841 ~~201-278841~~

FORM 8-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: ~~Mr.~~ Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

201-278841

13 October
red - fwd
WH/B&F
c/WH/SS
c/CPD
OF/CAAS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

Miss Joyce H. Pineirch

Dear Miss Pineirch

Reference is made to your current MOC with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 21 April 1966, said MOC is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"10. Taxes. As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph four (4) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal Income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said ~~contract~~ MOC remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ____________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8 Jun
cy WH/B&F
WH/1

MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENTS

Date 25 September 1962

TO : Chief, Finance Division
VIA : Contract Approving Officer
FROM : Chief of Station, Mexico City
SUBJECT: Engagement of LI[illegible]-1 as Independent Contractor.

1. TERM AND PROJECT CHARGE: The Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project ________ and is chargeable to Headquarters. The effective date of the oral contract is 1 [illegible] 1962 subject to termination by ODYOKE upon 30 days' actual notice.

2. SECURITY APPROVAL: The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type OA Date 29 August 1962.

3. CITIZENSHIP: The Subject ( ) is ( ) is not a foreign national.

4. COMPENSATION: The Subject will be paid 250.00 dollars per mo. The approximate equivalent of this amount in PBPRIME currency is $ --- dollars. Subject (x) will ( ) will not receive a Christmas bonus equivalent to one month's [illegible]. Other compensations in the nature of bonus commitments, gifts, paid vacations, etc. include: ________

5. TAXES : Subject (X) is ( ) is not subject to PBPRIME income taxes. If Subject to PBPRIME income taxes, payments and/or deductions will be made in the following manner [illegible] 18 % deducted or $45.00

6. QUARTERS AND/OR SUBSISTENCE: (a) SUBJECT ( ) will (X) will not be [illegible] quarters and/or subsistence allowances. (b) The following commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses: ________

7. OPERATIONAL EXPENSES: (a) Subject (X) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational travel. (b) Subject ( ) will ( ) will not be reimbursed for operational expenses. State nature of any operational expenses for which Subject will be reimbursed: As approved by Case Officer and Chief of Station

8. CONTINGENT OBLIGATIONS: The following have not been promised the individual but may have to be met by ODYOKE. Give reason for each contingent obligation ________ None

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

Signed ________
Case Officer

Reviewed ________
Contract Approving Officer

Approved Willard C. Curtis
Field Contracting Officer (COS)

Distribution: 3 Authentic copies to Hqs
1 File P-____
1 Admin Office

201-278841

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICERS:

1. Prepare Orig & 4 copies for distribution as above. Extra copies as needed.
2. PRIOR HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL IS REQUIRED before any commitments can be made regarding the following special benefits: Death; Disability; Missing in Action; Resettlement; and Citizenship or Emergency Assistance.
3. The dispatch sending copies to Hqs should provide, among other things, the following: (a) Statement regarding primary functions of the individual and the cover under which he will operate; (b) Pay instructions if to be paid by Headquarters; and (c) If cover income is to be offset, the amount of such income and date of first payment by the cover organization.

SECRET

A ril 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with CF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, ~~and~~ and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

Charlotte Bustos-Videla

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

RID CONTROL NO. (Filled in by RID)	DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST		
FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL. Renehan BR 4169	DATE OF REQUEST 18-7-67		
	BRANCH WH/PER	ROOM NO. 3D5309	PHONE NO. 4460

	TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	RID/FILES			
2	REQUESTER			
3	RID/FILES			
4				
5				

SUBJECT: Penernich Peninch, Joyce H.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from RID/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from RID/Index.
☐ Document reference from source other than RID/Index.

VERIFIED

R

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE
201-278841	CS COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY	

FORM 11-64 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38)

14-00000

21 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Finance

VIA: Chief, Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT: Joyce H. PINEINCH (p) - Tax Assessment

1. A covert Federal income tax percentage of two and eight-tenths (02.8) per cent of PINEINCH's gross, taxable Agency entitlements has been approved by the Covert Tax Committee. This percentage assessment is effective 1 December 1964, the beginning date of tax year 1965.

2. The retroactive application of this assessment to tax year 1965 will result in a dollar assessment of $84.00 (02.8% of $3,000.00). After applying the 1965 covert tax withholding of $540.00, a refund of $456.00 will be due PINEINCH for 1965. This eliminates the requirement for a covert tax return for 1965.

3. An acknowledged letter of instruction will be forwarded at a later date.

(s) JOHN F. PATTON

JOHN F. PATTON
Secretary
Covert Tax Committee

Finance (2)
CPD
WH
OF/CTB
CTC #361

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING	TO: ACTION BRANCH
1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.	If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO.

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

- retire files & cont POA. make copy to send to CI/OPP/DO but give to me as I want to make a comment.

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DO/RI		24 APR 1968	24 APR 1968	
2. C/PO/11/B-2		24 APR 1968		OB
3. 2.m.				
4. Lee				JOR
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15.				
16.				
17. RID/FI				

FILE TITLE

TRACE REQUEST — ABSTRACT — INDEX

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-277341

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 22 apr 68

DOCUMENT NUMBER: INDA 03761

FORM 1-65 610a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(40)

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief, Domestic Operations	XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM: Chief of Base, New York		MICROFILM
		MARKED FOR INDEXING

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/LICOOKY -- Termination of Contact with LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action required: retire file, again.
References: A. UNDA 3502, 22 January 1968
B. UNDA 3650, 13 March 1968

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 5 April 1968 agreement was reached that the WOFIRM relationship with her would be terminated. A memorandum of contact (NYM-2689) concerning the meeting is attached herewith, and indicates the reasons for this termination. No administrative action is required of either the Base or Headquarters in this instance, as LICOOKY/1 was not being paid by us here, and was formally terminated once before (1966). Her file can be retired, again, and this time presumably will be the last time.

2. Termination was very amicable, and LICOOKY/1 holds no ill-will for WOFIRM: she just does not wish to have any relationship with WOFIRM anymore.

3. The writer fully expects to hear from LICOOKY/1 from time to time by phone (in fact, she called later the same day of the meeting to wish the writer a pleasant Easter, as she had forgotten to do so during the meeting), but does not plan any further personal contact.

HOWARD G. FIGALAN

Attachment: NYM-2689 h/w

Distribution: 2 C/DO w/att.

1 H/w att

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA ~~3739~~ 3761	17 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

5 April 1968

TO: LICOOKY/1 File

NYM-2689

FROM: Howard G. FIGALAN

Distribution:
1-Unit A Chrono
1-Unit B Chrono
1-LICOOKY/1
1-WBM/Info (paras 3, 4 & 5)

SUBJECT: Meeting with LICOOKY/1, 5 April 1968

1. A meeting with LICOOKY/1 was held at 1100 hours, Friday, 5 April 1968. We breakfasted, and then held the meeting at the BARTHOLOMEW site. As is detailed below, we reached a mutual agreement that the relationship was not worth pursuing; this was thoroughly amicable, and recontact methods are available on both sides.

2. Substantive matters first. LICOOKY/1 said that John GERASSI had been in town on 23 March for the day. He was invited to lunch at the CMUN that day, Sunday. Apparently, GERASSI, is back in the good graces of the Cuban regime. He told LICOOKY/1 that he would be spending this Summer in Arizona.

3. LICOOKY/1 has been commissioned by M. S. ARNONI, editor of The Minority of One, to write a piece on the recent intellectual/political developments in Czechoslovakia.

4. LICOOKY/1 thought up, and is arranging, a Czech film festival to begin 15 April. It is to be sponsored by the St. Clemens Film Association, St. Clemens Church, 423 West 46th Street (this church houses the American Place Theatre -- Robert LOWELL's group). LICOOKY/1 got this idea from the recent Czech travails -- which she hails as evidence of the power of Czech intellocracy -- and from the commission referred to in paragraph 3 above. She contacted the Czech UN Mission which put her in touch with PAVLIC, the Czech Cultural Attache in the Washington Embassy. PAVLIC was all for the idea, and will be here for the opening of the festival. Milos FORMAN (director of the film "Loves of a Blonde") is currently here at the Hotel Ch[illegible] (a "dump on 23rd on the West Side" -- LICOOKY/1's characterization) and will participate in the festival. KADAR (director of the "Shop on Main Street") has been invited to participate. LICOOKY/1 is going to ask PAVLIC whether it would be OK for her to ask DRV[illegible] who teaches film at Columbia and who is a Czech in exile, to participate. LICOOKY/1 is very enthusiastic about this venture.

5. COMMENT: Milos FORMAN is mentioned in the article about Czechoslovakia in the 5 April 1968 issue of Time Magazine.

HTW a/[illegible] 1.70 UNDA 3761 SECRET COPY

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET

6. I knew something was bothering LICOOKY/1 and made her drag it out into the open. She started by remarking that WOFIRM and its computer apparently checked the welfare of its old agents every so often, and that this was the nature of our relationship. I explained that this was not the case, that I had found out she was in Manhattan and suggested to Washington that LICOOKY/1 might be of some value to us. This surprised her, and she apologized. She then took off on how when she was in Cuba she had dealt with Fidel and Che and Celia, and when she was involved with Guatemala she was dealing with AREVALO. She said that she didn't want to sound snobbish, but that she was accustomed to dealing with top politicos and intellectuals; she referred to a statement that I had made previously that perhaps she could get Tana de GAMEZ to invite her along to one of Tana's lunches with Cuban Permanent Representative Ricardo ALARCON Quesada. She said that she didn't want WOFIRM to think that she would seek out and cultivate lower level people, that she wasn't built that way. LICOOKY/1 said that even though Tana was a friend and that she liked her, Tana was not her equal, and that Tana wasn't "on her pedestal". That ALARCON was certainly not in LICOOKY/1's intellectual category. LICOOKY/1 said that she considered herself as very flexible, but not that much. LICOOKY/1 is a "special person" and that WOFIRM bureaucracy -- with the exceptions of "Bill" (her Mexico case officer, a friend of the writer), C/WH/1 (with whom LICOOKY/1 is particularly taken), and the writer (LICOOKY/1 repeatedly assured me that she had a very sincere esteem for me) -- probably didn't understand or acknowledge this. LICOOKY/1 said her feelings for certain WOFIRMers were one thing, but her dislike of WOFIRM itself was something else. WOFIRM is a massive card index that shows Miguel Angel ASTURIAS as an old "Nicaraguan war-horse" -- ASTURIAS of course is Guatemalan. LICOOKY/1 couldn't stop liking Communists regardless of WOFIRM desires.

and

7. LICOOKY/1 went on and on in this/similar veins, very impassioned, but very straightforward and without personal rancor for the writer. Summing up, the stated reasons as to why she does not wish to continue regular collaboration with WOFIRM are as follows:

A. fear of compromise -- LICOOKY/1 said that were her relationship with us to become known, it would ruin her standing in and associations with the intellectual community;

B. distaste for WOFIRM -- LICOOKY/1 really believes that WOFIRM is a large card file with all the cards having errors on them;

SECRET

14-00000

C. intellectual honesty -- LICOOKY/1 does not think that her intellectual honesty gains from her WOFIRM relationship;

D. lack of understanding -- WOFIRM, except for the three officers cited above, does not really understand the real LICOOKY/1.

8. Obviously, the unsaid reasons are the ones that really brought about this "confrontation", in the writer's opinion. These are as follows:

A. emotional instability -- LICOOKY/1, as has been known for years by the writer, is not the most stable of individuals;

B. money -- LICOOKY/1 receives no money from us anymore (since her termination in Mexico), and the writer suspects that LICOOKY/1 could have more easily rationalized working for the "Giant Indices in Washington" were she on salary;

C. sex -- in this case, lack of same (LICOOKY/1 comes always to emotional involvement with her male associates, and her Case Officers cannot fulfill this need, thus giving rise to problems; in the past, LICOOKY/1 could easily obtain her physical/emotional fulfillment in Cuba and Mexico without relying on the Case Officer, but now she is getting older and quite shop-worn and cannot compete for attention from men in the environment of a place such as Manhattan);

D. discipline -- again, in this case, lack of same; LICOOKY/1 tell us what she does, we don't tell her what she should do.

9. LICOOKY/1 exhibited some anguish over this whole affair. She has been upset for the past month, over this as well as over the confused outlook for her in general. It was made very clear at one point what aid and comfort could have been extended to LICOOKY/1 to alleviate her anguish, and the writer beat a hasty retreat to the kitchenette for a tactical drink of water.

10. Not elaborated above were the writer's answers to LICOOKY/1's opinions, but these were effective in countering her logic, if not her attitudes. LICOOKY/1 had to agree that WOFIRM did have grounds for its assessment of her performance - not awfully good.

14-00000

11. At any rate, the entire proceedings were very amicable, and, as mentioned above, LICOOKY/1 stressed that her basic opposition to WOFIRM was not on personal grounds, as she had enjoyed her dealings with her "three favorite contacts". She offered to call the writer anytime she had something tangible to pass on, and that he should do the same. It's just that she would be more comfortable as an ex-agent than as a current one. The writer fully expects to hear from her from time to time.

12. It actually was quite an interesting session.

On aure

201-278841

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA	FROM: (Division) (Case officer) (Extension) DO/I/B-2 Lee Peterson 4008
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) LECOOKY/1	NAME SHOWN IS: TRUE [ ] PSEUDO [ ] CRYPT [X]
CI/OA NO.	201 NO. 201-278841
PROJECT	
DATE OF BIRTH 24 August 1927,	PLACE OF BIRTH Ponca, Oklahoma
AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD	IS ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED [ ]

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

Subject requested that her relationship with CIA be terminated.

DATE 29 April 1968	SIGNATURE Lee Ann Peterson

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (38)

14-00000

DISPATCH

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO Chief of Base, New York

FROM Chief, [illegible]

SUBJECT [illegible]

REFERENCE: [illegible]

For your information [illegible] does have a 201-file (201-829165). However, [illegible] in the file to identify her half-sister or her nephew [illegible], who claimed to have been recruited by [illegible].

Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 -COB, New York

21 MAR 1968

201-829165

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	[illegible]-2280	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-829165

1 - DO/RI
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:I.Peterson/mb		20 Mar 68	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	[illegible]	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		Walter L. O'Brien

53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

DISPATCH

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / XX ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, DO

INFO.:

FROM: Acting Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/LICOOKY - Tana de GAMEZ

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Per para 1 & 7

1. During a meeting with LICOOKY/1 on 7 March 1968, the agent passed on the following information which may be of interest to the appropriate Headquarters components. L/1 apologized for the lack of details, but the agent was not in a position to pump for further information beyond that which was volunteered.

2. On 7 March Tana de GAMEZ, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Spanish origin, said that she had been telephoned the night before by the son of her half-sister Mercedes (last name unknown to L/1), her nephew Roy. The latter is a college student somewhere in Connecticut (possibly the University of Connecticut), and his home is somewhere in Westchester County. Roy said that he was calling his Aunt Tana because he knew that she had worked for OSS during WWII; Tana rejoined that she had never had anything to do with OSS, that she had worked for the Office of War Information (OWI). At any rate, Roy said that he wanted to tell his Aunt Tana that he had been "recruited" by the CIA, and that he was only going to work for the CIA so as to evade the draft. Upon being questioned on this, Roy maintained that he had been "recruited" by the CIA on campus.

3. The nephew's statements rather rattled Tana de GAMEZ, to the point where she had to take her heart medicine for palpitations (she has a heart history). Among other things, Tana was upset by the thought of a family member being affiliated with the CIA, even though the nephew is disliked by her as an individual.

4. Tana de GAMEZ was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Havana Cultural Congress in January 1968. She is a well-known figure in the intellectual leftist set in New York, and is outspokenly pro-Castro. She is a member of the editorial board of Grove Press; is a published author herself; and is a close friend and associate of John GERASSI, formerly of Ramparts Magazine.

CS COPY FILED IN 201-829165

5. Tana de GAMEZ is the subject of a voluminous ~~file at the~~ LNERGO office here. LNERGO information, which agrees with Base information obtained from L/1, indicates that de GAMEZ is vocal but

/CONTINUED/ file in 201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDA-3650	11 March 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-27 88 41

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

harmless. She considers herself a loyal American, but does not find this to be incompatible with being a vigorous "New Left" type. She recently became the Latin American editor of Manhattan FM radio station WBAI, an interesting melange of bourgeois/avant-garde programming slanted toward the left, according to L/1.

6. Tana de GAMEZ is in frequent contact with Ambassador Ricardo ALARCON Quesada, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations; she also is in contact with Jose Raul VIERA Linares, DGI officer within the CMUN.

7. Tana de GAMEZ probably is the subject of a 201 file at Headquarters; if so, this dispatch should be cross-referenced to that file. If not, the Base suggests that de GAMEZ be indexed.

8. Re paragraph 2 above, L/1 agreed that what the nephew probably meant was that he had been interviewed on campus, and that this to him meant that he had been accepted for employment.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DO

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: UNDA-3502 dated 22 January 1968

A copy of Subject's PRQ I is being forwarded under separate cover as per request. There was not PRQ Part II in Subject's file.

J.T.L.

Jessica T. LABATT

Attachment: U/S/C
As stated.

Distribution:
2 - New York

CS COPY

01 FEB 1968

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDW-2149	
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

Internal Distribution:
1 - DO/I
1 - RI/AN,201-278841

HB

AN / PP / ABSTRACT / INDEX

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B2	Lee Peterson	sm (29 Jan. 68)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B2	30/1/68	John Markham

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B2		Walter L. O'Brien

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. MFG. 1-64 (40)

DISPATCH

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XXX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, DO

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: ISOLOG -- LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQ: Forward PRQ Parts I and II, per paragraph 3 below

REF: UNDW - 2013, 29 November 1967

1. Reference advised that a POA had been issued to LICOOKY/1 for Base contact to determine her access to targets of interest.

2. The undersigned met with LICOOKY/1 on 20 December 1967 and 4 January 1968 and it appears that she can and will be of operational service to us. Headquarters will be kept abreast of future operational developments as they unfold.

3. For purpose of our background knowledge here, we would appreciate receiving copies of LICOOKY/1's PRQ Part I and her most recent PRQ Part II. No other material from her voluminous 201 file is really needed here, as the undersigned is conversant with her case from Headquarters' days.

4. A new PRQ Part II will be compiled on her in the near future.

Howard G. FIGALAN

DISTRIBUTION:
2-DO

CS COPY

JAN 22 1968

201-278341

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	UNDA - 3502	19 January 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-278341

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Base, New York

INFO.

FROM: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

SUBJECT: ISOLOG/LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: UNDA-3303, 25 October 1967

1. A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context. In issuing the POA, WOMUSE made the following comments:

a. In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with WOFIRM has been widely blown through broad publicity.

b. It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

c. The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

2. Please forward PRQ Part II.

J.T.L.

Jessica T. LABATT

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - COB, New York

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UNDW-2013	29 NOV 1967
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

1 - DO/I
1 - RID/AN

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
DO/I/B-2:	LPeterson	/mb (27 Nov 1967)	4008

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
DO/I/B-2	27/11/67	[signature]

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/DO/I/B-2		Walter L. O'Brien

ANC/1/28 DO/1/B2

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

SECRET

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DO/I/WH - L. A. Peterson	NUMBER: 201 - 278841
	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1
	REFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Dated 3 August 1967 cy

A Provisional Operational Approval is granted for the use of this Subject as set forth below.

A Provisional Operational Approval issued by CI Staff grants the same authority, on a temporary basis, for the use of an individual as the authority granted in an Operational Approval unless otherwise specified by CI/OA. It is based, however, only on preliminary file checks and investigation and is subject to a further final review when all investigation is completed.

A POA is issued for contact with Subject to explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.

In dealing with this Subject it should be recalled that her past association with CIA has been widely blown through broad publicity.

It is recommended that Subject be handled by a strong, mature case officer who can and will avoid emotional involvement with the Subject.

The case officer should be fully briefed on Subject's background and her emotional and sexual problems. Worthy of particular note is her involvement with John Rettie, BBC correspondent in Mexico and an MI - 6 agent whom the Soviets tried to compromise while he was serving a tour in Moscow.

Please forward PRQ Part II.

To process the Operational Approval, full information (completed PRQ Parts I and II) must be submitted as soon as possible and not later than six (6) months from this date. An Operational Approval will follow when all investigation is completed and upon the receipt of satisfactory PRQ Parts I and II. Cancellation must be requested if use of Subject by interested Divisions ceases.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

APPROVAL	
BY	DATE
CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION	13 November 1967

FORM 8-65 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (9)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING; XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED; ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING; MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: ISOLOG--LICOCKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES: A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOCKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: we understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOCKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard G. PIGALAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

201-278841

OCT 25 1967

CROSS REFERENCE TO: GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UKDA-3303

DATE: 24 October 1967

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

SECRET

8 November 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : DO/I

SUBJECT : LICOOKY 1 (201-278841)

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 27 October 1967

1. The following summaries indicate no derogatory information on Subject.

2. New York report dated 12/29/59 captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba" furnished CIA 1/8/60. This report stated that June Cobb translated pamphlets as part of her job for Fidel Castro with the idea of familiarizing the American people with Castro's writing. June Cobb believes Castro is doing a tremendous job in reconstructing the economy of Cuba. However, she stated that in her opinion it is unthinkable that Communism would ever be embraced by Castro or the people of Cuba. There seems to be no particular significance to this report as this information was previously known by the Agency.

3. Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba". Bernie Brennan asked June Cobb to deliver some information to Juan Orta who stated that Brennan was not needed anymore. Cobb thought Brennan might have been attempting to obtain a position with the Cuban Tourist Commission. The Agency has no further interest in Brennan. Therefore, there is no significance attached to the report.

4. Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS - Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62 was merely interview with Stuart. There is no significance attached to this report.

SECRET

5. Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart" (CSI 316/00789-64). June Cobb interviewed re Lyle Stuart. Lyle Stuart attempted to get close to Fidel Castro for the purpose of exploiting the journalistic advantages of an interview. Therefore, there is no significance attached to this report considering that it was merely an interview.

Lee Ann Peterson

201-257[illegible]
SEX F DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC TRANSLATOR
BIO DATA ON PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

UFG -[illegible]
23 APR
P5

COBB, JUNE

SEX F DOB ?

CIT USA
OCC ?

053-009-008
DBA -15934
11 JUL 62
P2

SINCE SEP, 59, SHE HAS BEEN EMPLOYED IN OFFICE OF FIDEL CASTRO, PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA. MISS COBB WAS IN NEW YORK CITY FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT INTENDED TO RETURN TO CUBA ON DEC 3, 1959.

COBB, Viola June

U.S. citizen

DAR-SOLO
10 Feb 62

Translator of "The Shark & the Sardines" - pro-Castro - expelled from Guatemala for political activities (Nov 61) employee, Exec Office of Prime Minister (June 61)

(List of Persons connected with Intel, Subversive & Sabotage Activities in behalf of Cuban Govt as reflected in working files of CI Branch, Security Div ACSI on 10 Feb 62)

[illegible] ... New York City ... New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO. (additional info [illegible]) — [illegible] 8 Jan 6[illegible]

[illegible] ... "The [illegible] of the Shark & Sardines" ... [illegible] ... according to [illegible]. — [illegible] 9 Nov 61
([illegible] 1 Dec 61 file [illegible])

COBB, June — [illegible] — CUBA

[illegible] ... Fidel CASTRO ... former girl friend of CASTRO, as one of the most fanatical ... of the ... according to [illegible] ... everything CASTRO did and ... State Dept policy on Cuba.

[illegible] ... New York City ... [illegible]

Cards from Cuban Desk
16/8/6?

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 27 October 1967 cy
TO: DO/I/WH - F. Toth	C NO. 201 - 275341
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: COBB, Viola June

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: FIRST | SECOND | THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

What is the status of this case? Please see our 889 of 27 September 1967. If DO is no longer interested, please advise so CI/OA can close its file on the Subject.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

	MARKED FOR INDEXING
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED
	ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
	MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Domestic Operations Division

INFO.: Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Base, New York

SUBJECT: ISOLOG--LICOOKY/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As stated

REFERENCES: A) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219
B) DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264
C) DIRECTOR 30635

1. Please advise the status of processing for the reinstatement of the clearance on LICOOKY/1, whom the Base is interested in contacting for the purpose of assessing her access to targets and information of Latin American ops interest.

2. FYI: We understood from C/WH/1 during his visit here some two months ago that LICOOKY/1 in his opinion still had mileage for our purposes here.

Howard G. FIGLAN

Distribution:
2-C/DO
2-C/WH

CS COPY

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification	UNDA-3303	24 October 1967
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	201-

OCT 25 1967

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 27 September 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Frank Toth	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/O DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/O COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	PI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: FIRST SECOND THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In addition to the requested traces, an evaluation and statement of the significance as to the proposed use of Subject, is needed on the following FBI references:

(1) New York report dated 12/29/59, captioned "June COBB - Registration Act-Cuba", furnished CIA 1/8/60.

(2) Letter to Director, FBI, from CIA dated 11/7/60 captioned "June COBB - Internal Security - Cuba".

(3) Washington report dated 4/26/62 captioned "Lyle Stuart - IS-Cuba; SM-C; RA-Cuba", furnished to CIA 5/4/62.

(4) Letter from CIA to Director, FBI, dated 8/19/64 captioned "Lyle Stuart". (CSI 316/00789-64).

CI/OA has no information indicating that these references have previously been reviewed; it appears that all others have.

CI/OA is otherwise prepared to take action on your request for a POA/OA on Subject.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 5 September 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - ~~Doris LaBaron~~ Lee Peterson/Frank Toth	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

CI/OA has received, through the Office of Security, a new and rather lengthly list of references to the Subject from the FBI. It appears that some of these references have previously been available to us and some have not. The CI/OA file on Subject also contains a long list of previous references to the Subject.

It is requested that someone from DO/I/WH discuss this case with an officer of CI/OA so that the course of required action can be determined.

This discussed in NYC between Kaufman & Brane. Latter told Dummer or Pavin that an occasional contact would be OK but not to put her up on a regular contact basis. Could do an occasional job but no more.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

ORIG: L. PETERSON
UNIT: DO/I
EXT: 6762
DATE: 24 AUG 67

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY
1 WH

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 24 PER ____ #
CONF: DO-4 [X] RID COPY

[ ] INDEX [ ] DESTROY [ ] RETURN TO ____ BRANCH [ ] FILE RID
[X] NO INDEX [X] FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841
INFO: FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, WH-8

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

25 13 57 Z

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK

30635

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264

WOMUSE AWAITING LNERGO CHECKS ON LICOOKY/1 AND ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEWING CASE ~~XXXXXXX~~ DUE TO FACT SUBJECT TERMINATED BY DYVOUR AS RESULT MAY 1966 PRESS EXPOSURE IN MEXICO CITY RE CONNECTION WOFACT.

END OF MESSAGE

EUGENE F. O'MEARA
C/DO/OP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

for FRANK A. TOTH
DO/I
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 15

SECRET

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2

ACTION
D 64 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/ICZ, SECUR 4

S E C R E T 221933Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3264 (KLUTAS ACTING) 22 AUG 67 IN 36824

NYOC

DIRECTOR

ISOLOG

REF: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219 (IN-23383)

AN 7	~~PT~~	
~~PS~~	~~DEST~~	DO/F
ABSTRACT X	~~INDEX~~	

PLEASE ADVISE STATUS OF PROCESSING FOR REINSTATEMENT OF LICOOKY ONE CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

22 Aug 67
201-278841

14-00000

S E C R E T

DATE 21 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION : John Howard

SUBJECT : LICOOKY/1

REFERENCE : Form 889 dated 18 August 1967

Field ___ RID xxx Division x traces have been completed on Subject with the results indicated below:

REFERENCE(S)	COMMENTS
RID	NDI
Division	
WH/Mexico	NDI
WH/Cuba	NDI
WH/Ecuador	NR
WH/Guatemala	NR
WH/Colombia	NR
Green List #182786	No new information which would change the status of LICOOKY/1's case.

Lee Ann Peterson
DO I/WH

S E C R E T

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) June Viola Cobb

FROM: John Howard

EXTENSION:

NO. 278841

DATE 18 Aug 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Frank A. Toth			lap	To 1: In accordance with the requirements of CSI No. 10-7, Para. 4 C, dated 23 June 1961, please review the attachments or dossier on Subject at FI/D and advise CI/OA in writing as to the significance of the information and your opinion as to its effect on the use of Subject in the operational capacity requested.
2. DO/1/WH				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)	REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 182786
C O B B, Viola June e1/04 201-278841	DATE 3 Aug 67
2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, ETC NUMBERS, ETC. Aka June COBB Aka Clarinda E. SHARP	TO CHIEF, FI/D
3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 24 Aug 27; Ponca, Oklahoma	ORIGINATING OFFICER NAME Lee Ann Peterson OFFICE DESIGNATOR DO/I/WH ROOM, BUILDING 1H 19 EXTENSION 6762
4. CITIZENSHIP USA	
5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION Residing in New York since Jul 65.	13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE) ☐ FIRST TIME SUBMITTED ☐ ADDITIONAL DATA ☒ RECHECK FOR CURRENT
6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION	14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE) ☐ ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY ☒ OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE ☐ OTHER

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Has been active in Fair Play for Cuba Committee		

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION	(HEIGHT)	(WEIGHT)	(EYES)	(HAIR)	(RACE)	(OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)

Any information except basic biographic and/or occupational data since previous Green List, No 125246, dated 5 Sep 62.

Aug 17 '67

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (9)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Lee Ann Peterson

16 Aug 67
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. [ ] SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. [ ] A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. [ ] WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. [XXXX] FI/D HAS NO ~~XXXXXXX~~ INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. * Except IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. [ ] THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

* PREvious green list requests from WH/3/M, 5 Sept 62, op., GL#125246 and from WH/4, 9 June 60, op., GL#101924 & GL#101066

--- NOTE:

1. State, To Havana, Dsp. A-348, 24 June 60, CONFIDENTIAL
2. State, Guatemala, Dsp. #257, 14 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED.
3. Associated Press, 9 Nov 61, UNCLASSIFIED (gist).
4. Washington Post, Parade, 12 Aug 62, p. 12, UNCLASSIFIED

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE: 18 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF'S DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF'S COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
XX	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent results 21/8/67

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 4 August 1967 jab
TO: DO/I/WH - Lee Ann Peterson	C NO. 201 - 278841
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LICOOKY/1

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

XX	PRQ I CURRENT (OLD IN FILE)		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
XX	PRQ II CURRENT AFTER ASSESSMENT (old in file)		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

sent PRQ I 10 AUG 1967

FORM 6-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

14-00000

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRQ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly.
2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA"
3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed

DISPATCH NO.

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First) Viola (Middle) June (Last) Cobb (Nee)

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.)

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

Clarinda E. Sharp - for Guatemalan friends to write her and for correspondence with Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

5. DATE OF BIRTH August 24, 1927

6. PLACE OF BIRTH Ponca City, Oklahoma

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

Very seldom drinks liquor. Does not gamble. Does not use drugs. Has had numerous affairs.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
M [ ] F [X]	40		FT. 5 IN. 6	128	fair	oval

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
blonde	bl[illegible]e	regular	tall	erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Scar over left clavicle.

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS IF OBTAINABLE

14-00000

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP: US	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.): NA
12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant): New York City, New York	
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.)	
14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED	
15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes): Mexico - 1947 - 48 original purpose to study. 1949 - Ecuador with fiance. 1951 - Colombia with fiance. 1952 - Colombia with fiance. 19 - Colombia. 1954 - Mexico. 1955 - Cuba. 1956 - Colombia, Cuba with fiance. 1959 - Cuba to work with Cuban govt. 1961 - Mexico and Guatemala. 1961-65 Mexico	

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION	17. TITLE	18. SALARY (Per annum)
19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property)		

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS
20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS	
21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS	

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
McKinley Grade School		1933	1939	Diploma
Ponca City Junior High		1939	1942	Diploma
Ponca City Senior High Ponca City, Oklahoma		1942	1944	Diploma
University of Oklahoma	Liberal Arts	1944	1946	None

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish (fluent)	X		X		X		X	
French (limited)	X		X		X		X	

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SECTION VI — **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS**

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES. ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES.

Only literary output in book form bearing her name is English translation of "The Shark and the Sardines" by J. J. Arevalo, published by Lyle Stuart 1961.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Has experience at radio announcing, programming, and radio control operating. (WNAD and WBBZ in Oklahoma.)

SECTION VII — **MILITARY SERVICE**

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Adjutant of the Civil Air Patrol squadron of Norman Oklahoma. Her commission was Second Class Lieutenant. During wartime the CAP was auxiliary of the Armed Air Forces.

SECTION VIII — **EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

No.	a. Inclusive Dates (From-To)	b. Employer	c. Address	d. Type of Work	e. Salary or Earnings	f. Reason for Leaving
26	1961 - 1966	WOFACT	Mexico	Contract Agent	$ per	Terminated July 1966 and returned to New York
27	1959 - 1960	Prime Minister, Cuban Govt.	Havana, Cuba	In charge of Eng. publications	$300 per month	Return to U.S.
28	1957 - 1958	MD Medical Newsmagazine	30 East 60th, New York City	Asst. to Managing Editor	85 per week	Intended to go to Europe
29	195? - 53	Dr. I. Snapper	Mount Sinai Hosp, NYC Cook County Hospital, Chicago, Ill.	Secretarial & Edit.	$ per	To join her fiance's sister
30	1947 - 48	Southeastern Oil de Mexico SA de CV	Paseo de la Reforma #1 Mexico, D. F.	Public relations	$ 100 per month	To return to U.S.

1946 - Ponca City News - Ponca City, Oklahoma - Staff writer - Left to go to Mexico

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS					
31. CHECK ONE	X SINGLE	MARRIED	WIDOWED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

NA

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE (First) (Middle) (Nee) (Last)	
NA	
34. DATE OF MARRIAGE NA	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE
36. DATE OF BIRTH	37. PLACE OF BIRTH
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS
40. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Last residence, if deceased)	

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
NA					

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

NA

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
Jasper E. Cobb	circa 1897	Missouri	US

45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE
NA	Retired Engineer	71? N. Sunset, Ponca City, Okla.

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
Jessie Lois Sharp	circa 1895	Illinois	US

52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE
NA	housewife	deceased

14-00000

SECTION XIII	BROTHERS AND SISTERS				
FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
Jasper E. Cobb	X		circa 1923	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US
Arthur Tom Cobb	X		circa 1925	Ponca City, Oklahoma	US

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY BROTHER OR SISTER (*Identify brother, or sister and give his, or her, present address*)

NA

SECTION XIV — RELATIVES, ACQUAINTANCES AND CONTACTS

55. NAMES OF RELATIVES IN ANY GOVERNMENT SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF GOVERNMENT ...

56. RELATIVES, FRIENDS, CORRESPONDENTS IN U.S. (*Explain relationship*)

57. NATURALIZATION OF CLOSE RELATIVES IN U.S. (*Give name, date, city and number of certificate granted*)

Jasper E. Cobb - Father

58. NAMES, ALIASES, TELECODES AND RELATIONSHIP OF ALL PERSONS KNOWN TO BE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH ANY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

Janet Fost

SECTION XV — PERSONAL ASSOCIATIONS

59. LIST CLOSE ASSOCIATES, INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

SECTION XVI — MISCELLANEOUS

DATE	SIGNATURE
9 August 1967	

14-00000

SECRET Att. No. 17 to UFGA 19939

SUBJECT: COBB, June

1. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

a. DPOB: c. 1930, Somewhere in US. US citizen.

b. OCCUPATION: Helping a fnu PELLICER, write a book on Anti-Communism.

c. ADDRESS: Somewhere in Mexico City, DF.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Around June or July of 1959, AMDOFF/1 was ordered by Celia SANCHEZ to pay the Habana hospital bill of an American named June COBB. The bill, which A/1 recalls, [illegible] $2,000.00 plus Habana Hilton Hotel expenses, were paid out of the PM's office account. A/1 believes that Miss COBB became acquainted with Fidel and Sanchez on their US trip of April-May 1959, but ignores the details. Sanchez instructed A/1 to employ Miss COBB in the press section of the PM's office: She was responsible with seeing all American and English speaking newsmen who desired to interview Castro or requested permits to visit the interior of the island. She also helped to translate Fidel's important speeches into English. It is A/1's understanding that she had no other duties or responsibilities. She never dealt with Castro directly, but through Maria WITOSKA, who was Sanchez's laison with the PM's office. A/1 states that their relationship was limited to her official function. She appeared to have a newspaper background, but A/1 ignores the details.

b. About late 1959 Miss COBB, together with Jose PUENTE Blanco, then FEU (Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria) president of the University of Habana, in conjunction with the INIT (Instituto Nacional de Industrias Turisticas), took over a finca (formerly owned by Batista) near Ceiba del Agua, Habana, and set up a boarding house to be used by American students visiting Cuba as guests of the government. A/1 ignores the details of this operation.

c. By mid 1960 A/1 learned that Miss COBB had left for New York City. She never returned. A/1 claims he does not know why she made this decision.

d. When A/1 arrived in Mexico in late October 1964, he came to know an American writer, Daniel JAMES (address: Vicente Gomez #145, Mexico City, DF. tel 40-19-71). James told A/1 that Miss COBB had recently been deported from Guatemala and was living in Mexico City. Later, A/1 met Miss COBB accidently at the Mexican Ministerio de Gobernacion offices. She was very friendly and said she was helping a fnu PELLICAR (believed by A/1 to be a Guatemalan) to write a book describing his defection from Communism. She wanted A/1 to help Pellicer with reference material on the Marcos RODRIGUEZ trial. She gave A/1 her address, but for various reasons he said he tore up the slip

SECRET COPY

23 Jul 65

17 UFGA 19939 201-152634

14-00000

A/1 claims he did not want to be associated with her while his political position is still under investigation and further, he did not want his wife to find any feminine references on his person when she arrived. He has not seen Miss COBB again.

e. (It should be pointed out that A/1 did not include her name on the original roster of the personnel of the PM's office. He remembered her participation when directed a special series of questions (requested by Dave in Mexico City in late Nov 64) on the activities of US news and public relations media.

3. JMWAVE traces:

a. COBB, June: Soviet officials informed the Cubans that Subject who acted as an interpreter for Fidel Castro was an FBI agent (201-287019, HVCA-08569; 01 Sept 61)

b. COBB, June: Since sept, 59, she has been employed in the office of Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba. Miss Cobb was in New York City for Medical treatment intended to return to Cuba on December 3, 1959 (053-003-008; DBA 15994; 11 Jul 62; P2)

c. COBB, June: Expected leave Hava on afternoon 3 June 60 by National airlines for NY. Requesting FBI not impede her activities (OUT 81006 to FBI; 31 May 60)

d. COBB, June: DPOB Jun 1927, Ponca, Calif., USA. Former Add" 1192 Park Ave, New York City; 220 E. 52nd St., New York City. A great admirer of CASTRO (Additional info to the DBF of the same date (DBF 40107; 8 Jan 60)

e. COBB, June: Subj, who translated AREVALO's "The Fable of the Shark and Sardines" was deported on 9 Nov 61 by Guatemalan police, according to news broadcasts (Also see DBF 95411, 1 Dec 61, File 100-9-14) (HAVA, FBIS; 9 Nov 61)

201-152634

14-00000

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation.

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/

PROPER FILE NO

TO: ALL ADDRESSEES

FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

FEB 1965

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1.	26	Feb 65			Copy detached
2. WH/C/MO	FEB 1965				
3. WH/C/CA/PP					
4. WH/C/FI					
5.					
6. WH/C/RR					
7. RR/RC					
8. WH/C/RR/OS					
9.					
10. RI/AN					
11.					
12.					
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14.					
15.					
16.					
17. RID/FI					

Each attachment should be filed under its own 201 number, leaving in the 201-152634 file only the cover sheet and any attachments without 201.

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE)

201-152634

ABSTRACT

INDEX

REQUEST

DOCUMENT DATE

DOCUMENT NUMBER

DATE MICROFILMED

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: XXX

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO: COS, Mexico; Chief, WH

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC
Debriefing of AMDOFF/1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None - FYI

References: UFGA -18898

1. Forwarded herewith are biographic data sheets based on information provided by AMDOFF/1 during his debriefing by AMBLINK/1 and Edwin M. [illegible] in Mexico City.

2. Data on additional personalities of interest to ODYOKE and KUBARK known to AMDOFF/1 will be forwarded as they become available in the future.

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

Attachments:
1 - 71 (a/s) (h/w)

Distribution:
3 - DC, WH/SA w/att
1 - COS, Mexico w/att
1 - Chief, WH w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO: [illegible] COPY

DATE TYPED: 18 Feb 65

DATE DISPATCHED: FEB 23 1965

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-19939

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 201-152634

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

SECRET

8 August 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: CI/OA

FROM : Lee Ann Peterson, DO/I/WH

SUBJECT : Viola June Cobb

There does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on Subject. DCS has no interest in Subject.

Lee Ann Peterson

Lee Ann Peterson:DO/I:sm: (8 Aug. 67)

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - DO/I/WH
1 - DO/I/Chrono

SECRET

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Viola June COBB, CDS Case 48248, and B 67-166

FROM: Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

EXTENSION: 6762
NO.
DATE: 3 August 1967

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DO/DCSL Attn: Jon Sucher 910 Key Bldg.	4 AUG 1967	4 AUG 1967	CA	4 Aug '67 1-6: As per our telecon, there does not appear to be anything new or derogatory in DCS files on this gal. The opinion here is that she is nothing but trouble, as you mentioned. Let me know if anything else is needed here. COT
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6. DO/I/WH (Mr Toth) Attn: Lee Peterson 1H 19 Hqs.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SPEED LETTER	REPLY REQUESTED		DATE 3 August 1967
	XX YES	NO	LETTER NO. 0039

TO : DO/DCSL
ATTN: Jon Sucher

FROM: Lee Ann Peterson
DO/I/WH
1H 19

Re: COBB, Viola June (aka June COBB)

1. Subject is of interest to DO Base/New York as a source of information on Latin American and Cuban activities. According to our records, Subject has been in contact with the New York office of DCS.

2. Attached for your information is pertinent correspondence on Subject. We would appreciate knowing Subject's current residence and employment, in addition to any derogatory information DCS may have in their files, since her arrival in the U. S. (July 1966). A POA is in process for our proposed use and we would appreciate an expedite on this request.

for Lee Ann Peterson
SIGNATURE

REPLY | DATE

SIGNATURE

RETURN TO ORIGINATOR

FORM 8-61 1831

SECRET

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 3 August 1967

TO:
- XX CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Lee Ann Peterson, DO/I/WH, 1H 19

SUBJECT: (True name) C O B B, Viola June

PROJECT:

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: Aka June COBB; Clarinda E. SHARP (A); LICOOKY/1; Joyce H. PIMFINCH (P)

CI/OA FILE NO.: C83492

RI 201 FILE NO.: 278841

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

USA

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE

POA is requested to contact Subject and explore her access to targets and information of operational interest in the Latin American and possibly Cuban context.
Coordination with DCS will be effected.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?		X
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT. No US Govt interest

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? XX YES / NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

XX	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED		PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	XX	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 182786

6. RI TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD	XX	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES (current)

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.		DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
X	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)* No foreign travel since previous OA		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Lee Ann Peterson

EXTENSION: 6762

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: FRANK A. TOTH, DO/I/WH

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PRQ PART I (EQUIVALENT)

NAME: C O B B, Viola June
Aka June COBB; Clarinda E. SHARP

DPOB: 24 August 1927; Ponca, Oklahoma

CITIZENSHIP: USA

OID: Subject returned to New York from Mexico City in July 1966 to look for a job. She recently came to our attention through the FBI/New York field office when the latter contacted our New York Base to inquire of her present residence. Subject is presently in contact with the DCS/New York field office, from whom we shall attempt to ascertain her present residence and employment.

SECRET

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SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE: 3 Aug 1967

FROM: Name: Lee Ann Peterson | OFFICE: DO/I/WH | ROOM: 1H 19 | PHONE: 6885 | TUBE ADDRESS:

1. TYPE ACTION: OPEN / AMEND X / CLOSE
2. FILE RESTRICTED: YES / NO X
3. PERMANENT CHARGE: YES X / NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): COBB, Viola June

5. 201 NO.: 278841

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
A	COBB,	June	
A	SHARP,	Clarinda	E.

7. SEX: F X
8. DATE OF BIRTH: 24 Aug 27
9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH:
10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH: OKLA, Ponca
11. CITIZENSHIP:
12. OCCUPATION (clear text): OCC. CODE:
13. SWL:
14. OI CODE:
15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER: NYDO-3219 DATE: 1 Aug 67
16. RESIDENCE: USA, N.Y.
17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards):

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION: USA/N.Y. CODE: 432
19. ACTION DESK: DO/I/WH CODE: 778
20. SECONDARY DESK: CODE:
21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES: UND
22. CRYPTONYM:

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER: Lee Ann Peterson

201 NO.: 278841

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(38-51)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 2 TOTAL COPIES

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM 3C

ACTION

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, WH8, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI.

S E C R E T 012214Z CITE DO BASE/NEW YORK 3219

1 Aug 67 IN 23383

DIRECTOR
ISOLOG

REF: DIRECTOR 15147

BASE DESIROUS OF CONTACTING LICOOKY/1, SUBJ REF, TO EXPLORE HER ACCESS TO TARGETS AND INFO OF OPS INTEREST. BELIEVE SHE COULD BE OF VALUE IN LATIN AMERICAN, AND HOPEFULLY CUBAN, CONTEXT. WOULD APPRECIATE REINSTATEMENT OF APPROPRIATE CLEARANCE. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

ABSTRACT X — DO/I

1 aug 67
201-278841

14-00000

C. TRETTIN:jaf
WH/COG/CICS
5106
XXXXXXXXX 26 JUNE 67

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY:
1
2 MO
3 RR
4
5 FI
6 RS

SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

INDEX | DESTROY | RETURN TO ___ BRANCH | FILE RID
NO INDEX | FILE IN CS FILE NO.

30 PER ___

WH/COG8 | RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR WH8, DO4, CI/OPS, CI/CA,

SECRET
(classification) (date and time filed) (elliptical reference number) (pica)

28 18 39Z

CITE DIRECTOR 15147

TO DO BASE/NEW YORK

TYPIC

REFERENCE: DO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

JUNE COBB IS FORMER WOFACT AGENT RESIDING NEW YORK CITY. HQS HAD GIVEN NAME AND CLEARANCE TO CONTACT COBB IN CONJUNCTION WITH INVESTIGATION LNERGO CONDUCTING. MATTER HANDLED THROUGH WODISH OFFICE. SUGGEST TO LNERGO THEY CONTACT NEW YORK WODISH OFFICE FOR CURRENT ADDRESS OF JUNE COBB WHO HAS BEEN ALREADY ALERTED TO LNERGO DESIRE CONTACT HER.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/COG/CICS
DO/WH

C/DO/OP
EUGENE F. O'MEARA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

201-278847

14-00000

DISSEM: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

FROM:

ACTION: WH/COG8

INFO: FILE, VR, WH8, DO4, CI/OPS, FI

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 28

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NYDO

S E C R E T 232159Z CITE DDO BASE/NEW YORK 3108

23 JUN 67 IN 97218

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

NEWYORK LNERGO WISHES INTERVIEW JUNE COBB, NEW YORK RESIDENT, DESCRIBED AS FORMER CASTRO PARAMOUR WITH WHOM THEY IN CONTACT APPROX SIX YEARS AGO. LNERGO STATES INFORMED BY WOFACT HEADQUARTERS THAT WOFACT HAD INTERVIEWED MORE RECENTLY, BUT NO MEANS OF CONTACT SPECIFIED. PLS ADVISE IF CURRENT ADDRESS AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

BT

Pls handle as desired

ABSTRACT X

201-278841
23 June 1967

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

ORTIZ, John

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf	6835	2349
		DATE 19 May 67

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/WH/COG/CIS		22/5/67		
2. WH/1/MEXICO				
3. CI/IPS/WH CI/LIAISON 2C-35	26 MAY 1967			
4.				Hand deliver pl.
5. RI/AN				
6. RID/MIS			8S	
7. RID/PS				26 MAY 1967
8.				
9.				AN / FI; PS / DEST; ABSTRACT X / INDEX
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				201-278841

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

26 MAY 1967

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director For Plans

SUBJECT: John ORTIZ
INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

MICROFILMED
JUN 15 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Reference is made to your informal request dated April 26, 1967, file: (LA) 105-155206, subject as above and to this Office's CSCI 316/01366-66 dated 25 March 1966.

2. This is to advise you that this Office no longer has contact with the source who originally furnished the information concerning Estelle SOKOLOWSKA de MADRIGAL in March 1966. Source is currently residing in the United States, New York City, and we have no objection to your contacting the source and debriefing her concerning any questions you may have concerning this case. Source has been alerted to the fact that you might contact her regarding this matter. Source is Viola June COBB, usually referred to as June COBB, who is mentioned in your informal memorandum to this office dated June 1, 1964, Subject: Lyle Stuart.

3. We would appreciate being apprised of any new information concerning the SOKOLOWSKA case that is surfaced as a result of your debriefing COBB.

CSCI-316/02389-67

19 May 1967

DDP/WH/COG/CICS/E. Ayers:jaf

File: 201-278841
201-794302

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - RID
1 - CI/LIA
1 - CI/R&A
1 - WH/COG/CICS
1 - WH/1/Mexico
1 - DCS (Mr. Musulin via telephone)
1 - Originator

CS COPY

B-201-794302

201-278841

SECRET

14-00000

15 Apr 1967

April 18, June Cobb called the New York DODS office about what to do about her CIA salary on her income tax return.

After discussions with OF/CAAS and George Powell of the Tax Committee, I phoned Mr. Museliz x2268 DODS to telll Cobb the following:

> Since she was supposedly a student in Mexico, ~~xkx~~ and she had paid tax on her CIA salary, she was not to list her salary anywhere on her 1966 tax return. However, she should send us a copy of her overt 1966 tax return.

charlotte Bustos-Videla

SECRET

11 October 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

VIA : WH/Personnel, Attention: Mr. Renehan

SUBJECT : Joyce C. PINEINCH (201-278841)

1. Subject has been terminated effective 1 July 1966 by the Mexico City Station. She was paid her salary through 30 June and was given her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 through 30 June 1966. A copy of the termination secrecy oath, signed in true name, is on file in Subject's official 201 file.

2. It is requested that the CPD and Office of Finance files be altered to reflect the termination of Subject.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Contract Personnel
cc - WH/Personnel
cc - WH/1 Chrono
cc - PINEINCH file (201-278841)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

201-278841

SECRET

22 AUG 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Igor Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was cleared CIA agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Daniel James who was described as being responsible to CIA.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York CIA office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to

SECRET

201-278841

liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

Suggested Action:

4. WH Division suggests that you may wish to forward a copy of this memorandum to your New York office. If Miss Cobb does establish contact, we would appreciate your office interviewing her to accept whatever information she might wish to contribute, but that no financial commitments be made on our behalf. WH Division plans to have no direct contact unless the information provided would appear to merit a special interview.

(Signed) Jacob D. [illegible]

William V. Broe
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Distribution:
0 & 1 - DO/WH
cc - D/DCS
cc - LICOOKY-1 201-
cc - WH/1/Memo Chrono

14-00000

SECRET

12 August 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Domestic Operations/WH

: Director, Domestic Contacts Service

SUBJECT : Miss Viola June Cobb, born 24 August 1927, Ponca, Oklahoma

Background:

1. On 22 or 23 September 1965 Miss June Cobb contacted the New York Domestic Contacts Office through Tour Gordevitch of the Vision Magazine, trying to establish contact in New York with CIA to pass along some information. WH/1 chose not to establish contact with Miss Cobb at that time, even though she was a cleared WOFACT agent in contact with the Mexico City Station.

Recent Developments:

2. Miss Cobb was terminated effective 1 July 1966 and was paid her salary through 30 June and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement and signed a Termination Secrecy Oath. Although she was terminated for lack of access and production, there was also considerable newspaper publicity in May 1966 in the Mexico City newspapers wherein Subject was attacked because of her connection with an anti-Communist meeting, the Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. In this publicity Subject was labeled as being closely connected with U. S. Government Police, and also as an agent of the FBI and INTERPOL. She was also accused of working for a newspaperman Denial James who was described as being responsible to WOFACT.

3. Miss Cobb planned to return to New York in July where she was to look for a job. Subject had been told previously by the Mexico City Station that the telephone number of the New York WOFACT office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States, but that she should only establish contact for an important or urgent matter. Since Miss Cobb tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, WH Division believes there is a possibility she may try to establish contact.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

201-278841

14-00000

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William V. Broe
C/WHD

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Domestic Operations/WH
1 - Director, Domestic Contacts Service
(1) - LICOOKY-201-
1 - WH/1/Memo Chrono

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION

TO: CHIEF, CI/OA		FROM: (Division) WHD	(Case officer) C. Bustos	(Extension) 3654
SUBJECT'S NAME (Pseudo, crypt or true may be used) LICOOKY-1		NAME SHOWN IS: TRUE / PSEUDO / X CRYPT		
CI/OA NO.	201 NO. 201-278841	PROJECT LICOOKY		
DATE OF BIRTH 24/8/27	PLACE OF BIRTH Ponca, Okla, USA	AGENT'S SERVICE RECORD: IS ATTACHED / WILL BE FORWARDED / will not be forwarded		

REASON(S) FOR CANCELLATION

LICOOKY-1 was terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was on 23 June, she was paid salary through June, and she was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement.

In view of subject's personality, and the broad publicity in mid-1966 (see 201 file) of accusations that Subject was connected with U.S. intelli ence in Mexico, any use of Subject should be made only after careful consideration.

See copy of HMMA 29461, Mexico City Station termination report, attached.

DATE: [handwritten, illegible]

SIGNATURE: [signature]

IF SUBJECT IS USED IN ANY CAPACITY, A NEW REQUEST FOR APPROVAL WILL BE SUBMITTED TO CI/OA

FORM 2-58 937 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

(38)

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LICOOKY Project
Termination of LICOOKY-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

1. Attached herewith is the LILINK report on the termination of LICOOKY-1. This report was received from LILINK on 24 June 1966.

2. Forwarded under separate cover are two copies of the Secrecy and Termination agreement signed by LICOOKY-1, in true name, on 23 June 1966.

3. At the time of termination, LICOOKY-1 was given (1) salary for [illegible], (2) [illegible] from Mexico City to New York, and (3) Federal Tax refund amounting to 9,005.00 MN. The household items in her possession at the time of termination, which belonged to the Station, were sold to her for US $300.00.

4. It should be noted that although LICOOKY-1 claims she intends to remain in the United States, she retained her apartment, which was turned over to a rental agency for sub-renting. The Station believes that she intends to return within the next several months or so should it develop that she cannot find suitable work in the New York area. Should she do so on her own it may be that the Station would want to make occasional use of her, and for that purpose a post office box to which she can write to initiate contact was given her prior to departure.

(CONTINUED)

Attachment:
A. U/W LILINK Report
B. U.S.C. 2 cys Secrecy Agreement

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WH w/atts

14 July 66

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
201-278841	HMMA-29461	14 July 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~50-6-120~~/1

201-278841

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	S E C R E T	HMMA-29461

5. Headquarters will be advised should the Statios have additional contact with her.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

SECRET

TERMINATION SECRECY OATH

I, June Cobb, am about to terminate my association with the Organization. I realize that, by virtue of my duties with the Organization, I have been the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of our country. I am aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the espionage laws of our government which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by writing, word, conduct, or otherwise, any information relating to the national defense and security and particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, including, but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private citizen, or government employee or official without the express written consent of the Chief of the Organization or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims I may have against the Organization or our government which may in any way necessitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however, that I am not satisfied with the decisions of the Organization concerning any present or future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satisfaction without prior written notice to the Organization, and then only in accordance with such legal and security advice as the Organization will promptly furnish me.

3. I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial responsibility of the Organization, having come into my possession as a result of my duties with the Organization or otherwise.

4. During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the Organization I have been given an opportunity to report all information about the Organization, its personnel, and its operations which I consider should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information which it is my duty, in the national interest, to disclose to the Organization, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse side of this sheet or on other attachments.

SECRET

201-278841

5. I have been advised that, in the event I am called upon by the properly constituted authorities to testify or provide information which I am pledged hereby not to disclose, I will notify the Organization immediately; I will also advise said authorities of my secrecy commitments to our government and will request that my right or need to testify be established before I am required to do so.

6. I am aware of the provisions and penalties of the espionage laws of our government and am fully aware that any violation on my part of certain matters sworn to by me under this oath may subject me to prosecution under the terms of these laws, and that violation of other portions of this oath are subject to appropriate action, including such dissemination of the violation as the circumstances warrant.

I have read and understand the contents of this oath and voluntarily affix my signature hereto with the full knowledge that this oath was executed for the mutual benefit of myself and our government, and that it will be retained in the files of the Organization for its future use or for reference by me at any time in the future that I may be requested or ordered to testify or disclose any of the matters included within the scope of this oath.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 23 day of June 19 66.

[signature] (SEAL)
Signature

Witnessed by me this 23 day of June 19 66,

at Mexico City, Mexico.

Arthur F. Ladenburg
SIGNATURE

14-00000

ATT TO HMMA-29461

Draft of Dispatch

1. LICOOKY-1 has been terminated effective 1 July 1966. The last meeting with her was held on 23 June. She was paid her salary through 30 June, her income tax refund for the period 1 January 1965 - 30 June 1966 and given money for one-way air fare to New York City. She was completely satisfied with the financial terms of the settlement. A Termination Secrecy Oath, signed in true name, was obtained.

2. L-1 plans to return to New York on or about 1 July. She said she will look for a job there, and is confident she will have no difficulty obtaining one. She does not yet know where she will be living.

3. L-1 is subletting the apartment she occupies here. She has purchased the KUBARK-owned household effects which had been loaned to her for that apartment. For this reason, in addition to the fact that she has acquired many close friends and interests here as a result of five years residence, the Station expects that she will return to Mexico, although she insists she has no plans to do so.

14 July 66

201-278841

4. She was given a post office box address to use to contact the Station in the event that she does return to Mexico and feels it necessary to do so. But no committment was made to her regarding any future contact or payment for information.

5. She was previously told that the telephone number of the New York KUBARK office is listed in the directory and she could call that office if contact were necessary while she was in the United States. She asked if that would still be the case and was told that it was but only to attempt such contact for an important or urgent matter. But since she tends to liberally apply importance to a wide variety of events and subjects, and since she is likely to be short of money shortly after arriving, it would not be surprising if she did try to establish such contact.

SECRET

21 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Request for Termination of Project LICOOKY

The LICOOKY Project was last approved for the period 1 January 1965 through 31 December 1965 for $5,140--$2,530 for FY 1965 and $2,610 for FY 1966. It is requested that the LICOOKY Project be terminated effective 1 January 1966, based on the following information geared to the outline in CSI-F NO. 230-60.

(1) Project Name: LICOOKY

(2) Original Project Objectives: Identify and report on plans, activities and associates of Central American Communists resident in or visiting Mexico City.

(3) Reason for Termination: LICOOKY-1 lost her access to the hard core group of CA communists partly because of her close association with LINLUCK who publicly renounced his break with the Guatemalan CP in 1962. The loss of access was also partly due to L-1's own apparent indiscretion vis-a-vis some of her close friends in Mexico City. This can be attributed both to her own growing distaste for the grubby and blindly unreasoning members of this group with whom she was asked to consort, and her reaction in her social group which took the form increasingly of anti-Communist remarks, and to the concomitant (or possibly resultant) rumors of increasing currency, that she was in the pay of PBSWING. Attempts were made to take advantage of her connections with literary circles in Mexico, but her inability to budget her time, sufficiently to satisfy station requirements led to the decision to terminate her. A contributing cause was also her inability to regularize her status in Mexico so she could accept a paying position which would give her reason to remain there, with the resultant strain of the thin legend that her father was providing her support.

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(4) Effectiveness of Project: Project supplied a certain amount of miscellaneous detail on the Central American Communist group in its early stages. Detail and continuity have always been lacking. During the post-project period of association, after termination notice was already given, she began to be more attentive to Station requirements and supplied several rather detailed profiles of controversial persons in the intellectual world who could be of operational interest to the Station.

(5) Date of Termination: 1 January 1966

(6) Status of commitments:

a. LICOOKY-1: This Contract Agent is being carried under LIRANCH (OOA) from 1 January through June 1966 to prepare special [illegible] against non-LICOOKY Project objectives. Termination costs will be borne by Project LIRANCH.

b. LICOOKY-2: LICOOKY-2 was terminated on 31 December 1965 for lack of continuous production. He was very understanding when told of the termination and recognized that his limited and occasional access made a regular salary illogical. Contact is maintained with him via a letter box through which he can indicate his need for case officer contact. He is then paid small sums for travel information supplied.

(7) Disposition of funds, material and personnel: There are no funds or material to be disposed of. LICOOKY-1 is being terminated effective 30 June 1966. At this time she will be supplied with air fare from Mexico City to New York and paid the income tax refund due her. Station owns some of the furnishings in her apartment and she has expressed a wish to purchase some of these. The normal three-bid process will be complied with in this case, through her advertising the sale and then offering slightly higher prices for the items. She plans to retain the apartment in Mexico and sublet it furnished so she will have a pied-a-terre whenever she returns there. Her specific plans for leaving the city are not known. The Station has no objections to her remaining in Mexico and

SECRET

is quite willing to maintain contact with her on an occasional basis. She would be reimbursed out of LIRANCH on a piecework basis.

(8) Request for funds: No extra funds are required.

(9) Progress made toward attainment of project objectives: See paragraph 4 above.

(10) Review of Project: No review is contemplated of Project LICOOKY.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS

PRIOR TO FILING

1. Fill in Sect. 2. on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID.
2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation

TO: ACTION BRANCH

If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID/AN.

FROM:

RID/AN

PROPER FILE NO

TO. ALL ADDRESSEES
FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK IF APPROPRIATE

COMMENTS

TO	ROOM NO	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WH/RCB				
2.				
3. C/WH/1/Fisher		27 JUN 1966		
4.				
5. Kaufman				WYK
6.				
7. Chacones				SCh
8.				
9. Bustos				B
10. WH/FI/Buccau				K
11.				
12.				
13. RI/AN				
14.				
15.				
17. RID/FI				

Copy Detached JUN 27 1966

Hold for Bustos

FYI

Please reclassify into 201-278841

WH/FI
WH/1
ABSTRACT X

TRACE REQUEST | ABSTRACT X | INDEX

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): ~~50-6-179/3~~ 201-278841

DATE MICROFILMED

DOCUMENT DATE: 16 June, 1966

DOCUMENT NUMBER: HMMA 29207

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LICOOKY-1/ Forwarding of Clippings and Comments Concerning Conference on Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union.

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None; FYI.

1. As Headquarters is already aware, a Latin American Conference to Study the Situation of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union (Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS) was held in Mexico City during the period 13 - 15 May 1966. Judging by numerous articles in the press, Política, La Voz de México, Sucesos Para Todos (see attachments under separate cover) and excerpts from conversations between numerous persons on LIENVOY and LIFEAT, the Soviet Embassy, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM - Partido Comunista Mexicano) and other groups and individual Communists were determined, if possible, to prevent the Conference from being held and, failing that, to discredit it completely and pin the ODIOKE/ODACID label on it. Despite their efforts and the voluminous adverse propaganda, both before and after the Conference, the Conference was held and was probably mildly successful.

2. Política, 1 May 1966, carried an article attacking the proposed Conference and ridiculing some of the Mexican participants (Attachment A). It contains, among other things, a partial reprint of the text of an interview or statement by Nicolas S. Leonov, Press Attaché of the Soviet Embassy in which he states that Mexico should not be drawn into the cold war propaganda battle, and he maintains that Jews in the Soviet Union are not mistreated or discriminated against. In addition to the attacks and counterattacks in the press, efforts were made (based on LIFEAT on Enrique SEMO Calev, Gerard PIERRE-CHARLES, and LIENVOY) to prevent Carlos Pellicer, a darling of the Mexican left but not a formal PCM member, from taking part; Pellicer is an official of the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR (Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética). Política, 15 May 1966

DOC [illegible] BY [illegible] 2 JUN [illegible]

CONTINUED

Attachments:
As stated above, UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WH Division, w/atts usc

CS COPY

201-278541
50-6-129/3

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-29207	16 June 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-6-129/3

(Attachment B) continued the attack on the Conference and its participants, claiming in effect that it is a clear anti-Soviet move backed by ODACID. As of 18 May, according to the article, numerous signatures had been collected on a "progressive manifesto" protesting the Conference. The list includes many well known Mexican Communists and pro-Communists. Attached also (Attachment C) is a copy of the "progressive manifesto", which was published in El Día on 19 May 1966, and a copy of a manifesto (Attachment D) published in El Heraldo, 22 April 1966, by the Mexican Committee for the Defense of the Jews in the USSR, in which a number of demands are made on the Soviet Government with respect to the Jews and their rights.

3. La Voz de Mexico, 15 May 1966 (Attachment E) carried an article bitterly attacking the Conference, which it charges is being organized and held by groups and persons in the service of ODACID. It specifically names LICOOKY-1, although the latter's name is incorrectly spelled, as one of those responsible for the Conference and says she is "well connected" with ODYOKE police. Sucesos, 21 May 1966, carried an article (Attachment F) attacking the Conference and its organizers and charging that there are sinister forces behind the Conference. This article carries a picture of LICOOKY-1.

4. Sucesos, 4 June 1966, included an inserted sheet (not found in all copies of this edition) entitled "An Agent of the FBI and INTERPOL in the Association of Mexican Writers," which deals almost exclusively with LICOOKY-1, her expulsion from Cuba, work in Mexico, and contacts and activities in Mexico. It charges that in Mexico she is working for Daniel James, who is responsible to KUBARK (Attachment G).

5. LICOOKY-1's name appeared in a notice (Attachment H) appearing in El Excelsior, 28 May 1966 by Vicente Echeverría del Prado, treasurer of the Mexican Association of Writers (AEM - Asociación de Escritores de México, A.C.), which simply stated that LICOOKY-1 is not authorized to accept dues or handle other business of the AEM within the province of the treasurer's duties and obligations. However, in view of the adverse publicity previously, the announcement had the effect or implied that the AEMAC or members of that group believed the charges that LICOOKY-1 had a part in organizing the Conference and/or is an agent of KUBARK. The notice, as it appears, also implies that LICOOKY-1 was mishandling AEMAC funds. Echeverría offered to publish the clarification on the sheet on which the AEMAC announcement appears; however, LICOOKY-1 asked him not to do so and said she would take up the notice and any clarification with the AEMAC Justice and Honor Commission.

6. On 9 June 1966 while conversing with SEMO (Attachment I), Leonov said that LICOOKY-1 had called him to say that she had had nothing to do with the Conference, and does not want the Soviets to catalogue her as an enemy. Leonov commented that LICOOKY-1 had left him her phone number and had asked him to help her (presumably refute the charges that she was involved with the Conference). The LILINK case officer who currently handles LICOOKY-1 said on the morning of 14 June 1966 that LICOOKY-1 told him she had called the Soviet Press Attaché to deny that she had had anything to do with the Conference "because it is what she would normally do." She did not, however, mention beforehand that she intended to call the Soviet Embassy. (Tape of conversation is forwarded as Attachment J.)

7. The Station believes that most or all articles attacking the Conference, and particularly those attacking LICOOKY-1, were Soviet inspired, and it is further believed that SEMO wrote most if not all articles attacking the Conference which appeared in La Voz, Política and Sucesos. The Soviets, who are probably aware of previous Cuban charges that LICOOKY-1 is an ODYOKE agent, probably felt that as an American closely associated with the AEMAC LICOOKY-1 would be vulnerable to such an attack.

8. As a result of the Sucesos article of 4 June 1966 an official from the Ministry of Government did visit LICOOKY-1 to check on her documentation. The official said that he did not believe the charges made in the Sucesos article, but since her tourist visa had expired he advised her to immediately leave the country in order to renew it, and he provided her with a letter to show to Mexican border authorities permitting her exit. She is currently in PBPRIME but is expected to return to Mexico in a few days.

9. As Headquarters is aware, LICOOKY-1 will be terminated effective 30 June 1966; the decision to terminate her was made some time ago, prior to the occurrence of the Conference and the resulting adverse propaganda. While she may be of some occasional use should she return to and remain in Mexico, it is believed that the recent adverse propaganda has impaired her future usefulness in Mexico, although many Mexicans undoubtedly do not believe the charges and others offered to "come to her defense."

10. A dispatch will be prepared and forwarded when the termination has been completed, and any new developments with respect to her alleged participation in the above Conference will be included in that dispatch.

Lee R. Wigren [signature]

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Att J to

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO. HMMA 29207
		DATE 16 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				BULKY
2.				
3.				
4.				Tape Recording of conversation
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				CALL RID/FILES, EXT. 6867 FOR ATTACHMENTS. RECORDS CENTER JOB NO. 67-1003 BOX NO. 8
14.				
15.				201-278841

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City X

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Contract Amendments

ACTION REQ: Advise Subjects

Attached for your retention are contract amendments relating to income taxes for the following personnel:

Cecil B. ARLISS
Rita H. BLAZEK
Howard R. BENJAYA
Helen P. FILESHA
Joyce H. PINELOCH
Leo C. REDLICH
Philip K. TESSAROLO
David M. WILSTED
Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

Howard D. MYNARD

Attachment:
As stated

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City

Wilcox

HMMS - 4770

SECRET

WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan: gms 8 June 1966 4660

Distribution:

14-00000

SECRET

Miss Joyce H. Piacinch

Dear

Miss Piacinch

Reference is made to your current MOC with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Effective 21 April 1966, said MOC is amended by deleting all reference to income taxes therefrom, and by adding thereto the following paragraph:

"10. Taxes. As an independent contractor, monies paid you under paragraph four (4) above constitute taxable income for Federal tax purposes and you must satisfy your Federal tax liability thereon. Such income may be paid you by or through a cover facility. Because of cover, operational, and security considerations the Tax Committee of this organization is authorized to make certain determinations and establish procedures (including tax withholdings) which will result in the full satisfaction of your Federal income and Social Security tax obligations. It is specifically understood and agreed that such determinations and procedures, whether oral or written, constitute an integral part of this contract and are legally incorporated herein by reference."

All other terms and conditions of said MOC remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY ______________________________
Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONGRESOS

¿Les Darán Permiso?

En 1961 un Comité Hindú pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética solicitó al gobierno de la India permiso para realizar un congreso al que asistirían intelectuales de varios países asiáticos. El permiso fue negado porque el primer ministro Nehru entendió que esa reunión afectaría las buenas relaciones de indo-soviéticas.

Trámites similares se hicieron al año siguiente en Ceilán y correspondió a la señora Sirimavo Bandaranaike, jefa del gobierno cuya política nacionalista fue saludada por las fuerzas progresistas de todo el mundo, negar el permiso, pues vio que se trataba de una más o menos sutil intromisión en la política exterior de su país.

Instituido el gobierno *gorila* en el Brasil, un Comité Latinoamericano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética no tuvo problemas para llevar a cabo en 1965 un congreso; éste se celebró poco después de uno similar que se reunió en mayo del año pasado en Washington y sobre el que un conocido poeta judío-norteamericano de ideas derechistas, Jacob Glatstein, hizo este comentario: "Todos gritaban en inglés que hacía falta la lengua judía... en Rusia". Esta expresión fue comentada por Aarón Vergelis, poeta y director de la revista en yidish *Sovietish Heimland* que se publica en la URSS, con esta frase:

Politica, 1 May 1966

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

"Nadie [illegible] en ruso que hace falta la lengua judía... en los EU".

A otro mitin antisoviético celebrado el tres de junio pasado en Nueva York, dos prominentes sabios judíos de la URSS, el economista Evsei Liberman, profesor de la Universidad de Jarkov, y el físico Lev Landau, Premio Nobel, enviaron un mensaje que decía: "Los ciudadanos de la URSS de nacionalidad judía expresamos nuestra profunda indignación por el hecho de que algunos círculos de Occidente hagan cundir incesantemente toda clase de infundios sobre la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética. Los judíos soviéticos consideramos como una provocación el mitin del tres de junio en artículo *Los judíos en la URSS*, publicado por la revista *Marcha* de Montevideo el 16 de octubre de 1965, y del que es autor Julio Adin, miembro del Partido Obrero Unificado de Israel. Julio Adin estuvo en México a mediados de abril y declaró a POLÍTICA: "Yo escribí ese artículo a pedido del Dr. Carlos Quijano, director de *Marcha*, revista cuya orientación progresista todos conocemos. Al remitírselo desde Jerusalén le expresaba en una carta adjunta que me disgustaría sobremanera que fuese utilizado para cualquier actividad, disimulada o no, de tipo antisoviético. Estoy enterado de los congresos que se han venido celebrando en muchos países para «defender» los dere- [illegible] Humanos. [illegible] que consiste en [illegible] tan las [illegible] nes civiles en Vietnam. [illegible] Luna repetía una y otra vez [illegible] la URSS y los países [illegible] para afirmar luego mentiras tales [illegible] URSS se editan mil[illegible] de libros de franco y [illegible] antisemita, que son vendidos a menor precio que las obras científicas o literarias; y que si bien la Constitución soviética condena el antisemitismo, actualmente el gobierno no sólo lo tolera sino que propicia su expansión.

Jacobo Mondlak, después de afirmar

MARTÍN LUIS GUZMÁN, CARLOS PELLICER, LUIS GÓMEZ Z. Y JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

"...que se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial que sí se practica en otros países?..."

el *Madison Square Garden* donde sin nosotros, sin representantes nuestros, se pretende discutir una cuestión que, para colmo, ni siquiera existe".

Al congreso de Río de Janeiro concurrieron por México dos personajes de prestigio: Martín Luis Guzmán y Carlos Pellicer. Poco después quedó constituido el Comité Mexicano pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, presidido ejecutivamente por un judío-mexicano de ideas ultraderechistas, Jacobo Mondlac, y honorariamente por el poeta Carlos Pellicer. Como secretario actúa el locutor de Radio Universidad, actor aficionado y empleado de la sucursal mexicana de una empresa financiera israelí Sergio Guzik. Para colaborar con ellos llegó a México a principios de este año Dov Yosefi, funcionario del ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Israel, experto de darle un barniz "liberal" y hasta "progresista" a ciertos eslabones de esta cadena echada a tejer por el Departamento de Estado de los EU.

Dov Yosefi trajo consigo abundante "literatura", entre la que se contaba el chos de los judíos en la URSS, y no tengo dudas sobre su carácter antisoviético propiciado por el Departamento de Estado de los EU".

Firmas mexicanas. La consecuencia para México de la reunión de Río de Janeiro fue un *Llamado de conciencia*, a cuyo pie se puso la respetable firma de Carlos Pellicer. El hábil trabajo de Dov Yosefi y Sergio Guzik logró que a la de Pellicer se sumaran 50 firmas, algunas tan honorables como las de León Felipe, Héctor Cruz, Rosario Castellanos, Alí Chumacero, Dagoberto Guillaumin, Héctor Mendoza, José Emilio Pacheco y últimamente otras como la de José Revueltas, Luis Gómez Z. o Carlos Monsiváis.

Para dar a conocer ese *Llamado de conciencia* fue ofrecida una conferencia de prensa el 21 de abril en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México. En las invitaciones se decía que la iba a presidir Carlos Pellicer, pero su lugar fue ocupado por una personalidad mucho menos importante, como lo es el Lic. Benjamín Laureano Luna, del Frente de modo irresponsable que todos los sectores de la comunidad judía de México lo habían elegido presidente del mencionado comité, sufrió un ataque de confusión geográfica y afirmó que en la URSS se producen frecuentes profanaciones de cementerios judíos. La verdad es que el único país donde se ha sabido que se produzcan tan abominables salvajismos es en la República Federal Alemana, donde florece el neonazismo y, en consecuencia, el antisemitismo; pero sobre esto ni una palabra dijeron los apurados "defensores": Mondlak, Laureano Luna y Guzik.

El 22 de abril, en todos los periódicos matutinos, incluido *El Nacional*, apareció el *Llamado de conciencia* con las 50 firmas. Esto sorprendió de manera desagradable a los sectores progresistas de México, no repuestos todavía de las intempestivas cuan amenazantes visitas de Johnson y Goldwater. La primera reacción de esos sectores fue el envío de cartas que diversas instituciones y personas hicieron llegar al poeta Carlos Pellicer, lamentando que hubiera aceptado presidir un comité inspirado y movido

ATT A TO HMMA-29307

201-278841

por el Departamento de Estado yanqui.

Comentario soviético. En entrevista con *El Día*, Nicolás S. Leonov, agregado de prensa de la embajada de la URSS en nuestro país, afirmó: "México no es campo propicio para hacer propaganda de guerra fría. El prestigio internacional de que goza y el respeto que le tiene el mundo entero no permiten que florezcan en este país brotes de la guerra fría. En la actualidad no hay ni datos, ni situaciones ni acontecimientos que justifiquen el deseo de algunas personas y elementos de reavivar el cadáver del llamado problema judío en Rusia. A juzgar por los argumentos, la aplastante mayoría de los firmantes usó para sus conclusiones no los datos personales, no los resultados de una investigación objetiva, sino material [illegible] tomado de segunda mano, superficial, erróneo y muchas veces tergiversado por pura mala voluntad".

En referencia al pedido de control de las publicaciones antisemitas que hacía el llamamiento, Leonov comentó: "Es curioso que pidan esto a la URSS y no a otros países en donde prolifera esta clase de literatura. Es falso afirmar que las publicaciones antisemitas aparecen en forma regular en la URSS; al contrario, la Unión Soviética es uno de los pocos países en donde la revelación de prejuicios raciales se castiga por la ley y se condena por la opinión pública. Es una pena —concluyó— que tantos intelectuales en tan poco espacio hayan cometido tantos errores. ¿No se pretende con toda esta propaganda contrarrestar la discriminación racial, que sí se practica en otros países?"

El congreso. Muy en silencio se ha venido preparando un congreso que habrá de celebrarse en la ciudad de México del 13 al 15 de mayo, al que concurrirán intelectuales de los países centroamericanos para "defender" los derechos de los judíos sovié[illegible] [illegible] cadena, [illegible] Mundial, durante la [illegible], se reunirá después otro [illegible] en Santiago de Chile, al [illegible] intelectuales de Argentina, [illegible] y otros países del "cono sur". Como dice un lector de *Siempre!* en la sección de *Cartas* del Nº 671, los resultados de esta campaña antisoviética "no pueden ser otros que los de favorecer la propaganda imperialista y, a la postre, el antisemitismo". Considera además que "muchos de quienes aparecen suscribiendo ese llamado parecen no darse cuenta de que son empujados como [illegible] o apoyo para la celebración de un congreso [illegible] antisoviético con sede en México; es decir, en un país que tiene buenas relaciones con la URSS y que sufre en carne propia las falacias del anticomunismo manejado desde Washington".

TRABAJO

Primero de Mayo

La celebración del Primero de Mayo, no ha dejado nunca de ser representativa de las aspiraciones de la clase trabajadora y de sus condiciones de vida y de lucha, por un lado, y de la actitud de la clase capitalista y su dominio frente a aquella, por el otro.

Así, por deformado y desvirtuado que esté el sentido esté el sentido auténtico de la conmemoración, a través de toda la historia de los 1os de Mayo en el país se ha visto una CROM callista, haciéndole el juego al régimen con el propósito de instituir el día de lucha del proletariado universal en una "fiesta del trabajo" organizada por el gobierno. Bajo el cardenismo, en pleno ascenso revolucionario, las manifestaciones obreras volvieron a ser en este día una presencia combativa de la clase trabajadora. Durante Alemán, al tiempo que se llegaba a asesinar trabajadores en el desfile, la sumisión de los *charros* del movimiento obrero llegaba a su máxima expresión cuando Fidel Velázquez lo calificaba de "primer obrero de la República".

En este 1965, lo que una vez fue en México lucha a favor de mejores condiciones de vida ha devenido en una "fiesta de unidad nacional a la que son invitados los empresarios", lo que da una panorámica general de la situación de la lucha de clases en el país.

[illegible] controlar las aspiraciones crecientes a la unidad por parte de los trabajadores (el Congreso Nacional del Trabajo) el Primero de Mayo, días antes de su celebración se hizo público el criterio que el gobierno y los líderes reaccionarios deseaban imbuir a esa fecha. Circulares y declaraciones de Fidel Velázquez y Antonio Bernal coincidieron con los conceptos que más tarde externaría el presidente Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.

El deseo del régimen de dar apariencia de unidad al intento de fusión burocrática que ha sido el Congreso del Trabajo, así como su empeño en presentarse como impulsor de la unidad obrera; se evidencia en su discurso de este Primero de Mayo: "Hoy empieza a ser una promisoria realidad la unificación de los trabajadores no en una sola central propiamente dicha, sino en ideales, en principios, en metas y en ayuda recíproca para poder alcanzarlos".

14-00000

VOL. VII, Nº 146 — POLÍTICA — 15 DE MAYO DE 1966

Quince días de México y del Mundo

PANORAMA NACIONAL

CONGRESOS

Antisovietismo en México

Del 13 al 15 de mayo se celebró en el Hotel del Prado de la ciudad de México la silenciosamente organizada Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS. Convocada por el Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética y con asistencia de algunos delegados extranjeros, especialmente centroamericanos, esta reunión fue el remate de una campaña internacional antisoviética, iniciada desde hace por lo menos cinco años por el Departamento de Estado norteamericano y el sionismo organizado.

A pesar de los densos velos de humanitarismo y eclecticismo con que se ha pretendido cubrirla, esta conferencia fue denunciada en su fase preparatoria por publicaciones como POLÍTICA y *La Voz de México*, órgano del Partido Comunista Mexicano. Nicolás S. Leonov, embajador de la Unión Soviética en nuestro país, la condenó como parte de la "guerra fría".

Analizando, aun en forma somera, la extracción de los diferentes delegados extranjeros, es fácil inducir sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste en la conferencia. Los delegados son en su mayoría o han sido funcionarios de gobiernos gorilas de Centro y Sudamérica; entre ellos se cuentan Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, exministro de Cultura de El Salvador; Ricardo J. Bermúdez, exministro de Educación de Panamá; Gerardo Molina, exrector de la Universidad de Colombia; Lic. Gardillo Barios, exministro de Economía y Trabajo de Guatemala; y Dr. René de Sola, exministro de Justicia y de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela.

A esta campaña, nada democrática y de calidad intelectual harto dudosa, fueron arrastrados algunos intelectuales mexicanos honestos. Una larga serie de artimañas fueron usadas para ello, desde el ocultamiento de la bien afinada organización y del puntual pago de sus servicios necesarios para la celebración de la conferencia, hasta el uso demagógico y falaz de pronunciamientos hechos, en bien diversas circunstancias, por personalidades y organizaciones de reconocida solvencia progresista.

Además se escamoteó el nombre del escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, que no aparece entre los firmantes del nefasto "Llamado de Conciencia". Sin embargo, el literato había sido designado con anterioridad para presidir la conferencia; así lo prueban tanto el mensaje dirigido a su nombre por el filósofo inglés Bertrand Russell el 26 de abril, como el discurso de inauguración de la conferencia, que debía dirigir Martín Luis Guzmán y que fue impreso y repartido por la oficina de prensa aun antes de que comenzara la reunión.

La conferencia. En la sesión de apertura se escenificó una farsa en la que se intentó despojar a la conferencia "pro judía" de toda implicación política, ubicándola dentro de una esfera exclusivamente "humana". Al mismo tiempo, se pretendió dar a las delegaciones extranjeras —algunas de las cuales sólo constaban de una sola persona— una representatividad "democrática" en las dos comisiones que se formaron: la de estudio y la de resoluciones.

La realización de la primera tarea se encargó de iniciarla, por medio de una carta a la conferencia, el que ha figurado como presidente del Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, Carlos Pellicer. Después de disculpar su ausencia de la reunión, pues acompañaba al presidente Díaz Ordaz, en una gira de trabajo, Pellicer enarboló el nombre de Bertrand Russell para "demostrar" que "...no, detrás de nosotros no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo". Y finalizó su carta con estas palabras: "Nunca como hoy se habla tan universalmente de Derechos Humanos. El gobierno soviético los proclama todos los días. ¿Qué ocurre entonces con los dirigentes de tan grande nación? ...Estaré lejos de ustedes en persona. Pero mi corazón está aquí y mi voluntad entera para seguir luchando por la justicia y la libertad donde quiera que la necesidad tan honrosamente nos obligue".

UNA SESIÓN DE LA CONFERENCIA "PRO JUDÍA"

...sus nexos con el imperialismo norteamericano y la intervención de éste...

A continuación, el presidente de la conferencia, Martín Luis Guzmán, y el que actuó como maestro de ceremonias, Benjamín Laureano Luna, hicieron sendos discursos en los que, cada uno a su manera, trató de justificar los objetivos de la conferencia.

Martín Luis Guzmán afirmó: "Pese a la revisión de aquellos factores negativos de la vida soviética y a los frecuentes cambios que en ellos se introdujeron, el gobierno de la URSS no ha restituido a los judíos sus indiscutibles derechos al goce de su cultura ancestral, a la conservación de sus instituciones, a la continuidad de su tradición milenaria". Después de algunas vaguedades añadidas a la primera, el escritor finalizó con ésta: "Así, enterados de las persecuciones que hoy sufre un gran grupo del pueblo judío, cuyo milenario legado cultural forma parte de la civilización de Occidente, hemos considerado deber ineludible el acudir aquí para que esta conferencia manifieste su decisión de protestar, como lo haría

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en cualquier otro caso de discriminaciones raciales, culturales o religiosas, contra el régimen que pesa sobre la minoría israelita de la URSS".

Benjamín Laureano Luna, presidente del Frente Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, cubrió su anticomunismo con reiteradas y demagógicas protestas en contra de las agresiones norteamericanas a Santo Domingo y Vietnam. Luego lanzó las más graves calumnias contra la Unión Soviética, y poco le faltó para poner en el mismo nivel del genocidio hitleriano al régimen de la primera nación donde se han sentado las bases para realizar el comunismo.

La jornada del 14 de mayo se cerró con un banquete al que asistieron, además de los delegados extranjeros, numerosos miembros de nuestra versátil y desaprensiva intelectualidad. Allí habló Jacobo Mondlak, gerente ejecutivo de la conferencia. De este seudoescritor, *La Voz de México* (en su edición 1829) denunció su filiación de extrema derecha y lo presentó como "dirigente del JEIRUT (partido israelita de ultraderecha y fascista), bien conocido en la comunidad judía de México por su ideología chovinista y reaccionaria".

Mondlak sólo dirigió ditirambos a la "gloriosa y hospitalaria patria mexicana" y a sus "monumentos toltecas de piedra". Después de barajar demagógicamente citas de Morelos, Hidalgo, Bolívar y Sandino pretendió curarse en salud: "No es preciso ser agente del Departamento de Estado para denunciar brotes antisemitas en la Unión Soviética, como tampoco es preciso ser agente comunista ni criticar algunas facetas de la política norteamericana".

A los informes sobre la filiación política de Mondlak se añade que su insistencia en colocarse al lado de quienes luchan por la libertad y contra la esclavitud es [illegible] por la posición de clase que ocupa dentro de la sociedad mexicana. Es miembro del grupo Mondlak, que posee tal y en el interior del país. La familia Mondlak acaba de invertir $20 millones en maquinaria textil, mediante operaciones realizadas con una empresa imperialista germanoccidental de rancio abolengo nazi.



DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS



VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO

"...han sido, son y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del socialismo..."

"Demandas". La conferencia se clausuró el domingo 15 de mayo, luego de adoptarse el acuerdo de pedir a la Unión Soviética que:

- Devuelva a la minoría judía la posibilidad de llevar una vida cultural integral.
- Extirpe de raíz toda manifestación antisemita.
- Dé a los judíos la posibilidad de profesar su religión, al igual que los creyentes de otras religiones.
- Otorgue a los judíos el derecho a la autodeterminación y el derecho a unirse a sus hermanos cuando así lo deseen.

Estos puntos fueron propuestos por el escritor costarricense Samuel Gevinsky quien, no pudiendo ocultar los intereses a los que sirve, dedicó su exposición a calumniar en todas las formas posibles a la Unión Soviética. Y acabó por hacer una ardiente defensa del sionismo internacional, movimiento al que la URSS, [illegible] la asamblea general de las Naciones Unidas en 1965, propuso que se le condenara junto al nazismo, al neonazismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo y de [illegible] hacia razas y nacionalidades.

Respuesta. De inmediato, grupo de personas progresistas redactó un manifiesto donde respondió a los organizadores del movimiento antisoviético y de la conferencia que:

"En relación al «Llamado de Conciencia» del Comité en Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la URSS y la Conferencia organizada por el mismo comité, que se celebró los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

- "La posición activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial en cualquier parte del mundo, es y debe ser tarea diaria de toda persona progresista y democrática.
- "El «Llamado de Conciencia» publicado en la prensa, no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien intencionadas y de reconocida militancia democrática y antimperialista hayan sido confundidas, prestando sus firmas a un

ALBERTO BREMAUNTZ



BERTRAND RUSSELL

"...¿cómo pueden explicar los apuestos «defensores» su negativa a dialogar?..."

documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de la URSS.

• "El racismo y las teorías antisemitas han sido [illegible] y seguirán siendo enemigos irreconciliables del [illegible] y [illegible] construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.

• "La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado «antisemitismo soviético» no sirve a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo a la fraternidad entre los pueblos, porque tiende a desviar la atención de estos de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y el antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que una vez más, levantan cabeza en Alemania occidental y en los Estados Unidos.

• "Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario, es burda calumnia o consideración subjetiva sin posibilidad de comprobación.

• "En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura específica en lengua nacional, yiddish, los judíos soviéticos, sus artistas y escritores siguen creando obras que continúan la herencia de la cultura progresista judía del pasado, aun cuando podrían señalarse ciertas deficiencias originadas en la compleja situación de la minoría judía en la URSS, que no vive concentrada en un territorio común y que conoce además un acelerado proceso de asimilación.

• "Los hoy gratuitos defensores de la cultura judía en la URSS siempre han combatido y difamado esa cultura, porque como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su forma es nacional y su contenido socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los apurados «defensores» su negativa a dialogar, en el pasado y el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?

• "Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan en realidad de imponer, desde afuera y con posiciones antisoviéticas, una anacrónica solución nacionalista estrecha y de ghetto, a la minoría judía de la URSS, que ligada íntimamente a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no comulga con las ideas de movimientos políticos judíos del mundo capitalista.

• "Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirvan a los verdaderos intereses de México, ni tampoco a los intereses vitales [illegible] judíos en el mundo en su



CARLOS PELLICER



MARTÍN LUIS GUZMÁN

...junto al nazismo, al sionismo y a todas las otras formas de colonialismo...

lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos".

Hasta el 18 de mayo habían firmado ese manifiesto progresista, que constituye un reto al brote de antisovietismo que ha surgido en México, las siguientes personas:

Vicente Lombardo Toledano, diputado; David Alfaro Siqueiros, pintor; Alberto Bremauntz, rector de la Universidad de Morelia; Manuel Marcué Pardiñas, director de POLÍTICA; Eli de Gortari, catedrático; Rius, caricaturista; Raquel Tibol, crítica de arte; Ermilo Abreu Gómez, escritor; Enrique Semo, economista; Margarita Paz Paredes, poetisa; Fernando Carmona, economista; Mercedes Quevedo, Pintora; Manuel Meza Andraca, agrónomo; Juan de la Cabada, escritor; Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Presidente de la Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas; Lic. José G. Saavedra; José Luis Parra, periodista; Marco Arturo Montero, escritor; Antonio Caram, periodista; Lic. Adán Nieto, dirigente sindical; Rosendo Gómez Lorenzo, periodista; Adriana Siqueiros; Carlos Estrada Lang, presidente de la AMPEC; Corrado Dávila, periodista; José Chávez Morado, pintor; Lic. Luis Córdova; Germán Liszt Arzubide, escritor; Profra. Hermelinda Ogazón; José Luis Ceceña, economista; Gabriel Figueroa, cineasta; Luis Suárez, periodista; Luis Rivera Terrazas, astrónomo; Elvira Vargas, periodista; Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo; Roger Bartra, antropólogo; Daniel Casez, lingüista; Sergio Véjar, director de cine; Javier Guerrero, pintor; Gerardo Dávila, periodista; Lic. Juan Manuel Gómez Gutiérrez; Francisco Mora, pintor; Lic. Arturo Rivera M.; Ramón Ramírez, economista; Jorge Godoy, director de teatro; Edmundo Jardón, periodista; Enrique Bordes, fotógrafo; Norberto Martínez, pintor; Froylán Manjarrez, periodista, y Óscar S. Frías, pintor.



JOSÉ LUIS CECEÑA

"...una anacrónica solución..."

14-00000

En relación al "Llamado de conciencia" [illegible] en defensa de [illegible] derechos [illegible] de los judíos en [illegible] y la Conferencia organizada por el mismo Co[illegible], que se efectuó los días 14 y 15 de mayo, declaramos:

1. [illegible] relación activa contra el antisemitismo y otras formas de discriminación racial, en cualquier parte del mundo es y debe ser tarea diaria de todo persona progresista y democrática.

2. El "llamado de conciencia" publicado en la prensa no sirve a estos altos valores humanitarios. Es, pues, de lamentarse que algunas personalidades bien [illegible] y de reconocida militancia democrática y antiimperialista [illegible] confundidos y hayan suscrito un documento que contiene afirmaciones falaces en contra de [illegible]

3. El racismo y las teorías [illegible] son, y seguirán siendo [illegible] irreconciliables del socialismo y de su construcción en el país de los soviets. La defensa de la existencia del Estado soviético, unión voluntaria y fraternal de numerosos pueblos, está íntimamente ligada a la lucha consecuente contra estas aberraciones chovinistas.

4. La campaña mundial —que ahora se expresa en México— contra el llamado "antisemitismo soviético" no corresponde a la verdad, ya que falsea deliberadamente la situación real de los judíos en la URSS. Tampoco aporta algo [illegible] entre los pueblos, porque [illegible] a desviar la atención [illegible] de los verdaderos promotores del racismo y del antisemitismo, como los neonazis y los belicistas que una vez más, [illegible] cabeza en Alemania Occidental y en los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica.

5. Los judíos en la URSS gozan en la actualidad de los mismos derechos y tienen las mismas obligaciones que los demás ciudadanos soviéticos en los campos económico, social, político y religioso. Toda afirmación en sentido contrario es [illegible] subjetiva [illegible] de comprobación.

6. En cuanto al desarrollo libre de su cultura es específica en lengua nacional "idish", los judíos [illegible] artistas y escritores [illegible] obras que [illegible] de la cultura progresista judía [illegible] sado, aun cuando [illegible] tes dificultades [illegible] en la compleja situación de la minoría [illegible] en la URSS, que no vive [illegible] en un territorio común y [illegible] más, un acelerado proceso de asimilación.

7. Los promotores de la campaña mundial "en defensa de la cultura judía en la URSS", han [illegible] y [illegible] famado esa cultura, porque, como la cultura de los demás pueblos soviéticos, su [illegible] nido es socialista. ¿Cómo pueden explicar los aparatos "defensores" su [illegible] tiva a [illegible] en el pasado y en el presente, con los representantes más sobresalientes de esa cultura?

8. Los verdaderos organizadores de la conferencia mencionada tratan, en realidad, de imponer desde afuera y con posiciones anti[illegible], una anacrónica solución, nacionalista, estrecha y de ghetto, [illegible] de la URSS, que, ligada [illegible] a la epopeya histórica de la construcción del socialismo, no coincide con las ideas de movimientos políticos judíos del mundo capitalista.

9. Las relaciones amistosas entre el pueblo de México y la URSS no deben ser perturbadas por la acción de fuerzas que no sirven a los verdaderos intereses de México ni tampoco a los intereses vitales de las masas judías en el mundo, en su lucha por la plena igualdad y fraternidad con los demás pueblos.

México, D. F., 16 de mayo de 1965.

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UN LLAMADO DE CONCIENCIA DEL COMITE MEXICANO PRO DEFENSA DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS JUDIOS EN LA UNION SOVIETICA

Al termino de un examen, libre de todo espiritu partidario, hemos comprobado ciertos hechos que nos llevan a abrigar el temor de que aún existe una brecha entre la situación de igualdad que la Constitucion de la URSS confiere a los judios, y su situacion real, en el plano religioso, cultural, económico y humano. Estamos convencidos que dicha situacion se halla en contradiccion con los fines que persigue la sociedad sovietica, y su evolucion desde 1956. Estamos asimismo convencidos que la misma constituye un obstaculo para aminorar la tension internacional. Es por esta razon que estamos igualmente persuadidos que el Gobierno de la Union Sovietica se mostrara sensible al llamamiento que hoy le dirigimos:

SOLICITAMOS DEL GOBIERNO DE LA URSS

1.—Que confiera a los judios soviéticos el derecho de desarrollar libremente su cultura especifica, con medios identicos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periodicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.

2.—Que permita a los judios soviéticos practicar su religion y disponer libremente de los textos, contar con oficiantes y con los objetos necesarios a la observancia del culto;

3.—Que autorice a los judios sovieticos para que a semejanza de las demas religiones, puedan organizarse en comunidades religiosas en todo el territorio, y a establecer intercambios culturales y de culto, con sus correligionarios;

4.—Que, a fin de evitar en el futuro toda publicacion antisemita del tipo de: "El Judaismo al Descubierto" y "El Judaismo y el Sionismo Contemporaneo", asi como ciertos folletines y caricaturas que aparecen en forma regular en la prensa sovietica, se ejerza un severo control sobre dicho tipo de propaganda racial. Dicho control seria sumamente viable toda vez que existen en la URSS los organismos adecuados para llevarlo a cabo;

5.—Que una legislacion especial sancione los delitos de indole racista, velando especialmente porque dichas tendencias antisemitas no lleguen a poner en peligro ante la justicia, la igualdad de los derechos de los ciudadanos sovieticos, considerando que los recientes procesos por delitos economicos y las condenas a muerte que les siguieron, dan lugar al temor de que dicha igualdad no es enteramente aplicada en el caso de los judios;

6.—Que considere con benevolencia el caso de los judios que deseen reunirse con sus parientes y conyuges que viven en Israel y en otros paises, despues de haber sido separados por diversas circunstancias.

Tenemos la plena conviccion que la atención que otorgue el Gobierno de la URSS a estas peticiones, habra de satisfacer la aspiracion de justicia de los pueblos y su adhesion a la Declaracion Universal de los Derechos del Hombre. La misma contribuira, además, debido a la renovacion y fortalecimiento de las simpatias y lazos amistosos que dicha actitud aportaria a la URSS, al relajamiento de la tension internacional, meta que todos anhelamos.

CARLOS PELLICER
Presidente del Comite

Licenciado Sergio Alvarez Castro; Max Aub, escritor; Abelardo Avila, grabador; Arnold Belkin, pintor; licenciado Carlos Carrero de la Borbolla; Rosario Castellanos, escritora; doctor Teodoro Cesserman; Ali Chumacero, escritor; Hector Cruz, pintor; licenciado Sergio Dominguez Vargas, catedratico; Roberto Dumont, actor; Leon Felipe, poeta; Juan Garcia Ponce, escritor; doctor Luis Garrido; Argelio Gasca, escritor; senador Luis Gómez Z.; profesor Julio González Tejada, catedratico; Miguel Guardia, escritor; Dagoberto Guillaumin, director teatral; Juan José Gurrola, director teatral; Joaquin Gutierrez Heras, compositor; Sergio Guzik economista; Arturo Guzman, escritor; Regino Hernández Llergo, periodista; Jorge Ibargüengoitia, escritor; Francisco Icaza, pintor; Benjamin Laureano Luna, Frente Mexicano Pro-Derechos Humanos; Vicente Leñero, escritor; Juan Lopez Moctezuma, director teatral; Jacobo Margolis, pintor, licenciado Carlos Medina; Juan Vicente Melo, escritor; Hector Mendoza, escritor y director teatral; licenciado Ruben Moheno, diputado; Jacobo Mondlak, escritor; Carlos Monsiváis, escritor; Magda Montoya, coreografa; doctor Manuel Moreno Barrera; doctor Marcos Moshinsky; Jose Emilio Pacheco, escritor; licenciado Carlos Pellicer; arquitecto Salvador Pinoncelly; Hero Rodriguez Toro, periodista; Fanny Rabel, pintora; Malkah Rabell, escritora y periodista; profesora Maria del Carmen Ramirez A.; Jose Revueltas, escritor; licenciado Salvador Rodriguez, diputado; licenciado Antonio Ruiz Acosta, catedratico; doctor Andres Serra Rojas, senador; Gutierre Tibon, periodista; licenciado Juan Tovar; Jacobo Zabludowsky, periodista.

El Heraldo ... de 1966
ATTD to HMMA-29002
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La Voz de México, 15 May 1966
1830

Repudio a la farsa antisoviética

La organiza el Dpto. de Estado, denuncia la AMP

La Asociación Mexicana de Periodistas salió al paso a la campaña antisoviética iniciada hace dos semanas por un grupo al servicio del imperialismo norteamericano que se ostenta como "defensor de los judíos". En un documento firmado por el Lic. Xavier Campos Ponce, Antonio Caram y Gerardo D[illegible], presidente, secretario y vocal, respectivamente de la AMP, denuncian el carácter de la campaña difamatoria, presentan un hecho que sirve para corroborar que los hilos de toda [illegible] del imperialismo y demuestran con una serie de datos que en la Unión Soviética no existe discriminación contra los judíos.

Este documento fue emitido días antes del anunciado "Congreso Latinoamericano" que grupos subvencionados por el Departamento de Estado planeaban iniciar en México el sábado 14.

En la declaración de referencia se señala al principio que la persona encargada de recolectar firmas para el llamamiento que apareció en todos los diarios de esta ciudad el 21 de abril en "defensa de los derechos de los judíos en la Unión Soviética", es nada menos que la ciudadana norteamericana June Jacob, persona muy ligada con las policías norteamericanas que actúan en nuestro país y quien inmediatamente después de regresar de un largo viaje por Estados Unidos, Europa y el Medio Oriente, se dedicó a conseguir firmas de intelectuales y personalidades progresistas, para el documento antisoviético, que sirve de base para la convocatoria de un congreso supuestamente dirigido a "defender a los judíos

(Pasa a la pág. 4)

Repudio

(Viene de la pág. 1)

residentes [illegible] la URSS". Los firmantes del [illegible] fueron sorprendidos hábilmente y muchos de ellos mantienen una actitud de desconfianza hacia los promotores de la campaña.

Respecto de una de las "peticiones" que se hace en el llamamiento antisoviético para "que se conceda a los judíos soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanzas, etc.", la AMP dice: "... los dos millones y tercio de judíos que forman parte del pueblo soviético viven exactamente igual que el resto de las 109 nacionalidades y de los 11 grupos afines a nacionalidades extranjeras. En cuanto a su cultura específica, como todas las del mundo tiende a fusionarse y a unificarse... los judíos en todas partes asisten a las mismas escuelas donde van los rusos, ucranianos, uzbecos, etc. Reciben, como todos los demás, educación gratuita en todos los niveles". Otros datos que demuestran que la discriminación de judíos en la URSS es sólo una invención de los agentes a sueldo del gran capital yanqui, son los siguientes:

En la biblioteca Lenin de Moscú hay 70.000 libros en yidish y 50.000 volúmenes en ese mismo idioma, en la Schedrin de Leningrado. Los judíos en la URSS disponen de publicaciones en su idioma, así por ejemplo la revista mensual "Yidish Hemland" tira 25.000 ejemplares. Se publican ediciones de autores judíos tanto soviéticos como extranjeros que alcanzan tiradas de millones de ejemplares como es el caso de Sholem-Aleijem. Los hebreos disponen también de sus propios teatros.

"Además de ello —se dice en el documento—, disponen de una tierra particular, exclusiva, a la que muchos llaman patria propia y que existe desde mayo de 1934, mucho antes de que los héroes judíos de la postguerra arrancaran Israel al poder inglés... calculamos en medio millón los judíos que habitan en esa región autónoma llamada Birobidjan, la cual forma parte de la URSS y abarca una superficie de 32 mil kilómetros cuadrados", a continuación viene luego una lista detallada de la cantidad de escuelas, institutos, centros médicos, etc. que existen en dicha república autónoma.

"Mucho más podríamos citar —dice finalmente la declaración de la AMP— en contestación a los errores cometidos por ese grupo de personas firmantes del "llamado", pero lo amplio del tema nos obliga a detenernos aquí, por ahora..."

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SUCESOS DE ULTIMA HORA

LOS JUDIOS EN LA URSS

EL CAPITULO "MEXICANO" DE UNA INTRIGA INTERNACIONAL

LUBLIN es una ciudad polaca en la que Hitler pensó concentrar a los judíos en un hacinado ghetto de tantos millones de discriminados como habitantes tiene hoy Tokio. En el histórico avance para acabar con la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, Hitler consideró que en vez de concentrar a los judíos se creaba menos problemas si los mataba de una buena vez. En los crematorios y fosas de los campos de concentración erigidos por los nazis en su marcha hacia el oriente quedaron las cenizas y los cadáveres de seis millones de judíos. La lucha contra el nacifascismo costó a la URSS 20 millones de vidas humanas.

En la ciudad de Lublín Nació Jacob Glatstein. Joven aún emigró a los Estados Unidos y se convirtió, con el correr de los años, en una de las más brillantes figuras de la poesía y de la crítica literaria en lengua Idish. Tiene ahora 70 años y milita en las filas del partido Poalé Sión (Trabajadores de Sión), que agrupa a los sionistas de tendencia socialdemócrata de derecha. Los poalesionistas editan en Nueva York el semanario Indisher Kempfer (Luchador judío). En septiembre de 1965, y en este periódico, publicó Jacob Glatstein un comentario bibliográfico sobre Horizontes, una antología con la producción más reciente de los poetas judíos de la Unión Soviética que escriben en lengua Idish, de la que se acababan de editar en Moscú 5,000 ejemplares, número que el comentarista señaló como bastante considerable para una antología de poesía nueva en cualquier parte del mundo. Glatstein celebraba haber descubierto en Horizontes a por lo menos una docena de poetas de primer orden a quienes, decía, "elogio sin titubeos porque son maestros del verbo y notables artífices de lo emotivo y lo temático... El Idish en manos de los magistrales poetas de la Unión Soviética es una creación madura que se sustenta más en un sabor popular que en la gran poesía del pasado. Ahí se ha conservado una savia popular que ha ampliado verdaderamente sus horizontes". Ya para terminar su comentario Jacob Glatstein afirmaba: "La antología Horizontes viene a demostrar que la palabra poética Idish vive en la Unión Soviética".

La comunidad judía de habla Idish en México es una de las más jóvenes de la América Latina; tiene unos 60 años de existencia y unos 30 mil miembros que se concentran principalmente en la capital y en las ciudades de Monterrey y Guadalajara. Organizada al estilo tradicional, cuenta con un centro deportivo, varias sinagogas y nueve colegios e institutos de enseñanza, en cinco de los cuales se enseña a los jóvenes la lengua Idish. En estos 60 años, hubo en México tres poetas que crearon en Idish obra digna de consideración: Itzjok Berliner, Moishe Glikowski y Jacobo Glantz. Los dos primeros han muerto y el sobreviviente, Jacobo Glantz, decidió en 1963 a los 61 años de edad, cambiar el Idish por el español, porque su poesía en aquel idioma, a pesar de los colegios e institutos que lo enseñan, no cuenta con lectores en México.

Ahora bien, Jacob Glantz, poeta Idish de México, que nació en Ucrania 15 años antes del estallido de la Revolución de Octubre, y que antes de su emigración a este país, en 1925, había sido profesor de literatura en Odesa no firmó el "Llamado de conciencia" que el 22 de abril publicó en todos los periódicos de la capital el denominado Comité Mexicano Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética, que preside Carlos Pellicer, eminente poeta mexicano que no sólo no lee el Idish sino que no sabe nada de poesía o de literatura en esa lengua.

Ese llamado, que Pellicer firmó aunque seguramente no redactó, porque los términos que lo com-

La numerosa concurrencia, presidida por don Martín Luis Guzmán.

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ponen son casi idénticos a los ... llamados similares que han venido circulando en el último lustro en muchos países, solicitaba ... que nada al gobierno de la URSS "que confiera a los judíos soviéticos el derecho a desarrollar libremente su cultura específica, con medios idénticos a aquellos de que disponen las demás culturas nacionales: teatros, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros, enseñanza, etc.".

Pellicer es poeta —¡quién lo duda!—, y las savias de su sensibilidad y de su forma poética son la realidad mexicana, las tradiciones nacionales y esa



Carlos Pellicer, el poeta; Martín Luis Guzmán, el escritor; Jacobo Mondlak, el organizador.

lengua que él depura y elabora porque la habla su pueblo y hay textos, periódicos, bibliotecas, teatros y escuelas por medio de los cuales la lengua y su correspondiente cultura se desarrollan libremente. Pellicer, que es poeta, ¿puede creer que existan poetas con "luminosa potencia creadora", que las savias populares amplíen sus horizontes, que un idioma sea elaborado con "tanto conocimiento y virtuosismo, con tan original y extraordinaria plasticidad" allí donde la cultura en ese idioma no tiene el derecho a desarrollarse libremente? ¿Lo creen así poetas de la talla de Rosario Castellanos, de José Emilio Pacheco, de Miguel Guardia, de León Felipe, o escritores que conocen los auténticos secretos del difícil y vivo oficio de las letras, como Max Aub, Alí Chumacero, Juan García Ponce, Jorge Ibargüengoitia, Vicente Leñero, Carlos Monsiváis, José Revueltas y Gutierre Tibón, que junto con Pellicer firmaron ese "Llamado de conciencia", que de tal sólo tiene el título, pues el nombre que le correspondería, después de someterlo a un riguroso análisis objetivo, sería el muy ionesquiano de "Llamado de un grupo de mal informados que firmaron porque dicen que les dijeron lo que no les consta porque no saben nada al respecto y la culpa de todo la tiene Bertrand Russel?"

Donde no aparece la firma de don Martín Luis. El ya anciano (79 años) autor de El águila y la serpiente y La sombra del caudillo, el escritor Martín Luis Guzmán, gusta del infantil juego de las escondidillas. En 1965 fue él quien convenció a Carlos Pellicer para que juntos asistieran a la Conferencia Latinoamericana Sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS que se celebró en Río de Janeiro los días 14 y 15 de septiembre de ese año. Pero he aquí que entre las 53 firmas que suscribieron el "Llamado de conciencia", que apareció en cuartos de plana, al día siguiente, en todos los diarios, en inserción ... por la norteamericana June Cob, no aparece el nombre de don Martín. ¿Se había retirado arrepentido? Al contrario, prefirió en ese momento no salir a la liza porque estaba atareadísimo desde hacía mes y medio firmando, como cabeza del Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética, las cartas en las que se invitaba a intelectuales mexicanos y latinoamericanos a concurrir a la conferencia que se efectuaría "en la ciudad de México durante los días 13 a 15 de mayo próximo y que se ocupará, como objetivo único, en examinar detenidamente el problema a que la minoría israelita hace frente en la Unión Soviética".

Según esas cartas, el comité organizador de la conferencia lo integraban, junto con don Luis Martín, el Dr. Luis Garrido y los licenciados André Serra Rojas y Carlos Pellicer. Mas he aquí que ninguna de estas personas se presentó en la conferencia de prensa que el Comité Mexicano Pro Derechos de los Judíos de la Unión Soviética dio en el edificio central de la comunidad israelita de México (Acapulco 70), el 21 de abril. Ahí apareció como presidente uno de los pocos judíos (10 en total) que habían firmado el llamado, un tal Jacobo Mondlak que es comerciante pero se dice escritor por los artículos que publica en un periódico que sale algunas veces al año, Tribuna Sionista, órgano del más ultraderechista de los grupos sionistas que existen en México.

El asistente de Mondlak en la conferencia de prensa era otro de los pocos firmantes judíos del documento, Sergio Guzik, actor aficionado ... que le presentarse en los espectáculos de Juan José Gurrola y que tiene con Walter Rubinstein y F. Mondragón una oficina —Consultores Técnicos de Negocios— donde se conciertan operaciones financieras con empresas israelíes, privadas o estatales. Esa oficina, en el Paseo de la Reforma No. 122, 6o. piso fue la que se ocupó en distribuir libros, folletos y reproducciones fotostáticas y mimeografiadas de documentos sobre la situación de los judíos en la URSS, antes, durante y después de la conferencia de prensa, y de preparar el material que utilizarían los intelectuales que se reunieron en el hotel Del Prado los días 14 y 15 de mayo.

Que el interés de don Martín Luis era muy grande lo prueba el hecho de que fue él quien llevó la voz cantante en la entrevista que el comité tuvo en los primeros días de abril con el secretario de Gobernación, Lic. Luis Echeverría, para solicitarle el permiso de rigor para que la conferencia pudiera celebrarse. Y fue él también quien ocupó desde el primer momento la presidencia de la reunión Del Prado

El santo Bertrand Russell. El gran pacifista Bertrand Russell, tan admirado en el mundo entero por sus protestas contra todo brote belicista, ha sido el consagrado ajonjolí de este mole antisoviético: a él se le atribuye un mensaje cuya autenticidad plena convendría averiguar, pues ni el estilo ni los conceptos corresponden a los de otros documentos que sobre este mismo asunto firmó Russell. Extraño resulta que el comité haya descuidado la presentación de una copia fotostática con la firma del sabio inglés. En lugar de eso se distribuyó una dizque traducción en papel con membrete de la Conferencia Latinoamericana de Estudios Sobre la Situación de la Minoría Judía en la URSS, y pie de página que dice: "organizada por el Comité Pro Defensa de los Derechos de los Judíos en la Unión Soviética". El "mensaje" de Lord Russell está redactado en un estilo burdo, digno de la pequeñez espiritual del señor Mondlak.

Con todo y su orientación humanitaria burguesa, los mensajes de Russell que se conocen estaban

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expresados con dignidad y con un respeto esencial por los grandes logros de los países socialistas. Hace apenas un año, Russell comenzaba así su mensaje a una conferencia similar celebrada en abril de 1965 en Estocolmo: "Es de gran importancia que la situación de los judíos en la Unión Soviética no sea utilizada como arma en la guerra fría. Hay muchos en Occidente que buscan cualquier oportunidad para continuar e intensificar la división del mundo entre el Este y el Oeste...

La autoridad democrática de Bertrand Russell está avalada por su decidida posición antimperialista, y para muestra basta un párrafo de su mensaje a la Conferencia Tricontinental efectuada en enero de 1966 en La Habana, Cuba. "Por toda la América Latina —dice—, regímenes corrompidos y tiránicos asesinan al pueblo y lo mantienen en un estado de inanición y enfermedad debido al apoyo militar y económico de la camarilla gobernante norteamericana para los tiranos locales. Tan pronto como el pueblo se alza contra la opresión, el poderío militar norteamericano entra directamente en acción. ¿Por qué, entonces, los pueblos del mundo han de confiar su destino a aquellos que colaboran con los regímenes títeres o tratan de encubrir a los notorios verdugos? Los frutos de tal política pueden verse dondequiera que ha sido aplicada: en Iraq o Indonesia, en Guatemala o en Brasil".

¿Cuántos de los conspicuos representantes de gorilas que don Martín Luis logró reunir en el Prado los días 14 y ... se atreverían a firmar junto con Russell este mensaje? ¿Y qué experto en política puede creer en la autenticidad plena de ese mensaje que fue mostrado como de Russell, enviado a un bananero ramillete de "intelectuales" procedentes de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panamá, Nicaragua, Colombia, Guatemala y Venezuela, que jamás han hecho declaración alguna en contra de sus gobiernos serviles, traidores a sus pueblos, ni han puesto el grito en el cielo porque los neonazis revanchistas de la República Federal Alemana le dan al Estado de Israel un crédito de 100 millones de marcos para "promover una colaboración continua entre ambos países", a pesar de las cenizas todavía calientes de los seis millones de judíos que fueron víctimas ayer de los generosos acreedores de hoy, ni se han reunido a conferenciar para ver qué se puede hacer contra el agresivo antisemitismo de los grupos ultras de Argentina, Uruguay, Brasil y otros países de la América Latina?

Faltó otra firma. En la fotostática que se distribuyó del mensaje del ausente Carlos Pellicer a los reunidos en el Prado, cualquier James Bond hubiera podido notar que, siendo copia fotostática, no traía la firma autografiada del poeta, y que no habiendo asistido Pellicer por encontrarse en Tabasco, como lo notificaron varios periódicos, la carta dirigida a los delegados estaba fechada en México, D. F.

"Detrás de nosotros —afirmaba en su mensaje Pellicer— no hay ninguna fuerza que nos mueva a actuar como lo estamos haciendo. Sería terrible saber que Bertrand Rusell el gran filósofo inglés, protesta, como lo ha hecho por el asunto que nos reúne, impulsado por algún gobierno. El insigne escritor inglés es uno de los espíritus más altos y limpios de todos los tiempos y nos honra pensar como él en esta cuestión judía".

¿No ha pensado Pellicer, que tan sabiamente maneja el hermetismo de los símbolos de la estatuaria antigua, que muchas veces el más honrado credo antirracista y antidiscriminatorio puede por ingenuidad, coincidir con las determinaciones de los Barry Goldwater y otros campeones del racismo y la discriminación? ¿Cómo puede Pellicer poner en primer plano el problema de los judíos de la URSS, los únicos que hoy en día producen una viva, una renovada cultura en ídish en todo el mundo, a pesar de las grandes concentraciones de judíos en los Estados Unidos y en Argentina, olvidando que es en Alemania Occidental donde sí se profanan con alarmante frecuencia los viejos cementerios judíos y las tantas veces vilipendiadas sinagogas?

El día en que se revele la trama invisible de este asunto, ante el cual los judíos de la URSS han tenido que reaccionar diciendo un "No me ayudes compadre", se verá que todo se origina en la guerra fría y en la necesidad de hacer olvidar la guerra en Vietnam y la discriminación contra los negros.



La dinámica Juno Cob.

Un Agente de la [illegible] y de la [illegible] en la Asociación de Escritores de México

El sábado 28 de mayo, en la página [illegible] del diario Excélsior el tesorero de la Asociación de Escritores de México, Lic. Vicente Echeverría del Pr[illegible], publicó un pequeño aviso advirtiendo a los [illegible] que no se dejen sorprender por la señorita June Cobb, quien por su cuenta y riesgo se había tomado la libertad de cobrar y recibir cuotas de inscripción o mensuales en nombre de la AEM.

El 30 de mayo, Lunes de Excélsior comentaba un "sorprendente ciclo de conferencias imaginado por Wilberto Cantón, June Cobb y Piazza" y que se efectuaría en el Instituto Cultural Israelí, A. C.

¿Quién es June Cobb? Es una ciudadana norteamericana que ha pasado por México muchas veces en la última década y ha fijado aquí su residencia, después de haber sido expulsada de la República de Cuba, acusada de ser agente provocador de la FBI. Antes de eso, y como agente de la Interpol, había colaborado de manera determinante para descubrir una poderosa red de traficantes de drogas en Lima, Perú.

Su centro de actividades en México es justamente la Asociación de Escritores donde ha logrado arraigar como ayudante de confianza del secretario Miguel Guardia y del presidente de la AEM, el poeta Carlos Pellicer, presidente que de hecho ha delegado sus funciones en esta señorita "servicial" y turbulenta, que ha tenido el cuidado de lograr un antecedente que la ligara a los escritores de la América Latina: tradujo al inglés el famoso libro del Dr. Juan José Arévalo, El tiburón y las sardinas, y después el libelo anticomunista del renegado guatemalteco Carlos Manuel Pellicer.

En la secretaría de Gobernación June Cobb figura como corresponsal extranjera, lo que le daría derecho a pertenecer al Club de Corresponsales Extranjeros que tiene su sede en el hotel Hilton, y no a una asociación nacional como la de escritores, que tiene su sede en esa especie de multifamiliar de grupos de periodistas e intelectuales que es el Club de Periodistas de México.

June Cobb conoce muy bien los círculos culturales mexicanos, pues ha buscado amistad con pintores, escritores, actores, músicos y demás especialistas en la creación artística. ¿Qué misión vino a cumplir en nuestro país? Se sabe que trabaja a las órdenes del periodista Daniel James, responsable en la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de una oficina cuya función consiste en penetrar en los círculos intelectuales, tanto de los Estados Unidos como de otros países, usando como fachada supuestos encargos de investigaciones para universidades estadunidenses.

Si en el Perú la señorita Cobb pudo decirle a la Interpol "misión cumplida", según van las cosas, en México el reporte ante su jefe Daniel James y la Agencia Central de Inteligencia no será tan escueto ni tan brillante. En el cálculo de probabilidades que en torno a este extraño personaje hicieron los organismos de penetración y provocación de los Estados Unidos no tuvieron en cuenta que para moverse entre intelectuales no sólo hay que ser singularmente inteligente, como lo es la señorita Cobb, sino que, además y también, hay que ser intelectual, trabajar como intelectual, dormir y pensar como intelectual. Y resulta que la señorita Cobb trabaja, piensa, actúa y hasta duerme como agente secreto, aunque indiscreto.

No deja de llamar la atención el que por segunda vez aparezca [illegible] con el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí, ahora en el ciclo de conferencias. ¿Qué pasa con el teatro en México?", que "imaginaron" ella y Luis Guillermo Piazza y coordinó Wilberto Cantón, secretario de actividades teatrales de la Asociación de Escritores de México. Antes fue la Conferencia Latinoamericana sobre la Situación de los Judíos en la URSS, en cuya preparación mostróse muy activa la directora cultural del Instituto, Susana Gamboa, quien trató de que algunos grandes periódicos dedicaran sus suplementos culturales al tema de la "discriminación" de los judíos en la Unión Soviética, maniobra provocadora de la cual SUCESOS ha informado ampliamente.

Aunque la cultura siempre adorna y es agradable, da qué pensar el hecho de que a partir del ingreso de Sara Susana [illegible] (verdadero nombre de Susana Gamboa) el Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí haya incrementado una serie de actividades que exceden la función específica de tales institutos, que es el intercambio cultural de México con [illegible] país amigo. El Instituto Cultural Mexicano-Israelí opera como una Dirección de Difusión Cultural o como un Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes, y no se percibe en sus programas (como ocurre con el Instituto Mexicano-Norteamericano, o con el Anglo-Mexicano, o el Francés para la América Latina, o el de Intercambio Cultural Mexicano-Ruso) el interés o la intención de divulgar en México los valores tradicionales y las conquistas actuales de la muy antigua y a la vez muy joven cultura Israelí.

La bohemia un tanto cuanto camp que ha cundido en cierto sector de la intelectualidad mexicana ha sido buen caldo de cultivo para el planecito Camelot que seguramente trae en cartera la "servicial" June Cobb. Quizá no esté muy lejano el momento en que figuras tan respetadas como Francisco Monterde, Salvador Novo, Héctor Azar, Celestino Gorostiza, Luis Reyes de la Maza, Carlos Solórzano y otros se pregunten alarmados qué intereses culturales pueden compartir con un brillante y dinámico agente femenino de la Interpol, la FBI y la ACI.

Al centro, el escritor alemán Günter Grass; a la derecha, la señorita June Cobb y el escritor Monteforte Toledo.



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ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES DE MEXICO, A. C.

El aviso publicado en los principales diarios de esta Capital el día 25 de mayo del año en curso, y suscrito por la Tesorería de la A.E.M.A.C., parece atribuir, por un mero error de redacción, el manejo indebido de fondos, a la Srita June Cobb, Secretaria Adjunta de la Asociación y, por lo mismo, nos complace aclarar que sólo se trataba de hacer una delimitación de funciones entre la Secretaría General de la Asociación y la Tesorería de la misma.

México, D.F., a 25 de mayo de 1956.

El Tesorero General,

[signature]

Arq. Vicente Echeverría del Prado.

AVISO
[illegible]ACION DE ESCRITORES
DE MEXICO, A. C.

[illegible] del conocimiento de [illegible] de la Asociación de Escritores de México, A. C. que la señorita June [illegible] autorizada para cobrar y recibir cuotas de [illegible] mensuales [illegible] que son exclusivas [illegible] suplica a [illegible] asociados que hayan en[illegible] dinero a la mencionada señorita [illegible] comunicarse con el [illegible] [illegible] sola No. 20, Ciudad.
México, D. F. Mayo de [illegible]
El Tesorero de la Asociación Vicente Echeverría del Prado.

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After 1250, 9 June

7.7 In. Leonov asks maid, who answers, for Enrique (Semo).
ES takes phone. ES has been looking for Leonov. Yes, L. got the message but at noontime, when ES is at home, Leonov has been very busy. (They talk to each other in familiar form.)
The University of Puebla has decided to invite a series of Ambs. to talk about the economic achievements of their countries. At the Economy School. France, USSR, U.S., Czech and other countries are invited. ES has the letter of invitation for Soviet Amb. What does Leonov think about this? Could this arrange this? They can try. Leonov understands that the Amb. is going onx vacations to Moscow at the end of this month, in 2 or 3 weeks. He is only waiting for the Councillor who is in Moscow (now) and Amb. will leave right after his return. Amb. will return in August. Perhaps there is someone else who could represent the Amb. The Councillor could go or some other "high-class" attache. Or First Secretary. ES says perhaps Leonov. No, he is too ignorant (joking). No. Leonov would be very good since he could talk Spanish. No, any person who would go, would speak Spanish. Yes, this is a lecture. It would be a person who speaks Spanish. ES thinks this would be a positive (act), a good opportunity. Leonov agrees. ES leaves Mexico today for 2 days. Perhaps they could see about this on Monday. ES could xxx send Leonov the letter meanwhile and then on Monday they can get together. Yes, they can set the time and place and will really meet. Leonov has no engagement on Monday so they could see each other at any time ES wants. ES asks if it wouldn't be good to talk to Amb. or someone on Monday. Leonov will take this up. ES will send Leonov the letter and perhaps he could arrange an interview for Monday. Leonov thinks it is not worthwhile for ES to talk to him. Leonov will talk to him (Amb.) and he (Amb) will tell Leonov frankly how things are and Leonov will give ES the message.. Then, they can have lunch together on Monday. Fine. ES wil go by for Leonov at 1400 on Monday.
ES asks how Leonov liked all the things and articles on the Jewish matter. They (Soviets) have sent everything there (to USSR). L. liked all of it. ES says that Leonov know that ....fell immediately and there is absolutely nothing on this. Leonov comments that - Besides, the people who participated lost prestige. Yes, they suffer...ES laughs. No, Leonov can tell him about the name of some people who call Leonov at times and they ....ES says - The people who signed the document. No, Leonov says, including persons like June Cobb. She called Leonov. ES has no idea of the repentance. JC gave Leonov her phone, asking him to help her - so doors are not closed to her. ES is surprised. She - did not want them to catalog her among their enemies (of Soviets), that she had nothing to do...This is a matter of fear. Leonov will tell ES all about it on Monday.

Label on Semo
Enrique
[illegible] Reel 84-ES-248
9 June 1966 JUN 13 1966 Leonov
P

ATT I to HMMA 29207 201-278841

14-00000

Traitor or Idealist?

William Morgan, deprived of U.S. citizenship in 1959 and executed in Cuba for treason in 1961, was described in secret Senate testimony as a loyal American "with ideals" who fought with Fidel Castro to overthrow the Batista dictatorship and [illegible] Castro "to blow the whistle" when he "finally realized that the Communists were taking over."

Viola June Cobb, who worked in Havana in 1959 and 1960 and knew Morgan well, appeared before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in 1962. Her testimony was released yesterday at her request for unexplained reasons.

Post 23 May 66

Trial [illegible]

Washington Post 23 May 66

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201-278841

7/NH/1

Excelsior 21 March 69

Fiesta de María José Chopitea



CONCEPCION de López Belloso, María José Chopitea, María Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su día onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudió un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cocteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno R. Jiménez y señora, Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nicte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vélez Ladrón de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Angelina Ibarra, María del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas más.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

201

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

MARKED FOR INDEXING | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO:

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LICOOKY Progress Report: 1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES

Reference: HMMA-27358, 7 October 1965

1. Station regrets the delay in keeping Headquarters informed of the progress of our association with LICOOKY-1. When the proposed amendment to the LIREAM Project involving LICOOKY was turned down, we informed her on her return to Mexico that we could no longer justify the continued association at the present rate since we were simply not getting enough out of it, but that if she could regularize her status here and obtain working papers, we would be more than happy to conclude a new arrangement with her. She felt there was little chance of this, and we then told her we would conclude our arrangement with her sometime in the summer. As indicated in paragraph 2 of the attachment, the date has now been established as 30 June, at which time all outstanding financial arrangements with her will be terminated and she will be given her air fare to New York.

2. Unfortunately, LICOOKY-1 seems to be incapable of realizing which side her bread is buttered on, at least here in Mexico. She cannot parcel her time out to her various interests, and therefore finds all her time taken up by her unpaid AEMAC duties. The profiles we have been harping on have not materialized except for the one submitted under HMMA-28831. We still hope for one on Francisco VILLAGRAN Kramer and such of the Mexican literary figures as amount in her judgment to "non-pigmies." We are not sanguine. We are still after a copy of Osegueda's paper on university reform.

Attachment:
Progress Report (in triplicate), h/w

CONTINUED

Distribution:
3 - Chief, WHD, w/att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28944	17 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	50-6-129/3

3. The advance made her at Headquarters is being held over her as an inducement to give us the balance of her time before departure and finish in a blaze of activity. If she does this, we will write off the advance here. If she does not, $195 of the advance will be counted as her February salary, $48 as travel expenses from New York to Washington and the remainder will be written off.

4. Rather than go through the formality of a project amendment as per HMMW-14517, Station would prefer merely to consider the project as terminated as of 31 December 1956 and pick up subsequent costs in LIRANCH. A formal project termination will be submitted in the near [illegible].

for
Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

LICOOKY Project Progress Report
1 October 1965 - 30 April 1966

1. Production

a. LICOOKY-1 has continued to devote the bulk of her time to the Mexican Writers' Association (AEM). She continues to handle most of its administrative work. She also organizes and does most of the work on the majority of the projects or activities which the AEM sponsors.

b. L-1 continued to report on efforts to establish the Latin American Writers' Community (CLE), including the results of the Organizing Congress in Arica, Chile. She reported on the steps taken by Mario Monteforte Toledo in beginning preparations for an early 1967 Congress in Mexico and on the AEM's probable role in helping organize that Congress.

c. L-1 supplied information on reactions among the Central American community in Mexico to the Guatemalan election campaign and results.

d. She maintained contact with and reported on individuals of interest to the Station, including Monteforte Toledo, Carlos Pellicer Cámara, Manuel Germán Parra, Francisco Villagran Kramer, and Raúl Osegueda Pelala.

SECRET

14-00000

e. LICOOKY-2 continued to report travel of Communists or leftists from Central America to Eastern Europe. During this period he reported on eight such travelers.

2. Operations

a. L-1 has been notified that she will be terminated effective 30 June. She has been given the following requirements to be fulfilled before that date.

Provide profiles on the personality and politics of significant Mexican and Central American intellectuals with whom she is acquainted.

Obtain information on the newly-formed Latin American Writers' Community, its probable political development, and progress toward the holding of its scheduled meeting in Mexico City in January 1967.

Obtain a copy of the analysis written by Raúl Osegueda Pelala of the problems of autonomous universities.

Special tasks such as reporting on the activity of Stasia Madrigal and on the UNAM student strike.

b. In order to accomplish the above tasks in the short time remaining, L-1 will be forced to curtail her ac-

SECRET

tivities at the AEM. There are enough jobs that need doing at AEM to occupy her full-time and therefore the immediate partial withdrawal from AEM work is a prerequisite to the accomplishment of these assignments.

c. Because L-1 has played such a key role in all AEM activities, and therefore in determining the direction and scope of these activities, her sudden withdrawal could result in important changes within AEM. Any major change in direction by AEM would probably become predictable once the identity of the person or persons who will move in to fill the vacancy left by L-1 become known. By having L-1 step aside now, rather than waiting until she is ready to leave Mexico, she may then be able to provide Station with an accurate account of any change resulting from her withdrawal.

d. L-2 has not been met regularly since 25 January. On that date he was given a mailing address which he uses to request a meeting only if he has information to report. L-2 is paid on a piece-rate basis for information supplied and does not receive a regular salary.

SECRET

14-00000

3. **Security**

No change.

4. **Personnel**

Handling of LICOOKY-1 was taken over by Gary H. Reymander, from Howard T. Etsinger, on 12 January 1966.

5. **Plans**

a. See paragraph 2a above.

b. It is possible that L-2 will, in the very near future, lose access to the travel information which he has been reporting, because he is being given new responsibilities in the office where he works. L-2 is intelligent, conscientious, and well-motivated. If he does lose his present access, the Station will consider him for other assignments in which he could be useful.

14-00000

MORE IMPORTANT - HANDLING LIMITED COPIES WASTES OUR MOST IMPORTANT RESOURCE

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

INFO:

FROM: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

SUBJECT: Recruitment by Cuban Intelligence of IDEN

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Attached under separate cover for your information are two Headquarters memoranda concerning IDEN, a PBPRIME citizen, who was reported by LICOOKY-1 (an asset of Mexico City Station) to have been recruited by a Cuban intelligence officer assigned to HTBASTE.

FRANCES A. BUSALACCLI

19 April 1966

Attachment:
As Stated u/s/c/

Distribution:
3 - COS/JMWAVE u/s/c att.

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	UFGW-5981	05 MAY 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-794302

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:
1 - RID wo/att.
1 - WH/C/ESEC wo/att.
1 - WH/1/M wo/att.
2 - WH/C/CICS wo/att.
1 - WH/C/MO wo/att.

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/C/CICS	E. Ayers	nlk	455

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME
C/WH/C/CICS		
C/WH/C/MO		
WH/1/M		

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
A/DCWHD/C		John T. Flynn

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Raul OSEGUEDA Pelala

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached, at long last, is LICOOKY-1's profile on Subject. While it is not as penetrating as it might be, it is better than we had expected. It is unfortunate that "Janet" is not available to query about the material allegedly turned in following L-1's return from Venezuela, since she is so insistent that she gave Janet quite a bundle of information.

2. This is the first of a series of profiles we hope L-1 can get around to preparing before she leaves Mexico.

3. L-1 has been instructed to do her best to obtain Subject's manuscript on university reform, which is now in the hands of someone at the UNAM press. This could be a highly popular subject in the train of the current trouble at the UNAM.

4. ~~No indexing is requested~~ here since nothing of substance is said about anyone except subject.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Profile on OSEGUEDA, h/w

Distribution:
2 - Chief, WHD, w/att
1 - COS, Guatemala City, w/att

CS COPY

LICOOKY-201

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28831	3 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: ~~50-6-144/3~~ 201-58003

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 11

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FROM: Dissem By 24 Per WH/C #2

ACTION: DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

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INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

S E C R E T 170103Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347 17 May 66 IN 18825

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7076 (IN 13733)

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

3. FUTURE CONTACT TO BE VIA TRAVELERS BETWEEN HABANA AND MEXICO WHO WILL MAIL LETTERS IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. S WANTS AMERICAN MAGAZINES SENT HER VIA PRENSA LATINA. PRECISE EMPLOYMENT CUBA NOT CERTAIN. ALLEGEDLY CAN HAVE OLD JOB WITH PRENSA LATINA, BUT LICOOKY SUGGESTED SHE TRY CASA DE LAS AMERICAS.

4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

14-00000

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 2

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 Apr 65 IN 02733

DIR CITE MEXI 7276

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM
Dissem By 24 Per WH#2

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE, VR, C/WH2, C/CI

17 MAY 66 IN 18325

S E C R E T 172123Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7347

DIRECTOR

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 7075 (IN 13733)

1. STASHA ARRIVED MEXICO 17 APRIL BY EASTERN FROM NEW YORK. STATION NOT YET ABLE CONFIRM FROM AIRLISTS. DEPARTED FOR CUBA 24 APRIL.

2. S RETICENT ABOUT HER MIAMI SOJOURN. MENTIONED JERRY HEMING AND HIS FRIEND "HOWIE" WHO HELPED HER GET AROUND IN EXILE GROUP. IN WHAT LICOOKY INTERPRETED AS SLIP, S IDENTIFIED HER CUIS CASE OFFICER NEW YORK AS GUTIERREZ. SAID HAD GIVEN HIM SEVERAL ROLLS TAPE COVERING MIAMI VISIT.

3. FUTURE CONTACT TO BE VIA TRAVELERS BETWEEN HABANA AND MEXICO WHO WILL MAIL LETTERS IN COUNTRY OF DESTINATION. S WANTS AMERICAN MAGAZINES SENT HER VIA PRENSA LATINA. PRECISE EMPLOYMENT CUBA NOT CERTAIN. ALLEGEDLY CAN HAVE OLD JOB WITH PRENSA LATINA, BUT LICOOKY SUGGESTED SHE TRY CASA DE LAS AMERICAS.

4. LICOOKY FEELS S DRAWN BACK TO CUBA MORE BY PRACTICAL THAN IDEOLOGICAL OR EMOTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, SINCE GOVT WOULD SUPPLY HOUSING AND HUSBAND WOULD HAVE TO HELP SUPPORT CHILDREN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7347 S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH HER CONVERSATION SHOWED DESIRE TO FIND FIDELISTAS AND COMMUNISTS ON RIGHT TRACK, SHE NOT APPARENTLY FULLY COMMITTED TO INFALLIBILITY OF FIDELISMO. JUST BEFORE LEAVING MEXI, SHE AND LICOOKY PREPARED LETTER REQUESTING GOM GRANT HER TRANSIT VISA FOR RETURN TO U.S. WITHIN "APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS." LICOOKY WHO WILL FILE THIS LETTER WITH GOBERNACION SAYS IT IS JUST IN CASE MEASURE, SHOULD CUBAN SOJOURN NOT WORK OUT.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

FORM 4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FROM MEXICO CITY

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INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C 3, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 222348Z

23 APR 65 IN 02733

DIR CITE MEXI 7076

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF DIR 93349

1. ACCORDING LICOOKY ON RETURN FROM MIAMI, STASHA WAS ALMOST DETERMINED TO BREAK OFF GAME WITH CUIS AND STAY IN U.S. BUT WAS SO OVERCOME BY SQUALOR IN WHICH FORCED TO LIVE IN BRONX QUARTERS THAT IMPETUOUSLY DECIDED CHUCK IT AND RETURN CUBA, BUT STILL NOT CONVINCED WISDOM THIS DECISION.

2. AS OF 22 APRIL, STASHA APPARENTLY HAD NOT HAD WIT TO GO CUBANA OFFICES ABOUT TICKETS PER TELECON WITH HUSBAND. MERELY WENT AIRPORT AND CHECKED BAGGAGE THROUGH 21 APRIL. NOT CLEAR HOW SHE DID THIS WITHOUT TICKET, BUT AS OF 1000 THIS DATE STILL DID NOT HAVE TICKETS. DOUBTFUL THEREFORE THAT WILL MAKE 22 APRIL PLANE. HOPES MAKE 25 APRIL FLIGHT.

3. S ARRIVED HERE 17 APRIL BY AIR. LINE NOT YET KNOWN.

4. NOT CERTAIN WHAT HQS HAS IN MIND RE "UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION." HOWEVER LICOOKY CERTAIN S WILL WANT COMMUNICATE AND NO PROBLEM ABOUT SUGGESTING NEUTRAL ADDRESS SINCE L HAS NO WISH GET S IN TROUBLE WITH CUBANS. WILL

LICOOKY

Stewart

SECRET

14-00000

OBTAIN L ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING S DEPARTURE.

S E C R E T

CFN 7076 98349 MIAMI STASHA CUIS U.S. BRONX CUBA NOT CONVINCED 22 STASHA NOT HAD WIT 21 NOT CLEAR 1000 NOT HAVE 22 25 S 17 NOT YET NOT CERTAIN HQS S NO PROBLEM L NO WISH S CUBANS L S

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 4

ORIG: [illegible]/[illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] APR 65

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302
201-[illegible]

SECRET

TO: MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
PRIORITY

CONF: [illegible]   INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO PRTY MEXI   INFO   CITE DIR

98349

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN AMROD LICOOKY

REF A. MEXI 7049 (IN 00938)
B. MEXI 6703 (IN 91562)

1. NO FURTHER INTELL RQS BUT WOULD LIKE KNOW WHEN AND HOW STASHA ARRIVED MEXI. FYI ONLY ODENVY WAS ADVISED OF STASHAS TRAVEL PLANS PER REF B; HOWEVER WE HAVE NOT BEEN ADVISED OF ANY COVERAGE MADE OR ACTION TAKEN BY ODENVY AS A RESULT. HQS ADVISING ODENVY STASHAS PRESENCE MEXI AND THAT WE HAVE COVERAGE.

2. INFO PARA 2 REF, I. E., NERVOUSNESS AT LACK TRAVEL FUNDS, UNCERTAINTY OF FUTURE, DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND DEPENDENCE LICOOKY MIGHT SUGGEST POSSIBILITY LICOOKY REASSESS AND HANDLE CONTACT WITH STASHA WITH POSSIBLE FUTURE PITCH IN MIND FOR EVENTUAL USE IN PLACE CUBA. IF PROGNOSIS FAVORABLE, MIGHT THINK IN TERMS LICOOKY PUSH EFFORT MAINTAIN MAIL CONTACT STASHA ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE CONTACT OUTSIDE CUBA FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PITCH. MIGHT THUS BE ABLE OBTAIN COPIES ANY LETTERS FROM STASHA AND MONITOR HER FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH FATHER OF HER CHILD AND HER REACTION TO LIVING AND WORKING IN CUBA. IF REASSESSMENT UNFAVORABLE, WOULD LIKE SEE UNWITTING ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED FOR CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION. NOT THINKING IN TERMS CRASH PITCH PRIOR REPORTED

CONTINUED.../

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM

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UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING	
1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 98349

DEPARTURE [illegible] THIS AND HER PROBABLE INABILITY DISSEMBLE IN CUBA ON [illegible] ANY SUCH PITCH.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Refs reported presence of Ana "Stasha" Sokolowska in Mexico, contact with her through LICOOKY, and "Stasha's plans travel Cuba via Mexico.

WH/C/CICS
WH/C/FI/[illegible] (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA/C. Anderson (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 9

2/4 SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: DC/WH/C 3 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☑ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED UNIT WH/C TIME 0240Z BY 8

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

S E C R E T 210135Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 7049

21 Apr 66 IN 00988

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD

REF DIR 92045

1. STASHA (S) NOW IN TOWN STAYING BOARDING HOUSE. LICOOKY SPENDING CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH HER AND HOPES GET ANSWERS REF QUESTIONS BY END 20 APRIL SESSION.

2. S DID GREAT DEAL WRITING DURING MIAMI TRIP MOSTLY ON COMMUNAL FORMATIONS OF MIAMI EXILES WHICH GAVE TO NY CUIS CASE OFFICER. ARRIVED MEXI WITH NO TRAVEL FUNDS AND AFTER NEAR HYSTERIA FOUND HUSBAND HAD SENT TICKETS TO CUBANA OFFICE HERE. PLANS TAKE 22 APRIL CUBANA FLIGHT THOUGH DOES NOT KNOW HOW LONG WILL REMAIN CUBA. DEFINITELY HOPES GO TO POLAND TO IMPROVE POLISH AND WHILE THERE MAKE UP MIND WHETHER WANTS CONTINUE CUBAN ASSOCIATION. WHOLE ATTITUDE HERE IS ONE OF DISTRUST VALIDITY HER OWN DECISIONS AND CONSTANTLY ASKS L FOR ADVICE. L HAS SO FAR AVOIDED GIVING ANY.

3. REYMANDER SEES LICOOKY AT 1000 LOCAL TIME 21 APRIL AND CAN RELAY ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS HQS WISHES PUT. SECRET

Licooky-1 201

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET IN 209.8 PAGE 2/2

4. PARA 2 ABOVE NEGATES LINLUCK REPORT PARA 2 MEXI 6783.

SECRET

CFN 7049 92845 STASHA S 28 S MIAMI MIAMI NY CUIS NO TRAVEL CUBANA 28 CUBANA NOT KNOW CUBA POLAND POLISH CUBAN L L REYMANDER 1323 21 HAS 2 LINLUCK 2 6783

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

26 SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH/C 8, CI, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CI/CA

ACTION

S E C R E T 062030Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6783

LICOOKY

REF: DIR 90202 *

* ODENVY MAY WISH INTERVIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES.

6 Apr 65 91562

1. LICOOKY-1 REPORTS RECEIVED CALL FROM STASHA ON 4 APRIL. STASHA HAD BEEN BACK IN NEW YORK FOR ABOUT WEEK AWAITING CUBAN VISA. WILL BE COMING THROUGH MEXI AS SOON AS VISA RECEIVED.

2. CONFLICTING REPORT FROM LINLUCK SAME DAY SAYS LICOOKY CALLED HIM TO SAY HAD JUST FINISHED TELECON WITH STASHA WHO SAID WOULD BE ARRIVING MEXI 7 APRIL AND LEAVING FOR CUBA 11 APR. SINCE CANNOT CALL DISCREPANCY TO ATTENTION EITHER SOURCE, STATION CANNOT RESOLVE CONFLICT UNTIL AFTER DATES MENTIONED.

S E C R E T

CFN 6783 90202 LICOOKY-1 4 STASHA LINLUCK LICOOKY 7 CUBA 11CANNOT CANNOT

BT

SECRET

WH/C/ Castro passed info orally to FBI, Sam Papich - FBI said no action required LICOOKY-1

B

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 7

ORIG: PATRICIA L. JOHNSON:car
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PA
EXT: 4198/1502
DATE: 29 MAR 66

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-794302 201-278841

3 SECRET

☐ DISC ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

TO: MEXICO
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C 3 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY 30 MAR 66 18 23z
C/EI/SD, C/WH 2, C/CI

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 92045

TYPIC LICOOKY AMROD

DISSEM PER WH/C #2

REF: DIR 90202*

1. HAVE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMTS FOR SOKOLOWSKA WHEN SHE GOES CUBA IF LICOOKY-1 THINKS SHE CAN LOGICALLY ASK THEM:

A. ANYTHING SHE CAN FIND OUT ABOUT CURRENT ARRESTS, PARTICULARLY IN MILITARY SPHERE.

B. ANY SIGNS PSP TYPES RETURNING TO POWER IN WAKE OF CURRENT PURGES.

D. IS DR. JOSE BUSTAMANTE, OLD COMMUNIST, STILL TREATING FIDEL CASTRO?

E. ANY INDICATION HILDA GADEA RETURNING CUBA?

2. REQUEST THAT LICOOKY-1 TRY PERSUADE SOKOLOWSKA TO CORRESPOND WITH HER FROM CUBA, POSSIBLY VIA CUTOUT SUCH AS SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER, TOUCHING ON ABOVE MATTERS, IF IT CAN BE DONE DISCREETLY.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C Comment: *Sokolowska, old friend of LICOOKY-1, recruited by CUIS and returning to Cuba to join husband.

C/WH/C/CA/PA

C/WH/C/CA

C/WH/C/RR

A/D C/WH/C

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JOHN T. FLYNN DC/WH/C

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING | XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING | MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LICOOKY reports on Raul OSEGUEDA and Juan Jose AREVALO

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Reference: MEXI-6574

Attached herewith are reports prepared by LICOOKY-1 on OSEGUEDA and AREVALO in January 1961 shortly after her return from Venezuela. No trace could be found of any additional reports though both reports indicated she planned to provide more information later.

Elsie I. SCALETTI

Attachment:
2 rpts.

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City w/att h/w

21 March 1961

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-14432

DATE: 24 MAR 1961

CS COPY

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

RI

Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT.
WH/1	C. Bustos	m	4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
C/WH/1	22 March	J. C. King (for) Kaufman

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG : C. BUSTOS-VIDELA
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 22 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

2/ SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

23 ... 28 31 Z

TO : MEXI

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8

INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY C/FPS C/CI 2 C/DO4 FI, FI/INT 2

WH C 8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 90202

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 6574 (IN 77407)*

1. HQS HAS LOCATED WHAT APPEARS BE AREVALO AND OSEGUEDA REPORTS PREPARED BY LICOOKY-1 (L-1) IN 1961. POUCHING COPIES HMMW-14432. FYI "JANET" RESIGNED EARLY 1963.

2. ODENVY REPORTS SOKOLOWSKA UNDER SURVEILLANCE MIAMI NOW, AND ACCORDING CURRENT INFO PROBABLY WILL RETURN NEW YORK FOR MEETING WITH HER CASE OFFICER PRIOR TRAVELING MEXI AND ONWARD HABANA. ODENVY WILL KEEP KUBARK ADVISED OF HER TRAVEL PLANS. POSSIBILITY ODACID WILL LIFT HER PASSPORT.

3. IF SOKOLOWSKA SEES L-1 IN MEXI, ONLY REQUIREMENT IS FOR L-1 TO ELICIT ANY INFO SHE CAN RE SOKOLOWSKA'S ACTIVITY MIAMI, PARTICULARLY RE FULFILLMENT OF HER CASE OFFICER'S INSTRUCTIONS, AND HER PLANS FOR HABANA. IN CASE SOKOLOWSKA EXITS CUBA VIA MEXI, L-1 SHOULD ELICIT WHAT SHE CAN AND OBTAIN TRAVEL PLANS.

4. ODENVY MAY WISH TO INTERVIEW LICOOKY ON HER NEXT TRIP TO STATES. AT TIME OF NEXT TRIP PLEASE ARRANGE CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS WE CAN PASS TO ODENVY.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-1 (201)

WH Comment: *Request Headquarters look again for LICOOKY reports on AREVALO and OSEGUEDA. Request requirements for LICOOKY against SOKOLOWSKA.

WH/C/Mr. Castero (in draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

7/WH/1

LICOOKY

Excelsior 21 March 69

AB Sociedad

Fiesta de María José Chopitea

CONCEPCION de López Bellosо, María José Chopitea, María Asúnsulo de Colín y June Cobb

Con motivo de su día onomástico, la escritora María José Chopitea ofreció la noche del sábado en su departamento de la calle Río Po, una alegre reunión.

Acudió un numeroso grupo de escritores, pintores, poetas, periodistas, quienes felicitaron a la anfitriona y disfrutaron de una velada muy alegre.

Los cócteles y bocadillos circularon al gusto de los presentes quienes cantaron y declamaron, en un derroche de inspiración.

"La Llorona" fue interpretada por un rato largo casi interminable, porque los versos se sucedían unos a otros en diferentes bocas.

Estanislao Rodríguez Ibarra, intérprete del salterio, deleitó a los concurrentes entre los que estaban, licenciado Benigno B. Jiménez y señora, Cecilia viuda de Espinosa Altamirano, Horacio Espinosa Altamirano, Helia D'Acosta, Marina Krauss, Juan García Jiménez, Eduardo Sierralta, Cristina Torres, Ivonne Garrido, Nicte Ha, María Asúnsolo de Colín, licenciado Mario Colín, Filiberto Aguilar, María del Carmen Aguilar, Manuel Vélez Ladrón de Guevara, Juan Fanhausser y señora, Cecilia Cárdenas, Fernando Gaytán, Angel Cañas y señora, Angelina Ibarra, Mara del Carmen Fuentes, y muchas más.

LICOOKY

201

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE VR C/OPS C/IC2 C/BA FI

S E C R E T 171941Z

17 MAR 63 IN 77407

DIR CITE MEXI 6574

LICOOKY

REFS A DIR [illegible]

B MEXI 6419 (IN 66243)

1. LICOOKY STILL INSISTS ON COMPLETION HER FIRST TRIP VENEZUELA (SEE PARA 4 HMMW-9800, JUNE 61) ABOUT FEB 61 AFTER WHICH SHE RETURNED DIRECTLY TO ZRMETAL, SHE MET "JANET" AND UNKNOWN CASE OFFICER(APPARENTLY PBRUMEN SPECIALIST) IN NO LONGER REMEMBERED HOTEL AND DELIVERED TO JANET EXTENSIVE PROFILES OSEGUEDA AND AREVALO. STATION PARTICULARLY INTERESTED RECOVERING OSEGUEDA WRITEUP TO BE USED AS BASIS UPDATED REPORT. NOTE THESE OCCURRENCES PRIOR STATION CONNECTION LICOOKY. OUR FILES BEGIN JUNE 61. APPRECIATE HQS EFFORT LOCATE AND QUERY "JANET."

SECRET

prepared [illegible] '63

Licooky-1

14-00000

2. LICOOKY REPORTS ON 15 MARCH TRIED RETURN PHONE CALL WHICH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL MADE HER IN NEW YORK 10 MAR. LEFT HER PHONE NUMBER WITH S HOTEL SWITCHBOARD. SAYS S WILL SURELY CALL HER AND PROBABLY STAY WITH HER WHEN COMES THROUGH MEXI. ADVISE WHAT ACTION MEXI TO TAKE.

S E C R E T

CFN 6574 A DIR 88211 B MEXI 6419 VENEZUELA 4 HMMW-9800 JUNE 61 FEB 61 JANET NO LONGER HOTEL OSEGUEDA AREVALO OSEGUEDA JUNE 61 HQS JANET 15 MARCH ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL NEW YORK 10 MAR S HOTEL S

BT

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / X NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO : Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM : Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT : Meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York During February/March 1966

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCES: DIR 85413, 5 March 1966

1. Attached are four (4) copies of internal Headquarters memoranda resulting from meetings with LICOOKY-1 in New York during February and March 1966, and as reported in Reference.

2. Three of the memoranda deal with the alleged planned travel of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA and one deals with the Rose and George SIMINOW case.

Thomas W. LUND

Attachments:
4 memos, h/w
8 Feb 66, 1 Mar 66, 4 Mar 66, 9 Mar 66 } sent -

Distribution:
O&1 - COS, Mexico City w/4 memos attached.

10 March 1966

201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW-14407	14 MAR 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-278841

1 - RI
1 - chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE	OFFICER	TYPIST	EXT
WH/1/	Mr. Kaufman	jz	4523

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL	DATE	OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
CWH/1		W. J. Kaufman

ABSTRACT X F/WH/

FORM 1-63 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
C/WH/1	4250	DATE: 8 February 1966

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/WH/1			wgh	
2.				
3. CI/OPS/~~Johnson~~ Hughs 2 B 44			Full	Per orl Telcom. wgh
4.				
5.				Orally, for source protection, to FBI 11 Feb with request for State P.P. status checked by Bureau, covering me.
6. C/WH/1 (Jack Kaufman)				3-6: Jack: Info. in your attached memo was passed orally to the Bureau. The Bureau responded that there had been previous corres. between us on Sokolowska. As a matter of fact, Sam Papich queried John Castoro of WH/Cuba/CI for any additional info. on her (this was on 17 Jan. Suggest you discuss previous Bureau interest with John Castoro. Also, your gal had previously reported info. ~~[illegible]~~ to the Bureau ~~[illegible]~~
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14. your gal in the U.S. Pls. contact John Castoro [illegible] the				
15. attached memo, because John has an outstanding reply to make to the Bureau				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

7 Feb 66

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estel Sakolowska

1. On 7 February LICOOKY-1 told the writer that Estel Sakolowska, a long-time acquaintance, had told her that she is planning a trip to Cuba. Sakolowska is now married to Mario Madrigal, a Costa Rican medical doctor who is now in Cuba. Sakolowska told LICOOKY-1 that she is now in the process of obtaining a (U.S.) passport for her child so that they can travel together to Cuba. This is her child's first passport. Her explanation for requesting the passport is for making a trip to Costa Rica. Sakolowska claims that the passport application is now in the State Department "Security Section".

2. Sakolowska also told LICOOKY-1 that the "Prensa Latina Bureau Chief" had proposed to her an apparent intelligence mission to accomplish enroute to Cuba. She believes this mission is to take place in Miami. LICOOKY-1 reported that on 7 February Sakolowska had a luncheon engagement with "someone" at the United Nations and speculates it may be to pick up a package to take to someone in Cuba. LICOOKY-1 further speculates that this may only be a gift to someone in Cuba.

3. LICOOKY stated that she had no additional information. It should be noted, however, that this item was given in a last minute rush just prior to her departure from the writer. LICOOKY-1 expects to be in New York until the end of February.

4. LICOOKY-1 states that Sakolowska has been a long-time "left winger". LICOOKY-1 reported earlier on Sakolowska and her connections with revolutionaries in Central America and Havana in dispatch HMMA 27924 dated 21 September 1965 pages 4 and 6. This office is planning no further action on this matter and in line with the writer's telephone conversation with Frank Hughes of the CI Staff today, we understand your office will be coordinating the Subject with the FBI and State Department.

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

1 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff att Mr. Hughes

INFO : WH/C Attention: Mr. Castoro

SUBJECT : Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estelle Sokolowska

REFERENCE : Memo, Same Subject, Dated 8 February 1966

1. On 22 February LICOOKY-1 told me that the referenced Prensa Latina correspondent, according to Sokolowska, had just advised her she would receive $500 operational expenses for the alleged intelligence assignment in the Miami area and $450 for travel presumably to Cuba. This information was passed orally to your office 23 February.

2. On 28 February LICOOKY-1 told me that while visiting with Sokolowska in New York on 23 February two FBI agents called at the Sokolowska apartment and interviewed Sokolowska about her intended travel to Cuba. According to L-1 the agents warned Sokolowska that she would be in serious trouble if she attempted such trip. The interview went on about three hours during which time L-1 remained in Sokolowska's apartment, sometimes in the living room and sometimes in the kitchen where the interview reportedly was taking place. L-1 stated that as a result of the warning by the FBI agents Sokolowska later told L-1 she would not make the trip.

3. Presumably the FBI, if the above story is accurate, had reason for this reported action even though from the limited information available, from L-1, there would seem a possibility of other more profitable courses of action.

4. L-1 states that Sokolowska had heard that her husband, now in Cuba, was living in Sokolowska's house and with a nurse to whom he was (engaged). It was partially for this reason Sokolowska wished to visit Cuba at this time.

5. This office is taking no further action on this matter unless so requested and suggests that addressees coordinate any planned ~~advice~~ action on this matter ~~to~~ with the Bureau.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

WH/1/Kaufman:mep Dist: O & 1 - CI
2 - WH/C/Castoro
2 - WH/1
1 - WH/FI w/8 Feb Memo

Crky-201

4 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Hughes

SUBJECT : Rose and George SIMINOW Plans for Vietnam Conscientious Objector Demonstration

1. Confirming telephone conversation with your office March 1st the following information was obtained from LICOOKY-1 in Washington on February 28th:

Rose SIMINOW, 382 Central Park West, New York City, long-time communist and contact of LICOOKY-1, told L-1 at several meetings during February that she was making plans for a demonstration against the U.S. role in Vietnam. Rose's son, George, discharged about September 65 from the military after active duty in Panama, expected to be recalled for active duty in Vietnam as a member of a military reserve unit. It is planned that if recalled George will refuse induction as a conscientious objector and mass demonstrations will be promoted in New York. Rose has had discussions with a "constitutionalist lawyer", one Boudion, to handle the expected court trial. Boudien's secretary, Teresa, is a friend of Rose. Rose plans to pay the initial attorney fees after which she will launch a national drive to raise funds. According to Rose, Boudine is "swamped" with similar cases. Rose is employed by Wolf Popper Jones Ross and Wolf. She has been a secretary for ten to fifteen years.

2. This office is taking no further action on this report unless so requested. Please advise if this matter is turned over to the FBI or any other action taken.

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

SECRET

LICOOKY-1 201

SECRET

9 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Frank Hughes

INFORMATION: WH/C, Mr. John Castoro
CWH/FI

SUBJECT: Alleged Planned Travel to Cuba of Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

SOURCE: LICOOKY-1

REFERENCE: Memoranda, same subject, dated 8 February and 1 March 1966.

1. Further to references, the writer again saw LICOOKY-1 in New York on 8 March. In that this new information clarifies and elaborates on Subject's alleged espionage intentions, it is believed best to recapitulate the whole story obtained during the course of the past month.

2. SOKOLOWSKA's husband, a Costa Rican medical doctor, by the name of Mario MADRIGAL, is now in Cuba with a profitable job and living in a house assigned to him with a Cuban nurse with whom he is "engaged." Subject is desirous of returning to Cuba in that she admires CASTRO and what she believes he is doing for Cuba, and wishes to assist in the "cause." She gained this impression during her stay in Cuba in the early 60's, at which time she personally met CASTRO and was befriended by him. Her desire to return is also influenced by the need to care for her two children and she plans to move in with her husband from whom she expects support. She no longer has any love for her husband, In New York Subject stays with her mother, a not too well informed Polish peasant immigrant.

3. An as yet unidentified Cuban UN representative in NY visited Cuba during the 1965 XMas holidays. While there he had one meeting with Subject's husband and upon returning to NY delivered a letter from the husband to Subject. From this first meeting, Subject was gradually drafted by the Cuban UN representative (hereafter referred to as CUIS rep) for intelligence purposes.

4. This culminated in Subject's departure from New York on the Atlantic Seaboard "Champion" train on 7 March for Miami. On 5 or 6 March, before her departure, the CUIS rep gave Subject a written list of questions to be used for cultivating and gaining the confidence of Cuban exiles in the Miami area to learn more about their organizational design and plans for work against Cuba.

SECRET

Subject's cover for this assignment is to gather material for a book she plans to write on the Cuban Revolution. The questions themselves are not intelligence requirements and reputedly are along the lines of "what was your role in the invasion attempt? Why did your particular sortie fail? etc." Pertinent here, however, is that the CUIS rep told Subject that he is very interested in the "Municipalidades" organizational development by the Cuban exiles. He said this was the smartest thing the exiles have done. Source stated that she understands the exile community has regrouped into cell organizations so that exiles from the same community from their homes in Cuba now form the individual cells. In this fashion they can better protect themselves from penetration and will be a better informed and cohesive group. Subject was given $550. for the Miami trip expenses. Source saw the money. Subject plans to spend two or three weeks on this mission and then return to NY to report to the CUIS rep.

5. Subject is taking her two children with her to Miami and is taking along a "babysitter." Subject had wanted to take a Puerto Rican girl [illegible] in NY, but as the PR girl could not obtain a leave of absence from her job, the PR girl's brother is serving as babysitter. He is described as being in his early twenties and is a supporter of CASTRO. Subject's immediate problem is to obtain entre to the Cuban exiles and a cheap way to live in the Miami area. To accomplish this she has re-established contact with a former acquaintance and ally, one Jerry HEMING. HEMING is described as being an American member of the William Morgan group in the invasion attempt. Subject met HEMING in the Frente Sandino in Nicaragua. She re-established this contact by finding an old Miami telephone number for HEMING and spoke to a person at this number who identified himself as "Little Joe." Little Joe said that HEMING moved but that he could put her in touch with him.

6. Subject told source she was delighted at having received a passport for herself and her children and permission from the State Department to travel to Cuba with them. Permission was granted on compassionate grounds. She was so excited at this development she immediately telephoned the CUIS rep despite an earlier admonition to never again call him at his office. He said his business is strictly compartmented from other members of the Cuban UN group. Subject stated that with her passport she now will be able to travel to Europe after returning to Cuba. Source understands that European travel will be for Cuban intelligence purposes but has no details. Source speculates that because Subject is fluent in Polish and French, with some knowledge of German, coupled with her American citizenship and Polish background, she will be able to gain entre into European Bloc circles to glean what she can of their true feelings and intent to the CASTRO government. Upon completion of her Miami mission and her return to NY, Subject then plans to depart to Cuba via Mexico. She plans only about two days in Mexico. She will be provided travel funds by the CUIS rep.

14-00000

SECRET

-3-

7. Source explained that Subject promised to advise source where she will be staying in the Miami area. Source has been requested to remain in NY until the morning of 10 March in the hope that this information will be forthcoming. Source was also requested to consider the feasibility of visiting the Miami area to determine Subject's whereabouts. Source stated that an excuse for this visit could be to visit Dr. SHAPPER and his wife in Miami in that they are leaving NY 9 March for a long-planned 10 day holiday there. Both Subject and Source are close friends of SHAPPER so this arrangement would be plausible. In this regard, Source stated that to save all concerned from embarrassment, she advised SHAPPER not to question Subject too closely as to Subject's plans upon Subject's departure from NY in that SHAPPER was under the impression that Subject was travelling directly to Cuba. Source implied to SHAPPER that Subject has to "earn her way" to Cuba. SHAPPER was described as being in no way connected with Subject's assignment nor to be in sympathy with such business. The SHAPPERS plan to stay in the Nichols Hotel, Miami Beach, Collins Avenue.

8. [illegible] Source's [illegible] of Subject being naive as to the happenings in Cuba. Source said that when discussing some aspects of the true situation there, Che GUEVARRA's name came up. When Source suggested that Che may have been done in, Subject responded that this certainly was not the case. Subject stated that about 3 March one of Che's "close aides" arrived in NY. Source understands this aide came to NY for contact with the Cuban UN group. Subject learned this from the CUIS rep.

9. The CUIS rep is described as being 5'3" to 5'4" tall, slight build, small features, tiny moustache, a "latin type" but not dark. He looks like Harold MARTINEZ, the father of Subject's first baby. Source now states that the CUIS rep is probably not a Prensa Latina rep as Subject stated this assignment is furthering his diplomatic career. The CUIS rep had meetings with Subject at least three times at Subject's home.

10. Depending upon developments by the morning of 10 March, Source may be asked to transit Washington for another meeting while enroute to Mexico. It is understood that Your Office will undertake the necessary coordination with other components and other Agencies and that this Office will take no further action pending your advice and request.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

SECRET

14 March 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/C, Mr. Castaro

SUBJECT: Estelle SOKOLOWSKA

REFERENCE: Memo dated 9 March 1966

Confirming my telephone conversation with you 11 March 1966, LICOOKY-1 at that time stated that Subject could be reached in Miami at telephone number 374-9336. L-1 learned this from Subject, who telephoned L-1's hotel room in New York with a number where she could be reached.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

cc: CI Staff

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : W.J. Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 11 March 1966

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

26 SECRET

ROUTING			
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TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8

INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY CI/OA, CI/ICZ

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 87397

LICOOKY-1 DEPARTED 11 MAR PLANS STOPOVER TULSA. ARRIVING MEXI ~~SIXXX~~ 13 OR 14 MAR. L-I ADVANCED TOTAL $295.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD

W.J. Kaufman
C.WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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ORIG : W.J.Kaufman
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 4 Mar 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

5 Mar 66 01 09z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

S-G GEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 85413

REF: MEXI 6341 (IN 59865)

1. LUND MET WITH LICOOKY-1 FEBRUARY 7 IN NEW YORK (NY) AND FEBRUARY 28TH WHEN SHE VISITED WASHINGTON TO REVIEW THE 1962 SENATE HEARING RECORDS FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE TO USE IN HER LEGAL PROBLEMS. L-1 PLANS TO RETURN TO MEXI NO SOONER THAN MARCH 7 DEPENDING ON PROGRESS WITH HER LAWYER. L-1 WON ROYALTY CASE WHICH SHOULD PRODUCE ABOUT $700 NOW; OTHER SUIT STILL UNRESOLVED.

2. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO DEBRIEF L-1 IN DEPTH IN THAT ALMOST EVERY ITEM SHE RAISED WAS REPEAT MATERIAL ON HER OLD CRONIES AND CONTACTS. POINTED OR REVEALING QUESTIONING ON ANY ACTIVE TARGET, I.E. LEVENSON COMPLEX, WAS AVOIDED.

3. FURTHER TO DIR 81088 L-1 STATED LEVENSON MET BERDECIO IN MEXI PRIOR TO EITHER SPRING OR SUMMER 63. IDEN OF GIRL IN CALIFORNIA UNKNOWN. LEVENSON LIVED WITH BERCEDIOS ON ARRIVAL 63. L-1 CLASSIFIES REVUELTOS, BERDECIOS, LEVENSON AS NON-COMMIE, SLIGHTLY LEFT, ALMOST APOLITICAL.

201 Licooky-1

CONTINUED.....

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

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TO :

PAGE TWO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

4. LEVENSON'S MAID INTRODUCED TO REVUELTOS BY THE FILIOS AT PARTY IN FILIOS' HOME. FILIOS' SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED (OTHER CHANNELS) INVOLVED COMMERCIAL ITEMS SUCH AS TRANSISTOR RADIO ETC. FOR MONETARY GAIN ONLY AND NOT INVOLVED WITH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. L-1 RECALLS MEXICAN MILITARY PILOTS SOMEHOW INVOLVED BUT HAS NOT DETAILS.

5. IN DISCUSSING LITERARY WORLD ONLY FLEETING REFERENCE MADE TO LIREAM, LIREAM EDITOR / AND TICHBORN WITH NO HINT OF KUBARK INVOLVEMENT DESPITE ETSINGER'S ADVICE THAT L-1 SAID LIREAM BLOWN. TO THE CONTRARY, L-1 CLAIMS LIREAM CONCEPT WAS HER IDEA AND HAD SPOKEN TO EDITOR / ABOUT IT SOME TIME AGO ONLY TO DISCOVER SUBSEQUENTLY ON RETURN FROM TRIP OUTSIDE MEXI EDITOR / HAD TAKEN THE IDEA AND WITH TICHBORN PRODUCED LIREAM. L-1 CLASSIFIES MEXICAN LITERARY GROUP WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS AS LOW CALIBER (PYGMIES) AND HARDLY WORTH BOTHERING ABOUT.

6. L-1 CLAIMS IGNORANCE ON CURRENT EVENTS GUAT AS SHE COMPLETELY OUT OF TOUCH SINCE LEAVING MEXI.

CONTINUED....

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO   INFO   CITE DIR 85413

7. L-1 ASKED SEVERAL TIMES FOR LATEST DEVELOPMENT ARICA, CHILE CONFERENCE (MEXI 6177) STATING SHE HAD HEARD OR READ NOTHING CONCERNING IT SINCE LEAVING MEXICO NOR DID ANY OF HER NY CONTACTS HAVE ANY INFORMATION. SHE DID SAY HOWEVER MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO HAD ALWAYS SINCE DEPARTURE, PLANNED RETURN MEXI 1 MARCH (DESPITE MEXI 6385 AND HMMA 28303 ADVISING THIS WAS A CHANGE IN PLANS). REASON BEING THAT MONTEFORTE COULD OBTAIN ONE YEAR ONLY LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM UNIVERSITY WHEREAS SOCIOLOGY STUDY SPONSORED BY UN REQUIRED TWO YEARS.

8. CONCERNING RAUL OSEGUEDA L-1 REPEATED HER CAPABILITY OF INFLUENCE AND COLLABORATION ON IDEAS WITH HIM AS WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER AND MANUEL GERMAN PARRA (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED HMMA 27924). IN ADDITION THOUGH AND OF INTEREST WAS ADVICE THAT OSEGUEDA HAD PREPARED A PAPER ON UNIVERSITY REFORM FOR A SOCIOLOGICAL CONFERENCE AT VERACRUZ IN NOVEMBER 65. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE POINTED OUT THAT OSEGUEDA HAD BEEN A MILITANT CHAMPION FOR AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITIES IN HIS EARLY YEARS BUT NOW REALIZING THAT SUCH AUTONOMY HAS BEEN THE ROOT EVIL OF UNIVERSITY MALADY IS CURRENTLY PROMOTING NEEDED CORRECTION AND CONTROL. FOR SOME REASON

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG :
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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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PAGE FOUR

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85113

PAPER NOT PRESENTED AT CONFERENCE BUT OSEGUEDA LATER MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MANUEL CALVILLO AND MAURICO MAGDALEÑO OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. L-1 CLAIMS SHE CAN OBTAIN THIS PAPER. STATION MAY WISH FOLLOW UP FOR POSSIBLE USE LICOAX AND OVERALL UNIVERSITY REFORM PROGRAM. MONTEFORTE AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER ALSO TOOK PART VERACRUZ CONFERENCE, PRESENTING PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT AND PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT RESPECTIVELY.

9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN ~~HER~~ NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING HER AND PRIOR ODENVY KNOWLEDGE FULL STORY ON ALLEGED PRENSA LATINA INVOLVEMENT). L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXICO TO MONITOR S PLANS. STATION WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

CONTINUED

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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PAGE FIVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR 85413

ANTICIPATES RECALL AS MEMBER OF RESERVE UNIT. THEY PLAN UTILIZE SERVICES OF CONSTITUTIONALIST LAWYER BOUDIEN. PLAN INCLUDES NATIONAL FUND DRIVE. ITEM PASSED ODENVY. MEMOS THIS AND PRECEDING PARA BEING POUCHED.

11. L-1 ~~ADVISED~~ SAID STATION HAD REQUESTED SHE MAKE PROFILES OF SELECTED PERSONALITIES (MEXI 6419) BUT THAT SHE HAD NOT HAD TIME TO COMPLETE. SHE INTENDS DOING THIS IMMEDIATELY ON RETURN. L-1 CONTACTS WITH GUAT EXILES BEING REVIEWED WITH GUAT DESK. WILL ADVISE IF WE DECIDE RECONTACT L-1 HERE FOR THIS PURPOSE.

12. WHILE DISCUSSING WITH L-1 "INTELLECTUAL GROUP" MEXI, (AS TO WHAT MAKES THEM TICK ETC) HER RECOMMENDATION FOR PRACTICAL METHOD TO EXERT INFLUENCE SOLICITED. SHE SUGGESTED THE USUAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS ETC. AT SECOND MEET SHE SOMEWHAT DESPONDENT IN BEING UNABLE PRODUCE REALISTIC BROAD GUAGE PROGRAM. IN THIS CONTEXT SHE WAS TOLD WE NOT SATISFIED OUR OVERALL PRESENT APPROACH AND BELIEVE ALL OF US SPINNING OUR WHEELS NEEDLESSLY. ADVISED WE NOW WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO REGROUP AND TOLD HER SHE SHOULD NOT COUNT ON CONTINUED SUPPORT FROM US. WHEN ASKED HER PLANS IF TERMINATED SHE STATED SHE PROBABLY WOULD STAY MEXI FOR ANOTHER YEAR

CONTINUED....

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR

BEFORE RETURNING NY. SUPPORT WOULD COME FROM FATHER. IN NY SHE HAS MANY "PROJECTS" WHICH NEED TO BE DONE. NO SPECIFICS. SUGGEST STATION CONSIDER KEEPING HER ON PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS COUPLE OF MONTHS TO PRODUCE PROFILES AND ANY DEBRIEFING IN DEPTH REQUIRED AND THEN TERMINATE. UPON RETURN TO NY SHE MIGHT BE PICKED UP FOR CONTACT BY KULAMP OR ODENVY. HAVE INITIATED DISCUSSIONS WITH KULAMP AND THEY INTERESTED CONTACT ARRANGEMENT WITH PIECERATE PAYMENT. LUND FOUND L-1 PROBABLY WELL-INTENTIONED BUT TRAGIC GADFLY HANDY TO HAVE AROUND FOR TIDBITS DESPITE BEING THOROUGHLY BLOWN BUT NOT WORTH A PROJECT. WILL ADVISE ANY REQUESTS FOR L-1 SERVICES DURING GUAT POST-ELECTION ACTIVITIES.

13. RECOMMEND STATION EXTEND PRESENT PROJECT FOR TIME DESIRED AND INCLUDE TERMINATION ARRANGEMENT. PLEASE NOTE LUND DID NOT TERMINATE BUT ONLY INDICATED THIS AS LIKELY FORTHCOMING. TERMINATION IF SO DECIDED IS NATURALLY STATION PREROGATIVE. WELCOME STATION COMMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/Ops/Hughes (draft)

Jacob D. Esterline
DC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM Mexico City

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, FI, CI/OA, CI/IC-2

S E C R E T 021858Z

DIR INFO GUAT CITE MEXI 6419

LICOOKY

1. JUST BEFORE HER DEPARTURE FOR PBPRIME LICOOKY TOLD EASBY AND REYMANDER SHE HAD PREPARED LONG PROFILES OF JUAN JOSE AREVALO AND RAUL OSEGUEDA FOLLOWING HER FALL 1961 TRIP TO VENEZUELA. SEARCH OF STATION FILES SHOWS NO EVIDENCE THESE PROFILES ALTHOUGH THERE SOME REPORTING ON TRIP ITSELF.

2. DID ADDRESSEES RECEIVE PROFILES? SUGGEST HQS QUERY

licooky-201

14-00000

IN 66243 Pg 2

CLYDE D. SHRYOCK FOR HIS RECOLLECTION. SECRET

3. GIVEN RECENT REPORTING ON PLANS FOR TERRORISTIC ACTIVITY IN GUAT FOLLOWING ELECTIONS AND OSEGUEDA PARTICIPATION, KUBARK SHOULD HAVE MOST DEFINITIVE INFO AVAILABLE ON IMPORTANT GUATS IN EXILE.

4. HQS NOTE PREVIOUS CABLES HAVE DESCRIBED LICOOKY ACCESS TO OSEGUEDA AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER WHICH APPARENTLY STILL PERSISTS DESPITE GOSSIP RE HER KUBARK AFFILIATION. DID HQS DEBRIEF HER IN ANY DETAIL THESE CONTACTS?

SECRET

CFN 6419 EASBY REYMANDER JUAN JOSE AREVALO RAUL OSEGUEDA FALL 1961 VENEZUELA NO EVIDENCE HQS CLYDE D. SHRYOCK GUAT OSEGUEDA HQS OSEGUEDA VILLAGRAN KRAMER RE HQS

BT

SECRET

MAR-66

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO: VR FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO INFO CITE DIR

PAPER NOT PRESENTED AT CONFERENCE BUT OSEGUEDA LATER MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MANUEL CALVILLO AND MAURICO MAGDALENO OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. L-1 CLAIMS SHE CAN OBTAIN THIS PAPER. STATION MAY WISH FOLLOW UP FOR POSSIBLE USE LICOAX AND OVERALL UNIVERSITY REFORM PROGRAM. MONTEFORTE AND VILLAGRAN KRAMER ALSO TOOK PART VERACRUZ CONFERENCE, PRESENTING PROBLEMS OF THE LEFT AND PROBLEMS OF THE RIGHT RESPECTIVELY.

9. MUCH TIME SPENT ON L-1 LEADS UPON LATEST ESCAPADE ESTELLE SOKOLOWSKA (MEXI 5054) IN THAT S REPORTEDLY GIVEN ASSIGNMENT BY PRENSA LATINA CORRESPONDENT NY TO VISIT MIAMI AND CUBA. THIS COORDINATED WITH ODENVY AND REACHED CRESCENDO WITH ODENVY REPS INTERVIEWING S IN HER NY APARTMENT (WHEN L-1 BY HAPPENSTANCE WAS VISITING). ~~AS STATE ON 3 MARCH GAVE PERMISSION FOR S TRAVEL CUBA ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS DESPITE ODENVY OBJECTIONS, L-1 MAY BE ASKED TO DELAY RETURN MEXI TO MONITOR~~ S PLANS.

10. L-1 ALSO SAW ROSE SIMINOW (MEXI 5075) WHO CLAIMED TO BE PLANNING DEMONSTRATIONS IN NY BY UTILIZING HER SON GEORGE AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY DUTY IN VIETNAM. GEORGE WAS DISCHARGED ABOUT SEPTEMBER 65 AFTER MILITARY DUTY IN PANAMA AND

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MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

DATE

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

I hereby acknowledge receipt of the following:

$100—

28 Feb 66

Please return ________ signed copy(ies) of this receipt

To ______________________

SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT

DATE RECEIVED

FORM NO. 752 REPLACES FORM 38-66
1 AUG 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(33)

14-00000

DODS

23 Feb 66

Jack,

I briefed Gaines for 30 minutes on LICOOKY giving him the full background on her bio, education, CIA relationship---from recruitment through current use in Mexico. My suggestion was that she be told to go to NY and find a job which would give her a means of livelihood as well as cover for any future CIA income. After 6 months (or some other specific period of time) it would be arranged that either we contact her or she contact us to determine what her personal situation was and whether she would then be in a position to target against selected persons of interest to CIA in the NY area. She could then be paid on a spot basis for herCIA work. Mr. Gaines wanted to think about it but thought that this would be the best approach. He will talk to you before Friday.

His only question was whether we had any indication whether she was under development by the opposition---Soviet, Cuban, etc. I told him that as far as I knew there was no such indication. If I am wrong (per your and Bill Johnson's recent activity) you better correct this.

CAN

Charlotte

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, [illegible]
INFO: Director of Finance
Chief, [illegible] Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: [illegible] - Tax Administration

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. During the stay of the Tax Committee representative seventeen individuals were briefed and sixteen were assessed. Attached is a copy of the briefing schedule prepared by the Station.

2. [illegible] was requested to obtain a signed blank return from [illegible] when he saw him on a recent TDY and to obtain as much information as possible on his tax problem. [illegible] is going to hand carry the signed return and the information to Headquarters.

3. [illegible] was advised of the I.R.S. interpretation of the Code as it affected his claim for a standard deduction. He stated that he would appreciate I.R.S. making a ruling on his particular circumstances. Under separate cover the request is being forwarded.

4. [illegible]'s assessment was prepared and an estimate of his 1965 tax liability was computed. Based on this estimate he requested that the personal check forwarded under separate cover be applied to the tax withholding account thereby satisfying his estimated 1965 tax liability.

5. [illegible], and Douglas J. [illegible] are in the Headquarters area and should be contacted directly. [illegible] was not returning to the Station until after the Committee representative left.

6. The forms for Jeremy K. [illegible], Douglas J. [illegible], [illegible], John R. [illegible] will be completed upon [illegible]'s return to Headquarters.

7. Edward S. [illegible] was not available for a briefing.

Attachment:
As Stated Above, h/w & usc

Distribution:
1 - Chief, [illegible], w/att
1 - Director of Finance, w/o att
1 - Chief, [illegible], w/o att

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]-6309

DATE: 21 February 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.

[illegible]

[illegible] PFRSONNEL [illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] L. [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
Carl [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] forms were forwarded earlier.

[illegible] C. [illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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FROM MEXICO CITY

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UNIT WH TIME 1535 BY G

INFO

FILE, VR, C/FI 2, C/OA, C/CI 3, FI, FI/INT, CS/DO

S E C R E T 211925Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6341

LICOOKY

21 FEB 66 IN 59865

REF DIR 81716 *

(IN 46043)

1. IF DESPITE LIREAM AMENDMENT AND MEXI 6043 HQS STILL INTENDS TERMINATE LICOOKY BELIEVE IT ONLY JUST GIVE HER CHANCE LOOK AROUND WHILE SHE STILL AVAILABLE THERE. IF THIS DONE REQUEST MEXI BE GIVEN FULL REPORTING ON CONVERSATIONS AND DEBRIEFINGS TO COINCIDE NEARLY AS POSSIBLE HER ARRIVAL HERE. REQUEST SHE BE GIVEN FULL SECURITY REBRIEFING RE HER TERMINATION.

(IN 49273)

2. MEXI 6177 AND VARIOUS CABLES OTHER CHANNELS MADE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR TOPICS HQS MIGHT WISH TAKE UP WITH HER. PLS CONFIRM WHICH DONE AND WHAT REMNANTS LEFT FOR MEXI CLEAN UP.

S E C R E T

CFN 6341 81716 LIREAM 6043 HQS RE 6177 HQS PLS

BT

* GIVE INDICATION OF POSSIBLE TERMINATION.

SECRET

NNNN

LICOOKY 201

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, SR-8

S E C R E T 181810Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6319

KUDESK

REF DIR 81088 *

PARA TWO REF, SUGGEST HQS CONSIDER PRETEXT CALL JEWISH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL FOR DATE LEVENSON VACATION MEXICO.

S E C R E T * KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JAN 66 FOR VACATION MEXI

CFN

6319 81088 HQS JEWISH LEVENSON

BT

ACTION

18 FEB 66 IN 58426

SECRET

NNNN

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ORIG : C.Bustos-videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 18 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO : MEXICO CITY

PRIORITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY c/m

PRTY MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81716

LICOOKY

AT LICOOKY REQUEST HQS PLANNING ADVANCE HER $200 FOR RETURN TRAVEL MEXI. SHE DOES NOT PLAN RETURN TILL END FEBRUARY. WOULD STATION LIKE HQS TO GIVE HER INDICATION OF PROBABLE TERMINATION? ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Licooky-201

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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ORIG : W. R. Johnson
UNIT : CI/OPS
EXT : 6918
DATE : 16 Feb 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☑ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-786276

SECRET

ROUTING

17 FEB 66 17 39z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/OPS
INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH 8, CI, SR 8

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 81088

KUDESK

REF: HMMW-14325*

1. LICOOKY TOLD LUND LEVENSON CONTACT OF ROBERTO BERDECIO BEFORE 1963 VISIT TO MEXI, HAD BEFRIENDED GIRL FREIND OF BERDECIO IN CALIFORNIA.

2. KUBARK QUERY PASSPORT OFFICE SHOWS LEVENSON RENEWED PASSPORT 14 JANUARY 66 FOR VACATION MEXICO. PASSPORT ORIGINALLY ISSUED FOR DEPARTURE ONE OCTOBER 62 FOR TRAVEL AND POSTGRAD STUDY EUROPE INCLUDING SPAIN USSR.

END OF MESSAGE

*ODENVY INVESTIGATION AND TRACES ROBERT CHARLES LEVENSON 201-786276.

LICOOKY-1

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

James R. Hunt
DC/CI
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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INDEX ☐ YES ☐ NO

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X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION CA/O-4 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, CA-2, WH-8, WE-8, CA/Prop, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, CI/OA, DO-4, DO/H-3, AF-7, FI, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 052018Z

5 FEB 65 IN 46273

SAGO INFO DIR PALP CITE MEXI 6177

QKOPERA DTLEAFAGE

REF HMM-13324 (NOT TO PALP OR SAGO)

HMMA-26269 (NOT TO SAGO)

1. SUBJECT IS FORMATION OF COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES (CLE) WHICH WAS DISCUSSED DURING JANUARY 65 MEET OF COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS (COMES) IN GENOA. CARLOS PELLICER (P) PROMINENT MEXICAN POET AND COMMY-LINER, ONE OF MEXI DELEGATES THAT MEETING, AGREED PUSH FOR ORGANIZING MEETING IN MEXICO DURING 1965 TO FORM SISTER ORGANIZATION TO BE CALLED CLE. THIS MEETING HAS NEVER BEEN CALLED. HOWEVER EARLY 65 MEXI STATION AGENT LICOOKY-1 WAS ACTIVE COOPERATOR IN ORGANIZING ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANSOS A. C. (AEMAC) WHICH SERVICE ORG FOR WRITERS TO GET BETTER ROYALTIES, PUBLICITY, DISTRIBUTION, AND OTHER BENEFITS. THIS ORG WHOSE CONSTITUTION SPECIFICALLY FORBIDS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATION ELECTED CARLOS PELLICER PRESIDENT. P HAS BEEN TRYING NUMEROUS DEVICES TO BRING CLE ORGANIZING MEETING UNDER AEMAC AUSPICES BUT SO FAR FRUSTRATED BY MEMBERSHIP.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET IN 49273 Pg 2

2. LUIS VILLORO, EDITOR OF REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO, ALSO ONE OF ORGANIZING COMMITTEE IN GENOA AND ATTENDING CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA IN ARICA, CHILE. EXPECTS MEET NUMBER OF GENOA ATTENDEES WHO HE THINKS WILL WANT PROGRESS REPORT ON PLANS FOR CLE ORGANIZING MEETING. VILLORO PLANS RATHER VAGUE. REALIZES GENOA MEETING ATTENDED MAINLY BY LEFTISTS AND THAT IF CLE WERE LAUNCHED UNDER SAME AUSPICES IT WOULD BE HEAVILY WEIGHTED ON LEFT. SAME TIME REALIZES THAT ONLY WRITERS ORGANIZATION MEXICO WITH ENOUGH COHESION TO GET MEETING GOING WOULD BE AEMAC WHICH COVERS WHOLE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WHICH SO FAR HAS SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED TAKING POLITICAL STANDS.

3. ALTHOUGH NOT CLEAR EXTENT TO WHICH PLANS FOR FORMATION CLE MAY COME UP DURING ARICA MEETING, NUMBER OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE LIKELY BE SAME AS ATTENDED GENOA MEETING AND MAY TRY STEAMROLLER COMMITTMENT FORM MEXI DELEGATION TO HOST ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING. MEXICAN INVITEES TO ARICA BESIDES VILLORO ARE HECTOR AZAR, HEAD OF THEATER DEPT OF NATINAL FINE ARTS INSTITUTE; PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY, LEFTIST AND WINNER NATIONAL LITERARY AWARD; HECTOR MENDOZA, UNIDENTIFIED; JUAN RULFO WHO NOT GOING; AND MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO, GUATEMALAN RESIDENT MEXI WHO MARXIST WRITER FOR LEFTIST MAG SIEMPRE.

SECRET

SECRET IN 49273 PG 3

VILLORO AND MONTEFORTE KNOWN TO CLAIM OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL IN-VOLVEMENT AEMAC. QKOPERA HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CONCERNED RE FORMATION OF A POLITICALLY ACTIVE CLE.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES KEEP MEXI POSTED ON ANY DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED BY ASSETS ATTENDING ARICA CONFERENCE PERTINENT ABOVE SUBJECT. BEST OUR KNOWLEDGE PURPOSE MONTEFORTE ATTENDANCE ARICA NOT AS PER LINLUCK, PARA 2 HMMA-28166 ("PREPARATION COMMUNIST CONGRESS FOR LA INTELLECTUALS"). LINLUCK NOT AS WELL PLUGGED IN THIS GROUP AS LICOOKY.

5. DIR: MOST OF ABOVE FROM LICOOKY11. YOU MAY WISH QUERY HER IN DEPTH THIS SUBJECT WHILE SHE AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

CFN

6177 HMM_10024 NOT TO HMMA-26069 NOT TO COMUNIDAD LATINOAMERICANA DE ESCRITORES CLE JANUARY 65 COMUNAUTE EUROPEENE D'ESCRIVAINS COMES GENOA CARLOS PELLICER (P) MEXICO 1965 CLE 65 ASOCIACION DE ESCRITORES MEXICANOS A.C. AEMAC P CLE AEMAC LUIS VILLORO REVISTA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE MEXICO CONGRESO DE LA COMUNIDAD CULTURAL DE LATINO AMERICA ARICA CHILE CLE NOT CLEAR HECTOR AZAR PADRE ANGEL MARIA GARIBAY HECTTR MENDOZA JUAN RULFO NOT GOING MARIO MONTEFORTE TOLEDO GUATEMALAN MAG SIEMPRE RE ARICA NOT AS LINLUCK PARA 2 HMMA-28166

SECRET

Li Cooky-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL WH BRANCH CHIEFS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DESK

SUBJECT : Contract Agents

According to latest records, attached is a list of Contract Agents assigned to countries in your Branch. To assist in updating and consolidating personnel records on WH Contract Agents, your Branch is requested to furnish by 28 January 1966 the following information for ONLY U. S. citizen Contract Agents who are employed full time.

Name	Viola June COBB
Date of Birth	24 Aug 1927
Place of Birth	Ponca, Oklahoma
Salary per Annum	$3000
Date of Arrival to Assignment	MAY 1961 (Officially recruited in Habana June 60)
Date of Scheduled Departure (if applicable)	
Type Contract	Formal written

Donald C. Marelius
WH/EXO

Attachment

Suspense: 28 January 66

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 26

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
MEXICO CITY

ACTION
WH 8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☒ TUBED

UNIT CS/DO TIME 1830 BY P

INFO
RFILE CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, OGC 2, CS/DO

SECRET 262150Z

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6043

LICOOKY

REF DIR 74752 *

AC

* MISS JONE COBB RETURNING NEW YORK TO FILE LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK.

26 JAN 66 IN 42076

1. SUBJ RETURNED 22 JAN BY PLANE TO NEW YORK TO CONSULT LAWYERS BROWN CROSS AND HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LIBEL SUIT BEING BROUGHT AGAINST HER BY LYLE STUART, PUBLISHER OF ENGLISH VERSION OF BOOK FOR HER CHARGES THAT HE ALTERED ORIGINAL TEXT. VISIT REVOLVES AROUND LAWYERS DESIRE OBTAIN RELEASE HER SENATE TESTIMONY OF MARCH 30, 1962 FOR USE IN DEFENSE. SHE UNWILLING RELEASE BECAUSE OF DELICACY SOME OF REVELATIONS ABOUT LINLUCK, AREVALO AND OTHERS. STUART LAWYERS ARE SCHEIMAN, ALBERT AND MACLEAN. FEELS CONFIDENT THROUGH PERSONAL VISIT TO LAWYER CAN PREVENT CASE COMING TO TRIAL.

2. SHE ALSO REPRESENTING ~~[illegible]~~ SELF IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION CASE 8 FEB AGAINST STUART FOR HIS FAILURE PAY FULL ROYALTIES DUE HER ON ENGLISH EDITION BOOK.

3. EASBY HAD LONG SESSION 20 JAN ATTEMPTING PERSUADE HER

HANDLE BY PHONE. SHE ALREADY TRIED THIS AND FOUND IT UNSATISFACTORY. SHE TOLD IN VIEW STILL PENDING APPROVAL HER KUBARK FUTURE, WE COULD NOT POSSIBLY RECOMMEND PAYMENT HER EXPENSES AND URGED HER RETURN SOONEST TO BEGIN VIGOROUS WORK ON NEW PROJECT DIRECTION. SHE EXPECTS RETURN 9 OR 10 FEB.

4. NO KNOWLEDGE WHERE STAYING NEW YORK AND TOLD HER ATTEMPT

NO ROUTINE CONTACT. IN EMERGENCY TO CONTACT OVERT OFFICE NEW YORK. IF HQS SEEKS CONTACT CAN DOUBTLESS MAKE THROUGH LAWYERS.

5. RE CONTINUATION LICOOKY KUBARK ASSOCIATION URGE SOME KIND DECISION NEAR FUTURE. SHE ANTICIPATES NO PROBLEM GETTING WORK NEW YORK IF WE TERMINATE, BUT DOES NOT WISH BE KEPT HANGING. SHE IS PROBABLY SINGLE MAIN SPARKPLUG AEMAC PROGRAM AND OBVIOUSLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT WORK AND PROSPECTS. BEFORE ANY TERMINATION PROCEDINGS STATION SUGGESTS HQS MAKE CAREFUL DETERMINATION THAT IT DOES NOT WANT WINDOW INTO AND ACTION CAPABILITY IN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY AND WILL NOT WANT IT TWO OR THREE YEARS HENCE. LICOOKY HAS WIDEST AND MOST INTIMATE RANGE CONTACTS ANY STATION ASSET THIS FIELD WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TICHBORN. STATION AT FAULT IN NOT EARLIER RECOGNIZING AND REPORTING HER UTILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST FIELD EXHAUSTED AND FUTURE LAY IN INTELLECTUAL WORLD. STILL RETAINS INTIMATE CONTACT HOWEVER WITH FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER, AND RAUL OSEGUEDA.

SECRET

CFN 6043 74752 22 JAN NEW YORK BROWN CROSS HAMILTON RE 600,000 DOLLAR LYLE STUART ENGLISH 30 1962 LINLUCK AREVALO STUART SCHEIMAN ALBERT MACLEAN 8 FEBSTUART EASBY 20 KUBARK NOT POSSIBLY

14-00000

IN 42076 PAGE 3

9 10 FEB NO KNOWLEDGE NEW YORK NO ROUTINE NEW YORK HQS RE LICOOKY KUBARK NO PROBLEM NOT WISH AEMAC HQS NOT WANT NOT WANT LICOOKY TICHBORN NOT EARLIER CENTRAL AMERICAN FRANCISCO VILLAGRAN KRAMER RAUL OSEGUEDA

BT

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES/24

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH8

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO

FILE, VR, CS/DO, CI/OA, CI/IC2

S E C R E T 262257Z

ACTION

PRIORITY DIR CITE MEXI 6947

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 6943 (IN 42076)

26 JAN 65 IN 42101

JUST LEARNED FROM REYMANDER LICOOKY STAYING HOTEL SUTTON PLAZA, 116 EAST 58 ST. ALTERNATIVE MEANS CONTACT IS THROUGH HER DOCTOR, I. SNAPPER, BARBIZON PLAZA, PHONE CI-7-7333.

S E C R E T

CFN 6947 6/043 REYMANDER LICOOKY HOTEL SUTTON PLKA, 116 EAST 58ST I SNAPPER BARBIZON PLAZA CI-7-7333

BT

NEED DECISION ON CONTINUATION KUBARK ASSISTANCE TO LICOOKY.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 23

ORIG : C.Bustos-Videla
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 24 Jan 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201- 278841

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

24 JAN 66 20 16z

FROM: DIRECTOR

SIG CEN

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA,

74752

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

ETSINGER REPORTED MISS JUNE COBB RETURNING TO NEW YORK TO FACE LIBEL SUIT CONCERNING AREVALO BOOK. ETSINGER VAGUE ON NAME OF PERSON BRINGING SUIT. REQUEST STATION PROVIDE DETAILS INCLUDING ETA, MODE OF TRAVEL AND MEANS CONTACT IN NEW YORK.

END OF MESSAGE

LICOOKY-1

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

14-00000

1C

SECRET

(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	1. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

LICOOKY /1/
201-278841
SEX M DOB ?

CIT ?
OCC ?

050-126-036/01
HMMA-27923
20 DEC 65

R 6512300052

FILE IN 201-278841

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Office of Finance

INFO: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: 1964 Income Tax Forms - Joyce H. PINEINCH

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: MEXI 5550, 8 December 1965

Attached herewith are two copies of PINEINCH's 1964 Covert Income Tax Return.

WILLARD C. CURTIS

Attachment:
As stated (h/w)

Distribution:
2 - Finance, w/atts
1 - WHD, w/o atts

cooky-1

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMT-6025

DATE: 9 December 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER:

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 1

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8 RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, OF 2, CCS 3

S E C R E T 081945Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5550

8 DEC 65 IN 10658

REF: DIR 62414

1. 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS FOR BENADUM, LIMOTOR 19 (BARBARA C. HUFIG), PINEINCH, SANDAMANIE BEING SENT BY HMMT 6018 IN 10 DEC POUCH. NOT POUCHED EARLIER AS OVERLOOKED IN STATION ACTION FILES.

2. RETURN FOR CAZAZZUS SENT HMMT 5399 APR 23 (JOINT WITH DOUGLAS J. FEINGLASS). RETURN FOR LIFUED 30, NOW RITA N. BLAZIK, SENT HMMT 5908, 28 OCT 65.

3. LIHUFF 1 SUBMITTED RETURN THROUGH OVERT CHANNELS; SIGNED COPY BEING POUCHED HQS.

4. WILL REPORT ON TICHBORN SEPARATELY.

SECRET

CFN 5550 62414 1964 BENADUM LIMOTOR 19 BARBARA C HUFIG PINEINCH SANDAMANIE HMMT 6018 10 NOT POUCHED CAZAZZUS HMMT 5399 APR 23 DOUGLAS J FEINGLASS LIFUED 30 RITA N BLAZIK HMMT 5908 28 65 LIHUFF 1 HQS

BT

SECRET

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ORIG : J. Fisher
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 4506
DATE : 29 Nov 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

2 Dec 65 22 06 z

TO : Mexico City

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY OF 2, CCS 3

~~SIG GEN~~

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 62414

PLS ADVISE WHEN HDQS CAN EXPECT 1964 COVERT TAX RETURNS REQUESTED HMMS-4366. IF NOT RECEIVED SOON, [illegible] FORCED REVEAL TRUE NAMES TO IRS WHO WILL THEN TAKE DIRECT ACTION.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested 8 delinquent 1964 Covert Income Tax returns.

WH/B&F [signature]

[signature]

[signature]
William V. Broe
C/WHD

[signature]
W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

REFERENCE: HMMS 4287, 19 August 1965

The following 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns are still overdue. Please contact the agents and see that they are forwarded to Headquarters as soon as possible. See referenced dispatch for information on the penalties imposed for late returns.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra S. CAZAZZUS
LIFEUD-30
LI[illegible]-1
LIMOTOR-19
Joyce H. PINEIRCH ✓ 200KX
John R. SANDAVAGIE
Edward C. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
O & 1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS 4360

DATE: 21 OCT 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

RI
Chrono

ORIGINATING

OFFICE / OFFICER / TYPIST / EXT
WH/1/Bustos-Videla:mes (15 Oct 65) 4506

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL / DATE / OFFICER'S NAME

RELEASING

C/WHD — William V. Broe

FORM 53 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

DISPATCH

14-00000

YES NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-278841
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID RET. TO BRANCH
DESTROY SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 23/30

SECRET

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FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH8 RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED TUBED

INFO: FILE, VR, CI/ICZ, WH/C8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC2, DO4, DO/H3,

19 Oct 65 IN 75330

S E C R E T 182320Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5075

LICOOKY

REF MEXI 5054 (IN 74054)

1. RECEIPT OF LICOOKY-1 WRITTEN REPORT REQUIRES SOME CORRECTIONS IN REF:

A. IGOR INTRODUCED HER TO "HARRY" (BUT NOT BY FULL NAME, WHICH SHE NEVER KNEW), DESCRIBING HIM AS ABSOLUTELY TRUSTWORTHY. IN LATE 1960, HARRY RECONTACTED HER THRU JORGE LOSADA WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN SINCE 1952 AND THIS TIME HARRY RECRUITED HER. COVER WAS RESEARCH FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS.

B. L-1 DID NOT TELL IGOR SHE RECRUITED AND WORKING FOR KUBARK IN MEXI. SHE SURMISES HE EITHER KNEW OLBSOR* ODUYMC YSMXQHXOM,3((645 & MMEN AND THAT SHE THEREFORE STILL WORKING IN MEXI

C. REAL REASON FOR ATTEMPTED KUBARK CONTACT WAS TO PASS ON INFO RE CARLOS ENRIQUE POLANCO, GUAT EXILE, ONETIME MEXI RESIDENT AND CURRENTLY IN PBRUMEN ON MEDICAL SCHOLARSHIP. L-1 LEARNED

19 Oct 65

201-278841

11-75 330 PAGE 3 of 3

POLANCO NOT PREVIOUSLY STASHA PRENSA LATINA HILDA GADEA CHE
GUEVARA MID NEW YORK DAILY WORKER L-1 STASHA ROSE SIMINOW AMERICAN
STASHA SIMINOW MARXISM L-1 STASHA 4

BT

5

NNN

SECRET

NOV 3 3 35 PM '62

NOV 3 11 26 PM '62

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 48

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Mexico City

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, DO4, DoH 3, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, WH/C8

S E C R E T 162125Z

DIR CITE MEXI 5354

16 Oct 65 IN 74054

IN 74054

LICOOKY

REF: DIR 45335

1. STATION PROBABLY AT FAULT FOR NOT FORWARDING LICOOKY-1 (201-4044) NY ADDRESS IN MEXI 4628. HOWEVER FEEL IN GENERAL WHEN PBPRIME NATIONAL AGENT ASKS FOR CONTACT MUST BE FOR WHAT HE FEELS GOOD REASON.

2. L-1 RELATES THAT WHILE VISITING HOME OF FRIEND IN NY SHE PICKED UP PHONE AND CALLER WAS ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA (MADRIGAL) WHOM SHE HAD KNOWN IN PBRUMEN AND IN MEXI DURING 61, WHERE SHE HAD COME TO HAVE BABY OF HAROLD MARTINEZ, NICARAGUAN LEADER OF FRENTE SANDINO IN CUBA. ATTENDING PHYSICIAN WAS MARIO MADRIGAL, YOUNG COSTA RICAN COMMUNIST DOCTOR WHO SUBSEQUENTLY MARRIED SOKOLOWSKA AND TOOK HER TO PBRUMEN SOME TIME 1962. SOKOLOWSKA HAD LEFT MADRIGAL AND ARRIVED NEW YORK VIA MONTREAL 12 OR 13 SEPT. TOLD L-1 THAT "IF NOTHING ELSE WORKED OUT" PLANNED JOIN JO ANNE SALAS, AMERICAN, NOW TEACHING ENGLISH IN CHINA. SOKOLOWSKA MOTHER IS ANNA SOKOLOWSKA, 963 179TH ST, BRONX, NY. ESTELLE WAS STAYING WITH HER.

Sokolov Secy for Dr. Snyper [illegible] [illegible] noted N.Y.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET IN 74054 PAGE 2.

3. IT WAS ABOVE INFO L-1 TRYING GET INTO KUBARK HANDS AND USED SUBJECT PARA 1 REF SINCE HE MADE FIRST INTRODUCTION TO HERMSDORF IN PBRUMEN WHO, ACCORDING L-1 RECRUITED HER SPECIFICALLY FOR KUBARK. STATION FILES ON L-1 DO NOT GO BACK THAT FAR SO HAVE ONLY HER WORD. L-1 DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER ESTELLE STILL NY OR WHETHER OTHER PLANS MATERIALIZED.

4. IF HQS DECIDES PURSUE LEAD, TRUST WILL BE DONE SO AS NOT IMPLICATE L-1.

S E C R E T

CFN 5054 45335 LICOOKY-1 NY 4623 L-1 NY ESTELLE "STASHA" SOKOLOWSKA MADRIGAL 61 HAROLD MARTINEZ NICARAGUAN SANDINO MARIO MADRIGAL 1962 12 13 L-1 NOTHING ELSE JO ANNE SALAS 963 179TH ST NY L-1 1 HERMSDORF L-1 L-1 NOT GO L-1 NOT KNOW NY HQS NOT IMPLICATE L-1

BT

SECRET * Licooky-1 Requested Kubark contact in New York.

14-00000

SECRET

Certain Chiefs of Stations and Bases

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

Contract Agent: Concerning Social Security Taxes for Certain Contract Agents Cecil B. ARLISS, Rita N. BLAZEK, Barbara ~~C. HUTTO~~, LIFEUD/19, LIHUFF/1, Joyce H. PINEINCH, John R. SANDAVANIE, Philip K. ~~TESSAROLO~~, Edward G. TICHBORN, Carol K. ZINSMEISTER

PRIORITY

Action Required: As Noted

1. Electronic data processing methods of the Internal Revenue Service have made it necessary to effect a procedure by which Social Security self-employment taxes and credits may be securely transferred for those Contract Agents (Independent Contractors) who do not have an attributable cover source for income earned under their contracts. Such individuals will be taxed under the Social Security ... provisions applicable to Contract Employees. Deductions at the employee rate will begin 1 December 1964 (beginning of the 1965 tax year) on contract compensation.

2. The attached amendment is for your retention and includes the Contract Agents who should participate in the new procedure. Acceptance by the individual is presumed since his Social Security tax is at a lesser rate for the same credits.

a. It is suggested the individual under written contract be asked to sign the amendment.

CONTINUED...

Attachment:
As Stated

Date typed: 4 October 65
Dispatch symbol and number: Book Dispatch 5178
Headquarters file number: Retain

SECRET

Distribution:
2 - WH/PERS
1 - WH/1
1 - WH/2
1 - WH/3
1 - WH/4
1 - WH/5
1 - WH/7
1 - WH/C

Originating: WH/Pers/W.S. Renehan: gms — Ext. 6576

Coordinating:

Office symbol	Date	Officer's name
C/WH/PERS		
C/WH/1		[signature]
C/WH/2	5 Oct 65	[signature]
C/WH/3	[illegible]	[signature]
C/WH/4	5 Oct 65	[signature]
C/WH/5		
C/WH/7	[illegible]	[signature]
ADC/WH/C	[illegible]	[signature]

Releasing: C/WHD — 10/5/65 — William V. Broe

18 OCT 1965

[illegible]

[illegible] continued on [illegible] [illegible] a contract employ- ee, [illegible] "[illegible] as you go" basis [illegible] this year.

[illegible] the undersigned [illegible] in [illegible] Security [illegible] 1965, [illegible] on or before 15 [illegible] 1965.

[signature]

[illegible] A. [illegible]

S E C R E T

SECRET

XXX Miss Joyce H. Piseinch

Dear XXX Miss Piseinch :

Reference is made to your current ~~contract~~ Memorandum of Oral Commitment with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer.

Arrangements have been recently completed allowing certain independent contractors of this organization to obtain social security credits by covering such individuals under the social security tax provisions applicable to employees. These arrangements also include a provision for retroactive applicability to the beginning of the 1965 tax year. This can be done only for reasons of security since the procedure results in reducing the social security tax from the self-employed rate to the employee rate. For example, in January of 1965 the tax rates were 5.4% and 3-5/8% respectively.

As a consequence thereof, said contract is amended by deleting all reference to social security and by adding the following paragraph:

"Effective 1 December 1964, social security taxes will be covertly deducted by this organization from your compensation in the same manner and to the same extent as would be done if you were a Government employee. Security reasons make this procedure necessary. Its implementation does not imply in any manner the actual creation of an employee-employer relationship. Your legal status under this agreement continues to be that of an independent contractor.

If you receive or expect to receive full or partial social security credits from overt sources you will so notify this organization and an ~~adjustment will be made or covert deductions discontinued, depending~~ upon the circumstances. Further, if you should subsequently receive overt social security credits, evidence thereof will be submitted to this organization. In such event your covert credits will be erased and your covert deductions returned.

All other terms and conditions of said contract remain in full force and effect.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY SIGNED

Contracting Officer

SECRET

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: C/Bustos-Videla
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4506
DATE: 23 Sept 65

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-278841

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO: MEXICO CITY

24 SEP 65 18 46z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY DO 4, DO/H 3, C/OPS, WH/C 8, C/OA, C/IC 2, CA 2, FI

SIG CEN

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 45335

1. HDQS RECEIVED PHONE REPORT FROM NYDO 23 SEPT THAT LICOOKY-1 HAD CONTACTED KUJUMP THROUGH IGOR GORDEVITCH OF VISION MAGAZINE. LICOOKY HAD TOLD GORDEVITCH SHE HAD BEEN RECRUITED FOR KUBARK BY MR. HERMSDORF IN CUBA, WAS NOW MEXI, AND WANTED A KUBARK CONTACT IN NEW YORK. SHE ONLY PLANNED BE THERE A COUPLE OF DAYS PRIOR RETURNING MEXI AND GAVE NO INDICATION WHY SHE WISHED CONTACT.

2. ALTHOUGH GORDEVITCH IS CLEARED KUWOLF CONTACT, PREFER NOT USE HIM AS INTERMEDIARY TO LICOOKY. IN VIEW HER PLAN RETURN MEXI SHORTLY HDQS MAKING NO CONTACT. REQUEST STATION DEBRIEF LICOOKY ON HER ACTIONS, PARTICULARLY WHY SHE REVEALED HER KUBARK RELATIONSHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

DO/WH/Toth [signature]

WH/FOA [signature]

LICOOKY-1

[signature]
William V. Broe
Chief, WH D
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[signature]
W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

14-00000

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 40

/53 SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA 2, CA/O 4, D/MS 2

S E C R E T 020322Z

ACTION

2 SEP 65 IN 44044

DIR CITE MEXI 4628

LICOOKY

1. LICOOKY-1 HAS BEEN IN POOR HEALTH FOR SEVERAL MONTHS EVIDENCED BY RECURRENT HACKING COUGH, BRONCHITIS AND OTHER ILLS. TREATMENT HERE HAS TEMPORARILY ALLEVIATED CONDITION BUT NEVER PERMANENTLY. MOST RECENT RECURRENCE HAS L-1 WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBLE LUNG CANCER. WANTS VISIT DR. I. SNAPPER, CHIEF BROOKDALE MEDICAL CENTER WHO KNOWS HERE ENTIRE MEDICAL HISTORY. LEAVING END FIRST WEEK SEPT AND RETURNING FIRST WEEK OCTOBER.

2. OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LOCATION IN LITERARY WORLD THROUGH HER ACTIVITY IN AEM STATION PAYING EXPENSES FROM PROJECT FUNDS. (SEE HMMW 13902) MEDICAL EXPENSES COVERED BY BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD SO ESTIMATE ONLY TRAVEL AND TEMPORARY HOTEL STAY BEFORE ENTERS HOSPITAL.

3. IF HQS WISHES INTERVIEW HER NEW YORK SUPPLEMENTING STATION REPORTING ON COMES PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING LA WRITERS COMMUNITY, STATION WILL FORWARD EXACT DATES AND ADDRESS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

LICOOKY-201

14-00000

SECRET IN 44044 Page 2

CFN 4628 LICOOKY-1 ILLS L-1 DR. I. SNAPPER BROOKDALE OWING L-1 STRATEGIC LITERARY WORLD THROUGH AEM STATION HMMW 13902 BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD HOTEL NEW YORK LA WRITERS

BT

NNNN

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

C No. 83492

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/1/Mexico -- W.J. Kaufman

Operational Approval is hereby granted in the case of ______ LICOOKY/1 ______, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows.

Amended as specifically requested in your memorandum of 17 August 1965.

This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-F 10-5.

/S/ Edward P. Brown

CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 30 August 1965 jb

Distribution:
Orig. to Addressee
1 to Files

SECRET

FORM 11-64 124 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING ACTION: X — NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO:

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: LICOOKY-1 Participation in Mexican Writers' Association

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Removed from Project LICOOKY
CS Classification: 50-6-129/3
JOB #67-86/77
Box: 27 Fold: 3

Reference: HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965

1. LICOOKY-1's efforts as described in reference have substantial merit and some potential particularly if the Station can find a way to tie them in with the LIREAM effort in the intellectual field.

2. LICOOKY-1 certainly is to be commended for her effort in getting writers both of the right and left such as Carlos PELLICER Camara to join the AEM. From a KUBARK standpoint the most interesting contact is the one with PELLICER because he has been the reported force behind the COMES/CLE effort in Mexico.

3. Although her assigned tasks as reported in para 7 a, b and d of the LILINK memo do not entail making her witting of other Station assets engaged in MHSPAWN Ops among the intellectuals, an amendment to her OA is required, and one has been requested. If her efforts progress to the point where she might be able to influence leftist writers in their efforts to establish the CLE in Mexico (para 7 c of LILINK memo) Headquarters should be forwarded your ideas on why and how LICOOKY-1 should be used as an active MHSPAWN agent, and another ammendment will be required for this role.

4. ANDRIETTE will discuss this operation with the Station during his TDY.

5. In view if the restricted OA which confines KUBARK's association with LICOOKY-1, it is important that Headquarters remain aware of any unusual activity in her personal life which might affect her security or the granting of amendments to her OA for individual operations. Therefore, we would appreciate your keeping us informed on a more timely basis of any undertakings such as the recruitments for membership in the AEM described in reference.

CS COPY FILED IN 50-6-129/3

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

FILE IN 201-278841

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMW 13902	18 August 1965
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	S E C R E T	50-6-129/3 ~~201-278841~~

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
X NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO.

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: Overdue 1964 Covert Income Tax Returns

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: Priority

The following agents in Mexico City are delinquent in the filing of their 1964 Covert Income Tax returns. You are requested to obtain these outstanding returns as soon as possible since delinquent tax returns are subject to 6% statutory interest on the unpaid tax due from 15 April to the date of payment, and in addition are also subject to a penalty of 5% per month, not to exceed 25% of the tax liability.

Jeremy K. BENADUM
Sandra B. CAZAZIUS
LIFEUD/30
LIHUFF/1
LIMOTOR/19
Joyce C. RNEINCH
John R. SANDAMANIE
Philip K. TESSAROLO
Edward G. TICHBORN

Ernest A. LUSBY

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City

LICOOKY-1
Pinnock 201

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMS 4278

DATE: 19 August 1965

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER

14-00000

SECRET

17 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR : CI/OA

SUBJECT : LICOOKY-1 (201-278841)

An amendment is requested to the Operational Approval of LICOOKY-1 to use her 1) to develop and report on members of the Mexican Writers' Association, 2) to assess her influence on these members and leaders, and 3) to continue her work in the AEM and to become a close confident of Pellicer, Rulfo and other influential leaders of the AEM. This is in compliance with the request set forth in HMMA 26,621, 15 July 1965, a copy of which has been made available to your office.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief WH/1

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - 201-278841
1 - WH/1 Memo

WH/1/Bustos-V:jah

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
		XXX MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief, WH Division		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief of Station, Mexico City		MICROFILM

SUBJECT LICOOKY Project Progress Report for March 1965

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

References: A. HMMA-25560, 11 March 1965.
B. HMMW-13437, 15 March 1965.

1. Attached is the LICOOKY Project Progress Report for the month of March 1965. The activity of this Project during the reporting period is covered in detail in an effort to comply with the instructions contained in paragraph 4 of reference-B.

2. Unless otherwise required the next Progress Report will cover the period 1 April through 30 June 1965. By that time the LILINK Unit hopes it will have a secretary to help with its "paper" load.

3. The "Juanita" referred to in paragraph 1c of attachment, is identical with Juana de LARIOS, previously reported in MEXI-2772. The Station is trying to locate her address and phone number in order to be able to provide the Guatemala Station with more information on this group.

4. It is requested that Headquarters index the following names in the context in which they appear here: Jorge *CARRANZA, Maria Teresa *REYES de *REVUELTAS, Arturo *FILIO, Jorge *FILIO, Luis *ARENAL, Guillermo *ROUSSET Banda, Jaime *NAVARRO. Station has no traces on Navarro, the brothers Filio, nor on the pseudonym Carranza.

for
Willard C. CURTIS

ATTACHMENT: Progress Report (Orig & 2), h/w

Distribution:

3 - Chief, WHD w/att. h/w
2 - Files:

LICOOKY-1
201 file

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-25798	7 April 1965
	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER 50-6-129/3

SECRET ATTACHMENT TO: HMMA-25796

LICOOKY Project Progress Report

March, 1965

1. Production

The LICOOKY Project has not produced any information reports during this reporting period. During this period LICOOKY-1 has been reporting on her activities and working as follows:

a. L-1 learned that the Guatemalan PGT have approached Bartolomé Costa-Amic about printing a "news letter" to be distributed in Guatemala. When this occurs she will be able to obtain copies and identify the authors and other pertinent details.

b. Continuing reports on the activities of Miguel Angel Toralla Burgos, Guatemalan guerrilla now in exile in Mexico. L-1 has established that Toralla meets Victor Manuel Gutiérrez once a week at some undisclosed place and time.

c. L-1 is attempting to identify and obtain the address and telephone of one "Juanita". "Juanita" acts as a courier to Guatemala for Gutierrez and also acts as a cut out between Gutierrez and Dr. Raul Oseguida Pelala. It has been established that Gutierrez always uses "Juanita's" phone to make his telephone calls. "Juanita" also takes telephone calls for Guitiérres.

d. L-1 is attempting to identify one "Jorge Carrarza", posing as an attorney in Cuidad Hidalgo. It has been established that "Jorge Carranza" is a psuedonym for a woman who is

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

in contact with Miguel Toralla and apparently a Guatemalan living in Ciudad Hidalgo who is a part of the commo system between the Guatemalan Communist exiles in Mexico and Party Members in Guatemala.

e. L-1 continues reporting target study data on Margarita Paz Paredes and Djuka Julius.

f. L-1 completed basic target studies on Amelia Castillo Ledon, new Mexican ambassador to Austria, and Alejandro Gomez Maganda, new Mexican ambassador to Panama.

g. L-1 is preparing a target study on Victor Urquidi, an advisor to the Secretary of Treasury.

h. L-1 has been instructed to report as fully as possible on Ernesto Madero, former chargé d' affaires in Moscow and who now has a responsible position in the Foreign Office.

i. L-1 is attempting to identify 11 Nicaraguan guerrillas now living in Mexico and being assisted by Edelberto Torres Espinosa and to get a line on their activities.

j. L-1 is also attempting to identify a group of Central Americans, Salvadoreans, Nicaraguans and Guatemalans, who are meeting with Luis Manuel Zuñiga.

k. L-1 has been instructed to try and locate one Victor Rico Galan and discover his present activities.

l. L-1 has been the source of information which provided the foundation for an CA operation against the PCM. L-1 has been seeing Maria Teresa Retes de Revueltas, wife of

14-00000

Jose Revueltas, Communist landmark personality in Mexico for the past several years, on a regular basis. Jose Revueltas has become an alcoholic and for the last several weeks has been living with an Indian girl. Mrs. Revueltas blames this situation of her husbands relationship with two brothers Arturo and Jorge Filio and on Jaime Navarro. According to Mrs. Revueltas these three are engaged in smuggling contraband goods into Mexico and are also engaged in ~~smuggling~~ drug activities. Mrs. Revueltas claims that they use their smuggling channels to help the PCM pass items and bodies in and out of the country. Jose Revueltas was the contact man between this group and ~~Alfredo~~ David ALFARO Siqueiros and Luis Arenal who were interested in smuggling Guillermo Rousset Banda accused of murdering Carlos Farias Jimenez, both known Communists, out of the country. There has been speculation that this murder was the result of differences between the Pro-Soviet and Pro-Communist China groups of PCM. Mrs. Revueltas believes that if she could cause the arrest of the Filios and Navarro she could rescue her husband from their influence. At L-1's suggestion, she wrote an anonymous letter denouncing the Filios and Navarro, describing their activities, types of contraband the addresses where the contraband was located. Mrs. Revueltas was told by L-1 she would give it to a friend of hers on the Narcotics Board in Mexico.

14-00000

The letter was passed to the Station where it will reach the proper Mexican authorities. This may not work, but if the information provided by Mrs. Revueltós is true and the group is arrested, publicity plus additional help from the stations publicity can create a damaging scandal against the PCM.

L-1 has been additionally instructed of the requirements outlined in para 2 of Ref. B.

LICOOKY-2 reported on 15 March that Judith Ferreto called him to send a ticket to San Jose, Costa Rica for Manuel Mora or to the person to whom he assigns it. The ticket was for travel from San Jose to Mexico City. On March 18 Ferreto called saying Mora was in the city and had not used the ticket but had given it to Señora Carmen Lopez de Ferreto who travelled to Mexico on 21 March. Ferreto called again on 26 March making a reservation for Carmen de Ferreto's return to San Jose on 1 April.

L-2 took advantage of this phone call to remark to Ferreto that there had been little travel lately. She told him there was no explanation other than people were just not travelling. She said she expected there would be some movement of students this summer.

2. Operations

I In order to better control and guide L-1's work, two steps have been taken. Discussions with L-1 have been directed toward blocking out and defining the goals she should achieve during the

14-00000

next three months period. For each meeting she prepares an "activities report". In this report she outlines her activities for the preceeding week, the tasks she was working on, the people she was in contact with and the results. She also lists the tasks she will work on during the coming week, the people she will see, etc.

L-1 is handicapped in this work since she has no control over her contacts and has to be extremely discreet in her eliciting of the facts. Many times her plans go awry since during a given conversation there is no opening to bring up the subject she wished to discuss.

3. Security

Both LICOOKY-1 and-2 appear to recognize the security implications of their work. Neither are curious about their case officers. They follow their instructions concerning the security of their meetings and commo with their case officers. During the reporting period their has been no evidence of any unusual security problems.

4. Personnel

LICOOKY-1 has regained her good health and her morale is high. Now that she has a permanent base of operations, in that she has her apartment furnished and a telephone, she is resuming her regular contacts that were broken when she was ill and living in a series of different locations.

During the present case officer's contact with L-1, she has not presented the personality described in Para 3 of Ref B. She

is an intelligent woman, and in all our meetings she has appeared mature and attentive. She has been prompt and reliable in her meetings. She discusses her problems calmly and accepts instruction and criticism without argument. She has responded well to instructions and has worked hard in trying to improve her reporting. She appears to be well adjusted to her environment which is most extremely trying at times.

In discussions concerning the Communist and leftist movements, she admitted that at one time she was influenced by their ideology, but as she had grown older and had observed more of their activities and personalities, she had lost all respect for them. She said that she had been fooled by Fidel Castro in his early days and had thought he would be good for Cuba, but as events have developed she has seen how mistaken she had been originally. She also commented that in long talks with LINLUCK, he had opened her eyes to the fallacy of the Communist ideology. In all of these conversations she has appeared sincere in her statements. Her liason with LINLUCK appears to be based on deep affection for him and not on promiscuity. The case officer has the impression that if there was not a present Mrs. LINLUCK she would become legally his wife. This is a problem that may have to be faced in the future.

LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

5. Problems

There are no unusual problems presented by this project.

LICOOKY-2 admitted the access to her communist contacts here had been hurt as a result of her known association with LINLUCK at the time he publicly broke with the party. As an example of this, Miguel Toralla told her that Gutierrez had referred to LINLUCK and LICOOKY-1 as "enemies" of the party and that he had been reprimanded for seeing LINLUCK when he first arrived in town. He had been forbidden to see either one of them.

6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches has been helpful. While her reporting for the past month has not produced any Information Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the paragraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

7. Plans

It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOOKY-2.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 16

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION WH 8

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S E C R E T 132023Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

REF HGG 3595

HMMA 25336

HMM 9477

HMM 9529

13 MAR 65 IN 22433

1. ALTHOUGH LICOCKY-1 SOURCE OF REFS C AND D, LUNLUCK CONTACT TO MIGUEL ANGEL TORALLA BURGOS HAS BEEN MUCH CLOSER. SINCE REFS TORALLA HAS CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LINLUCK:

A. RICARDO RAMIREZ DE LEON IS REAL LEADER OF FAR AND PERSONALLY PARTICIPATED IN ASSASSINATION OF ONE COL. OLIVA AND SON. RAMIREZ

SECRET

file LICOOKY-1

Para to disseminated as CS-311/63295-65 by WH/2/G

ALLEGEDLY ORDERED MURDER OF COL. MEDINA AND JUST ESCAPED WITH HIS LIFE (SEE REF A). R ALSO ORDERED BURNING AID GARAGE IN WHICH TORALLA PARTICIPATE.

B. GUAT WOMAN NAMED JUANA LARIOS MOVES BACK AND FORTH FREELY BETWEEN MEXICO AND GUAT AS COURIER TO YON SOSA FROM VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ, OF WHOM SHE AND HUSBAND RAFAEL ARE INTIMATE FRIENDS. RAFAEL IS SPANISH REPUBLICAN AND FORMER CHAUFFEUR FOR PRESIDENCY DURING ARBENZ REGIME. EXILED MEXI IN 1954. (LICOOKY-1 HAS IDENTIFIED "JUANITA" LARIOS GUTIERREZ AS CUTOUT BETWEEN VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ AND DR. RAUL OSEGUEDA. L-1 SOURCE IS OSEGUEDA WHO CONFIRMED JUANITA COURIER ROLE AND SAID HER LAST TRIP TO GUAT WAS EARLY FEB.)

2. DURING FIRST THREE DAYS IN MEXI, LINLUCK ASKED LICOOKY PUT TORALLA UP AT HER APT. THEREAFTER TORALLA MOVED IN WITH ABEL CUENCA MARTINEZ.

3. 4 MARCH TORALLA CONFIDED FOLLOWING TO LICOOKY (LINLUCK ABSENT IN FRANCE OWING SERIOUS ACCIDENT TO SON):

A. T HAS HAD THREE MEETINGS WITH VICTOR MANUEL GUTIERREZ WHO GAVE HIM MONEY TO PAY BOARD AT CUENCAS, AND ASSURED HIM PGT CAN GET HIM WORKING PAPERS HERE THRU GOBERNACION.

B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD

14-00000

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LICOOKY-2 doesn't present any personnel problem. While his niche is a small one and his access is limited, his assignments are carried out conscientiously.

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6. Effectiveness

LICOOKY-1's target studies and suggestions on possible recruitment approaches have been helpful. While her reporting for the ~~first~~ past month has not produced any Information Reports, it has kept the station aware of the activities in her particular area of access. If she is successful in performing her tasks as outlined in the paragraph under "Production" above, such information will be useful to the station. LICOOKY-2's effectiveness is limited to his narrow target, but such travel information that he does provide does serve a useful purpose.

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It is planned to continue the present direction and guidance given to LICOOKY-1 in an effort to increase the quantity and quality of her production.

The same attention will be given to LICOOKY-2.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 14

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GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

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VR. FILE, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, RI/AN

S E C R E T 132028Z

GUAT INFO DIR CITE MEXI 2772 (EASBY ACTING)

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HMMA 25336

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B. G TOLD T HAD RECEIVED FINE REPORT FROM PGT AND T SO WOULD

14-00000

FORGIVE HIS ERROR IN SEEING AND ACCEPTING HELP FROM (LINLUCK) AND (LICOOKY-1) WHOM HE NOT TO SEE AGAIN. T ASKED LICOOKY NOT TO REVEAL HE STILL SEEING HER. T ALSO REGULARLY SEEING LINLUCK NEPHEW JORGE GODOY.

4. LICOOKY ADDS THAT T APPEARS BE DELIBERATLEY CHANGING APPEARANCE BY CUTTING HAIR AND GROWING MUSTACHE. SPECULATES MAY PLAN RETURN GUAT. REPORTS ALSO THAT ABOUT 26 FEB LINLUCK TOLD ALL GLEANINGS FROM T (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING INFO IN HMM 9582 AND 9576) TO COL. MARCO ANTONIO VARGAS AGUIRRE, GUAT MILATT HERE WHO ALLEGEDLY RETURNED TO GUAT WEEKEND 27 FEB WHERE PLANNED REPORT ALL LINLUCK INFO. NOTE LINLUCK DID NOT TELL STATION THIS. HIS RETURN WILL (BE INDIRECTION) TRY GET HIS ADMISSION IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHAT COURSE ACTION (WILL PROBABLY BE) TAKING.

5. BECAUSE OF GUTIERREZ WARNING AGAINST OUR TWO MAIN SOURCES, STATION MAY BE LOSING IMPORTANT ACCESS TO T. ALSO POSSIBLE VARGAS REPORT MAY RESULT IN DEMARCHE TO GOM THRU GUAT AMB HERE TO COOPERATE IN CLOSER CONTROL ARMS MOVEMENTS AND SUBVERSIVE TRAVEL BETWEEN MEXI AND GUAT. ACCORDINGLY MEXI NEITHER TAKING NOR RECOMMENDING ACTION UNTIL AFTER LINLUCK RETURN, BUT WILL CONTINUE REPORT.

6. INDEX RAMIREZ, JUANA AND RAFAEL LARIOS, GODOY AND COL. VARGAS.

SECRET CFN

SECRET

104-10266-10138 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: LIRING-3
C-798301

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY: OFFICE OF SECURITY MATERIAL

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 AUG 78 2:33	4 Aug 78	ED LOPEZ	Edwin Juan Lopez

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14-00000

Polygraph Report
Office of Security

TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-65 126a

SECRET GROUP 1

(5-9)

14-00000

SECRET

APPROVAL WORK RECORD

DATE SET UP	TRUE NAME	DATE ORIG. REQ.
6 June 1966 jep		27 May 1966
201 # 798301	JURADO-Delmar, Carlos	SO#
☒ POA ☐ CNC ☐ ORSD ☒ OA ☐ SP. IN	VARIATIONS	
CRYPTONYM LIRING/3	PSEUDONYM	PROJECT LIRING
DATE OF BIRTH 1930	PLACE OF BIRTH Mexico City, Mexico	
CASE OFFICER Jane Zerance	DIVISION WH/1	EXTENSION 3656

	REMARKS	INITIALS	DATE	COMMENTS
P.O.A.				Records on RIS Agents Checked in CI/R&A, date: 6 June 1966 Results: NR Jab 9 June 66
OA				4 APR 1967 — Audio op to be run against subject.
ORSD				
CNC				
CASE CANCELLED	✓	[illegible]	20 DEC 1968	"HOSTILE"
PRQ I	BIO			
PRQ II				
167696 GREEN LIST	NR	[illegible]	14 June 66	
RI TRACES	~~WILL FWD.~~ No traces	JTW	23 June 66	per Div memo of 23 June 66
OPS & DIV TRACES	NR			
FIELD TRACES	DEROG. ATTACHED			
S.O. INDICES	NR	Jab	9 June 66	
XX FBI INDICES	Neg	JTW	6 July 66	
FBI CORD. REQUESTED				
FBI CORD. COMPLETED				
WRITTEN S.O. INVESTIGATION	CNF. NCSS - Neg	JTW	6 July 66	
TECHNICAL INTERROGATION REPORT				
CCS/NC NOTIFIED				
CCS/NC COMPLETED				

FORM 9-65 126a SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(5-9)

14-00000

IND. YES ☐ NO	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 42	REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
CLASS. TO FILE NO.	SECRET	
X-REF TO FILE NO.		
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐	PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED	
DESTROY ☐ SIG.		

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

S E C R E T 262005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

26 May 65 ☐ 24650

REF DIRECTOR 87441

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK Passport as means identification.

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 | 5; 2 | 6; 3 | 7; 4 | 8

DISSEM BY 23/3 PER ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 25 21 25Z CITE DIRECTOR 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

26 MAY 1966

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 0 TOTAL COPIES 19

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FROM MEXICO CITY

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☑ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

9 MAY 1966

S E C R E T 050042Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY, CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

14-00000

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

Controlled by Soviets

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG : W.P. Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

02820

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. ~~SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.~~

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts / Hold for 772

10 MAY 1966

NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and cryptos.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - derog info ... as to connections w/Cubans?

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT

SUBJECT: 201 -

TYPE OF REQUEST							
	POA		OA		CNC		SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date)

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

USE OF SUBJECT

Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (*Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.*)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD

GREEN LIST INITIATED: YES / NO

ATTACHMENTS: PRQ - PART I / PARTIAL BIO / OTHER

REMARKS

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

M/R - Bona fides need establishment.

FORM 3-64 693 SECRET (9) 5

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
WH/1/Zerance 332 Ames	3656	DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. WH/1 Stewart			8	Tiale deray process.
2.				
3.				
4. DCWH/1		6/3		
5.				
6.				
7. CI/OA				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION
(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:
- X CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
33? Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3 NR

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-758301 NR

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE
Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE
Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity to furnish information on Cuban economic & military reqmts, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in Mexico City, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? X YES ☐ NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

X	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER | EXTENSION 3656 | SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF [signature]

FORM 8-65 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:	Carlos JURADO-Delmar
DPOB:	1930 in Mexico City
CITIZENSHIP:	Mexican
OCCUPATION:	Artist
SCHOOLING:	Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico
RESIDENCE:	Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.
MARITAL STATUS:	Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

NR NR

DEROGATORY TRACES

STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 17 TOTAL COPIES 6

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ABSTRACT

DISSEM BY 38 PER 90-19

ACTION WH/COG 8

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INFO FILE, VR, CS/DO, SUSPENSE, WH/COG, CDO, WH8, CA2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O4, FI, FI/D4, FI/INT, IW, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, CI/IS, SOD6, CS/SGO, DO4, DO/H3, CCS3, C3PS, ADDP

S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9810 (MEXI)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

4 JAN 67 IN 71138

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9608 (65875[illegible]2)

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 23 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH

SECRET

LIRING-3

201 file

WH/1
201-798301

201-798301
4 JAN 67

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA. THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 120 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

14-00000

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E. G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTI-BIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPES OR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN [illegible]

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 35

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION By 7

INFO WH 8

RID COPY

FILE VR DDP ADDP SOD 6 CI CI/OPS C/PS FI FI/INT 2 DO 4 IO/H 3 RAZ CS/SEC

SECRET 2[illegible] CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6831

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY

31 DEC 66 68782

REFERENCE: GUATEMALA CITY 6847 (IN 64291)

1. ON EVENING 28 DECEMBER, COS DISCUSSED WITH MINDEF COL. ARRIAGA THE OBJECTIVE OF THREE WAY COLLABORATION ON PROBLEM OF ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO. COS GAVE ACCOUNT OF RESULTS OF CONVERSATIONS BY COS AND RODDY WITH COLS. SOSA AND CHINCHILLA AND INFORMED ARRIAGA OF IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE TO CHINCHILLA. ARRIAGA WELCOMED IDEA OF COLLABORATION AND SAID THAT, AT TIME HIS VISIT TO MEXICO IN SEPTEMBER, MEXICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS HAD PROMISED TO STRENGTHEN MILITARY COVERAGE ON GUATEMALAN BORDER. HE SAID THAT MEXICANS HAD COMPLIED FULLY WITH PROMISE AND HAVE EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF WHOLE MEXICAN FRONTIER WITH GUATEMALA. WHEN ASKED IF HE HAD ANYTHING ADDITIONAL TO ADD PRIOR COS DEPARTURE FOR MEXICO, ARRIAGA SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT KNOWN TO INTERESTED PARTIES THAT GUATEMALAN ARMY, AFTER 1 JANUARY, WILL INCREASE ITS FORCES ON BORDER TO PROVIDE EQUALLY COMPLETE COVERAGE ON THIS SIDE OF FRONTIER. SECRET

 SECRET

2. ARRIAGA SOMEWHAT VAGUE ON SPECIFIC AREAS COVERED BY MEXICAN ARMY. SUGGEST STATION MEXICO CITY THROUGH APPROPRIATE ASSETS MAY BE ABLE DETERMINE MEXICAN ARMY STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF UNITS ON GUATEMALAN FRONTIERS. STATION GUATEMALA CITY WILL UNDERTAKE PROVIDE SAME INFORMATION WITH RESPECT TO GUATEMALAN ARMY FRONTIER STRENGTH.

3. AS RESULT CONVERSATIONS WITH COLS. SOSA AND ARRIAGA, IT APPEARS THAT GUATEMALAN ARMED FORCES ARE MOVING FORWARD ON OWN INITIATIVE AND NEITHER OFFICER HAS AS YET MADE ANY SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR WOFACT ASSISTANCE, ALTHOUGH AS OPERATIONS DEVELOP, WOFACT MAY BE ABLE PROVIDE ASSISTANCE POSSIBLY IN FORM OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS OR TECHNICAL AIDS. FOR THE MOMENT, STATION WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WHICH HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR TREASURY GUARD.

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION					
LITEMPO PASSPORT CAMERA FILM #179-180 14-21 NOV 66	2. RI FILE NO.	50	6	91	/6	
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. HMMA-30821				4. DATE 9 Dec 66	
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM LITEMPO	8. DATE OF INFO. 14-21 Nov.		9. EVALUATION		
5. ANALYST [signature]	6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE		

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

Carlos JURADO-Delmar- Mexican arrived Mexico City via Cubana flight 464 from Cuba on 21 November 1966.

Mentioned in manifest following Subject's name was the name, Carlos Alberto JURADO-Malacara- (Any relation?)

LIRING-3

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. ➔ 201-798301

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-764704
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1
DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, [illegible], CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

WH/ES

ABSTRACT X

MEXI

S E C R E T 240005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346 24 NOV 66 IN 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: ~~MEXICO CITY~~ 9057 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DE-BRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

AN	PI	WH/ES
PS		
ABS		

WH/1 Records Officer - this should have been 201-798301.

201-798301
~~201-764704~~
24 Nov. 1966

14-00000

217.- Ent[illegible]da a las 1119hs.- MF Dio[illegible] Leon Giraldo -colombiano- por su visa.- Araceli: que llame mañana.--- 230.

6091

252.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF para el pasaporte de Othón González.- Aracel[illegible]: que llame en diez minutos.--- 260.

295.- Entrada a las 1146hs.- MF por Mirabal.- MD que no está.- MF que si Mirabal no dejó recado para Ramírez Pérez, - porque están esperando para la salida a Cuba para el día 14, alumnos de la Escuela Superior de Economía.- MD que llamen mañana para saber.-- Ramírez: que les urge hoy una solución. MD: que entonces dentro de una hora vuelva a llamar.-- 351

368.- Entrada a las 1205hs.- Rojas -de Cubana- por Curbelo, Abreu o Morabal.- MD que ninguno de ellos está, que llame - dentro de dos horas.-- MD es la Sra.de Copero y le informa a Rojas de la enfermedad de Copero.--- 398.

433.- Salida al 357900.- 1212hs._ MD la Sra.de Cepero con Almada.--- Almada que le diga a Cepero que llegó un cable para que viaje el 21 de noviembre a la Habana.--- MD pide una resor ación para el vuelo del viernes para Gerardo Cantú.- ----- 437.

8 nov 66

458.- Entrada a las 1245hs.- MF Marcela por Chichay.- MD -

50-6-75/4

14 nov 66

HMMA 30549

LIRING-3

201-

Fmr 11

que ella ya no trabaja aquí porque se está preparando para entrar a la Universidad.- Marcela que Chichay le hizo un pedido de libros para enviar a Cuba y que ya se los están cobrando.---- 472.

473.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Salomón Swan.- Araceli que ya está.--- 486.

510.- Entrada a las 1324hs.- HF por la visa para Luis Sánchez Mondragón -mexicano- Araceli que no ha llegado.-- Sanchez que está solicitada desde septiembre.--- 592.

704.- Entrada a las 1431hs.- HF José Ramírez Perez por Mirabal.- HD que no se encuentra.- Ramírez: que quiere verlo - para las cuatro de la tarde.- HD que le pasará el recado.-- ----- 720.

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14-00000

682. Entrada 1208.-Ignacio Sánchez Lo... pregunta al Vicecónsul si llegó su permiso de regreso a Cuba y Miraval indica que nó.- 730.-

6086

730. Entrada.-HF pregunta por Chichay y MD informa que hoy no trabajó.- 739.-

739. Entrada equivocada.- 761.-

761. Entrada 1254.-Héctor Ramírez de Arellano pregunta si llegó su pasaporte nuevo y MD dice que sí.- 782.-

782. Entrada 1300.-El italiano Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y MD pide hable más tardo.- 814.-

814. Entrada 1346.- Botifol, el que habló en la mañana, pregunta cómo puede hacer para solicitar prórroga para sus padres, porque a su papá lo tienen que operar nuevamente y MD pide pase mañana al Consulado para pasar un cable. HF acepta.859.

859. Entrada 1359.-Rafael Giordano pregunta si llegó su visa y MD dice que nó.- 880.-

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3.-Lll.- 7 Nov.66).- - - - - - - -

14-00000

148.- Entrada a las 1102hs.- Sámano, de Cubana pregunta que si el Consul es Curbelo.- Jorrín que no, que es Mirabal.--- 151.

6094

158.- Entrada a las 1109hs.- HF con Jorrín le dice que con el muchacho que le va a mandar el papel que pidió que si le puede mandar algo de literatura sobre Cuba porque el es simpatizante de los cubanos.- Jorrín: que sí, que lo que tenga se lo va a mandar.--- 169.

177.- Entrada a las 1115hs.- HF el diputado Alberto Orduña Culebro con Jorrín, le dice, que allá en la tierra de don Fidel hay una persona que necesita unas llantas y que el hermano de él le quiere mandar un juego de llantas -cinco llantas- por los conductos regulares, que si no hay alguna limitación a ese respecto.- Jorrín: que no, que las puede mandar por la Agencia General de Carga que está en Isabel la Católica 249.---- 193.

222.- Entrada a las 1200hs.- HF pregunta por Chichay.- Jorrín que ella ya no viene a trabajar a la embajada y que ella misma dijo que ya no iba a venir.- HF que se trata de unos libros.--- Que la va a localizar a su domicilio.--- 238. -- HF es Marcela Olguín.---

8 nov 66

247 .- Entrada a las 1210hs.- HF por el embajador Hernandez Armas.- Jorrín que no está.- HF es el profesor González Ra-

Mexican went to Cuba for Fish Institute
HMMA 30549 14 NOV 66

LIRING-3

14-00000

2

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INFO FILE VR WH/COG 3, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6841

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE

20D 62778

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY-9608

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANTO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 20 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANIO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ, WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) PADILLA, WHO

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 6841 S E C R E T SECRET

INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964

LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT.

INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME

FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. * RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: #146 **SECRET**

ORIG.	A. K. Carley:sm
UNIT	WH/COG/RR
EXT.	3483
DATE	16 December 1966

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WHC/SI	1			WH/1	3	WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.): MEXICO CITY-9628 (IN-60597) HMM-10908 LIRING (LIRING-3) Liaison *

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

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• ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN-60597

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS -314/15974-66

16 22 02 Z

DIST 16 DECEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 14 DECEMBER 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN PURCHASE OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (14 DECEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ HAS SPENT MORE THAN A MONTH IN MEXICO ON A SPECIAL COFFEE SEED BUYING MISSION FOR CUBAN PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO RUZ. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SUAREZ ARRIVED IN MEXICO 23 OCTOBER 1966 ASSIGNED AS AN ATTACHE IN THE COMMERCIAL SECTION OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY). WHEN SUAREZ FINALLY CONCLUDED NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF TEN TONS OF SEED, HE FOUND UPON DELIVERY THAT THE MEXICANS HAD WET THE SEED AND THAT MOISTURE ACCOUNTED FOR ONE TON OF THE WEIGHT OF THE SHIPMENT. THIS DECEPTION REPRESENTED A LOSS OF $10,000.00 (U.S. DOLLARS) TO THE CUBANS.

14-00000

2. SUAREZ SAID THAT CUBA WAS TRYING TO INCREASE ITS PRODUCTION OF COFFEE TO OFFSET LOSSES SUFFERED IN RECENT HURRICANES AND GENERALLY TO BUILD UP ITS CROP OF COFFEE FOR EXPORT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL HARD CURRENCY EXCHANGE.

3. DURING THE WEEK OF 18 DECEMBER SUAREZ PLANS TO VISIT COFFEE PLANTATIONS IN CHIAPAS STATE WHERE HE HOPES TO PURCHASE ADDITIONAL SEED.

4. (FIELD COMMENT: AN INDEPENDENT USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT SUAREZ HAS BOUGHT APPROXIMATELY 15 TONS OF MEXICAN COFFEE SEED AND IS TRYING TO BUY MORE. THIS SOURCE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE MEXICANS HAD CHEATED THE CUBANS BY WETTING THE SEED TO INCREASE ITS WEIGHT. THE SEED IS BEING FLOWN TO HAVANA BY CUBANA AIRLINES. SUAREZ INSTRUCTED THE CUBANA REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO TO ARRANGE TO HAVE THE SEED WELL AIRED AS SOON AS IT REACHES HAVANA.)

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, FBI, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE VR, SUSPENSE, WH/COG, CDC, ADDP, CSDO, WH 8, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D 4, FI/INT, IW, CI/OA, DO 4, DO/H 3, CA/O 4, DDP

S E C R E T 162250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9634

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 16 DEC 66 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

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LIRING-3

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE VR C/WH/COG 5, C/CI

S E C R E T 141930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9613 15Dec65 IN 59794

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 59022 PARA 2 *

COMPLETE TEXTS OF ALL PBRUMEN LIENVOY TRAFFIC POUCHED HQS ATTN: URQUHART REGULARLY. IN VIEW OF EXTENSIVE TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE COFFEE AND FERTILIZER SUGGEST THIS TEXT BE READ IN ITS ENTIRETY. BOTH NAMES ARE USED IN TRANSCRIPTIONS.

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* SUGGEST COUNTER SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROUTON - LIRING/3 MEETS

LIRING-3

201-798301

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE VR, WH/CCG 8, MPS/RG 2, CI/CA

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612 14 Dec 65 IN 59552

ACTION

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

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NNNN

LIRING-3
201-798301

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S E C R E T 142320Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9638

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

14 DEC 66 IN 58952

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4340, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTENDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

LIRING-3

14-00000

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9633 S E C R E T

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ASSESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

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1	5
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ORIG: J. Stewart/pem
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TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UGWA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]DIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

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PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/C/ER/OS [signature]
WH/COG/FIES [signature]
WH/COG/MO [signature]
WH/COG/FI [signature]
WH/COG/CA [signature]

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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EXT: 3554
DATE: 9 December 1966

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3	7
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(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 10 15 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58866

TO GUATEMALA CITY INFO JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

[illegible] LIRING

MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 59834)

1. HQS CONCERNED EFFORTS BY STATION MEXICO CITY TO INJECT LIRING-3 (IDEN) INTO CUBAN SUBVERSION ACTIVITIES MEXICO. LIRING-3 IS UNWITTING ANTI-SOVIET ASSET HANDLED BY SENIOR WOFACT STAFF AGENT, WILLIAM B. ROWTON, UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY. ROWTON PRETENDS BE GREEK BUSINESSMAN ALIAS NICK HARRIS WHO INTERESTED DEVELOPING LUCRATIVE SEMI-LEGAL BUSINESS DEALS WITH CUBA. LIRING-3 HAS MADE 3 TRIPS TO CUBA THIS CONNECTION. IN OCTOBER 1966 STATION SENT LIRING-3 INTO CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY WITH AN AS-YET-UNDISCLOSED NEWS ARREST CUBAN DIPLOMAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ. AS RESULT CUBANS INVITED LIRING-3 CUBA DISCUSS SENSITIVE CUBAN ACTIVITIES BUT ON ARRIVAL MERELY GAVE HIM LOW LEVEL REQUIREMENTS.

2. MEXICO CITY 9512 AND DIRECTOR 56903 CONCERN RESULTS ABOVE TRIP AND LIRING-3's SUGGESTION TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED GO CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

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PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO ~~MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO~~ DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE ~~SETTING UP~~ STAGE CREATE NET-WORK FOR CUBANS. WC

END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)

WH/COG/CICECS [signature]

[signature]
Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

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TO GUATEMALA CITY

INFO MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY, EX CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, E SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECORD)
WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
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S E C R E T 092303Z CITE JMWAVE 4534

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

9 DEC 66 IN 56744

TYPIC MHAPRON

REF JMWAVE 4498 (IN 51048)

AMOTS PROVIDED FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ: DURING BATISTA REGIME PARTICIPATED UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES WITH FATHER DIEGO MADRIGAL OF CARIDAD CHURCH. ONE ISMAEL SUAREZ WAS WITNESS FOR PROSECUTION IN DISMISSAL OF OTTO SIRGO FROM CUBAN ARTIS ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY STAGE PERFORMANCE. (REFS: BOHEMIA MAGAZINE EDITIONS OF 18 JAN 59, 7 AUG AND 21 AUG 60.)

HIGH-LEVEL CASTRO COMMUNIS

S E C R E T

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2

SECRET 032055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9560   5 DEC 66 IN 55884

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 9512 (IN 53867)

B. DIRECTOR 56923

1. LIRING-3 SAW JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT 1 DEC 66 AND ASKED FOR CONTACTS IN GUATEMALA COMMUNIST PART. JACOBO GAVE HIM NAME AND PHONE NUMBER SENORA HERNANDEZ (FNU), IN GUATEMALA CITY. AND SAID WOULD CABLE HER THAT LIRING-3 WOULD CALL. KROWTON WILL OBTAIN PHONE NUMBER.) LIRING -3 PROCEEDED BY RAIL TO MEXICAN-GUATEMALAN BORDER 2-3 DEC AND CALLED HERNANDEZ FROM MEXICAN SIDE. SHE PROMISED PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH "IMPORTANT PERSON FROM COMPANY" AND ASKED HIM CALL BACK EVENING 3 DEC OR NEXT MORNING, "SINCE COMPANY OFFICIAL NOT EASY LOCATE ON SHORT NOTICE".

2. LIRING-3 PHONED HERNANDEZ MORNING 4 DEC AND WAS INFORMED MEETING COULD NOT BE ARRANGED PRIOR 18 OR 20 DEC SINCE OFFICIAL AWAY ON BUSINESS. HERNANDEZ SAID MEETING WOULD BE HELD QUEZALTENANGO, GUAT., AND INSTRUCTED HIM CHECK IN ANY THREE HOTELS THAT CITY AND THEY WOULD LOCATE HIM.

SECRET

14-00000

3. LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY 6 DEC AND RECONTACTED JACOBO REPORTING WHAT TRANSPIRED. JACOBO EXPLAINED DELAY IN MEETING AS NATURAL IN VIEW SECURITY PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS AND SURMISED COMMIE OFFICIAL WOULD HAVE TO TRAVEL TO QUEZALTENANGO FROM MOUNTAINS. JACOBO SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHO REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE BUT HOPED WOULD BE FROM TURCIO GUERRILLA BAND. JACOBO SAID TURCIO HAD BEEN REPLACED BY CESAR MONTES WHO OLD FRIEND OF JACOBO. JACOBO PROMISED GIVE LIRNG-3 LETTER TO MONTES WHICH LIRING-3 COULD PRESENT TO PERSON SENT BY HERNANDEZ. LETTER WOULD ASK THAT LIRING-3 BE TAKEN TO MONTES.

4. LIRING-3 PLANS PROCEED QUEZALTENANGO 15 DEC. PER ROWTON INSTRUCTIONS WILL INFORM COMMIE REP OR MONTES HE HAS DEVELOPED EXCELLENT COMMERCIAL CONTACTS GUATEMALA CITY, HAS DISCUSSED GENERAL PLANS OF AID WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS, AND WANTS HELP REVOLUTION BY EXPLOITING UNWITTING COMMERCIAL CONTACTS PASS ARMS, ETC. ROWTON INPOSITION TIE LIRING-3 INTO ARVANITIS METALO-PLASTICS INDUSTRY GUATEMALA FOR COVER PURPOSES THROUGH STYLIANOS PREVOLIS, EMPLOYEE GREEK EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, WHO CLOSE FRIEND ARVANITIS AND COULD GIVE LIRING-3 LETTER INTRODUCTION IF REQUIRED.

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 9562 S E C R E T SECRET

5. RE QUESTIONS POSED REF B: LIRING-3 DID NOT HEAR WHAT HAPPENED LOPEZ; HERRERA NEVER MATERIALIZED, WILL REQUESTION FOR DETAILS CAMPS AND LOCATIONS. ROWTON ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE THOUGHT ARNOL RODRIGUEZ MIGHT HAVE BEEN BRIEFED BY DSE TO QUESTION HIM RE SOURCE HIS INFORMATION RE LOPEZ. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ IN NO WAY INTERROGATED HIM AND ASKED NO QUESTIONS BEYOND WHAT LIRING-3 TOLD HIM. LIRING -3 SAID HE IN HANDS FOUR SECURITY TYPES FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND THESE COULD HAVE INTERROGATED HIM HAD THEY DESIRED BUT APPARENTLY THEY DID NOT. LIRING-3 SAID RODRIGUEZ APPEARED KNOW NOTHING OF LOPEZ CASE.

S E C R E T *Re De Briefing Liring/3

BT

SECRET

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FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 291955Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9565

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

9 Dec 63 IN 56646

REF MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55884) *

PARA ONE REF LIRING 2 SHOULD BE LIRING 3.

S E C R E T

BT

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ORIG: J. [illegible]/pem
UNIT: [illegible]
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(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET   (DATE AND TIME FILED) 12 20 45 Z   CITE DIRECTOR   (REFERENCE NUMBER) 59022

TO MEXICO CITY
JMWAVE
PERUMEN LIRING

ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ
POSSIBLE CUBAN GOVT SECURITY AGENT (1966)

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UNSA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 BENIGNO DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISMAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLS D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]DIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

LIRING-3
201-798301

MICROFILMED JAN 06 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.

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CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

TO

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. ROWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW ROWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEMENDIA

WH/COG/RR/O3 [signature]
WH/COG/CICS [signature]
WH/COG/MO [signature]
WH/COG/FI [signature]
WH/COG/CA [signature]

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI/INT-2

S E C R E T 372228Z CITE JMWAVE 4498

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

7 DEC ... 54946

TYPIC MHAPRON LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9508 (IN 53817)

1. STATION FILES CNTAIN FOLL INFO ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA: ISMAEL SUAREZ WITH CODE NAME OF ECHEMENDIA REPORTED TO BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON IN CASTRO GOVERNMENT (UMWA-17, 11 SEPT 59). COMMUNIST; SECRETARY OF CONSTRUCTION; RESIDES SAN JOSE DE LAS LAJAS (UFGA-3240, 12 JAN 62). COMANDANTE ISMAEL SUAREZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA REPORTED AS ONE OF MANAGERS OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION DEPT IN CUBA (CS-3/479,278, 29 JUNE 61). ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ AKA COMANDANTE ECHEMENDIA WAS FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF HAVANA BUS TERMINAL; AS OF EARLY 63 HELD POSITION OF CHIEF OF BASIC SERVICE OF TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY (CUBAN REFUGEE, PEDRO LOPEZ CHAVIANO, 4 APR 63). ADMINISTRATOR OF CONSOLIDATED ENTERPRISE FOR TRANSPORT BY OMNIBUS (UFG-2997, 10 JUNE 63).

2. AMOT TRACES PENDING. WILL FORWARD ANY ADDITIONAL AVAILABLE INFO.

SECRET

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BT

201-748301

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 071940Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9537

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

7 DEC 63 54834

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9512

CORRECT MATRONYMIC PARA TWO NEXT LAST SENTENCE REF TO PADILLA.

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ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

ORIG: J. Stewart
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SECRET 6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO MEXICO CITY

[illegible] LIRING-3

VIEW [illegible] SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
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INFO FILE VR, C/WH/COG-8, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 061850Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9512

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 Dec 66 IN 53867

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 56923

1. RE PARA ONE REF, HQS ASSUMPTION CORRECT. LIRING-3 TOOK SON BY FORMER MARRIAGE WITH HIM AND BOTH RETURNED. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT WHEN HE DELAYED BY EMBASSY HE TOLD CEPEDA HE TAKING SON ALONG AS HOSTAGE TO PROVE GOOD INTENTIONS. CEPEDA PROTESTED THIS NOT NECESSARY BUT LIRING-3 TOOK SON ANYWAY.

2. RE PARA FOUR REF, LIRING-3 DEPARTED FOR CHIAPAS 1 OR 2 DEC 66 FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT CANDIDATES AS POSSIBLE SMUGGLING CHANNELS. HAD TALK WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA PRIOR DEPARTURE BUT ILLNESS ROWTON DID NOT ALLOW HIM GET RESULTS MEETING. LIRING-3/ WILL RETURN ABOUT TEN DEC.

3. RE PARA SEVEN REF, LIRING-4 NOT WORKING BUT STATES INTENTION ENTERING UNAM FOR COURSE ANTHROPOLOGY NEXT SEMESTER. BOTHER QUESTIONS POSED PARA SEVEN WILL BE ANSWERED UPON RETURN L-3 FROM CHIAPAS.

4. POUCHING ADDITIONAL DETAILS ROWTON'S DEBRIEFING L-3.

S E C R E T & Re HQS INTEREST IN INFO CONCERNING LIRING/4 CURRENT STATUS

BT

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S E C R E T 251720Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

6 DEC 66 IN 53817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9525 S E C R E T

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8 R/AN

ACTION CHANGE

MEXICO CITY 9508 (STATION & NUMBER) IN 53817 A (IN NUMBER)

C/S COMMENT: THE ACTION RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS CABLE HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED

FROM : WH/COG (DIVISION)

TO : WH (DIVISION)

BY : MR BELT WH/COG — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

IN COORDINATION WITH : MR STEWART WH — (NAME, DIVISION, AND EXTENSION)

LIRING-3
201-298301

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE VR, T/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, CI, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 051722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9528

6 DEC 66 IN 53817

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RTWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 25 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

Ismael SUAREZ - 201-257780 UMWA - 00017 11 Sept 67
represented by DIAZ as highly important person in FOC.

8

14-00000

SECRET

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH | CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: [illegible]

4. Please forward any Station traces on Dr. Armando [illegible] Rodriguez or Professor [illegible] for Headquarters files. It is suggested that [illegible]-1 might be able to develop a channel to [illegible] should the Station wish to follow up the matter through him.

Andrew F. [illegible]

ORIG : Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 1 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

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CONF: C/WH 6 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY, C/WH/COG 5, C/CI, C/FI 2

SECRET 2 23 44 Z CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9371 (IN 46965)*

1. PER STATION REQUEST PARA 12 REF, HQS OFFERS FOLLOWING COMMENTS: SUDDEN SWITCH FROM SERIOUS SENSITIVE PROJECTS ENVISIONED FOR LIRING-3 BY CUBAN EMBASSY (SUCH AS IMPLIED PARA 3 MEXI 8944 FOR EXAMPLE) TO RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS COULD, AS STATION OF COURSE AWARE, BE ONE OF SEVERAL NORMAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS CUBANS MIGHT TAKE THIS CASE. ANOTHER WOULD BE TRANSFER OF LIRING-4 TO LESS SENSITIVE JOB OR DISMISS ALTOGETHER, AS APPARENTLY OCCURRED. ALSO, SEEMS INCREDIBLE CUBAN SECURITY WOULD NOT QUESTION L-3 IN DETAIL ON SOURCE HIS INFO LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, TO WHOM L-3 SPENT THREE HOURS EXPLAINING DETAILS LOPEZ CASE, MIGHT BE DEBRIEFING L-3 BY SPECIAL REQUEST CUBAN SECURITY. LATTER, IF TRUE, WOULD GO FAR EXPLAIN GREAT EASE WITH WHICH L-3 ABLE OBTAIN SEVERAL VISAS GO CUBA THROUGH RODRIGUEZ. IN THIS CONNECTION,

(CONTINUED)

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TO

PAGE TWO

NOTE IN SCMEXI 873 THAT VISA ALSO GRANTED FOR PERSON WITH SAME NAME AS L-3 EXCEPT DIFFERENT MATRONYMIC (POSSIBLY SON BY FORMER MEXICAN WIFE?). NOTE THAT 6 NOV AIR MANIFEST SHOWS TRAVEL TO CUBA AND GIVES SAME MEXICO ADDRESS FOR BOTH. WOULD BE INTERESTING KNOW IF BOTH RETURNED MEXI 21 NOV AND WHAT EXPLANATION MIGHT BE.

2. GIVEN COMMERCIAL PROPOSALS AND ASSUMING STRONG CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST IN CASE, BELIEVE GOOD POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT LIRING-3 HAS IDENTIFIED HIS "CONTACTS" TO CUBANS AT LEAST IN PART AS GREEK BUSINESSMAN LOOKING FOR SERIOUS AND LUCRATIVE CUBAN TRADE WHO SOMEHOW HAD INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE. THUS REQUEST FROM RODRIGUEZ/SECURITY TO TEST HIS CONTACT BY SEEING IF HE COULD PRODUCE.

3. WITH REGARD ACTION SUGGESTED PARA 10 REF, HQS CONCURS STATION'S PLAN SEND L-3 BACK INTO CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY BUT WOULD SUGGEST L-3 PLAY DUMB ON WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED CUBA AND USE VISIT ONLY FOR OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE DELIVERING MESSAGE TO RODRIGUEZ VIA AMBASSADOR AND ROA PER PARA 8 REF. MESSAGE WOULD

(CONTINUED)

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TO

PAGE THREE

ASK RODRIGUEZ FOR CLARIFICATION TERMS WEED-KILLER, AMOUNTS DESIRED, ADVISE WHAT CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MEXI, ETC. MESSAGE COULD ALSO EXPRESS L-3'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT MISSION GIVEN HIM SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED, BUT WOULD SHOW HIS GOOD FAITH BY FOLLOWING THROUGH AS CUBANS SUGGESTED. IN KEEPING THESE SENTIMENTS ROWTON AND L-3 CAN GO THROUGH MOTIONS ATTEMPTING FIND INTERESTED PARTIES, ASCERTAINING AVAILABILITY, GETTING TERMS, AND, OF COURSE, OFFERING LEGITIMATE EXCUSES FOR INABILITY CONSUMMATE DEALS LATER ON. TO AVOID STEPPING NOTICEABLY OUT OF BELLIGERENT CHARACTER, L-3 CAN STILL WAX ~~XXXXXXXX~~ INDIGNANT ABOUT LOPEZ DIAZ ~~XXXXX~~ STUPIDITY, ETC. BELIEVE THIS COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT PRESERVE VARIOUS EQUITIES INVOLVED.

4. AGAIN TO SHOW L-3'S GOOD FAITH, BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD NOT TRY PRESENT CIENFUEGOS READY-TO-OPERATE SUBVERSION NETWORK, BUT IN INTEREST IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL SMUGGLING CHANNELS SEE NO OBJECTION L-3 CONTACTING JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA OR MAKING TRIP

(CONTINUED)

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CITE DIRECTOR 52903

PAGE FOUR

TO CHIAPAS FOR IDENTIFICATION AND PRELIM ASSESSMENT ONLY POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. DO NOT BELIEVE L-3 SHOULD ATTEMPT SIMILAR TASK ACROSS GUAT BORDER VIEW CURRENT SITUATION THERE.

5. HQS HAS NUMEROUS TRACES JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA (201-210804), GUATEMALAN PAINTER, NOT ACTIVE IN COMMUNIST PARTY WHO MARRIED TO LETICIA NAJARRO, RECENTLY EXPELLED FROM GUAT COMMUNIST PARTY BOTH RESIDING MEXICO (DOI 1957).

6. FYI, MACHINE RUNS SHOW FOLLOWING TRAVEL L-3 BETWEEN MEXI AND CUBA:

A. DEC 63 TO CUBA. B. NOV 64 TO CUBA. C. JAN 65 TO MEXI WITH FAMILY. D. MAY 66 TO CUBA. E. JUNE 66 TO MEXI. F. 19 AUG 66 TO CUBA WITH FAMILY. G. 29 AUG 66 TO MEXI. H. 18 SEPT 66 TO MEXI (FAMILY ONLY).

7. HQS INTERESTED IN ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF AND WHEN ACQUIRED:

(CONTINUED)

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CITE DIRECTOR 52903

TO

PAGE FIVE

A. WHERE LIRING-4 WORKING NOW? STILL IN EMBASSY?

B. RESULTS OF L-3 PLANNED CONTACT WITH JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA?

C. DID L-3 EVER HEAR WHAT HAPPENED TO JULIO LOPEZ DIAZ AFTER HIS RETURN CUBA?

D. DID FNU HERRERA (PERSON WHO WAS TO MEET L-3 IN HAVA) EVER MATERIALIZE? DETAILS?

E. ANY WAY GETTING L-3 TO PROVIDE MORE DETAIL AND LOCATE CAMPS HE VISITED ON MAP WITHOUT OVERSTRAINING ROWTON COVER?

F. ALL POSSIBLE DETAILS L-3 3-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH RODRIGUEZ ON LOPEZ DIAZ CASE, ESPECIALLY THOSE INDICATING FORMAL CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST.

END OF MESSAGE

* Gave LIRING-3 report of his visit to Havana and requested comments on proposals to send LIRING-3 back into Cuban Embassy Mexico City and for him to make contacts for possible subversive net.

(CONTINUED)

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CITE DIRECTOR 56903

TO

PAGE SIX

WH/COG/[redacted]

WH/2/G

William V. Broe
C/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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7 DEC 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR LIRING-3 FILE

SUBJECT: OOA Expenditures for LIRING-3 Ops as of 1 November 1966

REFERENCE: HMMT 7306 9 November 1966

Following are Subject Expenditures:

Date	Amount	Description	Purpose
20 October	$495.86	Medbery/Rowton Ops	LIRING-3 Op
25 October	$ 87.16	Medbery/Rowton Ops Expenses	LIRING Op October
25 October	$500.00	Medbery/Ops Payment	LIRING Travel PBRUMEN
26 October	$120	Medbery/Ops Payment	Safehouse LIRING Op October/November

Liring-3 file

14-00000

STRAIGHT - 8

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

LIRING/3

		ROUTING			
ORIG.	Virginia B. Flynn;eb	1		4	
UNIT	WH/COG/RR	2		5	
EXT.	3483	3		6	
DATE	30 November 1966				

TDCS DB-315/03581-66

CONFIRMATION COPIES
WH/COG 13

INFORMATION COPIES
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DATE DISTRIBUTED
30 November 1966

PRECEDENCE
X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.)
MEXI-9398 (IN-47895)
HMM-10866
LIRING (LIRING-3)
Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

WHC/RR	6	WHC/WAVE	1	WH/R	1
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	WH/1/R	3
WHC/CI	1			WH/MEXI	1
WHC/MO	1	E/IB/R	1		
WHC/SI	1	E/MADR	1		

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COORDINATING OFFICER(S)
WH/1/R C. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER
L. M. Harding
C/WH/COG/RR

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

• ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN -47895

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
FBI INS

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CITE TDCS DB-315/03581-66

S-E-C-R-E-T

DIST 30 NOVEMBER 1966

30 17 24 Z

COUNTRY CUBA/MEXICO

DOI 4 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE STAFF AND GUESTS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (21 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO. HMM-10866

SOURCE MEXICAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN DIPLOMATS IN MEXICO CITY. HE IS A NEW AND UNTESTED SOURCE.

1. ON 4 NOVEMBER 1966, THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY RECEIVED AN ORDER FROM HAVANA THAT ONLY THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS FAMILY, THE CODE CLERK AND HIS FAMILY, AND ONE OTHER OFFICER, INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY MOST PROBABLY, WOULD BE ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND. BEFORE THIS ORDER WAS RECEIVED, SEVERAL BACHELOR OFFICERS OR OFFICIALS, WHOSE FAMILIES WERE STILL IN CUBA, HAD BOARDED AND LODGED IN THE EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO THE RECENT ORDER, BOARD WILL BE PROVIDED ONLY TO THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE NOW ALLOWED TO LIVE IN THE EMBASSY COMPOUND.

5 4 3 2 1

S-E-C-R-E-T (classification) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD (dissem controls)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. THE ORDER ALSO SPECIFIED THAT ONLY CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) MEMBERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO STAY IN THE EMBASSY WHILE IN MEXICO. ALL OTHER VISITORS WILL BE OBLIGED TO SEEK PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS.

3. IN ADDITION, THE ORDER SET UP NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE HIRING OF MEXICANS TO WORK IN THE EMBASSY. MEXICANS MAY BE EMPLOYED ONLY AS SERVANTS. CHAUFFEURS AND SECRETARIES WILL NOW BE SENT FROM CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: TJFlores/yb
UNIT: C/WH/COG
EXT: 3481
DATE: 28 NOV 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

#137

ROUTING			
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CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE 004 DO/03 WH/COG 8

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 30 22 06 Z

(REFERENCE NUMBER) DIRECTOR IN-46964-B

TO CABLE SECRETARIAT

PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9370 (IN 46964 AND 46964-A) to NEW YORK DOST/ ~~DOMESTIC OPERATIONS~~, FOR INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

EUGENE P. O'MEARA
C/DO/OP 28-16
RELEASING OFFICER 1630

DO/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WH

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

INTEL TYPIC

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

[signature]

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION #115 SECRET

ORIG.	A. K. Carley;sm
UNIT	WH/C/RR
EXT.	3483
DATE	28 November 1966

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

TDCS-314/14998-66

CONFIRMATION COPIES: WH/C 11

INFORMATION COPIES: CS/DO, CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 4, WH 13

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 28 November 1966

PRECEDENCE: X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FS. NOS., PROJ.): MEXICO CITY-9370 (IN-46964) LIRING (LIRING-3) Liaison *

DISSEMINATION

		WHC/SI	1	E/IB/R	1	WH/R	1
WHC/RR	3	WHC/WAVE	1	E/MADR	1	WH/1/R	2
WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1			WH/MEXI	1
WHC/CI	1	WHC/CA/EW	1			WH/PACY (CINCSO)	1
WHC/MO	1						

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

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COORDINATING OFFICER(S): WH/1/R - Mr. Bounds (in draft)

RELEASING OFFICER: C/WH/C/RR

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN) GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPY NO.

LIRING/3-Prod

FORM 12-62 1R-1 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-20-44-47)

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ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -46964

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S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS-314/14998-66

20 20 53 Z

DIST 28 NOVEMBER 1966

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI 25 NOVEMBER 1966

SUBJECT REPORTED OUSTER OF CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER CARRILLO

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (25 NOVEMBER 1966) FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE IS IN CLOSE CONTACT AND ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS TRAVELLING TO MEXICO CITY.

1. ANTONIO CARRILLO CARRERAS, WHO WAS APPOINTED CUBAN VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER IN JUNE 1966, WAS OUSTED FROM THIS POSITION BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ ON 24 NOVEMBER 1966.

2. AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS VICE-FOREIGN MINISTER, HE WAS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE. IN HIS NEW CAPACITY, HE REPLACED TWO VICE-MINISTERS, PELEGRIN TORRAS DE LA LUZ AND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS. CARRILLO HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO THIS POSITION WITH THE SPECIFIC MISSION OR REORGANIZING AND REVITALIZING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATIONS ABROAD. HOWEVER, CASTRO HAD BECOME DISSATISFIED WITH

14-00000

CARRILLO'S PERFORMANCE AND LACK OF ACTION. (SOURCE COMMENT: IT IS NOT KNOWN WHO HAS BEEN APPOINTED AS CARRILLO'S REPLACEMENT.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

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FROM C.SSEM AX22

ACTION C/WH/COG5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH8, C/CI, C/FI2, C/FI/SPG, C/CI/PS, C/CS/SG9, C/SID3, C/DO4, C/DO/H3

SECRET 261845Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9371

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

26 Nov 63 IN 46965

REF: MEXICO CITY 9346 (IN 45539)*

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON HE MET WITH OSMANI CIENFUEGOS ON REF TRIP BUT RESULTS SOMEWHAT LESS THAN HOPED FOR POSSIBLY DUE NAIVE MANNER WHICH LIRING-3 PRESENTED HIS PLANS TO CIENFUEGOS.

2. ACTIONS LIRING STAFF AS LIRING-3 LEFT FOR HAVANA SEEMED INDICATE CUBANS NOT READY FOR LIRING-3 VISIT. LIRING-3 OBTAINED OWN VISA PRIOR DEPARTURE THROUGH FRIEND IN HAVANA, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, AND MADE PLANS DEPART 4 NOV. THAT DAY, HOWEVER, EMBASSY TOLD HIM VISA NOT COMPLETE, NEEDED SIGNATURE, AND HE UNABLE DEPART. LIRING-3 INDIGNANTLY TOLD REGINALDO CEPEDA CUBANS DID NOT TRUST HIM SINCE THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. LIRING-3 TOLD AMBASSADOR HE LEAVING NEXT PLANE, 6 NOV, OR WOULD NOT GO AT ALL. IN PROCESS LIRING-4, ANGRY OVER APPARENT STALLING, WENT STORMING TO AMBASSADOR CLAIMING THERE NO REASON FOR DELAY. STATION BELIEVES THIS PARTLY REASON LIRING-4 NO LONGER WORKING IN CONSULATE.

SECRET

Great deal — where working now?

14-00000

LIENVOY - Have phone calls? in cipher?

SECRET

3. EMBASSY ALLOWED LIRING-3 DEPART 6 NOV BUT WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM. UPON ARRIVAL HAVANA, LIRING-3 MET AT AIRPORT NOT BY HERRERA AS PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BY CEPEDA BUT BY FOUR UNIFORMED SECURITY OFFICERS. THEY CHATTED AMICABLY WITH HIM ON INSIGNIFICANT MATTERS AND TRIED FOUR HOTELS IN ATTEMPT FIND HIM PLACE STAY. EFFORTS UNSUCCESSFUL. FINALLY LIRING-3 SUGGESTED HE STAY WITH HONDURAN FRIEND RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, SECURITY OFFICERS AGREED AND HE SETTLED THERE.

4. NEXT MORNING FOUR OFFICERS RETURNED AND TOOK LIRING-3 TO FINCA IN PINAR DEL RIO. PLACE FILLED WITH AMERICAN ARMS AND MEN AND WOMEN DRESSED IN COMBAT CLOTHES UNDERGOING PARAMILITARY TRAINING. HE SHOWN OTHER SIMILAR FINCAS, ONE TO WHICH HE LIFTED BY HELICOPTER IN CAMAGUAY AND ANOTHER TO WHICH HE HIKED 20 KILOMETERS. HE GIVEN NO EXPLANATION FOR TOUR AND ON 10 OR 11 NOV HE RETURNED TO OCHOA HOME.

5. 14 NOV LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO HAD BEEN ON WEEK LONG TRIP CAMAGUAY. LIRING-3 SAID HE SPENT THREE HOURS TELLING RODRIGUEZ DETAILS LOPEZ CASE AND EXPLAINING HE HAD PLAN FORM HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK WHICH WOULD ASSIST PERFORM CLANDESTINE SUBVERSIVE MISSIONS FOR

NR (called [illegible] (Trace 3) [illegible] Visa A25 8 nov 66. [illegible] MC(1 8189 MH 73260 [illegible] [illegible])

SECRET

CUBA AS REQUIRED. RODRIGUEZ STATED HE THOUGHT THIS MAGNIFICENT IDEA. RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING-3 HE READY TRAVEL NEXT DAY. ON 15 NOV HE TOOK LIRING-3 IN OWN PLANE TO CAMAGUAY FINCA WHERE CIENGUEGOS SPENDING MOST HIS TIME.

6. AT FINCA LIRING-3 MET CIENFUEGOS WITH RODRIGUEZ AND FOURTH MAN, FAT, SQUAT, WHO LIRING-3 ASSUMED BE CIENFUEGOS SECRETARY. CIENFUEGOS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR LIRING-3 OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND STATED CUBA INTERESTED EXPORTING SUBVERSION TO CENTRAL AMERICAN TO HARASS UNITED STATES. LIRING-3 THEN EXPLAINED HIS PLAN ORGANIZE HIS MEXICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN CONTACTS INTO NETWORK ASSIST THIS ACTIVITY BUT CIENFUEGOS DID NOT TAKE BAIT STATING CUBANS TRUSTED LIRING-3 BUT NOT HIS CONTACTS OF WHOM KNEW NOTHING. CIENFUEGOS SAID SUBVERSION SERIOUS AND COMPLICATED BUSINESS AND THAT ONE UNTRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF LINK COULD BLOW ENTIRE EFFORT. RODRIGUEZ SUGGESTED LIRING-3 BE GIVEN POSSIBILITY TEST SINCERITY HIS CONTACTS. SAID CUBA WOULD PAY DOLLARS FOR MUCH NEEDED WEED KILLER BUT WOULD RATHER BARTER FOR NICKEL ORE. ASKED LIRING-3 SHOW WHAT HIS CONTACTS COULD DO THIS MATTER. LIRING-3 NOT ASKED IDENTIFY CONTACTS.

[Handwritten margin note: [illegible] L-3 [illegible] – L-3 went [illegible]]

7. LIRING-3 SOMEWHAT STUNNED BY LET-DOWN DID NOT ASK

SECRET

14-00000

SPECIFICS RE NICKEL ORE OR WEED KILLER. ROWTON HAS EXPLORED MATTERS SLIGHTLY AND FOUND NICKEL ORE ALREADY BEING OFFERED IN MEXICO BY OTHERS. MEXICAN-MADE WEED KILLER AVAILABLE THOUGH NOT YET SURE IT NOT MADE FROM U.S. PATENTS. STILL EXPLORING ALONG WITH PROBLEMS OF EXPORT.

8. END MEETING WITH CIENFUEGOS, RODRIGUEZ GAVE LIRING-3 FOLLOWING COMMO PLAN: WRITE LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ, PUT IT IN ENVELOPE BEARING RODRIGUEZ NAME ON OUTSIDE, PLACE THIS ENVELOPE IN SECOND ADDRESSED TO RAUL ROA GARCIA AND GIVE TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR MEXICO.

9. LIRING-3 TREATMENT CUBA MAY BE RESULT CUBANS TAKING SECOND LOOK AT PROPOSITION USING MEXICAN ASSIST IN GUNRUNNING TO CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY SO SOON AFTER LOPEZ CASE. THEIR EFFORTS STALL HIS DEPARTURE MEXICO CITY 4 NOV MAY HAVE BEEN ON ORDERS FROM DISCOURAGE TRIP ALTOGETHER.

10. AS FIRST COUNTER MEASURE AND IN KEEPING HIS PERSONALITY PLAN SEND LIRING-3 BACK INTO EMBASSY, AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FROM RODRIGUEZ TO CONFRONT LIRING-2 OR CEPEDA WITH DEMAND TO KNOW WHAT CUBANS PULLING ON HIM. WOULD POINT OUT HE SENT HAVANA ON SERIOUS MISSION OF SENSITIVE POLITICAL NATURE AND GIVEN TOUR OF FARMS AND REQUIREMENT FOR WEED KILLER. WOULD

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE 5 MEXICO CITY 9371 S E C R E T SECRET

EXPRESS DISGUST AT WAY CUBA TREATS DEDICATED FRIEND OF REVOLUTION. PLAN ALSO CONTINUE EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES SUPPLYING REQUIRED WEED KILLER FROM MEXICO. HAVE NO INTENTION INTRODUCING LIRING-3 INTO COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES FOR CUBANS BUT THIS ONE EFFORT WOULD SHOW GOOD FAITH. PLAN ALSO HAVE LIRING-3 WRITE RODRIGUEZ STATING HE DISAPPOINTED MISSION GIVEN SINCE IT NOT SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY TALK WHICH HE ANTICIPATED.

11. LIRING-3 ALSO SUGGESTS TO ROWTON HE BE ALLOWED TRAVEL CHIPAS WHERE HE FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND WHERE HE CLAIMS HAVE GOOD CONTACTS NOT YET IDENTIFIED. ROWTON WILL GET IDENTIFICATION. WOULD ALSO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALA FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEETING WITH THEM IN MEXICO. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA NIGHT OF 24 NOV TO DEVELOP MORE GUAT CONTACTS. ONCE HE HAS CHECKED CONTACTS COULD PRESENT TO CIENFUEGOS AS NETWORK READY TO OPERATE.

12. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS.

S E C R E T SIGNING FOR CFN.

BT

* PENDING TAPE OF MEETING

SECRET

NEW CONTACT.

Traces requested 1000, 21 Nov [illegible] (15 hit) + 201-210804

Guat 6745 [illegible] 48570

Guat [illegible]

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 9

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION WH/COG-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 240005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9346 24 NOV 63 45539

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31445)

LIRING-3 RETURNED MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 21 NOV AND HAD SHORT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT NIGHT. HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DEBRIEFING MORNING 22 NOV AND PROPOSED FUTURE DIRECTION L-3 OPERATION BEING CABLED SEPARATELY. ALSO POUCHING TAPE OF MEETING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. WHC/ES		25 NOV 66		
2. WH/COG/CICS				
3. FA				
4. BC				
5. WH/COG/FI/TC				
6.				
7.				
8.				

CKH

C/S/catt

TO TSD 29NOV66

only 1 cy of attachment sent TSD 19 Dec 66 via memo.

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Deputy Chief WH/C

INFO.: Chief, WH Division

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/AMKNOB/LIRING/Letter from LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Reference: Mexico City 9111

1. A copy of a letter written by LIRING-1 to AMKNOB-1 as set forth in reference is being forwarded under separate cover.

2. As pointed out, LIRING-1 used LIRING-3's old address as a return and when the letter was not delivered to AMKNOB-1 in Madrid it eventually was returned to LIRING-3 in Mexico City.

3. LIRING-3 mentioned the letter to Wallace B. ROWTON and later loaned it to him. Due to the relationship between LIRING-3 and ROWTON it is not possible for ROWTON to retain the letter and he will return the original to LIRING-3.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Letter a/s para 1 UNDER SEPARATE COVER att 29 Nov 66
See note above. TO: TSD

Distribution:
2 - DCWH/C w/att
1 - C/WHD w/o att 1cc to WH/1
5 - FILES

DOC FORWARDED W/O S/C
BY RID/AN 22 NOV 66

RING-3

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-30583

DATE: 17 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: LIRING-3 201-

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING | NIR — NO INDEXING REQUIRED | ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO.: Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: LIRING/OPERATIONAL/PRQ Part II on LIRING-3

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

MICROFILMED DEC 7 1966 DOC. MICRO. SER.

Reference: HMMA 30540 of 10 November 1966

1. A PRQ Part II for LIRING-3 is being forwarded under separate cover. It is to be noted that LIRING-3 has not been recruited in the name of WOFACT, but instead is engaged in clandestine activities for Wallace B. ROWTON, who LIRING-3 believes is a Greek businessman with international connections who requires economic, political and personality information in order to conduct his business.

2. The fact that LIRING-3 is not aware of his WOFACT connection, at the present time, outweights the value which would accrue were an attempt made to make him knowledgeable. He performs clandestinely for ROWTON and he is actually attacking priority targets. In this way he works against the target with a clear conscience and his left-wing sentiments are not threatened.

3. The operation is moving, however, toward the eventual full recruitment of LIRING-3, but it is moving slowly in that direction because of the political and social beliefs of Subject. One advantage of this false flag recruitment of this individual, at the present time, is the fact that he is able to enter the target area without fear of capture and exposure as an enemy agent. Under the present plan of operation he believes his work actually is aiding the revolution which he believes in from an idealistic standpoint.

for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
PRQ II UNDER SEPARATE COVER (3 cys) BY RI/AH
Dated [illegible]

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
2 - FILES

CS COPY

201-[illegible]

CROSS REFERENCE TO: | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA-30584 | DATE: 25 November 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

MICROFILMED
[illegible] 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

SECRET

— 57

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE PART II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION	PRQ NO.
	DISPATCH NO.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER

1. This form must be filled in by the case officer or appropriate authority on the basis of the best available information. It is not to be shown to the subject.
2. Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all questions in PRQ parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of FR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12b and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FR 10-215.
3. Three (3) completed copies of PRQ part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of this form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.
4. Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PRQ format in two (2) copies.
5. Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable write "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.

1. CRYPTONYM	2. PSEUDONYM
[illegible]	

SECTION I — CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT

1. INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.

[illegible] Newton first met Subject on 24 April, [illegible], at the Union de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle [illegible] 7, Mexico City, under alias (Nicolas Harris, Greek businessman), on the pretext that he was interested in arranging for Subject to paint a mural for a night-club in New York City. The approach was cold and subject did not question Newton's bona fides either as a Greek or international businessman visiting Mexico as a tourist. This first meeting led to social contact with Subject and wife.

2. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.

Subject could easily be turned over to a friend or business associate of Newton who could pose as a (non-American) third country national, preferably a Greek, [illegible] or [illegible]. If sufficient [illegible] [illegible] could be indicated at this point.

3. LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.

None.

[illegible]

CS COPY

FORM 7-59 1050a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (4-20)

SECRET

201-798301

SECTION II — **MOTIVATION AND CONTROL**

1. ESTIMATE SUBJECT'S MOTIVATION. *(Be detailed, if possible cite evidence. Do not use simple comment such as "anti-communist.")*

[illegible]

2. INDICATE WHAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS OVER THE SUBJECT. *(If no control, or if there is a lack of real control explain.)*

[illegible]

SECTION III — **COVER**

1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.

[illegible]

2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OBTAINING HIS INFORMATION AND IN CONTACTING HIS INFORMANTS.

[illegible]

3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR WHICH SUBJECT THINKS HE *(Will work) (Is working)*.

[illegible]

SECTION IV — **INTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING**

1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNOWN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION WITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTENT SUCH CONNECTION IS KNOWN OVERTLY.

[illegible]

2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS *(Agents, relatives, friends)* WHO KNOW OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

[illegible]

3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION V — **COLLABORATION POTENTIAL**

1. INDICATE OTHER FOREIGN POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE WITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY OR PAST ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

SECRET

SECTION VI	OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT

1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED.

[illegible] of [illegible] subject [illegible] of interest [illegible] produced [illegible] to officials [illegible] in [illegible] office [illegible].

2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.

Subject obtains information from social contacts with Cubans in Mexico City and Havana and through his wife, an employee of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.

Nothing. Subject appears to assume that Lowson retains the information for his personal use.

4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is being used in an attempt to penetrate (unwittingly) the DGI and the Tricontinental (LAAAPSO) Organization in Havana and Central America.

5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.

Subject is also being used to pass controlled information on an unwitting basis to the Cubans in Mexico City and Havana.

SECTION VII	PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:

A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:

NA

B. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN ODYOKE AGENCY:

NA

SECTION VIII	AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT

1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT, I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER, REMUNERATION, IF ANY, AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.

Subject is unwitting of an Agency interest in Subject.

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION IX. QUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONS

1. INDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS POSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.

[illegible]

SECTION X. COMMITMENTS

1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGULAR SALARY, INDICATE THE WEEKLY AMOUNT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN EXCHANGE COMMODITIES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.

Subject has been paid on a [illegible] basis [illegible]. It is proposed to pay Subject a [illegible] salary of 3,000 [illegible] per month in addition [illegible].

2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (*Example: Commitments regarding evacuation of subject and family.*)

None. Subject is interested in travel and [illegible] has exploited this by indicating that he [illegible] be able to arrange interesting trips for Subject if [illegible] developed [illegible] to justify such trav-

SECTION XI. CE AND SECURITY

1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES WITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.

2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKEN TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.

3. INDICATE WHETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL OR OPERATIONAL APPROVAL FOR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED.

4. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED

5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY AND SECURITY, CITING EVIDENCE WHERE POSSIBLE.

[illegible] of his life to [illegible] artistic [illegible] [illegible] anti-social. [illegible]

6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION OR INDISCRETION IN WHICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROM A CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.

[illegible]

SECTION XII. SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS

1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS, GAMBLING, PARAMOURS.

[illegible] Subject does not [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET

SECTION XIII — **AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS**

1. INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOBBIES OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC, ETC.

[illegible]

SECTION XIV — **GENERAL**

1. INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS A NATIVE OF A COUNTRY OR REGION OTHER THAN HIS OWN. EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRQ PARTS I AND II WAS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES, CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.

[illegible] files.

3. IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED, IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN. *(Also see para. 43b, supra)*

[illegible] of [illegible] has not made long-term commitments in his personal and business contacts.

SECTION XV — **EMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS**

1. GIVE FULL DETAILS I.E. RECOGNITION SIGNALS, S/W. WHERE COULD CONTACT BE MADE: WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUAL MAKING CONTACT USE?

[illegible] Newton. [illegible] he should reply:" No, but I have heard [illegible]".

SECTION XVI — **MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKS**

Subject is [illegible] questions. [illegible] respect, as he himself states, for Newton and [illegible] personal decision to follow Newton's guidance in his relations [illegible] the Cubans. Subject has never asked Newton for personal details of his (Newton's) life, including his permanent or temporary address. Subject apparently feels that through Newton he will acquire relatively good financial security and be able to travel and eventually improve his lot.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET/KAPOK

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: Deputy Chief WH/C

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: TYPIC/OPERATIONAL/LIRING/Review of LIRING-3 Operation

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES: FYI

Attached is an operational review of the LIRING-3 operation prepared by Wallace B. ROWTON. Attention is also called to PRQ Parts I and II. Part I was sent as HMMA 30540 and part II is being prepared for pouching.

Frank C. Medbery
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
LIRING-3 Review HEREWITH

Distribution:
(2) - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/att
3 - FILES

LIRETAIL OPS
50-6-137/3

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30585	16 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET/KAPOK	201-

GROUP 1: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

9 November, 1966.

Subject: Review and Assessment of LIRING Operation.

I. Background, Character and Assessment of LIRING/3:

1. Liring/3 (Subject) is a 36-year-old Mexican artist of the Diego Rivera School and an atheisitic existentialist oriented toward the philosophy of Jean Paul Sartre, with relatively strong leftist political convictions. He has produced a fair amount of painting and had relatively good success in murals both in Cuba and Mexico, but has not succeeded in selling many of his works, despite numerous expositions, sponsored by the Mexican Government plastic arts organization (Bellas Artes). Because of his family, educational and environmental background, Subject feels that his work has not been appreciated for its intrinsic worth by the Mexican Government and tends to blame his political convictions for this lack of acceptance. Subject, however, has, as he himself asserts, no feelings of bitterness or resentment, although he frequently experiences the "anguish, forelornness and lonliness" of the existentialist, but he has not permitted himself to degenerate into a beatnik either in his personal or artistic life. Subject has confided to Rowton that he has no real friends and that he has withdrawn from society, the dictates of which he cannot accept. He enjoys the prospect of travel, especially abroad, "to develop his art" but also as an escape from the pressures and obligations of the social life he has been forced to lead in Mexico.

2. Shortly after he met Rowton, in April, 1966, Subject confessed that he felt himself at a critical point in his personal and artistic life. He indicated that he felt the paradoxes inherent in his philosophy were overwhelming and depressing him and that he welcomed friendship with Rowton, an experienced foreigner whom he felt he could trust implicitly. At one critical point, Subject quit his rather tedious job with the Ministry of Education (teaching art in a public school) with the comment that "everyone must make personal decisions and take risks, and I have decided to throw my lot in with you (Rowton) for better or worse, and so have quit the job since it was interfering with my availability". This he did without knowing any more about Rowton than his name, which technical surveillance revealed he did not accept as a true name, and with no guarantees of future financial support from Rowton. Rowton, in his conversations with Subject, has been careful not to reveal any data concerning his personal life and background, including his permanent or local address, providing Subject only with the number of a telephone answering service, and using the safehouse rented by Subject as a principal point of contact. Subject has accepted money from Rowton, at first only for previously approved expenses, and subsequently for his personal use, but has accepted Rowton's initiative in this matter, and made no demands on Rowton for remuneration for services rendered. He has been meticulous in accounting for funds and shown no reluctance to sign receipts presented to him by Rowton (with his true-name signature). Subject has confessed (and shown) an almost complete lack of experience in business and intelligence work, but has accepted Rowton's guidance, where required, without hesitation.

att HMMA-30585 CS COPY 201-798301

14-00000

3. Subject, in his political outlook, is left of center, with a history of revolutionary activity in Cuba from 1961 until his return to Mexico in 1964. Subject has insisted to Rowton that, because of his (existentialist) philosophy, he has never permitted himself to join any organization, including the communist party, although he has given moral and material suport to revolutionary movements both in Cuba and thus Mexico. Subject has confessed his disillusionment with many of the revolutionary leaders in Cuba and with all of the Mexican leaders, remarking that sooner or later "the real" revolution will come to Mexico to eliminate the corruption and injustice that prevails throughout the country. Subject, however feels that in the meantime he must live under a more practical philosophy of daily life and is willing to make the necessary compromises to assist Rowton in his busines affairs. Subject has shown no reluctance to exploit his friends, and even his wife, to be of specific service to Rowton, and has, on numerous occasions, volunteered to do so with Rowton's approval. This appears to Rowton to be a reflection of the existentialist conviction that his philosophy gives him freedom to choose without dependency, obligation or justification.

4. Rowton is aware that Subject is currently undergoing a decisive climacteric, the future direction of which is not as yet certain. Rowton has succeeded in making Subject compromise a great deal with his past ideals particularly concerning deep involvement with other people and acceptance of financial support for purely business transactions, and for this reason has hesitated to uncover for Subject any of the mystery surrounding his own life and activities. Subject dislikes "northamericans" and considers life in the U.S., with which he is not familiar from experience, as corrupt and decadent. Rowton feels that he can eventually break down Subject's prejudice, if this proves to be necessary and worthwhile, but it would be fatal at this time for Rowton to reveal his [ ] and [ ] connections. Subject is, in his own words, completely confident of Rowton's good will toward him and is, at least for the moment, totally dependent upon him for guidance as well as financial support. Any attempt at direct recruitment for [ ] at this point would, in Rowton's opinion be counterproductive. In his various contacts with the Cubans thus far, particularly his current visit to Havana on what appears to be an IS briefing, Subject can in all respects act naturally, without the feeling that he is concealing anything from his Cuban friends, simply because he is unwitting of Rowton's true affiliations and intentions. If he were witting, he would appear to all concerned to be suffering from a severe psychological crisis, and certainly would not be in a good position to produce useful information or inspire confidence. Subject is under some strain as a result of his current relationship with Rowton in his capacity as an international bourgeois businessman, a fact attested to by his wife to Rowton on 7 November when she expressed concern over Subject's recent moodiness and lack of interest in painting. Subject has also become involved in a love affair with one of his rich art students, a Mexican woman who is known to visit Subject at the safehouse.

5. In summation Rowton feels that Subject is excellent potential agent material, both because of his background and experience as well as his direct access to targets of interest. The problems inherent in his philosophical and psychological make-up will continue to be taken into consideration in developing Subject's full potential. The obvious disadvantages of Subject's unwitting status vis-a-vis [ ] can be overcome by careful handling of Subject and increased control over him in the future.

WOFACT

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B- Development of LIENVOY/3 by Rowton:

6. Rowton met Subject in April,1966, by cold approach in the art studio where Subject at the time was presenting his latest works under sponsorship of Bellas Artes. Rowton posed as a Greek businessman interested in Subject's style and his immediate objective at the time was to ascertain the address in New York City of Subject's wife's father (a Cuban of Chinese origin who had left Cuba as a refugee). Rowton, feeling that he had to present an above-average prospect to Subject to permit future meetings, alleged that he was anxious to arrange for the painting of a mural to be installed in a New York nightclub owned by a Greek friend of his (Rita Dimitri, owner and performer at the "La Chansonette"). Rowton felt that pin-pointing a "New York nihhgtclub" would have the double advantage of determining Subject's sentiments toward working in New York City and in a bourgeois environment.

7. Subject reacted very favorably to the initial approach and accepted Rowton's invitation to dinner in the company of Subject's wife the next evening. Both Subject and his wife were cautious in revealing any specific data concerning their background and personal history, but neither concealed their mutual approval of Castro's regime and dislike for the corruption in Mexico. As a result of this meeting Rowton realized that any attempt at a direct approach to either Subject or his wife, who was then employed part-time at the Cuban Consulate, would be conterproductive and that a more subtle approach would have to be developed. Rowton decided that a strong personal relationship developed bwith Subject would be productive and could eventually lead to useful production on Subject's part.

8. When, therefore, on 2 May,1966, Subject eXpressed gratification at having met Rowton and indicated that he wished to continue his friendly contacts, regardless of whether Rowton purchased his painting or arrganged for the mural, Rowton ~~px~~ moved in with an offer to "hire" Subject as his business associate on an unofficial basis, so that Subject could acquire a degree of indeeence financially and perhaps do some traveling for Rowton. In order to develop as much clandestinity as possible in his future contacts with Subject, Rowton explained that he was simply a tourist in Mexico and as such not permitted to engage in lucrative business activities. He would therefore have to depend on Subject's discretion in any dealings he might have with him. Subject accepted this as quite normal but pointed out to Roton his limitations xas far as business training and experience went. In reply to Rowton's query, he did confess,however, that he had excellent contacts in Havana that could be exploited for business dealings with Cuba. He volunteered to make an exploratory trip to Havana to renew his friendship with the perons concerned. Rowton accepted this offer, not only to test Subject's story but also to seize the occasion to be in a position to provide Subject with money to make the trip and thus compromise him somewhat at the outset.

9. Rowton's next move was to explain to Subject that he had a long-term interest in Cuba and hoped to do a great deal of business in the fu-utre but first felt it was essential that both he and Subject develop the proper contacts inside to ensure success. Subject readily agreed to this and felt relieved that Rowton did not expect him to produce concrete results overnight. When Rowton, therefore suggested that Subject find and rent a safehouse for entertainment and development of prospective contacts, Subject went to work immediately without question. (Althoug Rowton's suggestion was first made on 17 June, Subject did not succeed in finding a suitable place until the end of July.) This project, however, gave Subject something specific and relatively clandestine to do for Rowton without seriously compromising any of his principles. Subject, as it developed later, was intereste in such a hide-away, unknowa even to his wife, for his own purposes.

10. Inasmuch as Subject and his wife had long lived an almost ascetic life in a small sparcely furnished apartment with no apparent luxuries and dressed in the simplest and apparently most inexpensive clothing available, and furthermore apparently did not have any conscious desire to improve their living conditions, Rowton realized that financial control over Subject would be difficult to establish unless Subject and his wife could be made to lift their eyes to see a more comfortable and promising life within their reach. He therefore chose some of the best restaurants for lunch dates with Subject (prior to the renting of the safehouse), brought several relatively expensive dolls and toys for their child, arranged through the COS to have a credit account opened for Subject and his wife at Sears Roebuck Stores and was able to present Subject with a credit card that would enable Subject and his wife to make effortless purchases on credit. Rowton also persuaded Subject to open a checking account at the Banco de Londres y Mexico, ostensibly so that he could keep better track of the rent payments on the safehouse. All these bourgeois trappings were calculated to raise Subject and his family fromthe complacent proletariat standard of living into which they had sunk. Subject expressed to Rowton his appreciation for such gestures and confessed that he now realized the importance of these outward signs of respectability and as a result felt more able to step into the world of higher society. His wife also revealed in her comments of appreciation to Rowton that she welcomed the prospect of a better life for herself and her child and hoped to be able to purchase enough furniture to make her home respectable and permit her to invite guests occasionally.

11. The one adverse effect of this effort on Rowton's part has been that Subject began to use the safehouse apartment for amorous trysts with one of his art students, an apparently wealthy Mexican woman, who has now in effect become his mistress (as revealed by technical surveillance from an LP in the same building set up and run very effectively by Medbury). Subject has revealed the name and address of this woman to Rowton in connection with the establishment of a P.O. Box which could be used as a drop for communication between Subject and Rowton while the former was in Cuba; but he has not to date told Rowton of his illicit relationship with the woman. This development can, of course, serve as a potential control over Subject and can be used in any future [redacted] examination, but, on the other hand may lead to complications in Subject's personal life and create hostility on the part of his wife, should she discover the philandering of Subject. She might likewise tend to blame Rowton for Subject's conduct. For this reason Rowton has made every effort to maintain good relations with Subject's wife (she has already confided to Rowton her concern over Subject's recent moodiness, as stated above) in the hope that she will turn to Rowton for help in the event she feels her marraige in jeopardy. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of breaking up as discreetly as possible Subject's affair with the Mexican woman in the event that it becomes more serious. Technical surveillance of the trysts will continue to provide useful information in this direction.

12. With regard to the use of Subject unwittingly to elicit operational information from his Cuban friends in Mexico City as well as Havana, Rowton gradually impressed on Subject the need to acquire all possible information both political and economic on Cuban developments as a prelude to engaging in serious and lucrative business with the Castro regime. Subject accepted this line without question and did produce some useful inside information of value. The turning point, however, came in connection with the disappearance of Julian López, the Press Attaché of the Embassy in Mexico City in late September, 1966. Subject reported the disappearance to Rowton with some glee, commenting that he and his wife were convinced that López had gone

off on a binge with some friends. Subject then repeated to Rowton his criticism of López' childishness and inexperience and recalled that when he himself had pointed out to López his negligence in handling his Embassy functions(in the Press and Cultural Field) López had shrugged off his admonitions with the comment that there were more important things to do for the revolution. The disregard, bordering on distain, with which López as well as apparently other Cuban officials, had greeted Subject's friendly advice in the past, obviously cut Subject to the quick and fostered in him the resentment of a peasant toward his master. Taking this into consideration and in the hope of stirring up as much trouble for López and the Embassy as possible, the Station permitted Rowton to pass to Subject the highly restricted information that López had actually been arrested by the Mexican police for complicity in the arms smuggling ring that had recently been uncovered in their operations from Mexico into Gatemala. Rowton gave Subject enough details to make the story convincing and asked Subject to attribute the information to "Central American friends" and to stress that it was already inthe hands of the press. In addition Rowton suggested that Subject pass this information personally to López as a hot tip so that López could discreetly disappear before the reporters managed to question him. When Subject did as requested by Rowton, López was apparently so overwhelmed with gratitude for Subject's good intentions that he informed the Ambassador the following morning (just before his sudden departure for Havana). Events then moved swiftly. The Ambassador called in Subject and expressed his personal appreciation for Subject's interest and help in this delicate matter and agreed with Subject that the involvement of Embassy personnel in arms smuggling was placing Cuban-Mexican relations in jeopardy. Overnight this raised Subject's status in the eyes of the Ambassador and his closest advisors (Curbelo and Cepeda) to that of a valued confident rather than simply a friend of the revolution. This obviously pleased Subject and made him all the more anxious to conceal the role of Rowton in the affair so that all the credit would continue to fall to him.

13. As a result Subject was subsequently called in by Curbelo and Cepeda and asked to offer his services to help the Tricontinental in its work in Central America. On Rowton's advice (which Subject sollicited) the offer was accepted on condition that the work to be done would be serious (i.e. worth the personal risks Subject would have to run) and that Subject would be permitted to work without the overt involvement of the local Embassy, These conditions were promptly accepted and Subject was invited to visit Havana again so that he could be briefed on the spot by Osmani Ciefuego and his staff.

14. Subject was thus catapulted into the level of IS activites,with Rowton maneuvered into a position of éminence grise. It remains to be seen following Subject's return from Havana (estimated at 21 November,1966) whethe Subject will be entrusted with secret requirements by the Tricontinental, but it appears certain at this point that Rowton will be able to provide full guidance to Subject and to steer the operations he might be engaged in toward targets of interest to [ ] WOFACT.

C- Biographical Data Elicited from LIRING/3:

15. Subject was born in Mexico City in 1930 of a middle class family. Subject's grandfather was a well-known textile merchantwho served some 12 years as president of the Chamber of Commerce. At least one of Subject's aunts is currently well-to-do and the owner of several apartment houses in Mexico City. Subject has at present little or no contact with his family.

16. At the age of 15 Subject left home to join the Mexican Navy. Subject has commented to Rowton that his childhood was not particularly happy and that his mother and father separated, apparently when he was in his teens. It appears likely that Subject left home as a result of family dissension. Subject states that his desire to travel and see the world wasvery strong at the time he joined the navy.

17. Inasmuch as the legal age for enlistment was 18, Subject had to have his birth certificate altered to show that he had been born in 1927 rather than 1930. As a consequence all of Subject's official documents now show his birth-date as 1927, including his passport.

18. Subject served a three-year hitch in the navy and visited nearly all the ports of Mexico and many of Central America. Subject's speciality appears to have been in the quartermaster branch, since he learned the rudiments of navigation and ship-handling. When he left the nval service, Subject entered the University of Mexico and took courses in Archaeology and Anthropology for the next two years. Subject simultaneously developed a strong interest in painting and sculpture and over the next five or so ~~xx~~ years, studied under such masters as Rivera and Siqueiros.

19. Subject was married in 1950 at the age of twenty years to a young Mexican woman from Leon, GTO..and during the next ten years had at at least four children by her. He divorced his wife in about 1960, just prior to his departure for Cuba, but he had not been on good terms with her for several years prior to the divorce. From about 1954 to 1960 Subject worked in the Mexican Government Social Service among the Indians in the southern states of Mexico. Subject attributes some of the tension that arose between him and his wife to this employment venture. He commented to Rowton that his first wife wanted to live a quiet normal life in Mexico City and was unwilling to share with him the hardships of social work in remote areas of tropical Mexico. During this period Subject gradually developed his own style in painting and began to establish close contacts with Mexican art circles.

20. Subject went to Cuba in about 1960 "to join the revolution",apparently as a result of his increasingly leftist political sympathies. He did a relatively large amount of painting and mural work during his four-year residence in Cuba, while at the same time working in the Ministry of Labor and Education. In about 1961 he married a Cuban woman of Chinese origin from Santiago de Cuba and the following year a (girl) child was born to them in Havana. Subject has told Rowton that he has had very little contact with his first wife since his divorce and pays no alimony. He added that his family, however, has continued to take an interest in his first wife and the children of his first marriage and has helped to support them financially. During his stay in Cuba, Subject developed close friendship with many Cuban revolutionaries, particularly Arnol Rodriquez, whose wife worked with Subject in the Ministry of Education at the time when Arnol Rodriquez was serving as Minister of Labor.

21. Subject returned to Mexico City in 1964 with his new wife and child (whom he had naturalized as a Mexican citizen). By this time Subject had become a professional artist but supplemented the rather modest income he acquired from the sale of his painting by teaching art privately and in Mexican public schools. His monthly income during 1965 and early 1966 did not exceed 3,000 pesos.

Wallace B Rowton

Wallace B Rowton

MEXI GOVT cc

14-00000

14 NOV 66

SEE SCMEXI 873 FOR

INFO RE LIRING-3 VISA

issue tourist visa [illegible] Carlos Jurado Elman [illegible] 135587
F 5120

and Carlos Jurado Malecara [illegible] 9755.

LIRING-3

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

XXX NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Acting Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Operational LIRING
PRQ Part I - Carlos JURADO Delmar

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Enclosed is PRQ Part I for Carlos JURADO Delmar. PRQ Part II has been prepared and will be forwarded by separate dispatch.

Frank C. [signature]
for
Robert L. EASBY

MICROFILMED
NOV 17 1966
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Enclosure:
As stated above

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD w/att (4 cys)

1ATT

CS COPY

201-798301

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-30540	10 November 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

7P

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE
PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

PRJ NO.

INSTRUCTIONS: 1. Write clearly. 2. Answer all questions. If question is not applicable, write "NA." 3. Attach blank pages, if additional space is needed.

DISPATCH NO. HMMA-30540

SECTION I — GENERAL PERSONAL AND PHYSICAL DATA

1. NAME (First)	(Middle)	(Last)	(Nee)
Carlos		Jurado	Delmar

2. NAME IN NATIVE LANGUAGE OR SCRIPT: Same

3. NAME AT BIRTH (If different than Item 1.): Same

4. ALIASES, NICKNAMES, TELECODES, LEGAL CHANGE IN NAME (State time, reason for and place of use)

201-798301

5. DATE OF BIRTH: 3 November, 1927 (see #8 below)

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Mexico City, Mexico

7. PERSONAL HABITS (Liquor, drugs, gambling, paramours)

No known vices. Drinks in moderation for social reasons.

8. COURT RECORD (Court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals)

Date of birth actually 3 November 1930, but birth certificate altered to show 1927 in order to qualify for entrance into Mexican Navy (age 18 in lieu of actual age 15).

MICROFILMED NOV 17 1966 DOC. MICRO. SER.

9. DESCRIPTION (Use American standards of measurements, if possible)

a. SEX	b. AGE	c. APPARENT AGE	d. HEIGHT	e. WEIGHT	f. COMPLEXION	g. FACE (Shape)
M X	39	35	FT. 5 IN. [illegible]	130	[illegible]	[illegible]

h. COLOR OF HAIR	i. COLOR OF EYES	j. TEETH	k. BUILD	l. POSTURE
Dark brown	Hazel	regular	slim	erect

m. SCARS AND MARKS OR OTHER DISTINGUISHING FEATURES

Ears relatively large - slight indentation on tip of nose. Cheek-bones protrude slightly

n. GENERAL APPEARANCE

Neat, clean shaven, generally dresses in plain sports clothes

o. PROMINENT FEATURES

Slight build, boyish appearance, hairline receding on sides of forehead.

p. OTHER IDENTIFYING FEATURES

ATTACH SAMPLES OF SIGNATURE AND HANDWRITING; ALSO DATED PHOTOGRAPH AND FINGERPRINTS, IF OBTAINABLE

FORM 2-61 1050 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. ATT TO HMMA 30540 CS COPY 201-798301 (14-20)

14-00000

SECTION II	CITIZENSHIP
10. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP Mexican	11. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH AND ANY SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS (If different than Item 10.) same
12. PRESENT RESIDENCE (Indicate as owner, tenant or sub-tenant) [illegible] Mexico	
13. PERMANENT ADDRESS (If different than Item 12.) same	
14. IF U.S. NATURALIZED CITIZEN, GIVE NAME, DATE, CITY AND NUMBER OF CERTIFICATE GRANTED	
15. TRAVEL OUTSIDE COUNTRY OF PRESENT RESIDENCE (Countries, dates and purposes) 1960-1964 Cuba (employed by Ministry of Labor and Education) 1965 - three ten-day visits.	

SECTION III	OCCUPATIONAL AND FINANCIAL DATA	
16. PRESENT OCCUPATION Artist and art teacher	17. TITLE Art teacher	18. SALARY (Per annum) [illegible]
19. FINANCIAL STATUS (Earnings, bank deposits, securities and property) Depends almost totally on earnings from sale of paintings and salary ([illegible]) paid by Bellas Artes(equivalent to government [illegible])		

SECTION IV	ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS
20. MEMBERSHIP IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS none	
21. PRESENT AND PAST MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS; POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS Member ~~Socialist Party of Mexico~~ PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTO (PPS)	

SECTION V — EDUCATIONAL DATA

22. SCHOOLS

NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	NAME OF COURSE	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE RECEIVED
"La Esmeralda" Mexico DF	Painting & Sculpture	194[illegible]	1951	none
School Anthropology, Univ of Mexico	Anthropology	1946	1951	none

23. LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence.)	READ YES	READ NO	WRITE YES	WRITE NO	SPEAK YES	SPEAK NO	UNDERSTAND YES	UNDERSTAND NO
Spanish	X		X		X		X	

14-00000

SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

31. CHECK ONE:		SINGLE		MARRIED	X	WIDOWED		SEPARATED		DIVORCED		ANNULLED

32. STATE DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

First married in Mexico City 1950, divorced 1960. [illegible] children by this marriage. No alimony paid since Subject's family continued support ex-wife. Oldest child born 1953. No contact with ex-wife.
Married again 1961 in Havana, Cuba, to Miriam Chiclay, Cuban citizen.

WIFE OR HUSBAND: IF YOU HAVE BEEN MARRIED MORE THAN ONCE, INCLUDING ANNULMENTS, USE SHEET FOR FORMER WIFE OR HUSBAND GIVING DATA REQUIRED BELOW FOR ALL PREVIOUS MARRIAGES.

33. NAME OF SPOUSE	(First) Miriam ND	(Middle)	(Nee) WIFE [illegible]	(Last) JURADO
34. DATE OF MARRIAGE [illegible]	35. PLACE OF MARRIAGE Havana, Cuba SEX F			
36. DATE OF BIRTH DOB [illegible]	37. PLACE OF BIRTH POB [illegible]			
38. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH Cit. [illegible]	39. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS WIFE OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR (201-79730)			
40. PRESENT RESIDENCE [illegible]				

SECTION X — CHILDREN

FULL NAME	SEX M	SEX F	YEAR OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	NATIONALITY AT BIRTH*
[illegible] Chiclay		X	19[illegible]	Havana, Cuba	[illegible]

*SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS HELD BY ANY CHILD (Identify child and give his, or her, present address)

SECTION XI — FATHER

41. FULL NAME	42. YEAR OF BIRTH	43. PLACE OF BIRTH	44. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
45. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	46. OCCUPATION	47. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION XII — MOTHER

48. FULL NAME [illegible]mar	49. YEAR OF BIRTH	50. PLACE OF BIRTH	51. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH
52. SUBSEQUENT CITIZENSHIPS	53. OCCUPATION	54. PRESENT RESIDENCE	

SECTION VI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS AND INTERESTS

24. INDICATE ANY WRITING. GIVE DETAILS INCLUDING TITLES OF BOOKS OR ARTICLES, ALSO NAMES OF PUBLISHERS AND PUBLICATION DATES. Murals

1) Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis. 1957.
2) Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, Mexico, D.F., 1960.
3) Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (T.S.E.) La Habana, Cuba, 1963.

25. SPECIAL SKILLS, ABILITIES, HOBBIES SUCH AS RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHY, ETC.

Art and sculpture.

SECTION VII — MILITARY SERVICE

COUNTRY	DATES FROM	DATES TO	UNIT	RANK	DUTY*
Mexico	1945	1946	Navy	Seaman	Sea

*IDENTIFYING COUNTRY. INDICATE WHERE SERVICE PERFORMED, DECORATIONS, WHEN AND WHY DISCHARGED. GIVE DETAILS IF WAR PRISONER.

Joined Navy at age 15 by falsifying birth certificate to read born 3 November, 1927 instead of 3 November, 1930.

SECTION VIII — EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

NOTE: *INDICATE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT LISTING LAST POSITION FIRST. INCLUDE ANY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT.*

No.	a. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To)	b. EMPLOYER	c. ADDRESS	d. TYPE OF WORK	e. SALARY OR EARNINGS	f. REASON FOR LEAVING
26.	1954-1960	Mexican Government	Instituto Nacional Indigenista	Social	$ per	[illegible] reasons
27.	1962-1964	Cuban Government	Ministry of Education	Teaching art	$ per	Return Mexico
28.	1964-1965	Mexican Government	Ministry of Education	Teaching art	$ 1,[illegible] per [illegible]	[illegible] Travel of Cuba
29.	1964-1966	Mexican Government	Bellas Artes	Tutor of art	$ 1,[illegible] per month	still employed
30.					$ per	

14-00000

DATOS BIOGRAFICOS DE CARLOS JURADO.

Nace el 3 de noviembre de 1927 en la ciudad de México. Estudia durante un tiempo en la Escuela de Pintura y Escultura "La Esmeralda", donde es discípulo de María Izquierdo, Rivera, etc. Permanece por seis años en medios rurales del país, trabajando con el Instituto Nacional Indigenista. En 1960 obtiene un premio en el certamen " Nuevos Valores" en el Salón de la Plástica Mexicana del Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes.

Exposiciones colectivas más importantes:

Galería 23 Escalones, México,D.F. 1953. Escuela de Artes Plásticas de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. Chis. 1956. Exposición Internacional de Grabado, Yogoeslavia, 1959. Primer Salón Nacional de Pintura, México, D.F. 1959. " Nuevos Valores " México,D.F. 1960. Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1960- Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1960. Reseña Mundial de Festivales Cinematográficos, Acapulco, Gro. 1962. Nueva Búsqueda de la Joven Pintura Mexicana, San Antonio, Texas, 1962. Retratos, Galerías Glantz, México,D.F. 1964. Pintura Contemporánea de México, Nueva Orleans, 1964. Salón de Pintura 1964, México,D.F. Pintura Mexicana Contemporánea, Galerías de San Carlos, México,D.F. 1964. Primer Salón de Artistas Jóvenes, Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F. 1965. Pintura Contemporánea de México, La Habana, Cuba, 1965. Salón de Pintura 1965, México,D.F. " Autorretrato y Obra" Museo de Arte Moderno, México,D.F.1966.

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

S E C R E T

ROUTING 79 83 01

ORIG: SEARS:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 8 MAY 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 76 PER #

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 INFO FILE. VR. M/AN, C/OPS, C/CA, FI 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

S E C R E T 08 20 06Z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00136

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG Paul Eckert

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

S E C R E T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 17 June 66

CASE NO. 201- 798301

SET UP FOR POA | EXPEDITE INDICES | DATE | EXPEDITE FBI INDICES | DATE

SET UP FOR OA | SPECIAL INQUIRY | COVERT NAME CHECK | ORSD | AREA:

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)		REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / LCFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below,* or see remarks)		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE: ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
✓	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 30 June 66
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / FINAL
	REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II		ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: [illegible] Sep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS

FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

SUBJECT: 201 - [illegible]

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: [illegible] Mexico City

TYPE OF REQUEST				OS INDICES RESULTS BY	FBI CHECK RESULTS BY
POA	OA	CSC	SI	(Date) [illegible]	(Date)

USE OF SUBJECT: Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI [illegible]	DIVISION [illegible]	FIELD [illegible]

GREEN LIST INITIATED		ATTACHMENTS		
YES	NO	PRQ - PART I	PARTIAL BIO	OTHER

REMARKS

CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA

DATE

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results:

JUN 9 8 49 AM '65

14-00000

Exposiciones Individuales :

Ateneo de Artes y Ciencias de Chiapas, Tuxtla Gtz. 1957. Galerías Glantz, México, D.F. 1960. Galería de Arte, La Habana, Cuba, 1962. Casa de las Américas, la Habana, Cuba, 1963. Galerías Chapultepec, México,D.F. 1964. Salón de la Plástica Mexicana, México,D.F. 1966.

Obra Mural:

Escuela de Derecho de Chiapas, San Cristóbal de las Casas, Chis.1957. Pabellón de la Revolución Mexicana, Feria del Libro, México,D.F. 1960. Biblioteca del Ministerio de Educación (I.S.E.) la Habana, Cuba, 1963.

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 34

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DISSEN BY 25/M

ACTION WH/C 8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, WH8, TSD6, FI, EUR8

S E C R E T 072045Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9156 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

7 ... 34558

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF: DIRECTOR 49618 *

INSPECTION REF ENVELOPE DISCLOSES MEXICO CITY POSTMARKS DATED 27 FEB 66. ADDITIONAL POSTMARK MADRID SHOWS IT PLACED IN GENERAL DELIVERY THERE 1 FEB 66. NO INDICATION WHEN TAKEN OUT OF MADRID GENERAL DELIVERY AND RETURNED MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

*RYBAT

BT

LIRING -3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 3

ACTION DC/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR, ..., CI/CI, CI/EI 2

S E C R E T 251558Z CITE JMWAVE 3970

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

5 Nov 66 IN 33709

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32408)

1. REVIEW OF FILES SHOWS THAT IN AMKNOB/1 S/W MESSAGE TWO DATED 24 MAR 66 MEXICO RECEIVED JMWAVE 28 MAR AMKNOB/1 REPORTED RAUL ASKED HIM IF HE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM HIM IN MADRID THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY. WHEN AMKNOB/1 ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, RAUL SAID IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT AND WITH THE RETURN ADDRESS USED HE WAS SURE THE LETTER WOULD BE RETURNED.

2. RE PARA 4 REF "HOUSE OF AMADEO" PROBABLY REFERS TO AMADEO MARTINEZ ZEPEDA, CUIS ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY GIVEN TO AMKNOB/1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 13

ORIG: J. STEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT:
DATE: 3 NOV. 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

S-E-C-R-E-T

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 26 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: DC/WH/C5 ☐ RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE C/WH6

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR

31465A
061

TO

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT

PLEASE RELAY MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) PRIORITY TO JMWAVE FOR INFO FRADYER.

SECRET

WH/C COMMENT: REF CONCERNS COVER STORY FOR LIRING-3 BEING IN POSSESSION OF INFO IN CASE OF JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, CUBAN DIPLOMAT RECENTLY ARRESTED IN MEXICO.

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER J STEWART WH/1
COORDINATING OFFICER A WISNOWSKI FOR WH/C/MO
RELEASING OFFICER W CINI FOR WILLIAM V BROE C/WHD

BT

Stewart

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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14-00000

TOTAL COPIES: 25

ORIG: B.CAREW
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 4 NOVEMBER 1966

☐ RID ☐ INDEX ☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

DISSEM BY 30/A PER RYBAT # CABLES

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ——— BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/SB 5

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

SECRET

FW 19 16 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 49618

TO MEXICO CITY INFO ROUTINE JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32408)*

1. REQUEST DETAILS OF EXAMINATION REF ENVELOPE FOR INDICATIONS LOCATIONS REACHED, CANCELLATIONS AND CHANNELS IT WENT TO INCLUDE DATES AND TIMES IF POSSIBLE.

2. CHECK OF AVAILABLE TRAVEL MANIFESTS REVEALS LIRING/1 DID NOT TRAVEL PRAGUE EARLY 1966.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/CICS John A. Easton

WH/1 JACK STEWART (DRAFT)

WH/C/MO [signature]

WH/COG/FI [signature]

WH/COG/RR Priscilla [signature]

William V. Broe
C/WHD

Thomas J. Flores
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

4-6

SECRET

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COPY NO.

1300

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 36

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

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FROM: Dissem by 24

ACTION: DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO: FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031636Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9...

JMWAVE DIRECTOR 3Nov... 32408

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF HMMW 14744

1. LIRING-3 RELATED FOLL STORY TO WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 31 OCT 1966:

2. WITHIN FEW DAYS PREVIOUS ABOVE MEETING LIRING-3 HAD GONE TO OLD RESIDENCE AT IDEN A TO CHECK WHETHER ANY MAIL HAD ARRIVED THERE SINCE HE DEPARTED. FOUND TWO LETTERS, ONE OF WHICH ADDRESSED AMKNOB, ADDRESS IDEN B. LETTER HAD LIRING-3 NAME AND ADDRESS FOR RETURN AND LETTER NOT FINDING ADDRESSEE HAD BEEN RETURNED TO LIRING-3.

3. LIRING-3 OPENED LETTER WHICH DATED 17 JANUARY 1966 TYPE-WRITTEN ON HAMMERMILL BOND AND SIGNED QUOTE RAUL UNQUOTE. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD THOUGHT MUCH OF MYSTERY AND FINALLY REMEMBERED THAT LIRING-1, MANY MONTHS AGO, HAD FOR NO APPARENT REASON ASKED HIM FOR HIS ADDRESS. HE HAD GIVEN LIRING-1 IDEN A ADDRESS. WITH THIS KNOWLEDGE LIRING-3 CONFRONTED LIRING-1 WITH FACT HE HAD RECEIVED LETTER AND HE ASKED LIRING-1 WHAT WAS IDEA USING HIS RETURN. LIRING-1 GAVE NO REASONABLE ANSWER AND ASKED FOR LETTER

SECRET

BACK. LIRING-3 REFUSED SAYING QUOTE YOU SENT IT, IT WAS RETURNED TO ME AND I'M KEEPING IT UNQUOTE.

4. IN LETTER LIRING-1 EXPRESSES HIS HOPE OF MEETING AMKNOB IN PRAGUE WHERE LIRING-1 HAS TO GO ON BUSINESS NEXT MONTH (FEB 66). LIRING-1 THEN ASKS AMKNOB TO WRITE OR BETTER CABLE HIM QUOTE TO THE HOUSE OF AMADEO UNQUOTE SAYING WHETHER HE CAN MAKE MEETING. LIRING-1 STATED HE WOULD BE A GUEST IN HOTEL FLORA, PRAGUE, AND THAT HE WOULD ADVISE AMKNOB OF DATE HIS ARRIVAL THERE.

5. WOACRE REP INSPECTED LETTER AND ENVELOPE. NO EVIDENCE OF SW DISCLOSED. OPEN TEXT WOULD INDICATE LETTER CONTAINED NO SW. POUCHING COPY OF LETTER. DUE RELATIONSHIP ROWTON LIRING-3 IT WOULD NOT BE EASY RETAIN LETTER AND ROWTON WILL RETURN IT TO LIRING-3 WHEN LATTER RETURNS FROM FORTHCOMING TRIP PBRUMEN.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

19-6-113/3 fld
201-798521

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☒ WH/1

DESTROY ☐ SIG. [illegible]

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 6

SECRET

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FROM Dissem by 2d

ACTION DC/WH/C-5 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/WH-6, C/EUR-4, C/SB-5, C/TSD-3, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 031610Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9112 3 Nov 66 IN 32191

JMWAVE DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING AMKNOB

REF MEXICO CITY 9111 (IN 32406)

IDENS:

A. FRESNO202, COLONIA FLORIDA, MEXICO CITY

B. LISTA DE CORREOS PRINCIPAL, CIBELES, MADRID.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

WH/1

MICROFILMED NOV 14 1966 DOC. MICRO. SER.

NNNN

RING-3

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 28

ORIG: Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 1 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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DISSEM BY 66/53 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH 6 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE DDP/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, ADDP, C/FI/INT 2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (PICA) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET

12 23 10 Z CITE DIRECTOR 49106

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS

KAPOK PBRUMEN

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9024 (IN 27279)

B. CARACAS 5157 (IN 28199)

1. APPRECIATE STATION VIEWS RE ATTEMPTING HAVE LITEMPO-12 ESTABLISH HIS SOURCING REF A REPORT THAT SUBJECT VEN COMMIE, CARRYING MESSAGES FROM PEDRO MEDINA SILVA AND AMERICAN DOLLARS FOR FALN, AND ON VENEZUELAN IMMIGRATION BLACKLIST. IN PARTICULAR, DID INFO COME FROM VENEZUELAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES WHO HQS UNDERSTANDS IN CONTACT WITH DFS OR FROM CUBAN EXILES OR BOTH? NOTE THAT MEDINA REPORTEDLY IN VENEZUELA SINCE SEPTEMBER.

2. FYI, SEVERAL REPORTS RECEIVED ON SUBJECT AND HUSBAND WHICH CONFLICT SENSITIVE INFO FROM TWO SOURCES. IF STATION COULD ESTABLISH REASONABLE GROUNDS BELIEVE SUBJECT ACTUALLY CARRYING LARGE SUM AMERICAN DOLLARS (I.E. OVER AND ABOVE TRAVELING EXPENSES), BELIEVE IT IN OUR INTEREST ATTEMPT ENCOURAGE DFS ARREST AND SEARCH. THIS, IF ACCOMPLISHED, WOULD GIVE CHANCE ASSESS VARYING REPORTS

(CONT'D)

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		5	
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3		7	
4		8	

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

CITE DIRECTOR 49106

PAGE 2

TO

AND IF SHE ACTUALLY SUBVERSIVE AGENT WOULD ACCOMPLISH IMPORTANT DISRUPTION ON OUR PART. NEEDLESS TO SAY WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED SEEING ANY MESSAGES OR MONEY FOUND. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE STATION ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE DAMAGE OUR INTERESTS SUCH ARREST MIGHT HAVE, INCLUDING EFFECT ON ROWTON-LIRING/3 RELATIONSHIP.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (in draft)
WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (in draft)
WH/3/V ______
______

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

ACTION

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO

FILE, VR, EUR 3, WH 8, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T Ø21114Z CITE LONDON 6474 2 Nov 66 IN 30875

DIRECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY, JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 48602

COOKE HAS BEEN IN NEW YORK FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, RETURNING LONDON 19 NOVEMBER. WILL ATTEMPT GET PROMPT REPLY AT THAT TIME.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

NNNN

Jane
LIRING-3
Stewart

14-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR: J Kaufman

T. Polgar would like to talk to you before sending attached. He seems to believe that it# is redundant Also said T.Flores was with him and believes same.

J Stewart

not sent.

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED. 1 AUG 54 (47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/WH/1		V
2	WH/C/MO		[illegible]
3	WH/C/FI		[illegible]
4	~~WH/C/CICS~~		
5	WH/FI		
6	Cable Secretariat		

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
WH/1/J. Stewart/332 Ames/3654	3 Nov 66

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions 2-61 (40)

FORM 11-65 12 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

1. MESSAGES ARE CONSIDERED ROUTINE UNLESS A HIGHER PRECEDENCE IS INDICATED IN INTERNAL ADDRESS LINE
2. SEND ORIGINAL AND BLUE-GREEN COPY TO CABLE SECRETARIAT. REMOVE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.
3. DO NOT ERASE, X OUT AND CONTINUE TYPING. DO NOT EXCEED 69 TYPEWRITTEN CHARACTERS PER LINE, INCLUDING SPACES. END TEXT LINES WITHIN THE RIGHT MARGIN GUIDE APPROPRIATE FOR YOUR TYPEWRITER

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: J. Stewart/mhf
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 3 November 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

TO

PRIORITY PRIORITY

MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE FOR FRADYER

DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REFS: MEXICO CITY 9097 (IN 31465) ~~[illegible]~~ *

1. ~~WHILE REALIZE STATION IN BEST POSITION~~ SELECT PROPER COVER STORY HQS RELUCTANT SEE ATTENTION INVITED TO ROWTON ANY MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

2. FOR JMWAVE: REQUEST FRADYER COMMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

* Ref concerns cover story being furnished LIRING-3 for the information he had on Cuban diplomat Julian LOPEZ Diaz being arrested by Mexicans for involvement Guatemalan arms smuggling.

William V. Broe
C/WHD

for WH/C/MO [signature]
~~WH/C/FI~~
~~WH/C/CRRB~~
COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 11

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
DISSEM BY 30/M

ACTION DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH6, C/CI, C/FI2,

S E C R E T 022135Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9097

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9011 (IN 27211)

relayed JMWAVE for Fields 3 Nov

2 Nov 65 IN 31465

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 1 NOV 66 ONLY SIGNIFICENT INFORMATION REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ HAD GIVEN HIM IN WAY OF BRIEFING FOR FORTHCOMING TRIP WAS THAT LIRING-3 WOULD BE MET AT HAVA AIRPORT BY ONE HERRERA (FNU) WHO WOULD PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH PROPER PEOPLE.

2. FLIGHT ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 2 NOV WAS FIRST POSTPONED TO 3 NOV THEN SET BACK TO 4 NOV. STRIKE OF MEXICANA AIRLINE EMPLOYEES MAY CAUSE FURTHER DELAY SINCE MEXICANA SERVICES CUBANA.

3. LIRING-2 AND CEPEDA MET WITH LIRING-3 26 OCT AS REPORTED REF BUT NO SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RESULTED. LIRING-3 SAID IT APPEARED HIM MEETING CALLED IMPRESS HIM WITH IMPORTANCE OF CEPEDA AND LIRING-2. CEPEDA DID ALL TALKING. AMBASSADOR DROPPED IN, GREETED LIRING-3 CORDIALLY BUT LEFT. CEPEDA PREFACED MEETING WITH LENGTHY LECTURE ON POSITION CUBA VIS A VIS TRI CONTINENTAL. POINT MADE WAS CUBA INDEPENDENT OF ACTIVITIES THIS ORGANIZATION BUT DIRECTLY INVOLVED SOME ASPECTS DUE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION. SECRET

14-00000

4. DURING MEETING CEPEDA ASKED LIRING-3 WHO HE KNEW HAVA. LIRING-3 BRUSHED THIS OFF SAYING HE KNEW MANY PEOPLE AND COULD NOT BEGIN LIST THEM. CEPEDA THEN WENT ON IN APOLOGETIC TONE ASKING LIRING-3 AVOID TOO MUCH CONTACT WITH FRIENDS UNTIL HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THOSE INSIDE. AS RESULT MEETING LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE DEFINITELY CONCLUDED CEPEDA DSE REP MEXICO. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 COMPLY WITH CEPEDA REQUEST AND NOT CONTACT FRIENDS HAVA UNTIL HE HAD DISCREETLY CHECKED SUCH CONTACTS WITH PERSONS DIRECTING HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. AT 26 OCT MEETING CEPEDA SAID HE WOULD HAVE FINAL BRIEFING WITH LIRING-3 BEFORE HE DEPARTED. THIS FINAL SESSION HELD 1 NOV AND RESULTED ONLY IN CEPEDA INFORMING LIRING-3 OF NAME OF FIRST CONTACT CITED PARA ONE ABOVE.

6. ROWTON HAS BRIEFED LIRING-3 ON GENERAL SECURITY PRECAUTION AND WARNED HIM BE ALERT POSSIBLE SURVEILLANCE INSIDE. ALSO IN CASE EXTREME PRESSURE APPLIED TO LEARN SOURCE LIRING-3'S INFO ON JULIAN LOPEZ HE WAS TOLD BY ROWTON TO INFORM THEM HE HAD OBTAINED FROM FRIEND (ROWTON) GIVING FICTICIOUS NAME FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL, WHO HAD OBTAINED FROM UNKNOWN GUATEMALA REPORTER WHO OBTAINED FROM NATZUL AGUIRRE COCK, GUATEMALAN PGT MEMBER. THIS EXTENT INFO GIVEN LIRING-3. ACTUALLY AGUIRRE WAS EXILED IN MEXICO AFTER FALL OR ARBENZ AND WAS

SECRET

Assumption that NAC can't be checked by Cubans through PGT? Of course friend (ROWTON) could have be draining L-3.

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXICO CITY 9297 S E C R E T

ARRESTED BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES EARLY OCT 66 FOR BEING ONE OF PRIME INSTIGATORS IN STUDENT RIOTS MORELIA RECENTLY. AGUIRRE DEPORTED TO GUATEMALA BY MEXICANS EARLY OCT 66 ALONG WITH JAIME DIAZ ROZZOTTO, FORMER PGT CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER.

S E C R E T

BT

[illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 30

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 31 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

DISSEM BY 30/M PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE EUR 8, WH 8, FI, FI/INT 2,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 1 20 21 52 CITE DIRECTOR 48602

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 34711

PLS ADVISE WHETHER COOKE HAS DEVELOPED ANY INFO ON REF REQUEST.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA [signature]

WH/C/MO E. Chiocca (phone)

WH/1 J. Stewart (Phone)

EUR/Cuba Crawford (phone)

E/BC/UK John G. Roberts

LIRING-3

John G. Roberts
DC/EUR/BC
for

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

1-3

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

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0845

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 27

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM Disson

ACTION WH/C 8

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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977 26 Oct 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23893)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

Liring-1 - Abreu

14-00000

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 32

JACK STEWART
WH/1
28 OCT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/C8, DO4, DDH3, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, FI, FI/INT2

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

28 22 56 Z CITE DIRECTOR 47951

TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF A MEXICO CITY 9311 (IN 97211)

B MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

HQS FOLLOWING LIRING-3 CASE WITH INTEREST. AGREE STATEMENT PARA 7 REF B THAT CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ DIAZ. BELIEVE IT MATTER OF HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT L-3 BE GIVEN BEST POSSIBLE COVER STORY AND URGE STATION GIVE FULL ATTENTION THIS ASPECT OF OP IN VIEW UPCOMING TRIP L-3 TO CUBA PER REF A.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER JACK STEWART WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICER JOHN A. CASTORO WH/C/CICS

RELEASING OFFICER W. CINI FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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FROM Dissem by 24

ACTION DC/WHC-5

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INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/CI, C/FI-2

ACTION

S E C R E T 272040Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9011

27 Oct 66 IN 27211

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 6977 (IN 25352)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON EVENING 26 OCT 66 THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY LIRING-2 COME TO EMBASSY AT 1900 HOURS THAT NIGHT FOR MEETING WITH LIRING-2 AND REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ.

2. LIRING-3 PRESSED LIRING-2 FOR GENERAL IDEA OF MEETING AGENDA. LIRING-3 REPLIED QUOTE WHEN YOU GO TO HAVANA YOU WILL BE SEEING CERTAIN CENTRAL AMERICANS AND WE WOULD LIKE TO TALK THIS OVER WITH YOU BEFORE YOU GO IN UNQUOTE.

3. LIRING-3 WILL MAKE DETAILED REPORT TO ROWTON EVENING 27 OCT WHICH WILL BE TAPED. ACCORDING PRESENT PLANS LIRING-3 WILL LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON FLIGHT SCHEDULED 1 NOV 66.

S E C R E T

BT

Liring/3 Reported He Had Again seen Liring/2 24 Oct

SECRET

LIRING-3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/OA,

S E C R E T 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

S E C R E T SECRET

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14-00000

24 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Handling of LIRING-3 as Hostile Agent

In view of Station Mexico City's statement in paragraph 6 of MEXI 8944 (IN 23093), which presumably comes from LIRING-3's handler Wallace B. ROWTON, to the effect that LIRING-3 "still has strong anti-U.S. feelings", the time probably has come to review the LIRING-3/Ops (briefly.) In the same cable the Station set forth several control elements including true name receipts and taps made in ROWTAN's safehouse of LIRING-3's amourous sessions with a young art student. What appears to be lacking is considering the case as the handling of a double agent, possibly hostile, "is" homework--that is to say, that there are certain actions that should be taken in the case as follows:

a. Placing of a phone tap on L-3's telephone, if it can be determined that he has a telephone.

b. Intercept of all mail going to LIRING-3's home address.

c. Physical and photo surveillance of L-3 to determine any patterns of actions or contacts with suspicious persons, to see if L-3's contacts and actions agree with what L-3 tells ROWTON and to allow ROWTON to be prepared to cover himself in his relations with L-3.

d. To discreetly investigate L-3's sources of income, i.e., to see if his income from teaching art classes (and more recently from his wife's salary from Cubans) are sufficient to account for his scale of living, whatever it is.

Secret

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There are indications in the file that the "homework" as outlined above has not yet been done. The Station was queried in DIR 39039, DIR 14107 and in DIR- 07441 and 1 as to the above matters. It is noted in MEXICO CITY- 8944 that the Station said that it did not as yet have "independent checks" on this agent, beyond evidence of entry to the Cuban Embassy furnished by LIONION photo surveillance, and in fact had only his word on claimed actions and statements (in previous correspondence), and that LIENVOY and LITAINT-2 confirm that L-4, L-3's wife, is definitely employed as a secretary to LIRING-1 as claimed by L-3. The Station tended to doubt that L-3 is a Cuban plant but said that even if he were, that it was no additional risk (the Station was referring to a proposed trip by L-3 to Cuba) since L-3 would be provided with a suitable uncheckable explanation as to how L-3 obtained info on the LOPEZ case.

e. Check as suggested in DIR 07441 on status of LIRING-4's father, who is presumably a Chinese, reportedly in the United States. This is of interest in view of stringent U.S. entry requirements laid on Chinese.

Sherrod given the word at his TDY trip Oct 63

Secret

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO

FILE

22 Oct 65 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

1. LIRING-2 CALLED LIRING-3 TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION.

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. (L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

This necessary for commercial type action

PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

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6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME.

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

SECRET

rich
wife of Mexican

14-00000

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LICNION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE ~~WILL PROVIDE HIM~~ ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

9. FACT LIRING-4 DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, LITAINT-2 AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

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S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938

22 OCT 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149)

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUNCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND. HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWTON.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 2

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 20 16 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR 51087

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/FI
C/WH/C/CI
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1
WH/3/V
WH/5

LIRING-3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

19-18

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S E C R E T 071805Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8757

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA 7 Oct 66 12398

KAPOK TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8692 (IN 07422)

1. STATION PURSUING JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ ARMS SMUGGLING CASE WITH TWO OBJECTIVES:

A. "BURN" LOPEZ IN EYES HIS SERVICE AND EXPOSE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE. THIS DELICATE UNDERTAKING IN VIEW MEXICAN EFFORTS PLAY DOWN CASE AND AVOID MENTION CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

B. ELEVATE LIRING-3 IN EYES OF CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO AND HOPE HE MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO LOCAL CUBAN SPONSORED CLANDESTINE OPS. THIS ALREADY DISCUSSED BY ROWTON WITH L-3 WHO AGREED COOPERATE PROVIDING CUBANS USE HIM IN PROFESSIONAL MANNER PROVIDING HIM WITH GOOD SECURITY.

2. AS PROBABLE DIRECT RESULT FACING LOPEZ WITH FACTS HIS ARREST, LIRING-3 SAW AMBASSADOR JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS AT LATTER'S REQUEST ON 2 OCT. PER STATION INSTRUCTIONS RELAYED BY ROWTON, L-3 MADE FOLL POINTS:

A. LOPEZ WHO TALKED UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LIQUOR WAS

SECRET

Jane

RESPONSIBLE FOR ARMS CASE ARRESTS. ONE OF PERSONS WHO OVERHEARD HIM CONTACTED POLICE WHO SURVEILLED LOPEZ PRIOR TO RAID ON GONZALEZ HOME.

B. LOPEZ FOOLISHLY INVOLVED HIMSELF UNDER HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES BETTER UNDERTAKEN BY INDIVIDUALS READY SERVE REVOLUTION AND MUCH LESS CONSPICUOUS, SUCH AS LIRING-3.

C. WIFE AND FATHER IN LAW OF LOPEZ COULD BE OBJECT LOCAL HARASSMENT SHOULD STORY LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT BE PRINTED.

D. DETAILS OF LOPEZ ARREST OBTAINED FROM "LEFTIST CENTRAL AMERICAN FRIENDS" WHOM HE SAID HE WOULD NOT IDENTIFY FURTHER FOR OBVIOUS REASONS.

from Paston
in also from
unknown
source
from
the
Ag. [illegible]

3. ALTHOUGH APPRECIATIVE, CUBAN AMBASSADOR TRIED GIVE LOW KEY EMPHASIS TO ENTIRE ARMS AFFAIR. IN COURSE 2 OCT MEET THIS ANGERED L-3. LATTER CALLED ON AMBASSADOR NEXT EVENING TO WARN HIM THAT "STORY OF ARMS CASE SOLD IN MEXICO TO FOREIGN NEWSMAN". THIS APPEARED WORRY AMBASSADOR WHO ALSO SHOWED CONCERN WHEN L-3 AGAIN POINTED TO GUILT AND FOOLISHNESS OF LOPEZ AND REITERATED HIS CONCERN FOR LOPEZ' WIFE. AMBASSADOR SAID MRS. LOPEZ DUE LEAVE FOR HAVANA ON NEXT PLANE (7 OR 8 OCT).

4. LATE 4 OCT LIRING-2 ASKED SEE L-3, OSTENSIBLY TO THANK HIM

SECRET

Cubans think info from Soviets?

14-00000

FOR HIS INTEREST IN "EMBASSY" AFFAIRS. L-3 REPEATED WHAT HE ALREADY
MENTIONED TO AMBASSADOR. L-2 VISIBLY SHAKEN SAID HE HAD HARD TIME
BELIEVING LOPEZ LOOSE TALK RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING. L-3 STRESSED
IT INFANTILE FOR CUBANS TO BE USING DIPLOMATS FOR CLANDESTINE OPS
AS SUCH EFFORTS EASY SPOT AND COULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE MEXICAN/
CUBAN RELATIONS. L-3 ADDED IT PROBABLY VERY COSTLY TO KEEP CUBAN IN-
VOLVEMENT IN ARMS AFFAIR QUIET. L-2 SAID CUBANS DID NOT HAVE TO PAY
BUT L-3 REPLIED HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT AS KNEW MEXICANS ONLY TOO WELL.
L-2 CURRENTLY SITTING IN OFFICE OF COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY. HIS MEETING
WITH L-3 LEFT LATTER UNDER DEFINITE IMPRESSION L-2 ASSESSING HIM FOR
POSSIBLE RECRUITMENT.

5. ARMS STORY INCLUDING LOPEZ INVOLVEMENT APPEARED IN GUATE-
MALAN "ELIMPARCIAL" 3 OCT. AT STATION DIRECTION, LITAMIL-2 PASS-
ING AS IRATE ANTI-COMMIE MEXICAN PHONED GUATEMALAN EMBASSY 5 OCT TO CALL
ATTENTION OF EMBASSY TO "IMPARCIAL" ARTICLE WHICH APPARENTLY WOULD
NOT BE RECEIVED AT EMBASSY FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. ALSO EVENING 5 OCT
STATION OFFICER MENTIONED "IMPARCIAL" PIECE TO FORNOFF CONTACT (WHO
HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY KNOWN OF IT). HE SEEMED DISTRUBED AND MADE
PHONE CALL TO UNKNOWN PARTY. ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPER MENTIONED

 SECRET

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CASE 6 OCT WITHOUT GIVING LOPEZ IDENTITY, SIMPLY MENTIONING THAT CUBAN OFFICIAL INVOLVED "DISAPPEARED". LICOMET-1 WAS APPROACHED BY UPI STRINGER LATE 5 OCT AND ASKED VERIFY LOPEZ ARREST. AFTER CHECKING WITH STATION L-1 WILL CONFIRM LOPEZ ARRESTED WITHOUT FURTHER DETAILS. STATION HAS ARRANGED HAVE LICOMET-20 DISCREETLY PHOTOGRAPH DEPARTURE MRS. LOPEZ AT AIRPORT UNDER COVER HIS FUNCTIONS. HOPE TO BE ABLE USE PHOTOS FOR FURTHER ARTICLE IN FOREIGN PRESS. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 37

SECRET

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DISSEM BY 26

ACTION: WH/6 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H3, CI/PS

SECRET 022163OZ CITE MEXICO CITY 8659

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8692 (IN 07422)*

2 OCT 66 IN 07879

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BRAGGINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF BRAG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] ALSO [illegible] LIENVOY/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ

[illegible] WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND

[illegible] MAY ENDANGER [illegible] TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE.

[illegible] AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER

[illegible] ISSUE. [illegible] HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO

[illegible] GETTING [illegible] AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED

[illegible] OCTOBER.

[illegible] C R E T

* JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ released by Mexican Police [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

RID COPY

C/CI, C/CI/PS, C/FI 2, C/CA2, C/SOD 3

MEXICO CITY

10 07422

REF: A. MEXICO CITY (IN 44124)

B. MEXICO CITY 6643 (IN 44643)

1. [illegible] RELEASED BY MEXICAN POLICE AFTERNOON [illegible] CONSIDERING [illegible] NO EVIDENCE TO [illegible] AT LEAST [illegible] LEAD INTO [illegible]

[illegible] BE PLAYING THIS ACTIVITY [illegible] APPEARED [illegible] CITY PRESS [illegible] LOPEZ [illegible]

[illegible] WALLACE B. [illegible] CONTACTED [illegible] LIRING/3 ACKNOWLEDGED LOPEZ DIAZ [illegible] OF 29 SEP [illegible] WAS NOT AVAILABLE [illegible] EVENING OF 29 SEP [illegible] LIRING/3 HE HAD LEARNED LOPEZ [illegible] DIAZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH ARMS SMUGGLING [illegible] AND HAD BEEN HELD FROM 25 SEP TO 28 SEP.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible] MEXICO CITY 6592 S E C R E T

[illegible] LOPEZ WAS CARRYING $6000 IN TWENTY DOLLAR BILLS [illegible] IN HOUSE OF GONZALEZ. LIRING/3 WAS AMAZED AT [illegible] TOLD LIRING/3 INFO WAS IN HANDS AT LEAST ONE NEWSPAPERMAN AND MIGHT BREAK IN PRESS ANY TIME. ROWTON [illegible] THIS FROM OFFICIAL OF MEXICAN GOVERNMENT [illegible] ALREADY HAD STORY. ROWTON ALLEGED HE HAD PERSUADED MEXICAN OFFICIAL TO CONVINCE NEWSPAPERMAN NOT [illegible] NEXT FEW DAYS.

4. ROWTON SUGGESTED LIRING/3 GO LOPEZ HOME AND TIP HIM OFF SO HE WILL NOT BE UNEXPECTEDLY CONFRONTED BY PRESS [illegible] IN CASE STORY BROKE. LIRING/3 INSTRUCTED GIVE LOPEZ ALL FACTS ROWTON HAD DISCOVERED.

5. MORNING [illegible] SEPTEMBER ROWTON CONTACTED LIRING/3 [illegible] FIND OUT RESULTS OF PLOY. LIRING/3 [illegible] NIGHT BEFORE FOUND LOPEZ THERE WITH WIFE AND FATHER-IN-LAW VICTOR TRAPOTE. LIRING/3 TOLD [illegible] HAD LEARNED LOPEZ HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED [illegible] AFTER [illegible] TURNED UP IN CONTACT WITH ARMS [illegible] THAT HE WAS CARRYING $6000 IN SMALL BILLS. LIRING/3 STATED HE HAD NO WAY KNOWING TRUE FACTS BUT WAS

SECRET

SECRET

[illegible] MEXICO CITY [illegible] S E C R E T

[illegible] THAT IF TRUE LOPEZ [illegible] GO INTO [illegible]. [illegible] LOPEZ TURNED WHITE UPON HEARING [illegible] ADMITTED [illegible] COMPLETELY TRUE.

[illegible] TOLD [illegible] HE HAD INFORMED LOPEZ AFFAIR [illegible] AND [illegible] HAD LEARNED IT FROM SOME CENTRAL [illegible]. LOPEZ COMMENTED THAT THESE FRIENDS MUST [illegible] IT FROM [illegible] AND ADDED IN ANY CASE HE LEAVING [illegible]. [illegible] REPLIED PLANE NOT DUE UNTIL [illegible] LOPEZ LEAVE NEXT DAY. LOPEZ [illegible] BUT HE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER [illegible] OR [illegible] SCHEDULED [illegible] FLIGHT ADVANCED [illegible]. LIRING/3 CHIDED LOPEZ BECOMING INVOLVED IN AFFAIR [illegible] LOPEZ [illegible] HAVE USED SOMEONE LIKE LIRING/3 [illegible]. THIS GOT LITTLE REACTION FROM LOPEZ WHO MERELY [illegible] IT ALREADY [illegible] NOW.

[illegible] TOLD [illegible] HE SAW NO SIGNS OF PHYSICAL [illegible] LOPEZ.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 21

ORIG: B. CAREW:mot
UNIT: WH/C/CICS
EXT: 2578
DATE: 28 SEPT 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ——— BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, WH 8, C/OA, C/OPS, C/IC 2

FI

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

29 1313Z

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY 8651 (IN 04697)*
B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)**

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT ROWTON/LIRING-3 RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRING-3 AND -4 INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE PLACE TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE AS MENTIONED REF B? HAS LITAMIL-7 BEEN ABLE VERIFY LIRING/4 EMPLOYMENT LIRING?

END OF MESSAGE

* ** REFS ATTACHED.

C/WH/C/CICS [signature]
C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett (draft)
WH/C/FI/TC J. Lucey (draft)
C/WH/C/CA/PA C. Anderson (draft)
C/WH/1 J. Fisher (draft)
WH/C/MO R. Ottman (draft)

LIRING 3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

28-23

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COPY NO.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 23

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FROM
DISSEM BY 32

ACTION
WH/C 8

☑ RID COPY

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INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/ICZ

S E C R E T 272215Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8651

27 SEP 63 04697

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

Joe 7
1/2

15 Sep 66 WASH POST

Western Trade With Cuba Down

MIAMI, Sept. 14 (AP)—An exile organization reported today that Western world trade with Communist Cuba declined sharply last month compared with the same month in 1965.

Revolutionary Unity (UR), which claims it keeps track of ship dockings in Cuba, said only 14 ships from non-Communist countries called at Cuban ports last month. This was a drop of 65.8 per cent compared with August, 1965, the group said.

Of the vessels reported docking in Cuba last month, eight belonged to Britain, three to Greece, and one each to Lebanon, France and Italy, the report said.

Interesting, in view LIRING-3 report that Cuba needed 24 bottoms.

Jane
LIRING-3

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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INFO: VR , FILE (WH 8) CI/OA FI/INT 2

SECRET 15 12 53 Z CITE DIRECTOR 35223

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)

B. DIRECTOR 34711

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1 Stewart (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 40

ORIG: MOUGHAN:fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
R FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

DISSEM BY 7 PER #

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C 8 ☑ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE EUR 8 WH 8 FI FI/INT 2 SB 8

SECRET 13 20 29Z CITE DIRECTOR 34711

TO LONDON INFO MEXICO CITY JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995) NOT SENT LONDON

1. MEXICO CITY SOURCE REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS. SHIPS POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH REPORTEDLY TO REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. FOREGOING MAY INDICATE RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID CUBA BEING CUT.

2. PLS QUERY STANLEY A. COOKE (P) TO SEE WHETHER HE CAN DISCREETLY CONFIRM CUBAN NEED FOR SHIPS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
WH/C/MO Ortman (draft)
WH/1 Stewart (draft)
E/BC/UK
EUR/Cuba Raty (phone)

LIRING-3

C/EUR
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

13-9

SECRET

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TRANSMITTAL OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION: #032 SECRET

ORIG. R. Whitney Tucker;sm
UNIT WH/C/RR/RE
EXT. 3483
DATE 10 September 1966

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

CONFIRMATION COPIES: WH/C 11

TDCS DB-315/02533-66

INFORMATION COPIES: CS/DO, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 6, IW, CA 2, CA/PEG, DO 2, DO/H 4, EUR 6, WH 12

DATE DISTRIBUTED: 10 September 1966

PRECEDENCE: X ROUTINE

BASED ON (FLD. RPT., PROJ.): MEXI-8487 (IN-91995), MEXI-8458 (IN-89335), LIRING-3, Liaison *

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WHC/FI	2	WHC/CA	1	E/MADR	1		
WHC/CI	1						
WHC/MO	1			WH/PACY (CINCSO)			1

EVALUATION REQUESTED OF: STATE | ARMY | NAVY | AIR

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

C S INTERNAL USE ONLY

LIRING-3 PROD

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER(S)

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (WHEN FILLED IN)

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RELEASING OFFICER: C/WH/C/RR

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FORM 12-62 1K-2 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

LIRING-3 Production

14-00000

ROUTINE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -91995
-89335

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

REPCINCLANT FBI BIC COAST GUARD

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

S-E-C-R-E-T

TDCS DB-315/02533-66

DIST 10 SEPTEMBER 1966

10 15 22 Z

COUNTRY CUBA

DOI AUGUST 1966

SUBJECT CUBAN INTEREST IN CHARTERING MERCHANT VESSELS

ACQ MEXICO, MEXICO CITY

FIELD NO.

SOURCE A MEXICAN INTELLECTUAL WHO IS A NEW, UNWITTING REPORTING ASSET. SOURCE HAS CULTURAL AND FAMILY TIES IN CUBA. HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO.

1. ACCORDING TO WORD RECEIVED IN MEXICO FROM AN OFFICIAL OF THE CUBAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT AT THE MOMENT IS THE CHARTERING OF 24 SHIPS, VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED AS "OF MEDIUM TONNAGE" AND "OF APPROXIMATELY 10,000 TONS", FOR USE IN 1967. THIS PROJECT IS BEING HELD AS SECRET INFORMATION, AND MANY CUBAN OFFICIALS DO NOT KNOW OF IT, EVEN IF THEY ARE CONCERNED WITH TRADE AND SHIPPING MATTERS. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SHIPS ARE POSSIBLY TO BE USED TO TRANSPORT THE 1967 SUGAR CROP, WHICH ALLEGEDLY WILL REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS.) (FIELD COMMENT: PERHAPS A REDUCTION IS EXPECTED IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN THE MATTER OF SHIPPING.)

S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE, IS GOING TO CANADA ABOUT THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER TO SEEK THE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL FOR RENTING SHIPS. HIS TRIP IS NOT BEING PUBLICIZED BECAUSE PAST EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT CHARTERING IS MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE HER REQUIREMENTS BECOME KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS.

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO.

14-00000

Cua. 2.-430.- 19 octubre 66.

$_)./ 460.- Salida al 703009.- 1442hs. Orlando Suárez con MF -- Electa le pregunta que que estaba haciendo.- Electa que esta dibujando.- Suárez: que buena ocupación.--- Electa: que donde esta.- Suárez: que en la embajada._ Electa: que si se cansó ayer.- Suárez: que no que tuvo que hacer un montón de cosas por la mañana.- Electa: que si vió a Leopoldo.- Suárez que sí.- Electa: que qué le dijo.- Suárez: que bueno, que así que el interés de hacer la exposición, pero que con poco entusiasmo.--- Electa: que mamá le dice que seguramente el que sí no tiene toda la coolección completa de su obra, que el sí tiene una colección completa que puede ser suficiente - para hacer la exposición personal.- Suárez: que el dice que tiene muy pocas, que para hacer una exposición de unos cien o ciento cincuenta grabados que nada mas tendría la tercera [illegible] que son fotografías y que a él -Suarez- no le gusta esa idea.--- Electa: que se podría conseguir -pero que eso sería averiguarlo con calma- que -- Bellas Artes prestara algunas cosas.--- Suarez: que puede ser una cosa combinada con la OPIC.-- Electa: que otra cosa, que el taller está preparando una exposición de toda su historia y piensa poner un número pequeño de cada uno de sus miembros pero va a ser grande en conjunto, que eso es lo que está preparando.--- Suárez que a él le interesa ir por el taller.--- Electa: que entonces dice mamá que que le parecería que llevara a traves tuyo esta exposición después de presentarse en Bellas Artes, que fuera a Cuba así completaoc:o la va a montar Bellas Artes, que no sabe que dificultades haya con esta gente de Bellas Artes, pero su mamá parece entusiasmada con esa idea, que entonces su mamá fijará un día para que vaya con ella al taller, que le diga cuando y que el día en que se vayan a reunir que ella le avisa para que tu estés al tanto de eso.--- Suares que se pondran de acuerdo estos días y que cuando puedan ir allá que irán.--- Electa: que que va a hacer ahora.- Suárez que va a ver si puede ver a Carlos Jurado que vive cerca de la embajada. que comió con Siquieros ahora en su casa.- Electa que que dice.- Suárez: que está enfrascado con su trabajo que quiere terminar para el 20 de noviembre el mural de Chapultepec; que esta noche hay una conferencia que le interesa ir, que es al Curso que se llama Teorico Problema Arte Sociedad, que va a hablar el maestro José Luis Balcarsel que

Arenal

22 Oct 66 HMMA 30397

#5-986

14-00000

el lugar va a ser en el Salón 1? de la Escuela Nacional de Ciencias Políticas de la Ciudad Universitaria a las 19 horas, que si le interesa ir.--- Electa: que hay un compromiso con los hijos.--- quedan en comunicarse para hacer cita para verse.--- 553.

558.- Salida al Hotel Insurgentes.- HD Rafael con Heriberto le dice que va a pasar con ellos.-- Heriberto de acuerdo. - - - - 577.

. . . .

Nico le diga llame al 146777 y pregunte por Juán Gonzáles.--
Nico queda de dar el recado al Dr.Roberto Pereda.- 220.-

220. Salida al 492141.-1530.-Jorrin pide a MF le diga a Juán que le tiene un paquete y MF acepta.- 224.-

224. Salida al 310106.-HD pregunta por Enrique,Olga y Sergio, y MF informa que no están.- 233.-

233. Salidas al 259100.-1601.- Curbelo se comunica a la Embajada Americana,pide la ext.343 y pregunta a la señorita .... qué noticias le tiene de la visa del [illegible] y MF dice que estará lista a las 5. Curbelo(que irá a esa hora.- 246. --

246. Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.- 434.-

434. Entrada.-Rolando pregunta a Jorrin si alguién lo llamó- y éste dice que nó,pero Carlos Jurado le dejó un recado. - Rolando Rodrígues pregunta cuál Carlos Jurado y Jorrin dice- efectivamente estaba equivocado.- 447.-

448. Salidas ocupado y sin contestación.- 693.-

693. Salida al 153273.-1700.- Jorrin se queja de que le llevaron el pedido pero sin los 6 atomisadores que pidió y MF - pide marque el 158720 y hable con la señorita Durán.- 706.-- Jorrin acepta y al enterarse de que por la mañana no habló-- con la señorita Durán, repite lo anterior a la señorita Barrera y ésta queda de enviárselos mañana.- 756.-

756. Aparato muerto y salidas ocupado y sin contestación.852.

(3.-L31.- 10 Oct.66).-

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES

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ACTION

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO
FILE

S E C R E T 131756Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8624

13 Oct 66 IN 19737

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8608 *

1. WIFE AND TWO CHILDREN OF RAMON ROSSIE LISTED ON CUBANA MANIFEST OF OCT 66 TO MEXICO CITY, HOWEVER MANIFEST SHOWED THEY DID NOT TRAVEL. SOURCE LIFIRE.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 11 OCT 66 HE HAD HEARD CECILIA MARQUEZ FERNANDEZ DE ROSSIE AND TWO CHILDREN ARRESTED AS THEY BOARDING CUBANA FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT. SOURCE OF LIRING-3 INFO NOT DISCLOSED BUT PROBABLY CAME FROM OTHER PASSENGERS WHO MADE FLIGHT.

3. LIRING-3 ALSO TOLD ROWTON HE HAD HEARD ROSSIE NOW IN BRAZIL WHERE HE MADE DEROGATORY STATEMENTS AGAINST CUBAN REGIME. LIRING-3 SUSPECTED THIS MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSE FOR WIFE'S ARREST AT AIRPORT.

SECRET

S E C R E T * NOT PROCESSED BY C/S AS OF 13 Oct 66 2030 HRS.

S E C R E T

BT

LIRING-3

5839

174. Entrada sin contestación.- 1?.-

17?. Salida al 144237.-1045.- Chichay pregunta a Olga hasta qué hora ... puede llevar cosas para enviar a Cuba y Olga dice que hasta las 12.- 182.-

1050 h.

182. Entrada.-La señora Susana Mitrani Moreno de Benzuza pregunta si llegó la certificación de su acta de nacimiento y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y Susana dice que es trabajo en el 122584.- 246.-

246. Entrada 1052.-HF explica que su hijo que está en Cuba ... ... le mandó su acta de matrimonio y quisiera saber dónde pudo localizar al embajador y Abreu dice que en Relaciones Exteriores y pregunte por el Embajador Pamanes.- 259.-

259. Aparato descolgado, aparato muerto y entrada equivocada. 349.-

349. Salida al 515689.-1156.- Abreu con Marcela para platicarle que ayer fué a Oaxtepec, pero prefiere el Varadero; que hoy ó en la semana irá a verla. Marcela acepta y luego habla con Chichaya a quien queda de ir a ver mañana a la embajada ó a su casa y Chichay acepta y aclara que vive a media cuadra de la embajada.- 414.-

NMMA 30173
4oct66

Haciendo Teschi

414. Entrada 12? .- La señora ...de Teschi pregunta si llegó su pasaporte que solicitó hace un año y Chichay dice que nó; pregunta su teléfono y HF dice que es el 403646.-462.-

462. Entrada.-La señora Rosa María .... pregunta si llegó la prórroga de su pasaporte y Chichay indica que nó.- 499.-
(2.-LII.-26 Sep.66).-

14-00000

5827

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-26-47.
29 septiembre 63.- 111-M18.
0910-1417 hs.-

01-49.- Entradas sin contestación.

45.- ...a las 1009hs.- García de Cubana con MD le dice que está un señor que trae una carta firmada por Curbelo para unos pasajes, pero que el número de orden que dan no está correcto.- MD que para quienes son los pasajes.- García: ... [illegible] ..., que dice que para que hagan uso de un pasaje de la orden de ... con el número 1369-03558 y que ese número no existe.- ... que va a investigar con Curbelo en la embajada y que luego le llama.--- 63.-

64.- Salida al 141326.- 1007hs.- Mary de parte de Loreu por el teléfono de CAPOTE.- Jorrín que es el 35-39-64.--- 72.

96.- Salida al 141326.- MD con Jorrín le dice que si está Curbelo.- Jorrín que no está.- MD que le diga que en Cubana no pueden expedir los pasajes para Pérez González y Cepeda Hernández porque está equivocado el número de la orden de pasajes.- Jorrín que el va a llamar a Cubana.--- 110.

111.- Salida al 213689.- 1055hs.- Miriam con Marcela Olguin Hablan de asuntos personales.- Quedan en juntarse a platicar ... ella.- Marcela le proporciona su dirección: Xola 1053-3 ... con ....- Miriam a su vez le proporciona su dirección: Calzada de Tacubaya 172-5-B.-- 171.

203.- Entrada.- MD la Sra. Mitrani con Miriam le habla sobre la ... de un documento que se mandó a la Habana.- Miriam que no ha llegado, que llame el lunes.-- 257

2...- Entrada a las 1146hs.- MD con Mary le dice que ella

5818

[illegible] 14-12-[illegible]
21 [illegible] 1530-[illegible]
1530-[illegible]

66.- Salida al [illegible]073.-1530hs.- Jorrín con Dr Villarroel le dice que entiende su impaciencia que ya lo comprenderá.- Villarroel: que su coche ya lo mandaron traer pero no lo [illegible] ahora, que el [illegible] será mañana.- Jorrín: [illegible] que le gustaría que lo [illegible] Alcántara de El Universal porque ellos [illegible] alguna foto [illegible] aunque ya se hizo la entrega simbólica, pero que sería [illegible] por portando el vehículo. Jorrín: [illegible] que el [illegible] comunique con el cuñado [illegible] Villarroel que entonces el lo avisa [illegible] 67.

70.- Salida al 494407.- 1602hs.- Chichay con Aurea le dice que [illegible] en la Ciudadela [illegible] a [illegible] exposición de [illegible] de dos [illegible] cubanos, para que vayan, que [illegible] de la noche.- [illegible] que Jorge anda por Aguascalientes porque se fué de jurado para el concurso de teatro y que regresa hasta el sábado.- Chichay: que la exposición es solamente mañana en la Escuela de Artesanía, que le diga a las demás personas que vayan.--- 92.

93-195.- Salidas sin contestación, ocupado y equivocado.

215.- Entrada a las 1616hs.- Dr Alberto Domingo por Nuez.- Chichay que no está.--- Domingo: que más tarde habla.- 26

263.- Salida al 197010.- 1544hs.- Chichay por Sonia Quiñones. [illegible] que no ha llegado.- Chichay: que le diga que [illegible] a poco por una [illegible] en casa de Carlos Jurado.--- 273.

274-275.- Salidas sin contestación y ocupado.

5924

Pos... y Rogelio Farias pide a Chichay que cuando lleguen --
lo llamen al 465925. Chichay acepta.- 115.-

115. Salida.- Curbelo al enterarse de que no está Acevedo,--
pide que cuando llegue le digan le llame y HP acepta.- 122.-

123. Salida sin contestación.- 135.-

135. Entrada.-HP pregunta por Curbelo y Chichay pide le ha--
ble al 143237.- 144.-

144. Salidas ocupado.- 155.-

155. Salida.- Chichay pregunta a qué número se le puede ha--
blar a Juán Carrasco y HP dice que le hable a su mamá al --
217404 y pregunte por la señora Rosa....-170.-

170. Salidas sin contestación.-184.-

184. Salida al 217404.-1058.- Chichay, la esposa de Carlos -
Jurado, pide a HP le diga a su amigo Juán Carrasco que le --
trajo una caja de tabacos de La Habana y quisiera invitarlo-
para hoy a las 8 de la noche a la exposición de unas carica-
turas de unos cubanos en la Ciudadela, Balderas 125,Escuela-
de Artesanía. HP queda de dar el recado.- 210.-

210. Salidas ocupado.- 219.-

219. Salida al 480339.-1102.- Chichay pregunta el teléfon--
de la oficina de Carmen Fabregat y al enterarse de que HP no
lo sabe, pide le diga que Carlos Jurado la invita a la expo--
sición de caricaturas que tendrá lugar en Balderas 125 hoy--
a las 8 de la noche. HP: muy bien.- 237.-

(2.-L31.-22 Sep.66).-

14-00000

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-28-47.
21 septiembre 66.- M18-L11.
0950-1227hs.-

10.- Entrada a las 0950hs.- HF de la embajada Checoeslova ca con Chichay le pregunta que si puede mandar al consulado a la Japonesa para su pasaporte.- Chichay que sí.--- 28.

36.- Entrada a las 1045hs.- HF Armando Martínez con Curbelo le pregunta que si puede pasar a verlo para tratarle un caso de asedio por la policía.- Curbelo que sí.- Mtz. que dentro de hora y media pasará con él.--- 68.

69.- Entrada a las 1047hs.- MF Velete -venezolana- con Abreu hablan sobre el asunto de la visa para su hijita.--- que no la necesita.--- 79.

80.- Entrada a las 1122hs.- HF Fernando Rodríguez por su visa.- Chichay: que no ha llegado.--- 101.

102.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por Curbelo.- Chichay dice que Curbelo ya no trabaja en el consulado, que llame a la embajada al 141326.--- 107.

109.- Entrada a las 1129hs.- MF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carnot.-- Abreu le dice que un momento, pero no hay información.--- 161.-

183.- Entrada.- Adolfina Carnet por su permiso de entrada. Nery: que no ha llegado nada.--- 198.

226.- Salida al 147010.- 1223hs.- Chichay con MF que se le diga a su amiga que pase a recoger una carta a la casa de Carlos Jurado, de parte de Oscar.--- 234.

235.- Salida al 347770.- (Laboratorios Químico Mexicana) 1223hs.- Chichay con HF Andres Aguirre le dice que ya tie

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S E C R E T 221252Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8623 (EASBY ACTING) 22 SEP 66 IN 01702

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6808

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 89337)

B. DIRECTOR 33487 *

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 19 SEP 66 THAT ON PASSING THROUGH HAVANA FROM SANTIAGO ON WAY HOME TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-4 HAD VISITED AURELIO ALONZO MUTUAL FRIEND IN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE.

2. ALSONZO TOLD LIRING-4 THAT THEIR FRIEND RAMON ROSSIE HAD ABSCONDED WITH $300,000 OF MINCEX FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED TO HIM TO MAKE PURCHASES SYRIA. THIS HAD LED DSE, WHICH AT FIRST BELIEVED ROSSIE DEFECTED FOR POLITICAL REASONS, TO BELIEVE THAT HIS MOTIVES FOR FLIGHT WERE PURELY PERSONAL AND FOR FINANCIAL GAIN. LIRING-4 ALSO CONTACTED ROSSIE'S VENEZUELAN WIFE IN HAVANA. LATTER TOLD LIRING-4 SHE HAD BEEN OFFERED GOOD JOB BY CUBAN GOVT BUT HAD TURNED IT DOWN BECAUSE SHE DESIRED RETURN VENEZUELA WITH TWO CHILDREN.

3. ACCORDING LIRING-4 FROM ALONSO THIS REFUSAL OF WIFE CAUSED DSE REASSESS CASE AND IT NOW INCLINED BELIEVE ROSSIE SECRETLY IN TOUCH WITH WIFE AND WILL PROBABLY RETURN TO HER ONCE SHE OUT OF CUBA. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON IF WIFE COMES THROUGH MEXICO SHE WILL MOST PROBABLY CONTACT LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

BECAUSE OF PAST FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN COUPLES.

4. RECOGNIZE THIS DOES NOT JIBE WITH REF B REPORT BUT WILL WATCH FOR WIFE AND IF CONTACT CAN BE MADE HAVE APARTMENT WHICH LIRING-3 CAN OFFER HER IN MEXICO CITY TO ASSIST HER DURING STAY.

5. ALONZO ALSO TOLD LIRING-4 HE WOULD TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY 30 SEP OR 1 OCT ON TRIP MENTIONED REF A. ALSO HOPE HOUSE HIM IN APARTMENT WHICH STATION NOW PREPARING WIRE FOR SOUND.

S E C R E T

*RE ROSSIE, CUBAN DEFECTOR

BT

SECRET

5704

EMBAJADA CUBANA.- 11-26-47.
19 septiembre 65.- M18-111.
0924-1300hs.

25.- Salida al 259100 (Embajada Americana) 0924hs.- Curbelo con HF la Srita.De Laval le pregunta que si tiene una visa para [illegible] FERRER y EDUARDO CISNEROS y DORA RIVERO -- [illegible].-- De Laval que el de Dora ya está pero que el de Ferrer no,-que quizas llegue en el transcurso del día la autorización.--- 53.

74.- Salida al 48564F.- 0953hs.- Miriam con HF le dice que tiene una carta para el Sr.Leopoldo Zorrilla Montiel que le trajo de la Habana, que pasen a recogerla.- HF de acuerdo.- ---- 90.

92.- Salida al 118220.- 0955hs.- Miriam con HF Graciela le dice que le trajo una carta de la Habana. Graciela que ella pasará a recogerla.--- 107.

115.- Entrada a las 1025hs.- HF aleman con Miriam le dice que le llamo de Siemens de México,S.A., que uno de los señores de nuestra casa matríz en Alemania quiere volar a Cuba y están preguntando si ustedes aquí le pueden dar una visa y que cuanto tiempo tarda eso.- Miriam: que que es lo que va a hacer a Cuba.- HF que el va a estar en contacto con las empresas con las cuales estamos haciendo negocio, que no le dicen precisamente cuales, pero que deben ser la QUIMIMPEX, LA ALIMPEX... ect., Miriam: que llame al departamento comercial al 250914.---- 128.

215.- Entrada.- HF con Miriam Chichay.- Miriam le llama de amor.-- HF que le llama porque a la 1.15pm que ya habló con BCE que ya se consiguió la primera de las cosas que se va a hacer: que la va a llevar a la persona que va a encargarse de eso a [illegible]ETICA que es donde van a estar ellos a la 1.15pm

que entonces llegará como al cuarto para las dos.- Miriam: que está bien.- HF que a donde lo va a esperar.- Miriam: que en la embajada porque es el primer día que está trabajando y que está sola.- HF que mejor se vaya a la casa.--- 227.

223.- Entrada a las 1159hs.- HF por la respuesta del cable 130 para renovación de pasaporte.-- Mery: que ya llegó.- 236

237.- Entrada a las 1207hs.- HF por la contestación del cable 132.- Mery: que ya llegó.--- 244.

253.- Entrada a las 1227hs.- HF Sánchez Leal por Curbelo.- Mery que no está.- Sánchez que llamará mas tarde.--- 259.

260.- Entrada a las 1230hs.- HF Amado por Abreu.- Mery: que no está.-- Amado: que le diga que les hace falta la cosa del fiador que lo tenga preparado para esta tarde.--- 264.

287.- Entrada a las 1244hs.- HF por el permiso de entrada para Adolfina Carmot.- Mery que no ha llegado.- HF que de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba aseguran que ya lo mandaron.- --- 323.

332.- Entrada.- HF por la visa para Fernando Rodríguez.- Miriam que no ha llegado nada.--- 339.

347.- Entrada a las 1300hs.- HF por la certificación para la Srita. Teresa Lovaina Morales, que es certificación de segundo año de secundaria básica.- Miriam: que no ha llegado. --- 373.

374.- 460.- Entradas y salidas sin contestación.- Teléfono desconectado.-

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14-00000

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S E C R E T 031353Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8437

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 8 SEP 66 IN 31995

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8453 (IN 89335) *

B. DIRECTOR 32961 *

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED INFORMATION ON CUBAN NEED FOR 24 SHIPS OF APPROXIMATELY 13,000 TONS AS COMING FROM AURELIO ALONSO GONZALEZ, OFFICIAL OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE. LIRING-3 MADE STATEMENT SHIP POSSIBLY TO BE USED TRANSPORT 1967 SUGAR CROP WHICH HE SAID WOULD REACH LARGE PROPORTIONS. NOT KNOW IF THIS STATEMENT BY ALONSO BUT HE EXPECTED THROUGH MEXICO CITY SHORTLY AND LIRING-3 WILL BE ABLE CONTACT AND POSSIBLY CAN REQUERY REASON FOR NEED. STATION COMMENTED THAT PERHAPS RUSSIAN SHIPPING AID BEING CUT.

2. REALIZE THAT TO GIVE ASSISTANCE CHARTERING SHIPS COUNTER WOLADY POLICY, HOWEVER, IN VIEW BOOST SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD MEAN IN LIRING-3 PRESTIGE WITH PBRUMEN REQUEST HQS COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS. WALLACE B. ROWTON KNOWS GREEK SHIPPING OFFICIAL NEW YORK FORMERLY CLEARED WHO HE BELIEVES COULD ASSIST. THIS INDIVIDUAL, CAPT. GEORGE STAM OR STAMATOPOLIS, WELL ACQUAINTED INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CIRCLES AND MIGHT BE IN POSITION MEET ALONSO IN CANADA AND UNDER GUISE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8487 S E C R E T

ATTEMPTING ASSIST OBTAIN CHARTERS COULD POSSIBLY LEARN MORE DETAILS CUBAN SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS.

3. IN FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY ROWTON ON MATTERS CONTAINED REF A, LIRING-3 STATED ARMANDO HART IS LEADING FIGURE IN CIVILIAN FACTION ALONG WITH PRESIDENT DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA GARCIA.

S E C R E T

BT *REF: RYBAT

** Requested Source Statement Possibility Exists Cut in Soviet Assistance.

SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	PROCESSING ACTION
TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division		MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO: Deputy Chief WH/C and Chief of Station, JMWAVE		NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT: LIRING-1 and LIRING-2		MICROFILM

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. On 6 September 1966 Station Officer Lawrence F. BARKER attended a meeting of the Consular Association, a loosely knit, rather [illegible] association used in the past [illegible] as a [illegible] by honorary consular officers. With the election of LIRING-2 as president of the group in late 1965, representatives of countries not friendly with PBRUMEN have generally boycotted the meetings. In the belief that the documents were willing to present their resignations so that another slate of officers might be elected, BARKER was selected to attend for LNPURE. As it turned out, the meeting drew only nine persons and no business of any consequence was [illegible] [illegible] previously met. The purpose of this dispatch is to record certain conclusions drawn about LIRING-1 and LIRING-2. The latter "presided" over the meeting.

2. LIRING-1 impressed BARKER as being intelligent, articulate, self confident, affable and attentive. It was clear that, while LIRING-1 holds no office in the association, he intended to speak for himself and LIRING-2. He explained in a straightforward manner that he felt that the sad state of the association was due to politics; namely, that a representative of a "socialist country" (LIRING-2) had been elected president in a sparsely-attended meeting. He felt that because of this most of the other consular officers were avoiding meetings and that no amount of nice diplomatic talk could gloss over this fact. (This impressed BARKER as a good estimate of the situation). LIRING-1 then said that he felt it would be best for LIRING-2 to step down so that the association could once again draw people to its meetings. He further promised that the PBRUMEN representatives would stick with the association as ordinary members and give their full support to the next slate of officers.

3. Dressed in a rather lumpy and shabby suit that appeared to have been made from old army blankets dyed dark blue, LIRING-1 made up for his appearance and slight stature by flashing a warm smile and being pleasant throughout the meeting which consisted of a sojourn at the bar followed by dinner. BARKER

CONTINUED . . . .

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
	SECRET	HMMA-2[illegible]

attempted, apparently with success to exorcise all [illegible] slang and accent from his own speech, and LIRING-1 never inquired whether BARKER had ever been to [illegible] or had any connection with matters [illegible]. He seemed genuinely interested in a BARKER spiel on Mayan archaeology and anthropology and by the end of the meal was slapping BARKER on the back. While young and perhaps somewhat immature, LIRING-1 appears to be a tough character -- quick witted and thoroughly convinced that he stands for what is right. The overall impression is somewhat at variance with what had been expected from AMPICK-1 and, to some extent, AMMUG-1 reports. LIRING-1 is no "kid" and while he may have plenty to learn in the intelligence trade he appears to be quite capable of learning it given sufficient time. From the opposition viewpoint he should be an effective agent developer.

4. For the record, it should be noted that he has a ruddy complexion and bright blue-green eyes.

5. LIRING-2, on the other hand, appears to be a rather wishy-washy sort [illegible] of weakness. Although superior to LIRING-1 in the association and within LIRING itself, he took a back seat to LIRING-1 in the discussions. He seems to be essentially introverted. He is pleasant but one gets the impression that this is a matter of diplomatic correctness.

6. The above observations are all based on a one-time, two-hour encounter and may well be inaccurate. They are set forth, however, in an effort to assist in arriving at a correct assessment of key opposition personnel, primarily LIRING-1. He has the makings of a good operator and merits respect as well as study with a view to his eventual recruitment.

for Willard C. CURTIS

14-00000

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TO

S E C R E T CITE DIRECTOR

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8458

HQS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED INFO PARA 5 REF. REQUEST SOURCE STATEMENT POSSIBILITY EXISTS CUT IN SOVIET ASSISTANCE. IS THIS STATION OR LIRING/3 COMMENT, OR WAS IT STATEMENT BY LIRING/3 CONTACT IN CUBA? IF LATTER, WHO WAS SOURCE?

S E C R E T

NOTE: ORIGINATING OFFICER H WEILER WH/C/RR
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????? WH/1
T HAZLETT WH/C/FI
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LIRING-3

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UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
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DATE: 6 SEPT 1966

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FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: RID COPY
FILE: [illegible]

SECRET 1441Z CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 88835)

ROSSIE OF REFERENCE, PARAGRAPH 7 WHILE VISITING BEIRUT EARLY JULY 1966 WAS RECRUITED BY WOFACT AND TRAINED BECOME ON ISLAND ASSET. ROSSIE WAS DEPART SYRIA FOR PRAGUE 14 JULY ENROUTE CUBA BUT INSTEAD STAYED SYRIA WITH NEW SYRIAN WIFE. EARLY JULY CUBAN REPRESENTATIVE BEIRUT BEGAN TRYING LOCATE ROSSIE. WE UNAWARE HIS WHEREABOUTS FROM 14 JULY UNTIL 15 AUGUST WHEN HE WALKED INTO WOFACT COVER OFFICE BARCELONA, SPAIN. HE SUBSEQUENTLY SENT MADRID WHERE STATION HAD LITTLE LUCK DEBRIEFING HIM DUE HIS AGITATION AND NERVOUSNESS. 26 AUGUST HE SIGNED QUIT CLAIM. HE AND NEW WIFE HOPE RESETTLE VENEZUELA WHERE HE NATURALIZED CITIZEN. ROSSIE DID NOT DEFECT WITH ANY CUBAN FUNDS. HE BROKE WHEN ARRIVED BARCELONA AND RELIABLE SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATED CUBANS WHEN INITIALLY BEGAN LOOKING FOR HIM WERE WORRIED BECAUSE HAD LIMITED FUNDS.

END OF MESSAGE

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CITE DIRECTOR 33487

TO

PAGE TWO

DC/WH/C/CICS John A Crites

C/WH/C/FI

for C/WH/C/MO

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

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THOMAS J. FLORES
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S E C R E T 031932Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8463

3 SEP 65 IN 68336

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY JMWAVE

NAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8458 (IN 84977)

1. LIRING/3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT IN HAVANA AIRPORT 29 AUGUST AS HE ABOUT EMBARK ON CUBANA TO MEXICO CITY HE MET LINO SALAZAR FORMER EMPLOYEE CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO. SALAZAR TOLD LIRING/3 HE AT AIRPORT TO ESCORT VIRGINIA A. GOMEZ CUEVAS DE LIZALDE TO PLANE AND SEE HER SAFELY ON WAY BACK TO MEXICO CITY.

2. VIRGINIA IS SISTER OF GUMERSINDO GOMEZ CUEVAS ARRESTED IN NICO GALAN ROUNDUP. GOMEZ ACCORDING TO POLICE STATEMENT WAS REPORTEDLY IN CHARGE DRAWING UP PLANS ON ESSENTIAL INDUSTRIAL CENTERS IN MEXICO (MEXICO CITY 8241). (IN 76854)

3. LIRING/3 TALKED WITH VIRGINIA ON FLIGHT. SHE APPEARED VERY DEPRESSED OVER ARREST OF HER BROTHER AND FRIENDS IN MEXICO. SHE SAID SHE HAD BEEN UNABLE DO ANY SIGHTSEEING IN HAVANA. LIRING/3 INFERRED FROM FACT SHE ESCORTED TO AIRPORT SHE MUST HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH CUBAN OFFICIALS HAVANA. ON RETURN FLIGHT SHE ACKNOWLEDGED HAVING NO MONEY AND LIRING/3 PRESSED 150 MN ON HER AS FRIENDLY LOAN. LIRING/3 ALSO CONCLUDED FROM HER SAD APPEARANCE CUBAN OFFICIALS HAD GIVEN HER NO

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8460 S E C R E T SECRET

HOPE FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THERE.

4. CUBANA MANIFESTS SHOW VIRGINIA FLEW MEXICO CITY TO HAVANA 15 JULY 1966. HER MEXICO CITY ADDRESS GIVEN ON RETURN FLIGHT MANIFEST 29 AUG. AS ALMENCENES 98 A WPRN COLONIA TLALTELOLCO, MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

14-00000

FORM 4-67 3010

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 39

SECRET

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: D. SSEM BYRD

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UNIT: OS TIME

INFO FILE VR, C/WH-6, C/CI, C/FI-2, C/CA-2, C/EUR-3, C/SOD-3, C/DO-4, C/DO/H-3, C/SB-3, C/CA/O-2, DDP, ADDP

S E C R E T 031858Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8458

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

3 SEP 66 IN 89335

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8313 (IN 79989)

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON AND LIRING/3 HELD BRIEF MEETINGS 2 SEPT 66 FOLLOWING LIRING/3 RETURN FROM HAVANA 29 AUG. BELOW ARE SOME OF HIGHLIGHTS LIRING/3 TEN DAY TRIP.

2. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HOLDS KEY POSITION IN MINISTRY OF SUGAR ALTHOUGH HE NOT ACTUALLY MINISTER. HE EXPECTS TRAVEL TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, PROBABLY POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IN NEAR FUTURE ORDER ARRANGE FUTURE PURCHASES SUGAR.

3. ON OWN INITIATIVE, RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 THAT LIRING/4 SHOULD BE EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY. APPARENTLY FACT SHE ALREADY WORKING THERE NOT KNOWN HAVANA. RODRIGUEZ SAID LIRING/4 SHOULD [NOT] BE GIVEN DIPLOMATIC STATUS SINCE THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE HER STATUS AS [WIFE] LIRING/3. RATHER SHE WILL WORK OSTENSIBLY AS VOLUNTEER. LIRING/3 HAS NEVER ADMITTED TO ROWTON THAT LIRING/4 WORKING IN EMBASSY.

4. RODRIGUEZ PUT LIRING/3 IN CONTACT WITH IMPORTANT OFFICIAL OF MINISTERIO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR (MINCEX) WHOSE FIRST NAME IS AURELIO (LELO) BUT WHOSE LAST NAME LIRING/3 CANNOT RECALL. LIRING/3 STATES HE HAS KNOWN

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 3458 S E C R E T SECRET

AURELIO SOME TIME BUT NEVER HAD BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH HIM. AURELIO APPEARED APPOINT LIRING/3 HIS SPECIAL REP MEXICO AND SAID HE WOULD SEND LIRING/3 INSTRUCTIONS THROUGH COMMERCIAL ATTACHE MEXICO CITY, SERGIO MARTINEZ BARROSO, REGARDING URGENT COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS OF HAVANA.

5. AURELIO CONFIDED TO LIRING/3 THAT CUBA'S MOST URGENT REQUIREMENT OF MOMENT WAS CHARTER OF 24 MEDIUM TONNAGE SHIPS FOR USE IN 1967. AURELIO ADDED THIS CLASSIFIED SECRET AND THAT SERGIO MARTINEZ KNEW NOTHING OF THIS AND THAT LIRING/3 SHOULD NOT MENTION IT. AURELIO STATED HE WILL TRANSIT MEXICO CITY ABOUT 15 SEPTEMBER ENROUTE CANADA AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY LEADS LIRING/3 COULD GIVE AT THAT TIME RE BEST AND CHEAPEST CHANNEL RENTING SHIPS. AURELIO COMMENTED CUBA COULD NOT PUBLICIZE THIS NEED SINCE PAST EXPERIENCE INDICATED CHARTERING MORE DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE FOR CUBA ONCE REQUIREMENT KNOWN TO WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. POSSIBILITY EXISTS RUSSIANS MAY HAVE CUT DOWN THEIR ASSISTANCE TRANSPORT CUBAN SUGAR, FORCING CUBANS CHARTER BOTTOMS FOR THIS PURPOSE.

6. LIRING/3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET AMOIL-1 ON PLANE GOING INTO CUBA 15 AUG AND APPARENTLY TWO BECAME FRIENDLY. AMOIL-1 ARRANGED BY PHONE PASSAGE ON CUBANA FOR LIRING/4 TO SANTIAGO WHEN PASSAGE NOT EASY OBTAIN. EVEN OFFERED FLY HER THERE IN HIS PLANE IF NECESSARY. LIRING/3 ASKED

SECRET

AMOIL/1 IF THERE WEREN'T SOMETHING HE NEEDED FROM MEXICO CITY OR IF HE COULD NOT SEND HIM GIFT. AMOIL/1 APPARENTLY HAD NO PARTICULAR WANTS BUT ASKED LIRING/3 USE CHANNEL THROUGH JORRIN AT CUBAN EMBASSY RATHER THAN POUCH IF LIRING/3 WANTED SEND SOMETHING TO AMOIL/1.

7. AURELIO OF MINCEX TOLD LIRING/3 THEIR MUTUAL FRUEND RAMON ROSIE WHO HAD BEEN SENT SYRIA BY MINCEX HAD DONE EXCELLENT JOB BUT HAD FINALLY DEFECTED AND MARRIED LOCAL SYRIAN TELEPHONE OPERATOR. ROSIE HAS WIFE AND CHILD HAVANA. AURELIO IMPLIED ROSIE HAD DEFECTED WITH CONSIDER-ABLE MOUNT OF CUBAN FUNDS. LIRING/3 COMMENTED TO ROWTON THAT ROSIE COULD BE USEFUL ROWTON'S BUSINESS INTERESTS BECAUSE OF HIS MANY CONTACTS MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE. LIRING/3 BELIEVES HE KNOWS ROSIE WELL ENOUGH RECRUIT HIM FOR ROWTON.

8. AS TO POLITICAL MANEUVERS LIRING/3 REPORTED ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD HIM MOST POWERFUL ELEMENTS IN CUBA AT PRESENT ARE RAUL CASTRO AND RAMIRO VALDEZ WHO CARRY WEIGHT OF MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES DESPITE FACT NEITHER HAS POPULAR SUPPORT. THEIR OPPOSING FACTION HEADED BY DORTICOS AND RAUL ROA CARCIA WHO APPEAR HOLD RELATIVELY GOOD POPULAR SUPPORT. FIDEL CASTRO IS IN MIDDLE ATTEMPTING CONCILIATE TWO FACTIONS BUT WITHOUT SUCCESS TO DATE.

9. ACCORDING ARNOL RODRIGUEZ LIRING/2 NO LONGER CONSUL MEXICO CITY

Discrepancy with SI.

14-00000

SECRET

IS TO REMAIN MEXICO LONG ENOUGH CLEAN UP ADMINISTRATIVE MESS HE CREATED DURING HIS TOUR. MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS TOLD LIRING/3 IN HAVANA HE WOULD NOT BE COMING BACK TO MEXICO CITY. DID NOT KNOW WHERE HE WOULD BE REASSIGNED OR WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM MEXICO.

10. REGARDING CURRENCY RESERVES, ARNOL RODRIGUEZ TOLD LIRING/3 CUBA HAS SUFFICIENT RESERVES MEET CURRENT COMMITMENTS. CUBA HAS RECENTLY SIGNED 52 MILLION DOLLAR CONTRACT WITH FRANCE TO BUILD INDUSTRY CUBA.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: X NO INDEXING REQUIRED

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City; San Salvador

FROM: Acting Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: DYVOUR/[illegible]
Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training Near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

Action Required: See Paragraph 3
References: A. SAN SALVADOR-6332, 28 August 1966
B. HMMT-14[illegible], 27 June 1966
C. HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

1. Headquarters was interested to learn of JUDAIBG-1's report of Mauricio de la [illegible]'s claim in Reference A that..."they have a center in Tehuantepec for the training of guerrillas for Central America..." in the light of Subject Report involving the same general area and the identification of Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas by [illegible]-1 in 1964 as the Salvadoran Communist Party link with the Cuban Intelligence Service in Mexico City.

2. For the information of Stations Guatemala City and San Salvador, Reference B reported information from a Mexican ex-military physician of unknown reliability that the Cuban Consulate in Merida had established a group of Cubans in [illegible], Malpaso, where the Netzahualcoyotl Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics; and reference C reported background information on Malpaso published in the Mexican pro-Castro magazine Siempre under the byline of one Carlos NAVARRETE. It was noted that a person by the name of Carlos NAVARRETE had been reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 as a Guatemala Communist living in Mexico. It is now noted that the Siempre staff appears recently to have been taking more than usual amount of interest in the Chiapas area (which includes Tehuantepec). In addition to the NAVARRETE article on Malpaso, the 31 August 1966 issue carried no less than eleven articles and a four-page color picture spread on the area by Jose Natividad ROSALES, Horacio [illegible], Pedro ALVARADO Lang, Pablo [illegible], Antonio [illegible], Nabor [illegible], Renato LEDUC, Jose CIRON, and Rodolfo [illegible]. One of the articles by ROSALES even noted that on the road from Tapachula, the entire Siempre team almost perished in a near-automobile accident. The same issue carried part two of an article on guerrilla activities of the

Continued.../

Distribution:
2 - COS, Mexico City
1 - COS, Guatemala City
1 - COS, San Salvador

Possible interest in LIRING-3 Case

CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-14[illegible] | DATE: 1 September 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET | HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-120-13

RI
Chrono
WH/C/FI
WH/2

ORIGINATING: WH/1 Jack Stewart | EXT. 3654

COORDINATING:
WH/C/FI
WH/2

RELEASING: AC/WH/1 | Fisher

DISPATCH

[illegible] Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) by Antonio CARAM. Antonio CARAM may be identical with Antonio CARAM Mafud, a [illegible] [illegible] engineer in Mexico City who was born in [illegible], Chiapas. CARAM was reported to be a high official of the Frente Electoral del Pueblo (FEP) in 1963 and is believed to be identical with the Antonio CARAM who was reliably reported in May 1964 to be in contact with Oldrich [illegible] of the Czech Embassy in Mexico City. While of course none of the foregoing may have any direct connection with reports of guerrilla training in this area or with the arrest of Victor RICO Galan, the noted [illegible] writer and pro-Castro activist, on 18 August 1966 for subversive activities, the information may be of background interest.

3. When [illegible]-1 is debriefed, it might be of interest to attempt to ascertain if he has any further light to throw on the Tehuantepec area with respect to guerrilla training activities and to ask him to keep an ear out for such information.

Andrew F. [illegible]

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 32

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INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/04

S E C R E T 192255Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8310 IN 79989

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 20 AUG 66

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON MET LIRING-3 18 AUG IN LAST MEET PRIOR L-3 DEPARTURE FOR CUBA 19 AUG. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD TALKED WITH ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 18 AUG FROM WHOM HE LEARNED FOLLOWING:

A. ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS HAS BEEN MADE MINISTER OF SUGAR IN NEWLY ORGANIZED OR REORGANIZED SUGAR MINISTRY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD CONTACT RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FIRST UPON ARRIVAL CUBA TO CHECK HIS PRESENT POSITION AND LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.

B. SENDING OF OLD DC-4 AIRPLANE TO MEXICO 16 AUG WAS OSTENSIBLY SPECIAL SERVICE FOR JOSEPHINE BAKER AND 16 CHILDREN TO TRANSPORT THEM TO MEXICO. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO CURBELO THIS PLANE ALSO GAVE CUBANS EXCUSE FOR NOT EVACUATING MEXICANS IMPLICATED IN RICO GALAN CASE WHO WERE PRESSING CUBAN EMBASSY FOR SANCTARY IN CUBA TO AVOID ARREST.

2. L-3 BELIEVES RICO GALAN CASE POINTS UP CONFLICT IN CUBAN EMBASSY BETWEEN SECURITY/INTEL AND FOREIGN MINISTRY GROUPS. ON 15 AUG L-3 TOLD ROWTON THAT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ, PRESS AND CULTURAL ATTACHE WARNED L-3 NOT TAKE 16 AUG PLANE BECAUSE THERE GOING BE SEVERAL

SECRET

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14-00000

MEXICANS GOING TO CUBA TO ESCAPE ARREST IN RICO GALAN CASE. AS IT TURNED OUT ONLY FIVE PERSONS FLEW IN DC-4 BACK TO CUBA 16 AUG AND NO MEXICANS AMONG THEM. L-3 STATED CURBELO ON 18 AUG INDICATED CUBANS VERY FEARFUL FOR CUBAN/MEXICAN RELATIONS DUE RICO GALAN CASE AND DID NOT WANT BE ACCUSED BY MEXICANS OF GRANTING ASYLUM TO GUILTY PARTIES. IT VERY UNUSUAL FOR CUBANA ON MEXICO TO HAVANA RUN CARRY ONLY FIVE PASSENGERS.

4. L-3 STATED HE SAW FERNANDO RICO GALAN BROTHER OF VICTOR, IN CUBANA OFFICE 12 AUG ATTEMPTING ARRANGE FLIGHT TO HAVANA. FLIGHT DID NOT COME MEXICO CITY THAT DAY AND FERNANDO ARRESTED IN ROUNDUP. L-3 ALSO SAW ON 12 AUG ONE NOEL BARRA ZENIL ATTEMPTING ARRANGE PASSAGE. BARRA DESCRIBED BY L-3 AS RABID COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO CLOSE TO RICO GALAN AND UNTIL RECENTLY A LONG RESIDENT IN HAVANA.

5. L-3 BELIEVES LOPEZ PROBABLY SECURITY OR INTEL REP IN EMBASSY SINCE HE VERY CLOSE RICO GALAN AND APPEARED FEEL MEXICANS CONNECTED WITH CASE WHO NOT YET ARRESTED SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN PASSAGE TO CUBA. ALSO RECENTLY L-3 ASKED LOPEZ WHY HE DID NOT DO MORE IN CULTURAL PRESS WORK FOR CUBA. LOPEZ REPLIED THAT NOT IMPORTANT BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS ASSISTING REVOLUTIONARY FORCES MEXICO. L-3 COMMENTED ATTITUDE OF CURBELO APPEARED REFLECT FOREIGN MINISTRY POLICY NOT TO

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SECRET

DO ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT UPSET CUBAN MEXICAN RELATIONS.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

Dolores, a agregada del Departamento de Visas, con Abreu, quien explica que hace aproximadamente 5 días la señorita Lourdes González solicitó a su familia la visa, que sus padres están graves y como Lourdes es religiosa quisiera saber si puede hacer algo por ella, ya que si no se va el viernes, ya no podrá viajar, pero la opinión del Consulado es que viaje lo más pronto posible. Dolores que está en trámite, pero le volverá a decir al compañero.- 870.-

870. Salida al 09.- MD pide el costo de la llamada anterior y MF queda de llamarlo.- 880.- Lourdes González vuelve a llamar y pide que el importe de la llamada se la pasen al 732962 y pregunta por la madre Angela. MF dice que fueron 9 minutos e importaron $ 112.50. Lourdes dá las gracias.962.

962. Entrada 1221.- El Lic. Mójica, de la Secretaría de la Presidencia, y Abreu quedan de verse mañana a las 3 de la tarde en la Fonda Santa Anita que está en Humbolt.- 999.-

999. Entrada 1225.- Marcela Olguin después de comunicarlo a Miriam que se vá hoy ó mañana, se entera que Chichay se va el viernes a Cuba con su esposo y su hija, pero regresarán como dentro de 10 días para luego regresar por más tiempo. Marcela le desea buen viaje e indica que cuando tenga tiempo irá a verla porque ya no aguanta a su espos y quiere que lo deporten. Miriam indica que mañana ó el sábado llega Curbelo y le sugiere que le hable todos los días. Marcela la acepta.- 1074.-

HMMA-29793 18 aug 66 LIENVOY

Jane LIRING-3

- -

(5.-LII.- 15 agosto 66).-

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 31

ORIG: H. WEILER;gb
UNIT: WH/C/RR
EXT: 3561
DATE: 10 AUGUST 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
X NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: 10WH/C 8 ☐ RID COPY

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RUR 8 CI/OPS

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

11 AUG 66 21 52Z CITE DIRECTOR 27103

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 8189 (IN 73260)

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL RQMS FOR LIRING-3:

A. CUBAN REQUIREMENTS FOR FREE WORLD PURCHASES. MOST URGENT ITEMS. AMOUNT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AVAILABLE FROM THIS YEAR'S SUGAR CROP FOR SUCH PURCHASES. CREDIT PLANS TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES POSSIBLE.

B. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE OTHER EXPORTS AUGMENT FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS HEDGE AGAINST CONTINUED POOR CROPS.

C. CUBAN PLANS INCREASE TRADE MEXICO, OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. CUBAN PLANS IMPROVE RELATIONS THIS AREA.

D. PRESENT POSITION, STATUS ARNOL RODRIGUEZ.

2. ONLY ADDL TRACE OCHOA: EGK 40533, 23 MARCH 1966 (CATIDE) REPORTS RENE OCHOA (NATIONALITY NOT GIVEN) AND AGUSTIN P. ROMAN ATTENDANCE FIRST CONGRESS OF PUBLISHERS OF SOCIALIST PEDAGOGICS, PRAGUE, 15-30 NOV 1965.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/C/FI [signature]
WH/1 J. Stewart (in draft)

LIRING-3

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

11-11

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4-65 3010

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FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H 3, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING

9 Aug 66 IN 73260

REF MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN.

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,200 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG.

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

File LIRING-3

WEILER DRAFTED ROMS/CABLE. TRACES. I COORDINATED.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8189 S E C R E T SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04248 30 APRIL 1964.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

- Frias OCHOA.

Hittie [illegible] OSYS 10 [illegible]

EGK - 40533 [illegible] 23 [illegible]

[illegible] Agustin P. Roman attended [illegible] Congress of Publishers of [illegible] [illegible] Prague 15 - 20 [illegible] 65

[illegible] files from PCH [illegible] - 64 [illegible] 63-4-124.2 [illegible]

in Cuba 1966 expelled from [illegible]

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MESSAGE FORM
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DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966

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☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/C/FI ____

C/WH/C/CI ____

C/WH/1 ____

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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3-16

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INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, CI, CI/OPS, FI, DO-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 021815Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8115

2 AUG 66 IN 68647

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

1. IN MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON ON 1 AUGUST 1966, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR STATED MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS HAD SHOWN HIM LENGTHY CABLE FROM HAVANA WHICH ARRIVED MEXICO CITY AFTER DEPARTURE OF ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON ON 25 JULY WHICH SUMMARIZED LIST OF DEFICIENCIES AND INEFFICIENCIES OF CURBELO DURING HIS ASSIGNMENT MEXICO CITY.

2. CABLE SIGNED BY RAUL ROA GARCIA. CABLE CITED UNANSWERED MESSAGES REQUESTING SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND LIST OF ACTIONS NOT TAKEN. LOZANO TOLD JURADO IT UNLIKELY CURBELO WOULD RETURN TO MEXICO CITY.

S E C R E T

BT

?? I note that Curbelo back in spite of this. Obviously not built up. Thus L-3 possibly legit.

201-798301

LIRING-3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 022227Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3126 2 Aug 63 IN 68738

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8126 S E C R E T

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERE. WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

S E C R E T

BT

NNNN

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, C S D O, DCI, DDP, CS/RE, ...

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23 JUL 66 IN 62489

S E C R E T 231655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8026

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7994 (IN 60617)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AFTERNOON OF 22 JULY 1966, HE HAD DISCUSSED MATTER OF AIRMEN PRISONERS IN NORTH VIET NAM WITH MIGUEL LOZANO EARLIER THAT DAY. JURADO SAID LOZANO REMARKED THAT IN HIS OPINION AIRMEN WOULD NOT BE EXECUTED AND REFERERED TO RECENT REPLY OF NORTH VIET NAM PRESIDENT TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS THAT PRISONERS WERE BEING TREATED HUMANELY. LOZANO ADDED NO SUCH THING AS EXECUTION OF PRISONERS WAS FORESEEN.

2. BELIEVE THIS BEST KNOWLEDGE CUBANS AT EMBASSY HERE HAVE OF SITUATION AND CAN ONLY CONCLUDE ORIGINAL STATEMENT BY ABELARDO CURBELO WAS UTTERED TO SPARK AN OTHERWISE ORDINARY CONVERSATION AND PERHAPS ATTEMPT GET RISE OUT OF RAMIRO ABREU AND JURADO.

S E C R E T

CS Comment: *Advised that ROWTON (I) would meet Jurado and attempt to assess Cuban knowledge of NVN intentions regarding the airmen prisoners.

BT

SECRET

ROWTON ??

~~SD6-137/3~~

201-798301

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE E TOTAL COPIES 83

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S E C R E T 210345Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7994 CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY DDI 20, D/OCI 2

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

IN 60657

NO NIGHT ACTION

TYPIC LIRING

REF A DIRECTOR 21425 **

B MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59538)*

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON[1] IN MEETING 20 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO DETERMINED STATEMENT REPORTED REF B RE EXECUTION OF PRISONERS MADE BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON IN PRESENCE OF RAMIRO ABREU QUINTANA AND JURADO. STATEMENT WAS MADE POSITIVELY BY CURBELO IN CONTEXT OF BRIEF DISCUSSION RE GRAVITY OF SITUATION IN VIET NAM.

2. THOUGH FACT CURBELO MADE STATEMENT RATHER THAN ABREU WHO RECENTLY RETURNED MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA, TENDS DETRACT FROM IMPACT OF STATEMENT, ROWTON[1] HAS INSTRUCTED JURADO CONTINUE CHECK OUT STATEMENT IN EMBASSY TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS RAISED IN PARAS 2 A AND B REF A. JURADO TOLD ROWTON[1] HE WOULD TALK WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, EMBASSY COUNSELOR, WHO, ACCORDING TO JURADO, IS MUCH MORE RELIABLE SOURCE AND MORE AWARE OF SITUATION IN HAVANA THAN EITHER CURBELO OR ABREU.

SECRET

LIRING-3

14-00000

SECRET

3. NEXT ROWTON[1] JURADO MEETING WILL BE AFTERNOON 23 JULY.

WILL ADVISE RESULTS.

S E C R E T

BT CS COMMENT: *Jurado told ROWTON (1) that the situation in Vietnam is grave because the North Vietnamese are going to execute the U.S. Airmen recently captured.
**Hqs feels it essential for ROWTON (1) to develop fullest possible info needed to assess Cuban knowledge of VN intentions and seek answers to a number of posed questions.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CS/DO, FE8, SAVA2, FI, FI/INT2, C/OPS, C/CA, ADDP

SECRET 221939Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7933

IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A. DIRECTOR 21425 *

B. MEXICO CITY 7971 (IN 59838)

* SEEKING TO CLARIFY STATEMENT MADE BY LIRING-1 RE EXECUTION OF AMERICAN AIRMEN

1. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH JURADO SCHEDULED FOR 2000 HOURS 20 JULY. ROWTON BELIEVES IT BEST NOT ATTEMPT SET EARLIER MEETING LEST IT RAISE QUESTIONS JURADO'S MIND RE ROWTON'S INTEREST IN REPORT. THUS FAR ALL REPORTING BY JURADO TO ROWTON HAS BEEN UNDER GUISE OF BASIC POLITICAL INFORMATION WHICH ESSENTIAL TO PLANS FOR FUTURE BUSINESS DEALS OF ROWTON.

2. AT 2000 HOUR MEETING ROWTON WILL BE ABLE ESTABLISH PARAGRAPH 2 A AND B REF A AND THIS WILL BE REPORTED SOONEST.

3. ANSWERS TO PARA 2C AND D WILL REQUIRE JURADO REINTERROGATION OF LIRING-1. ROWTON WILL REQUEST JURADO DO THIS AT MEETING BUT IT PROBABLY WILL BE 21 JULY BEFORE JURADO CAN SEE LIRING-1.

4. IT APPARENT FROM CONTEXT OF REPORT CITED REF B THAT LIRING-1 HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT POSSIBLE REPORT REGARDING AIRMEN WAS EXPRESSION MADE TO LIRING-1 BY RODRIGUEZ.

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BT

LIRING-3

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: V. GRIFFIN
UNIT: WH/C/8/RR
EXT:
DATE: 20 Feb 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

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CITE DIRECTOR 21425

TO

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR

IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7971

1. REF OBVIOUSLY PROVOKING MUCH INTEREST HQS, PARTICULARLY DUE JURADO CLAIMED ACCESS, PLUS DEFINITENESS STATEMENT RE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTION EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN AND ATTRIBUTION TO OFFICIAL CUBAN SOURCE.

2. IT THEREFORE ESSENTIAL ROWTON PURSUE ACTION ANTICIPATED PARA 4 REF AND METICULOUSLY DEVELOP FULLEST POSSIBLE INFO NEEDED TO ASSESS CUBAN KNOWLEDGE VN INTENTIONS. SPECIFICALLY REQUEST ROWTON SEEK ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

A. CAN STATEMENT BE ATTRIBUTED TO LIRING/1 WITH CERTAINTY?

B. ANY FURTHER INFO AS TO UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN WHAT CONTEXT WAS STATEMENT MADE?

LIRING-3

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

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2	6
3	7
4	8

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CITE DIRECTOR

TO

C. DID STATEMENT REFLECT OFFICIAL CUBAN ESTIMATE OR WAS IT PERSONAL SPECULATION BY LIRING/1 OR HIS MERE ECHOING OF VN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, PRESS PLAY, OR CUBAN WISHFUL THINKING?

D. IF STATEMENT REPRESENTS OFFICIAL POSITION, FROM WHAT GOC OR OTHER FUNCTIONARY DID LIRING/1 OBTAIN IT? WHAT IS POSITION AND ACCESS OF THIS FUNCTIONARY TO SUCH HARD INFORMATION RE VN INTENTIONS, E.G., VN REP CUBA.

S E C R E T

NOTE:

ORIGINATING OFFICER GRIFFIN/VIDAL WH/C/RR/CIOS

COORDINATING OFFICER J. FISHER WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER E. WILLIAMSON FOR WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD

BT

RELEASING OFFICER

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UNIT CS/DO TIME 0435Z BY J

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SECRET 200352Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7971

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

20 JUL 66 IN 59838

TYPIC LIRING

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON IN MEETING 19 JULY WITH CARLOS JURADO OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CAME FROM LIRING-1 WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY FROM HAVANA 15 JULY.

2. SITUATION IN VIETNAM GRAVE BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOING TO EXECUTE U.S. AIRMEN RECENTLY CAPTURED.

3. ROWTON ELICITED THIS STATEMENT FROM JURADO AFTER JURADO TOLD HIM LIRING-1 HAD BROUGHT JURADO MESSAGE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO RECENTLY WAS REPLACED AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS. MESSAGE TO JURADO FROM RODRIGUEZ VIA LIRING-1 WAS TO EFFECT HE REPLACED AND AWAITING REASSIGNMENT BUT EFFECT OF REPLACEMENT NOT SERIOUS. JURADO TOLD ROWTON LIRING-1 HAD SAID THERE MUCH REORGANIZATION GOING ON IN CUBA NOW BUT IT NOT SERIOUS; HOWEVER, LIRING-1 SAID SITUATION IN VIETNAM WAS SERIOUS BECAUSE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE GOING SHOOT AMERICAN AIRMEN AND AS A CONSEQUENCE THIS WOULD ESCALATE WAR THERE.

4. ROWTON HAS SCHEDULED MEET WITH JURADO EVENING 20 JULY. WILL ATTEMPT LEARN MORE DETAILS AND ESTABLISH EXACT SOUR

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE [illegible] MEXICO CITY 7971 S E C R E T

2

[illegible]-1 KNOWLEDGE [illegible] MATTER.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE C TOTAL COPIES 11

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ACTION DC/WH/C 5

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 2, C/CI

S E C R E T 142332Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7920 15 JUL 65 IN 56860

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REF DIRECTOR 19940

1. NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR HAS BEEN ASKED SEVERAL TIMES BY WALLACE B. ROWTON IF HE HAS HEARD ANY MORE OF RODRIGUEZ' TRAVEL PLANS BUT HE ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

2. RENTAL OF APARTMENT WHICH STATION HOPES HOUSE RODRIGUEZ WHILE HE HERE EXPECTED BE COMPLETED THIS WEEK. JUARDO HAS RECEIVED AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM LANDLADY AND HAS MONEY AND FIADOR AVAILABLE. OCCUPANTS SUPPOSED BE OUT OF APARTMENT 15 JULY. WILL ADVISE.

3. CHECKING NUMBER TEST LETTERS NOW IN BOX. WILL SERVICE AS REQUESTED.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

ORIG: C.W. ANDERSON/pap
UNIT: WH/C/CA/PA
EXT: 2975
DATE: 14 JULY 1966

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: [illegible] RID COPY

FILE: [illegible]

SECRET

14 18 09 Z CITE DIRECTOR 19940

TO MEXICO CITY

KAPOK TYPIC AMROD LIEMPTY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 7868 (IN 54246)

B. MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

MEXI 7920
15 July 66

1. REF A SUGGESTS RETURN OF ABREU MAY PRODUCE MOVEMENT IN AMROD OP.

2. PLS CONTINUE TWO TEST LETTERS PER WEEK TO MIGUEL SCHULTZ AND SERVICE ALL BOXES 5-8 AUGUST IN USUAL MANNER.

3. ABOUT HOW MANY TEST LETTERS ARE NOW STACKED UP AT SCHULTZ?

4. MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR CONTINUING REPORTS ON LIFEAT/LIENVOY REFERENCES TO LICLOVE-2. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY WINDOW INTO OVERALL AMROD OP STATUS AND EFFECTIVENESS AND INFO CONTAINED IS OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO HANDLING OTHER ASPECTS THIS OP AND RELATED OPS.

5. ANY INDICATION REF B INSPECTION OF LIRING IS STILL SCHEDULED?

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA/PA

C/WH/C/CA

WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

EARL WILLIAMSON
AC/WH/C
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TOTAL COPIES: 15

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ROUTING 79 83 01

IG: SEARS:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 8 MAY 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 76 PER #

INDEX · NO INDEX · RETURN TO BRANCH · FILE RID · FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: WH 8 INFO: FILE, VR, MI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI 2

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 08 20 06z May 69

CITE DIRECTOR 00136

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 52298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER · COORDINATING OFFICERS · AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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358

S E C R E T 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 8125 8 MAY 1969

8 MAY 69 IN 53298

DIRECTOR

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 9832 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68 818842

1. FATHER (LIRING-4) DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

S E C R E T

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798301

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INFO FILE VR. Riley, cilops, cilsa

SECRET 121716Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 Jul 68 IN 49231

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SICE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

SECRET

BT

15 JUL 1968

SECRET

14-00000

798301

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 18

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CONF: WH 8 [ ] RID COPY

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818642 FILE, VR, RI/AN, C/ILPS, C/OA, CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

11 22 06 z JUL 68

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. [798301]

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 [818642] SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

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INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO ______ BRANCH FILE RID

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INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

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CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 250185Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5598 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9082 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 (798301) AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 (818842) SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

SECRET

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ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO:

FILE. VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 S E C R E T

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CA 5, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 162103Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5540 (IN 08570)

798301

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

File

17 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

- 798301

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S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5543 10 May 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384) 818842

1. MANUELH (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MINUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. (798301) STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

13 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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ACTION WH 8 [X] RID COPY

INFO. FILE. VR. CI/OPS, CI/IA, FI

S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 APR 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED

798301 918442

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5205 S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 15

ROUTING 79 83 01

SECRET

TO: SEARS:mamd
UNIT: WH/COG/OPS
EXT: 1255
DATE: 8 MAY 69

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION 76 PER

INDEX / NO INDEX / RETURN TO BRANCH / FILE RID
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DISSEM: WH 8 INFO FILE, VR, M/AN, C/OPS, C/CA, FI 2

SECRET 08 20 06z MAY 69 CITE DIRECTOR 00136

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING-4

REF: MEXICO CITY-0125 (IN 53298)

1. VIEW PBRUMEN APPARENT SUSPICIONS OF LIRING-3, PREFER ROWTON NOT LEVY ANY REQUIREMENTS ON LIRING-4 OR OFFER ANY AID. HOWEVER, SHOULD OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF OR ELICIT DEVELOP AFTER TRIP, WOULD WELCOME SAME.

2. FILE 201-798301, 201-818842.

END OF MESSAGE

9 MAY 1969

DC/WH/COG

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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FILE VR. RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI2, FI/D4

358

SECRET 080031Z MAY 69 CITE MEXICO CITY 0125 8 MAY 1969

DIRECTOR 8 MAY 69 IN 53298

TYPIC LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 5830 (IN 34397)

B. MEXICO CITY 4543, 16 FEB 68 818442

1. FATHER LIRING-4 DIED 21 APRIL. LIRING-4 FEELING VERY BAD ABOUT FACT SHE DID NOT SEE FATHER BEFORE DEATH HAS NOW APPLIED FOR VISA TO VISIT HER MOTHER IN CUBA. IF VISA GRANTED PLANS STAY ONLY ONE OR TWO WEEKS.

798301

2. ROWTON HAS KEPT AWAY FROM LIRING-4 SINCE LIRING-3 RELEASED FROM JAIL IN GUATEMALA AND LIRING-3 HAS TOLD HER HE OUT OF CLANDESTINE BUSINESS. IF HQS SO DESIRES HOWEVER ROWTON COULD TRY RENEW CONTACT WITH HER TO SEE IF SHE WILLING ASSESS SOME HER "FRIENDS" LISTED IN PARA 1A THROUGH 1F OF REF B OR AT LEAST COLLECT UP TO DATE BIO INFO ON THEM. (STATION HAS SUBJECT PARA 1C REF B PARTICULARLY IN MIND.) THIS IN RETURN FOR FINANCIAL HELP IN MAKING TRIP. PLS ADVISE.

3. FILE 201-798301.

SECRET

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14-00000

798301

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ACTION

(131) WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, RI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/OA

S E C R E T 121715Z JUL 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 9242

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 JUL 68 IN 48331

REF A. SCWASHINGTON 94613

B. DIRECTOR 15576

STATION APPRECIATES MEXICO CITY STATION OPERATIONAL PROBLEM WITH LIRING/4. HOWEVER, SINCE ACTION SUGGESTED REF A MIGHT RESULT IN LIRING/3 CASE BEING WORKED OUT WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL INTERVENTION, BELIEVE REASONABLE THIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PASS PRIOR LIRING/4 TAKING ANY ACTION.

S E C R E T

BT

15 JUL 1968

SECRET

14-00000

798301

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 16

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CONF: WH 8 [ ] RID COPY

INFO: xref 50-9-11 201-818842 FILE, VR, CI/AN, CI/PS, CI/OA, CI, CI/IC 2

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pico)

SECRET 11 22 06z Jul 68 CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY INFO GUATEMALA CITY

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 6223 (IN 47056)*

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9236 (IN 47690)**

12 JUL 1968

1. HQS FILES INDICATE ARTURO SERRANO IN 1966 WAS DIRECTOR PCM PUBLISHING HOUSE FONDO DE CULTURA IN MEXICO CITY, BUT THERE NO DETAILS RE HIS CONTACTS WITH THIRD COUNTRY EXILES OR OFFICIALS. WE THEREFORE UNABLE COMMENT ON VALIDITY HIS CLAIM TO ASSIST LIRING/3. [798301]

2. CONCUR GUATEMALA CITY COMMENT REF B. FEEL LIRING/4 [818842] SHOULD CONTINUE PRESS SERRANO FOR MORE DETAILS HIS CHANNEL TO AND IDENTITY OF GUATEMALAN OFFICIALS INVOLVED. BELIEVE LIRING/4 AND STATION WILL THEN BE IN BETTER POSITION TO ASSESS VALIDITY SERRANO CLAIM. SUGGEST LIRING/4 ALSO CHECK SERRANO STORY WITH LEFTIST CIRCLE OF FRIENDS TO ATTEMPT VERIFY IT AND EXPLORE POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FUNDS IF FEASIBLE. STATION

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1	5
2	6
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4	8

ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : [illegible]
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/CA

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 12 20 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR 59022

TO MEXICO CITY

JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

COVER

REF: A. MEXI CITY 9508 (IN 53817)
B. JMWAVE 4498 (IN 54946)*

1. NO HQS TRACES ADDITIONAL TO REF B. FURTHER DETAILS UMGA-17, 11 SEPT 59: ON 1 SEPT 59 [illegible] DIAZ, FORMER SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN AIR FORCE AND THEN SENIOR PILOT FOR CUBAN MAPPING INSTITUTE (ICCC), ANGEL ROS, ICCC CO-PILOT, AND ISRAEL SUAREZ ARRIVED MIAMI CONNECTION ALTERATION AT-11 AIRCRAFT TO ACCOMMODATE PHOTO EQUIPMENT. SUAREZ REPRESENTED BY DIAZ AND HIMSELF BE HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL PERSON CASTRO GOVERNMENT, AND WAS OBVIOUSLY SENIOR PERSON IN GROUP AND CLEARLY ONE GIVING ORDERS. SUAREZ SAID AT ONE TIME DURING REVOLUTION HE WAS CO-ORDINATOR OF THE SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY FRONTS. SUAREZ INVITED SOURCE QDALUM TO VISIT HIM HAVANA AND GAVE QDALUM KEY TO APARTMENT 65, CORNER CALLE D AND 23RD. SUAREZ TOLD QDALUM THAT SUAREZ CODE NAME WAS "[illegible]DIA" AND USE THIS NAME WOULD RESOLVE ANY QDALUM PROBLEMS CUBA. TRACES ROS AND DIAZ INDICATE BOTH LEFT CUBA 1960 FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

(CONTINUED)

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UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 8 December 1966

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CITE DIRECTOR 59022

PAGE 2

798301

2. GIVEN CUBAN SECURITY INTEREST LIRING-3 AS RESULT JULIAN LOPEZ DIAZ CASE AND NOTING COINCIDENTAL APPEARANCE ON SCENE OF PERSON OF SUAREZ BACKGROUND, NOT OUT OF QUESTION SUAREZ AMONG OTHER THINGS SENT TO CHECK LIRING-3 "BUSINESSMAN CONTACT", I.E. BOWTON. WHILE NOT WISHING BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS, DOES SEEM ADVISABLE SUGGEST COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE NEXT FEW BOWTON-LIRING-3 MEETINGS. ALSO, REQUEST CABLE FULL LIENVOY TAKE RE SUAREZ PURCHASE TWELVE TONS OF "SOMETHING" AND FURTHER INFO ON SUAREZ AS DEVELOPED.

END OF MESSAGE

*Requested traces Ismael SUAREZ De La Paz
poss iden Ismael ECHEVERRIA

WH/COG/RR/OS [signature]
WH/COG/CICS [signature]
WH/COG/MO [signature]
WH/COG/FI [signature]
WH/COG/CA [signature]

[signature]
Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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UNIT   TIME   BY

INFO FILE VR, WH 8, F/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/CA, ...

S E C R E T 061722Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9523

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

6 DEC 66 IN 53817

TYPIC LIRING   9 DEC 1966

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. RIWTON 21 NOV 66 HE HAD MET IN CUBAN EMBASSY INDIVIDUAL FROM HAVANA WHO TOLD HIM HE TRAVELING UNDER ASSUMED NAME. L-3 REPORTED INDIVIDUAL TOLD HIM HE MEXICO TO BUY COFFEE SEEDS ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

2. L-3 STATED HE BELIEVED MAN'S NAME TO BE ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. CHECK OF CUBAN MANIFESS OCT AND NOV 66 SHOWS NO ARRIVAL OF ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA BUT ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ARRIVED 23 OCT 66. RECENT LIENVOY SHOWS SUAREZ INTERESTED IN COFFEE MATTERS.

3. ON 28 NOV SUAREZ PHONED COMMERCIAL OFFICE IN EMB AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WANTED TALK TO HUGO DEL PINO ABOUT A MEETING IN MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF COFFEE AND WHEN TOLD HUGO NOT IN HE ASKED IF ROLANDO (CURBELO) COULD GO WITH HIM TO AN INTERVIEW AT INSTITUTE. HE SAID IT VERY IMPORTAANT TO THEM AND THEY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN THE PROBLEM. HE ASKED HER TO TELL HUGO HE WAS GOING TO INSTITUTE AND THAT HUGO WAS TO COME TOO. THREE MINUTES LATER MAN CALLED SAME PHONE AND TOLD SECRETARY HE WAS NOW AT INSTITUTE AND THAT HE WAS AWAITING HUGO.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 9508 S E C R E T

JUST AFTER THIS CALL HUGO DEL PINO CALLED SAME OFFICE AND SECRETARY TOLD HIM ECHEMENDIA IS AT INSTITUTE AND IS AWAITING HIM. HUGO SAID HE WOULD GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.

4. NO STA TRACES ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ OR ISMAEL ECHEMENDIA. L-3 STATED INDIVIDUAL APPEARED WELL DRESSED, INTELLIGENT AND DEVOTED FIDELISTA. LATEST LIENVOY INDICATES HE HAS BOUGHT TWELVE TONS OF SOMETHING BUT ITS IDENTITY NOT MENTIONED.

5. TRACES REQUESTED.

6. HQS PLS INDEX NAMES PARA FOUR.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE A TOTAL COPIES 33

SECRET

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INFO FILE, VR, WH/C8, CI/AN, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INTR, SOD6

14 DEC 1966

S E C R E T 142020Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9633

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 9560 (IN 55841)

14 DEC 66 IN 58952

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-3 BY WALLACE B. ROWTON PRODUCED ADDITIONAL INFO RE LIRING-3 IMPENDING TRIP GUAT MEET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS.

2. PHONE NO. AGUSTINE HERNANDEZ IS GUAT CITY 20 057. JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA GAVE LIRING-3 THIS NO. WHICH USED FIRST CONTACT WITH AGUSTINA. AFTER LIRING-3 RETURN FROM MEXI BORDER, JACOBO TOLD LIRING-3 NOT ASK FOR AGUSTINA THAT NUMBER BUT FOR JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. JACOBO TOLD L-3 AGUSTINA WORKED AT PIEDRO SANTO PRINTING OFFICE, BUT COULD BE REACHED FRANCO NUMBER WHEN NOT AT WORK.

3. NO MEXI STA TRACES AGUSTINA. HMM 4343, 26 JUN 59 REPORTS JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO ATTENDED MEETING PGT 29 MAY 59 AT MANUEL MARIA CONTRERAS NO. 43-J, MEXI CITY. SEVENTY PERSONS ATTENDED MEETING. LIESCORT ON 29 JAN 59 REPORTED JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO, PAINTER, WAS NEW APPLICANT FOR PGT MEMBERSHIP.

4. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE WOULD LEAVE 15 DEC 66 ORDER ARRIVE HUEHUETENANGO TIME BE IN PLACE 18 DEC PER INSTRUCTIONS AGUSTINA.

14-00000

CITY OF MEETING GIVEN REF WAS ERROR. SHOULD READ HUEHUETENANGO, GUAT, NOT QUEZALTENANGO. WILL CARRY LETTER FROM JACOBO TO CESAR MONTEZ EXPLAINING LATTER THAT LIRING-3 LIKE BROTHER TO JACOBO AND ASKING MONTEZ PROVIDE ALL ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE.

5. L-3 GAVE ROWTON COPY LETTER HE SENT ARNOLD RODRIGUEZ CAMPS AFTER HE RETURNED FROM LAST FRUSTRATING TRIP CUBA. IN LETTER L-3 EXPLAINED HE REALIZED HE MADE MISTAKE DESCRIBING HIS PLAN AND TOLD ARNOLD TO RELAY TO OSMANI HE HAD NO INTENTION MAKING HIS COMMERCIAL CONTACT WITTING ANY ARMS PASSED THROUGH CHANNEL. ALSO TOLD ARNOLD HE PLANNING TRIP CENTRAL AMERICA SOON TO CONTACT AND ACCESS BUSINESS CONTACTS. ALSO RELAYED WHAT ROWTON LEARNED RE PRICES OF WEED KILLER MEXI AND ASKED FOR SPECIFICATIONS AND QUANTITIES DESIRED. ALSO STATED WAS SOMEWHAT DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL AT WAY REYNALDO CEPEDA AND DSE TREATED HIM.

6. NEXT L-3 ROWTON MEETING 14 DEC 66.

7. HQS PLS INDEX AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ, JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO AND CESAR MONTEZ TO MEXI STA FILE P-12,729. * REF R/BAT.

S E C R E T

BT

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 22

ORIG: J. Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 6 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 50-6-134/1

SECRET

ROUTING: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/COG 8, CI/OA

SECRET 6 21 54 Z CITE DIRECTOR 57519

TO [illegible]

MEXICO CITY

[illegible] LIRING-3

VIEW [illegible] SUBSTANTIAL LIRING-3 (798301) MONTHLY EXPENDITURES (ABOUT $2,200 FOR SEPT-OCT), SUGGEST STATION INCLUDE THIS AGENT UNDER LIRAVINE PROJECT WHICH UP FOR RENEWAL 31 DEC. PLEASE ADVISE.

File
7 DEC 1966

END OF MESSAGE

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 6 TOTAL COPIES 46

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SECRET 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9439

30 Nov 66 IN 49724

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

8 DEC 1966

INTEL TYPIC

798301

1. ON 21 NOVEMBER LIRING-3 REPORTED ONE FUNDORA OR FUNDIDOR (FNU AND MATRONYMIC UNKNOWN), WHO IS OFFICIAL IN HAVANA IN CHARGE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, STATED IN MID-NOVEMBER THAT CUBAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS WERE HANGING BY A THREAD. ACCORDING L-3 THIS PERSON PERFORMS LIAISON WITH ALL FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES. DEFER ANY DISSEM HQS IN VIEW LACK DETAIL AND IDENTITY CUBAN OFFICIAL.

2. AMBASSADOR ONLY INFORMED OF CUBAN'S STATEMENT.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

EXT: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

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ACTION: WH/C-8

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH-8, DO-4, DO/H-3, C.I., CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT-2, CI/IC,

SECRET 260055Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8977

26 OCT 66 IN 25352

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

20 OCT 1966

REF: MEXICO CITY 8944 (IN 23093)

798301

1. LIRING-3 REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 24 OCT 66 THAT LIRING-4 PASSED MESSAGE TO HIM MORNING 23 OCT THAT REYNALDO (CEPEDA) HERNANDEZ, FIRST SECRETARY CUBAN EMBASSY AND IDENTIFIED DGI OFFICER, WISHED SEE HIM SAME DAY. LIRING-3 MET CEPEDA SAME MORNING IN EMBASSY RECEPTION ROOM. MEETING LASTED ABOUT 30 MINUTES.

2. CEPEDA MADE IMMEDIATE REFERENCE RECENT CONVERSATION LIRING 3 AND LIRING-2 MENTIONED REF. LIRING-3 FEELING SHOULD PLAY IT CLOSE TO CHEST REPLIED HE HAD TALKED WITH LIRING-2 AND WAS PLANNING TRIP HAVANA EARLY NOVEMBER FOR CERTAIN DISCUSSIONS. CEPEDA REPLIED HE WAS AWARE OF EVERYTHING AND HAD CALLED LIRING-3 TO STATE HE VERY INTERESTED WHOLE AFFAIR AND WANTED WORK CLOSELY WITH LIRING-3 IN FUTURE. CEPEDA SAID HE PLANNING GO HAVANA 12 NOV 66 AND SUGGESTED THEY BOTH GO TOGETHER ORDER KEEP CLOSE CONTACT DURING DISCUSSIONS.

3. LIRING-3 REPLIED HE WOULD TRY REVISE PLANS TO ARRANGE TRIP COINCIDE THAT OF CEPEDA.

4. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 THIS CLEVER PLAN OF CEPDA INSINUATE

SECRET

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HIMSELF IN MATTER NOT CONCERNING HIM DIRECTLY. ROWTON EMPHASIZED IT ESSENTIAL LIRING-3 CONSULT HAVANA CONTACTS PRIOR ANY INVOLVEMENT LOCAL PERSONNEL LIKE CEPEDA WHO MIGHT WISH INFILTRATE INTO LIRING-3 AFFAIRS THROUGH CURIOSITY OR AS CUBAN INTEL OR SECURITY DESIRING MONITOR HIS ACTIVITIES.

5. LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD AGAIN SEEN LIRING-2 MORNING 24 OCT AND QUESTIONED HIM RE CONTACTS HE WOULD BE EXPECTED MAKE IN HAVANA DURING TRIP. LIRING-2 REPLIED OSMANI CIENFUEGOS WOULD CERTAINLY BE ONE OF PRINCIPAL CONTACTS.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 CABLE FRIEND ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMP FOR VISA. HE EXPECTS RECEIVE IT BY 28 OCT. LIRING-3 WILL THEN PURCHASE TICKET FOR FLIGHT SCHEDULED 31 OCT. HE WILL THEN TELL OR GET WORD CEPEDA HE LEAVING EARLIER THAN EXPECTED. ONLY FACTOR MIGHT ALTER THIS PLAN IS INSTRUCTIONS FROM LIRING-2 DELAY DEPARTURE TO COINCIDE WITH THAT CEPEDA.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, DO 4, DO/H 2, CA 2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 OCT 66 IN 23093

S E C R E T 220016Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8944

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 39039

25 OCT 1966

1. LIRING-2 CALLED (LIRING-3) [798301] TO EMBASSY 19 OCT. DURING MEETING L-2:

A. THANKED L-3 FOR HIS COOPERATION DURING LOPEZ AFFAIR AND COMPLIMENTED HIM ON ACCURACY HIS INFO.

B. SAID HAD GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO L-3 SUGGESTIONS AND CRITICISMS AND ADDED QUOTE WE WOULD LIKE YOU ASSIST US FURTHER IN SPECIFIC PROJECTS HERE IN MEXICO UNQUOTE.

2. PER PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES FROM ROWTON L-3 TOLD L-2 WOULD BE GLAD HELP REVOLUTION PROVIDED:

A. PROJECTS ASSIGNED HIM BE OF IMPORTANCE TO REVOLUTION

B. EMBASSY PERSONNEL NOT BE INVOLVED IN THEM FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

3. L-3 REACTION TO L-2 VERY FAVORABLE COMPLIMENTED HIM ON SERIOUS APPROACH SAID HAD ANTICIPATED L-3'S CONDITIONS AND FELT L-3 SHOULD GO HAVANA TO DISCUSS PROJECTS DIRECTLY WITH RESPONSIBLE PERSONS RATHER THAN WORK THROUGH EMBASSY. L-2 DID NOT THINK IT WISE

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

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INFO

FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA, FI, DO4, DO/H3 CA2, CA/PEG, FI/INT

22 Oct 66 IN 23093

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SECRET

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PRESS FOR DETAILS. L-2 SAID AMBASSADOR IN FULL AGREEMENT AND HOPED L-3 WOULD BE ABLE TRAVEL WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS.

4. ROWTON ENCOURAGED L-3 PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR TRIP AND PROMISED PROVIDE MAXIMUM SUPPORT. L-3 STATED WOULD NOT MENTION ROWTON (AS GREEK FRIEND) TO CUBANS BUT WOULD COUNT COMPLETELY ON LATTER'S ADVICE AND GUIDANCE IN ALL ACTIONS. AGREED WITH ROWTON HE SHOULD NOT APPEAR NEED FUNDS TO MAKE TRIP SINCE WANTED CONTINUE HAVE FREE HAND IN PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS. WOULD EXPECT CUBANS FINANCE HIS ACTIVITIES ONCE BEGINS WORKING FOR THEM. FINANCES NOT MENTIONED IN MEETING WITH L-2.

5. L-3 FEELS CUBA NEEDS COMMERCIAL CONTACTS WITH WEST. SINCE ROWTON DOES NOT APPEAR AGAINST REVOLUTION AND WANTS DEVELOP TRADE WITH CUBA, L-3 WILLING WORK FOR HIM. AGREES WITH ROWTON THAT TO TRADE WITH CUBA, MUST HAVE GOOD INSIGHT IN WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, POLITICALLY AS WELL AS ECONOMICALLY. AT SAME TIME L-3 BELIEVES CUBANS OPERATING IN MEXICO WITH POOR SECURITY AND FEELS THAT WITH ROWTON'S ASSISTANCE COULD DO BETTER JOB AND SERVE BOTH ROWTON AND REVOLUTION. HIS CONDUCT WITH CUBANS THEREFORE IS NATURAL AND HIS CLANDESTINITY WITH ROWTON JUSTIFIED IN HIS EYES ON GROUNDS IT NECESSARY FOR OWN WELFARE.

SECRET

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6. DIRECT WOFACT APPROACH AT THIS TIME WOULD DEFINITELY SHOCK L-3 WHO STILL HAS STRONG ANTI WOLADY FEELINGS AND COMPROMISE OP. DEGREE OF L-3'S ASSOCIATION WITH ROWTON SUFFICIENT COMPROMISE HIM WITH CUBANS AND LEFTISTS SHOULD IT COME TO LIGHT. OTHER CONTROL ELEMENTS ARE TRUE NAME RECEIPTS AND TAPES MADE IN ROWTON'S SAFE HOUSE OF L-3 AMOROUS SESSIONS WITH YOUNG ART STUDENT. IN VIEW OF ABOVE BELIEVE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF L-3 SHOULD CONTINUE ON CURRENT BASIS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH ROWTON AS NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY FORMAL RECRUITMENT AT THIS TIME.

7. STATION AWARE CUBANS MAY WANT GET L-3 TO CUBA TO QUESTION HIM ABOUT "SOURCES" FROM WHOM OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ. INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITIES GIVE L-3 NAME OF STATION CENTRAL AMERICAN LEFTIST ASSET OR EVEN D.F.S. CONTACT (WITHOUT IDENTIFYING THEM AS ASSET OR CONTACT). L-3 WOULD EXPLAIN THAT INFO FROM THESE SOURCES, WHOM HE DOES NOT KNOW, WAS TRANSMITTED TO HIM VIA LOCAL FOREIGN LEFTIST WITH WHOM HE HAS REGULAR CONTACT PLAN BUT WHOSE ADDRESS OR REAL NAME HE DOES NOT KNOW.

8. STATION NOT AWARE YET OF TIMING ON CUBA TRAVEL, BUT TENTATIVELY VIEWS WITH FAVOR PENDING RECEIPT AND STUDY ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND DATA ON LIRING-3 FROM ROWTON. AWARE FACT

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PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 3944 S E C R E T SECRET

STATION HAS NO INDEPENDENT CHECKS THIS AGENT BEYOND EVIDENCE OF ENTRY TO EMBASSY FURNISHEED BY LIONION. HAVE ONLY HIS WORD ON CLAIMED ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS. HOWEVER, SO FAR TEND DOUBT HE CUBAN PLANT, BUT EVEN IF SHOULD BE, STATION INCURRING NO ADDITIONAL RISK BY FALLING IN WITH TRIP, SINCE WILL PROVIDE HIM ONLY WITH SUITABLE UNCHECKABLE EXPLANATION HOW HE OBTAINED INFO ON LOPEZ.

9. FACT (LIRING-4) DEFINITELY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY LIRING-1 CONFIRMED BY L-3, (LITAINT-2) AND LIENVOY. STATION NOT SURE, HOWEVER, IF SHE PAID BY HAVANA OR BY EMBASSY OUT OF LOCAL FUNDS.

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BT

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO FILE, VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC, ...

S E C R E T 212318Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8938 22 OCT 66 IN 23083

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149)

1. LIRING-2 REPORTED TO ROWTON 19 OCT 66 HE HAD MADE CONTACT WITH CECILIA CARMEN MARQUEZ DE ROSSIE AFTER LATTER ARRIVED ON CUBANA FLIGHT FROM HAVANA 17 OCT 66.

2. LIRING-3 STATED LIRING-4 HAD MET CECILIA AT PLANE BUT THAT LATTER HAD BEEN SO OPEN IN HER DENUCIATION OF CASTRO REGIME THAT LIRING-3 TOLD LIRING-4 BREAK CONTACT FOR FEAR JEOPARDIZING HER POSITION. LIRING-4 NOTED CECILIA WAS CONTACTED AT HOTEL BY CUBAN REFUGEES OF "DOUBTFUL LOYALTY" AND THAT CECILIA, AFTER THESE CONTACTS, WAS SEEN TO HAVE LARGE SUM U.S. DOLLARS IN HER POSSESSION. LIRING-4 REPORTED SHE SAW ONE QUANTITY AMOUNTING TO FIVE HUNDRED.

3. IN VIEW LIRING-3 PRESENT STATUS WITH LIRING-2, LIRING-3 CONFIRMED WITH ROWTON THAT HE SHOULD REPORT FACTS OF CECILIA TO LIRING-2. HE BELIEVES THAT TO WITHHOLD SUCH INFORMATION MIGHT WORK TO HIS DISADVANTAGE WERE IT TO BECOME KNOWN TO CUBAN EMBASSY PERSONNEL.

4. CECILIA REPORTED TO LIRING-4 THAT CUBANS HAD BUMPED HER OFF PLANE 9 OCT 66 ON PRETEXT THERE NO ROOM. DID NOT ARREST OR QUESTION

SECRET

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8938 S E C R E T SECRET

HER AND LATER ALLOWED HER AND CHILDREN LEAVE ON 17 OCT. SHE REMAINED IN HAVANA HOTEL DURING INTERIM.

5. CECILIA PROFESSES HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HER FORMER HUSBAND, HOWEVER, MEXICO CITY NEWSPAPER EL UNIVERSAL, 11 OCT 66, CARRIES STORY DATELINED RIO DE JANEIRO, 10 OCT 66 IN WHICH RAMON ROSSIE, NAMED IN PAPER AS RAMON RODRIGUEZ, DENOUNCES CASTRO REGIME AND STATES HE GOING MAKE HOME IN RIO. LIRING-3 GAVE EL UNIVERSAL CLIPPING OF STORY TO ROWION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 13 TOTAL COPIES 37

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INFO FILE VR, WH 8, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, CA 2, CA/PROP, DO 4, DO/H3, CI/PS

S E C R E T 021632Z CITE MEXICO CITY 6699

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

4 OCT 1966

2 Oct 66 IN 07879

TYPIC LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 6692 (IN 07422)*

1. LIRING/3 HAS RECEIVED REQUEST FROM JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS FOR MEETING AND MEETING SCHEDULED NIGHT OF 2 OCTOBER 1966 IN CUBAN EMBASSY. NO DOUBT BUT THAT HERNANDEZ REQUEST FOR MEETING RESULT OF LIRING/3 CONFRONTATION OF JULIAN LOPEZ MENTIONED REF.

2. LIRING/3 PREPARED GIVE HERNANDEZ SAME STORY HE GAVE LOPEZ BUT WITH TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED:

A. ACCORDING TO LIRING/3 FRIENDS, WHICH HE INSTRUCTED NOT TO IDENTIFY, ARRESTS CAME AS RESULT LOPEZ BABBLINGS AT DRINKING PARTY TO EFFECT CUBANS SUPPORTING REVOLUTION IN GUATEMALA AND HE AT HEAD OF EFFORT IN MEXICO. AS RESULT THIS DISCLOSURE MEXICAN POLICE HEARD OF BRAG AND BEGAN FOLLOWING LOPEZ AT LEAST TWO WEEKS BEFORE ARRESTS MADE.

B. LOPEZ FOOL FOR TAKING ACTIVE PART IN REVOLUTIONARY SUPPORT AND SHOULD HAVE PROTECTED HIMSELF AND CUBANS BY USING SUCH PEOPLE AS LIRING/3 AND OTHER MEXICANS OR CENTRAL AMERICANS. HOPE BY THIS MEANS ELEVATE VALUE OF LIRING/3 TO CUBAN EMBASSY AND ITS ILLEGAL/CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

SECRET

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 8699 S E C R E T SECRET

3. ALSO PLANNING HAVE LIRING/3 RETURN TO HERNANDEZ 3 OCTOBER WITH STORY FACTS OF LOPEZ ARREST ABOUT TO BREAK IN PRESS AND THIS MAY ENDANGER IRINA TRAPOTE DE LOPEZ AND HER FATHER VICTOR TRAPOTE. US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT SCHEDULED BREAK STORY IN MEXICO 4 OCTOBER 1966 ISSUE. WARNING TO HERNANDEZ COULD BE STAGED SO LATE THERE NO CHANCE GETTING IRINA AND VICTOR ON CUBANA FLIGHT WHICH SCHEDULED 3 OCTOBER.

S E C R E T

BT # Julian Lopez Diaz Released by Mexican Police 28 Sept.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: MARVIN FRANCIS
UNIT: WH/C/FI/TC
EXT: 2625
DATE: 19 OCTOBER 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
X FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-800004

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FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH/C8 RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 20 18 27 Z CITE DIRECTOR

TO: MEXICO CITY INFO: RIO DE JANEIRO, CARACAS, JMWAVE 45103

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: MEXICO CITY 8889 (IN 20149) (BEING SENT RIO DE JANEIRO)

FOR MEXICO CITY: PLEASE ATTEMPT ELICIT FROM LIRING/3 (798301) INFORMATION CONCERNING AMPOP/1'S WIFE AND FAMILY WHO ARE SUBJECTS OF REFERENCE. PARTICULARLY INTERESTED WIFE'S FUTURE PLANS; HER TREATMENT WHILE CUBA; AND REACTION AMPOP/1 EMPLOYERS TO HIS DEFECTION AND DESERTION HIS FAMILY.

END OF MESSAGE

24 OCT 1966

C/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/CI

C/WH/C/MO

WH/1

WH/3/V

WH/5

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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S E C R E T 181930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8859

CARACAS INFO JMWAVE, DIRECTOR

PERUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 8824 (IN 16737) 19830 18 OCT 65 IN 20149

LIFIRES REPORTED ARRIVAL MEXICO FROM HAVANA ON 17 OCT OF ISABLE (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ, VEN PPT M38861, CARMEN (MARQUEZ) DE (ROSSIE), VEN PPT M38860 AND MIGUEL (ROSSIE) MARQUEZ VEN PPT M38862. LOCAL ADDRESS GIVEN WAS HOME OF LIRING-3.

SECRET

BT

19 OCT 1965

File

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE TO
SECRET

CICS

SP 66

RID COPY

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 39039

MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC LIRING

REFS: A) MEXICO CITY [illegible]

B) MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725)

79831

FROM HQS READING OF THIS OP, APPEARS THAT LIRING RELATIONSHIP MAY BE NEARING POINT OF POSITIVE RECRUITMENT. REQUEST CURRENT STATION READING OF OPERATION AND UPDATED ASSESSMENT LIRINGS INCLUDING POSSIBLE PLANS FOR RECRUITMENT OF EACH. HAS STATION BEEN ABLE [illegible] TECHNICAL OR OTHER SURVEILLANCE [illegible] HAS [illegible] BEEN ABLE VERIFY [illegible] EMPLOYMENT [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CICS
C/WH/C/FI T. Hazlett
WH/C/FI/[illegible]
C/WH/C/CA
[illegible]

14-00000

Mr Tally:

No Record of LIRING/1, /2 + /4 as of this A.M.

Bert
28 Sep 66

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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S E C R E T 272215Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8551

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

27 Sep 66 04697

TYPIC LIRING

File

28 SEP 1966

78301

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 26 SEPT THAT LIRING-4 NOW OFFICIALLY EMPLOYED AS SECRETARY TO LIRING-1. (Cuban Ambassador / or Consul) ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 LIRING-1 AND LIRING-2 WILL GO HOME PCS IN DECEMBER.

2. NEW CONSUL WHO WILL REPLACE LIRING-1 IS EMPLOYEE WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO EMBASSY TWO YEARS AGO. LIRING-3 COULD NOT REMEMBER HIS NAME BUT WILL QUERY LIRING-4 AND OBTAIN.

3. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE HAD BEEN ASKED ABOUT CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AT EMBASSY BY ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON LAST TRIP TO HAVNA. LIRING-3 SAID HE REPLIED THERE WAS NONE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY LIRING-3 CARRIED LETTER TO JULIAN LOPEZ, CULTURAL ATTACHE, AND AFTER LOPEZ READ IT HE APPEARED COOL TOWARD LIRING-3. MORE RECENTLY LOPEZ APPEARED WARM UP AGAIN WITH LIRING-3 AND NOW HAD ASKED LIRING-3 DIRECT CUBAN ART ACTIVITIES MEXICO, PARTICULARLY PLASTIC ARTS. LIRING-3 ACCEPTED. LIRING-3 TAGS LOPEZ AS CUIS TYPE.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: J. MOUGHAN;fph
UNIT: WH/C/CA/EW
EXT: 2601
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 66

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-120-58

SECRET

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

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SECRET

15 21 25 3 Z CITE DIRECTOR 35223

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

15 SEP 1966

TYPIC LIRING

798301

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 8487 (IN 91995)

B. DIRECTOR 34711

1. APPRECIATE STATION POSITION BUT IT HQS OPINION THAT ANY BOOST IN PRESTIGE LIRING 3 MIGHT GAIN IS OVERSHADOWED BY WOLADY POLICY AGAINST CHARTERING SHIPS. HQS ATTEMPTING CONFIRM NEED FOR SHIPS THROUGH OTHER SOURCES AND DOES NOT WISH INVOLVE STAM.

2. PLS KEEP HQS INFORMED PARA 1 REF A DEVELOPMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

C/WH/C/CA
C/WH/C/MO
WH/1 Stewart (draft)

WILLIAM V. BROE
for C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
for C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: [illegible]	DATE [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	C NO. [illegible]
	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA.
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: FIRST SECOND THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a [illegible], it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

[illegible] has been made of [illegible] 7234, [illegible] 7441 and [illegible] 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

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(20)

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INSTRUCTION SHEET				DATE 12 SEP 1966	CASE NO. 201-798301
	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
	SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED *(No notice to Division)*		REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / LCFLUTTER REPORT
	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION *(Reason checked below.* or see remarks)*		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES		FILE
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓	TICKLE 14 Nov.
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES	✓	NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / ✓ FINAL
	REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II		OTHER

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

Final

Pls repeat my memo of 23 June 66.

[signature]

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(21)

14-00000

4-65 3010

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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INFO
FILE, VR, WH 8, DO 4, DO/H3, C/DA, C/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 092240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8189 10 AUG 1966

DIRECTOR 201-798301 9 AUG 66 IN 73260

PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 68738)

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON AT 8 AUG MEETING HE PREPARED REVISIT CUBA TO FURTHER DEVELOP CONTACTS FOR ROWTON BUSINES ACTIVITIES. HE PLANS REQUEST VISA 9 AUG DIRECTLY FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ WHO STILL IN FOREIGN MINISTRY THO NO LONGER VICE MINISTER. L-3 EXPECTS SPEEDY SERVICE ON VISA REQUEST ALLOWING HIM TAKE 13 AUG FLIGHT TO PBRUMEN.

2. L-3 VERY ANXIOUS TAKE WIFE (LIRING-4) AND CHILD WITH HIM THIS FLIGHT AND HER VISA APPROVALGN REQUESTED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, EXPECTED ARRIVE IN TIME ACCOMPANY HIM. WIFE AND CHILD WILL FLY ON TO SANTIAGO FOR VISIT WITH HER MOTHER. WILL GIVE L-3 $1,000 U.S., HALF IN MEXICAN PESOS, FINANCE TRIP. L-3 TO STAY HAVANA 13-26 AUG GO SANTIAGO 27 AUG RETURN MEXI 29 AUG. — see MEXI 8126 2 Aug '66.

3. ROWTON CONFIDENT L-3 RELATIONSHIP PROGRESSED TO POINT HE CAN LEVY SPECIFIC POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND EVEN MILITARY REQUIREMENTS ON L-3 WHO WILL DO BEST TO SATISFY. L-3 TOLD ROWTON HE REALIZES NECESSITY KEEPING ROWTON INFORMED IN DETAIL ON CUBAN SITUATION SINCE

SECRET

14-00000

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 8189 S E C R E T SECRET

BUSINESS SO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH AFFAIRS OF COUNTRY. ROWTON HAS ASKED HIM SOUND OUT ALL CONTACTS FOR ANY INDICATION CASTRO NEUTRALIZED OR DOWNGRADED AND IF SO WHO NOW IN POWER. ALSO HAS ASKED TO REPORT ANY INCREASE OR DECREASE IN SOVIET AND CHINESE INFLUENCE. REQUEST OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

4. ROWTON ALSO HAS ASKED L-3 SPOT AND POSSIBLY RECRUIT HAVA RESIDENT TO WORK WITH ROWTON AND L-3 IN BUSINESS VENTURES. INDIVIDUAL WOULD HAVE TO HAVE CAPABILITY FOR TRAVEL MEXICO FREQUENTLY CONSULT WITH ROWTON. L-3 FROM CURRENT KNOWLEDGE FRIENDS INSIDE PROPOSED RENE OCHOA FUNEZ, 30-YEAR-OLD HONDURAN MARRIED TO CUBAN. OCHOA IS DIRECTOR DE LA EDITORA NACIONAL DE EDUCACION DE CUBA WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. HE INTENDS SOUND OUT OCHOA FOR COLLABORATION AND WILL LOOK AT OTHER CENTRAL AMERICANS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES. FOR POSSIBLE INFORMATION ON OCHOA HQS IS REFERRED TO HSSA 04848 30 APRIL 1964.

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MESSAGE FORM
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EXT: 2625
DATE: 3 AUGUST 1966

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CITE DIRECTOR 25094

TO MEXICO CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 8126 (IN 88738)

CARLOS OF REFERENCE IS LIRING/3. PLEASE USE CRYPT IN FUTURE TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

AC/WH/C/FI

C/WH/C/CI

C/WH/1

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

THOMAS J. FLORES
C/WH/C

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO FILE, VR, WHB, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 022227Z CITE MEXICO CITY 8126 AUG 1966 IN 63738

DIRECTOR 788301 3 AUG 1966

TYPIC LIRING

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED TO WALLACE B. ROWTON 1 AUG HE HAD CONTACTED MANOLO GONZALEZ IN VERACRUZ 30 AND 31 JULY. GONZALEZ IS MEXICAN FUNCTIONARY AND LOCAL EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN CONSULATE IN VERACRUZ. HAS RESIDED VERACRUZ PAST 35 YEARS AND HAS WORKED FOR CONSULATE MOST THIS PERIOD.

2. JURADO HAD BEEN SENT VERACRUZ BY ROWTON TO DEVELOP GONZALEZ FOR USE IN ROWTON - JURADO BUSINESS DEALS AND ULTIMATELY FOR INTEL PURPOSES. GONZALEZ AGREED WORK WITH JURADO ON CONDITION HIS COOPERATION REMAIN QUOTE BETWEEN US UNQUOTE SINCE HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING TO HIM IF HAVA LEARNED HE DOING BUSINESS ON SIDE.

3. GONZALEZ TOLD JURADO HE GOING HAVA SOON ON HIS OWN SINCE HE NOT FAMILIAR WITH CITY SINCE REVOLUTION. PLANS FLY CUBANA FROM MEXI CITY 5 AUG AND WILL ARRIVE MEXI CITY DAY BEFORE. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO OFFER HIM FREE OVERNIGHT STAY IN NEW APARTMENT RENTED BY JURADO AND FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON. NO EVIDENCE GONZALEZ HAS YET ASKED FOR VISA.

SECRET

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SECRET

4. VIEW GONZALEZ GENERAL ACCEPTANCE JURADO PITCH, ROWTON WILL PASS 100 DOLLARS U.S. TO GONZALEZ THROUGH JURADO HELP HIM MEET EXPENSES. ROWTON WILL HAVE JURADO PASS GONZALEZ REQUIREMENTS PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE. JURADO TOLD BY ROWTON NOT SURFACE ROWTON TO GONZALEZ. JURADO ALSO PLANNING MAKE SECOND EXPEDITION HAVA FOR ROWTON SOON AND EXPECTS SEE GONZALEZ THERE. WILL TAKE WIFE WITH HIM BUT DELAY BEING ENCOUNTERED OBTAINING VISA FOR HER.

SECRET

S E C R E T

BT

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14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION AND/OR NAME CHECK

DATE: 6 June 1966 jep

TO : Deputy Director Security, IOS
FROM: Chief, CI/Operational Approval and Support Division

PROJECT AND AREA OF ASSIGNMENT: LIRING
WH/1 Mexico City

SUBJECT: 201 -798301

TYPE OF REQUEST: X POA X OA CRC SI

OS INDICES RESULTS BY (Date) 15 June 1966

FBI CHECK RESULTS BY (Date)

JUN 7 1 38 PM '66

USE OF SUBJECT: Informant

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS (Limitations on investigation, cover pretext, etc.)

CS TRACE RESULTS	RI	DIVISION	FIELD
	WILL FWD.	NR	Derog. in Bio

GREEN LIST INITIATED: X YES / NO

ATTACHMENTS: PRQ - PART I / X PARTIAL BIO / OTHER

REMARKS

POA

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

ENDORSEMENT

TO : Chief, CI/OA
DATE 6/30/66

FROM: Deputy Director Security, IOS

☐ 1. OS Indices results: NR SO 798301

JUL 5 2 25 PM '66

☒ 2. Checks were conducted at the indicated Agencies with negative results:

FBI	ONI	ACSI	STATE	PP	CSC	HCUA	OSI	I & N		
X	X	X								

☐ 3. Checks were conducted at the following Agency(ies) with positive results, reports attached ______

☐ 4. Domestic Field Investigation has been completed, ______ reports attached.

☐ 5. Domestic Field Investigation favorable, reports will follow within 60 days.

REMARKS

file 6 July 66

[signature]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR SECURITY, IOS

FORM 3-64 693

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

TO: [illegible]	DATE: [illegible]
	C NO. [illegible]
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: [illegible]

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

☐	PRQ I	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
☐	PRQ II	☐	REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
☐	FIELD TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RI TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
☐	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	☐	REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
☐	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION	☐	REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
☐	GREEN LIST	☐	OTHERS (See Remarks)

NOTICE: ☐ FIRST ☐ SECOND ☐ THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of [illegible] 7454, DIR C7441 and [illegible] 7454.

SECRET

DATE:

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security
(Investigations and Support)

SUBJECT : C#
SO#
201#

FI traces - No Traces

ATTACHMENTS (IF ANY):

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OA

FORM 2413
8-65

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SECRET

INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 23 JUN 1966

CASE NO. 201- 798301

SET UP FOR POA	EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE		EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
SET UP FOR OA	SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK		ORSD	AREA:

USE

ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST GREEN LIST
ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL	REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL	REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I	REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)	REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / FLUTTER REPORT
CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (Reason checked below.* or see remarks)	REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
REQUEST FI TRACES	✓ FILE 201
REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES	✓ TICKLE 23 July
REQUEST FIELD TRACES	NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / FINAL
REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II	ORSD NOTICE TO DIVISION

POA EXPIRED ______________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

In order to qualify subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, II R 07441, and MEXI-7954,

See MEXI 8126 of 2 Aug '66.
ROWTON using subj. as directed agent to recruit + use GONZALEZ.

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 9-65 707 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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(21)

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
WH/1/Zeyeace	3656	DATE 22 June 66

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCWH/1		6/22		
2.				
3.				
4.				
5. CI/OA				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

JUN 23 9 24 AM '66

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

cc to SO
file 23 June 66

SECRET

14-00000

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REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW

	DATE
TO:	C NO.
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT:

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF/D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	PI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (20)

ORIG: Marvin Francis:lq
UNIT: WH/1/3E04
EXT: 6924
DATE: 11 July 1968

MESSAGE FORM
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INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO _____ BRANCH FILE RID
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INFO: FILE , VR

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 15576

TO MEXICO CITY PAGE - 2

SHOULD NOT ADVANCE LIRING/4 ANY FUNDS UNLESS LIRING/4 ABLE SECURELY EXPLAIN THEIR SOURCE.

END OF MESSAGE

INDEX - SERRANO

WH COMMENTS: *LIRING/4 approached by PCM member Arturo SERRANO who claimed he has contact with Guatemalan exile who could arrange bribe through relatives in Guatemala to assist LIRING/3 who imprisoned that country.
**Guatemala City requested more information prior to commenting on feasibility of bribe offer by SERRANO.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

WH/2/G:

COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO:
FILE. VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 250105Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5685

27 MAY 1968

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

25 MAY 68 IN 18245

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5592 (IN 12717)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 9002 (IN 13509)

1. HECTOR RODOLFO (SANDOVAL) ALEGRIA IS GUAT REBEL WHO TOGETHER WITH FRANCISCO (LARA) ENGINEERED LIRING-3 AND FRANCISCO LARA TRIP TO GUATEMALA WHERE NOW INCARCERATED. SANDOVAL SAW LIRING-4 SEVERAL TIMES AFTER LIRING-3 ARREST AT ONE POINT SAYING HE MIGHT HAVE TO HOLD UP BANK TO COME TO LIRING-4 ASSISTANCE. ACCORDING MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINAS, SANDOVAL ARRESTED 5 MAY SHORTLY AFTER HIS WIFE RETURNED FROM TRIP TO GUATEMALA. SANDOVAL WIFE NOW STAYING AT HOUSE OWNED BY MARCUE TOGETHER WITH FAMILY FRANCISCO LARA.

2. IN ATTEMPT COUNTER EVENTUALITY MEXICAN POLICE (ON BASIS INFO PROVIDED BY SANDOVAL) MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR LIRING-4 FOR INTERROGATION, STATION HAS ASKED LIRING-4 GIVE UP BOTH APARTMENTS SHE AND LIRING-3 HAVE BEEN RENTING. LIRING-4 NOW LIVING WITH GIRLFRIEND. BEFORE MOVING SHE RECEIVED VISIT OF MAN WHO DESCRIBED SELF AS LAWYER OF MEXICAN EMBASSY GUATEMALA CITY. LAWYER SAID HE APPOINTED DEFEND LIRING-3. LIRING-4 HAS RECEIVED FIVE SHORT

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INFO:

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5683 S E C R E T

MESSAGES FROM LIRING-3 SMUGGLED FROM JAIL. ONE IN OPEN CODE SUGGESTED S/W BE PASSED TO HIM. STATION NATURALLY WILL DO NO SUCH THING.

S E C R E T

BT

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798301

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INFO FILE VR. WH/COG 8, CA 6, CA/PROP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2

S E C R E T 162108Z MAY 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8996 /16 May 68 IN 12603

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5548 (IN 09570)

798301

LIAISON REPORTS THAT PERSAVAL AND LIRING/3 BEING HELD PAVON PRISON FARM PENDING SENTENCING BY FOURTH JUZGADO DE PRIMERA CNSTANCIA. ONLY CHARGE IS DISTRIBUTING COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. LIAISON SPECULATES THEY WILL RECEIVE LIGHT SENTENCE IF ANY.

S E C R E T

BT

17 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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S E C R E T 102325Z MAY 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5542 10 MAY 68 IN 08570

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 5375 (IN 98384)

1. MANUEL H (MARCUE) PARDINAS INFORMED LIRING-4 8 MAY THAT HIS SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW HAD SUCCEEDED IN OBTAINING GUAT VISA AND TRAVELED GUATEMALA CITY IN AN EFFORT TO SEE CARLOS MIGUEL (PERSAVAL) MARCUE IN JAIL. MARCUE SAID SISTER AND DAUGHTER IN LAW WHO RETURNING WEEK 12 MAY LEARNED PERSAVAL AND LIRING-3 SENTENCED TO MINIMUM TERM OF SIX MONTHS.

2. LIRING-4 CURRENTLY EXPLORING POSSIBILITY TRAVEL GUATEMALA TO TALK TO LIRING-3. STATION IN FAVOR SUCH TRAVEL IF SHE CAN GET VISA AS LIRING-3 CAN BE EXPECTED URGE LIRING-4 GO CUBA DURING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT.

3. CAN GUATEMALA CITY STATION CONFIRM LIRING-3 SENTENCE AND PROVIDE DETAILS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/OPS, C/CA, FI

S E C R E T 151615Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5205 15 Apr 68 IN 91298

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

B. MEXICO CITY 5141 (IN 86263)

16 APR 1968

1. UPON RETURN FROM SHORT VACATION, WALLACE B. ROWTON WAS GIVEN SEALED LETTER FROM LIRING-3 BY LIRING-4. LETTER INDICATED:

A. LIRING-3 DEPARTURE FOR GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS DELAYED WHEN FRANCISCO LARA ACCIDENTALLY SHOT SELF IN ANKLE WHILE CLEANING GUN. LARA ANXIOUS NEWS OF ACCIDENT NOT REACH EARS OF FAR AS FAR MEMBERS FORBIDDEN CARRY WEAPONS IN MEXICO.

B. LIRING-3 DEPARTED 10 APRIL WITH LARA AND OTHER GUAT WHO MEMBER YON SOSA FACTION. LIRING-3 STATED IN LETTER THIS GUAT INSISTENT HE TALK DIRECTLY WITH YON SOSA.

C. LIRING-3 AND LARA WILL PROBABLY VISIT SAN SALVADOR IN ADDITION GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS.

2. PER LIRING-4 OTHER GUAT WHO INTRODUCED TO LIRING-3 BY LARA AND IS PROBABLY RODOLFO SANDOVAL CALLED AT HER APARTMENT 9 APRIL LOOKING FOR LIRING-3 WHO OUT. SANDOVAL STATED HE HAD TO TALK TO LIRING-3 IN PRIVATE AS DID NOT WANT LARA LISTEN TO CONVERSATION. SANDOVAL IDENTIFIED SELF AS MEMBER SOSA FACTION. EXPLAINED THAT

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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐ DESTROY ☐ SIG.

ACTION ☐ RID COPY

INFO

FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5285 S E C R E T

ALTHOUGH SOSA GROUP AND FAR NOW GENERALLY WORKING TOGETHER THERE WERE STILL MANY THINGS "KEPT ON A COMPARTMENTED BASIS." ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 DID NOT REFER TO SANDOVAL IN HIS LETTER TO ROWTON, HE MENTIONED THAT HE HAD "LONG TALK" BEFORE LEAVING.

3. LIRING-3 WILL KEEP ROWTON ABREAST OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS VIA ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS IN MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

S E C R E T

BT

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798301

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DISSEM BY 26 PER

ACTION WH 8 | INFO. FILE: VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI

SECRET 262230Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5141   5 APR 68 IN 86253

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

1. ON 5 APRIL 68 STATION RECEIVED PHOTOGRAPHIC COPIES OF GUATEMALAN PASSPORT WHICH LIRING-3 SAID FRANCISCO LARA WOULD USE TO ENTER HONDURAS FROM GUATEMALA. COPIES INDICATE THERE WAS DISCREPENCY IN NAME ORIGINALLY REPORTED IN REF AND NAME ON PASSPORT. CORRECT NAME IS JOSE MARIA OLIVA CARRANZA, ORDINARY GUATEMALAN PASSPORT NUMBER 134825 SERIES D REGISTRY NUMBER 22743 ISSUED 27 MAY 1963 IN GUATEMALA CITY. OLIVA BORN SAN FELIPE, RETALHULEU ON 9 FEB 1935.

2. OTHER DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED INCLUDE MILITARY INSCRIPTION IN GUATEMALAN ARMY, CARD NUMBER 49259, BIRTH CERTIFICATE NUMBER 2825671, CEDULA DE VECINDAD 287165 AND ELECTIRON CARD 127817.

3. THESE DOCUMENTS PHOTOGRAPHED BY LIRING-3 WHEN THEY PASSED TO HIM BY FRANCISCO LARA TO USE IN MAKING FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF DOCUMENTS TO ADDRESSEES.

SECRET

BT

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14-00000

798301

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INFO FILE, VR, CI/OA, CI, CI/OPS, FI

S E C R E T 041920Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5111   4 Apr 68 IN 85161

15 APR 68

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, TEGUCIGALPA

REF: GUATEMALA CITY-5622 (NOT SENT TEGUCIGALPA) (IN 80309)

1. AFTERNOON 3 APRIL 68, LIRING-3 (798301) REPORTED HE PLANS DEPART FOR GUATEMALA CITY VIA LAND IN COMPANY GUATEMALAN CITIZEN FRANCISCO LARA CIRCA 4 APRIL 68. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION AND LARA HAS FALSE MEXICAN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION DOCUMENTATION, THEY WILL ATTEMPT ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY.

2. IN GUATEMALA CITY, LARA PLANS INTRODUCE LIRING-3 TO WOMAN WHO LOGISTICAL OFFICER FOR FAR IN GUATEMALA CITY. TRIP WILL THEN BE ARRANGED FOR LIRING-3 TO VISIT FAR SIERRA DE LAS MINAS HEADQUARTERS TO DISCUSS FUTURE SUPPORT OF FAR FROM MEXICO CITY.

3. AFTER APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS IN GUATEMALA, LARA AND LIRING-3 WILL TRAVEL TEGUCIGALPA TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES OF SETTING UP PRINTING PRESS UNDER LIRING-3'S TRUE NAME.

4. LARA'S FALSE MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION IS IDENTITY CARD FROM SECRETARIA DE EDUCACION PUBLICA UNDER NAME JACINTO RANGEL CERVANTES. FOR IDENTITY CARD PHOTOGRAPH, LARA WORE GLASSES, HAIR DYED GREY AND NO MUSTACHE. LARA TOLD LIRING-3 THAT FOR TRAVEL TO TEGUCIGALPA FROM GUATEMALA CITY, HE WILL USE GUATEMALAN PASSPORT UNDER NAME

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 5111 S E C R E T

MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA. LIRING-3 WILL PROBABLY USE VALID MEXICAN DOCUMENTATION. POUCHING COPIES OF LARA AND LIRING-3 DOCUMENTATION.

5. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: LIRING-3 (IDEN) IS STATION PENETRATION OF GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA GROUP IN MEXICO CITY. FRANCISCO LARA IS FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARY WHO HAS RESIDED IN MEXICO FOR PAST YEAR AND WHO CLAIMS TO BE FAR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO.

6. ALTHOUGH LIRING-3 HAS TELEPHONE NUMBER AND POST OFFICE BOX IN MEXICO CITY FOR STATION CONTACT, DO NOT BELIEVE STATION WILL BE ABLE SUPPLY ADDRESSEES WITH INFO ON HIS TRIP TO GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS UNTIL HE IS THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AFTER HIS RETURN TO MEXICO CITY. WILL ADVISE.

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S E C R E T 041912Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5112 4 Apr 68 IN 85227

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR TEGUCIGALPA

REF MEXICO CITY 5111 (IN 85161)

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

MEXICAN CITIZEN

PROFESSION: ARTIST (PAINTER)

S E C R E T

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798301

INFO: FILE, VR, CS/DO, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, WH/COG 8,

S E C R E T 282327Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8822 29 MAR 1968

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR

REF: MEXICO CITY 5000 (IN 80219) 29 MAR 68 IN 80309

1. RE PARA 4 REF: DUE 28 MARCH CHANGES WITHIN GUATEMALAN ARMY, INCLUDING REMOVAL OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAFAEL (ARRIAGA) BOSQUE, STATUS OF "OPERATION AZTECA" UNCERTAIN. CONSEQUENTLY STATION CANNOT GUARANTEE ANY TYPE PROTECTION FOR LIRING-3 (798301) IN CASE HE CAPTURED. ALSO NOTE THAT MEXICAN BORDER AREA BEING HEAVILY PATROLLED.

2. ESMOOSE-1 (818094) REPORTED THAT ON EARLY MORNING 28 MARCH ESMARVEL-1 (804875) ALERTED SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF GUAT ARMY (SCUGA) TO BE PREPARED FOR IMPORTANT OPERATION. HE SAID INFORMATION HAD BEEN RECEIVED THAT GROUP OF THIRTY CASTRO CUBANS PLANNED ENTER GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND THEIR ARRIVAL TIED IN WITH WAVE OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WHICH REPORTEDLY TO TAKE PLACE 31 MARCH. ESMARVEL-1 DID NOT INDICATE SOURCE OF ABOVE INFO. HE SAID THAT REINFORCED SCUGA TEAMS WOULD BE SENT TO THE DEPARTMENTS OF SAN MARCOS AND HUEHUETENANGO ON MEXICAN BORDER, WITH A BACK-UP TEAM IN DEPARTMENT OF QUEZALTENANGO. SCUGA UNIT WAS IN PROCESS OF PREPARING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT WHEN WORD RECEIVED OF REMOVAL OF ARRIAGA. ESMOOSE-1 SAID AS RESULT OPERATION CANCELLED. POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SAME

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PAGE 2 GUATEMALA CITY 8522 S E C R E T

INFO HAS BEEN PASSED TO MILITARY UNITS AT BORDER WHICH MIGHT MAKE LIRING-3'S CROSSING INTO GUATEMALAN EVEN MORE DANGEROUS.

3. FOR HQS: PARA 2 INFO HAS NOT BEEN DISSEMED DUE LACK OF CONFIRMATION AND SCARCITY OF DETAILS.

S E C R E T

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TSD 6, FI, FI/INT 2, SOD 6, ADDP DDP

S E C R E T 282120Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5000 — 28 MAR 68 IN 80219

PRIORITY GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

29 MAR 1968

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4828 (IN 70689)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8551 (IN 41008)

C. MEXICO CITY 4486 (IN 50312)

1. ON 27 MARCH 68 LIRING-3 (798301) REPORTED THAT GUAT FAR MEMBER WHO PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS MIGUEL ANGEL OLIVA CASTANEDA IS ACTUALLY FRANCISCO LARA, PROBABLY IDENTICAL WITH FRANCISCO ADALBERTO LARA BARRIOS, AKA CARLOS LARA (REFS B AND C). LARA INADVERTENTLY GAVE HIS TRUE NAME WHILE DISCUSSING WITH LIRING-3 THE PLANNED TRIP TO GUATEMALA.

2. AT PRESENT, LIRING-3 MAKING FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR PERSONS HE TO LEAD INTO GUATEMALA. THEY PLAN TRAVEL SOMETIME BEFORE 31 MARCH. LIRING-3 TO ENTER GUATEMALA WITH GROUP IN ORDER MEET UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN WHO IS FAR LOGISTICAL OFFICER. GROUP BELIEVES LIRING-2 (NR) SHOULD TALK TO HER TO DETERMINE WHAT SUPPLIES HE CAN MAKE AVAILABLE TO FAR (COULD UNIDENTIFIED WOMAN BE DIAN ADELA JIMENEZ OR BRENY HOSEL CUENCA?)

3. LIRING -3 IS NOW ATTEMPTING DETERMINE TRUE NAMES OF OTHER PERSONS HE TO TAKE TO BORDER AND EXACT DEPARTURE DATE. STATION

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 5000 S E C R E T

WAS ABLE TAKE PHOTO OF PERSON LIRING-3 IN CONTACT
AND LIRING-3 IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIED THIS PERSON AS FRANCISCO
LARA. STATION HAS ALSO TAKEN PHOTOS OF ADDRESS WHERE GUATS
BELIEVED BE STAYING AND FILM BEING DEVELOPED. WILL PRIORITY
POUCH PHOTOS AND LIRING-3 REPORTS.

4. LIRING-3 WILLING ENTER GUATEMALA WITH FAR MEMBERS BUT
WOULD LIKE KNOW IF OPERATION AZTECA STILL IN FORCE. IF NOT,
COULD STATION GUATEMALA ARRANGE ANY TYPE OF PROTECTION FOR HIM
IN CASE HE IS CAPTURED BY MILITARY OR POLICE?

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S E C R E T 141940Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4828

15 MAR 1968

GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

14 Mar 68 IN 70689

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

B. GUATEMALA CITY 8733 (IN 68957)

1. FOLLOWING CABLED IN ANSWER QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 3 REF B:

A. FAR KNOWS LIRING-3 (798301) HAS CAPABILITY OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTATION. LIRING-3 FOR EXAMPLE OBTAINED FALSE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND MILITARY REGISTRATION CARD FOR JACOBO PADILLA.

B. LEFTIST CONTACTS LIRING-3 INCLUDING GUATS KNOW HE FAMILIAR WITH GUAT BORDER AREA IN CHIAPAS. LIRING-3 WORKED FOR NUMBER OF YEARS IN CHIAPAS FOR MEXICAN EQUIVALENT INDIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU. IT ALSO WELL KNOWN TO FAR THAT LIRING -3 HAS BUSINESS LOCATED IN BORDER AREA IN ST CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS SINCE THIS BUSINESS WAS TO BE USED AS COVER FOR ARMS SUPPLY TO GUAT REBELS.

C. AS GUAT CITY STATION WILL REMEMBER LIRING-3 WAS TAKEN BY FAR TO HIDEOUT IN GUAT WHERE HELD TALKS WITH FAR MEMBERS. LIRING-3 EVEN SUPPLIED FAR SOME MEDICINE AND COGNAC FOR WHICH INCIDENTALLY HE NEVER PAID.

D. IN LIRING-3 OPINION, FACT FAR REPS IN CUBA RECENTLY EXPRESSED THANKS FOR HIS DENUNCIATION MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL IN

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PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4828 S E C R E T

SUMMER 67 AND SENT WARNING THAT FAR "PENETRATED BY WOFIRM AGENT" *

(SEE MEXICO CITY 4314) (IN 40487) CONSTITUTES INDICATION HE STILL IN GOOD GRACES OF AT LEAST SOME OF FAR RANK AND FILE.

E. REQUEST LIRING-3 HELP FAR REPS OVER GUAT BORDER CAME FROM CARLOS (PERSAVAL) MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL (MARCUE) PARDINES, VIA CARMEN (LOZADA) DE RAMIREZ, PERSAVAL SISTER IN LAW * MISTRESS LIRING-3. ~~8543)848, 3-3.~~ ANF4$13,5 AS FAR AS STATION KNOWS PERSAVAL, MARCUE OR LOZADA HAVE NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO AND OTHER GUAT LEFTISTS WITH WHOM LIRING -3 PREVIOUSLY IN CONTACT.

2. LIFEAT ON LIRING-3 CONFIRMED PERSAVAL SCHEDULED PHONE LIRING-3 14 MARCH TO SET UP 15 MARCH MEETING WITH TWO MALE AND ONE FEMALE GUAT REBELS LIRING-3 AGREED GUIDE OVER GUAT BORDER. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, STATION KNOWS GUATS MAY PHONE LIRING-3 AND ASK FOR IMMEDIATE MEETING. TO FACE SUCH POSSIBILITY LIEMBRACES STARTED SURVEILLANCE LIRING-3 MORNING 14 MARCH, WILL TRY OBSERVE MEETING WITH GUATS, TAKE PHOTOS OF THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTUAL RESIDENCE THROUGH TAILING EXERCISING UTMOST CAUTION.

3. WILL CABLE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS THIS CASE.

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SERVICE

MEXICO CITY [illegible]8 — STA & NR

1[illegible] MARCH 196[illegible] — DATE

[illegible] — IN NR

PLEASE CORRECT THE GARBLED PORTION(S) OF THIS MESSAGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

"PERAVAL SISTER IN LAW AND RECENT MISTRESS LIRING-3"

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14-00000

798301

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S E C R E T 122147Z MAR 68 CITE GUATEMALA CITY 8733

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR 12 MAR 68 IN 68951

REF MEXICO CITY 4790 (IN 68111)

1. ALTHOUGH SPECULATION ONLY, POSSIBLE THAT YOUNG WBZQAN* WHO TO RETURN GUATEMALA COULD BE CLEMENCIA (PAIZ) CARCAMO (AKA "LUISA"), SISTER OF MIRNA (PAIZ) CARCAMO WHO RECENTLY RELEASED FROM JAIL IN MEXICO. ACCORDING TO FEMALE INFORMANT OF GUAT ARMY, CLEMENCIA IS WIFE OF JULIO CESAR (MACIAS) MAYORA (AKA "CESAR MONTES"). ALSO REPORTED THAT CLEMENCIA WAS TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO IN MID-DECEMBER 1967 TO ARRANGE FOR SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO FAR, AND WAS POSSIBLY TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY DINGRDELA (JIMENEZ) MUNOZ AND HILDA (SOSA) ALDANA. THERE HAS BEEN NO CONFIRMATION THAT ANY OF THE ABOVE WOMEN TRAVELLED, BUT PRESENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN.

2. STATION DOES NOT HAVE BIO DATA OR PHOTOGRAPHS CLEMENCIA, AND ESLAIR TEAM HAS NOT BEEN ABLE LOCATE ENTRY FOR HER IN FILES OF CIVIL REGISTRY. ATTEMPTING OBTAIN FROM ESMICAS, AND WILL SEND TO MEXICO CITY IF SUCCESSFUL.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE MEXICO CITY COMMENTS ON WHY LIRING/3 (798301) APPROACHED TO OBTAIN FALSE DOCUMENTS FOR RETURNEES AND WHY HE MIGHT BE SELECTED

13 MAR 1968

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PAGE TWO GUATEMALA CITY 8733 S E C R E T

TO SERVE AS GUIDE. ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE THAT MEMBERS OF PGT SUPPORT NET IN MEXICO--SUCH AS ERNESTO (CAPUANO) DEL VECCHIO, MAY BE UNWILLING ASSIST FAR MEMBERS IN VIEW RUPTURE PGT/FAR RELATIONS, WOULD SEEM THAT FAR WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ENTRUST DELICATE MISSION OF THIS NATURE TO LIRING/3 WHO RELATIVELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY.

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FORM 3020 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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S E C R E T 120855Z MAR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4798 12 MAR 68 IN 68111

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

798301

1. ON 5 MARCH 68, LIRING-3 REPORTED HE HAD DINNER WITH CARLOS PERSAVAL MARCUE, NEPHEW OF MANUEL MARCUE PARDINAS, DIRECTOR OF THE NOW DEFUNCT MAGAZINE "POLITICA", COMMUNIST BI-MONTHLY PUBLICATION. PERSAVAL ASKED LIRING-3 IF HE COULD OBTAIN A FALSE PASSPORT FOR WIFE OF IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA LEADER IN MEXICO WHO MUST TRAVEL GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 SAID HE WOULD DO WHAT HE COULD TO OBTAIN DOCUMENTS.

2. ON 8 MARCH, PERSAVAL SAID TWO IMPORTANT GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES HAD TO TRAVEL TO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO BY MID MARCH AND ASKED IF LIRING-3 STILL WILLING TO HELP. LIRING-3 ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT SAID THERE WAS LIMITED CHANCE OBTAINING FALSE DOCUMENTATION. HE COULD, HOWEVER, BRIEF THESE REVOLUTIONARIES ON GUAT/MEXI BORDER IN ORDER MAKE ILLEGAL CROSSING EASIER. IF THEY DESIRED, HE COULD PERSONALLY GUIDE THEM ACROSS BORDER.

3. ON 9 MARCH, PERSAVAL CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WITH LIRING-3 ON GUATEMALAN REVOLUTIONARIES WHO HAD TO TRAVEL GUATEMALA URGENTLY. HE SAID ONE OF THEM HAS LEGAL DOCUMENTATION BUT OTHER DOES NOT. HE

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FORM 3020A 9-67 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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FILE, VR.

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4798 S E C R E T

THEREFORE DECIDED BOTH SHOULD ENTER GUATEMALA ILLEGALLY. THEY CANNOT ENTER THRU TAPACHULA, HOWEVER, SINCE THEY WELL KNOWN THERE. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED SAN CRISTOBOL AREA WHICH NOT SUBJECT TO MEXICAN OR GUATEMALAN SURVEILLANCE. THE PERSON WITHOUT DOCUMENTS IS WOMAN 20 YEARS OLD. PERSAVAL NOT WILLING GIVE LIRING-3 NAMES OF REVOLUTIONARIES BUT PROMISED ARRANGE FOR CONTACT BETWEEN THEM EVENING 15 MARCH.

4. STATION HAS NO INFO ON IDENTITIES OF MAN AND WOMAN WHO MUST RETURN GUATEMALA MID MARCH. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS. WILL ADVISE DEVELOPMENTS.

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES 27

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CITE DIRECTOR 68269

JAN 19 23 40Z

TO MEXICO CITY

INFO: JMWAVE

PERUMEN TECHS

REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 67083*

22 JAN 1958

POUCHING AGENT S/W SENDING SYSTEM #36 AND AGENT RECEIVING SYSTEM #32 TOGETHER WITH NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRAINING IN HMMA-16083.

END OF MESSAGE

79839

COORD: TSD/SW Little (by phone)

C/WH/COG/CICS

HQ COMMENT: *Hqs. selecting appropriate S/W system for use with LIRING-3.

818842

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

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201-798301

S E C R E T 162326Z 17FEB 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4526 16Feb68 IN 52083

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PERUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 4371 (IN 45349)

B DIRECTOR 70922

C JMWAVE 1115 (IN 42146)

1. VIA LIRING-3 ROWTON MET XOCHITL VIVO DE LA TORRIENTE, DAUGHTER OF LOLA DE LA TORRIENTE MENTIONED IN REFS. XOCHITL, BORN MEXICO CA 1932 IS MEXICAN CITIZEN. SHE LIVED CUBA 1958 TO 1963 WHERE SHE ACTIVE AS BALLERINA IN MODERN DANCE GROUP OF CUBA WHICH TRAVELED MANY PLACES IN EUROPE INCLUDING MOSCOW. SHE LEFT CUBA 1963 FOR U.S. WHERE WORKED IN NEW YORK AS SHOW GIRL AND SECRETARY FOR SEVERAL YEARS. SHE SINGLE BUT NOW LIVING WITH AMERICAN AND WORKS AS THEATRICAL ARTIST.

2. XOCHITL THOROUGHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST, IS DISSATISFIED WITH HER SITUATION AND ANXIOUS DROP AMERICAN BOYFRIEND. WOULD LIKE GET IN SOME SORT OF BUSINESS GIVING HER FINANCIAL INDEPENDENCE. SHE IN REGULAR MAIL CONTACT WITH MOTHER IN CUBA AND FEELS MOTHER WHO VERY MUCH WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE CUBA COMPLETELY ANTI-REGIME.

3. AFTER SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH XOCHITL, ROWTON OBTAINED HER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4526 S E C R E T

AGREEMENT VISIT CUBA TO DETERMINE IF MOTHER WILLING COOPERATE IN SUPPLYING INFORMATION ON GVT ACTIVITIES AND PERSONALITIES SHE IN CONTACT WITH. ROWTON HAS PASSED SELF AS BUSINESSMAN INTERESTED IN CUBA FOR EVENTUAL FINANCIAL PROFIT. WILL CONTINUE REPORT DETAILS THIS OPERATION. REQUEST ADDRESSEES FILE CHECK XOCHITL AND HQS START PROCESS POA. PRQ PART ONE BEING POUCHED.

SECRET

SECRET

14-00000

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SECRET 262013Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4271 26 Jan 68 IN 38363

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING-4

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67233

201-

29 JAN 1968

COVER

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING LIRING-4 PRODUCED FOLLOWING:

A. SHE LONG TIME FRIEND CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), NIECE PRESIDENT DORTICOS WHO WORKED AT CUBAN PRESIDENCY IN 1964 WHEN LIRING-4 LAST SAW HER. GUILFRIDO WHO BORN IN LIRING-4 HOME TOWN IN ORIENTE ABOUT 1938 IS ANTI-CASTRO. LIRING-4 FELT GUILFRIDO COULD PROBABLY HELP HER OBTAIN USEFUL JOB IF STILL IN CUBA AND MIGHT EVEN AGREE COOPERATE AGAINST REGIME. GUILFRIDO RECENTLY GOT MARRIED AND MOVED BUT LIRING-4 FELT COULD FIND HER.

B. LIRING-4 KNOWS LOLO DE LA (TORRIENTE), ELDERLY CUBAN NEWSPAPER WOMAN WHO DISAFFECTED WITH CURRENT REGIME. LIRING-3 WHO ALSO KNOWS WOMAN TOLD ROWTON THAT IN EARLY 1967 MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER RAUL (ANGUIANO) CONFIDED TO HIM HE RECEIVED LETTER FROM DE LA TORRIENTE WHO CLOSE FRIEND ASKING HIM HELP HER OBTAIN MEXICAN VISA IN ORDER LEAVE CUBA SINCE SITUATION THERE "INTOLERABLE." ANGUIANO CONFESSED TO LIRING-3 HE IN QUANDARY

SECRET

AS DID NOT WANT BETRAY REVOLUTION OR DAMAGE HIS REPUTATION. AS FAR LIRING-3 KNOWS, ANGUIANO DECIDED AGAINST APPEAL FOR HELP TO LITEMPO-8 WHO CLOSE FRIEND AND DE LA TORRIENTE APPARENTLY DROPPED MATTER. LIRING-3 ADDED DE LA TORRIENTE IS WELL KNOWN BIOGRAPHER OF DIEGO RIVERA AND CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND LUIS (WANGUEMER), DIRECTOR OF "MUNDO." LIRING -3 FELT RELATINSHIP WITH WANGUEMER MAY HAVE PROTECTED DE LA TORRIENTE FROM REPRISALS FOR ANTI-REGIME ATTITUDE. ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN "SUCESOS" IS ACCORDING TO LIRING-3 WANGUERMER'S BROTHER AND UNCLE ANDREA (GOMEZ) WITH WHOM LIRING-4 MAY STAY IN HAVANA. THIS SHOULD ENABLE HER RENEW CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH DE LA TORRIENTE.

C. LIRING-4 KNOWS CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), CURRENT HEAD OF CUBAN INSTITUTO CARCGRAFIA Y GEODESIA WHOM SHE FIRST MET AT LIRING IN AUG 67 ~~WHEN~~ and HE ATTENDED GEODETIC CONFERENCE MEXICO CITY. CARBALLO WAS MOST HELPFUL ~~[illegible]~~ SECURING SPACE ON HAVANA SANTIAGO FLIGHT FOR LIRING-4 DURING THE LATTER'S LAST VISIT TO CUBA.

D. SHE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH MARGOT (MACHADO), HEAD OF THE DEPARTAMENTO JURIDICO OF MINREX WHEN SHE AND LIRING-3 LIVED IN CUBA.

E. SHE GOOD FRIEND RAQUEL (PEREZ) WHO SERVED TOUR AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO WITH HUSBAND. PEREZ WHEN LAST HEARD FROM

SECRET

14-00000

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S E C R E T 270045Z JAN 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 4277

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PERUMEN LIRING-4

27 Jan 68 IN 38440

29 JAN 1968

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 4123 (IN 29420)

B. DIRECTOR 67663

C. MEXICO CITY 4271 (IN 38363)

OVER

201-818842

1. IN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH LIRING-4 ROWTON REACHED FOLLOWING TENTATIVE AGREEMENT

A. ROWTON WILL PROVIDE 600 DOLLARS FOR THREE MONTHS FOR MAINTENANCE LIRING-4 AND HER DAUGHTER (CHILD NOW GOING WITH HER) IN CUBA PLUS 150 DOLLARS TO COVER TRAVEL EXPENSES.

B. LIRING-4 WILL INFORM ROWTON VIA S/W OF DEFECTABLE TARGETS AND OF PROGRESS MADE IN OBTAINING POSITION OF INTEREST IN MINREX, INTERIOR MINISTRY OR PRESIDENCY.

C. IF ROWTON INSTRUCTS HER REMAIN HAVANA BEYOND THREE MONTH PERIOD (MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TIME SHE ALLOWED STAY OUT OF MEXICO WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING HER IMMIGRANT STATUS IN THAT COUNTRY), ROWTON WILL ARRANGE REINSTATEMENT FULL TIME ALREADY ACCUMULATED IN MEXICO AND WILL DEPOSIT TO NEW YORK ACCOUNT IN LIRING-4 NAME "REASONABLE" MONTHLY COMPENSATION COMMENSURATE WITH POSITION SHE OBTAINED AND

SECRET

14-00000

29 JAN 1969

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 4277 S E C R E T SECRET

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED. ROWTON MENTIONED FIGURE BETWEEN 300 AND 500 DOLLARS A MONTH BUT MADE NO RPT NO COMMITMENT.

2. ROWTON CAN DRAW UP LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING TO BE SIGNED BY LIRING-4 IF HQS DESIRES. LIRING-4 STATED FRANKKLY SHE HOPED BE ABLE PROVIDE ROWTON SUFFICIENT RECRUITMENT LEADS AND BIO INFORMATION TO BE ABLE LEAVE CUBA AFTER THREE MONTHS ALTHOUGH SE REITERATED SHE WOULD STAY LONGER IF SHE SUCCEEDED IN GAINING POSITION PROVIDING UNUSUALLY GOOD ACCESS TO INFORMATION DESIRED BY ROWTON.

3. AS LONG AS SHE DOES NOT ACTUALLY DIVORCE LIRING-3, LIRING-4 IS ELIGIBLE FOR MEXICAN VISA TO ALLOW HER LEAVE CUBA AND REJOIN HUSBAND EVEN IF SHE REMAINS CUBA MORE THAN THREE MONTHS. DO NOT BELIEVE CUBANS WOULD PREVENT HER FROM RETURNING MEXICO TO HUSBAND. FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE, BELIEVE LIRING-4 COULD GAIN REINSTATEMENT AS IMMIGRANT WITH APPROPRIATE BRIBE. LITAMIL-7 FOR EXAMPLE REGAINED IMMIGRANT STATUS WITHOUT ANY TIME PENALTY BY PAYING THOUSAND PESOS BRIBE. PLS ADVISE WHEN STATION MAY EXPECT S/W FOR LIRING-4 SO THAT FINAL PLANS CAN BE MADE FOR HER DEPARTURE. ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL OBTAIN CUBAN TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

S E CD E T SECRET

WAS WORKING IN MINREX.

F. LIRING-4 RECALLS HAVING MET AND DEVELOPED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH A NEGRO CUBAN IMMIGRATION OFFICIAL WHO QUESTIONED HER ROUTINELY WHEN SHE LAST LANDED AT HAVANA AIRPORT. NAME OF OFFICIAL IS VINCENTE (LEYVA), DIRECCION PROV. DE INMIGRACION, VEDADO.

2. STATION FILES CHECKS ON ABOVE NAMES GAVE FOLLOWING RESULTS:

A. CLARIBEL (GUILFRIDO), CAPT JOSE LUIS (CARBALLO), AND VINCENTE (LEYVA), NEGATIVE.

B. LYA DE LA (TORRIENTE) BRAU WAS LISTED IN 1960 AS DIRECTOR OF CULTURE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS, CUBAN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, AND TRAVELED CHILE IN 1959 AND MEXICO 1960 AS DELEGATE TO LEFTIST WOMEN CONGRESSES. SHE REPORTED IN EARLY 1960 BE CLOSE FRIEND VILMA (ESPIN) DE (CASTRO), WIFE RAUL (CASTRO).

C. MARGOT (MACHADO) PADRON AND RAQUEL (PEREZ) BOTH SPENT TOUR OF DUTY WITH CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO, MACHADO AS OFFICER AND PEREZ AS SECRETARY TO CUBAN AMBASSADOR. PEREZ WAS REPORTED HAVE PREVIOUSLY WORKED FOR CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER RAUL (ROA) AS HIS SECRETARY. HER HUSBAND MIGUEL ANGEL (LOZANO) VILLALOBOS WAS REPORTED TO HAVE OCCUPIED FAIRLY HIGH POSITIONS IN MINISTRY OF

14-00000

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

D. ONLY REFERENCE TO (WANGUEMER) IS INTERCEPTED LETTER DATED MARCH 63 FROM LUIS G (WANGUEMERT) IN CUBA MENTIONING SUGAR HARVEST.

E. NUMBER OF REFERENCES LIST RAUL (ANGUIANO) AS SUCCESSFUL MEXICAN LEFTIST PAINTER WHO TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY AND MAINTAINS CONTACTS WITH EMBASSIES COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN MEXICO CITY.

3. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

S E C R E T SECRET

14-00000

798301

ORIG: Will Korbersas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 10 January 1968

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CITE DIRECTOR

JAN 10 22 40Z

TO MEXICO CITY 11 JAN 1968 765492

INFO: JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 3989 (IN 22030)*

LIRING-3

201-798301

1. HQS CAN ARRANGE TO OPEN SAVINGS BANK ACCOUNT FOR SUBJECT REF USING POST OFFICE BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS. ACCOUNT WILL BE WITH FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK.

2. TO OPEN ACCOUNT IN TRUE NAME IT NECESSARY THAT SUBJECT SIGN BANK SIGNATURE CARDS WHICH HQS POUCHING. SUGGEST ROWTON HAVE SUBJECT SIGN CARDS NEXT TIME HE VISITS MEXICO.

3. WILL CONSIDER FUTURE REQUESTS FOR OPENING OF SWISS ACCOUNTS ON AN INDIVIDUAL CASE BASIS.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: *Since opening a bank account in Switzerland appears so difficult, request advise possibility of opening account in U.S.

C/WH/COG/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE, C/WHD — RELEASING OFFICER

Monetary Div. Mr. Farr (by phone) — COORDINATING OFFICERS

W. J. KAUFMAN, C/WH/1 — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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798301

ORIG: V. Daly
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6955
DATE: 5 JAN. 68

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 64492

Jan 5 23 55 Z

18 JAN 1968

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: JMWAVE

PBRUMEN TECHS 201-798301 LIRING-3

REFERENCE: MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)*

1. BELIEVE IT PREFERABLE AT THIS JUNCTURE LET LIRING-4 RETURN PBRUMEN AND ATTEMPT ESTABLISH HERSELF BEFORE MAKING COMMITMENTS FOR CLANDESTINE COMMO, SALARY AND SGSWIRL. WHILE INTERESTED IN POSSIBILITIES LIRING-4 GAINING ACCESS IN ANY ONE OF POSITIONS MENTIONED REF, COMMITMENTS SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY DEGREE OF ACCESS, COMMO ARRANGEMENTS AND HER WILLINGNESS TO PERFORM. CONSIDERING FACT SHE NOT PARTY MBR AND THREE YEAR ABSENCE FROM PBRUMEN, IT APPEARS PREMATURE TO ASSUME SHE WILL GET JOB WITH SUFFIENTLY INTERESTING ACCESS. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY WE NEGATIVE ON CPS UTILIZATION IF SUCH WARRANTED BY DEVELOPMENTS.

17 JAN 1968

2. IF LIRING-4 DOES OBTAIN INTERESTING POSITION CAN STATION MAKE ARRANGEMENTS NOW FOR HER TO TRAVEL MEXI AFTER

(CONTINUED..)

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CITE DIRECTOR 64492

PAGE TWO

TO

SEVERAL MONTHS, OSTENSIBLY VISIT HUSBAND OR TO CLOSE OUT HER BUSINESS AFFAIRS AT WHICH TIME COULD ARRANGE TRAINING, SECURE COMMO AND LEVY REQUIREMENTS BASED ON ACCESS? ALSO CAN STATION NOW ESTABLISH CORRESPONDENCE LINK TO ROWTON THRU HUSBAND?

3. REQUESTING POA. WILL ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

Coord: C/WH/ECOG/CI

WH COMMENT: *Requested Hqs advise re possible recruitment, SGSWIRL, Commo and salary for LIRING-4, who returning Cuba to obtain job.

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

W.J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 3 JAN 1968

SUBJECT: LIRING-4

FILE NUMBER: 798301

Discussed the POA/CA request with Will Kolbe, WH/1, today. He sees the inconsistency of requesting a POA/CA on L-4 (for which she cannot qualify) and will resubmit request for a CNC.

We agreed that ROUTON has been running [illegible] as an agent (without any approval) since May, 1966.

Kolbe sees ROUTON losing interest in L-3 (her husband, who [illegible] + has a [illegible]) because of poly results, etc.

OFFICE AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
	[illegible]

FORM 7-62 1954

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S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3994

4 JAN 68 IN 22968

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

TYPIC TECHS

Why did she leave employ of Cuban Consulate?

798301

1. AS RESULT DIFFICULTIES WITH LIRING-3 AGGRAVATED BY HIS AFFAIR WITH CARMEN LOZADA, LIRING-4 DECIDED TO SEPARATE FROM LIRING/3 AT LEAST TEMPORARILY AND GO CUBA FOR THREE MONTHS. THIS IS MAXIMUM LENGTH OF TIME LIRING-4 CAN STAY OUT MEXICO WITHOUT LOSING IMMIGRANT STATUS AND POSSIBILITY BECOMING MEXICAN IN TWO MORE YEARS AFTER FIVE YEARS RESIDENCE.

2. IN COURSE SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS, ROWTON, WITHOUT INFLUENCING HER DECISION GO CUBA, POINTED OUT LIRING-4 COULD HELP HIM COLLECT VALUABLE DATA ON CURRENT POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CUBA. THIS WOULD DEPEND ENTIRELY ON HER WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY GAIN ACCESS TO IMPORTANT TARGETS. LIRING-4 ASSURED ROWTON SHE DEEPLY APPRECIATED HIS INTEREST AND HELP IN PAST AND VOLUNTEERED DO WHATEVER SHE COULD UNDER ROWTON DIRECTION TO ACCOMPLISH TASKS ASSIGNED BY HIM. LIRING-4 DID NOT QUERY ROWTON AS TO HIS ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OR POLITICAL AFFILIATION HIS "FRIENDS" AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN HER ABILITY MAKE CONTACTS AND DEVELOP FRIENDSHIPS IN HAVANA. HER ONLY RESERVATION WAS PROCUREMENT OF SPECIFIC INFO REQUIRED BY ROWTON AS THIS WOULD DEPEND ON GAINING ACCESS TO RIGHT PERSONS AND MAKING SKILLFUL ELICITATIONS.

3. LIRING-4 PLANS LEAVE MEXICO LATE JAN, SPEND ONE WEEK

SECRET

SANTIAGO VISITING FAMILY THEN RETURN HAVANA TO TRY FIND WORK INTERIOR MINISTRY, ICAP OR FOREIGN MINISTRY. SHE AWARE GOOD JOBS IN THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE USUALLY RESERVED FOR COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERS BUT BELIEVES SHE MAY HAVE CHANCE LAND JOB GIVING HER ACCESS TO INTERESTING INFO THROUGH SUCH FRIENDS AS LIRIH-1, JOSE ANTONIO (PORTUONDO) VALDOR AND OTHERS. LIRING-4 COULD PROBABLY LIVE IN HAVANA AS GUEST ANDREA GOMEZ, MEXICAN MURALIST WHO RESIDES NEAR MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND IS CLOSE FRIEND MASOLA OF ICAP. GOMEZ IS DAUGHTER ROSENDO (GOMEZ) LORENZO OF MEXICAN MAGAZINE SUCESOS AND NIECE (GOMEZ) WANGUEMER, DIRECTOR OF EL MUNDO IN HAVANA. ANDREA GOMEZ, NOW ON VACATION MEXICO, WILL SEE LIRING-4 PRIOR HER RETURN HAVANA.

4. LIRING-4 PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LIRING MERMBERS GREATLY IMPROVED SINCE RUMORS SHABBY TREATMENT SHE RECEIVED FROM LIRING-3 AND HER PROBABLE BREAK WITH HIM REACHED LIRING. BOTH LIRING-2 AND LIRING-13 ASSURED HER 29 DEC THEY PREPARED DO WHATEVER THEY CAN FOR HER. SHE ALSO HAD FRIENDLY CHAT WITH CHIEF LIRING. LIRING-4

HAS EQUIVALENT TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE, SPEAKS SOME ENGLISH AND SOME CANTONESE AND PREVIOUSLY WORKED AT LIRING. AT STATION REQUEST ROWTON SOUNDED HER OUT ON POSSIBILITY SHE MIGHT LAND JOB WITH CUBAN EMBASSY ABROAD AND ASKED HER ABOUT HER WILLINGNESS GO COMMUNIST CHINA. LIRING-4 SAID SHE WILLING DO ANYTHING FOR ROWTON INCLUDING LEARN MANDARIN AS POSSIBLE WAY LAND CHINA ASSIGNMENT. SHE AGREEABLE STAY CUBA BEYOND THREE MONTHS PERIOD MENTIONED ABOVE IF OBTAINS JOB JUDGED OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE BY ROWTON. LIRING-4 CAN RETURN MEXICO AS LONG AS SHE STAYS MARRIED TO LIRING-3 WHO MEXICAN CITIZEN. THROUGH BRIBERY THERE GOOD POSSIBILITY SHE MAY BE REINTEGRATED AS IMMIGRANT AFTER MORE THAN THREE MONTHS ABROAD WITHOUT LOSING HER THREE YEARS MEXICO RESIDENCE. LIRING-3 HAS NO PLANS DIVORCE LIRING 4 EVEN IF LATTER REMAINS SEPARATED FROM HIM FOR LONG PERIOD. LIRING-4, WHO STILL IN LOVE WITH LIRING-3, DOES NOT WANT DIVORCE EITHER.

5. LIRING-4 AT ROWTON REQUEST PROVIDED BASIC PRQ DATA ESSENCE OF WHICH CABLING SEPARATELY. ALTHOUGH SHE WILL REMAIN UNRECRUITED FORMALLY, ANTICIPATE LIRING-4 WILL READILY ACCEPT SGSWIRL. THUS REQUEST:

A. STEPS BE TAKEN ISSUE LIRING-4 POA FOR USE AS ON ISLAND ASSET.

SECRET

"What are the Field Trace results?

14-00000

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 3994 S E C R E T SECRET

B. SPANISH SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR BE SCHEDULED VISIT MEXICO CITY TO TEST LIRING-4 BEFORE 31 JAN.

C. TWO WAY S/W SYSTEM BE ISSUED LIRING-4 AFTER PASSING SGSWIRL. HQS MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER OWVL IN ADDITION TO TWO WAY S/W. TRAINING COULD BE DONE BY ROWTON OR SPANISH SPEAKING TECHNICIANS. COMMO SYSTEM MUST BE GIVEN HER BEFORE DEPARTURE FOR CUBA AS WILL NOT RETURN AFTER THREE MONTHS IF ABLE LAND WORTHWHILE JOB.

D. HQS INDICATE WHAT IT WILLING PAY LIRING-4 FOR WORTH-WHILE JOB IN CUBA OR IN CUBAN OFFICIAL INSTALLATION ABROAD. LIRING-4 INTENDS LIVE STRICTLY ON CUBAN SALARY WHILE WORKING FOR CUBANS. WOFIRM SALARY TO BE DEPOSITED IN ESCROW.

6. PLEASE ADVISE.

S E C R E T SECRET

14-00000

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INFO FILE, VR, WH 8, CI/OA

4 Jun 63 IN 22867

S E C R E T 040105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3995

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC

REF MEXICO CITY 3994 (IN 22968)

1. FOLLOWING IS BIO DATA MIRIAM (CHICHAY) DUARDO DE JURADO:

A. BORN 17 DEC 1940 CENTRAL JOBABO, ORIENTE PROVINCE. MOTHER NELIDA DUARDO, CUBAN, LIVES CALLE AGUILERA 554, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. FATHER PORFIRIO CHICHAY, ~~CU..., 91 178,33 94842, 3,844 535~~ RAN OF CHINESE ORIGIN EMIGRATED U.S. 1959 AND RESIDES 1506 NORTHERN BLVD MANHASSET L.I. NEW YORK.

B. THREE BROTHERS, JOAQUIN 29, PORFIRIO 25, ROGELIO 2?. ONE SISTER LILIAN 18.

C. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL: TWO YEARS ORIENTE UNIVERSITY, SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, NO DEGREE.

D. MARRIED TO CARLOS (JURADO) DELMAR IN HAVANA 1962 (MEXICAN CITIZEN). DAUGHTER ZINZUNI (JURADO) CHICHAY BORN 1963 HAVANA, MEXICAN CITIZEN.

E. CUBAN CITIZEN BUT HAS FM-2 IMMIGRANT STUATUS IN MEXICO AS SPOUSE MEXICAN NATIONAL. HAS THREE YEARS OF MEXICO RESIDENCE.

2. POUCHING MORE COMPLETE INFO.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: J. STEWART/lm
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 17 AUGUST 67

SECRET

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☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: WH8 ☐ RID COPY INFO: FILE, VR, WH/C 68, C/CI, FI

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SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 28757

PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE 2117Z

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 2479 (IN 32323)

REGRET HAVE BEEN UNABLE COME UP WITH SUITABLE INTERIM HANDLER FOR LIRING-3. SUGGEST ROWTON SET UP PLAN FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT BY "TRUSTED BUSINESS ASSOCIATE WHO MAY BE COMING THROUGH AREA." WILL DISCUSS POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES WITH ROWTON DURING LATTER'S TDY HQS BEGINNING 21 AUGUST.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT: ROWTON going on home leave 18 August. Station feels it most desirable keep direct contact with LIRING-3 during ROWTON's absence.

WH/COG W. CINI (IN DRAFT)

JACOB D. ESTERLINE
AC/WHD

J. H. V. FISHER
AC/WH/1

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S E C R E T 151515Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2479

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

15 Aug 67 IN 32323

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE 18 AUGUST.

2. AFTER THROUGH REVIEW LIRING-3 (201-798301) OPERATION FEEL IT MOST DESIRABLE KEEP DIRECT CONTACT WITH LIRING-3 (WHO LIABLE GO CUBA AND POSSIBLY GUATEMALA IN NEAR FUTURE) DURING ROWTON'S ABSENCE. UNTIL SGSWIRL CAN BE GIVEN LIRING-3 BY SPANISH SPEAKING OPERATOR AS REQUESTED BY STATION, FEEL IT WISE NOT PUSH LIRING-3 TO WITTING LNHARP RECRUITMENT. THEREFORE BELIEVE LIRING-3 SHOULD BE HANDLED BY SPANISH SPEAKER ABLE PASS NOTIONALLY AS EUROPEAN BUSINESS FRIEND OF ROWTON (I.E. WITHOUT GRINGO ACCENT). ALTHOUGH KNOWLEDGE EUROPEAN LANGUAGE NATURALLY DESIRABLE IT NOT ESSENTIAL AS PER ROWTON LIRING-3 WILL NOT QUESTION BACKGROUND HIS FRIEND OR MEET HIM IN PRESENCE OF OTHER FOREIGNER SINCE MEETINGS HELD IN SAFEHOUSE. TO AVOID SECURITY COMPLICATIONS AT THIS JUNCTURE BELIEVE LIRING-3 WOULD BEST BE HANDLED FOR THREE - FOUR WEEK PERIOD BY TOYER FROM WAVE OR HQS WITH ABOVE REQUIREMENTS. STATION WILL CONTINUE TO ASSUME COMPLETE DIRECTION THIS OPERATION.

3. ALTERNATIVE TO HANDLING BY TOYER WOULD BE TO PLACE

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PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 2479 S E C R E T

LIRING-3 "ON ICE" FOR PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE SENDING HIM OUT OF MEXICO CITY AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND THUS CUTTING HIM OFF TEMPORARILY FROM FURTHER CONTACTS WITH CUBANS, GUATEMALAN REBELS AND LOCAL MEXICAN LEFTIST FRIENDS. THERE NO GUARANTEE HOWEVER LIRING-3 WOULD STAY OUT OF MEXICO AND FURTHER OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT FOR FULL PERIOD ROWTON'S ABSENCE.

4. PLS ADVISE PRIORITY.

S E C R E T

BT

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14-00000

798301

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INFO FILE, VR, 8006, C/OPS, C/OA, FI

4 AUG 1967

S E C R E T 040003Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2372

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PHOTO LEONARDO (CASTILLO) HOHNSON, CHIEF SAN MARCO GUERRILLA AREA, GUATEMALA, SHOWN LIRING-3 (798301) WHO DID NOT RECOGNIZE. LIRING-3 STATED HOWEVER THAT MOISES (OROZCO) LEAL TOLD HIM 31 JULY THAT CASTILLO HAD BEEN KILLED. OROZCO ALSO IMPLIED DAVID (CASASOLA) MEJIA ALSO DEAD.

4 Aug 67 IN 25197

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 2

ORIG: Jack Stewart
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 1 August 1967

SECRET

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BY 35/21 PER

CONF: WH 8 RID COPY

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19 09 7 CCS 3 24298

PRIORITY

CITE DIRECTOR

TO MEXICO CITY

PERUMEN LIRING-3

REFERENCE: A. MEXICO CITY 2322 (IN 22584)

B. DIRECTOR 99380

C. MEXICO CITY 2105 (IN 11046)

REGRET SPANISH-SPEAKING SGSWIRL OPERATOR READIED 1 JUNE PER REFERENCE B NOW NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SEPTEMBER. CAN FURNISH ENGLISH-SPEAKING OPERATOR FROM HEADQUARTERS ~~TO~~ IF ACCEPTABLE. ~~COULD ALSO HANDLE REFERENCE C CANDIDATES IF DESIRED.~~ PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST. ASSUME YOU UNDER NO ILLUSION ABOUT HIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST ONCE SGSWIRL USED.

END OF MESSAGE

798301

WH/Comments: A. Requested SGSWIRL operator for LIRING-3/ Aug. B. Spanish-speaking SGSWIRL operator available for LIRING-3 1 June. C. Station queries if can examine new Station contract employee and three field agents.

2 AUG 1967

WH/COG MAHONEY (TELECOORD)
OS/JRD BEONAR (TELECOORD)

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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C/WH/1
W.J. Kaufman
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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INFO FILE VR. CI. CI/OPS, C/FI, CI/IC 2, FI

S E C R E T 152015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2139

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR

REF MEXICO CITY 2015 (P06822)

15 JUL 67 IN 12289

1. ON 14 JULY 67, DOSCHER SHOWED LIREBEL-2 (244191) COMPOSITES OF "GARCIA" MADE BY THE LIEMBRACES, (LIRING-3 (748221) AND LIRING-4. LIREBEL-2 SAID THE PERSON WAS DEFINITELY NOT DAVID CASASOLA MEJIA (STATION FELT IT WAS INITIALLY) BUT THAT THE COMPOSITE HAD A STRONG RESEMBLANCE TO LUIS CASTILLO RALDA. LIREBEL-2 GAVE DOSCHER CASTILLO'S ADDRESS BUT ASKED THAT CASTILLO NOT BE FOLLOWED BECAUSE HE IS VERY SECURITY CONSCIOUS. HE WOULD SPOT THE SURVEILLANCE AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY SUSPECT LIREBEL-2 OF HAVING PASSED THE ADDRESS TO SOMEONE.

2. IN VIEW OF THIS, STATION HAS DECIDED USE PHOTO TRUCK TO OBTAIN RECENT PHOTOS OF CASTILLO AND THEN DETERMINE IF HE IS "GARCIA" BY SHOWING PHOTOS TO LIEMBRACES AND LIRING-3 AND 4.

3. ADDRESSEES WILL BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

201-798301

ORIG: MM PALMER
UNIT: WH/3/V
EXT: 4521
DATE: 14 JULY 1967

SECRET

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 30 PER

COPY: WH8 RID COPY INFO: FILE, VR, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC2, CI/OA

SECRET WH/COG 8 DDP ADDP FI FI/INT2

17 16 33 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

TO MEXICO CITY INFO CARACAS

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-2111 (IN 11245)*

B. CARACAS-7262 (IN 12233)**

C. MEXICO CITY-1954 (IN 01455)***

1. REQUEST MEXICO CURRENT APPRAISAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIRING-3 (798301) AND WOULD BE BENEFACTORS OF VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AS SOON AFTER ROWTON RETURN MEXICO AS POSSIBLE.

2. CONCUR THAT [VALDEZ-MORENO] OPERATION APPEARS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. CAN LIRING-3 DISSUADE VALDEZ FROM THIS UNDERTAKING BY POINTING OUT EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA MONITORING OF SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS? 2 JUNE ARREST OF ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR), AMERICO MARTIN, AND 19 JUNE ARRESTS OF FELIPE NERI CARRILLO ALONG WITH SEVENTEEN OTHER DOUGLAS BRAVO ORIENTED TERRORISTS MIGHT SERVE AS CASES IN POINT.

3. SUGGEST THAT LIRING-3 MIGHT BE ABLE TO PERSUADE VALDEZ AND MORENO THAT INVOLVEMENT WITH VENEZUELAN SUBVERSION AT PRESENT TIME SIMPLY NOT PRUDENT AND WASTFUL OF RESOURCES WHICH COULD BE BETTER EMPLOYED ELSEWHERE.

CONTINUED

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PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 20276

TO

4. IF LIRING-3 UNABLE DAMPEN VALDEZ ARDOR BUT RETAINS ABILITY MONITOR ACTIVITIES, SEE NO HARM IN LIRING-3'S CONTINUED CONTACT, PROVIDED MONITORING CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING IN ANY WAY TO SUCCESS THEIR EFFORTS.

5. FOR CARACAS: REQUEST TRACES ORTEGA AND COMMENTS ON PARA 1, MEXICO 2075.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENTS: *ROWTON (LIRING-3 Case Officer) will return to Mexico without stopping in Caracas to discuss LIRING-3 operation.

**Caracas requested that LIRING-3 not become operationally engaged - principally because assistance most likely being directed to BRAVO guerrilla forces and the MIR and that the tangible advantage to be derived by the extremists would outweigh the value of any intelligence produced.

***LIRING-3 has established contact with VALDEZ and MORENO, young Mexican leftists who wish to go to Caracas and set up some sort of commercial venture in order to provide assistance to Venezuelan subversives. LIRING-3 aggreed to help them as partner in Venezuelan venture.

WH/1/Mexico

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

LAWRENCE M. STERNFIELD
C/WH/3
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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201-298301

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S E C R E T 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2075

IN 09498

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF A MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

B CARACAS 7262 (IN 02328)

1. ACCORDING TO SERGIO VALDEZ, LATTER'S CONTACT WITH VENEZUELAN REBELS IN CARACAS IS RAMIRO ORTEGA WHOM HE ORIGINALLY MET IN MEXICO. ORTEGA INSTRUCTED VALDEZ WHEN LATTER COMES CARACAS TO INSERT AD IN LOCAL NEWSPAPER SAYING: QUOTE LA PERSONA INTERESADA EN ARTESANIA MEXICANA FAVOR COMUNICARSE CON SERGIO VALDEZ UNQUOTE FOLLOWED BY ADDRESS. EITHER ORTEGA OR OTHER MEMBER VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WILL MAKE CONTACT. VALDEZ ALSO IN CONTACT WITH VENEZUELANS IN MEXICO.

12 JUL 1957

2. STATION BELIEVES VALDEZ AND RAUL MORENO DETERMINED HELP VENEZUELAN RESISTANCE WITH OR WITHOUT ADVICE OF LIRING-3. (298301) SINCE IT APPEARS DESIRABLE MONITOR THEIR ACTIVITIES, LIRING-3 FORMED LOOSE COMMERCIAL ASSOCIATION WITH THEM IN MEXICO CITY BY NAME "COLORLUZ". THIS WILL ALSO HELP LIRING-3 IN FUTURE DEALINGS WITH HIS REVOLUTIONARY FRIENDS IN CUBA WHEN NEXT VISITS HAVANA (WHICH HE BEING URGED DO SOON) AS COULD POINT TO PERSONAL

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

BT

CHANNELS TO BOTH GUATEMALAN AND VENEZUELAN REBEL ELEMENTS.

3. WALLACE B. ROWTON (IDEN) WHO DIRECTS LIRING-3 OP CURRENTLY ON TDY SOUTH AMERICA AND IS SCHEDULED FLY BACK MEXICO 18 OR 19 JULY VIA CARACAS. RATHER THAN EXPLAIN LIRING-3 OP, AT THIS POINT, WHICH INVOLVED UNDERTAKING, SUGGEST ROWTON STOP CARACAS ONE DAY AND DISCUSS OP DIRECTLY WITH STATION. WILL NOTIFY ROWTON IF STATION AGREEABLE. ROWTON UNDER DEEP COVER MEXICO CITY SO THAT EVENTUAL CARACAS MEETING SHOULD BE SET UP ACCORDINGLY.

4. MEXICO STATION TRACES RAMIRO ORTEGA NEGATIVE. REQUEST ADDEE TRACES.

S E C R E T

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SECRET 111930Z CITE MEXICO CITY 2076 11 Jan 67 IN 09490

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REFERENCE MEXICO CITY 2075 (IN 09498)

IDEN IS MR. ROBERT DRISCOLL.

SECRET

BT

SECRET

14-00000

798301

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INFO FILE VR, WH/COG-8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, CI/OA, FI/INT-2, SOD-6

SECRET 301930Z CITE CARACAS 7262 6 JUL 1967 30 Jun 67 IN 02328

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN

REF: MEXICO CITY 1954 (IN 01455)

201- file 798301

1. NO STATION TRACES.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE THAT STATION EXERCISE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS COVER BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT LIRING-3 NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE. HAVE NO OBJECTION TO MEXI MONITORING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT DO NOT DESIRE BECOME ENGAGED OPERATIONALLY.

3. PCV OBTAINING SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ABROAD PRESENT TIME AND STATION ABLE MONITOR THIS THROUGH EXISTING ASSETS. WHILE A CUBAN SPONSORED FUNDING MECHANISM WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT THE DOUGLAS BRAVO DISSIDENT PCV GROUP AND THE MIR, BELIEVE THAT TANGIBLE ADVANTAGES TO BE DERIVED BY THE EXTREMISTS WOULD OUTWEIGH THE VALUE OF ANY INTELLIGENCE PRODUCED.

4. HAS LIRING-3 BEEN SUFFICIENTLY TESTED IN OPERATIONS VIS A VIS GUAT GUERRILLAS TO ESTABLISH HIS BONA FIDES? IS HE STILL UNWITTING AND IF SO WHAT IS THE DEGREE OF OUR CONTROL OVER HIM?

Good questions

SECRET

SECRET

BT

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201-798301

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SECRET 300015Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1954 30 JUN 67 IN 01455

CARACAS INFO JMWAVE DIRECTOR

PERUMEN 6 JUL 1967

1. MEXICO CITY STATION ASSET LIRING-3 (798301) RECENTLY HAD SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH YOUNG MEXICAN LEFTISTS SERGIO GABRIEL (VALDEZ) AND RAUL (MORENO) WONCHEE WHO INTERESTED HELP LEFTIST ELEMENTS VENEZUELA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES OUTSIDE COMMUNIST PARTY FRAMEWORK. VALDEZ WHO WOULD TAKE CARE COMMERCIAL VENTURE USED AS COVER FOR THIS ACTIVITY CURRENTLY IN CONTACT WITH MARYEDITH GARCIA MENDEZ AVENIDA LOS GERANIOS RES. MAFARA 4, LA FLORIDA, CARACAS. GARCIA WHO DIVORCED OR OBTANING DIVORCE IS WEALTHY WOMAN WHO TRAVELS EXTENSIVELY AND TOOK APT COURSE MEXICO WITH VALDEZ. SHE WILLING FINANCE DECORATIVE GLASS FACTORY RUN BY VALDEZ AND IS UNWITTING OF LATTER'S PLAN TO USE SUCH FACILITY AS COVER FOR SUPPORT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES. MORENO WHO CLAIMS HAVE LEFTIST CONTACTS VENEZUELA WOULD HANDLE CLANDESTINE WORK. TWO MEN WENT TO CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, FOR HELP BUT WERE GIVEN RUN AROUND AND FINALLY TOLD CONTACT LIRING-3 AS THEIR PROJECT "TOO SENSITIVE FOR CUBANS TO SUPPORT AT THIS TIME".

2. LIRING-3 WHO CURRENTLY IN TOUCH WITH PEPS GUAT GUERRILLA

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE TO MEXICO CITY 1954 S E C R E T

MEXICO AND ATTEMPTING BUILD COMMERCIAL COVER FOR ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT THESE GUERRILLAS AGREED HELP MORENO AND VALDEZ AS PARTNER IN THEIR VENEZUELA VENTURE. WILL PROVIDE IDENTITY MORENO'S SUBVERSIVE CONTACTS VENEZUELA AND HELP DESIRED BY THEM AS SOON INFO AVAILABLE. WOULD APPRECIATE ADDEES TRACES MARYEDITH GARCIA. STATION TRACES NEGATIVE.

S E C R E T

BT

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201-288301

14-00000

798301

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DATE: 30 June 1967

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR 16464

1 16 50 Z

TO MEXICO CITY INFO: GUATEMALA CITY, JMWAVE

REF: MEXICO CITY 1930 (IN 00593)

1. NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR.

2. MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ PROBABLY MARCO ISIDA VINICIO GONZALEZ Y GONZALEZ (201-817006) WHO PRESIDENT GUATEMALA UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (AEU) AND KNOWN REBEL ARMED FORCES (FAR) MEMBER.

3. IF FURTHER L-3 CONTACT CONFIRMS SALAZAR FAR CONNECTION, AND SALAZAR CONTINUES RECEIVING COLD TREATMENT FROM CUBANS, BECOMES NATURAL RECRUITMENT CANDIDATE. THEREFORE HQS INTERESTED ANY FURTHER INFO WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED, INCLUDING CONFIRMATION BY OTHER STATION SOURCES IF CAN BE SECURELY OBTAINED.

6 JUL 1967

LIRING-3

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: LIRING-4 reported Carlos Enrique Salazar visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico and requested to go to Cuba. Salazar destitute and without necessary documentation. Cuban Embassy personnel appear in no hurry to help him travel to Cuba.

198301

C/WH/2
WH/COG/FI
WH/FI

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD

WALTER J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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S E C R E T 282326Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1930

GUATEMALA CITY INFO DIRECTOR, JMWAVE 29 Jun 57 IN 00593

PBRUMEN

1. LIRING-4 WHO NOW WORKING LIRING TALKED TO CARLOS ENRIQUE SALAZAR AT LIRING 22 JUNE. LATTER SAID:

A. HE FLED GUAT CA 7 JUNE AS CONNECTED WITH REBEL MOVEMENT AND POLICE LOOKING FOR HIM.

B. HE STAYING WITH ANGEL CAMPIARAN SANCHEZ WHO OWNS BATTERY SHOP CALLE DE AMORES 806, LETRACX, MEXICO CITY. ANGEL CAMPIRAN IS FATHER ENICE CAMPIRAN YOUNG MEXICAN STUDENT REPORTEDLY ASSASSINATED WITH HUSBAND BY POLICE IN GUAT CITY.

C. COULD GIVE MARCO VINICIO GONZALEZ, PRESIDENT "SOCIEDAD ALUMNOS UNIVERSITARIOS DE GUATEMALA" AS REF IN GUAT.

D. REBEL MOVEMENT IN GUAT CRUMBLING AS RESULT INTENSIFIED ARMY AND POLICE COUNTER INSURGENCY ACTIVITIES.

2. LIRING STAFF APPARENTLY IN NO HURRY HELP GUAT REBEL WHO DESTITUTE WITHOUT PAPERS AND ANXIOUS GO PBRUMEN. WILL TRY HAVE LIRING-3 CONTACT HIM (GUAT STUDIED PAINTING IN GUADALAJARA) AND DEBRIEF RE REBEL CONTACTS IN GUAT.

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET IN 09493 PAGE 2/2

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 1930 S E C R E T

3. NO STATION TRACES SALAZER OR GONZALEZ. STATION HAS SEVERAL REFS TO EUNICE CAMPIRAN AS ACTIVE TROTSKYITE IN MEXI 1954 WHO KILLED WITH HUSBAND DAVID AGUILAR MORA GUATEMALA SUMMER 1966.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

268301

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES 3

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S E C R E T 212240Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1851

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

TYPIC PERUMEN

REFS A MEXICO CITY 1945*

21 Jun 67 IN 95240

B DIRECTOR 127320

798301

1. SUBJS REF B RETURNED CUBA 19 JUNE. LIRING-3 TO WHOM THEY HANDCARRIED LETTERS FROM HAVANA FRIENDS, HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH THEM. INFO OBTAINED DURING THESE MEETINGS CABLED MEXICO CITY 1319, (IN 93428) 1842 AND 1843.** (IN 94380)

2. DURING PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH LIRING-3 SHORTLY BEFORE RETURNING CUBA, DR. JOSE AGUILERA MACEIRAS TOLD L-3 HE SENIOR VICE MINISTER AND NO. TWO IN CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. UNLIKE DR. MAX FIGUEROA ARAUJO, EDUCATION VICE MINISTER IN CHARGE HIGHER (UNIVERSITY) EDUCATION, HE MEMBER COMMUNIST PARTY AND, AS SUCH CLAIMED COULD DO "FEW THINGS" FOR L-3 IF AND WHEN LATTER COMES CUBA. AGUILERA ADDED FIGUEROA TYPICAL OLD STYLE TEACHER AND STILL BOURGEOIS AT HEART WHO HAD CHANCE APPLY FOR COMMIE MEMBERSHIP BUT DID NOT TAKE IT.

3. HAVE ASKED LIRING-3 FOR ANY BIO ON VICE MINISTERS AND HIS PERSONAL ASSESSEMENT OF BOTH. IT ALREADY APPARENT HE NOT OVERLY IMPRESSED WITH PERSONALITY OF FIGUEROA WHOM HE FEELS IS OPPORTUNIST.

SECRET

BOTH MEN HAD LIRING-4 BUY LONG LIST OF ITEMS FOR WHICH, IN THE END, THEY HAD INSUFFICIENT FUNDS. AGUILERA APOLOGIZED AND OFFERED RE-IMBURSE LIRING-3 IN CUBAN PESOS WHENEVER HE COMES HAVANA.

S E C R E T

BT

*POSSIBLE REF SHOULD BE 1745** 1743
(IN 87949) (IN 87938)

14-00000

22 798301

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE F TOTAL COPIES

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ACTION WH8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, C/OPS, C/OA, FI.

S E C R E T 171520Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1885 17 Jun 67 IN 92302

DIRECTOR JMWAVE

PBRUMEN

1. LIRING-4 RECEIVED PHONE CALL 14 JUNE FROM CERTAIN "DELVA" ASKING FOR LIRING-9. WHEN TOLD LIRING-9 NOT AT LIRING, "DELVA" LEFT MESSAGE HAVE L-9 CONTACT HER ROOM 909 MARIA ISABEL HOTEL. THIS INFORMATION CONFIRMED BY LIENVOY SAME DAY.

2. DISCREET CHECK MARIA ISABEL IDENTIFIED OCCUPANT ROOM 909 AS SANDRA LINDA CONTRERAS, US CITIZEN GIVING HOME ~~TWON~~ Town AS NEW YORK, NO OTHER DETAILS. CONTRERAS CHECKED OUT HOTEL EARLY AFTERNOON 14 JUNE. STATION CHECKING AIR MANIFESTS THAT DATE TO NEW YORK. WOULD APPRECIATE TRACES INCLUDING LNERGO.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

798301

LIRING-3

19 JUN 1967

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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FROM 25/M

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, DDP, ADDP, TSD 6, FI

S E C R E T 302230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 0399 30 MAR 67 IN 33354

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LISAMPAN LIRING-3

1. REQUEST HQS REINSTATE POAS LIPLUG-1 AND LIPLUG-2. EXPLORING POSSIBILITY RECONTACT FOR USE AS BASEHOUSE KEEPERS/ TRANSCRIBERS FOR LP SERVING TECH INSTALLATION AGAINST LIRING-3. LIPLUGS IN TURN WILL BE USED MAN THIRD LISAMPAN LP WHEN SUITABLE ONE LOCATED.

2. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING THIS CLEARANCE.

S E C R E T

BT

C-105308 NR 119301

31 MAR 1967

SECRET

398301

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.

X-REF TO FILE NO.

FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐

DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD6, NE6, DO 4, DO/H 2,

S E C R E T 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 07441

Hold for LIRING/4

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

201-798301

26 MAY 1966

17 APR 1967

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 S E C R E T

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1,
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

FILE RID
INDEX
X NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 5
2 6
3 7
4 8

DISSEM BY 28/3 PER #

DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 RID COPY INFO: VR, FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 25 21 26Z CITE DIRECTOR 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

26 MAY 1966

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC [signature]

WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 17

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FROM: MEXICO CITY

ACTION: DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

9 MAY 1966

SECRET 250242Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234

5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MARIAN CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

14-00000

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLITERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UNSALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

14-00000

PAGE 3 MEXI 7234 S E C R E T **SECRET**

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBJECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 19

ORIG : W.F. Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
3	7
4	8

9 MAY 66 20 76z

TO : MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WH8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY C/CA, WH/C8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

Card crypts
Hold for 772
10 MAY 1966
NR
NR

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

M/R - Check original incoming cable - derog info as to connections w/Cubans?

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

998301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 20

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

ORIG: J. X. [illegible]ce/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 4167/5424
DATE: 12 May 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION: 3 PER ___ #

INDEX / DESTROY / RETURN TO ___ BRANCH / FILE RID
[X] NO INDEX [X] FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-815836

CONF: WH 8 [X] RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR, WH/COG 8, CI/CA

SECRET 12 22 12 Z CITE DIRECTOR 01284

MEXICO CITY

REF MEXICO CITY 1361 (IN 62544)*

1. SUBJECT REF 201-815836 IS LIROSIN ONE.

2. TO FACILITATE CABLE DISTRIBUTION XX AND CRYPT RECOGNITION, LIRING CRYPT WILL BE RESERVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR LIRING PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH LIRING CRYPTS ALREADY ASSIGNED WILL BE RETAINED.

END OF MESSAGE

WH COMMENT *Requested Crypt be assigned Leon CRUZ-Garcia who targetted against LIRING-3. 998201

carded + recorded 15 may 67

15 MAY 1967

WH/COG/FISHER AMES (TELECORD) 8

William V. Broe
C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. Fisher
AC/WH/1

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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798301

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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FROM 22

ACTION WHZ

RID COPY

FILE

S E C R E T 200047Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1162

20 APR 67 IN 49085

DIRECTOR

PBRUMEN LIRING-3

REF: DIRECTOR 92565

20 APR 1967

1. LICAGE-1 S FAMILY INCREASED SINCE LAST CONTACTED AND IS NOW TOO LARGE FOR LIRING-3 L/P. SAME CONDITION APPLIES LIPLUGS. REQUEST CLEARANCE LEON (CRUZ) GARCIA. DPOB 11 APRIL 40, PACHUCA HIDALGO, MEXICO, FOR USE L/P/KEEPER L-3 OP. SUBJ KNOWN TO STATION PEUVION PAST 2 YEARS AS RESPONSIBLE HARD WORKING PRO U.S. TYPE. IN VIEW URGENCY THIS OP PLUS FACT SGSWIRL OPERATOR NOW MEXICO, REQUEST PRIORITY PROCESSING.

2. PLS ADVISE.

Fantastic, but--

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

20 APR 1967

11 MAY 1967

John, I believe that we have a case now. Pls file

Hold for # 772.

14-00000

	CLASSIFIED MESSAGE	TOTAL COPIES 32	
INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO	SECRET		REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
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X-REF TO FILE NO.			
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐			
DESTROY ☐ SIG.			
21			
ACTION WH-8	☒ RID COPY	ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED	UNIT / TIME / BY
INFO FILE VR, WH/COG-4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/RA, TSD-6, FI, DDP, ADDP, CI/OA			

S E C R E T 122250Z CITE MEXICO CITY 1086 12 APR 67 IN 43875

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRING-3

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 3399 (IN 33549)

B. HMMA 31721

STATION NOW IN RECEIPT RECEIVER NEEDED MONITOR REF B INSTALLATION IN HOME LIRING-3 AND LP READY AND WAITING. REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING CLEARANCES REF A BASEHOUSE KEEPER CANDIDATES.

S E C R E T

SECRET

BT

13 APR 1967

201-814895

201-350966

14-00000

201-298301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ORIG: J. Stewart/sas
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954/9041
DATE: 11 April 1967

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY ___ PER ___ #

CONF: WH 8   RID COPY

INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO ___ BRANCH FILE RID
NO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO: FILE , VR MPS/BE 2, CI/OPS, CI/OA

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pica)

SECRET 12 23 33Z CITE DIRECTOR 92161

TO MEXICO CITY

PBRUMEN LIRAVINE

REF HMMW-15396*

PROJECT LIRAVINE APPROVED 7 APRIL FOR DOLLARS 36,150 INCLUDING FUNDS FOR UMPHLET AND LIRING-3 OPS. COPY 13 APRIL. SINCE LIRANCH SERIOUSLY OVEROBLIGATED BECAUSE OF LISAMPAN, UMPHLET AND LIRING-3 CHARGES, PLEASE REOBLIGATE TO LIRAVINE WHERE APPROPRIATE AND DO SAME WITH LISAMPAN WHEN WRITTEN AND APPROVED.

END OF MESSAGE

*WH COMMENT: Ref advised that Hqs include LIRING-3 and UMPHLET under LIRAVINE Project renewal request.

13 APR 1967

WH/B+F David Wilson Klattue

WH/COG

William V. Broe
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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YES ☐ NO
TO FILE NO.
TO FILE NO.
RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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SECRET

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FROM DISSEM BY 38

ACTION WH 8

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INFO FILE, VR, RI/AN, WH/COG 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI

S E C R E T 082253Z CITE MEXICO CITY 3336

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE, GUATEMALA CITY

PBRUMEN LIRING

9 FEB 1967

REF: DIRECTOR 73089

1. RE QUESTIONS ASKED REF, WALLACE B. ROWTON SAW LIRING-3 (795301) OFF ON PLANE WHICH TRAVELED NON-STOP GUAT CITY FROM MEXI CITY. L-3 SAID HE STAYED AT FLORIDA HOTEL AS PLANNED AND RECEIVED PHONE CALLS THERE FROM FAR REPS. L-3 SAID HE MET SEVERAL TIMES AND HAD LUNCH WITH NICOLAS BATSAKIS, DIRECTOR OF METALOPLASTICA, AND BROUGHT BACK SAMPLES OF PLAETIC FLOWERS MADE AT FACTORY AND WHICH SEEN BY ROWTON.

2. ROWTON PLANNING QUERY L-3 FOR MORE DETAILS TRIP AND DESCRIPTIONS INDIVIDUALS HE MET. NEXT ROWTON L-3 MEETING NIGHT OF 8 FEB 67. FAR REP MEXI CITY HAS NOT YET CONTACTED L-3 TO PICK UP MEDICINE, RADIO TUBES AND COGNAC.

3. HQS PLS INDEX NICOLAS BATSAKIS AND METALOPLASTICA TO MEXI STA FILE P-12729.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

File reviewed 8 March 67 by A. [illegible] WH/1

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

ORIG: Jack Stewart/nao
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 6954
DATE: 7 February 1967

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1	5
2	6
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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

DISSEM BY 15 PER ______ #

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY

SECRET 7 16 41 Z CITE DIRECTOR 73089

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 8 FEB 1967

PBRUMEN LIRING

REFS A. MEXICO CITY 0240 (IN 93416)*

B. MEXICO CITY 0130 (IN 88362)**

PLEASE ADVISE WHAT STEPS HAVE BEEN AND COULD BE TAKEN TO CONFIRM LIRING-3'S TRAVEL AND STORY OF ACTIVITIES WHILE IN GUATEMALA CITY. DID HE STAY AT HOTEL FLORIDA AS PLANNED REF B? COULD ROWTON SAFELY ELICIT DESCRIPTIONS OF YOUNG FAR REPRESENTATIVE CONTACT AT MUSEUM AND FEMALE CONTACT AT RESTAURANT? ALSO APPRECIATE DETAILS METALOPLASTICA VISIT AND ANY OTHER INFO TO ASSIST HQS FOLLOW THIS HIGHLY complex CASE.

END OF MESSAGE

*Furnished details LIRING-3 trip to Guatemala City 26-29 January.
**Reported LIRING-3's departure and plans to go Guatemala City.

WH/COG

WH/2/G

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WH

W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 27

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INFO

31 JAN 67 80358

S E C R E T 312102Z CITE JMWAVE 5378 (LINGHURST ACTING)

CARACAS INFO DIRECTOR, RIO DE JANEIRO

TYPIC AMPOP

REF: CARACAS 5376 (IN 57369)*

* CAR HQS STATED HAS ON AMPOP-1 WIFE POL. ORIENTATION

1. JMWAVE FILES DO NOT REFLECT ANY INFO RE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF AMPOP-1 WIFE.

2. DI SERVENO, WHO DEBRIEFED AND TRAINED AMPOP-1 IN BEIRUT, REMEMBERS FAMILY WAS TOUCHY SUBJECT WITH AGENT WHO DESERTED VENEZUELAN WIFE AND CHILDREN IN CUBA TO "MARRY" SYRAIAN GIRL IN FICTITIOUS CEREMONY. BECAUSE OF THIS AND LACK OF TIME, POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF WIFE WAS NOT DISCUSSED WITH AMPOP-1 AND ONLY ROUTINE PRQ PART ONE INFO WAS OBTAINED.

3. HOWEVER, WISH POINT OUT FOLLOWING FACTS. ACCORDING TO [illegible]-3 REPORTS, WIFE AND CHILDREN WERE DETAINED AS THEY BOARDED CUBANA FLIGHT FOR MEXICO CITY 9 OCT 66 AND WIFE DENOUNCED CASTRO REGIME OPENLY AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL MEXICO 17 OCT 66. ALTHOUGH APPARENTLY WIFE IS NOT PROREGIME, POSSIBILITY EXISTS SHE MAY HAVE AGREED SERVE CUBAN I.S. IN EXCHANGE FOR PERMISSION LEAVE CUBA WITH CHILDREN AND GET EVEN WITH AMPOP-1.

S E C R E T

SECRET

14-00000

DISSEM BY: [ ] YES [ ] NO
INDEX TO FILE NO.
FILE NO.
RET. TO BRANCH [ ]
DESTROY [ ] SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE — TOTAL COPIES 49

SECRET

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INFO: FILE VR, WH8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/INT 2, SB8, SOD 6, CI/PS, CS/SGO, CA2, CA/O4, DO7

S E C R E T 190340Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9934 — 19 JAN 67 IN 81261

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY

TYPIC LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 9339 (IN 72194)

798301

1. AT MEETING WITH WALLACE B. ROWTON 16 JAN 67, LIRING-3 REPORTED THAT CUBAN A13 ON 11 JAN CALLED LIRING-3 ASIDE DURING RECEPTION AT EMB AND STATED HE HAD RECEIVED CABLE FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ASKING LIRING-3 RETURN CUBA FOR ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE BELIEVES THIS IS ANSWER HIS FIRST LETTER TO RODRIGUEZ FOLLOWING LAST TRIP TO CUBA MID DECEMBER AT WHICH RODRIGUEZ INTRODUCED HIM TO OSMANI CIENFUEGOS AND AT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED LIRING-3 PROPOSAL ASSIST TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE IN GUAT.

3. LIRING-3 AND STA BELIEVE IT BEST L-3 NOT JUMP MINUTE CUBANS CALL SO HE TELEPHONED RODRIGUEZ NIGHT 17 JAN INFORMED HIM HE WOULD GO CUBA BUT NOT UNTIL AFTER HAD MADE ANOTHER TRIP SOUTH WHICH MUST DO IN NEXT FEW DAYS. LIRING-3 PLANS GO GUAT ABOUT 27 JAN AFTER RECEIVING SUPPLIES ROWTON ORDERED WHILE AT HQS WHICH DUE ARRIVE MEXICO 25 JAN. POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT RODRIGUEZ WILL ASK LIRING-3 COME CUBA PRIOR TRIP TO GUAT BUT LIRING-3 INTENDS BEG OFF IF POSSIBLE. RESULTS PHONE TALK WILL BE OBTAINED AT ROWTON LIRING-3 MEETING NIGHT 18 JAN.

SECRET

14-00000

4. DURING PAST WEEK LIRING-3 CONTACTED ARCHAEOLOGIST FRIEND CARLOS NAVARETTE CACERES, GUAT COMMIE WORKING FOR MEXI GOVT, WHO REVEALED TO LIRING-3 IN GREAT CONFIDENCE HE INFORMED BY MUTUAL FRIENDS OF LIRING-3'S RECENT TRIP TO GUAT. NAVARETTE FURTHER STATED HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO PLACE HIMSELF AT DISPOSAL OF LIRING-3 TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. NAVARETTE SAID HE AND JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA WERE MEMBERS OF FAR NETWORK IN MEXI. HE CAUTIONED LIRING 3 AGAINST CONTACT WITH MEXI COMMUNIST PARTY BECAUSE CERTAIN HIGH LEVEL POLICY MATTERS HAD NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED BETWEEN PCM AND FAR.

5. NAVARETTE FURTHER TOLD LIRING-3 MASSIVE SOVIET AID PAREN IN EXCESS OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARES END PAREN WAS AVAILABLE TO FAR QUOTE DIRECTLY UNQUOTE BUT WITH CERTAIN STRINGS ATTACHED WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT PLACE FAR UNDER COMPLETE SOVIET CONTROL. FAR, IN DESPARATE ATTEMPT RETAIN INDEPENDENCE, IS RAISING FUNDS ON OWN BY SUCH MEANS AS BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

6. PLAN HAVE LIRING-3 RENT HOUSE IN SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, LEAVE SHIPMENT THERE ON WAY TO GUAT, CONTACT FAR REPS INSIDE GUAT AS ON LAST TRIP, AND EXPLAIN SHIPMENT IS AT HOUSE AND CAN BE PICKED UP WHEN THEY WISH. WILL EXPECT THEM PICK UP SHIPMENT IN SAN CRISTOBAL AND CARRY ACROSS BORDER.

* Requested up be discussed with Rostow.

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798301

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S E C R E T 062152Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9849

DIRECTOR INFO GUATEMALA CITY 6 Jan 67 IN 73020

ATTENTION DAINOLD

REFS: (A) GUATEMALA CITY 6831 (IN 61532)

(B) GUATEMALA CITY 6847 (IN 64231)

(C) GUATEMALA CITY 6881 (IN 68762)

(D) GUATEMALA CITY 6883 (IN 69317)

(E) GUATEMALA CITY 6892 (IN 70202) *

(F) HGGA 8352

OVER

1. USING REFS ABOVE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GUATEMALA CITY COS AND MEXICO CITY STATION OFFICERS ON OPERATIONS WHICH CAN BE INITIATED BY WOFACT TO AID MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS COUNTER GUERRILLA ARMS SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO INTO GUATEMALA. FOLLOWING POINTS EVOLVED:

A. MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS APPARENTLY BELIEVE MOST SMUGGLING OCCURS IN SOUTHEASTERN PORTION STATE OF CHIAPAS ON MEXICAN SIDE AND SOUTHWESTERN PORTION GUATEMALA WHERE GOOD ACCESS ROADS EXIST. MOST SMUGGLING DONE VIA TRUCKS, BUSES AND OTHER VEHICLES. BOTH GOVERNMENTS COOPERATING CLOSELY AND HAVE BEEFED UP OR HAVE PLANS TO BEEF UP MILITARY UNITS ..

SECRET

THIS BORDER AREA TO DETECT ARMS TRAFFIC. GUATEMALAN SECOND VICE MINISTER DEFENSE, COLONEL FRANCISCO SOSA AVILA, HAS INITIATED UNILATERAL OPERATION TO PENETRATE GUATEMALAN CUSTOMS HOUSES IN KEY AREAS TO DETERMINE WHO AIDING SMUGGLERS.

B. TREMENDOUS SURGE OF GOODWILL WHICH NOW EXISTS BETWEEN MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENTS WILL CERTAINLY AID IN KEEPING JOINT OPERATION OF WIPING OUT SMUGGLERS ON TRACK. TEND BELIEVE MAJOR WOFACT EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGEMENT AND AID TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS WITH ADVICE, TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, TRANSPORTATION, MONEY AND HARD INFO ON SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES WHEN AVAILABLE. AS CITED IN REFS, GUATEMALA CITY STATION HAS ALREADY INITIATED SUCH MATERIAL SUPPORT TO GUATEMALAN TREASURY GUARD TO BUILD UP ITS COLLECTION CAPABILITIES.

C. REGARDING COLONEL SOSA'S UNILATERAL PENETRATION OF THE CUSTOMS HOUSES ALONG THE BORDER, MEXICO CITY STATION CAN DISCUSS SIMILAR POSSIBILITY WITH LITEMPO-8 (775322) TO SEND PERSONNEL TO PENETRATE MEXICAN CUSTOMS HOUSES. THIS MIGHT REQUIRE FINANCIAL AID FROM MEXICO CITY STATION TO PAY SALARIES OF ADDITIONAL EMPLOYEE/AGENTS.

2. UNILATERALLY, STATIONS PLAN:

A. EXPLOITATION OF WHATEVER POTENTIAL LIRING-3 (798301) AND NORRIS K. UMPHLET (C-16251) MAY HAVE IN PENETRATING GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND ARMS TRAFFIC RING. THESE PLANS DISCUSSED IN SEPARATE CABLES.

9 JAN 1967

B. LIRENO-1, FORMER MEXICAN IMMIGRATION OFFICER, WILL BE QUERIED ON HIS ABILITY RECONTACT FORMER COLLEAGUES ALONG BORDER AREA WHO HAVE ACCESS INFO ON ARMS SMUGGLING FOR POSSIBLE UNILATERAL RECRUITMENT. THIS DIFFICULT OPERATION, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF COMMO PROBLEMS CREATED BY DISTANCE FROM MEXICO CITY. ALSO, ANYONE WHO NOT FROM BORDER AREA EASILY SPOTTED BY LOCALS AND WOULD CREATE SUSPICION.

C. ON 5 OR 6 JAN 67, MEXICAN AND GUATEMALAN AUTHORITIES PLAN MEET TO DISCUSS SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES AND WHAT THESE GOVERNMENTS CAN DO TO JOINTLY SMASH ARMS TRAFFIC. COS GUATEMALA WILL FIND OUT WHO ATTENDED MEETING AND WHAT WAS AGREED UPON TO GIVE MEXICO CITY STATION CLEARER IDEA OF FOLLOW UP POSSIBILITIES.

D. IN VIEW FACT LIREBEL-1 TRIP TO CUBA HAS NOT PANNED OUT TO DATE AND FACT HE COULD BE OF IMMEDIATE USE TO GUATEMALA CITY STATION IN WORKING WITH GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ON GUERRILLAS AND ARMS TRAFFIC, PLAN CANCEL CUBA TRAVEL AND HAVE HIM RE-ENTER SECRET

JAN 1967

PAGE 4 MEXICO CITY 9849 S E C R E T

9 JAN 1967

GUATEMALAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SEPARATE DISPATCH TO FOLLOW.

2. DESPITE LINLUCK ASSESSMENT CAPUANO WHICH SHOWED OBVIOUS PREJUDICE, STATION INTENDS REVAMP PLANS FOR CAPUANO RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT. CABLE TO FOLLOW.

3. ONE OF MAIN POINTS IN ENTIRE CASE IS HOW SERIOUS IS SMUGGLING THREAT. THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF ARMS IN GUATEMALA FROM VARIOUS HISTORICAL INCIDENTS (1954 FALL OF ARBENZ REGIME; 13 NOV 1960 UPRISING WHEN LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARMS TAKEN FROM GUATEMALAN MILITARY; 1961 WHEN ARMS LEFT IN GUATEMALA TRAINING SITES AFTER BAY OF PIGS; AND CONTINUOUS INFILTRATION OF ARMS ON SMALL SCALE OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS). WOFACT GOALS OF JOINT OPERATION ARE TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF ARMS SMUGGLING INTO GUATEMALA FROM MEXICO AND ASSIST GUATEMALAN AND MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN EFFORT REDUCE ARMS TRAFFIC AND GUERRILLA THREAT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

4. CANNOT ESITMATE COST OR DURATION OF OPERATION YET, BUT EXPECT SOME FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE MAY BE REQUIRED TO HELP BOTH GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN BORDER AREA. THIS, OF COURSE, IS IN ADDITION TO TECHNICAL AND OTHER

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EQUIPMENT. *4 - Leads on Current Arms Smuggling Activities*

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S E C R E T 041905Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9310 DO4, DC/H3, CCS3, CSPS, ADDP

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE GUATEMALA CITY 5 JAN 67

TYPIC LIRING 4 JAN 67 IN 71138

REF MEXICO CITY 9608

1. FOLL ARE HIGHPOINTS LIRING-3 DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON ON 2 JAN ON HIS VISIT TO GUATEMALA AND HIS DISCUSSIONS IN VILLAGE NEAR ZACAPA WITH ALLEDGED REPS OF GUAT GUERRILLA GROUP.

2. LIRING-3 MET AT HUEHUETENANGO BUS STATION BY TWO MEN WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS "OCTAVIO" AND "FALCON" AND LOCAL FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS (FAR) REPS. SINCE LIRING-3 ONLY ABLE OBTAIN 48 HR GUATEMALA VISA FAR REPS ASKED HIM RECROSS INTO MEXICO AND MEET THEM AGAIN NIGHT 22 DECEMBER AT POINT ON MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY NEAR LA MESILLA, GUATEMALA. LIRING-3 DID AS TOLD, WAS LED ACROSS BORDER BLACK AND DRIVEN TO GUATEMALA CITY BY SUCCESSION OF VEHICLES. DURING ALL LEGS OF TRIP SECOND VEHICLE WAS USED WELL AHEAD OF ONE DRIVING LIRING-3 TO GUARD AGAINST ROADBLOCKS.

3. IN GUATEMALA CITY LIRING-3 TAKEN TO HOUSE ON 29TH AVENUE OCCUPIED BY WOMAN INTRODUCED AS VICKY (WILL OBTAIN EXACT ADDRESS). TOLD STAY THERE UNTIL CONTACTED WHICH SECRET

OCCURRED 23 DEC WHEN OCTAVIO AND FALCON RETURNED AND ESCORTED HIM BY CAR TO GUALAN ON TRANS OCEANIC HIGHWAY BEYOND ZACAPA THERE LIRING-3 INTRODUCED TO "PASCUAL" AND "SALVADOR" WHO IDENTIFIED SELVES AS MEMBERS OF "EDGAR IBARRA" FRONT. THESE TWO REPS STATED FOLLOWING:

A. TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE AGREEMENTS NOT CARRIED OUT BECAUSE OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

B. FOR ABOVE REASON CUBAN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INCONSEQUENTIAL AND THEREFORE GUERRILLAS HAVE RESORTED TO MORE DIRECT METHODS TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE INCLUDING BANK AND TRAIN ROBBERIES. MOST DIRECT SOURCE OF OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SOVIETS VIA THEIR EMBASSY MEXICO.

C. GUERRILLA ALSO UNABLE COUNT ON CUBA FOR ASSISTANCE AS CUBA TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH OWN PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY CONSOLIDATION. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR EVIDENCED SARCASM IN THIS STATEMENT.

D. "EDGAR IBARRA" GUERRILLAS CONTROL FRONT MORE THAN 100 KILOMETERS LONG AND REQUIRE MORE AND MORE SUPPLIES TO EXPAND MEMBERSHIP AND INCREASE THEIR AREA (NOT FURTHER DESCRIBED).

E. IN PAST GUATEMALA GUERRILLAS THEMSELVES ARRANGED

SHIPMENTS ARMS AND SUPPLIES WITHIN MEXICO. CONSEQUENCES DISASTROUS, E.G. LOPEZ CASE. THEY HAVE LEARNED GREAT PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN MEX-GUAT BORDER AREA WHERE THERE NUMEROUS NORTH AMERICAN AGENTS WORKING ON MEXI SIDE UNDER COVER AS TOURISTS AND MISSIONARIES. SPECIFICALLY THERE IS AMERICAN BASE LOCATED AT YAXOQUINTELA (NOT IDENTIFIED) WITH AIRFIELD AND COMMO CENTER WHICH WELL KNOWN TO THEM AND ATTACKED BY THEM IN PAST. (STATION FEELS THIS MAY REFER TO "ALAS DE SOCORRO MISSION" IN IXTAPA, CHIAPAS.)

4. PASCUAL AND SALVADOR INDICATED INTEREST RECEIVING MANY TYPES SUPPLIES INCLUDING ARMS BUT SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED ANTI-BIOTICS AND TUBES FOR ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER. NO TYPES OR QUANTITIES SPECIFIED EITHER ITEM BUT GUATS SAID WOULD TAKE ANY AMOUNT THESE ITEMS THEY COULD GET.

5. LIRING-3 COMMITTED SELF RECONTACT GUATS IN 20-30 DAYS WHEN HE TOLD THEM WOULD HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. GUATS ASKED FOR CONCRETE PLAN RE MANNER SHIPPING SUPPLIES. THEY TOLD LIRING-3 THEY COULD HANDLE FROM MEXICAN SIDE OF BORDER TO THEIR GUERRILLAS IN GUATEMALA.

6. LIRING-3 SUGGESTED TO ROWTON THAT HOUSE BE RENTED IN

PAGE FOUR MEXICO CITY 9810 S E C R E T SECRET

SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, MEXICO, 300 KILOMETERS NORTH GUAT BORDER ON PANAM HIGHWAY AS PERMANENT CONTACT POINT WITH GUERRILLAS. LATTER TOLD LIRING-3 TOWN ACCESSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT THEY COULD PICK UP SUPPLIES THERE, CARRY ACROSS BORDER AND DELIVER TO GUERRILLA GROUP.

7. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE DEPARTING MEXICO FOR MONTREAL AND PROBABLY NEW YORK NEXT DAY FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD TRY OBTAIN RADIO TUBES AND ANTIBIOTICS IN TIME FOR LIRING-3 NEXT TRIP TO BORDER. LIRING-3 CONTACT PLAN WITH GUATS TO REMAIN SAME AS BEFORE: WHEN READY TRAVEL WILL CONTACT AUGUSTINA HERNANDEZ IN GUATEMALA CITY AND ADVISE HER DATE HIS ARRIVAL IN HUEHUE TENANGO. LIRING-3 WOULD NOT CARRY SUPPLIES TO GUATEMALA BUT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN MEXICO, TRAVEL TO HUEHUETENANGO MEET CONTACTS AND INFORM THEM WHERE LOCATION. GUERRILLAS WOULD THEN MAKE PICK UP AND CARRY SUPPLIES GUATEMALA.

8. STATION COMMENTS AND PRELIMINARY OPERATIONAL PROPOSAL BEING CABLED.

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FILE VR WH/COG 8, CI/OA, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI/INT 2,

S E C R E T 192319Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 5844 20 DEC 1966

MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR , JMWAVE

PBRUMEN LIRING 79830 20 DEC 62778

REF: MEXICO CITY-9638

1. STATION EXTREMELY INTERESTED LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL. FOLLOWING RESULT OF STATION TRACES AND INVESTIGATION OF INFO CONTAINED REF:

A. THERE ARE NO STATION TRACES ON AGUSTINA HERNANDEZ. NOT ABLE LOCATE PIEDRO SANTO (OR PIEDRA SANTA) PRINTING OFFICE IN ANY GUATEMALA CITY DIRECTORIES.

B. GUATEMALA CITY PHONE NUMBER 22 057 IS JOINTLY REGISTERED TO ROBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ AND SAMUEL B. (FRANCO) CORDON. NO TRACES EITHER ROBERTO OR SAMUEL, BUT JULIO HUMBERTO (FRANCO) PEREZ , WHO POSSIBLY BROTHER OF ROBERTO, REPORTEDLY INVOLVED TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN 1962 INCLUDING ARMS BUYING FOR GUERRILLAS.

C. THERE ARE NUMEROUS TRACES ON JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO WHICH INDICATE HE INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 1949.

2. ALSO NUMEROUS TRACES ON JACOBO (RODRIGUEZ) PADILLA, WHO

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INVOLVED IN COMMUNIST AND COMMUNIST FRONT ACTIVITIES SINCE 1940'S. MOST RECENT REPORT WAS NOVEMBER 1964 LIAISON REPORT WHICH LISTED HIM AS MEMBER OF THE PGT. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT RODRIGUEZ PARTICIPATED IN SOME FRONT ACTIVITIES WITH JUAN ANTONIO FRANCO. * RE DEBRIEFING LIRING/3

SECRET

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c o Lily

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S E C R E T 162035Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9534

79534

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

16 DEC 1966

16 Dec 66 IN 60637

TYPIC LIRING

1. LIRING-3 TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 14 DEC 66 HE HAD HEARD IN HAVA ON RECENT TRIP (HE RETURNED MEXI 5 DEC) THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD RECENTLY CAUSED ARREST OF ELEVEN MEMBERS EDITORIAL STAFF OF GRANMA NEWSPAPER.

2. L-3 LABELED THOSE ARRESTED AS MEMBERS OF QUOTE RED GUARD UNQUOTE WHICH HAD CRITICIZED CASTRO FOR HIS RECENT SPEECH REGARDING CUBAN MILITIA IRREGULARITIES AND DIFFICULTIES. CRITICISM REFLECTED IN COLUMNS OF GRANMA AND BROUGHT ABOUT ARREST OF ELEVEN.

3. ROWTON ASKED L-3 FOR IDENS THOSE ARRESTED BUT LATTER COULD NOT SUPPLY EXCEPT TO SAY ONE WAS HUSBAND OF HIS FRIEND VELKIS CUSA, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED. ROWTON HAS ASKED L-3 DISCUSS ARRESTS WITH ISMAEL SUAREZ DE LA PAZ ORDER OBTAIN MORE DETAILS.

4. L-3 STATED HE HAD DISCUSSED INTERNAL CUBAN AFFAIRS WITH SUAREZ AND LATTER TOLD HIM FIDEL CASTRO EXPERIENCING DIFFICULTIES ACCOMPLISHING OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF BUREAUCRATIC CLUMSINESS PARTY UNDERLINGS AND UNBELIEVABLE INEFFICIENCY CUBAN DIP SERVICE. SUAREZ TOLD L-3 CASTRO REQUIRED DELEGATE IMPORTANT AND SENSITIVE TASKS HIS CLOSE CONFIDANTS ORDER ASSURE ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

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S E C R E T 091757Z CITE GUATEMALA CITY 6913 9 JAN 1967 9 JAN 67 IN 74091

DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

REFS: A. MEXICO CITY-9839 (72194) (73330)

B. GUATEMALA CITY-6906 (HGG-4397)

C. MEXICO CITY-9810 (IN 71138)

1. STATION GUATEMALA MOST OPTIMISTIC DEVELOPMENTS LIRING-3 OPERATION WHICH APPEARS HAVE EXCELLENT POTENTIAL. OPERATIONAL TAKE SHOULD PROVE EXTREMELY USEFUL. STATION AGREES WITH MEXICO CITY THAT LONG RANGE OBJECTIVES THIS OPERATION PRECLUDE PASSAGE TO LIAISON AT THIS STAGE DEVELOPMENT.

2. AS REF B REPORTED THAT TWO MEMBERS OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) NOW IN HABANA SEEKING CUBAN AID, BELIEVE LETTER SUGGESTED PARA 1 OF REF A WOULD BE TIMELY AND ALMOST CERTAIN BOOST LIRING-3'S IMAGE WITH THE FAR.

3. BELIEVE PARALLEL OPERATION USING NORIS K. UMPHLET (PARA 3 REF A) ALSO OFFERS EXCELLENT POSSIBILITIES. AS MOST KEY COMMUNISTS IN GUATEMALA NOW UNDERGROUND, INITIAL CONTACTS MIGHT PROVE PROBLEM. UMPHLET MIGHT ARRANGE CONTACTS THROUGH GUATEMALAN EXILES IN MEXICO, OR COULD BEGIN WITH SO CALLED COMMUNIST "INTELLECTUALS", SUCH AS ROLANDO COLLADO ARDON OR ALFONSO BAUER PAIZ, WHO STILL IN THE OPEN.

201-798301

C-16351

14-00000

PAGE 2 GUATMALA CITY 6913 S E C R E T

GUATEMALA WILL BE HAPPY PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT.

4. RE PARA 4 REF C: STATION WOULD BE INTERESTED IN RECEIVING ANY ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE "ZENITH MEDIUM RANGE TRANSMITTER RECEIVER". ALSO NOTE WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT PURCHASE CORRECT TUBES IF NO ADDITIONAL DATA AVAILABLE.

S E C R E T

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: [illegible] 1967

SUBJECT:

FILE NUMBER: 807668 - 798301

Rec'd for my coordination an outgoing cable to MEXI, saying that PREVOHS had been granted a Limited Contact-Assessment POA on 19 Jan '67. The next sentence said that WH/1 was asking for amendment of this contact & assessment POA so that PREVOHS could provide cover for LIRING-3 (201-798301). Jack Stewart, at the outset of our conversation when I mentioned L-3, said "I hope you never got mixed up in the LIRING-3 case. What a mess".

I informed Stewart I had been deeply "mixed up" in the L-3 case since 3 June '66 when Stewart himself requested a POA on L-3. I told him of the three notices over a six months period I had sent to WH/1 asking for resolution of the derog info and my invitation to discuss. CI/OA never heard a word from WH/1 in answer to its notices. Then on 20 Dec. '66, CI/OA closed the LIRING-3 file for failure to comply. Stewart said Station was handling L-3 as a hostile, but appeared dumbfounded that the use of such a person as a directed agent requires that that person qualify & gain a POA/OA.

Re the requested amendment on PREVOHS, the latter has only a limited POA because of items cited in POA granting; moreover, L-3 has never had the proper approval and was technically disapproved by the action of 30 Dec. 1966.

Stewart removed sentence telling MEXI that they ~~were~~ will asking for such an amendment, and I coordinated on simple notification of POA action of 19 Jan '67.

OFFICE AND TITLE: CI/OA/WH

SIGNATURE:

FORM 1-62 1954

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GROUP 1
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(40)

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CANCELLATION TO DIVISION

DATE ______________

MEMORANDUM FOR: [illegible]

ATTENTION : [illegible]

201- ______________

C- ______________

The file on ______________________________ is cancelled and closed in CI/OA for the following reason:

Case closed for failure to comply.

M/R - See M/R dtd. 20 Jan. 1967 in 201-809668.
jk

Prior to any future use of Subject, it will be necessary to furnish a new approval request (Form #772) to CI/OA.

/s/ Edward P. Brown
CHIEF, CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

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FORM 3-65 691 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(9)

14-00000

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INSTRUCTION SHEET

DATE: 14 DEC 1966

CASE NO. 201- 798301

	SET UP FOR POA		EXPEDITE INDICES	DATE	EXPEDITE FBI INDICES	DATE
	SET UP FOR OA		SPECIAL INQUIRY	COVERT NAME CHECK	AREA	

USE

	ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST GREEN LIST
	ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		REQUEST RESULTS FI/D DOSSIER REVIEW
	EXTEND POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REVIEW FI/D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	REINSTATE POA FOR DAYS UNTIL		REQUEST RESULTS TECHNICAL INTERROGATION FROM: SECURITY OFFICE / DIVISION
	FORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISION		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OA
	FORWARD TO SECURITY OFFICE: ATTACHMENT / PRQ I		REVIEW SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OA
	CANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO DATED (No notice to Division)		REVIEW AT CI/OA: FBI REPORT / LCFLUTTER REPORT
✓	CANCEL PER CI/OA NOTICE TO DIVISION (~~Reason checked below,*~~ or see remarks)		REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE; ADVISE CI/OA OF NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE
	REQUEST RI TRACES	✓	FILE att.
	REQUEST OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		TICKLE
	REQUEST FIELD TRACES		NOTICE: FIRST / SECOND / FINAL
	REQUEST: PRQ I / PRQ II		OTHER

POA EXPIRED ________. PLEASE SUBMIT PRQ II. IF, WITHIN 30 DAYS, NO FURTHER INTEREST IN SUBJECT HAS BEEN INDICATED, POA WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY CANCELLED.

*FAILURE TO SUBMIT PRQ II AS REQUIRED UNDER CSI NO. 10-5 OR TO INDICATE ANY FURTHER INTEREST IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OF SUBJECT.

REMARKS

To: WH/1

Case closed for failure to comply.

/s/ Edward P. Brown

20 DEC 1966

CANCELLED

COPY TO SECURITY

[signature]

SIGNATURE

☐ OVER

FORM 7-63 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(21)

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INFO: FILE VR, WH/COG 8, MPS/BG 2, CI/OA

S E C R E T 141725Z CITE MEXICO CITY 9612 14 DEC 66 IN 59552

DIRECTOR

PERUMEN LIRAVINE

REF: DIRECTOR 57519

AS REQUESTED REF, LIRING-3 (49830) HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN LIRAVINE PROJECT RENEWAL.

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BT

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file

and now, about resolution of bona fides ----

NNNN 15 DEC 1966

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM

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ORIG: J. [illegible]/[illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN ☐ FILE NO. 201-[illegible]301

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 15 PER ____ #____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 4, CI, CI/OPS,

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET 1545 Z CITE DIRECTOR 58866

12 DEC 1966

TO [illegible] INFO [illegible]

File

11 JAN 1967

[illegible] [illegible] CITY

[illegible]

[illegible] CITY 9[illegible] ([illegible])

1. [illegible] TO [illegible]

[illegible]-5 ([illegible]) [illegible] MEXICO. [illegible]-3

[illegible] STAFF AGENT,

[illegible] D. [illegible], UNDER DEEP COVER [illegible] CITY. [illegible]

[illegible]-

[illegible] CUBA. [illegible]-3 [illegible] TRIPS

TO CUBA [illegible]. IN OCTOBER 1966 [illegible]-3 [illegible]

[illegible] ARREST

[illegible]. [illegible]-3

[illegible]

[illegible].

2. [illegible] CITY 9[illegible] AND DIRECTOR 5[illegible] ABOVE

[illegible]-3's SUGGESTION TO [illegible] CHIAPAS,

CONTINUED....

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WE/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

SECRET

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: INFO: VR , FILE ☐ RID COPY

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (REFERENCE NUMBER)

SECRET CITE DIRECTOR 58866

PAGE 2

TO

WHERE LIRING-3 FORMERLY WORKED FOR MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS, TO ATTEMPT CONTACT GUATEMALAN FRIENDS ACROSS BORDER AND ARRANGE MEET THEM MEXICO, ALSO TO MEET JACOBO RODRIGUEZ PADILLA TO DEVELOP MORE GUATEMALAN CONTACTS, ALL FOR PURPOSE SETTING ~~UP~~ STAGE CREATE NET-WORK FOR CUBANS.

& END OF MESSAGE

Summary Ref: Results LIRING-3 meeting with Jacobo RODRIGUEZ Padilla and set-up of meeting with Guatemalan communist in Guatemala.

WH/2/G TERRELL (TELECOORD)

WH/COG/CIXECS [signature]

[signature]
Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

[signature]
W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG : J. Stewart/pem
UNIT : WH/2
EXT : 3654
DATE : 9 December 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES:

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ROUTING: 1 5 / 2 6 / 3 7 / 4 8

DISSEM BY 15 PER ___ # ___

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ___ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR . FILE ☒ RID COPY WH/COG 8, CI, CI/OPS, CA

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET (DATE AND TIME FILED) 10 15 45 Z CITE DIRECTOR (REFERENCE NUMBER) 58867

TO GUATEMALA CITY

JMWAVE MEXICO CITY

[illegible]

DIRECTOR 58866

IDEN: CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, BORN 3 NOV 30 MEXICO CITY, MEXICAN ARTIST RESIDING MEXICO CITY, RESIDENT HAVANA 1963-64. WIFE MIRIAM CHECHY, EX CUBAN CITIZEN OF CUBAN-CHINESE DESCENT, EMPLOYEE OF CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNTIL NOV 66. JURADO 5 FEET 6, 130 POUNDS, HAZEL EYES, DARK BROWN HAIR, LIGHT COMPLEXION, APPARENT AGE 35, SLIGHT BUILD, BOYISH APPEARANCE, HAIRLINE RECEDING ON SIDES OF FOREHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/2/G Terrell (Telecord)

WH/COG/CICS

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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W. J. Kaufman
C/WH/1

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(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

JURADO DELMAR, CARLOS
201-796301
SEX M COB ?

201-020481
MEXI-07920
15 JUL 66

CIT ?
OCC ?
RE NO MORE HEARD OF PLANS SEND ARMANDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS TO MEXICO CITY INSPECT CONSULATE. SUBJ ADMITS BEING PUZZLED WHY RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT APPEARED.

R 6608050621

Ring 3

FILE IN 201-798301

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.

FORM 8-67 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE: 23 June 1966 crm
TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance [signature]	C NO.: 201 - 798301
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. B..wn	SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS (*See Remarks*)

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

In order to qualify Subject for a POA, it is necessary to resolve the derogatory information which you previously submitted and to furnish concrete evidence as to establishment of Subject's bona fides.

Note has been made of MEXI 7234, DIR 07441 and MEXI 7454.

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(20)

14-00000

4-65 3U/U

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TOTAL COPIES 43

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM DSG A424 Pg 90-19

ACTION WH-8

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME 18453 BY

INFO FILE, VR, CS DO, DDP, Suspense - C/WH, CDO, ADDP, WH/C-8, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/Prop, CA/CO-4, CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW

ACTION

S E C R E T 091642Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7855

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

9 JUL 66 52438

TYPIC

REF: MEXICO CITY 7828 (51413)

1. AT MEETING 1800 HRS 8 JULY 66 BETWEEN WALLACE B. ROWTON AND CARLOS JURADO DELMAR, LATTER STATED HE HAD SAT IN ON QUOTE BULL SESSION UNQUOTE THAT MORNING BETWEEN REYNALDO CEPEDA HERNANDEZ AND MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS AT WHICH SUBJECT WAS FIDEL CASTRO.

2. BOTH LOZANO AND CEPEDA DECLARED CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY THROUGH ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD FORMALLY UPBRAIDED FIDEL FOR HIS EXCESSES FOLLOWING GUANTANAMO INCIDENT. PARTICULARLY DISTASTEFUL TO PARTY WAS FIDEL RAGING ON RADIO IN WHICH HE CALLED U.S. HIJO DE PERRO. SHORTLY AFTER SPEECH HIJO DE PERRO SIGNS APPEARED IN HAVANA. AFTER SPEECH PARTY ALSO CONCERNED FIDEL'S ACTIONS DURING FORTHCOMING 26 JULY CELEBRATION AND THIS ANOTHER REASON PARTY BELIEVED FIDEL SHOULD TAKE REST ORDER CALM HIMSELF AND ASSURE ORDERLY DIGNIFIED CELEBRATION.

3. THROUGHOUT BULL SESSION DISCUSSION IMPLICATIONS WERE

LIRING 3

Suspense handled by M Bencheq 11 Jul
from C OC/s

201-798301

14-00000

FIDEL'S MENTAL CONDITION SUCH HE UNACCOUNTABLE AND UNPREDICTABLE IN HIS ACTIONS.

4. MUST POINT OUT ATMOSPHERE OF BULL SESSION ONE IN WHICH ALL THREE PARTICIPANTS CONFIDENT THEY SPEAKING WITH FRIENDS WHO WOULD NOT RELAY STATEMENTS MADE.

S E C R E T Re Rpt That Castro Drop From Scene Due Operation For Hernia

BT

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
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FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES 5

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REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM
Dissem BY 24 P- 90-19

ACTION
WH-8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME

INFO
FILE, CS DO, VR, DDP, C/WH-Suspense, AddP, CA-2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O-3, WH/C-8, SB-2, D/MS-2, CI/OPS, CI/IC-2, FI, FI/D-4, FI/INT, IW, EUR-2, ID-4, DO/H-3

S E C R E T 062230Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7232 6 JUL 66 IN 51413

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7711 (IN 43725) *

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON 4 JULY 1966 HE HAD DISCUSSED CASTRO DISAPPEARANCE WITH MIGUEL LOZANO VILLALOBOS, COUNSELOR OF CUBAN EMBASSY, AND LATTER REPORTED CASTRO DROP FROM SCENE DUE OPERATION FOR DOUBLE HERNIA. LOZANO TOLD JURANDO HE LEARNED THIS FROM BRITISH CITIZEN WHO CAME OUT OF CUBA IN LAST FEW DAYS AFTER SPENDING THREE YEARS THERE ASSISTING AGRICULTURE PROGRAM. LOZANO REPORTED BRITISHER VERY CLOSE TO FIDEL.

2. JURADO ALSO TOLD ROWTON CASTRO HAD OVER EXERTED HIMSELF DURING RECENT GUATANAMO INCIDENT WHICH INDUCED HERNIA. JURADO ALSO OPINED CASTRO HAD SOMEHOW INCURRED SOVIET DISPLEASURE. ROWTON DID NOT QUESTION HIM ON WHERE HE GOT THIS IDEA BUT IT MAY ALSO HAVE COME FROM LOZANO.

S E C R E T *REF: RYBAT

BT

SECRET

(5)

Jam
LIRING-3

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

TO: Chief of Station, Mexico City

X

INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala City

FROM: Chief, WH Division

SUBJECT: DYVOUR/PBRUMEN/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez-Report of Cuban Guerilla Training near Netzahualcoyotl Dam

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: See para 3 & 4 of Reference

Reference : HMMW-14480, 5 April 1966

Hqs. notes that in Siempre of 22 June 1966 there appears an article on page IX of the supplemental section entitled "A Punto de Revelarse El Misterio" de la Cultura Olmeca. Los Trabajos de Arqueologia en Malpaso by one Carlos NAVARRETE. The article may be of interest to the Station in connection with subject report. A person with the same name as the author of the Siempre article was reported by LICOOKY-1 in 1963 to be a Guatemalan Communist living in Mexico.

Andrew F. MERTON

Attachment:
HMMW-14480

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - COS, Mexico City w/o att
1 - COS, Guatemala City w/att

Possible interest on LIRING-3

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMW-14685

DATE: 27 June 1966

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

HQS FILE NUMBER: 50-120-13

ORIGINATING

OFFICE: WH/1/J.Stewart/mvh

EXT: 3654

RI
Chrono

COORDINATING

WH/C/CICS

WH/C/FI

RELEASING

C/WH/1 R. J. Kaufman

53

DISPATCH

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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DISSEM BY 56/60

ACTION: C/WH 6

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ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE VR, DC/WH/C 5, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/DO 4, C/DO/H 3

S E C R E T 231953Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7711 — 23 JAN 66 IN 43725

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: DIRECTOR 14107

ACTION

1. STATION PLANNING PLACE LIRING-3 UNDER SURVEILLANCE AS SOON AS TEAM FREE. TIME SPENT BY ROWTON ON L-3 THUS FAR AT MINIMUM AND IT NOT BELIEVED IT WILL INVOLVE MAJOR EFFORT. AT SAME TIME, L-3 HAS ALMOST EMPLOYEE-LIKE ACCESS TO CONSULATE, KNOWS ALL STAFFERS THERE INCLUDING AMBASSADOR AND WITH WIFE ON SCENE BELIEVE HE AT LEAST PARTIAL PENETRATION OF LIRING ESTABLISHMENT.

2. ROWTON BELIEVES ACTUAL RECRUITMENT OF L-3 WILL EVOLVE IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION. ~~WITH RELATIVELY SHORT TIME, AND HE ALREADY MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION.~~ WITH REPLACEMENT OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ, CLOSE FRIEND OF L-3, ROWTON HAS GOOD OPENING PULL L-3 UP SHORT BY STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF HAVING GOOD INFORMATION ON GOINGS-ON INSIDE SO THAT HE AND L-3 WILL KNOW QUOTE BUSINESS ATMOSPHERE UNQUOTE IN WHICH THEY OPERATING. SHORTLY ROWTON WILL FACE L-3 WITH BIG JUMP IN WHICH L-3 MUST DECIDE WHETHER HE WORKING FOR CUBANS OR FOR ROWTON. AS RELATIONS DEVELOP ROWTON WILL MENTION AMERICANS WITH WHOM HE DOES BUSINESS AND POSSIBILITY THAT AT TIMES BUSINESS MAY BE TO DETRIMENT OF CUBANS. ALSO PLAN SOON GIVE L-3 REQUIREMENTS OF DETAILED REPORTING ON PERSONNEL IN LIRING

201-778301

14-00000

INSTALLATION IN ORDER COMPROMISE L-3.

3. ALREADY HAVE COMPROMISING RECEIPTS SIGNED BY L-3 IN TRUE NAME AND BY GRADUALLY APPLYING PRESSURE EXPECT HIM WAKE UP ONE DAY TO FACT HE HAS BEEN IN CLANDESTINE BUSINESS WITH ROWTON FOR SOME TIME. HE HAS NOT YET ASKED FIRST QUESTIONS RE ROWTON'S BONA FIDES AND ROWTON PLAYING BIG BUSINESS ACT SO CLOSELY TO INTEL COLLECTION L-3 MAY TAKE RECRUITMENT TO WITTING BASIS IN STRIDE.

4. L-3 ALREADY DISCUSSING NEXT TRIP IN FOR ROWTON BUT COMMENTED 26 JULY NOT GOOD TIME BECAUSE OF FIESTA ATMOSPHERE. SUGGESTED TO ROWTON HE GO IN AFTER CELEBRATION WHEN MINISTRIES BACK TO NORMAL.

5. REMOVAL OF ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS FROM POSITION AS VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING HOWEVER DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL AFFECT TDY VISIT OF ARNOL BROTHER ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS ON INSPECTION TRIP TO CONSULATE HERE. IF ALDO COMES L-3 WILL BE IN GOOD POSITION CONTACT HIM AND EFFORTS BEING MADE THROUGH L-3 TO PROVIDE ALDO WITH QUOTE PREPARED UNQUOTE APARTMENT IN WHICH TO LIVE DURING STAY HERE.

S E C R E T

BT

the importance of [illegible] clandestine Activities of CUIS.

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET

22 June 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OA

ATTENTION: Mr. Lally

SUBJECT: LIRING-3
201-798301

There were no RI traces on Subject. A Provisional Operational Approval is requested.

W. J. Kaufman
Chief, WH/1

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TOTAL COPIES: 24

SECRET

ORIG: J. [illegible]
UNIT: [illegible]
EXT: 3654
DATE: 20 JUNE 66

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201-798301

ROUTING: 1 5 / 2 6 / 3 7 / 4 8

DISSEM BY 48 PER #

DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/WH/C X RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE, DC/WH/C 5, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT 2, C/CI

SECRET

21 20 38 Z CITE DIRECTOR 14107

TO MEXICO CITY INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7613 (IN 37364)*

1. [illegible] ACTIVITIES OF [illegible] CUBANS IN WESTERN HEMISPHERE, HQS WELCOMES ANY LEADS INTO TRICON ARMS SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES. DIFFICULT TO COMMENT AT THIS TIME ON HOW FAR TO GO ON LEADS AS THEY UNCOVERED, AS DECISIONS WILL [illegible] HAVE TO BE MADE ON CASE BY CASE BASIS. WOULD NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED TIME-CONSUMING ARMS SMUGGLING OP UNLESS LIRING-3 RECRUITED AND CONTROLLED AND INFO FROM HIM PROVES RELIABLE. VIEW L-3 BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE AS NOTED TO DATE, CONSIDER IT NOT OUT OF REALM POSSIBILITY HE CLOSER TO CUBANS THAN APPARENT. MIGHT BE WORTH WHILE PUT COMPLETE SURVEILLANCE/COVERAGE ON HIM FOR 10-DAY PERIOD TO SEE IF PATTERN DEVELOPS OR INTERCEPTS OF INTEREST OBTAINED. WOULD WELCOME STATION COMMENT ON AMOUNT TIME ROWFON TAKES REQUIRED THIS OP SINCE DO NOT DESIRE THIS OP BE TO EXCLUSION OF TARGETING HIM AGAINST ON-ISLAND

CONTINUED.../

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☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

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3		7
4		8

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☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

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SECRET PAGE 2

CITE DIRECTOR 14107

TO

REPORTING SOURCES OR LOCAL LIERING PENETRATIONS. ALSO REQUEST COMMENT ON POSSIBILITY RECRUITING L-3 ON WITTING BASIS.

2. RE POSSIBLE SALVADORAN CONTACTS MEXI, HQS FILES REFLECT THAT A[illegible]-1 WAS TO HAVE MET WITH FOLL SALVADORANS DURING VISIT MEXI MAR 64: A. JORGE ARIAS GOMEZ. B. ROQUE DALTON GARCIA. C. ALEJANDRO MONTANA GOMEZ. D. RAUL CASTELLANOS. NOTE ARIAS IDENTIFIED AS SERGIO PEREZ, HEAD SALVADORAN DELEGATION TRICON CONFERENCE JAN 66. ALSO NOTE THAT MAURICIO DE LA SELVA VERGAS REPORTED 64 BY A[illegible]-1 AS SALV CP LINK IN MEXI WITH CUBS THERE.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: Ref furnishes possible lead to Central American group authorized by TRICON committee to purchase arms and supply to LA revolutionaries.

WH/C/CICS [illegible] (DRAFT)
WH/C/FI [illegible] (DRAFT)

WILLIAM V. BROE
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/2
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

SECRET

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION AND REVIEW	DATE 17 June 1966 crm
TO: WH/1 - J. Zerance	C NO. 201 - 798301
FROM: CHIEF, CI/OA /s/ Edward P. Brown	SUBJECT: LIRING/3

IN ORDER THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION MAY BE GIVEN YOUR REQUEST FOR APPROVAL IN THIS CASE, IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FURNISH THIS OFFICE THE INFORMATION CHECKED BELOW, OR REVIEW INFORMATION AS INDICATED.

	PRQ I		REVIEW OF STAFF'D DOSSIER
	PRQ II		REVIEW OF STAFF'D COLLATERAL INFORMATION
	FIELD TRACES		REVIEW OF SECURITY OFF. REPORT AT CI/OA
XX	RI TRACES		REVIEW OF SEC. OFF. CONCURRENCE MEMO AT CI/OA
	OPERATIONAL AND DIVISION TRACES		REVIEW OF FBI REPORT AT CI/OA
	RESULTS OF TECHNICAL INTERROGATION		REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCE
	GREEN LIST		OTHERS *(See Remarks)*

NOTICE: [ ] FIRST [ ] SECOND [ ] THIRD AND FINAL

REMARKS:

No Ri traces

FORM 8-65 889 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION

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(20)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION C/WH 6

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR DC/WH/C 5, C/SOD 3, C/CA 2, C/CA/O 2, C/FI 2, C/FI/INT

S E C R E T 141800Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7613 14 Jun 66 37364

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7558 (IN 33490)*

ACTION

1. AT LUNCH 13 JUN 66, CARLOS JURADO DELMAR TOLD WALLACE B. ROWTON THAT FOR THEIR BUSINESS PURPOSES HE PLANNING CULTIVATE CONTACTS HE HAS IN MEXICO WITH CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP AUTHORIZED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE PURCHASE ARMS AND SUPPLY TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES.

2. IN RESPONSE ROWTON QUERIES JURADO SAID HE ALMOST CERTAIN ONE OF GROUP IS SALVADORAN HE MET IN HAVANA DURING REVOLUTION. JURADO SAID THIS PERSON VISITS MEXICO MORE OR LESS REGULARLY AND HE AND JURADO HAVE MUTUAL FRIENDS HERE. JURADO INDICATED HE HOPED MAKE CONTACT WITH THIS GROUP WITHIN NEXT 60 DAYS. BECAUSE OF PRESENT JURADO - ROWTON RELATIONSHIP ROWTON DID NOT ASK FOR NAME OF SALVADORAN AT THIS MEETING BUT IS CERTAIN CAN OBTAIN IT SHORTLY.

?. How Known

Can we help?

3. IN PASSING, JURADO MENTIONED ANTONIO DEL CONDE PONTONES (201-728065) WHO HELPED SUPPLY FIDEL WITH GRANMA AND ARMS. COMMENTED DEL CONDE PROBABLY NOT BEING USED BY TRICONTINENTAL COMMITTEE BECAUSE

SECRET

PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 7613 S E C R E T

HIS WIFE HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY CUBANS WHILE IN ACT SMUGGLING LARGE QUANTITY OF DOLLARS OUT OF CUBA.

4. CONSIDER IT HIGHLY POSSIBLE JURADO WILL TURN UP LEAD TO ARMS-BUYING GROUP LEADING TO THEIR IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONG METHODS, HOWEVER, WOULD APPRECIATE HQS COMMENTS THIS ASPECT AND GUIDANCE ON HOW FAR CAN PLAY THIS GAME. ARMS SMUGGLING SO TENUOUS AND INVOLVED THAT ROWTON OPERATIONG THROUGH JURADO SHOULD BE ABLE DEVELOP LOGICAL SOUNDING, EVEN TO JURADO, SUPPLY STORY WHICH COULD BE MADE TO FALL THROUGH ANY TIME KUBARK DESIRED PULL PLUG.

5. PLS ADVISE.

S E C R E T *RE FURTHER DEBRIEFING CARLOS JURADO

BT

14-00000

8 June 1966

EXCERPT FROM HMMA 29157

Para 32: "ROWTON is off and running on his development of LIRINGs 3 and 4. He is doing this under false flag as a Greek businessman. Again, the ubiquitous LITAINT-2 is in a position to monitor this operation as he is close to both LIRINGS and has no connection with ROWTON. On 27 May LIRING-3, who is well connected in PBRUMEN, flew to PBRUMEN on a trip to scout out business opportunities for ROWTON. LIRING-4 continues to work at LIRING."

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 2

SECRET

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dissem by 23

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C5, C/CI, C/SB5, C/FI, C/FI/D4, C/FI/INT, C/CA2

S E C R E T 081728Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7558
DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE 8 JUN 65 IN 33490
KAPOK DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7549 (IN 32832)

1. FURTHER DEBRIEFING OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR BY WALLACE . ROWTON PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING REGARDING JURADO TRIP CUBA 27 MAY 3 JUNE 66:

2. MILITIA FORCE WHICH CAPTURED LANDING PARTY IN LAUNCH RECENTLY WAS LEAD BY CUBAN MINISTER OF EDUCATION. JURADO STATED CUBA LITERALLY BRISTLING WITH VERY LATEST WEAPONS INCLUDING MISSILES WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS. IN RESPONSE TO ROWTON QUERY JURADO STATED HE ASSUMED SOVIETS CONTROLLED NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT THAT CUBANS NOW WELL TRAINED TO USE THEM IF NECESSARY.

3. JURADO STATED EVERY CUBAN HE TALKED TO WAS SINCERELY CONVINCED INVASION IMMINENT AND THAT ONLY ALERTNESS OF MILITIA HAD PREVENTED A SUCCESSFUL LANDING. JURADO ENTERED MOVIE ONE DAY DURING WEEK SAW ONLY THREE SPECTATORS AND LEFT IN EMBARRASSMENT. SUBJ SAID IT OPINION IN CUBA THAT ABORTIVE INVASION HAD SOME DIRECT CONNECTION WITH ELECTIONS IN SANTO DOMINGO. HE ADDED HE WAS TOLD STATE OF WAR MOBILIZATION IN CUBA WOULD LAST ABOUT MONTH.

SECRET

To reports - Brown

14-00000

4. DUE NATURE ROWTON CONTROL OVER JURADO AND PARTICULAR MANEUVER BY WHICH ROWTON INDUCED SUBJ MAKE TRIP IT NOT POSSIBLE ESTABLISH GOOD SOURCING FOR ABOVE STATEMENT. JURADO SAW ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, THREE TIMES AND ONE OF THESE IN RODRIGUEZ' HOME WHERE PAIR SAT UP TALKING UNTIL 0300.

S E C R E T SECRET

BT

NNNN

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT	DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
	2. RI FILE NO.
	3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. / 4. DATE
	7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM / 8. DATE OF INFO. / 9. EVALUATION
5. ANALYST / 6. DATE PROCESSED	10. DISSEMINATED IN / 11. DATE

DOCUMENT DISPOSITION

12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE	13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

14.

[illegible]-Delmar, Carl — 201-795301

6 June 1966 — [illegible] John [illegible] x3596

THERE IS A RESTR[illegible] DA FOLDER ON THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

FORM 11-63 449 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — ABSTRACT FILE SLIP (18)

THERE IS A [illegible]ICTED CI/[illegible] THE SUBJECT OF THIS 201

15. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 201 79 83 01

FORM 9-57 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET (7-46)

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES 16

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/M

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR C/CI, C/FI 2, DC/WH/C 5,

S E C R E T 072305Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7549 — 7 JUN 66 IN 32832

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK DYVOUR PERUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO CITY 7537 (IN 32041)*

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR REPORTED FOLLOWING TO WALLACE B ROWTOONN 6 JUNE 66 WHICH CARLOS HAD OBTAINED 27 MAY - 3 JUNE IN HAVANA FROM ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS:

2. A. ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, BROTHER OF ARNOL, WILL SOON COME TO MEXICO CITY TO INVESTIGATE AFFAIRS AT CUBAN EMBASSY. ALDO RODRIGUEZ IS WATCHLIST 65 NO. 534. FORMERLY WAS CUBAN DIP ASSIGNED MONTEVIDEO. NOW WORKING FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVANA.

B. CUBAN MOBILIZATION HAS COST GOVT 25 MILLION PESOS UP TO LAST WEEK.

S E C R E T

BT

*RE RETURN OF CARLOS JURADO DELMAR

SECRET

NNNN

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 15 TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 40/57

ACTION C/WH 6

☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

INFO FILE VR, DC/WH/CS, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 070145Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7537

7 JUN 66 IN 32041

ACTION

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PERUMEN LIRING

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

1. CARLOS JURADO DELMAR RETURNED MEXICO CITY 3 JUN FROM TRIP TO HAVANA SPONSORED BY WALLACE B. ROWTON. DID LITTLE PROMOTE ROWTON BUSINESS DEALS EXCEPT RECEMENT RELATIONS WITH ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS WHO ASKED JURADO SEND HIM SOME SPARK PLUGS FOR CAR.

2. JURADO SAID ATMOSPHERE EXTREMELY TENSE IN HAVANA BUT PEOPLE DO NOT BELIEVE SOLDIERS PENETRATED GUANTANAMO, WHERE SHOT AND THEN MANAGED TO GET OUT. PEOPLE GENERALLY BELIEVE THIS CUBAN PROVOCATION TO COVER SORRY EXONOMIC PLIGHT OF COUNTRY AND BOLSTER SAGGING MORALE.

3. SUBJ REPORTS CUBA CALLING ON OTHER COUNTRIES FOR VOLUNTEERS AUGMENT ARMED FORCES AND MIRIAM CHICHAY TOLD ROWTON CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO MEXICO JOAQUIN ARMAS HAD ATTENDED MEETING OF OFFICIALS IN HAVANA AT WHICH CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS WAS DISCUSSED.

4. FURTHER DEBRIEFING BY ROWTON IN PROGRESS. JURADO STILL ASKING NO PRYING QUESTIONS OF ROWTON AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED IF JURADO HAD BLOWN ROWTON TO CUBANS. CHICHAY TOLD LITAINT-2 LAST WEEK JURADO IN HAVANA, NO OTHER DETAILS. LITAINT-2 TOLD STATION C/O HE THOUGHT JURADO ON CULTURAL MISSION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

: Probably desire Rowton ... WH/CA/RR

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 33

ORIG: Robert O. Bussey:hl
UNIT: C/TSD/OA
EXT: 2603
DATE: 31 May 1966

SECRET

DISSEM BY ___ PER ___ # ___

FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: TSD-6 RID COPY
INFO: VR , FILE , WH-8, WH/C-8, FI, NE-6, CI/OPS, CI/OA

SECRET 31 20 30Z CITE DIRECTOR 00039

TO MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING TECHS

RE: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

LIRING 3

1. KURIOT CAN SUPPLY REQUESTED DOCUMENTS BUT SINCE HAVE LIMITED SUPPLY BLANK ORIGINAL GREEK PASSPORTS, PROPOSE FOLLOWING: ISSUE AS MAIN IDENTITY DOCUMENT REPRODUCED GREEK INTERNATIONAL DRIVER'S LICENSE FROM ATHENS. SUPPORT THIS WITH NEW YORK DRIVER'S LICENSE, POSSIBLY MEXICAN TOURIST CARD AND GREEK POCKET LITTER. ADVISE.

2. FOR PASSPORT OR LICENSE NEED FOLLOWING: FULL NAME, INCLUDING MATRONYMIC, PARENTS' FIRST NAMES, PROFESSION, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, DISTINGUISHING MARKS, COLOR EYES AND HAIR, FULL FACE AND THREE QUARTER PROFILE WITH RIGHT EAR PHOTO NEGATIVES AND SIX SPECIMEN SIGNATURES, HEIGHT, WEIGHT, MARITAL STATUS.

MEXI 286.3B

RELEASING OFFICER   COORDINATING OFFICERS   AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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MESSAGE FORM
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UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1
2
3
4

DISSEM BY ______ PER ______ # ______

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ______ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR , FILE

(CLASSIFICATION) (DATE AND TIME FILED) (ELITE) (REFERENCE NUMBER) (PICA)

PAGE 2 CITE DIRECTOR 03639

TO

3. KURIOT CAN ARBITRARILY SELECT DATA WHICH CANNOT BE FURNISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

TSD Comment: Requested information whether TSD can supply Greek passport, New York driver's license and pocket litter for flash identification in Mexico.

Telecoordination: WH/1 - Jack Stewart (x3655)
NE/Greece - Pete Dodge (x6808)
WH/1 - Joseph H. Fisher (x2861)

RICHARD A. KRUEGER
ADC/TSD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

ROBERT O. BUSSEY
C/TSD/OA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

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COPY NO.

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR GREEN LIST NAME CHECK № 167696

DATE 27 May 66

TO ~~CHIEF,~~ FI/D

ORIGINATING OFFICER

NAME Jane F. Zerance
OFFICE DESIGNATOR WH/1
ROOM BUILDING 332 Ames Center
EXTENSION 3656

13. TYPE OF REQUEST (CHECK ONE)
- [X] FIRST TIME SUBMITTED
- [ ] ADDITIONAL DATA
- [ ] RECHECK FOR CURRENT

14. INTEREST IN SUBJECT (CHECK ONE)
- [ ] ESPIONAGE OR CE ACTIVITY
- [X] OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE
- [ ] OTHER

1. SUBJECT (TYPE NAME IN ROMAN LETTERS - SURNAME IN UPPER CASE)
Carlos JURADO-Delmar 201-782301

2. ALIASES, VARIANT SPELLING, CTC NUMBERS, ETC.

3. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH
1930 in Mexico City

4. CITIZENSHIP
Mexican

5. PRESENT ACTIVITY AND LOCATION
Artist

6. OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES, EDUCATION
Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University

7. PAST ACTIVITIES INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE

ACTIVITY	LOCATION	DATES
Resided Cuba a considerable length of time		

2 31 PM '66

8. OTHER SIGNIFICANT DATA (POLITICS, RELIGION) - ADD EXTRA SHEETS WHEN NEEDED

9. DESCRIPTION (HEIGHT) (WEIGHT) (EYES) (HAIR) (RACE) (OTHER)

10. SPOUSE (IF WIFE, GIVE MAIDEN NAME)
Miriam Chichay de JURADO (Chichay is Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese maiden name)

11. OTHER MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND ASSOCIATES

JUN 3 21 PM '66

12. INFORMATION REQUIRED (DEFINE SPECIFICALLY. GENERAL TERMS SUCH AS "DEROGATORY" MAY RESULT IN A SEARCH THAT DOES NOT FULLY MEET REQUIREMENTS.)
MORE BIO DATA AND PERTINENT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS: INSERT CARBON; FILL OUT FORMS COMPLETELY. SEND BOTH SHEETS TO FI/D. SEE CSI 10-7

FORM 6-61 501 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

TO: Jane F. Zerance

14 June 1956
DATE

FROM: FI/D

A. [ ] SEE DOSSIER ON SUBJECT IN FI/D BIOGRAPHIC FILES.

B. [ ] A MEMORANDUM IS ATTACHED HERETO.

C. [ ] WITH THE LIMITED IDENTIFICATION PROVIDED IN THE REQUEST, FI/D IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT OR NOT.

D. [XXXXXX] FI/D HAS NO XXXXXX INFORMATION ON SUBJECT. IF INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECT APPEARS AT A LATER DATE, IT WILL BE REPORTED TO YOU AS IT BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. [ ] THE SUBJECT OF THIS REQUEST IS APPARENTLY THE SUBJECT OF THE FOLLOWING:

NOTE TO THE ORIGINATING OFFICE

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS NO LONGER IMPORTANT TO YOUR OFFICE, THIS SHEET, WITH THE FOLLOWING CANCELLATION NOTICE COMPLETED, SHOULD BE SENT TO FI/D.

REVIEW YOUR FILE OF THESE SHEETS FREQUENTLY, AND SEND TO FI/D THE SHEETS FOR PERSONS THAT ARE NO LONGER OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST TO DEMAND A CONTINUING NAME CHECK. PLEASE DO NOT TIE UP FI/D'S FACILITIES WITH CONTINUING SEARCHES FOR INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REQUIRED.

TO: FI/D

DATE

FROM:

NAME
OFFICE DESIGNATOR
ROOM, BUILDING
EXTENSION

CANCEL THE STOP CARD FOR THIS REQUEST

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OR INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

(Always handcarry 1 copy of this form)
PLEASE COMPLETE EACH SECTION AND APPROPRIATE BLANK

DATE: 27 May 1966

TO:
- [X] CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
- [ ] CHIEF, INVESTIGATION AND SUPPORT DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY
- [ ] CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY

FROM: Jane Zerance
WH/1
332 Ames Center
x3656

SUBJECT: *(True name)* Carlos JURADO-Delmar

PROJECT: LIRING

CRYPTONYM, PSEUDONYM, AKA OR ALIASES: LIRING-3

CI/OA FILE NO.:

RI 201 FILE NO.: 201-798301

SO FILE NO.:

1. TYPE ACTION REQUESTED

X	PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROVISIONAL PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
X	OPERATIONAL APPROVAL		PROPRIETARY APPROVAL
	PROVISIONAL COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		COVERT NAME CHECK
	COVERT SECURITY APPROVAL		SPECIAL INQUIRY *(SO field investigation)*
	CONTRACT TYPE A		CONTRACT TYPE B

2. SPECIFIC AREA OF USE: Mexico City

3. FULL DETAILS OF USE: Contact, assessment and use in an unwitting capacity to furnish information on Cuban economic & military targets, on activities in general in the Cuban Emb and Consulate in MexCity, and to spot persons of possible interest for Cuban ops. Of course, should development results warrant, consideration will be given to seeking operational approval for his use in a witting capacity against the same targets, especially thru his wife, LIRING-4, an employee of Cuban Consulate in Mexico City.

4. INVESTIGATION AND COVER

	YES	NO
A. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
B. CIA INTEREST MAY BE SHOWN DURING INVESTIGATION?		X
C. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN HIM?	X	
D. IS SUBJECT AWARE OF CIA INTEREST IN HIM?		X

E. INDICATE ANY LIMITATIONS ON COVERAGE IN THE INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

F. SUGGEST "COVER PRETEXT" TO BE USED IN CONDUCTING PERSONAL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJECT.

G. DO YOU PLAN TO MAKE SUBJECT WITTING OF AGENCY OR GOVERNMENT INTEREST? [X] YES [ ] NO

IF NO INVESTIGATION OUTSIDE CIA, EXPLAIN FULLY

5. PRQ AND GREEN LIST STATUS

X	PRQ I, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (2) COPIES ATTACHED	X	PRQ II WILL BE FORWARDED
	PRQ II, OR EQUIVALENT, IN (1) COPY ATTACHED	X	GREEN LIST ATTACHED, NO: 167696

6. RI TRACES

	NO RECORD	X	WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

7. DIVISION TRACES

X	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD		NON-DEROGATORY		DEROGATORY ATTACHED

8. FIELD TRACES

	NO RECORD		WILL FORWARD
	NO DEROGATORY INFO.	X	DEROGATORY ATTACHED
	LIST SOURCES CHECKED		SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ATTACHED
	NOT INITIATED *(Explanation)*		

SIGNATURE OF CASE OFFICER: Jane Zerance [signature]

EXTENSION: 3656

SIGNATURE OF BRANCH CHIEF: [handwritten initials]

FORM 2-63 772 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(9)

14-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT:	Carlos JURADO-Delmar
DPOB:	1930 in Mexico City
CITIZENSHIP:	Mexican
OCCUPATION:	Artist
SCHOOLING:	Studied anthropology and archeology at the National University in Mexico
RESIDENCE:	Resided in Cuba for a considerable length of time.
MARITAL STATUS:	Miriam CHICHAY de JURADO (Chichay is a Cuban attempt at transliteration of Peach Blossom which is her Chinese name.)

DEROGATORY TRACES

STATION

Subject was a member of the PPS in July 1961

Member of the Preparatory Committee for the Third Latin American Congress, Artists and Writers, Havana in January 1962.

LITAINT-2 reports that JURADO has many Communist friends in Mexico. He spent time in Cuba and may have served in the Cuban military service or militia.

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☒ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO. 201-798301
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 17

SECRET

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ACTION C/WH-6 ☒ RID COPY

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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, DC/WH/C-5, C/CI, C/FI-2

S E C R E T 270105Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7467 (EASBY ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

26 MAY 66 IN 25489

REF: MEXICO CITY 7454 (IN 24660)

1. LIRING-3 PURCHASED CUBANA TICKET FOR CUBA 26 MAY, WITH MONEY PROVIDED BY ROWTON. WILL DEPART 27 MAY. SIGNED TRUE NAME RECEIPT FOR FUNDS. PLANS STAY WEEK. HAS CONTACTED FRIENDS AMONG CUBAN ARTISTS WITH WHOM WILL LIVE WHILE ON ISLAND.

2. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE MET ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS IN 1962 WHILE LIRING-3 EMPLOYED WITH CUBAN MINISTRY EDUCATION. ACTUALLY WIFE RODRIGUEZ WORKED UNDER LIRING-3 AND FRIENDLY ASSOCIATION BEGAN THROUGH WIFE. RODRIGUEZ THEN WORKING FOR MINISTRY LABOR.

3. QUICK ACTION ON LIRING-3 VISA BROUGHT QUERIES FROM CUBAN CONSUL MEXICO CITY ABELARDO CURBELO PADRON AS TO WHOM LIRING-3 KNEW IN CUBA. CURBELO SAID EVEN FOR CUBANS IT TAKES WEEK. LIRING-3 TOLD ROWTON HE ANSWERED ONLY THAT HE HAD FRIENDS CUBA. ROWTON GAVE LIRING-3 MONEY WITH WHICH HE BUYING GIFTS MEXICO FOR RODRIGUEZ AND FAMILY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASS BY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE G TOTAL COPIES 13

SECRET

GROUP 1

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

DISSEM BY 25/3

ACTION WH 8 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT TIME BY

INFO FILE VR WH/C 8, CI/OPS, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, TSD 6, NE 6, DO 4, DO/H 3,

S E C R E T 260005Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7454 EASBY ACTING

DIRECTOR

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF DIRECTOR 27441

ACTION

26 May 66 IN 24660

1. LIRING-3 INFORMED ROWTON 25 MAY HE OBTAINED ONE- DAY VISA SERVICE 24 MAY. MEETING HELD 1300 HOURS 25 MAY PRIOR ARRIVAL REF. LIRING-3 SHOWED APPARENT DISAPPOINTMENT IN ROWTON NOT BEING ABLE CONFIRM TRIP. ROWTON NEXT MEETING WITH LIRING-3 26 MAY LUNCH AT WHICH WILL GIVE SUBJ GO SIGN.

2. QUICK SERVCE ON VISA APPEARS CONFIRM LIRING-3 BOAST HE CONFIDANT OF RODRIGUEZ. ROWTON HAS IMPRESSED ON LIRING-3 THAT HE ROWTON'S AGENT AND MIDDLE MAN IN THIS TRANSACTION AND MUST NOT REVEAL ROWTON. IF ROWTON REVEALED THEN CUBANS WOULD WANT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH ROWTON CUTTING OUT LIRING-3. LIRING-3 STATES HE UNDERSTANDS THIS CLEARLY. LIRING-3 ASSURES ROWTON HE NEED NOT INFORM CUBANS ANYTHING OF ARRANGEMENT SINCE THEY TRUST HIM.

3. CAN HQS SUPPLY ROWTON WITH GREEK PASSPORT NEW YORK DRIVERS LICENSE AND ANY OTHER LOGICAL POCKET LITTER INDICATING GREEK NATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS. MATERIAL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR TRAVEL, BUT AS OP DEVELOPS MY BE HANDY FLASH GREEK

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE TWO MEXICO CITY 7454 S E C R E T

PASSPORT AS MEANS IDENTIFICATION.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 24

ORIG: JSTEWART
UNIT: WH/1
EXT: 3654
DATE: 25 May 1966

☐ FILE RID
☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING

1		5	
2		6	
3		7	
4		8	

DISSEM BY 28/3 PER ____ # ____

☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ____ BRANCH

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: VR, FILE WH/C 8, CI, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CI/IC 2, FI

(CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

(DATE AND TIME FILED) 25 21 26 Z

CITE DIRECTOR 07441

TO PRIORITY MEXICO CITY

DYVOUR PBRUMEN LIRING

REF: A. MEXICO CITY 7422 (IN 23654)*

B. MEXICO CITY 7234 (IN 10462)**

CONCUR REF TRIP. EVEN IF TRIP NON-PRODUCTIVE, OP STILL MIGHT DEVELOP INTO LIRING PENETRATION VIA LIRING-4. IN THIS REGARD, STATUS OF LIRING-4 FATHER, WHO PRESUMABLY CHINESE, PER PARA 4 REF B, IN PBRIME OF INTEREST IN VIEW STRINGENT ENTRY REQUIREMENTS AND BELIEVE ROWTON MIGHT PROFITABLY ATTEMPT ELICIT INFO THIS ASPECT CASE DURING L-3 DEVELOPMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * L-3/Rowton meeting re L-3 trip to Cuba.
** Rowton contact and assessment of L-3 and L-4. Requested POA on both.

WH/C/FI/TC [signature]

[signature]
WILLIAM V. BROE
Chief, WH Division

[signature]
W. J. KAUFMAN
C/WH/1

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

COPY NO.

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

[CLA]SSIFIED MESSAGE B TOTAL COPIES 7

SECRET

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PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED

FROM: DISSEM by 23/3

ACTION: DC/WH/C 5 ☒ RID COPY

ADVANCE COPY ☐ ISSUED ☐ SLOTTED ☐ TUBED

UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO: FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2,

S E C R E T 242242Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7433 24 [illegible] 23008

DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

REF MEXICO 7422 (IN 236521)

FULL NAME SUBJ REF IS CARLOS JURADO DELMAR.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

liring -3

LIRING-3

14-00000

INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
X-REF TO FILE NO.
FILE RID ☐ RET. TO BRANCH ☐
DESTROY ☐ SIG.

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UNIT TIME BY

INFO

FILE

S E C R E T 241655Z CITE MEXICO CITY 7422

PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO JMWAVE

KAPOK PBRUMEN LIRING

24 MAY 63 IN 23654

REF: MEXICO 7234

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAD LUNCHEON MEETING LIRING-3 22 MAY WITH RESULT THAT LIRING-3 ENTHUSIASTICALLY URGING ROWTON LET HIM MAKE TRIP CUBA LEARN WHAT ITEMS CUBANS WANT BUY FROM WESTERN FIRMS.

2. LIRING-3 BELIEVES HE DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL GREEK BUSINESSMAN WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS WHO WANTS ECONOMIC RESEARCH DONE ON CUBA FOR UNNAMED CLIENTS WISHING SELL TO CUBA. LIRING-3 SAID HE HAD MANY HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS INSIDE CUBA DEVELOPED BEFORE CASTRO TAKE-OVER.

3. BEST LIRING-3 FRIEND IS (FNU) RODRIGUEZ WHO HIGH IN MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHO MIGHT BE ARNOL RODRIGUEZ CAMPS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. WILL CHECK TO BE CERTAIN. LIRING-3 ALSO CLAIMS PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH RAUL ROA KURI AND EVEN FIDEL CASTRO.

4. LIRING-3 KNOWS ROWTON ONLY AS NICOLAS HARRIS. HAS ASKED NO QUESTIONS TO BETTER ESTABLISH ROWTON BONA FIDES. APPARENTLY ACCEPTS HIM WITHOUT QUESTION. DUE LIRING-3 CLOSE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

CONTACTS WITH HIGH OFFICIALS ROWTON TOLD HIM FIRST THING HE SHOULD DO IS FIND OUT WHAT THESE OFFICIALS PERSONALLY NEED ON OUTSIDE. LIRING-3 ACKNOWLEDGED THIS PROBABLY SMART MOVE AS HE HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT DISILLUSIONED SEEING HIGH OFFICIALS BUYING ALL TYPES WESTERN CONVENIENCES AND PRODUCTS FOR SELVES.

5. LIRING-3 HAS BEEN OFFICIALY INVITED TO 26 JULY CELEBRATION. ROWTON TOLD LIRING-3 HE APPEARED BE GOOD CANDIDATE FOR ROWTON NEEDS SINCE HE PLACED PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE AND CONFIDENCE IN THESE MATTERS ABOVE PRACTICAL OR THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE OF ECONOMICS. SUBJ COMMENTED CUBANS HAD LEARNED THEY COULD NOT BUY ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES DIRECTLY AND OPENLY ON WORLD MARKET HENCE WOULD WELCOME LIRING-3 ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY WHOM THEY COULD TRUST. ROWTON HINTED HE HAD CONTACTS IN MUNITIONS TRADE IN ITALY AND GREECE AND WOULD BE INTERESTED CUBAN MILITARY RE-QUIREMENTS. LIRING-3 SAID HE COULD HANDLE THIS ALSO THROUGH RODRIGUEZ WITH THE CUBAN GENERAL STAFF.

6. AT END OF LUNCH LIRING-3 ASSURED ROWTON HE COULD VISIT CUBA FOR 10 DAYS OSTENSIBLY TO SEE WIFE'S FAMILY. HE ALSO ASSURED ROWTON HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO EXPLAIN TO ANYONE HIS RE-LATIONS WITH ROWTON. NEXT MEETING SET FOR 25 MAY.

SECRET

14-00000

 SECRET

7. ROWTON OBTAINED INFORMATION SUBJECT BORN MEXI CITY 1930, STUDIED ANTHROPOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGY AT NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AND LIVED CUBA CONSIDERABLE LENGTH OF TIME. MARRIED WIFE THERE SIX YEARS AGO.

8. REQUEST AUTHORITY PERMIT ROWTON SEND LIRING-3 CUBA ON EXPLORATORY TRIP WHICH WILL ALLOW LIRING-3 RECONTACT OLD FRIENDS LEARN WHAT ITEMS ARE CRITICAL AND WILL BE FIRST STEP INVOLVING LIRING-3 IN CLANDESTINE OPERATION ~~WITH ROWTON~~. IF, DESPITE HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE WILL NOT REVEAL NICK HARRIS TO CUBANS, HE IS INDUCED GIVE NAME HIS CONTACT IN MEXICO CITY NOTHING IS LOST AS IT THUS FAR ALL IN NAME OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. IF TRIP MADE NOW IT COINCIDES WITH LIRING-3 SPRING VACATION FROM HIS ART TEACHING CLASSES.

9. RECOGNIZE THIS QUICK JUMP INTO OPERATION WITHOUT FULL INVESTIGATION OF SUBJ BUT BELIEVE IT GOOD OPPORTUNITY TIE LIRING-3 TO ROWTON IN WAY WILL LATER REVEAL ITSELF TO BE COMPROMISING. DO NOT BELIEVE LIRING-3 NEEDS BE FULLY CLEARED WITTING AND RECRUITED FOR THIS OPERATION.

10. REQUEST PRIORITY REPLY.

S E C R E T

BT

SECRET

14-00000

EXERPT FROM HMMA-28909, 12 May 1966

Para 29: "ROWTON; posing asd Greek, made rapid progress in developing the husband of a girl now working at the PERUVIAN Cjonsulate by expressing interest in the young man's professional work. The Subjects are LIRING-3 and LIRING-4."

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / MICROFILM

TO: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division

INFO: DCWH/C

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: PBRUMEN/OPERATIONAL/Carlos JURADO and Miriam CHICHAY

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: FYI

Reference : MEXI 7234

1. As indicated in Reference, attached are the contact reports of Wallace B. ROWTON resulting from his recent meetings with Subject individuals.

2. Similar contact reports will continue to be forwarded to Headquarters as this operation develops.

Frank C. Medberry
for Willard C. CURTIS

Attachment:
Contact report a/s h/w

Distribution:
2 - C/WHD w/att
1 - DCWH/C w/o att
4 - FILES

AN	FI	
PS	DEST	
ABSTRACT		INDEX

1cc w/o att to WH/C/ES

CS COPY

201-798301

~~50-120-13~~

1 att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HMMA-28875	11 May 1966
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: FFN # 12,328

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. At about 1830 on 2 May, 1966, Rowton dropped into the Salon de La Plastica Mexicana in the hope of running into Subject so that he could renew contact more or less casually.

2. Fortunately as soon as he stepped into the door he found Subject engaged in conversation with the receptionist and another person (probably a Mexican employe of the Salon). When Subject spotted Rowton he broke off his conversation and moved away to greet Rowton cordially. He said that he had himself just arrived at the Salon and was very happy to run into Rowton again. After a few brief remarks, he invited Rowton to coffee in a nearby cafe. Rowton accepted and they both left the Salon without further delay.

3. Rowton remained with Subject in conversation over coffee for about 45 minutes. Subject expressed gratification in having met Rowton and several times reassured Rowton that he enjoyed conversing with him regardless of whether he made an sale of his painting or not. Rowton reverted to the theme that he had a genuine interest in Subject's future and hoped in some way to provide Subject with the means of becoming relatively independent so that he could travel and carry on his art work freely. Rowton added that he had given much thought to the idea of using Subject to help him in his economic research, since this would justify Rowton's putting Subj ct on his expense account. He then questioned Subject on his possible connections in Mexico, but Subject confessed that he had only limited contacts that probably wo ld not be useful to Rowton. Rowton then moved into the target question. He stated that most of his clients in England, France and Greece were interested in Cuban requirements and perhaps Subject was in a unique position to prepare a report on what the Cuban economy required at the moment. Subject responded without hestitation that he could do something on Cuba without too much difficulty. He explained that he knew official Cubans in Mexico City, including those in the Commercial Mission, and could travel into Cuba if necessary.

4. Rowton then stressed that he really did not need too many statistics on the Cuban economy nor contact with the Cubans but wanted somehow to justify helping Subject financially. He explained that he could easily assemble some data himself, but wanted Subject to do something concrete so that he would remain in the picture and Rowton could consider him in

201-798301

att #1 to 4HMMA 28875

ES COPY

a sort of stringer in reporting on economic developments. Subject replied that he understood and did not see that such a task would be too difficult.

5. Rowton then asked Subject how he was coming in locating a new aprtment/studio. Subject replied that he had found a desirable place near Chapultepec, and hoped to be able to move soon. Rowton then commented that he might have to leave for Paris in the next few days and would be away for about two weeks on business. He stated that he might be able to help Subject with the rent on his studio provided it had a phone. Rowton explained that he was at present paying 350 pesos monthly for secretarial service and could just as well pay Subject something for taking telephone messages. Subject replied that he would be glad to be of service to Rowton without compensation ("mi casa es suya") in such a matter.

6. Rowton then turned the conversation to Subject's wife and family. Subject revealed that his wife's maiden name (apellido) was the Chinese translation of "Flor de Durazno". He pronounced it in Chinese for Rowton but Rowton made no attempt to transliterate it and at this point cannot recall the phonetic pronunciation. Subject added that Chi-chay is a Cuban corruption of the Chinese given name. In reply to Rowton's direct query, Subject stated that his wife's father mother is in Cuba but her father is in New York. He added that her father did not agree with the revolution and left but the rest of the family remained. He also stated that her mother has not remarried and lives with her brothers and sisters. Subject added that his wife felt no bitterness toward her father and in fact the father writes regularly - once a week from New York. Rowton did not press for an address at the time, feeling that it would be more discreet to wait for an opening at a subsequent meeting(when he could allege that he was planning to stop over in New York).

7. Rowton took the occasion of his alleged impending departure to ask for Subject's home address so that he could write from Europe. Subject stated that since he might move it would be better for Rowton to write to him care of the Salon rather than to his present address.

8. On leaving Subject Rowton promised to pass by the Salon again before he left so that he could say goodbye to Subject.

Wallace B Rowton

14-00000

2 May, 1966

Subject: Wallace B. Rowton Contact with Carlos Jurado.

1. When Rowton arrived at the entrance to the Bellas Artes Building at 1100 on 30 April, as planned, he found Subject waiting on the steps. Subject greeted Rowton cordially and suggested that they take a taxi since the Ministry of Education building was a little too far to walk to. He then hailed a taxi and instructed the driver to take them to the Secretaria de Education Publica on Calle Argentina.

2. On arrival he escorted Rowton through the court-yard of the building and explained the murals of Diego Rivera. He commented that he felt the murals were superior to those at the Prado Hotel and Cuernavaca since they had more "social meaning". He stressed the hardship under which Rivera had worked, which included some physical danger from certain elements opposed to his socialist ideas. Rowton picked up this theme in relationship to Subject's own situation in an attempt to elicit as much information as possible concerning Subject's financialstatus and position vis-a-vis the Mexican government.

3. In the course of conversation Subject stated that he had received relatively little understanding and sympathy from the government officials as a whole but did receive some support from the Instituto Nacional de Bellas Artes. He explained that he was able to earn enough money from teaching assignments to be relatively independent, and not depend on sales of his picutres to make a living. In reply to Rowton's comment to the effect that perhaps his wife could find some employment to help Subject, the latter replied that his wife could not work because of her status. He quickly added that he probably would not find it difficult to procure working papers for her, but he preferred not to do so at least at the present time.

4. After completing his tour of the Secretariat of Education Building, Subject invited Rowton to view the murals of the Supreme Court Building on Pino Suarez, which he described as superior even to those of Diego Rivera, especially because of their open defiance of official opinion. On the way Rowton continued to put discreet questions concerning Subject's personal life. Subject replied by revealing that

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he lived with his wife and three-year-old child in a very small apartment near San Angel and shared a studio with another artist. He added that he was paying 650 pesos monthly rent which he considered very high for what he was getting. He also complained that the artist with whom he was sharing the studio was a dilettante who was more interested in the atmosphere of the Latin Quarter than in art for its own sake. He said he found it difficult to paint with guitars playing and cocktail glasses clinking in the background. Subject then stated that he was looking for a more suitable arrangement, perhaps in a condominio and preferably in the Tacubaya area.

5. In connection with his own future hopes, Subject stated that he wanted very much to travel to gain as much experience as possible so that his style could be crystalized. He commented that he could move easily to Cuba since his wife's family lived there and he could get along with the Cuban authorities, but he felt Mexico was better for him at the moment. He expressed preference for Sweden, North Africa and Greece. In reply to Rowton's queries, he stated that he did not feel that his daughter would present a problem, since he could leave her in the care of his or his wife's relatives. He added that she was currently attending a Jardin de Niños in the mornings and doing very well despite her tender age.

6. Subject commented also that he likedtravel so much that he had joined the Mexican Navy to see the world. He added that he had been able to visit almost all the ports of the east and west coasts of North and Central America but had not succeeded in seeing Europe as he had hoped. Since Rowton was posing as a Greek, Subject expressed great interest in visiting Athens and the Middle East, and at one point asked Rowton how much money he would need to live in Athens for a month as a tourist. Subject also stated that both he and his wife were anxious to learn English and French so that they could absorb as much local culture as possible in their travels.

7. After inviting Rowton to coffee at a nearby restaurant, Subject stated that he had to meet his wife and some friend's for lunch and left Rowton at about 1335 in front of the Cathedral. He promised to telephone Rowton again so that they could get together before Rowton left the country.

Wallace B Rowton

14-00000

27 April, 1966

Subject: Wallace B Rowton Contact with Mr. and Mrs. Carlos Jurado. (from LITAWT-1)

1. Following a Station lead to the effect that Mrs. Chichay Jurado, who is employed by the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, is the daughter of a Cuban residing in New York City, Rowton visited the Salon de la Plastica Mexicana, Calle Havre 7, where Carlos Jurado's paintings were on exhibit. After several unsuccessful attempts to meet Jurado by chance at the salon, Rowton left his alias and telephone answering service number with the receptionist on 14 April, 1966, and asked that Jurado contact him for a meeting. On 18 April Rowton again visited the salon (having received no message through the answering service) and fortunately met Jurado who had dropped int to pick up messages from the receptionist.

2. Rowton explained that he was interested in Jurado's style, particularly for a mural that might go well in a New York night club owned by a friend of his. Jurado was, of course, immediately interested and commented that he was most anxious to visit New York to see the Museums. In answer to Rowton's query, he stated that he did not have any relatives in New York and had never been outside Mexico. Rowton invited Jurado and his wife to dinner the following evening so that they could discuss the proposed mural. (Rowton planned, if pressed, to use the "La Chansonette" night-club restaurant owned by his ~~frien~~ Greek friend Rita Dimitri as the prospective client).

3. On 19 April at 1930 Rowton met Jurado at the Salon as planned. Fortunately Jurado had brought his wife Chichay along as Rowton had suggested. Rowton invited them to dinner at the Restaurante &

14-00000

"El 77" at Calle Londres 77. Neither had eaten there previously and appeared delighted at the opportunity to enjoy a good dinner.

4. In the course of conversation, Jurado stated that his wife Chichay was born in Cuba and that they had a three-year old daughter. Niether he nor Chichay made any referance to her employment at the Consulate and Rowton did not feel it wise to press too hard on that subject. Rowton again asked whether Jurado had any relatives in New York in the event it might be advisable for him to travel there in connection with the mural, but neither he nor his wife responded in the affirmative.

5. Later in the evening, Jurado and his wife strolled along ~~that~~ Calle Niza and Reforma to the Hotel Hilton with Rowton. This gave Rowton an opportunity to sound them out on politics with specific reference to Cuba. Rowton pretended to be of Greek-Irish parentage and more or less neutral in his own political views with respect to Cuba. Chichay Jurado stated that she felt Cuba was doing well and that the relovution was the only answer to the corruption that had existed previously. Carlos Jurado agreed, commenting that the "Northamerican" position with regard to Cuba was unfortunately erroneous and short-sighted. Rowton placed much of the blame on the former Batista regime but lamented the fact that in the meantime the Cuban people ware suffering from the mistakes of the politicians.

6. While walking along Reforma, Carlos Jurado commented that his wife's father was Chinese but did not indicate where he was then residing. Chichay Jurado stated that she had learned some Cantonese as a child, but did not consider herself proficient in Chinese.

7. Before leaving him for the evening, Carlos Jurado invited Rowton to visit some of the better murals in Mexico City on Saturday, 23 April, and promisedd to telephone Rowton to set the time and

place of the meeting. He informed Howton that he himself could be contacted on 48 22 66, a telephone that was located near his studio in the Colonia Florida. He asked Howton to obtain as soon as possible the measurements of the proposed mural and ~~a~~ photographs of of the owner so that he could make a sample painting.

Wallace B Howton

14-00000

MESSAGE FORM
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ROUTING

1		
2		
3		
4		

ORIG : W.F.Frederick
UNIT : WH/1
EXT : 3654
DATE : 6 May 66

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

9 MAY 66 23 26z

TO : MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WH 8 INFO: VR, FILE ☐ RID COPY, C/CA, WH/C8

TO MEXI INFO CITE DIR 02820

REF: MEXI 7234 (IN 10462)*

1. NO TRACES HQS ON SUBJS REF. PLS CABLE BIO DATA SO THAT POA CAN BE OBTAINED.

2. SUBJS ASSIGNED CRYPTOS LIRING-3 AND LIRING-4.

END OF MESSAGE

LIRING-3 LIRING-4

*ROWTON made contact with Carlos Jurado and Miriam Chichay de Jurado and wants POA and crypts.

201 req'd 25 May 66

Jacob D. Esterline
AC/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

W.J. Kaufman
C/WH/1
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

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INDEX: ☐ YES ☐ NO
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UNIT | TIME | BY

INFO FILE, VR, C/WH 6, C/CI, C/FI 2

S E C R E T 050040Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 7234 5 MAY 66 IN 10462

KAPOK TYPIC

1. WALLACE B. ROWTON HAS MADE CONTACT WITH CARLOS JURADO, ARTIST HUSBAND OF MIRIAM CHICHAY CLERK IN CUBAN CONSULATE. ROWTON HAS BECOME QUITE FRIENDLY WITH JURADO, HAS TAKEN HIM AND CHICHAY TO DINNER AND IN TURN JURADO ESCORTED ROWTON ON TOUR OF RIVERA MURALS IN MEXI CITY BUILDINGS.

2. ROWTON USING ALIAS HAS EXPLAINED SELF AS IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH BUSINESS. WHERE FIRST MEETING DEVELOPED FROM ROWTON VISIT TO SALON WHERE JURADO SHOWING HIS PAINTINGS RELATIONSHIP HAS NOW SWUNG AROUND TO PLACE WHERE ROWTON INTERESTED GENERAL WELFARE OF JURADO AND WANTING DO SOMETHING FOR HIM IF JURADO CAN SUPPLY SOME SERVICE FOR WHICH ROWTON COULD LOGICALLY AFFORD PAY HIM. JURADO IS SNAPPING AT THIS BAIT AND APPEARS GENUINELY LIKE ROWTON ASIDE FROM FACT ROWTON APPEARS BE NON-AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH MONEY.

3. IN LAST MEETING, ROWTON QUERIED JURADO ON HIS CONTACTS IN MEXICAN COMMERCE AND JURADO SAID HE HAD NONE. ROWTON ASKED WHAT SORT CONTACTS HE HAD CUBA SINCE THAT SUBJECT OF INTEREST OT ALL AND JURADO FELL OVER SELF COUNTING WHAT HE COULD DO FOR ROWTON ON CUBAN SUBJECT.

SECRET

Lead given to Rowton by Station. Believe original lead from LITAINT-2. 8

CHRONO — DO NOT [illegible]

S

cc: Stewart

SECRET

SAID HE KNEW EVERYONE AT CUBAN EMBASSY MEXI AND COULD GO TO CUBA FOR ROWTON.

4. ROWTON SLOWED MATTERS DOWN BY SAYING HE HAD GO EUROPE FOR ABOUT THREE WEEKS BUT THAT THEY WOULD TALK MORE ABOUT IT UPON HIS RETURN. IN TURNING COVERSATION TO WIFE, ROWTON LEARNED SHE HAS FATHER IN NEW YORK WHO LEFT CUBA TO GET AWAY FROM REVOLUTION. FATHER AND DAUGHTER ON GOOD TERMS AND HE WRITES HER EVERY WEEK. HIS NAME CHINESE FOR PEACH BLOSSOM AND CHICHAY IS CUBAN ATTEMPT AT TRANSLIT-ERATION. JURADO SPOKE CHINESE NAME BUT ROWTON UNABLE REMEMBER PHONETIC PRONUNCIATION AND COULD NOT ASK FOR SPELLING. CHICHAY MOTHER STILL IN CUBA WITH BROTHERS AND SISTERS.

5. LITAINT-2 HAS BEEN CULTIVATING CHICHAY SEVERAL MONTHS. SAW LETTER HER DESK ONE DAY IN CONSULATE AND ASKED IF BORE NEW CUBAN STAMPS. CHICHAY SAID NO IT FROM HER FATHER IN NEW YORK. SHE UN-SALARIED AT CONSULATE AND CURBELO, WHO REPORTED BE FRIEND OF JURADO ACCORDING LIENVOY, HAS DELAYED SENDING HER PHS TO CUBA FOR EMPLOYMENT ON SALARY BASIS. REASON FOR DELAY NOT KNOWN. SHE FREINDLY WITH CURBELO BUT NOT WITH LIRING-1. WHEN THEIR DAUGHTER SICK LITAINT-2 GAVE CHICHAY MONEY TO TAKE CHILD TO DOCTOR. L-2 SAYS JURADO HAS MANY COMMIE FRIENDS MEXI. SPENT TIME IN CUBA AND MAY HAVE SERVED CUBAN

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

PAGE 3 MEXI 7234 S E C R E T

MILITARY SERVICE OR MILITIA.

6. STA TRACES SHOW JURADO AS MEMBER PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA, MEXICO, IN JULY 61, AND MEMBER PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THIRD LATIN AMERICAN CONGRESS, ARTISTS AND WRITERS, HAVANA, JAN 62. WIFE MIRIAM CHICHAY DE JURADO EMPLOYED AT CUBAN EMBASSY ABOUT SIX MONTHS.

7. REQUEST POA JURADO AND CHICHAY FOR CONTACT AND ASSESSMENT. REQUEST COUPLE BE ASSIGNED PSEUDOS IN LIRING SERIES.

8. POUCHING ROWTON CONTACT REPORTS THIS SUBSECT.

S E C R E T

CFN 7234 WALLACE B. ROWTON CARLOS JURADO MIRIAM CHICHAY CUBAN RIVERA CUBA EUROPE NEW YORK CHINESE PEACH BLOSSOM CHINESE NOT ASK LITAINT-2 NO IT CURBELO LIENVOY NOT KNOWN NOT WITH LIRING-1 -2 L-2 STA PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA MEXICO 61 HAVANA JAN 62 POA LIRING

BT

Need Hqs assessment

Cmd ... lungs

Voces Peach Blossom — Chinese name of Miriam Chichay.

Rey ...

HSI 1153 ... family name

Hua Hara

... female given name

TAO-HWA 2711.5363

TAO HUA

Hwa-tao

NNNN

14-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING ACTION

TO
Chief, WHD

INFO. Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Chief of Station, Mexico City

FROM
Chief of Station, San Salvador

SUBJECT JMTRACAS
Identification of Jorge ARIAS Gomez as Salvadoran Delegate to Tri-Continental Conference

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. [illegible] forwarded to [illegible] a copy of the 15 February 1966 edition of Politica, a Mexican publication that contained photos of and speeches delivered by the Chiefs of the various delegations to the Tri-Continental Conference held in Havana in January.

2. "Sergio [illegible]", described therein as the Chief of the Salvadoran delegation, was identified from his photo by the [illegible] and [illegible]-2 as Jorge ARIAS Gomez, a member of the Central Committee of the PCES. According to [illegible]-2, ARIAS is probably the #4 man in the PCES hierarchy - behind Raul CASTELLANOS Figueroa, Jorge Shafick HANDAL, and Salvador Cayetano CARPIO. It is rather strange that the PCES sent ARIAS on this [illegible], [illegible] JMWAVE-2 and [illegible]-2 reported that, while in Cuba in 1961-62, ARIAS had an affair with a girl that resulted in her pregnancy, and the Cubans sent a strong complaint to the PCES concerning his conduct.

3. A LIVACATE main intercept ([illegible]-22291) indicated that ARIAS was expected in Moscow in January. He apparently has not yet returned to El Salvador, and thus he may also be representing the PCES at the 23rd CPUSSR Congress. Any available photos of Salvadorans at that affair would be appreciated.

4. R.I. please index:

Jorge ARIAS Gomez (aka Sergio [illegible])
CIT: El Salvador

In photo of chiefs of various delegations to Tri-Continent Conference in Havana in January 1966 (Politica, 15 Feb 66). "Sergio [illegible]", head of Salvadoran delegation, was identified as Jorge ARIAS Gomez.

Floyd R. CUTTER

LIRING-3

Distribution:
3 - C/WHD
1 - COS, JMWAVE
1 - COS, Mexico City

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	HSSA-5557	1 April 66
	CLASSIFICATION: SECRET	HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-111046 · [illegible] 63-[illegible]-117.3

SECRET

201 PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE TYPE OR PRINT

TO: RID/201 Section Room GA-20 Tube Address DW-6

DATE

FROM: Name | OFFICE | ROOM | PHONE | TUBE ADDRESS

1. TYPE ACTION: X OPEN / AMEND / CLOSE
2. FILE RESTRICTED: YES / NO
3. PERMANENT CHARGE: X YES / NO

4. TRUE NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)
5. 201 NO.

6. NAME VARIANTS AND TELECODES (see Instructions, item 6)

TYPE	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)
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8. DATE OF BIRTH
9. COUNTRY OF BIRTH
10. CITY/TOWN OF BIRTH
11. CITIZENSHIP
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13. SRL
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15. DOCUMENT SYMBOL & NUMBER
DATE
16. RESIDENCE
17. COMMENTS (text for Index cards)

18. COUNTRY OF LOCATION CODE
19. ACTION DESK CODE
20. SECONDARY DESK CODE
21. INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
22. CRYPTONYM LIRING-3

HAND CARRY OR FORWARD BY TUBE IF TRUE NAME APPEARS ABOVE.

23. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER
201 NO.

FORM 9-65 831 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(38-51)

14-00000

DISPATCH

SECRET

Chief of Station, Mexico City

XX

Chief, WH Division

[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]/Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez - Report of Cuban Guerrilla Training near [illegible] Dam

Action Required: See paragraphs 3 and 4

1. Attached is a copy of an unsolicited employment letter to [illegible] from Dr. Armando SOTO Rodriguez, self-described as an ex-military physician. The letter bears the return address [illegible] [illegible], Villahermosa, Tabasco, Mexico and a Villahermosa postmark dated 21 (?) February 1966. In the letter, which was written in fairly good English, SOTO said among other things that the Cuban Consulate in Merida has established a group of Cubans in [illegible], [illegible], where the [illegible] Dam is being finished, who are training Mexicans in guerrilla tactics.

2. Headquarters has no traces identifiable with Armando SOTO Rodriguez or [illegible] also mentioned in the letter. The National Geographic map of Mexico and Central America dated 1953, 1:3.5 million, shows the town of [illegible] at [illegible], [illegible], on the [illegible] River about fifty miles from the Guatemalan border.

3. [illegible] on Cuban guerrilla activity at [illegible]. Since a sensitive source (LITACK) did report occasional interest by the Cuban Consulate in the Tabasco area, and since the area [illegible] by source does lend itself to cross-border activities, it would be appreciated if Mexico City Station would endeavor to check out this report. [illegible]-1 especially might be able to furnish some information in this connection. A former Merida Base staffer now stationed at Headquarters recalls that Ventura "El Tigre" [illegible], a wealthy Mexican cattleman, has extensive holdings centering around Emilio Zapata, about 25 miles from [illegible], and might be knowledgeable of activities in the area. Access to [illegible] would probably be gained through [illegible]-1 and Raimundo [illegible] who services [illegible]-1's and [illegible]'s airplanes in Merida. [illegible] has previously extended invitations to visit his ranch at [illegible] and might do so again if suitably approached. It is recalled that Lawrence F. [illegible] has traveled or planned travel near the general area. Perhaps [illegible] could set up a trip to this area. Another possibility for background and channels might be through [illegible] who has recently been heard to say that he is visiting the Isthmus of Tehuantepec regularly. (This was overheard from an intercepted ham radio conversation). Three maps of the area are attached as of possible assistance.

Attachment:
A. Letter u.s.c.
B. 3 maps u.s.c.

Distribution: 2 - COS, Mexico City

Continued...

Possible interest in [illegible] 3 case.

5 April 1966

[illegible]-14489

[illegible] [illegible]

SECRET

RI
Chrono

WH/1 J. Stewart [illegible] [illegible]

WH/C/FI

WH/2/[illegible]

C/WH/1 W. J. Kaufman

DISPATCH

SECRET

TOTAL COPIES 21

RID COPY

SOD 6 UNIT OT TIME 2140Z

FILE, VR, C5/00, OT, C1/OA, OPS ER, WH/C 8

S E C R E T 072054Z CITE JMWAVE 1869 7 JUL 66 IN 52218

PRIORITY (ISOLATION) INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, EGLIN

PBRUMEN KUROAR CHAPPIE RAMROD

REF A WAVE 0818 (IN 47001)

B WAVE 0746 NOT SENT EGLIN (IN 14906)

1. REQUEST TRAINING FOR SIX MAN LEADER GROUP SCHEDULED ARRIVE (ISOLATION) 11 JULY AS FOLLOWS: (ISOTROPIC) SAME GIVEN AMANCHORS LESS EMPHAIS UDT. (ISOLATION) STRESS LEADERSHIP TRAINING AND ROTATE LEADERSHIP ASSIGNMENTS IN FIELD EXERCISES ENCOMPASSING TRADECRAFT, CACHING, OBSERVATION AND REPORTING. ALL TRAINEES COMPLETED JMWAVE TRAINING AND HAVE OA'S AND RECENT LCFLUTTERS.

2. TRAINEES:

AMLILAC/29 TA IGNACIO (TRAINED AT (ISO/ISOT) JULY 63)

AMLILAC/33 TA MANUEL (TRAINED AT (ISO) FEB 64) 741331

AMSKIRT/1 TA PABLO (TRAINED AT (ISO) JAN 65) 755409

AMHINT/56 TA FRANK (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 332676

AMTRUNK/21 TA LUIS (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY)

AMLUNT/2 TA FILIPE (JMWAVE TRAINING ONLY) 334551

AMPOLISH/1 TA SIMON (ISO/ISOT AUG 65) INTERPRETER C/O TO 285159

SECRET

610V

14-00000

BE ASSIGNED.

3. REQUEST AIRLIFT LEADER TEAM TO (ISO) NIGHT 11 JULY AND RETURN AMANCHOR GROUP (ISO) WAVE NIGHT 12 JULY.

S E C R E T

BT

2/IN

14-00000
104-10269-10079 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

313 ERB

DATE : 17 MAY 61

TO : BELL

FROM : RIO DE JANERIO

ACTION : BELL 15

INFO : DDP, COP, ADDP/A, WH, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAY 18 1340Z 61

ROUTINE

IN 2065

BELL WAVE MEXI INFO SAOP (BY POUCH) CITE RIOD 5366

JMZIP

1. ACCORDING LOCAL PRESS CUBAN VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS CARLOS OLIVARES NOW IN MEXI, PLANS COME BRAZIL ABOUT 20 MAY TO "PROCLAIM TRUTH ABOUT CUBAN REVOLUTION".

2. REQUEST SOONEST RESUME DEROG INFO OLIVARES TO BE PASSED HIGH LEVEL LIAISON.

3. REQUEST MEXI ADVISE RE TRAVEL.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

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104-10275-10176 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

2 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMBANG-1

1. I met with AMBANG-1 on 27 July 1963 in Miami. The following is a resume of the business transacted at that meeting.

a. Request for High Explosives

AMBANG-1 stated that in view of my outline of strategic targets inside Cuba during our last meeting which took place in Washington on 21 June 1963, he had decided to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant. He informed me that he has a man employed in the power plant in Havana who is capable of launching this operation. In this connection AMBANG-1 asked if we could make available twenty pounds of high explosives as well as six to eight thermite grenades. AMBANG-1 asked if it were possible to have the twenty pounds broken into smaller lots. In our further discussion of this subject, it became apparent that A-1 would be willing to receive the materiel either in San Juan or inside Cuba, but that he definitely preferred the latter if this were possible. Like in most other instances during our conversation, I advised AMBANG-1 that I would need to discuss this matter with my superiors but that I could tentatively assure him of our ability and willingness to furnish the high explosives in San Juan and possibly inside Cuba. At this point I asked AMBANG-1 if he could foresee the need for materiel of this type inside Cuba. I told him that I asked this question because if his group were prepared now or in the near future for meaningful sabotage action inside Cuba it was conceivable that we could begin the caching of needed materiel inside Cuba. AMBANG-1 assured me that they

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were in a position to sabotage the electrical plant in Havana. (I did not ask, neither did he specify which plant.) He did not promise immediate action, adding that he wanted to assure himself of the details of the planned operation and the safety-odds of the man involved. A-1 then indicated that he would certainly be in a position to accomplish this mission and others in the future and would be most grateful for any materiel we could put in place. I left the matter with him with the understanding that if it were possible we would proceed with caching the high explosives in the general area of Havana. He assured me of their capability to service and retrieve the cache.

b. Request for Contact in Guantanamo

AMBANG-1 asked me if it would be possible for us to arrange some means for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo and talk to his brother who is an employee of the Naval Base and another agent of theirs likewise employed there. The reason A-1 gave for the request was that they wished to inform Ramon Cisneros Diaz of the JURE plans to begin the implementation of their plan of resistance and overthrow of the Castro Regime. I advised A-1 that whereas I would look into this matter as I could tentatively tell him that the chances of accomplishing this were remote.

c. AMBANG-1 Political Plans

AMBANG-1 informed me that he was planning at this time to be in New York on or about 10 August and that following this trip he intended to go to Santo Domingo and Caracas. In Santo Domingo he hoped to set up a small base for operations such as a small house on a farm near the shore which could be used for boat travel to Cuba. Once he had made such arrangements he intended to talk to President Júan Bosch telling him of the plan and asking his acquiescence if not support. AMBANG-1 intends to tell Bosch that he will not embarrass him and will go about his business in a secure and professional manner adding that if he should embarrass Bosch, the latter could disclaim him and A-1 would desist from any further activity there.

So far as AMBANG-1's trip to Caracas is concerned, that will be principally devoted to orienting the JURE representation

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in that city. In addition, AMBANG-1 will attempt to see and talk to Venezuelan Government officials including President Betancourt.

Some time after this trip AMBANG-1 intends to visit Central America principally Costa Rica and if he can procure a visa, Mexico. The purpose of all his travel is the raising of funds, the general tightening of his organization and discussions necessary to coordinate their efforts.

d. Isolation of Cuba.

AMBANG-1 made it exceedingly clear that the lifeline to his assets inside Cuba had been severely restricted when PAA flights were suspended. Nothing could suit AMBANG-1 more than to have these flights resumed. AMBANG-1's obviously great interest in the resumption of these flights was the most eloquent statement yet of his belief that he has a network, or that he can revive a network within Cuba. At least at this stage of JURE operations, AMBANG-1 does not appear to consider the infiltration of manpower as necessary.

AMBANG-1 stated that the use of flights from Spain and Mexico to Cuba was difficult and costly whereas the Miami-Havana run had been most useful in maintaining contact within Cuba. It was AMBANG-1's opinion that the resumption of PAA flights would be an operational boom to JURE and that whereas he could see Castro making some political capital out of the flights, he believed that some appropriate statement such as "there is no political significance but only a humanitarian and compassionate reason for the reestablishment of this link," would be sufficient to negate any political advantage by Castro.

e. AMBANG-1 Phasing Out of his Employment

AMBANG-1 gave me to believe that he is closing shop and giving up his position with the Corporacion de Renovacion Urbana y Viviendas where he is employed as an engineer in charge of building pre-cast concrete houses. AMBANG-1 stated that during the past week Governor Munoz Marin gave final authority for the erection of a plant to produce these houses in Puerto Rica. AMBANG-1 is

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torn with the thought of leaving this project which he believes will be most successful, and which would assure his livelihood, but he knows that he must devote himself to the fight against Castro. It is obvious to me that AMBANG-1 will within the next two months phase out of this employment to devote full time to the liberation of Cuba.

f. A JURE Radio Link

AMBANG-1 asked me if I would be able to assist him in the establishment of a San Juan-Caracas-Miami radio link. He explained that the JURE has spent a great deal of money on telephonic communications between these points and were most anxious to set up a means of radio communication in order to economize. I guess that AMBANG-1 could tell from my reaction that I was not too sympathetic to his request for he withdrew it almost as soon as he had made it. He went on to say that this was a problem which they could overcome and I presume that he will seek to establish such radio communications without our assistance.

g. Aerial Maps of Cuba

AMBANG-1 informed me that the JURE membership had brought out of Cuba an entire series of maps showing key roads, bridges, industrial plants, et al, which they had copied by the Aero Service Corporation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. AMBANG-1 stated that they had received most of these photos from the Aero Service Corporation but that the 101 were still missing. He gave me the numbers of those missing and asked if we could procure them. I have since informed AMBANG-1 that it would perhaps be best it he could, or his organization, do this instead but that we would pay the travel of one of his men, should this prove necessary. Attached, hereto, is a copy of the missing photos in question.

h. JURE Organization and Strength

AMBANG-1 informed me that the membership of the JURE in San Juan was now at about 500 members and that each of these individuals makes a weekly contributionto the organization.

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In addition there are large JURE organizations in Caracas, Venezuela and Dallas, Texas. There are according to AMBANG-1 a total of thirty delegations in Latin America, the U. S. A. and Europe. He cited as an example the delegation in San Francisco which had recently purchased a typewriter through the collection of green stamps. He added that Rogelio Cisneros had travelled to San Francisco some time ago to communicate with that group and to tighten its organizational activities.

i. AMBANG-1 Asks About ARTIME and the Activities in Central America

AMBANG-1 raised the question of Manuel ARTIME's activities in Central America and particularly in Nicaragua. He stated that any association with Somoza would not help in creating the mistique and political coloration necessary to inspire revolution and resistance from the non-Communists elements in Cuba. Whereas, I had expected AMBANG-1 to go into a long harangue as to the positive damage that ARTIME's actions with Somoza could cause, he left the matter at about this point. I agreed that the Somozas did not have a liberal political reputation throughout Latin America, but added that whatever Cubans could do from that or any vantage point against Communism in Cuba would in my estimation be helpful, -- while I am sure AMBANG-1 did not agree with me, he did not say so. In respect to ARTIME and Miro Cardona, whose name entered into the conversation later, AMBANG-1 took a fairly objective view. He stated that Miro had arrived in San Juan and that he wished him the best as he figured he had suffered enough. Insofar as ARTIME was concerned I gathered that AMBANG-1 might feel that the association with Somoza would not do ARTIME any good in a post-Castro Cuba. As AMBANG-1 is convinced that a government after Castro must be of a progressive liberal stripe, ARTIME was not doing himself any good by identifying himself with the Somozas.

j. A List of Cuban Diplomats

As AMBANG-1 had asked for a list of Cuban Diplomats abroad while we were in Paris, I advised him that such a list had been prepared and we would make it available to him. In this connection he asked if we could include the addresses of each of the Cuban installations. Speaking of diplomats, AMBANG-1 wanted to

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know if Ambassador Gustavo Arcos had returned from Prague. I informed him that I did not know. AMBANG-1 was most interested to learn that Franqui's wife and children had actually come out of Cuba, and indicated that he would intensify his efforts to maintain contact with Cuban Diplomat Cabrera Infante in Brussels as a means toward the eventual recruitment of Franqui.

k. AMBANG-1 Relation with Jorge Volsky

In conjunction with questions regarding propaganda sent to Cuba, and the JURE's general plans in this field, I asked A-1 about his relation with Jorge Volsky. A-1 stated that he considered Volsky to be an extremely able, serious newspaperman. He added that whereas he saw Volsky frequently on his trips to Miami, the latter did not work for him. A-1 stated that Volsky's work was a full-time job which left him little time to do anything else.

A-1 stated that JURE propaganda was produced by a twelve - man board.

A-1 added that the JURE expected to shortly introduce a statement on its position into Cuba.

l. AMBANG-1 Asks about Two Man Underwater Craft

A-1 asked if I knew anything about a two man type craft which travels through the water. I presume A-1 was talking about the "sea-sled." I advised him that I knew little about this type craft, but in my opinion its usefulness for the type activity he had in mind was limited. AMBANG-1 would use this craft for the final phase of an infiltration effort. A-1 stated that this craft was being used at the hotel beaches in San Juan as a type of sporting activity. I will advise him that he could pursue this matter himself as all knowledge on this subject is publicly available.

m. AMBANG-1 Trained in Simple Scorch System

A WAVE technician, Culver Ladd, under the name of Mr. Lane trained A-1 to use a simple scorch system of S/W. A-1

14-00000

was given some eighty pills with which he will be able to make the "ink" used in this system of S/W. A-1 was pleased with the system, especially its simplicity. He will use the system to communicate with his chief delegate in Paris and undoubtedly other persons in Cuba as well as in the other JURE delegations.

n. AMBANG-1 is Writing an Article for Cuadernos

At the request of German Arcienegas, the famed Colombian intellectual, A-1 is preparing an article which is to be published in Cuadernos. The article will deal with the problems facing Latin America and how they can be resolved. A-1 will be in select company as Arcienegas has asked a number of prominent Latin American intellectuals for their views.

o. Communication Between AMBANG-1 and Case Officer

AMBANG-1 gave me the following addresses at which he can be reached:

Corporacion de Renovacion
Urbana y Viviendas
PARADA 31
Ponce de Leon,
Hato Rey
Puerto Rico Telephone No. 723-1671

(NOTE: This is not AMBANG's office or home, but that of a friend who is always able to reach A-1.)

Also:

Mr. Jaime Mitrani
1260 W. 61 Place
Hialeah, Florida

AMBANG-1 was given the following means of contacting me:

Mr. Alfred Fernandez
P. O. Box 1104, Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. Telephone No. 737-8294

AMBANG-1 will use the name "Tony" as a signature in mail to me.

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2. General Observations

I beleive AMBANG-1 is planning to return to Cuba. He indicated that he would give the matter serious thought to even go in, disguised, as a legal traveller if that road were generally open, i. e., if rather large numbers of travellers were going in via PAA flights. This line seemed a bit out of character for A-1, for it seems unrealistic and somewhat remindful of Macaulay's references to the state of mind that exiles develop. I also detected what we consider to be a somewhat unrealistic appraisal of the Cuban situation in A-1's estimate that Castro has considerably less than 40% of the Cuban people with him. A-1 may be losing more than a little touch with Cuban reality.

A-1 remains convinced that he is on the right track in working for the eventual overthrow of Castro. He is convinced, however, that two to three years is all the time left for actually destroying the Castro regime, believing that there will be a favorable turn in the Cuban economic situation by late 1965. A-1 is likewise convinced that Castro cannot add to the improvement of Cuba, to the contrary that so long as the principal decisions are made by Castro, the general trend will be confusion arising from a failure to concentrate on specific problems until they are corrected.

AMBANG-1 is likewise convinced that the JURE is building a political group and general outlook which will have an impact on Cuba for many years to come. He is especially concerned with the need to carefully consider each position of his group in order to create the lasting impression that JURE knows where it is going and that its leadership is composed of men who know how to "run" a country without the false starts, confusion and chaos identified with the Castro regime.

AMBANG-1 is likewise greatly concerned with the necessity of not creating an impression inside Cuba that the JURE will return to mete out "justice." It is essential, A-1 states, to convince the general populace that the overthrow of Castro will not result in a bloodbath, rather that the sole aim is to save the revolution that has been betrayed. He is anxious that the people inside Cuba see

14-00000

the JURE as a responsible, intelligent and dispassionate group which is capable of bringing to Cuba all that the revolution promised.

Alfonso Rodriguez
SAS/SO

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6957

MEXICO CITY

MEXI

RYBAT TYPIC

86284

REF: DIR 86283

IDEN A: FERNANDO PALENZUELA VAQUET
SON OF MATEO AND JOSEFA
DPOB 9 NOV 1903 ARTEMISA, PINAR DEL
RIO, CUBA, 5'7" BROWN EYES, GRAY
HAIR, PASSPORT No. 45809, RESIDENT OF
AVENIDA 35 No. 9809, MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN B: MARIA FRANCISCA CRESPO FALCON
DAUGHTER OF ARTURO AND JOSEFINA
DPOB 28 NOV 1914 GUIRA DE MELENA, HABANA, CUBA
5'0" BROWN EYES/HAIR PASSPORT No. 28149,
RESIDENT OF AVENIDA 35 No. 9809
MARIANAO, CUBA

IDEN C: HOWARD ANDERSON

SAS/SEC MKH

WH/3/MEXI

C/WH/3

J. W.
C/WHD
RELEASING OFFICER

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S-E-C-R-E-T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

201-20481

86520

RYBAT TYPIC AMROD

PLEASE HAVE SCANTLING WRITE LETTER EMBODYING FOLLOWING IDEAS:

"EXCELENCIA:

AS YOU MAY KNOW FOR SEVERAL MONTHS I HAVE BEEN ENGAGING IN PURCHASING VARIOUS COMMERCIAL ITEMS FOR MR. SIKOBAS AND MR. VEGA OF YOUR EMBASSY. FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS THESE PURCHASES WENT VERY WELL AND I BELIEVE BOTH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND I WERE SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS AND DELIVERIES.

SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF MR. SIKOBAS AND MR. VEGA, HOWEVER, I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CARRY ON MY BUSINESS WITH THEM IN A NORMAL MANNER. I HAVE GONE TO MUCH TROUBLE TO GATHER ARTICLES THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN AND TO DELIVER THEM AS INSTRUCTED; YET, NOW THREE WEEKS AFTER MAKING MY LAST DELIVERY I HAVE STILL NOT BEEN PAID.

I OBJECT TO THE PRESENT DELAYS IN MAKING PAYMENT TO ME AND REQUEST THAT MR. SIKOBAS OR HIS APODERADO IN THIS CITY BE INFORMED THAT I BADLY NEED THE MONEY AND CANNOT MAKE FURTHER DELIVERIES UNTIL I HAVE [illegible]

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

S E C R E T

ROUTING

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

INFO CITE DIR

"I ALSO REQUEST THAT THIS LETTER BE ANSWERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND I HOPE NEITHER YOUR GOVERNMENT NOR I WILL BE CAUGHT UNPREPARED IN THE EVENT THE AMERICAN NATIONS ALL BREAK RELATIONS WITH CUBA. I HAVE NOW AT MY WAREHOUSE A NUMBER OF ITEMS MR. SINOBAS AND MR. VEGA ORDERED AND WILL DELIVER THEM AS SOON AS THE CHECK ARRIVES AND OUR ACCOUNTS LIQUIDATED.

S S S

MARCO TULIO RODRIGUEZ"

2. PLEASE DATE AND SEND 7 DECEMBER VIA REGISTERED MAIL TO SR. JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ ARMAS, FRANCISCO MARQUEZ 160, COLONIA CONDESA, DF, USING OROPEZA PO BOX AS RETURN ADDRESS, IF OROPEZA BOX SERVICING 6 DECEMBER UNPRODUCTIVE.

END OF MESSAGE

SAS/MOB

WH/3/MEXI

J. C. KING
C/WHD

DESMOND FITZGERALD
C/SAS

S E C R E T

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SAS/[illegible]/PA/PROP
6055
2 DECEMBER 1963

S-E-C-R-E-T

TO: MEXICO CITY BOGOTA LIMA GUATEMALA JMWAVE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: SAS 8

INFO: DDP, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, WH 7, VR

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TO MEXI BOGO LIMA GUAT INFO WAVE CITE DIR

86694

REF: DIR 86693

IDEN: GRACE HOLMES, P.O.BOX 1767, CORAL GABLES, FLORIDA.

END OF MESSAGE

C/SAS/[illegible]/PROP
WH/2
WH/3/[illegible]
C/[illegible]/3

A. A. [illegible]
C/SAS/[illegible]

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: DIRECTOR

: FE 8

: DDP, CI/OPS, CI/OA, CCS 3, WH 7, SAS 5, VR

INFO

CITE DIR

86803

SUGAR

REF DIR 86802

1. IDEN A MR. WATANABE.

2. IDEN B MR. K. SUZUKI, TRANS PACIFIC COMMERCE CONSULTANTS, SUITE 315, 450 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. TELEPHONE DOUGLAS 2-6594.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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ORIG: [illegible]
UNIT: SR/CI/K
EXT: 6991
DATE: 10 DECEMBER 63

S E C R E T

TO: SEE BELOW

FROM: DIRECTOR

INFO: ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, FI/INT 2, AF 5, FE [illegible], WE [illegible], NE 4, EE 6, VR, WH 7

TO / INFO / CITE

89383

AF	EE	FE	NE	WE	WH
ALGI	VIEN	[illegible]	KABU	BRUS	GORG
ORAN	SBUR	CNBR	COLO	OTTA	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	COPE	[illegible]
YAOU	FRAN	PENH	[illegible]	LOND	SJOS
ADDI	[illegible]	[illegible]	CALC	HELS	[illegible]
ACCR	BONN	TAHI	[illegible]	PARI	QUIT
CNKY	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
ABID	FROB	DJAK	[illegible]	[illegible]	GUAT
NOBI	HAMB	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	HEID	TOKY	[illegible]	[illegible]	TEGU
SPLI	[illegible]	SEOU	[illegible]	[illegible]	KING
WHEL	STUT	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	MEXI
[illegible]	ATHE	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
TNAR	KAVA	KUAL	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
CASA	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
LAGS	ZURI	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	LIMA
BRAZ		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SJAN
LEOP		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	SALV
[illegible]		SAIG	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	PRIN
[illegible]			[illegible]	LAPA	MONT
[illegible]			[illegible]	RIOD	CARA
[illegible]			[illegible]	[illegible]	
[illegible]			[illegible]	BELO	
[illegible]			[illegible]	BRIL	
[illegible]			[illegible]	CURI	
[illegible]			CAIR	[illegible]	
[illegible]			ALEX	RECI	
[illegible]			[illegible]	SALV	
[illegible]			TAIZ	SAOP	
[illegible]			[illegible]		
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[illegible]					

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ORIG: SHAPOVICH:mg
UNIT: [illegible]/II
EXT: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible] DECEMBER 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

SECRET

ROUTING
1 | 4
2 | 5
3 | 6

TO: BOOK CABLE (SEE BELOW)
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO:

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X ROUTINE

TO ALL COS, &COB INFO CITE DIR

REDWOOD LCIMPROVE

1. 20 DECEMBER IS FORTY-SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF FOUNDING OF SOVIET STATE SECURITY ORGANIZATION. THIS "CHEKIST BIRTHDAY" IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY KGB REZIDENCIES AROUND THE WORLD BY DISCREET GATHERING IN EMBASSY OR OTHER OFFICIAL INSTALLATION, OR IN HOME OF REZIDENT OR OTHER REZIDENTURA MEMBER.

2. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SOME STATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NEW IDENTIFICATIONS OR TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS TENTATIVE IDENTIFICATIONS ON BASIS OF ATTENDANCE THIS PARTY. SUGGEST ADDRESSEES MOUNT UNILATERAL SURVEILLANCE AND/OR ALERT LIAISON SERVICES TO THIS DATE AS APPROPRIATE.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

PAGE TWO

TO

I certify that this cable must go to all stations and bases.

C/SR [signature]

C/SR/CI [signature]
SR/O/AF [signature]
SR/O/EE D.W. Schroeder
SR/O/FE [signature]
SR/O/WE [signature]
SR/O/WH [signature]
SR/O/NE [signature]

C/AF [signature]
C/EE [signature]
for C/FE [signature]
C/WE [signature]
C/WH [signature]
C/NE [signature]

C/SR/CI [signature]

C/SR

C/SR [signature]

SECRET

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104-10290-10162
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S E C R E T

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible] CARA

89669

REFS: A. CARA 8245 (IN 77465) ([illegible]), [illegible])*

B. [illegible] 9136 (IN [illegible]) ([illegible], CARA)**

1. 40 H.P. OUTBOARD MOTOR MODEL R.D.S. SERIAL NUMBER C-367809 RPT 367[illegible], MANUFACTURED BY JOHNSON MOTORS, PETERBOROUGH, CANADA, FOUND IN ARMS CACHE VENEZUELA COAST, ASCERTAINED FROM MANUFACTURER'S WAUKEGAN, ILLINOIS, INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS TO HAVE BEEN ORDERED 25 SEPT 1963 BY MONTREAL MOTOR BOAT, 725 ST. [illegible], MONTREAL, DEALER OF LONG STANDING. MOTOR ONE OF FOUR 40 H.P. UNITS, OTHERS SERIAL NUMBERS C-367808, C-367830 C-367833, SHIPPED [illegible] THIS DEALER TOGETHER WITH ONE 40 H.P. UNIT WITH ELECTRIC CLUTCH, SERIAL C-367450, AND ONE 28 H.P. MOTOR, SERIAL C-389561.

2. IN VIEW [illegible] [illegible] BEFORE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES [illegible] CUBA SOURCE THIS CACHE REQUEST OTTA THROUGH LIAISON ASCERTAIN IDENTITY PURCHASER FROM MONTREAL DEALER WITH ANY AVAILABLE BACKGROUND BIO INFO. ALSO ATTEMPT TRACE MOTORS MOVEMENTS FROM HANDS PURCHASER IN EFFORT ESTABLISH DELIVERY CHANNEL CUBA.

3. FOR [illegible], [illegible]: RE 12 OUTBOARDS IN REF B, WAUKEGAN HEADQUARTERS ADVISES THREE MODELS RDS 25D SHIPPED BY AMSTERDAM FACTORY 25 OCTOBER 1963 TO ALMACO[illegible] JOHNSON BRUSSELS DISTRIBUTOR. OTHER PLACED WITH DISTRIBUTOR 24 OCT BY MR. [illegible]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S E C R E T

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J. J. [illegible]
WH/[illegible]
6637
17 FEB 1963

SECRET

PAGE TWO

INFO

HOTEL PLAZA, BRUSSELS, [illegible] [illegible] CASH AND DELIVERY F.O.B. DISTRIBUTOR'S PLACE OF BUSINESS. SUBJECT HAD MOTORS TRUCKED TO BRUSSELS AIRPORT AND SHIPPED SCHIPHOL AIRPORT, AMSTERDAM, WHERE TRAIL LOST. BANK RECORDS SHOW PURCHASE FUNDS TRANSFERRED FROM CANADIAN BANK ACCOUNT OF [illegible] [illegible] CO. LTD., QUEBEC. SUBJECT HOME ADDRESS GIVEN AS 3019 [illegible] [illegible], ST. FOY, QUEBEC.

4. ~~[illegible]~~ CARACAS CHECK [illegible] CONSPIRACY REPORTEDLY ORIGINATED ALSO BY CANADIAN [illegible] [illegible] GOV.

89669

END OF MESSAGE

WH Comment: * Identified by Manufacturer's name plate outboard [illegible] area cards.

** Identified [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] background purchase.

RELEASING OFFICER [illegible]

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

14-00000
104-10290-10168 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DODS 4, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CI/IC 2, SAS 8,

PRIORITY

TO PRIORITY BOOK CABLE INFO CITE DIR 89778

CABA HAVA WAVE BOGO
MEXI LIMA PACY GUAT
BOGO QUIT GAYA
RIOD SAGO LAPA
SANJ

REF: DIR 88860 *

FYI. ACTION INTENDED PARA 2 REF WAS UNATTRIBUTABLE SURFACING VIA MEDIA. DO NOT DESIRE AT THIS TIME ADDEES MAKE DIRECT OR INDIRECT OVERTURES TO LOCAL OFFICIALS OR GOVTS IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED ADDEES TO CONSIDER SURFACING ANY EVIDENCE CASTRO FINANCING TERRORIST AND PRO CUBAN ACTS, ETC.

SECRET

104-10290-10190 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

S E C R E T

PRIORITY MUNI
ROUTINE

LOND HAMB OSLO BEIR TEHE TUNI MANI BERN HEID PARI CAIR ACCA
FROG BUDR ATHE JIDD LEOP BOGO MEXI GEVA ANKA KARI PRET SING
ROME LISB BONN AMMA ALGI MELB OKIE FRAN LAND VIEN DHAH
KACU NARO BAGH WEED TPLI HUAL RIOD KINGS SJAN ADDI

PARAND

WORLD BRIEF

(NOFORN IN SLANTS. REMAINING INFO RELEASABLE TO LIAISON.)

1. BERLIN: THE COMMUNISTS VIEW AS "OFFICIAL" THE TALKS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BERLIN NEGOTIATORS WHICH ACHIEVED THE AGREEMENT ON CHRISTMAS PASSES AND CONSIDER THEM A BOOST TO MOSCOW'S "FREE CITY" PROPOSAL FOR WEST BERLIN. WILLY BRANDT, ON THE OTHER HAND, REGARDS THEM AS ONLY "TECHNICAL" AND AS NO SETBACK TO HIS STATURE IN WEST GERMAN POLITICS.

2. YUGOSLAVIA: //TITO IS APPARENTLY NO LONGER DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ADMINISTRATION OF YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS. HE HAS EXHIBITED LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF A NUMBER OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES AND HAS BEEN DIVESTING HIMSELF OF RESPONSIBILITIES. TWO RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HIS FACULTIES HAVE DIMMED //

3. NORTH VIETNAM: HEAVY PROPAGANDA EMPHASIS ON THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM

SECRET

SECRET

20 DEC 63 00 47 Z

SIG CEN

90407

(PAGE TWO)

SUGGESTS A GROWING CONFIDENCE IN HANOI THAT INSURGENTS CAN SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR POSITION DESPITE US BACKING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. (CONF)

4 CUBA: COASTAL DEFENSE CRUISE MISSILES ~~NOW~~ (REPORTEDLY) ARE PART OF THE CUBAN ARTILLERY FORCES. ~~[illegible]~~ CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SOVIET-DOMINATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IS ALSO INCREASING. A SOVIET SO-1-CLASS SUBCHASER HAS ARRIVED IN CUBAN WATERS AND TWO OTHERS ARE PROBABLY EN ROUTE.

5. USSR: KHRUSHCHEV'S LONG-RANGE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET CHEMICAL INDUSTRY IS TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY RETRENCHMENT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ECONOMY DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS. HOUSING, CONSUMER SERVICES, AND SOME HEAVY INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION ARE TO BE AFFECTED, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A SLOWING IN THE RATE AT WHICH MILITARY EXPENDITURES HAVE INCREASED SINCE 1960

6 ITALY: DOUBTS ABOUT THE MORO GOVERNMENT'S VIABILITY HAVE SUBSIDED SOMEWHAT AS A RESULT OF STRONG VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IT RECEIVED ON 17 DEC. [illegible] AUTHORITY HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED BY [illegible] REFUSAL TO MAKE ANY DEAL WITH LEFTWING [illegible] TO [illegible]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

(PAGE THREE)

SUPPORT ON THE CONFIDENCE VOTE. MORO'S POSITION IS FIRMER BECAUSE OF THIS AND BECAUSE OF THE VATICAN'S PRESSURE ON CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC RIGHTWINGERS NOT TO BREAK PARTY UNITY. (CONF)

7. CUBA: THE CASTRO REGIME SEEMS INTENT ON CULTIVATING AFRICAN COUNTRIES AS WAY OF LESSENING ITS ISOLATION FROM THE FREE WORLD. AN EMBASSY IN TANGANYIKA INDICATES THIS. IN ADDITION, CUBA HAS, DURING THE PAST MONTH, EXPANDED CONTACTS WITH NINE COUNTRIES SOUTH OF THE SAHARA. THERE IS ALSO REASON TO SUSPECT AFRICANS GOING TO CUBA ON SCHOLARSHIPS ARE GETTING TRAINING IN GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES.

8. UK: //BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE DOUGLAS-HOME GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY FOCUSED ON KEEPING THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE OPEN AND IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY. BOTH SIR ALEX AND FOREIGN SECRETARY BUTLER ESPECIALLY DETERMINED TO KEEP EXPLORING AREAS POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH MOSCOW -- A POLICY WHICH PAID OFF HANDSOMELY FOR CONSERVATIVES IN ELECTIONS OF 1955 AND 1959. MAIN OBJECTIVE -- BUTLER'S RECENT VISIT, BONN WAS TO SOUND OUT GERMAN REACTION TO SUCH BRITISH INITIATIVES.//

9. BRITISH GUIANA. JAGAN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS HAVE BEEN ATTACKING

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INFO (PAGE FOUR) 90407

THE UK AND US IN INCREASINGLY VITRIOLIC TERMS. HIS PARTY IS PARALYZED BY INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND IS UNDECIDED WHETHER TO CONTEST THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS SET FOR NEXT YEAR OR TRY TO BLOCK THEM BY RESORTING TO VIOLENCE. OPPOSITION PARTIES, MEANWHILE HAVE DONE LITTLE TO COOPERATE AGAINST JAGAN BEYOND REACHING A TENTATIVE AGREEMENT NOT TO ATTACK EACH OTHER PUBLICLY.

10. FRANCE: PARIS IS TRYING TO PROMOTE TRADE WITH COMMUNIST CHINA BY ENCOURAGING PRIVATE FIRMS TO DEVELOP NEW MARKETS THERE. THERE ARE BUILT IN LIMITATIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT FRENCH-CHINESE TRADE CAN GROW, COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS ARE FEW, AND CREDIT PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO LIMIT PURCHASES BY CHINESE WHO SEEM PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN OBTAINING FRENCH TECHNICAL SKILLS. PARIS INTEREST IN CHINESE TRADE AND EXPANDED CULTURAL CONTACTS WITH PEIPING HAVE STIMULATED SPECULATION THAT SOME SORT OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IS IN THE OFFING. THIS IS STOUTLY DENIED AT ALL LEVELS OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT.

11. FINLAND: FOR THE SECOND TIME IN FOUR MONTHS FINLAND IS GOING THROUGH A CABINET CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY DISAGREEMENT WITHIN THE RULING COALITION OVER DOMESTIC LEGISLATION. A NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT

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SECRET

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SECRET

(PAGE FIVE)

OF CIVIL SERVANTS, HEADED BY ECONOMIST REINO LEHTO, HAS BEEN APPOINTED TO SERVE UNTIL THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS RESOLVED. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS SEEM LIMITED TO AGRARIAN MINORITY GOVERNMENT, RECONSTITUTION OF AGRARIAN-DOMINATED COALITION OR AS A LAST RESORT, GENERAL ELECTIONS. WHATEVER THE OUTCOME, PRESIDENT KEKKONEN DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. MOSCOW CAME OUT AGAIN DURING HIS TRIP TO THE USSR.

12. SOUTH KOREA: PRESIDENT PAK CHONG-HUI'S DOMINATION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INAUGURATED ON 17 DEC UNDER SOUTH KOREA'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME MAY TRANSFER POLITICAL INFIGHTING TO A NEW ARENA. THE CONTROVERSIAL FORMER SECURITY CHIEF KIM CHONG-PIL CONTROLS THE PARTY APPARATUS, AND HIS MANY ENEMIES ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO USE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES TO TRY TO WREST POWER FROM HIM. PRESIDENT PAK STILL BACKS KIM, HOWEVER, AND THEY AND THEIR COHORTS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT'S MAJOR DECISIONS. THE CABINET HEADED BY CHOE TU-SON APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CHOSEN WITH A MIND TO BALANCING FACTIONAL AND SECTIONAL INTERESTS AND FOR AN ABILITY TO CARRY OUT, RATHER THAN FORMULATE POLICY. WITH ELECTIONS OVER, THE REGIME IS

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

INDEX
NO INDEX
FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING

TO

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

TO INFO CITE DIR 90407

(PAGE SIX)

LIKELY TO SPEED DECISIONS ON MANY OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. A STAGNANT ECONOMY BESET BY INFLATION IS THE MOST PRESSING ONE. DISCONTENT WITH RISING PRICES EXTENDS INTO THE ARMED FORCES. PAK IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO CONCLUDE THE TEN-YEAR OLD NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. (CONF)

13. TURKEY: THE THREE-WEEK OLD CABINET CRISIS APPEARS TO BE APPROACHING A CLIMAX FOLLOWING THE FAILURE OF BOTH MAJOR PARTIES TO BRING MINOR PARTIES INTO COALITION ARRANGEMENTS. ONLY A COALITION BETWEEN THESE TWO, PRIME MINISTER INONU'S REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY AND THE JUSTICE PARTY, OR A "NATIONAL COALITION" OF ALL POLITICAL GROUPS, REMAINS TO BE TRIED. DESPITE THE DEEP DIFFERENCES, AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE TWO MAY PROVE FEASIBLE, FOR THE POLITICIANS FEAR THAT EXTENDING THE CRISIS MUCH LONGER MIGHT PROVOKE MILITARY INTERVENTION. (CONF)

14. CONGO: // THE ADOULA REGIME'S POSITION REMAINS PRECARIOUS ITS EXTREME LEFTIST OPPONENTS JOINED IN A "COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" (CNL) CONTINUE TO PLOT AGAINST IT FROM THEIR BRAZZAVILLE BASE THOUGH SOMEWHAT CRIPPLED BY LEOPOLDVILLE'S EXPULSION OF THEIR SOVIET

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S E C R E T

(PAGE SEVEN)

EMBASSY CONTACTS. THE EXILES HAVE SENT EMISSARIES ABROAD TO SEEK FUNDS AND ARMS. THEIR PLANS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE ASSASSINATION OF LEOPOLDVILLE LEADERS, AN "INVASION" OF THE CONGO, AND INSTIGATION OF A COUP BY THE CONGO ARMY. THE WEAKNESS OF THE LEOPOLDVILLE REGIME, ESPECIALLY THE QUESTIONABLE RELIABILITY OF GENERAL MOBUTU'S ARMY, CLEARLY ENHANCES THE CNL PROSPECTS. LAST MONTH MOBUTU AND SURETE CHIEF NENDAKA, THE REGIME'S TWO KEYSTONES, WERE WAYLAYED BY SOLDIERS AND NEARLY KILLED. STUDENT AGITATION MAY BECOME A FACTOR IN VIEW OF THE CLOSE CONNECTIONS TO STUDENT GROUPS OF TWO HIGH OFFICIALS RECENTLY OUSTED -- FOREIGN MINISTER MABIKA-KALANDA AND LONDON CHARGE THOMAS KANZA. IN THE NEWEST DELIBERATIONS TOWARD WRITING A CONSTITUTION PROVINCIAL VOICES DESIRING A LOOSE ARRANGEMENT APPEAR STRONGER THAN SUPPORTERS OF ADOULA'S PUSH FOR A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.//

[illegible] LAOS: //RIGHT-WING AND NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES, ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SUCCESSES IN CENTRAL AND NORTHERN LAOS, ARE CONSIDERING [illegible] [illegible] INITIATIVES. THEY ARE PLANNING MOVES AIMED AT CAPTURING [illegible] BESIEGED XIENG KHOUANG [illegible] AND [illegible] OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST SUPPLY ROUTES FROM NORTH VIETNAM. COMMUNISTS [illegible]

S E C R E T

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FROM: DIRECTOR

CITE 90407

(PAGE EIGHT)

HAVE RECAPTURED THE KEY ROAD JUNCTION OF LAK SAO, HOWEVER, AND RETAIN THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE SHARP COUNTERMOVES ELSEWHERE. THE CONTINUING MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PATHET LAO AND NEUTRALIST FACTIONS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGES, BUT THE PATHET LAO HAVE EXPRESSED NEW INTEREST IN ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN THEIR CHIEF PRINCE SOUPHANNOUVONG AND PREMIER SOUVVANNA PHOUMA TO ARRANGE FOR FULL PATHET LAO PARTICIPATION IN THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. COUP RUMORS, MOSTLY CENTERING ON PLANS BY RIGHT-WING MILITARY ELEMENTS ALLIED WITH THE SANANIKONE CLAN, CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE IN VIENTIANE. //

SECRET

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S E C R E T

LOIA DUBS ABUS BOGO BRIL SAOP
BUEN CARA GUAT LIMA
H/BA MONT PRIN QUIT
RIOD SAGO SJOS STOM
TEGU MEXI LAPA SALV
PACY GAYA CORG SECI
WAVE KOLA OTTA

70598

RADNOTE

BOOK MESSAGE

1. MEXI NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET AND AUTHORIZED HANDLE CRYPTO CLASSIFIED CLEAR TEXT. ROUTING INDICATOR RUQSEM ASSIGNED.

2. OTTA NOW ACTIVE MEMBER AXANET. ROUTING INDICATOR RUZIOW ASSIGNED. ONLY KUBARK TRAFFIC HANDLED BY OTTAWA.

END OF MESSAGE

OC-S -
OC-T -
COORDINATING OFFICERS

OC-AD
RELEASING OFFICER

S E C R E T

OC-AD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Margaret Ragler
FE/AA/AP
5151
16 Dec. 63

SECRET

FILE IN CS FILE NO. 201 - 760633

TOKYO MEXI MANILA HONG KONG

21 DEC 63 21 37 z

SIG CEN

DEFERRED
X ROUTINE

TOKY MEXI INFO MANI, HONG, CITE DIR 90761

REQUEST TRACES HENRY YAMADA, CIT US, PTOB CALIFORNIA 1923, JAPAN 1946-48 USARMY OCCUPATION FORCES, MEXICO CITY C. 1950-55 FREE LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER, TRAVELED JAPAN, MANILA, HONGKONG WITH AGENCE FRANCE PRESS BETWEEN 1956-62. NO OBJECTION LIAISON CHECKS PROVIDE NO OPERATIONAL INTEREST SHOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Mexico
FE/HongKong
FE/Manila
FE/Japan
C/FE/AA/AP
C/FE
DDFE/AA
FE/AA/COPS

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ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, DODS/L, DOD3 4, SPOG 2, CI/OPS, FI, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 1517582

DIR WAVE CITE MEXI 6536

15 OCT 63 IN 40401

PBRUMEN HTBASTE

1. WHILE IN NEW YORK 7 OCTOBER CONTACTING CUBAN EXILES WITH POSSIBLE LINKS MEXI, LITAMIL-3 HAD CHANCE ENCOUNTER AND CHATTED BRIEFLY WITH ANTONIO DE SOUZA CARBAJAL, MEMBER CUBAN UN DELEGATION. ON OWN INITIATIVE, L-3 SUGGESTED DEFECTION TO WHICH DE SOUZA REPLIED HE MERELY PERFORMING HIS DUTY AND VERY FRIGHTENED. DE SOUZA DID STATE HE WOULD TALK WITH L-3 AGAIN IN FUTURE UNDER SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES. L-3 DESCRIBES DE SOUZA AS "A KEY MAN."

2. REQUEST TRACES, COMMENTS, ADVICE ON ANOTHER TRIP BY L-3 TO N.Y. FOR PURPOSE TALKING DE SOUZA.

S E C R E T

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: C/WH 5

INFO : DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

S E C R E T 191317Z

DIR INFO WAVE CITE MEXI 6587

TYPAT PBRUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA BENITO RUIZ [illegible]. DOB [illegible] JAN 1894, LOS ARABOS, MATANZAS. WIFE [illegible] RUIZ, BORN SANTA CRUZ DEL SUR, HAVANA PROVINCE. MANAGER [illegible] SERVICE, HOTEL NACIONAL, HAVANA. FOUNDER AMERICAN SOCIETY TRAVEL AGENTS (ASTA). ACQUIRED AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP EARLY YOUTH; RELINQUISHED CERCA 1930. NO LIVING CHILDREN. [illegible] [illegible] LIVES NEAR SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS. [illegible] JENNY LAVIN AND GRANDSON JOHN [illegible] RUIZ LIVE MIAMI. THIRTY-THIRD DEGREE MASON.

2. SUBJECT IS SOLE CUBAN DELEGATE ASTA CONVENTION MEXI [illegible] 21 THRU 28 OCTOBER. ALLOWED TRAVEL DUE PRESTIGE AS FOUNDER [illegible] PRESIDENT CARIBBEAN AREA, AND DEAN ALL HAVA TRAVEL AGENTS. STATES HAS ACCESS TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL INFO, INCL PRIOR NOTICE MUCH OF LATTER. CLAIMS VALUABLE INFORMATION [illegible] IN NATIONAL POST OFFICE, ESPECIALLY CENSORSHIP SECTION. [illegible] HAS ASSISTED ANTI-CASTRO PERSONS BY FORGING VISAS. KNOWLEDGE [illegible] BLOC TECHS LIVING HOTEL NACIONAL.

SECRET

14-00000

[illegible] APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE CASUAL ACQUAINTANCE WITH [illegible] IN [illegible] ANA 1959. SUBJECT APPEARS COOPERATE [illegible]

COMMUNICATE VIA [illegible]. PRO PART 1 BEING FORWARDED. NO [illegible] TRACES.

[illegible] C R E T

14-00000

[illegible] APPROACH TO SUBJECT FACILITATED DUE [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] 1959. SUBJECT AGREES COOPERATE [illegible]

COMMUNICATE VIA [illegible] PRO PART I BEING FORWARDED. NO [illegible] [illegible]

S E C R E T

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION : WH 8

INFO : DDP, CI/OA, SAS 8, RF, VR

S E C R E T 222330Z

23 Oct 63 IN 45573

DIR INFO WAVE MNTY CITE MEXI 6620

PERUMEN

1. REQUEST TRACES AND POA JORGE ANTONIO ABASOLO GARCIA, CUBAN, DOB 1927, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEER, GRADUATE GEORGIA TECH, ADDRESS CALLE 96 OXABER 308 TELEPHONE 2-6301, MIRAMAR, HAVANA. SUBJ DIVORCED FROM MARIE PAZ SOMEILLAN WHO NOW REPORTED LIVING WITH TWO CHILDREN AGES 5 AND 7 IN MNTY. SUBJ CHIEF OF DIVISION IN MINISTRY INDUSTRIES. WORKS CLOSELY WITH ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA. CONTROLS WOOD FURNITURE INDUSTRY, PORTION OF PAPER INDUSTRY INCLUDING PAPER SACKS, TOY INDUSTRY, ONE OTHER UNSPECIFIED INDUSTRY. HAS HAD SOME CONTACT WITH SOVIETS IN CONNECTION WITH CEMENT PROCUREMENT. RECENTLY REPORTED BELIEF SOVS CONSTRUCTING SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CAME TO MEXICO ON SPECIAL PASSPORT 2 AUG 63 TO SEE CHILDREN BUT FORMER WIFE MANAGED PREVENT CONTACT. RETURNED CUBA 21 AUG.

2. BROTHER OF SUBJ IS GUSTAVO ABASOLO, CUBAN, ABOUT 42, LEFT CUBA ABOUT 1959 OR 1960 GOING FIRST TO BERMUDA, LATER TO MEXICO. EMPLOYED CONTINOUSLY 22 YEARS COMPANIA INTERAMERICANA DE SEGUROS. NOW ASSISTANT MANAGER SALES FOR MEXICO. STRONGLY ANTI-CASTRO, FRIEND OF AMSEVER-2. CORRESPONDS WITH SUBJ THROUGH NETHERLANDS EMBASSY DIPLOMATIC POUCH. AT STATION REQUEST THROUGH A-2 GUSTAVO

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RECENTLY ASKED SUBJ IF WOULD BE WILLING FURNISH "CERTAIN INFORMATION" FOR A-2 WHOM SUBJ KNOWS AS ANTI-CASTRO. SUBJ GAVE TENTATIVE AGREEMENT BUT ASKED HOW FAR DO YOU WANT ME TO GO?

3. SUBJ PLANNING TO LEAVE CUBA AT END OF YEAR, DISILLUSIONED WITH REGIME. BELIEVE STATION MIGHT BE ABLE PERSUADE HIM STAY IN PLACE.

4. DIVORCED MOTHER OF EX-WIFE HAS RE-MARRIED TO JOAQUIN MIRABAL, COMMUNIST; FORMER "CHIEF OF SECURITY SERVICE" HAVANA, RECENTLY PROMOTED TO MORE IMPORTANT POSITION.

5. ABOVE INFO FROM GUSTAVO ABASOLO, FLESHED OUT BY A-2 WHO MET SUBJ DURING AUGUST SOJOURN MEXI. NO STATION TRACES ANY PERSONS MENTIONED HEREIN EXCEPT FOR CONFIRMATION SUBJ TRAVEL. LIFIRE LISTS SHOW HE CARRIED SPECIAL PASSPORT G3/442, SHOW HIS ADDRESS AS CALLE 34 NUMBER 1712, MARIANAO.

S E C R E T

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STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Federal Personnel Manual Ch.
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

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BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 27 Dec 72

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (CIARDS) VOLUNTARY
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 31 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-0117 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): Public Law 88-643 Section 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/PLANS STAFF
CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP
NONOFFICIAL COVER BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER - CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 5
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000

18. REMARKS:
Supergrade Board

LAST WORKING DAY 28 Dec 73

Coordinated with Paul Seidel/ROB 27 December 1973

10A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED
10B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: J.L. Olmstead, C/MSB | DATE SIGNED: 27 Dec 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQRTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
45	10				1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		0	BJ, 00, 0, 0				

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0-NONE, 1-5 PT., 2-10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO DA YR) | 37. LONG. COMP DATE (MO DA YR) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0-WAIVED, 1-REG, 2-REG/OPT, 3-INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 2[illegible]-[illegible]-0844

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — CODE: 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-27-73 JFR — 02 JAN 1974
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 27 DEC 1973

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET — CLASSIFIED BY: 01-0352 — E2 IMPDET (4)

14-00000

3 APR 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

I am happy to send to you, under separate cover, your Agency Retirement Medallion. The Medallion is a tangible form of recognition and appreciation of your service to the Agency. It should serve as a lasting reminder of an honorable career, rewarding associations and the knowledge that you played your part in a vital activity.

Let me, therefore, add my congratulations and wish you the very best for the future.

Sincerely,

F. W. M. Janney
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - OPF

OP/RAD/ROB/MWBenthall:jtb (26 March 1974)

14-00000

Executive Registry
74-522

26 JAN 1974

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler
6600 Millwood Road
Bethesda, Maryland 20034

Dear Pete:

As you reach the end of your active career of Government service, I want to join your friends and colleagues in wishing you continued success and satisfaction in your retirement.

You have been privileged to face the challenge of important responsibilities during your many years of service to your country. The success with which you have met this challenge should be a source of lasting pride and satisfaction to you.

May I extend to you, personally and officially, my sincere appreciation for the important work you have done and my warmest hopes that you will find full enjoyment in the years ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ W. E. Colby

W. E. Colby
Director

Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Pers
~~1 - OPF~~
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

Originator: Director of Personnel
23 JAN 1974

OP/RAD/ROB/MDLasnek:jat/3257 (17 January 1974)

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

OPF

TSB

29 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Plans Staff

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Distinguished Intelligence Medal for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

The Honor and Merit Awards Board is pleased to notify you that the Distinguished Intelligence Medal has been approved for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler and requests that you inform him of the award. Arrangements for presentation may be made with the Executive Secretary, Honor and Merit Awards Board, extension 3645, room 412, Magazine Building.

/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

R. L. Austin, Jr.
Recorder
Honor and Merit Awards Board

Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee
1 - OPF w/forms 382 & 600
1 - Exec Sec/HMAB
1 - Recorder/HMAB

14-00000

REPORT OF HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

Executive Registry 74-196

DATE 18 December 1973

The Honor and Merit Awards Board having considered a recommendation that:

SERIAL OR ID NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	BIRTHYEAR	SEX	TYPE EMPLOYEE
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	1915	M	Staff

OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	SD	SCHEDULE	GRADE	STATION
DO/CMG	D	GS	17	

BE AWARDED

Intelligence Medal of Merit

☐ FOR HEROIC ACTION ON

☒ FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE OR ACHIEVEMENT DURING THE PERIOD September 1952 - December 1973

☐ RECOMMENDS APPROVAL ☐ DOES NOT RECOMMEND APPROVAL

☒ RECOMMENDS AWARD OF Distinguished Intelligence Medal

UNCLASSIFIED CITATION

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler is hereby awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal in recognition of his outstanding achievement with the Central Intelligence Agency for more than 23 years. Serving in a series of responsible senior positions both in headquarters and abroad, Mr. Wheeler has compiled an enviable record of achievement. Demonstrating deep integrity and total dedication, his performance has been characterised by creativity, and superb leadership. Mr. Wheeler's devotion and professionalism have been evident throughout his career, reflecting the highest credit on him and the Federal service.

REMARKS

(Recommendation approved by DD/O on 10 December 1973)

APPROVED

/s/ Vernon A. Walters

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 JAN 1974

DATE

SIGNATURE (Signed) F. W. M. Janney

TYPED NAME OF CHAIRMAN, HONOR AND MERIT AWARDS BOARD

F. W. M. Janney

SIGNATURE

(signed on original)

TYPED NAME OF RECORDER

R. L. Au[illegible]n, Jr.

FORM 9-73 382 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Off

RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR OR MERIT AWARD
(Submit in triplicate - see HR 20-32)

SECTION A — PERSONAL DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last, First, Middle)	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE	5. SD
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	Ops Off/Chief	GS-17	D

6. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	7. OFFICE EXT.	8. STATION
DDO/CMG/NOC	4103	X Headquarters; Field (Specify location)

9. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code)	10. HOME PHONE	11. CITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIRED
6600 Millwood Rd., Bethesda, Md. 22034	229-1973	U.S., Birth

12. RECOMMENDED AWARD	13. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT	14. POSTHUMOUS
Intelligence Medal of Merit	31 December 1973	YES; X NO

15. NAME OF NEXT OF KIN	16. RELATIONSHIP	17. HOME ADDRESS (No., St., City, State, ZIP Code)	18. HOME PHONE
Adelia Wheeler	Wife	same as above	same

SECTION B — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTION OR ACCEPTANCE OF HAZARD

19. WERE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT: YES; NO

PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:

20. FULL NAME	21. ORGN. TITLE	22. GRADE	23. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:

24. FULL NAME	25. AWARD RECOMMENDED

CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:

26. LOCATION	27. INCLUSIVE DATES	28. TIME OF DAY

29. PREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED

30. DATES FOR WHICH AWARD RECOMMENDED	31. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED	32. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT
	YES; NO	YES; NO

SECTION C — RECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT, SERVICE, OR PERFORMANCE

33. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE: X YES; NO

34. OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF PERSON RECOMMENDED AT TIME OF SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE
Ops Officer/Chief

35. COMPONENT OR STATION (Designation and location)
CMG/NOC

36. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ASSIGNED POSITION
Chief, Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch

37. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	38. ASSIGNMENT COMPLETED	39. NOW IN SAME OR RELATED ASSIGNMENT
Sept 1952-December 1973	YES; X NO	X YES; NO

PERSONNEL WHO ASSISTED OR CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE SERVICE OR PERFORMANCE

40. FULL NAME	41. ORGN. TITLE	42. GRADE	43. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT

LIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE PERFORMANCE

44. FULL NAME	45. TYPE OF AWARD

FORM 600 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
5-68

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

(When Filled In)

SECTION D — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

Award for Heroic Action or Acceptance of Hazard: Was act voluntary? Describe why act was outstanding, and if it was more than normally expected. Explain, why, and how. If an aerial or marine operation, describe type and position of craft, crew position of individual, and all unusual circumstances. Indicate results of the act. Enclose unclassified citation.

Award for Achievement, Service, or Performance: State character of service during period for which recommended. (Give complete description of administrative, technical, or professional duties and responsibilities if not covered in Section C; include dates of assignment and relief.) What did the individual do that merits the award? Why was this outstanding when compared to others of like grade and experience in similar positions or circumstances? If appropriate, include production records and assistance rendered by other persons or units. What obstacles were encountered or overcome? Indicate results of achievement, service, or performance. Include reference to Fitness Reports, Letters of Commendation, or other documentation already on file which supports this recommendation. Enclose unclassified citation.

Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with the Agency in September 1952 for assignment in Tokyo. During the period from 1952-1956 he served in the capacity of Deputy Chief, FI Ops and Chief, FI Liaison. For several years he served in responsible positions at Headquarters and was promoted to GS-15 in 1957. In 1959 he returned to Tokyo as Deputy for Operations and as DCOS until 1964. He was promoted to GS-16 in August 1964. From 1964-1966 he served at Honolulu Base. In 1965 he was appointed COB, Honolulu. From 1966-68 he served in the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting. In 1968 he was reassigned to the Missions and Programs Staff and in 1971 was appointed Chief, MPS and served there until January 1972 during which period he was promoted to GS-17. In 1972 he was appointed Chief of the then designated Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division (presently Nonofficial Cover Affairs Branch), from which assignment he is retiring.

Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication. He is a natural leader, bright and original. He has a creative mind, is articulate and rational. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator and manager. He is a searching individual who is totally committed and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the DDO. During his tenure he has received laudatory commendations for his efforts.

Mr. Wheeler has made a valuable contribution to the Agency during his extended career and it is fitting that upon retirement after such a distinguished career, he be awarded the Intelligence Medal of Merit.

☐ CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

46. ENCLOSURES (List individually) IF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS OR DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACT OR PERFORMANCE, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OF EYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUALS HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.

1. PROPOSED CITATION
2.
3.

47. RECOMMENDATION INITIATED BY	48. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE MAKING RECOMMENDATION	49. DATE
Gordon Mason	Gordon Mason Chief, CMG	10 DEC 1973

SECTION E — RECOMMENDATION FORWARDED THROUGH OFFICIALS CONCERNED FOR THEIR INFORMATION

	TITLE AND SIGNATURE	DATE
50. HEAD OF DDO CAREER SERVICE (Career service of nominee)	See Item # 52	
51. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CAREER SERVICE	See Item # 52	
52. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF OPERATING COMPONENT	William E. Nelson William E. Nelson	11 Dec 73

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 September 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 3/ YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 4121-0117/0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/Plans Staff
Career Management Group
Non Official Cover Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer-Ch (17)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0049
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17/4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $36,000

18. REMARKS

Reassigned from DDO/PS/CMG Pending Reassignment

~~+ [illegible]~~
+ Supre blurb

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] Jasper C. Olmstead C/NCSB
DATE SIGNED: 9/17/73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER:
DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGRATE CODE	24.	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	3132 PS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES · 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30. RETIREMENT DATA · 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33. SECURITY NO. · 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE · 36. SERV. COMP. DATE · 37. LONG. COMP. DATE · 38. CAREER CATEGORY · 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE · 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE · 42. LEAVE CAT CODE · 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA · 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 9-21-73 [signature]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED:

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 01 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: X V TO V 0109; CF TO V 0109
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4221-~~2975~~ 0117 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/PLANS STAFF ~~UNASSIGNED~~ Career Management Group Pending Reassignment
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER CH
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0000
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $36000
18. REMARKS: FROM: DDP/NOCA DIVISION/DEV COMP/9997

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL — DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — [signature] — DATE SIGNED 10 July 73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOSPITAL CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO DA YR	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
30	10	30135 PS	75013		1	11 09 15		

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 7-?-73 [initials]

O.P. APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED 24 Jul 73

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION — SECRET — CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]

14-00000

SECRET

31 JAN 1973

Dear Mr. Richmond,

At the direction of the Deputy Director for Plans you served from 6 November to 17 November 1972 as a member of the Clandestine Service Nonofficial Cover Board Sub-Panel convened for the purpose of evaluating GS-12 Staff and Career Agent personnel under nonofficial cover. I know that this work was particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and the diligent application of your professional experience were decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of this aspect of the Nonofficial Cover Board's missions.

I wish to commend you personally for your contribution to our evaluation procedures each phase of which helps to strengthen the Clandestine Service Career Service.

A copy of this letter will be included in your official personnel file.

Robert P. Wheeler
Chairman
Nonofficial Cover Board

SECRET

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

12 July 1972

Dear Pete,

I want to thank you personally for your fine work as a member of the GS-15 Evaluation Board which convened from 15 May to 16 June 1972. I know that this work has been particularly demanding. Your full-time participation and diligent application of your professional experience have been decisive factors in the successful accomplishment of the Board's missions. I know that your recommendations will provide a reliable base for the Clandestine Service Career Service Board and myself in arriving at a final promotion list.

Your wise and energetic participation in the evaluation process has helped to strengthen the Clandestine Service by objectively identifying those officers whose performance, qualifications and potential mark them as especially fitted for senior positions of leadership.

Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

Robert P. Wheeler

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 22 February 1972

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 03 | DAY 09 | YEAR 72
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2231-4148
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/NOCAD division Development Complement
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 36,000
18. REMARKS

*0410

From MPS, Position # 0001

Concur: Karen Tillotson (telecoord)
MPS

3/8

DB 3/20

cc: Payroll
cc: Security

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Carl T. Taylor, C/NOCAD/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 23 Feb 72

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS
DATE SIGNED: 9 MAR 1972

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
32	18	54977	NCOA	75013		1	10 07 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CC, 2—CRSH, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE), HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: DDR 3-9-72 *From MPS
46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher
DATE APPROVED: 15 Mar. 72

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

20 MAR 1972

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 November 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Promotion

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 11 | DAY 28 | YEAR 71

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: X V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 2221-2886-0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/Missions & Programs Staff
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, DC

36
H

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer - Ch (18)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0001

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~GS~~ 17 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 35,801

18. REMARKS

cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. Sheay, C/CSPS | DATE SIGNED: 24 Nov 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOOTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
23	10	52100	MPS	15013		1	10 09 15	11 28 71	11 28 71

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 3—NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY CODE (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE) HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE NO. TAX EXEMP. STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-26-71 [illegible]

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry B. Fisher

DATE APPROVED: 1 Dec 71

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 March 1971

Field	Entry
1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment and Transfer to Vouchered Funds
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month/Day/Year)	03 / 21 / 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	X CF TO V
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	1221-2886
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Missions and Programs Staff Office of the Chief
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	Ops Officer - Ch
12. POSITION NUMBER	0001
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 6
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 32,819

18. REMARKS

From MPS Position # 0008

cc: Security
cc: Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
[signature]	5 Mar 1971	[signature]	3/8/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VOUCHERS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	52100	MPS	75013			13 04 [illegible]		

28. NTE EXPIRES · 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OASDI, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) · 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. · 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) · 36. SERV. COMP. DATE · 37. LONG. COMP. DATE · 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/CIST, PROV/TEMP) · 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE) · 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) · 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE · 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) · 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
3-9-71 [initials]	Harry B. Fisher	8 March 71

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Date: MAR 4 1971

In Reply Refer To:

Your Reference:

Subject: Completion of "The Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, Virginia

From: Nancy W. Dalton
Registrar, Federal Executive Institute

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the "Winter Program for FEI Executives" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from February 28 - March 2, 1971. One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

CSC FORM 631
NOVEMBER 1961

14-00000

SECRET

23 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CSCS Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion - Robert P. Wheeler

1. As one of the final acts in my CIA career I want to bring to your attention and add my strong concurrence and recommendation to two (2) recorded recommendations for the promotion of Robert P. Wheeler to the grade GS-17. I find it hard to imagine a more persuasive recommendation for this action than that forwarded by my predecessor in June 1969 (Attached). I can imagine Mr. Mitchell's feeling when he prepared the second recommendation in February 1970 (Attached). And yet, I find in February 1971 there has still been no action. In the year that has passed this promotion has become even more deserved, for despite the natural disappointment accompanying such a continuing lack of recognition, there has been no diminution of enthusiasm, no lowering of standards, and the CS is clearly better managed because of his continuing efforts. Were these two previous recommendations not so clear cut and descriptive, I would conclude that those in control simply do not know what this officer does and has done. Knowing what he does and how he does it should not continue to be unrewarded and, hence, I add my strongest recommendation for early and favorable action.

2. This officer has performed in a most outstanding manner, as testified in his fitness reports by my predecessor, and certainly during my tenure as Chief, MPS for the past 12 months.

Sidney A. Stein
Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

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5 JUN 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-17.

2. Mr. Wheeler obtained a B.A. degree in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1942 and a M.A. in International Relations from George Washington University, Washington, D.C., in 1946. He entered the U.S. Navy in 1942 and after a concerted course in Japanese served the Navy until 1946 as an Intelligence Specialist, Japanese Language Officer, and the War Department, still as an Intelligence Specialist in Tokyo, from 1946 to 1952. In September 1952 he joined the Agency for duty in Tokyo; returned to Headquarters in June 1956 where he served until 1959; left for service in Japan from June 1959 to October 1964; served under non-official cover in Honolulu from August 1964 to August 1966; served at Headquarters with the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) from August 1966 until January 1969, and with MPS from the latter date to the present.

3. During his career with the Agency he has been a field Operations Officer, Liaison Officer to overseas U.S. agencies and a foreign intelligence service, a supervisor, Deputy Chief of Station (Tokyo), Chief FI for a division (FE), Chief of Base (Honolulu), Program Analyst (OPPB), and Program Analyst and Group Chief (MPS).

4. In his present position as Chief of Programs Group in the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for liaison between the CS and the OPPB on the PPB System and non-budgetary matters; installing the PPB System

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within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual responses to the Program Call; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; coordinating and preparing the annual DDP report to the PFIAB, preparing the annual DDP briefing of the DCI on CS problems and progress; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In his previous assignment Mr. Wheeler was detailed to OPPB to give that office, in the preparation of Agency programs for submission to the Bureau of the Budget, a better understanding of clandestine collection and covert action, to help that office better review and integrate CS programs in Agency programs, and to give him a broad view of the PPB System and Agency management in both of which he had shown considerable interest. His performance in that office was rated "Strong," and it was on that performance and on his genuine enthusiasm and interest in management generally that his services were sought for MPS.

6. In the performance of his duties as Chief, MPS/PRG he made immediate use of his long experience in and knowledge of CS operations, the experience and knowledge gained in OPPB, his formal education in the PPB System, and a strong belief in and desire to put to work within the CS certain concepts of that system for general and specific management improvement. Given the idiosyncrasies of the CS, he recognized early that in order to make the PPB system work effectively knowledge of the "why" and "how" of that system must be possessed at every decision-making level. With limitless energy and enthusiasm he set about "preaching the gospel" from division chief to case officer. Whenever and wherever a formal group is assembled and management is a topic for discussion, the Office of Training can count on him to drop everything and hold forth on the subject, be it the Senior Management and Planning Course (whether for supergrades or below), Station Chief Conferences, the CS Senior Seminar (now in session) and the like. Acting as the DDP/TRO's right arm to encourage attendance at the Senior Management and Planning Course he has crusaded with division and staff chiefs for the attendance of certain of

SECRET

their key employees. To date upwards of 100 from the CS have attended that course with many more to follow. With some of those same senior officials he has argued the benefits ultimately to accrue to their components from the temporary assignment of a senior key official for a year or two to MPS and/or CPPD and eventual return to the mother component. One such arrangement, with duty in CPPD, has just been completed. His tactful, understanding, friendly, businesslike, professional and competent handling of the chairmanship of the PRP and the reviews of the Operating Directive and country activities conducted by that Panel leaves little to be desired. Regarding the PPB System, he reads everything, pro and con, that comes to his attention, and he has spent a fair sum out of his own pocket to build a library on the subject. He has persuaded potential converts to the system to read those books, magazines, periodicals and pamphlets to the end that most of that library is on constant loan. His insatiable appetite for news on current as well as historical domestic and foreign matters, his excellent sense of humor, and his genuine friendliness are invaluable assets in his present assignment inasmuch as they have given him such a wide range of acquaintances, in and out of the CS, as to open wide the door for discussion on MPS responsibilities that are anything but sexy. He is so highly regarded by his contacts in the divisions and staffs of the CS and in CPPD that his advice and guidance are constantly sought. He gives of his time and energy willingly, regardless of the grade of the individual or the magnitude of the problem. His enthusiasm is catching and he sets an excellent example for subordinates, equals and superiors as well.

7. In view of the above, Mr. Wheeler, a broadgauged, fast moving, competent, dedicated, sincere and friendly individual who has not yet reached his full potential, whose goal is to make the Clandestine Service the best managed directorate in CIA, and who will soon have served five years in grade, is strongly recommended for promotion to GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

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14-00000

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9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Clandestine Service
Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Promotion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler to GS-17

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to the grade GS-17.

2. By memorandum dated 5 June 1969 the undersigned recommended Mr. Wheeler for promotion. In that memorandum was set out the career of Mr. Wheeler from the date he completed college (1942) until June 1969, and was described his wartime (1942-1946), immediate post-war (1946-1952) and Agency (1952-to June 1969) experience, all in the field of intelligence. Since it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Board should have the benefit of all the facts stated in that memorandum and since there is no change in the contents thereof, I hereby incorporate by reference the memorandum of 5 June 1969, make it part hereof and attach it hereto as a significant part of the present memorandum.

3. The time passed since 5 June 1969 has served only to confirm my conviction in Mr. Wheeler's true value to the CS. He has continued the strong leadership of the Program Review Panel and his subordinates. His unbounded energy and incessant championing of the applicable principles of the PPB System have resulted in office chiefs or other most senior officials appearing before the last Program Review Panel apparently interested and better prepared than ever before. His obvious sincerity and friendly and intelligent approach to the job have convinced many of the need for the better management of their affairs. This is no mean accomplishment in a world where the normal human resents

SECRET

even constructive criticism. Mr. Wheeler is so dedicated to making the CS the best managed component in the Agency that he continues to spend his own earnings on books and periodicals on the subject of management and to encourage interested parties to read them and pass them on to others.

4. The undersigned is aware that for the past six (6) months a private interest has dangled an impressive carrot in front of Mr. Wheeler in an attempt to induce him to retire and represent overseas the interests of that private concern. This fact is not to be considered by the Board as a sword of Damocles. It is simply to bring to the Board's attention that if a promotion at this time should serve to dissuade Mr. Wheeler from accepting the proffered job, the Board would have been instrumental in retaining for the CS in the management field one of the most dedicated, friendly, readily accepted, knowledgeable, industrious and qualified officers in the Agency.

5. In view of paragraph 3 above, the contents of the attachment hereto, and his potential for further growth, Mr. Wheeler is strongly recommended for promotion to Grade GS-17.

(signed) Michael G. Mitchell

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

Attachment: a/s

14-00000

[illegible] 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Head of Career Service

SUBJECT : Retirement Planning

1. In order to assist employees in planning for their eventual retirement, it is the practice of the Agency to notify each employee at a point in service five years prior to the date of scheduled retirement. I am, therefore, taking this opportunity to advise you that you are scheduled to retire in October 1975.

2. The prospect of retirement from the Agency deserves serious thought and careful planning so that you may make the transition to the next phase of life with purpose and confidence. To assist you in this regard, the Agency will make available to you various resources which are attuned to the needs of prospective retirees. In October 1970, the Agency will conduct a Retirement Information Seminar to which you will be invited. Your spouse, if you are married, may accompany you to this seminar. Following the seminar, you will be invited by the Retirement Counselor for your Directorate to an individual pre-retirement counseling session (or more than one, if you wish); this phase of retirement planning will be tailored solely to your own particular situation and circumstances and will be within the context of the retirement system under which you will retire. The individual counseling sessions are intended to give you a wide range of information on such matters as estimates of your annuity, survivor benefits, life and health insurance, Social Security taxes, relocation and movement of household effects and assistance in obtaining other employment, if appropriate. In addition to the sessions with your Retirement Counselor, you will be invited to avail yourself of selected literature on all aspects of retirement.

3. Some persons who wish to retire voluntarily prior to the scheduled date, or who wish to commence their planning as early as possible, prefer to work with their Retirement Counselor well before the time he would normally contact them. If you believe you would benefit from such an earlier start on your personal planning, you are invited to contact the Retirement Counselor responsible for your Directorate. He is assigned from your Directorate to the Retirement Affairs Division, 212 Magazine Building in Rosslyn, on telephone extension 3328.

4. Experience has amply demonstrated that careful planning facilitates the transition to retirement. I recommend, strongly, that you avail yourself of the services the Agency offers you in planning your own retirement.

R. S. Wattles
Director of Personnel

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13 MAR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

THROUGH : Administrative Officer, MPS

SUBJECT : Purchase of Service Credit

1. This is to advise you that your application to purchase service credit under the CIA Retirement and Disability System has been processed. The amount of $437.00 will be required to purchase credit for the period 18 June 1946 through 17 June 1947 when no deductions were withheld from your salary. Under the current provisions of the CIA Retirement System, payment of the above amount will increase your annuity by approximately 2 per cent of your high-three average salary at the time of retirement. The amount due includes interest to the present date.

2. It should be explained that under the CIA Retirement and Disability System, all periods of creditable Federal civilian service during which retirement deductions were not taken from salary must be purchased by making a deposit in order for the time to be counted in the computation of the retirement annuity. Under the Civil Service Retirement System, such periods of Federal service are always creditable in the computation of annuity, but if not purchased, the annuity is reduced by 10 per cent of the amount due. For example, if a deposit of $1,000 is required to purchase credit for those periods of service during which no deductions were withheld from salary, and it is not paid, the basic annuity would be reduced by $100 per year. If the deposit of $1,000 is paid, the retiree would have to wait 10 years to recover his own deposit before profiting from the payment.

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

3. The Agency has as an aim legislatively to secure the Civil Service option, i.e., credit for periods of non-deduction service without prior payment therefor, but with reduction of the basic annuity by 10 per cent of the amount due. Therefore, you may wish to consider deferring payment. You should be aware that the interest on the amount due will continue to accumulate at the rate of 3 per cent compounded annually if you decide to defer. For example, if it would take $1,000 to purchase credit today, the amount due one year later would be $1,030.

4. After consideration of the above options, if you wish to purchase credit for the period of non-deduction service noted in paragraph 1, please make your check payable to the Treasurer of the United States and forward it to the Chief, Retirement Operations Branch, 205 Magazine Building. If you prefer, you may make installment payments or arrange for bi-weekly payroll allotments of $25.00 or multiples thereof. A receipt showing a statement of your account will be sent to you acknowledging each payment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

/s/ Francis G. Monan

Francis G. Monan
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

Distribution:
O - Addressee
1 - D/Pers
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

OP/RAD/ROB/RTConners:jat (6 March 1970)
Retyped: OP/RAD/JMG (13 March 1970)

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 3 June 1968

Field	Entry
1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WHEELER, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	Reassignment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month/Day/Year)	06/21/68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	Regular
6. FUNDS	CF TO CF: X
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8121-2887
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/Missions and Programs Staff Programs Group
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE	~~[illegible]~~ Ops Officer (SG)
12. POSITION NUMBER	0008
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 5
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 23,778

18. REMARKS

Date: Security Approval has been granted for this request.

Dist: 1 - CSPS
1 - Security
1 - Payroll

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 3 June 68

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. OCCUPATION CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	52150 MPS	7503		1	010415		

28. NTE EXPIRES: XXXX XX

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: From O/PPB 06-12-68 [initials]

45. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 10 June 68

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1966

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Excepted Appointment
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 7 31 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 7114-0001
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI/Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting; Planning and Programming Division; Program Analysis Branch
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Washington, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: IO - Program Eval
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0005
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.70
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 22085
18. REMARKS: ~~2 FRA as provided by the provisions of HR 20-17 d.(c)~~ for a period of two years.

C-09-55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John M. Clarke, Director/PPB — DATE SIGNED: 8/5/66
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Head, D Career Service — DATE SIGNED: 8/5/66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. Action Code	20. Employ Code	21. Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22. Station Code	23. Integree Code	24. Occupation Code	25. Date of Birth	26. Date of Grade	27. Date of LEI
13	16	02350	OPPB	75013		1	12 09 15	08 07 64	08 19 65

28. Date Expires	29. Special Reference	30. Retirement Data	31. Separation Data Code	32. Correction/Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. Security Req. No.	34. Sex
		2				0000	M

35. Vet. Preference	36. Serv. Comp. Date	37. Long Comp. Date	38. Career Category	39. Federal Health Insurance	40. Social Security No.
1	02 06 43	07 13 62	C	1	

41. Previous Civilian Government Service	42. Serv. Cat. Code	43. Federal Tax Data	No. Tax Exemptions	44. State Tax Data
1	2	0	NO	

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION
46. C.P. APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 10 Aug 66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	1 August 1966
1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	Robert
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month/Day/Year)	07 30 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	CF TO CF: X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	7129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/DOD U.S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE	CHIEF OF BASE GS-14
12. POSITION NUMBER	0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.08
16. GRADE AND STEP	16 4
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 22,085

18. REMARKS

Subject is reemployable.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Virginia C. Lynch, C/DO Pers. & Training	1 Aug 66	[signature]	5 Aug. 66

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	30. RETIREMENT DATA
45	10	10 04 15	1,00 609.1

EOD DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
8/5/66	[signature]	8-5-66

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 July 1965

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): [handwritten, partly redacted]
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 | DAY 01 | YEAR 65
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | XXX CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: CHIEF OF BASE
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.08
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20,245

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

1cc to OP/BSD/RCB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] DATE SIGNED: 12 July 65

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOYEE CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
28	10	43620	DOD	75020		2	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 64

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 8/[illegible]/65

O.P. APPROVAL: [signatures]

DATE APPROVED: [illegible]

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	29 OCTOBER 1964
1. SERIAL NUMBER	060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	[redacted] COLLINS, Robert
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	(CAREER) EXCEPTED APPT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED	10 25 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6. FUNDS	CF TO CF X
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	5329-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE	OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER	0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP	15 3
17. SALARY OR RATE	$ 20245

18. REMARKS

C-09/55

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
VIRGINIA C. [illegible]	29 Oct 64	J. M. Collins	4 Nov. 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION	23 INTEGREE	24 POSITION CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
13	10	43620	DOD	7502		2	10 09 15	08 30 64	08 30 64

28	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
		1				00000	M

35 VET. PREFERENCE	36 SERV. COMP. DATE	37 LONG. COMP. DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	08 06 49	09 28 52	2	1	—

41 PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42 LEAVE CAT.	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA
1	3	0 / 6	—

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 C.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
11/9/64	Joseph B. [illegible]	5 Nov 64

FORM 8-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF CLEARANCES

TO: DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

ATTENTION:
- [ ] Mobilization and Military Personnel Division
- [ ] Chief, Benefits and Counseling Branch, BSD
- [X] Chief, Staff Agent Branch, CPD

SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	GRADE	POSITION TITLE
060747	Wheeler, Robert P.	GS-16	Ops Officer

OTHER TRUE NAMES USED WHILE IN AGENCY:

COST CENTER NUMBER CHARGEABLE: 5120-0269 — FUNDS: [ ] V [X] CF

REASON FOR CLEARANCE:
- [X] SEPARATION
- [ ] EXTENDED LEAVE (Note reason)
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

LAST WORKING DAY (Date): 23 October 1964

EFFECTIVE DATE OF SEPARATION: 25 October 1964

- [ ] FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, WAS FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL ON 29 Oct. 64
- [ ] FORM 1152, REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION, IS ATTACHED TO THIS FORM.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE COMPONENTS LISTED BELOW HAVE FURNISHED POSITIVE VERIFICATION BY TELEPHONE OR CERTIFICATIONS TO THE UNDERSIGNED THAT THE SEPARATING EMPLOYEE:

- HAS RETURNED OR ACCOUNTED FOR ANY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY ISSUED TO HIM;
- SETTLED OR SATISFACTORILY ARRANGED FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF ANY INDEBTEDNESS TO THE AGENCY;
- RETURNED SPECIAL I.D. CARDS OR CREDENTIALS ISSUED TO HIM;
- RECEIVED AND UNDERSTOOD INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL CLEARANCES, COVER INFORMATION, AND SECURITY BRIEFINGS;
- SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED OR CLOSED OUT ANY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO HIM.

		DATE CLEARED	CLEARED BY - NAME
✓	OFFICE OF LOGISTICS	10 Nov 64	Brown
	OFFICE OF SECURITY	19 Nov 64	John Whitt
✓	DOCUMENT CONTROLS (Incl. RID)	10 Nov 64	Becky
✓	SPECIAL CLEARANCES	10 Nov 64	Whitacre
	CENTRAL COVER STAFF 4408	18 Nov 64	[illegible] Jr
✓	MEDICAL STAFF	6 Nov 64	BILL MICHAEL
✓	COMMO SECURITY	[illegible] Nov 64	[illegible]

TITLE OF OPERATING COMPONENT OFFICIAL	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE	DATE SIGNED
[illegible] DC Personnel & Training	Virginia C. Lynch	16 Nov 64

REMARKS

FORM 7-63 21a

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-9)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 29 OCTOBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT F
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 31 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5123-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, HAWAII
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 20245
18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DC/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 29 Oct '64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. HDQTRS. CODE: 5
25. DATE OF BIRTH: MO. 10 DA. 04 YR. 15
26. DATE OF GRADE
27. DATE OF LEI
28. MIE EXPIRES
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 3—FICA, 5—NONE)
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 152009
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)
36. SERV. COMP. DATE
37. LONG. COMP. DATE
38. CAREER CATEGORY
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA
44. STATE TAX DATA
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11/4/64
46. O.P. APPROVAL — DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	10 24 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3129 0369 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0281	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

Form 1150 11-64 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 30 September 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, ROBERT P.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 10 DAY 16 YEAR 64
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5129-0369
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/DODx US Field
U.S. STATION
HONOLULU BASE
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: HONOLULU, Hawaii
11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER 00
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0261
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS-~~GY~~
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: ~~15~~ ~~5~~ 16 3
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ ~~18,740~~ 20,245
18. REMARKS:

* Phone concurrence R Newman for FE

POSITION TITLE CHANGE

Security Approval Granted by Tele. on/on 10/6/64
RLy 10/16/64

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Virginia C. Lynch
VIRGINIA C. LYNCH, DO/PERS
DATE SIGNED: 30 Sept 64
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Robert W. [illegible]
DATE SIGNED: 13 Oct 64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	43330	[illegible]	25020		2	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES; 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSR, 2-FICA, 3-NONE); 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA; EOD DATA; 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.; 34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE; 36. SERV. COMP. DATE; 37. LONG. COMP. DATE; 38. CAREER CATEGORY; 39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE; 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA; 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE; 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA; 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: FE 2 14 Oct 64
46. O.P. APPROVAL: B W [illegible] for D/Pers
DATE APPROVED: 14 Oct 64

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
8/63

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

1 0 MAY 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16, Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. It is recommended that Mr. Robert P. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16. He has been in grade since December 1957.

2. Mr. Wheeler is serving as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo. To this post he has brought his depth of knowledge of things Japanese, gained over many years of concentration on this subject. He has also brought his operational ability and his personal capability of operating among significant Japanese leaders. He has been of major value through a most difficult period of very substantial reduction of the station's staff and the termination of many of its functions. While Mr. Wheeler may have spent much of his time on things Japanese, he has also served as Chief, FI, for FE Division in which post he demonstrated his ability to operate on non-Japanese matters with force, intelligence and dispatch.

3. For these reasons it is recommended that Mr. Wheeler be promoted to GS-16.

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, CS Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion to GS-16 -- Mr. Robert P. Wheeler

1. Mr. Wheeler stands Number Four on the Division's list of recommended promotions to GS-16. Mr. Wheeler is 47 years old and has been in grade since December 1957. Most of Mr. Wheeler's Agency career has been devoted to the Japanese scene although he served one tour most commendably as Chief FI for the FE Division. He is now Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, and is an operations officer and executive of the highest quality. In addition to bearing a very large share of the administrative burden of a big station, Mr. Wheeler has acquired a collection of Japanese friends and contacts in important governmental and business circles unequaled, I believe, by any other member of the official American community in Tokyo. Although he has exploited these contacts most effectively for Agency and U.S. Governmental purposes, it is the plan of the FE Division to give freer rein to Mr. Wheeler's operations in this field by arranging, carefully and deliberately, unofficial cover for Mr. Wheeler which will permit him to devote a greater share of his time to the exploitation of this most important section of Japanese society. We believe that his very considerable talents as an administrator can be adequately replaced but that his standing among the Japanese and his capability for operational exploitation of his advantages are unique. I believe that Mr. Wheeler can well be considered to be the prototype of the high ranking staff officer who can forego bureaucratic advancement for a purely operational career under deep cover in one area.

2. On the basis of his proven ability and past performance as well as his seniority I believe Mr. Wheeler to be fully qualified for promotion to GS-16.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET
EYES ONLY

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 560947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JKO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Pol Asst 1st Sec
Ops Officer (DCOS)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): FSR GS .00

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 03-7 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: 19860 $20,245

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED
[illegible signature] | [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

24. HOURS CODE: 3

25. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 04 15

EOD DATA

43. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] 08/28/64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Harry W. [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

Form 1152 5-63 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 4 August 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 560917

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER, Robert P.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 8 DAY 30 YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FE/JKO - Tokyo Station
Office of the Chief

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer (DCOS)

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS 06

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 16-3

17. SALARY OR RATE: $20,245

18. REMARKS

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. EMPLOY. CODE | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. HOURS CODE | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.) | 26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.) | 27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE; CODE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE; 0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV., PROV. TEMP; CODE) | 39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES, 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION

46. O.P. APPROVAL: /s/ Harry W. Fields, Jr.

DATE APPROVED: 28 AUG 1964

FORM 1152 (9-63) USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 — EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 SEPTEMBER 1964

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CONVERSION FROM FSR Status *

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 — COB 25 — YEAR 64

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 5137-1566

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE
FOREIGN FIELD
FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

9 F

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE: OPS OFFICER DCOS

12. POSITION NUMBER: 3003

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 18749

18. REMARKS

SUBJECT CONVERTED FROM FSR COB 25 AUGUST 1964.

* Superceded Action Promotion to GS16 3 $20,295 effective 08/30/64.

Recorded By CSPD [illegible]

1 COPY PAYROLL.

FOR FURTHER INFO CALL X5271

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] ROBERT L. STATEN C/FE/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 9/21/64

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: Ronald Gage — DATE SIGNED: 9/22/64

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
56	10	15370	FE	28591		3	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY: 212 69 — 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG. COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP) — 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) — 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT.; STATE CODE)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature] Kearney 09/24/64

46. O.P. APPROVAL: Ronald Gage — DATE APPROVED: 9/22/64

FORM 6-63 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 — EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

DD/P 1-4627

30 August 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Second Tour for Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, as D/COS, Tokyo

Panel "A" recommends your approval of request of second tour for Mr. Wheeler.

Al Lipp
Clandestine Services
Career Service Panel
(Section A)

APPROVED:

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

1 SEP 1961
Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

V to V | V to UV | UV to V | UV to UV

DATE PREPARED: Mo | Da | Yr

1. Serial No.
2. Name (Last-First-Middle): Wheeler, Robert P.
3. Date Of Birth: Mo 10 Da 04 Yr 15
4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code: 1
5. Sex: M
6. CS - EOD: Mo | Da | Yr
7. SCD: Mo | Da | Yr
8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1, No-2) Code
9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority
10. Apmt. Affidav.: Mo | Da | Yr
11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code
12. LCD: Mo | Da | Yr
13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations: DDP/FE, FE/JAO - Tokyo Station, Deputy for Operations, Office of the Chief
Code
15. Location Of Official Station: Tokyo, Japan
Station Code
16. Dept.-Field: Dept.-Usfld.-Field, Code 5
17. Position Title: Pol Asst 1ST Sec* / Ops Officer
18. Position No.: 3936
19. Serv.: GS
20. Occup. Series: 0136.01
21. Grade & Step: 03 / 15 2
22. Salary Or Rate: $ 11,660 / 12,270 12,070
23. SD: DI
24. Date Of Grade: Mo 12 Da 15 Yr 57
25. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 60
26. Appropriation Number: 0137 7351 3000

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action: Reassignment — Code 56
28. Eff. Date: Mo 09 Da 06 Yr 59
29. Type Of Employee: Regular — Code 01
30. Separation Date

PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations: DDP/FE, FE/JAO - Tokyo Station, Office of the Chief
Code: 5191
32. Location Of Official Station
Station Code: 37517
33. Dept.-Field: Dept.-Usfld.-Field, Code 5
34. Position Title: Pol Asst 1ST Sec / Ops Officer (D COS)
35. Position No.: D-15 / 3003
36. Serv.
37. Occup. Series
38. Grade & Step
39. Salary Or Rate: $
40. SD
41. Date Of Grade: Mo 12 Da 15 Yr 57
42. PSI Due: Mo 12 Da 11 Yr 60
43. Appropriation Number

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): William H. Center, ACFE/JAO
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little, X2957
C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Desmond FitzGerald, CFE
Date Approved

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	[illegible]	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[initials]	[illegible]	E. Release		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	

Remarks

Subject will replace Mr. William E. Nelson, who is returning to Hqs. PCS in August 1959.

☐ Continued on reverse side

FORM 4-58 1152a (USE PREVIOUS EDITION)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

DD/P 4: 6610

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) 17 AUG 1959

SUBJECT: Appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan

1. The appointment of Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler as Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo, Japan, effective on or about 15 August 1959 is recommended. Mr. Wheeler will replace Mr. William E. Nelson who is scheduled to return to Headquarters approximately 2 September 1959 for reassignment.

2. Mr. Wheeler has been an employee of the Agency since 28 September 1952 and is currently assigned as an Intelligence Officer, GS-15. A biographic data sheet, including information regarding his Agency experience and training, is attached.

for William V. Broe
Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

The recommendation in paragraph 1 is approved:

Richard M. Bissell 25 AUG 1959
Deputy Director (Plans) (Date)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

NAME	:	Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler
GRADE	:	GS-15
SERVICE DESIGNATION	:	DI
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	:	4 October 1915, Fitzgerald, Georgia
MARITAL STATUS	:	Married; six children
EDUCATION AND CAREER OUTSIDE OF AGENCY	:	1934-1937, Mercer University 1941-1942, University of California 1942-1943, University of Colorado 1944-1946, George Washington University, M.A., International Relations 1941-1942, University of California, Reader in Political Science (part-time) 1942-1946, U.S. Navy, Language Officer, Intelligence Specialist, Lt. 1946-1952, War Dept., GHQ, FEC, Tokyo, Intelligence Specialist
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY	:	Japanese - Fair
CIA EXPERIENCE	:	EOD CIA Sep 1952, Acting Chief, FI, concurrently Chief of Liaison, Tokyo Station Jun 1956, Deputy Chief, FE/1 Mar 1957, Acting Chief, FE/1 Dec 1957, Chief, FE/PO/FI, FE Division
CIA TRAINING	:	Operations Course, Clandestine Methods & Techniques, Staff Indoctrination, Secret Writing, Documentation, Clandestine Services Review, CIA Review, Special Management Course, Reading Techniques

14-00000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

121-250-104

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

C0255

☒ FS ☐ DEPTL

1. NAME	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Robert P. Wheeler	10-4-15	FSA-7	3-26-59

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Limited Appointment	5/8/59	Section 522.1 PL 724 - 79th as amended

	FROM	TO
8. POSITION TITLE		Political Officer
9. SCHEDULE, SERIES, NO., GRADE, SALARY		FSR-3 $11,660
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS / Post		Tokyo
11. HEADQUARTERS		
12. CS CATEGORY		

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE	14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION
X	X 1-1011-333

15.	16. APPROPRIATION	17. RETIREMENT	18. DATE OF APPOINT.	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
N	FROM / TO 91-4013	☒	5/8/59	STATE D.C.

20. This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission or the Department.

Marital Status - Married - Six

Military Reserve Status - None

Appointment limited to 5 years or need of employee's services, whichever is less.

Execute SF-61a.

EMPLOYEE COPY

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. / Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10 04 15	1	M 1	09 28 52

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. / Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI / Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. / Code
08 06 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 28 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field / Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	01	12 15 57	05 14 59	9 3700 20 001

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Reassignment	05	05 03 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/JAO Tokyo Station Office of the Chief Deputy for Ops.	51	Tokyo, Japan	37557

33. Dept. - Field / Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	Area Ops Off			0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
	$				9-3735-55-005

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Edward R. Korn C/FE/JAO

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Rozelle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): H. L. Shobe C/FE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: Please transfer from Vouchered to Unvouchered funds on 3 May 1959.

2 Copies to Security.

Recorded by CSPD

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED Mo	Da	Yr	V to V	UV to V	V to UV	UV to UV

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date of Birth Mo	Da	Yr	4. Vet. Pref.	Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
	WHEELER, Robert P.	10	4	15	None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2		M	

7. SCD Mo Da Yr	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo Da Yr	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo Da Yr	13. MIL. SERV. CREDIT, LCD Yes-1 No-2	Code

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/JAO - Tokyo Station ~~Tokyo Station~~ Deputy for Operations Office of the Chief		Tokyo, Japan	

16. Dept.-Field	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. - Ullid. Fron - 8	5	~~Deputy for Operations~~ Ops Officer	3936	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	25. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	26. Appropriation Number
15 / 1	$ 12,770	DI			

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo Da Yr	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Integration Department of State	58	5 8 59	R	OM	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code

33. Dept.-Field	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
Dept. - Ullid. Fron - X		Pol. Assistant, 1st Sec. (when)		FSR	

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo Da Yr	42. PSI Due Mo Da Yr	43. Appropriation Number
3	$ 11,660		10 5 57	6 14 59	9-3730-35-005

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): OP/ER/CCD/CCL

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): B. Eggleston, x8109

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): B. Eggleston, Cover Officer

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control	[signature]	14 MAY 1959	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By		

Remarks: All sick and 166 annual leave to be transferred to Department of State.

FORM 1152a 10-57 USE PREVIOUS EDI.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 1 July 1959

N 20-190-160

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

PANEL OF EXAMINERS OF THE CIA SELECTION BOARD

In accordance with paragraph 5b of Regulation No. 20-105, The Career Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence has appointed the following persons, as members of the Panel of Examiners for the period 1 July 1958 through 30 June 1959.

Name	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Anderson, Kenneth A.	SC	DDS/OC
Beers, Colwell E.	SA	OTF/DDS
Bielefeldt, Talbot	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Blackett, Gustav	OD	DDI/OO/FDD
Bradley, Herbert C.	SA	DDS/OC
Brooks, William E.	SA	DDP/WE
Burris-Meyer, Harold	D	DDP/CI Staff
Burt, Arthur L.	IR	DDI/ORR
Cashell, John L.	SF	DDS/Compt
Channing, Hayden	IS	DDI/OSI
Crowley, Robert T.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Czajkowski, Anthony J.	OC	DDI/OO/C
Darling, James A.	DN	DDP/NEA
Dean, Warren L.	DI	DDP/WE
Donalley, Gail F.	SC	DDS/OC
Fuller, Robert, III	D	DDP/PPC
Gibson, Frank E., Jr.	SM	DDS/Med
Heney, Carlyle F.	SS	DDS/OS
Hewitt, Robert L.	IN	DDI/ONE
Holbrook, Newton D.	DI	DDP/SR
Heuffner, Donald C.	DI	DDP/FI
Ingersol, Harold B.	IC	DDI/OCI
Johnson, Dwight C.	IB	DDI/OBI
Karamessines, Thomas H.	DI	DDP/FI
Kaufman, Walter J., Jr.	DI	DDP/NEA
King, Henry E., Jr.	DP	DDP/PP

NOTICE
NO. 20-190-160

PERSONNEL
14 July 1958

NAME	Service Designation	Organizational Component
Knott, William M.	SS	DDS/OS
Kolarik, George T.	SL	DDS/OL
Korn, Edward N.	DP	DDP/FE
Kriebel, Norman F., Jr.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Leach, Arthur R.	SL	DDS/OL
Lehman, Raymond D.	SC	DDS/OC
Little, Harry W., Jr.	DI	DDP/FI
Lowe, Francis D.	SL	DDS/OL
McPherson, Paul S.	OB	DDI/OO/FBID
Morse, Richard A.	SL	DDS/OL
Needham, William C.	DP	DDP/SE
Osborne, William A.	SS	DDS/OS
Phillips, Marvin W.	DT	DDP/TSS
Radford, William J.	C	DDI/OCR
Ragan, Joseph B.	SP	DDS/OP
Reinhardt, Nicholas W.	SF	DDS/Compt
Remsen, James K.	IR	DDI/ORR
Richardson, J. Roy	IS	DDI/OSI
Roberts, Elliott P.	ST	DDS/OTR
Roman, Howard E.	DI	DDP/EE
Ryan, Edward	DI	DDP/WE
Sawyer, William L.	SC	DDS/OC
Sells, Oscar H.	ST	DDS/OTR
Sharpe, C. F. Stewart	IB	DDI/OBI
Sheay, Robert W.	SP	DDS/OP
Swasey, Edgar, Jr.	DT	DDP/TSS
Tenney, Calvin W.	DI	DDP/CI Staff
Thorn, John H.	C	DDI/OCR
Voigt, Frederick A.	IC	DDI/OCI
von Schrader, Atreus	I	OFF/DDI
Walsh, William B.	SM	DDS/Med
Wheeler, Robert P.	DI	DDP/FE

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

L. K. White
Deputy Director
(Support)

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus each member of the Panel of Examiners

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

19 Nov. 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo Da Yr)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo Da Yr)
	WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	10 04 15	1	M	

7. SCD (Mo Da Yr)	8. CSC Retmt (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo Da Yr)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo Da Yr)	13. Mil. Serv. Credit LCD (Yes-1 No-2) Code
				1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FI/CI Staff ~~Office of the Chief~~		Washington, D.C.	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Unfld.-Fran.) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	I.O. (FI) Stf Ch	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	25. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	26. Appropriation Number
14 - 5	$ 11,180.00	DI			8-3700-20 CH

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo Da Yr)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	15 DEC 1957	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
	5113		

33. Dept.-Field (Dept.-Unfld.-Fran.) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo Da Yr)	42. PSI Due (Mo Da Yr)	43. Appropriation Number
15 - 3	$ 11,610.00		[illegible] 57	[illegible] 57	

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name and Title)	C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title)
Ronald Page, Chief, FE/Personnel	
B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.) Jimmie Dewberry x 2957	

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	27 Nov 57	D. Placement	[signature]	27 Nov 57
B. Pos. Control	[signature]	12/3/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	12/3/57

Remarks

FORM 3-57 1152a

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Classify According To Content.

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

30 August 1957

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo Da Yr)	4. Vet. Pref.	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD
	WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	10 04 15	1	M	

7. SCD	8. CSC Retmt	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav.	11. FEGLI	12. LCD	13. Mil Serv. Credit LCD
				1		

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Branch 1 - Japan Office of the Chief		Washington, D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
Dept. X	Area Ops Off (Dep Br Ch)	B-110	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade	25. PSI Due	26. Appropriation Number
14 ~~4~~ 5	~~$10,965.00~~ 11,180 p/a	DI		09 22 57	8-3700-20 GP

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Reassignment	51	1 DEC 1957	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FI/CI Staff	5113	Washington, D. C. DI	

33. Dept.-Field	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
	I. O. (FI) (Stf Ch)	3418 ~~FE-57-27-D~~	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade	42. PSI Due	43. Appropriation Number
14 5	~~$10,965.00~~ 11,180 p/a	DI	09 28 52	09 22 59	8-3700-20 GP

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name and Title): Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. C/FE

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Ronald Gage, Ext. 3003

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): Approved by CS Career Service Panel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board			D. Placement		OCT
B. Pos. Control		11/14/57	E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	Robert W. Shoay	OCT

Remarks

Please double slot with Robert L. Brown who is to be reassigned.

APPROVED BY FE CAREER MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

FORM 1152a 5-57

u/o File

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

[NAME]: WHEELER, ROBERT P. AGE: 4 OCT 1915 DATE: 30 AUGUST 1957

[STAT]ION: WASHINGTON, D. C. PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DI
[D]UTIES: I.O.(FI)STF.CH. DD/P UNIT: FE
REASSIGNMENT

[PR]ESENT GRADE: GS-14 PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-67-15
[PR]OPOSED GRADE: GS-14
TRAINING: OPERATIONAL MGT, CSR, CLAND MET & TECH,
DOC, S/W, SIC, TSS BRIEFING PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110-14

[ED]UCATION: 1934-37, MERCER UNIV; 1940-42, UNIV OF CALIF, BA IN POL SCI;
1942-1943 UNIV OF COL. JAPANESE; 1944-46, GWU, MA IN INTERNATIONAL REL.
[L]ANGUAGE PROFICIENCY: JAPANESE - FAIR

[AS]SESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
MAY 38-OCT 38, CHAUFFEUR, AARON GOLDBERG
NOV 38-AUG 40, CLERK-DRIVER, GROCERY STORE
SEP 41-JUN 42, READER, UNIV OF CALIFORNIA
JUN 42-JUN 46, INTL OFF, TRANSLATOR, INTERPRETER, US NAVY, AUSTR. & JAPAN
JUN 46-SEP 52, INTEL CONSULTANT, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
28 SEP 52, EOD, IO, GS-14, OSO/FE, TOKYO, JAPAN
28 FEB 54, REASSIGNED, IO(FI), GS-14, TOKYO, JAPAN
4 SEP 56, RETURNED TO HQS, PCS, & ASSIGNED AS D BR CH, DDP/FE/BR. 1, JAPAN
11 MAR 57, APPOINTED AS ACTING CHIEF, DDP/FE/BR. 1 JAPAN, WASH., D. C.

RECOMMENDED BY: CONCURRENCES:

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR., CFE

- -

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

APPROVED BY FE C.S.B. ... COMMITTEE
OCT 1 1957

FORM NO. 965
1 MAR 57

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

21 AUG 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Clandestine Services Career Service Board

SUBJECT: Wheeler, Robert P. -- Recommendation for Promotion from GS-14 to GS-15

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. In April, 1957 he became Acting Branch Chief and has been serving in this position in a superior manner. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in the undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15. It is planned in the near future to appoint Mr. Wheeler Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff of the FE division, a most responsible GS-15 position.

Alfred C. Ulmer Jr.
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

SECRET

14-00000

5 APR 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chairman, FI Career Service

SUBJECT: Nominations for Replacement of FE Consultants to FI Career Service

The following individuals are nominated to replace those Consultants from the FE Division to the FI Career Service, who will no longer be available for such duty:

Robert P. Wheeler vice William E. Nelson

Robert J. Jantzen vice Evan J. Parker, Jr.

Robert V. Lias vice Armand J. Vellieres

Paul B. Breitweiser vice Bernard Reichhardt

signed

ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

S-E-C-R-E-T

This Notice Expires 20 April 1957

CSN NO. 1-104

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
NOTICE NO. 1-104

ORGANIZATION
20 March 1957

PERSONNEL ANNOUNCEMENT

FE DIVISION

Announcement is made of the designation, effective 4 March 1957, of Mr. Paul B. Breitweiser as Acting Chief, FE/7.

Announcement is made of the following designations, effective 11 March 1957:

Mr. Robert J. Jantzen, Chief, FE/4

Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Acting Chief, FE/1

FRANK G. WISNER
Deputy Director (Plans)

Released by:
Richard Helms
Chief of Operations

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

FE NOTICE NO. 30-11
CHANGE 2

FISCAL
7 March 1957

FAR EAST DIVISION NOTICE

SUBJECT: FE NOTICE NO. 30-11, "FE Division Approving Officers"

1. Effective 4 March 1957, paragraph 1,k of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Bernard F. Reichardt, CFE/7 reassigned
Add Paul B. Breitweiser, A/CFE/7

2. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,f of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete William E. Nelson, CFE/1 reassigned
Add Robert F. Wheeler, A/CFE/1

3. Effective 11 March 1957 paragraph 1,i of FE Notice No. 30-11 dated 21 November 1956, should be amended as follows:

Delete Ivan J. Parker, CFE/4 reassigned
Add Robert J. Jantzen, CFE/4

Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.
ALFRED C. ULMER, JR.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
FE Staffs and Branches
CSA/DDS
RI

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

8 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Promotion of Robert P. WHEELER

1. Mr. Wheeler entered on duty with CIA on 28 September 1952 as a GS-14. He had, previous to that, served in a distinguished manner with the G-2 Section of the Army in Japan in the early days of the occupation. His name was submitted for promotion by the Chief of the Japan Station in November 1955. He entered on duty at Headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Japan Branch in September 1956. As of this date he has served in that capacity for a period of five months. He is 41 years of age and has been in grade with the Agency for 4½ years.

2. A review of Mr. Wheeler's Fitness Reports will adequately reflect his strength and weaknesses, with the possible exception of the most recent one dated 7 July 1956, in which, in undersigned's opinion, the rating officer did not have adequate time to fairly rate Mr. Wheeler. Granting his occasional tendency to allow his emotions to color his work, he is, nevertheless, one of the hardest working and generally capable officers I have been associated with. He has great ability in dealing with people, he is an accurate and meticulous reporter, and he is adjusting rapidly to the requirements of his job in Headquarters and is turning in a most effective performance. In view of the length of time in grade, his age, and above all his performance, I strongly recommend Mr. Wheeler for promotion from GS-14 to GS-15.

William E. Nelson

WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER	4 Oct. 1915		16 Oct. 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 16 Dec 56

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2302		Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BF-110
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $10,965. p/a		GS-0136.01-14 $10,965. p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch		DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Office of the Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan		Washington D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[x] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[ ] FIELD [x] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject is transferring from UNVOUCHERED to VOUCHERED funds.
Subject's W-4 and Form D-4 attached.
Subject's Personnel Data Sheet attached.

[signature] (CWS), FE/OM 14 Nov. 56

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title) Henry F. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension) Nelda P. Wicklund x-3308

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Approved by CS Career Service Panel 20 Nov 56
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT: DISAB.	10 POINT: OTHER
	X				

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	RE...

SD:DI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION
FROM 7-3735-55-005
TO 7-3700-20

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[initials]	30 Nov 1956	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[initials]	23 Nov 56	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [signature] 28 Nov '56

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DD/P

PERSONNEL DATA SHEET

NAME: Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER AGE: 41 DATE: 16 October 1956

STATION AND DUTIES: Washington D.C. DD/P UNIT: FE/1 PRIMARY CAREER DESIGNATION: DI

Area Ops. Officer - Dep. Br. Chief

PRESENT GRADE: GS-14
PROPOSED GRADE: GS-14
CIA TRAINING: BOC, OC, SW, SIC
TSS Briefing, CSR

PRESENT T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BFF-2302 GS-0136.51-14

PROPOSED T/O SLOT NUMBER AND GRADE: BF-110 GS-0136.01-14

EDUCATION: Mercer University 1934 - 2½ yrs; Univ. of California 1940 - 2 yrs. - B.A.
George Washington University 1944 - 2 yrs. - M.A.

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY:
Japanese - Speak - Fair; Read - poor; Write - poor.

ASSESSED: DATE: TYPE OF POSITION: RESULTS:

EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO CIA (excluding SSU-OSS):
June 1946 - Sept. 1952 - U.S. Dept. of Army - Tokyo, Japan - Intell Specialist
June 1942 - June 1946 - U.S. Navy - Language Officer, Intel specialist

SUMMARY OF CIA-SSU-OSS ASSIGNMENTS INCLUDING PREVIOUS GRADES AND DATES:
EOD 28 Sept. 1952 to present - Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Japan - GS-14
Chief, Liaison Division - Japan Station, Tokyo

RECOMMENDED BY:
Philip F. Fendig
Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1

CONCURRENCES:

RECOMMENDATION OF CAREER SERVICE BOARD:

APPROVED BY FE
NOV 29 11 29 AM '56
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

FORM NO. 965 1 APR 55 REPLACES FORM 38-1 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SECRET

14-00000

Job Description: Will be assigned as Deputy Chief, FE/1.

Recommended by Philip F. FENDIG, CFE/1

MAIL ROOM
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DI Career Service Board DATE: 19 December 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-7751

1. Mr. Robert P. WHEELER, I.O., FI, GS-14, will complete his overseas tour (as extended) with the Japan Base, Tokyo, in June 1956. Subject will return to the U. S. for Home Leave and requests that he be permitted to return to the Japan Base for a new two year tour of duty upon completion of TDY at Headquarters for orientation and training.

2. Mr. WHEELER is Chief of Liaison for the Japan Base, Tokyo. He will resume this position upon his return to his official station (refer to Form 202 dated 9 November 1955 for subject).

3. Subject's request has the concurrence of the Chief, Japan Base, and this Division.

George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

DI Career Board

14-00000

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. [illegible] 7751

5 DEC 1955

TO Chief, FE

DATE 30 November 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo J.K.

INFO: COS/HA

SUBJECT GENERAL Administrative/Personnel
SPECIFIC [redacted]

Mr. Richard P. Wheeler

1. Attached is a rotation data sheet on [redacted].

2. As you will note [redacted] lists as his first choice return to Japan Base.

3. While it is realized that [redacted] has not had a regular tour at Headquarters, Japan Base concurs in [redacted]'s request, provided it does not hinder his career. This concurrence is based on the fact that Japan Base will be losing by next summer several of its key personnel who have contributed much to the operations of the Base. These include STEWARD, WAISTLING, possibly CAPASSO and others.

4. [redacted] has a unique knowledge of the Japanese scene, speaks the language and has a continuity of service that makes his service invaluable.

5. During the next couple of years as this base gradually reduces in size, and while the Japanese are still in a receptive mood it is felt that much can be accomplished through our liaison efforts. It is therefore felt that [redacted]'s experience can be to the maximum benefit to KUBARK by his return here for another tour.

6. In order to assist this Base in its planning, an early answer will be appreciated.

[signature]

Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

Attachment:
1. Rotation Data Sheet;

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Chief, FE, w/attach.
1 - COS/HA, w/o attach.

RYBAT

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJRA-7285

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief, FE

DATE 28 OCT 1955

FROM Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo R.J.K

INFO: COS/FA
FE Support Base

SUBJECT
GENERAL Administration/Personnel
SPECIFIC Recommendation for Promotion of Robert P. Wheeler

REF JAPA-3079

1. In pursuance of recommendation submitted in Ref, it is requested that Robert Puhuit be considered for promotion from the grade of GS-14 to GS-15. Subject has been in grade since 27 September 1952. He occupies a GS-15 slot.

2. Subject has been in his present position for approximately one year and has been under my supervision for 22 months.

3. Subject has made an unusual contribution to the work of the base through:

a. His outstanding leadership;
b. His almost unique knowledge of the area;
c. His ability to deal on a close personal basis with individuals on the highest levels; and
d. His quick and often brilliant assessment and solution of many of the important day-to-day problems of the base.

4. These qualities coupled with his strong devotion to duty fully warrant, in my opinion, his promotion to the grade of GS-15.

Harvey W. Little Jr.

Robert P. Wheeler Chief, Japan Base, Tokyo

Attachment:
1. Job Description
18 October 1955
Distribution:
4 - Addressee, w/attach.
1 - COS/FA, w/attach.
1 - FE Support Base, w/attach.

Cancelled
Per C FE
Dec 55

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

[illegible]

Robert P. Wheeler

1. The position currently held by incumbent is two-fold: a. Deputy for KUFIRE and b. Chief of Liaison. These two positions will be described separately.

2. Deputy KUFIRE, Japan Base

As the title implies, incumbent is Deputy Chief, Japan Base for KUFIRE activities, a position comparable to the Deputies for Administration and KUCOMM activities. As such, incumbent is the responsible officer for the KUFIRE activities of the Japan Base, responsible to the Chief and Deputy Chief of Base. These responsibilities include the originating, planning and supervision of the execution of all Japan Base KUFIRE activities under the broad supervision of the Chief of Base, guided and directed by KUBARK KUFIRE regulations such as the SOI and the TRD. Incumbent supervises the work of approximately twenty persons ranging in grade from GS-13 to GS-5 and including such persons as the KUFIRE operations officer, the special projects officer, the chiefs of the KUFIRE sections of the Base. It is incumbent's further responsibility, generally on the initiative of the Deputy for Administration, to handle certain personnel matters for KUFIRE personnel, matters such as efficiency reports, promotion actions, disciplinary actions, etc. Incumbent also represents the Base on all KUFIRE matters, being charged, for example, with most KUFIRE relations with higher echelons, such as the Senior Representative, [illegible], and laterally with KUFIRE elements of adjacent Bases. As one of five Deputies, incumbent assists in setting Base policy, determination of personnel assignments, determination of work assignments, determination of Base operational priorities (again under the guidance and direction of KUBARK Headquarters), and, generally with the Chief of Base but often on his own responsibility, represents the KUFIRE aspects of the Base and of KUBARK so far as Japan is concerned to ODACID, ODIBEX and ODUNIT.

3. Deputy for Liaison, Japan Base (or Chief, Japan Base Liaison)

In this capacity incumbent is charged with basic responsibility for all Japan Base liaison activities, with all Japanese agencies or entities and other ODYOKE Agencies represented in Japan. Here incumbent is responsible to the Chief of Base for the origination, planning, supervision and frequently the actual conduct of all Base liaison, under the broad guidance of FR 52-200. Under incumbent's direct supervision are approximately twenty persons, separate from those mentioned above, who range in grade from GS-14 to GS-5, including all Base personnel in any form of liaison activity though their basic assignment may well be in one of the operating sections of the Mission. Being the Senior Liaison person of the Base, incumbent is frequently called upon to conduct liaison activities with such persons, on the one hand, as the Deputy Prime Minister of the host country, the Chiefs of major Japanese Governmental departments, high ranking officials of various branches of the host country, and, on the other, with such persons as the Senior ODACID representative in the country

and various branch or section heads of the local ODACID establishment, senior military officers of all three services and various branch and section chiefs of the local military establishments. One segment of these activities involves LAURICLE matters of high importance. One of the primary direct responsibilities of incumbent is the origination of KUBARK liaison with these agencies and of equal import is the maintenances of good liaison relationships, stepping in where there is potential trouble, where policy decisions have to be made, where new departures in liaison are necessary (such as joint operational activities with other PBPRO or other ODYOKE agencies).

4. Inherent in both of the current assignments is the planning and review function which are both so necessary to effective and continued operations. This includes the initiation of PPOP's and review of those originated by personnel under the supervision of incumbent; included also is operational review and critical analysis of all KUTUBE operational and Base liaison activities.

5. In addition to the above functions and responsibilities, incumbent is also the case officer for one political KUTUBE operation.

6. Aside from the above general description of incumbent's duties and responsibilities the following seems pertinent: incumbent has been on duty in Japan, with minor interruptions, since September 1945 and in this period, seven years was spent with G-2 of the command (throughout its many changes). One result of this service has been an uninterrupted liaison relationship with many Japanese agencies and more importantly Japanese personalities, while, on the other hand, at the same time there has been a rather unique relationship with the Command and with personnel of the Command (many of the ODYOKE personnel with whom KUBARK is now in liaison are persons with whom incumbent has worked intimately at some period throughout the past ten years, making for a naturalness of relationship that has paid innumerable dividends). In addition incumbent has specialized in things Japanese for some fifteen years, being somewhat more than a neophyte in Japanese history, economics, language, and customs and traditions.

7. I certify that the above described duties are true and correct.

/s/ Robert [illegible]

/s/ Harry W. [illegible], Jr.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : FI Career Service Board DATE: 26 January 1955

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. WHEELER — Extension of Overseas Tour

ATTACHMENT: FJBA-3333, dated 13 January 1955

1. Subject's request for extension of overseas tour contained in the attachment is forwarded for your approval.

2. Mr. WHEELER entered on duty with the Agency in the field on 28 September 1952. He completed his two-year tour on 28 September 1954 and requests that his tour be extended to 28 September 1956.

3. The above request has the concurrence of the Chief of the Japan Mission and Chief, FE/1.

for George E. AURELL
Chief, FE

APPROVED:

FI Career Service Board

Orig: A. Tallackson
x - 3332

SECRET

14-00000

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. FJBA-3335

CLASSIFICATION

13 JAN 1955

TO : Chief, FE

DATE

FROM : Chief, Japan Mission

INFO: Support Mission

SUBJECT
GENERAL: Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC: Robert P. WHEELER Request for Extension of Overseas Duty

Robert P. WHEELER completed his two-year overseas tour on 28 September 1954. Subject requests an extension to 28 September 1956. The Chief of Mission concurs in this request.

Viola N. Partain
Viola N. PARTAIN
Acting Chief, Personnel Section

Distribution:
4 - Headquarters
1 - Support Mission

CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET

11 June 1954

MEMORANDUM

TO : Robert P. Wheeler

FROM : Chief of Mission

SUBJECT: Commendation

1. It gives me very great pleasure to forward herewith a personal commendation to you from Robert A. ASCHAM, Chief, KUBARK. This commendation was transmitted to the Japan Mission by Philip J. CROCKETT, the Senior Representative, North Asia, who requested that his personal appreciation be extended to you.

2. Your performance in the case which resulted in ASCHAM's commendation reflects great credit upon KUBARK in general and upon the Japan Mission in particular, as well as indicating conclusively your outstanding professional and executive capabilities in the direction and conduct of intelligence activities.

3. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my congratulations and to extend my personal thanks and appreciation.

Robert J. Kendall
Robert J. KENDALL

14-00000

SECRET

MAY 1 1954

TO : XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Robert P. Wheeler

SUBJECT : Commendation

1. It is a very real pleasure for me to be able to acknowledge the excellent manner in which you carried out your duties as officer in charge of the direct handling of the POCARGO case. You are to be particularly commended on the manner in which you adjusted to a type of operation with which you had never previously been directly concerned, on the personal rapport which you developed with POCARGO and the good judgment displayed in anticipating and dealing with difficult personality problems, and on your understanding of the broad policy problems implicit in this case.

2. I wish to assure you that your substantial contributions to the success of this operation, as well as the personal inconvenience caused by your precipitate and prolonged departure from your family, are fully appreciated. You are further commended on the demonstrated fact that this personal inconvenience in no way affected either your effectiveness or your contagious enthusiasm which contributed so much to this operation.

3. Copies of this letter are being forwarded for the Chief, Japan Mission and the Senior Representative, North Asia, as well as to your permanent personnel file at headquarters.

Robert A. Ascham
ROBERT A. ASCHAM

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONNEL TRANSFER AND CLEARANCE SHEET

3 October 1952

TO: Chief, FE

FROM: Chief, JCU

1. Robert Prentiss WHEELER   Branch: JCU

2. Detached from: Tokyo, Japan   Ordered to: Washington, D. C.

   On Temporary Duty for 90 days and return to Tokyo, Japan

3. Approximate date of departure: 3 October 1952. Travel by air.

4. Monthly salary allotment in the Field: $400. Not yet effective.

   Overall base pay per annum: $9600   Marital status: Married

5. Allowances: 10% Differential. Not yet effective.

6. Per Diem: Not applicable

7. Unaccounted or unpaid advances at time of detachment:

   Travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 outstanding. Travel from Tokyo, Japan, to Washington, D.C., to be accounted for at headquarters. Travel from Washington, D.C., to Tokyo, Japan, to be accounted for at field station upon return to Japan.

8. Leave used at this station: None

   Accumulated leave to date of detachment: Unknown

Additional Remarks: Subject entered on duty in the field 28 September 1952. Transfer of leave record has not yet been accomplished. Salary and 10% differential have not been paid.

FOR THE CHIEF, JCU:

Walter D. N[illegible]

14-00000

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. ZJJA-505

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FE

DATE: 30 September 1952

FROM : Chief, JCU

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administration - Personnel
SPECIFIC- WHEELER, Robert Prentiss, Completion of Personnel Forms

REFERENCE: ZJJW-108, 17 March 1952

ATTACHMENTS:
(a) Form W-4
(b) Form 61
(c) Secrecy Agreement (dup)
(d) SF 78 (in lieu of Form 88)
(e) Letter of Appointment (dup)
(f) SF 2806
(g) Form 37-79 (dup)
(h) Form 37-50
(i) Memorandum of Field Allowance dated 28 September 1952 (dup)
(j) True Signature Form (dup)
(k) Personnel Transfer and Clearance Sheet (quad)

1. Transmitted herewith are completed personnel forms for subject employee.

2. Standard Form 2808, Designation of Beneficiary, is withheld by this Unit. Designated beneficiary as indicated by Retirement Act order of preference is satisfactory to subject.

3. Reference attachment (j), Acknowledgement of Pseudonym Forms will follow.

4. Attachment (k) is submitted in accordance with Field Regulation 30-3. Subject entered on duty 28 September 1952 and estimated date of departure from Tokyo is 3 October 1952 via Pan American Airways Flight 822 at 1600 for temporary duty in headquarters for a period of 90 days. A travel advance in the amount of $1,460.62 has been given employee. A field allotment of $400 per pay period will be effective beginning pay period 11 October to 8 November 1952. This allotment will accumulate at the field station and will be paid in a lump sum upon subject's return from temporary duty at headquarters. However, the period of duty from 28 September to 12 October 1952 should be paid to subject by the headquarters finance division.

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

14-00000

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, understand that by virtue of my duties in the ____________________, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and which belongs to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to security standards set by the ____________________. I have read and understand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917, (Espionage Act) as amended, concerning the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I agree that I do not now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest, title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by virtue of my connection with the ____________ ____________, but shall always recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such matters.

3. I do solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either by word, conduct, or any other means such classified information, intelligence or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in each case by the Director, ____________________.

4. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United States.

5. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand and seal this 23rd day of September 1952.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler (Seal)

Sworn to before me this 23rd day of Sept 1952

at Tokyo, Japan.

Connie M. Trueblood

14-00000

1499

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. FJTA -

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: AUG 28 1953

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Senior Representative, Tokyo

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative - Personnel

SPECIFIC— [redacted] Commendation of Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

Attachment (1) Dispatch No. FJJA-1279- dtd 17 August 1953 under the above subject

It is with pleasure that I endorse and forward to Headquarters the attached dispatch prepared by the Chief, JCU, commending [redacted] for performance of his duties as Chief of Staff, JCU.

Philip J. Crockett
PHILIP J. CROCKETT

24 August 1953

Distribution

3 - HQS - w/3 encls.
1 - JCU - w/o "
1 - Registry
1 - File

SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
JUL 1949

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

DATE: 2 November 1951

NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment

EFFECTIVE DATE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O. (CE)
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-13 $8360
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		FDZ
BRANCH		C - Japan Composite Unit CE Section Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS

FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE

PERSONNEL OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

Thomas M. Fisher H. C. [illegible] 2/11/51

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES ☐ NO ☐

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON

SECURITY CLEARED ON

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED

ENTERED ON DUTY

C # 1817

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS: Attachments: PHS (in duplicate) w/Appendix I, Ltr. of Availability

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, CE Section Slot #1 (I.O., CE, GS-13), Personnel No. 51. Subject to be processed at basic salary of GS-13; upon receipt of 201 file from Deptar, necessary salary adjustments to be made at that time.

IOM, Requesting Waiver of OSO Reg. 20-1 attached.

Secrecy agreement to be forwarded from the Field.

FORM NO. 37-1 NOV 1949

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

TRAINING EVALUATION

OPERATIONS

IMPORTANT: The official to whom this report is entrusted is personally responsible for it. He may show it to other members of his staff or to the student concerned if such action is considered necessary and advisable. This report summarizes the test results. Observations and opinions of the various instructors for the course listed only. More complete data are available in the files of the office of Training (Covert), and may be examined after contacting the Training and Evaluation Officer. Any questions as regards the evaluation of this student should be referred to the Chief, Training and Evaluation, TR(C).

NAME OF STUDENT (LAST) (FIRST) (INITIAL)	AGE	GRADE (GS OR RANK)	DATE OF REPORT
Wheeler, Robert P.	37	GS-14	9 December 1952
DIVISION	PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT		COURSE NO.
FI FE C	Tokyo, Japan		40

PERFORMANCE RECORD

THE FOLLOWING GRADES SHOW THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STUDENT IN THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE COURSE. TWO GRADES ARE ASSIGNED IN EACH AREA. ONE FOR COMPREHENSION AND ONE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. A SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF EACH OF THESE TERMS, AS WELL AS OF THE ADJECTIVAL RATINGS EMPLOYED, IS GIVEN ON THE BACK OF THIS EVALUATION FORM.

MAJOR ELEMENTS	FAILURE COMP.	FAILURE IMP.	POOR COMP.	POOR IMP.	SATISFACTORY COMP.	SATISFACTORY IMP.	EXCELLENT COMP.	EXCELLENT IMP.	SUPERIOR COMP.	SUPERIOR IMP.
1. Organization of Clandestine Operations						X	X			
2. Cover						X	X			
3. Communications						X	X			
4. Target Analysis								X	X	
5. Criteria For Agent Selection							X	X		
6. Agent Recruitment							X	X		
7. Agent Handling								X	X	
8. Agent Direction								X	X	
9. Assessment and Reassessment								X	X	
10. Special Operational Problems							X	X		

TRAIT RECORD

THE FOLLOWING INDICATES THE VARIOUS TRAITS AS OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTORS DURING THE TRAINING PERIOD. THE OBSERVATIONS INCLUDE THE STUDENT'S PARTICIPATION AND CONDUCT IN TRAINING AS WELL AS HIS REACTIONS TO VARIOUS PROBLEMS AND SITUATIONS.

A. Constructive Imagination (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Devoid of constructive imagination or inventiveness in approach to problems.	Showed only a very limited degree of constructive imagination.	Showed sufficient constructive imagination to meet most school situations adequately.	Demonstrated the possession of creative ability to a greater than average degree.	Outstandingly creative, inventive, or original.

B. Astuteness (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Appeared gullible and naive.	Exhibited below average skepticism and discernment.	Displayed adequate judgment and perspicacity.	Displayed above average perspicacity and skepticism.	Displayed exceptional shrewdness and perspicacity.

C. Industry (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Did not show sufficient application of time and effort.	Applied only the minimum amount of time and effort necessary.	Showed adequate compliance as regards time and effort necessary.	Volunteered greater time and effort than is normally expected in this course.	Was unusually industrious, giving generously of time and effort.

D. Initiative (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Consistently failed to act without being specifically instructed to do so.	Generally exhibited a low level of enterprise but occasionally acted on his own.	Normally took steps to implement ideas without external prompting.	Usually displayed enthusiasm and aggressiveness in carrying out projects.	Displayed unusual energy, enthusiasm, and aggressiveness.

E. Ability to Write (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Showed unable to express thoughts clearly in written form.	Was weak in expressing thoughts clearly in written form.	Written work showed no significant weakness.	Displayed ability to express thoughts thoroughly in written form.	Was outstanding in ability to express ideas in clear, correct, coherent, manner.

F. Facility of oral expression (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Unable to express self clearly. Presented ideas in groping and incoherent fashion.	Lacked fluency or ease in his speech, but meaning usually clear.	Displayed reasonable facility in oral expression.	Spoke confidently, conveying ideas clearly and readily.	Outstanding in fluency and clarity of oral expression.

G. Ability to Get Along With Associates. (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Frequently alienated his associates.	Failed to win social acceptance but did not actively antagonize others.	Reasonably effective in his social relations.	Displayed definite ability to achieve harmonious relationships with his associates.	Unusually effective in his ability to win acceptance from others

H. Ability to Influence His Associates (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Withdrew from group activities to a marked degree, failing to influence the thinking and actions of others.	Normally socially retiring, opinions rarely affected his associates.	Usually participated in group activities, was fairly successful in selling a point or himself.	Was excellent at influencing others by his own personality and thinking.	Was outstanding in ability to command respect and attention through his personality and thinking.

I. Tact (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Markedly blunt and indiscreet.	Frequently said or did something which induced an unfavorable reaction.	Reasonably discreet and tactful.	Had good discernment for the appropriate thing to say or do.	Consistently demonstrated keen perception for fitting speech or conduct.

J. Adaptation to Training (NOT OBSERVED ☐)

1	2	3	4	5
Displayed no interest or enthusiasm for training and failed to adapt himself to the demands made upon him.	Accepted training program reluctantly and had difficulty adapting himself to the training requirements.	Displayed average interest in and acceptance of training.	Exhibited an excellent acceptance of training and readily adapted to demands made upon him.	Outstanding in his acceptance of training and display of enthusiasm and interest.

COMMENTS

CfB

SIGNATURE OF CHIEF INSTRUCTOR

APPROVED	REVIEWED
SIGNATURE OF DEPUTY FOR STAFF TRAINING	SIGNATURE OF CHIEF, TRAINING AND EVALUATION
Robert B. Sheffer	[illegible]

FORM NO. 51-86
OCT 1951

SECRET

(OVER)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL
Security Information

[illegible] STATUS AND EFFICIENCY REPORT

Sections 1 through 6 will be completed by employee. Type if possible.

1. NAME (Printed) WHEELER Robert P.

LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	CAF RATING	SALARY
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	GS-14	$9600.

Date of assignment to present [illegible] 28 Sept. 1952
(Was in U.S. on TDY. Returned station 12 January 1953)

2. Description of duties since last efficiency report. (List most recent first. Describe concisely but fully)

Deputy Chief of Station

3. If courses of instruction were completed during period of this report, list title, location of school, length of course and date completed.

Courses while on TDY in U.S.

4. Proficiency in Foreign Language	READING			SPEAKING			UNDERSTANDING		
	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR	EXC	GOOD	FAIR
Japanese			x			x		x	

5. My preference for next duty after termination of current assignment is:

TYPE OF DUTY	LOCATION
Same	Same

(List one or more in order of preference)

6. Have there been any changes in personal status since original employment or last report - whichever is later? (Answer yes or no. Marital Status No, Number of Dependents +1 *, Emergency addresses No, legal address No. If the answer to any of the above is yes, attach a separate detailed report in duplicate hereto. In the case of marriage, the report will include names, addresses, and citizenship of spouse, Father-in-law, Mother-in-law, Brothers-in-law and Sisters-in-law.

DATE 1 June 1953

* Child born 11 Feb. 1953
Charles Slayton [illegible]

/s/ Robert P. Wheeler

CONFIDENTIAL

Items [illegible] through 11 to be completed by immediate supervisor

Period covered by this report: Date from 27 Sept. 1952 [illegible] 1 June 1953
[illegible] for report: Annual x ___, [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible]
Proposed reassignment of employee reported on ___ ; Covering initial [illegible] days of employment ___

6. Is this employee qualified to perform all present duties? Yes x No ___
Is employee better qualified for other duties? Yes ___ No x
If so, what duty or duties?

Do you concur in employee's description of duties under Section 2?
Yes x No ___ If NO, explain in Section 11.
Has employee striven for professional improvement? Yes x No ___
Do you recommend employee for promotion? Yes x No ___
If so, to what grade and for what position?

To grade GS-15. However, there is no current vacancy in JCU T/O.

9. For each factor observed check the appropriate box to indicate how the employee compares with all others of the same classification whose professional abilities are known to you personally. Do not limit this comparison to the others now under your supervision. Do not hesitate to mark "Not Observed" on any quality when appropriate.

Rating Factors

		Not Observed	Unsatisfactory	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent	Outstanding
A.	Ability to work and get along with people						x	
B.	Interest and enthusiasm in work						x	
C.	Security consciousness						x	
D.	Ability to grasp instructions [illegible]					x		
	[illegible]						x	x
G.	Ability to obtain results and get things done							x
	[illegible]						x	
	Initiative							x
	Ability to handle and direct [illegible]						x	
	[illegible] of present duties							x
	Ability to evaluate intelligence information						x	
	[illegible]						x	
N.	Sagacity (Non-Gullibility)					x		
O.	Leadership						x	
P.	Physical Stamina					x		
Q.	Mental Stamina						x	

10. Indicate your attitude toward having this employee under your command or supervision. Would you: Definitely not want him ___ Prefer not to have him ___ Be satisfied to have him ___ Be pleased to have him ___ Particularly desire him x

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

11. Enter here any desired remarks pertaining to particular qualifications or lack therof which are considered pertinent to the evaluation of this employee. Outstanding assets and/or serious limitations should be stated, also reasons for and recommendations as to reassignment will be given if appropriate to this report.

Subject officer is an outstanding addition to KUBARK as a general service staff officer. He has the aggressive sense of urgency so necessary in any position of responsibility together with the necessary qualities of balance, understanding of human nature and sincerity of purpose. He would be an asset to any branch, division or staff of KUBARK home office, and would be capable of assuming almost any responsible position in an overseas post. If he has any weakness at present, it is a lack of experience in covert operations; this can be overcome before the expiration of his present tour.

(If additional space is needed, attach extra sheet.)

17 August 1953
(Date)

(Signature of Reporting Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below.)

(Signature of Reviewing Officer)
Walter D. NEWPHER

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS THIS REPORT TO BE SHOWN TO THE EMPLOYEE REPORTED ON

BIASED OPINIONS BASED ON PERSONAL LIKES AND DISLIKES MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY AVOIDED. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT THE PREPARATION OF EFFICIENCY REPORTS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF ALL SUPERVISORS OF EMPLOYEES, AND THE ACCURATE AND TRUE EVALUATIONS EXPRESSED THEREIN ARE A DIRECT REFLECTION UPON HIS OWN ABILITY AND QUALIFICATION FOR THE POSITION HE HOLDS.

ANY DESIRED REMARKS OF REVIEWING OFFICER AND/OR CHIEF OF STATION:

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

1-12-31-15

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 26 Dec 73
FILE NO.: 4908
SS NUMBER: 258-12-0844
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947
ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) NOCAD

ATTN: Administrative Officer

REF: Retirement Debriefing

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

OFFICIAL COVER: ESTABLISHED / X DISCONTINUED

UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS

- BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ______
- OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ______ TDY ______ OTHER (Specify)
- SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
- SUBMIT FORM 3254 ... W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11)
- SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2c)
- SUBMIT FORM 1323 ... TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (... 240-2c)
- EAA, CATEGORY I ___ CATEGORY II ___
- SUBMIT FORM 2588 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD

CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS

- X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD
- X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED (HHB 20-11)
- NA SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ______ (HHB 20-7)
- NA EAA, CATEGORY I ___ CATEGORY II ___
- X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
- X SUBMIT FORM ... HOSPITALIZATION ...
- DO NOT ... THIS ...

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

SUBJECT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE CIA AS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT FOR HIS ENTIRE PERIOD OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT BUT WILL NOT REVEAL SPECIAL PLACES OR LOCATIONS OF ASSIGNMENT.

GSN/kas

DISTRIBUTION:
- COPY 1 - ...
- COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
- COPY 3 - ...
- COPY 4 - ...
- COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 007622

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABL[ISH]MENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE		MARCH 1971
TO: (Check) X	CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION	FILE NUMBER: 4908
	CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION	EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947
X	CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) MPS	ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: MPS/Chief Personnel Branch

REF: FORM 1322 dtd MARCH 1971

OFFICIAL COVER: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX; X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert P.

UNIT: REMOVE FROM: U.S. ARMY STAFF GROUP

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	X CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF	DATE: EFFECTIVE COB 28 FEB 1971
SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT CIA W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
X SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR GEHA HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

EDF/pw

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - O/CO
COPY 4 - OL/FILE
COPY 5 - OF
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

James H. Franklin [signature]
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

(13-80-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ES[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

2 April 1968

FILE NUMBER: 4908

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 060947

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) O/PPB

ATTN: CHIEF SUPPORT STAFF

REF: VERBAL REQUEST

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED / DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WHEELER, ROBERT P.

UNIT: U S ARMY STAFF GROUP

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

	ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (opemno 20-800-11)		CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (opemno 20-800-11)
X	A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ____ B. CONTINUING AS OF ~~XXX~~ EOD		DATE (as of COB)
X	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)		SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X	ASCERTAIN THAT ARMY W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HB 20-661-1)		RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X	SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HB-240-2)		DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X	SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HB-240-2)		
	CONCUR IN ISSUANCE: AGENCY HOSPITALIZATION CARD / NACS HOSPITALIZATION CARD		

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY:

Sep 52 - Jun 56 Japan/DAC
Jul 56 - Jun 59 Washington, D.C./DAC
Jul 59 - Aug 64 Japan/State integree
Aug 64 - Aug 66 Honolulu/NOC
Aug 66 - Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DOD
Apr 68 Washington, D.C./DAC

[illegible] RDF/ack

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - [illegible]; COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT; COPY 3 - [illegible]; COPY 4 - [illegible]; COPY 5 - [illegible]; COPY 6 - [illegible]; COPY 7 - [illegible]

James H. Franklin
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER CONTROL [illegible] STAFF

FORM 1551

SECRET

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP	DATE 17 October 1966
TO: (Check) X CHIEF, PERSONNEL OPERATIONS DIVISION; CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION; X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) DCI/OPPB	ESTABLISHED FOR WHEELER, Robert P.
ATTN: Chief Personnel	FILE NO. 4908
REF: Verbal Request	ID CARD NO.
OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED Office, Secretary of Defense (Admin)	EMPLOYEE NO. 060947

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

[X] **Block Records:** *(OPMEMO 20-800-11)*

a. Temporarily for ____ days, effective ____

b. Continuing, effective EOD

[X] Submit Form 642 to change limitation category. *(HHB 20-7)*

[X] Ascertain that Army W-2 being issued. *(HB 20-661-1)*

[X] Submit Form 1322 for any change affecting this cover. *(R 240-250)*

[X] Submit Form 1323 for transferring cover responsibility. *(R 240-250)*

THIS RECORD SHOULD REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

N/A Concurred in issuance

AGE / NACS [ ] Hospitalization card.

COVER HISTORY

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER (CCS)

Copy 1-PAB, Copy 2-Operating Component, Copy 3-D/OS, Copy 4-CL/TELSR, Copy 5-OP/OSD'18, Copy 6 CCS OFF, Copy 7-File

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OMSS 2 JAN 74

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Dorothy/P. B.

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 12 31 73

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: X V TO V

7. FAN AND NBCA: 4221 0117 0000

8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NONOFFICIAL COVER BRANCH

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: [illegible] -CH

12. POSITION NUMBER: 0040

13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0136.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 17 5

17. SALARY OR RATE: 36000

20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK ... [D]IRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF



BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

25. DATE OF BIRTH: 10 04 15

31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: 0EJ0000

EOD DATA

POSTED
1-3-74
[initials]

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

SECRET

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

14-00000

H31

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	37 135	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 17	4	$36,000	11/28/71	GS 17	5	$36,000	11/25/73		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Gordon Macon DATE: 2 Oct. '73

- [X] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [X] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERK'S INITIALS: [illegible]

J.F. 6 NOV 73 (VERIFIED BY)

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous edition

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

DMS8 2 JAN 74

DEP

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	12 31 73	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND FISCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	4221 0117 0000	PL 88-643 SECT 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0049	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	17 5	36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	37 325	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

KHN: 12 OCT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 21 73	REGULAR

6. FUNDS					7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	V TO V		V TO CF	4221 0117 0000	50 USC 403 J
		CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP NON OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0049	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	17 4	36000

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

18. ACTION CODE	19. Employ Code	20. OFFICE CODING		21. STATION CODE	22. INTEGREE CODE	23. Hours Code	24. DATE OF BIRTH	25. DATE OF GRADE	26. DATE OF LEI
37	10	37325	PS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data		33. SECURITY REG NO	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 9-72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

17

14-00000

RCS: 30 JULY 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	07 01 73	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	4221 0117 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/PLANS STAFF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP PENDING REASSIGNMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0000	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	17 4	36000

18. REMARKS

"IN ACCORDANCE WITH HR 20-23A(2), AN EMPLOYEE WILL HOLD SUPERGRADE RANK FOR SUCH TIME AS THE DIRECTOR MAY DETERMINE, REGARDLESS OF THE NATURE OF THE DUTIES PERFORMED."

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	37135	PS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 5 NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NOCAD

POSTED 8-1-73

FORM 1150 9-72 Use Previous Edition

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	54 997	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

BS: 21 MAR 72

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	03 09 72	REGULAR

6. FUNDS				7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	V TO V		V TO CF	2231 4148 0000	50 USC 403 J
	CF TO V		CF TO CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/NOCA DIVISION DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	17 4	36000

18. REMARKS
OTHER

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric)	21. (Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Vacancy Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	18	54997	NOCA	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Computer Correction Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI	HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM MPS

POSTED
3-22-72

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 100	V	GS 17 4	$36,000

14-00000

BBG: 30 NOV 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	11 28 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
X	CF TO V	CF TO CF	2221 2886 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/MISSIONS & PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0001	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	17 4	35801

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric)	(Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Integra Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	52100	MPS	75013		1	10 04 15	11 28 71	11 28 71

28. TIME EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
7 DEC 1971

FORM 1150 5-64 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

H 36

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	32 100	V	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	6	$32,819	08/24/69	GS 16	7	$33,757	08/22/71		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE [illegible] '71

AUG 15 1971

[X] NO EXCESS LWOP
[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
[ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

WITHIN GRADE PAY SUSPENDED UNTIL 14 NOV 71 PER 20. PTG15. EFFECTIVE DATE RETAINED FOR DATE OF LAST EQUIVALENT INCREASE.

CLERKS INITIALS BEK

AUDITED BY [signature]

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PDD: 13 MAR 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060917	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	03 21 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS				7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	V TO V		V TO CF		
X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1221 2866 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER CH	0001	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 6	32619

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODINGS (Numeric)	(Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Subject Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	10	52100	MPS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[signature] 3.22.71

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 6	$32,619

36 H

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	52 150	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	5	~~$25,873~~ 28384	08/27/67	GS 16	6	~~$26,640~~ 29219	08/24/69		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE *Michael G. Mitchell* DATE *3 June 1969*

- [x] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [x] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

FORM 7-65 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

DB

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 5	$28,384

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	52 150	CF	GS 16 5	$23,778	$25,879

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

JLB: 12 JUN 58

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	06 12 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		8121 2887 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/MISSIONS AND PROGRAMS STAFF PROGRAMS GROUP	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0008	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 5	23778

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Health Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	52150 MPS	75013		1	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPEC. VI. REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CSS, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE; CODE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction / Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
XX XX XX							

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI - HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM O/PPB

POSTED

[illegible]

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	02 350	CF	GS 16 3	$22,755	$23,778

14-00000

E-4

1. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. SINCE	5. LWOP HOURS
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P	02 390	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ.
GS 16	4	$22,085	08/29/65	GS 16	5	$22,755	08/27/67		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE Gene R. Koontz DATE 6 June 1967

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 7-55 560E Use previous editions (4-51)

COMPENSATION & TAX DIV
AUG 22 1967

14-00000

PJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OAF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 050947
2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE): WHEELER ROBERT P
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: EXCEPTED APPT CAREER
4. EFFECTIVE DATE: 07 31 66
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 7114 0001 0000
8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USC 403 J
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DCI/OFFICE OF PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING DIVISION PROGRAM ANALYSIS BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: IO PROGRAM EVAL
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0005
13. SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0132.70
16. GRADE AND STEP: 15 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: 22085
18. REMARKS:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. Action Code	20. Employ. Code	21. Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22. Station Code	23. Integree Code	24. Vetpref.	25. Date of Birth	26. Date of Grade	27. Date of LEI
13	10	02350	OPPB	75013		1	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 29 65

28. OTH EXPIRES; 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30. RETIREMENT DATA: 2; 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA; EOD DATA; 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.: 00000; 34. SEX: M

35. VET PREFERENCE: 1; 36. SERV. COMP. DATE: 08 06 42; 37. LONG COMP. DATE: 09 28 52; 38. CAREER CATEGORY: C; 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE: 1; 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA: 1; 42. LEAVE CAT CODE: 0; 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: C MO; 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
8 17 66

Form 1152 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

FJH: 15 AUG 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OEB

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	[illegible], Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	07 30 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7123 0369 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
CHIEF OF BASE	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.08	16 4	22085

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Regn'l Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
			1500091		EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA — 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

[illegible] 8.17.66

1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

060947 [redacted]						43 620	CF			
OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 16	3	$20,245	08/30/64	GS 16	4	$20,900	08/29/65			

Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

POSTED

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: Harry A. Rosetzl DATE 15 June 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$21,653	$22,085

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
[redacted] T Wheeler, Robert	060947	43 620	CF	GS 16 4	$20,900	$21,653

14-00000

11 AUG 65

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	Wheelson, Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	08 01 65	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	6123 0369 0000	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOO U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
CHIEF OF BASE	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.08	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY DISPATCH FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND OF HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

POSTED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS. CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
29	10	43520	000	25020		2	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 58

28. WTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[signature] 8/6/65

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

JCD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OAB

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	[illegible] Robert

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT CAREER	10 25 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5129 0369 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

POSTED ON
[illegible] 1964

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
13	10	43620 / 000	75020		2	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 64

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
		1		EOD DATA	00000	M

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
1	08 05 42	09 28 52	C	1	

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) CODE	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA
1	8	0 / 0	

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[illegible] 11/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

14-00000

JGD: 12 NOV 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OEF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RESIGNATION	10 24 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		5129 0369 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOD U. S. FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Regis. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
45	10					10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	33. SECURITY REG. NO.	34. SEX
			18D0091	EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG. COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED JGD 11/13/64

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET JGD

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

16 OCT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	10 16 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		5129 0369 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/DOD US FIELD UNITED STATES STATION HONOLULU BASE	HONOLULU, HAWAII

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER	0261	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	43620	DDD	75020		2	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE) | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS.) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED: 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: FE - 2

POSTED
19 OCT 1964

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

14-00000

DLB: 30 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	08 30 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER DCOS	3003	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	16 3	20245

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
TO DELETE INTEGRATED INFORMATION.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
						10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/01/64 MCG

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

14-00000

DLB: 16 SEPT 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION (CORRECTION)	08 30 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	3003	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	03 1 16 3	14860 20245

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 EFFECTIVE DATE 08/30/64 AS FOLLOWS:
ITEM #1, SERIAL NUMBER, WHICH READ 560947, TO READ 060947.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE | 20. Employ. Code | 21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC) | 22. STATION CODE | 23. INTEGREE CODE | 24. Hdqtrs. Code | 25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.): 10 04 15 | 26. DATE OF GRADE | 27. DATE OF LEI

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OF OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/18/64 JK

FORM 1150 11-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET 18 SEP 1964

(When Filled In)

14-00000

28 AUG 64

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ODF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	08 30 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
				X	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FE/JKO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFFICER DCOS	3003	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
FSR GS	0136.01	03 1 16 3	14860 20245

18. REMARKS
TOKYO, JAPAN

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
22	10	45380	FE	37587	1	3	10 04 15	08 30 64	08 30 64

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
09/15/64 [illegible]

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

SEP 1964

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OLD: 20 SEPT 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CONVERSION FROM FSR STATUS	COB 08 25 64	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	5137 1566 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/JKO-TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	TOKYO, JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
OPS OFFICER DCOS	3003	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0136.01	15 5	18740

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
56	10	45380 FE	37581		3	10 04 15		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA | 42. FEGLI CAT | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
10/01/64 MCK

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

(When Filled In)

060947 | WHEELER ROBERT P | 45 380 CF

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	4	$17,210	06/10/62	GS 15	5	$17,725	06/07/64			

8 Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP 03
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD 7/2
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: DATE 14 May 64

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	45 380	CF	GS 15 4	$16,005	$17,210

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87 - 793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	060947	56380	CF	15 4	$14705	15 4	$16005

060947 WHEELER ROBERT P 55 380 CF

Old Salary Rate				New Salary Rate				Type Action		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ
GS 15	3	$14,380	12/11/60	GS 15	4	$14,705	00/10/62			

Remarks and Authentication

3

742

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP / / EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

742

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	2	$14,055	06	14	59	GS 15	3	$14,380	12	11	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION

☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

POSTED TO 2809

WK 12/7/60

OBLIGATION APPROVED

E.D.ECHOLS

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WHEELER ROBERT P	560947	51 71	GS-15 2	$13,070	$14,055

EMMETT D. ECHOLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

BS 4 SEPT 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS. EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10 04 15	1	M 1	09 28 52

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit. Code Yes-1 No-2 Code
08 06 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 28 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

16. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER	3936	FSR GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
03 15 2	$ 11660 13070	01	12 15 57	06 14 59	9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	09 06 59	REGULAR	OM 01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO - TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept.-Field Dept-1 USfld-3 Frgn-5 Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	POL ASST 1ST SEC OPS OFF (D COS)	3003	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
03 15 2	$ 11660 13070	01	12 15 57	12 11 60	0137 7351 3000

44. Remarks

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 15	1	$12,770	12	15	57	GS 15	2	13,070	06	14	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

742

14. AUTHENTICATION

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

14-00000

SECRET

ARE: 1 MAY 1959

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CSC Mo.	Da.	Yr.
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15	1	M 1	09	28	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Code
08	06	42	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	09	28	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	I.O.FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12	15	57	06	14	59	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05	05	03	59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	AREA OPS OFF	3936	GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	DI	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

44. Remarks

SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

J. M. STEWART

FORM NO. 1 MAR 57 1150a

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE: 19 MAY 1959

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex		6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
560947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10	04	15	1	M	1	09	28	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Appt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code
08	06	42	1	50 USCA 403 J					09	28	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

16. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	AREA OPS OFF	3936	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. NSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 12770	D1	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT OF STATE	58	05	08	59	REGULAR	CH	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION DEPUTY FOR OPERATIONS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF	5171	TOKYO, JAPAN	37587

33. Dept. - Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	POL ASST 1ST SEC* OPS OFFICER	3936	FSR GS	0136.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. NSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
03 15 1	11660 $ 12770	D1	12	15	57	06	14	59	9 3735 55 005

44. Remarks

SUBJECT IS TO BE PAID THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIA SALARY OF $12770 AND FSR SALARY OF $11660 TO BE PAID BY DEPT. OF STATE AND ALLOWANCES IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH.

ALL SICK AND 160 HOURS ANNUAL LEAVE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

FORM NO. 1150a

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WHEELER ROBERT P	160947	GS-15-1	$11,610	$12,770

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ARE

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. (None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2) Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10 04 15	1	M 1	09 28 52

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1, No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1, No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. (Yes-1, No-2) Code
08 06 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			09 28 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH. D. C.	75013

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USHd - 4, Fran - 6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	I.O. FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
14 5	$ 11180	01	09 28 52	03 22 59	8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	12 15 57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 2, USHd - 4, Fran - 6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	I.O. FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
15 1	$ 11610	01	12 15 57	06 14 59	8 3700 20

44. Remarks

POSTED

FORM NO. 1150 1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

DMG

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth (Mo. Da. Yr.)	4. Vet. Pref. / Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD (Mo. Da. Yr.)
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	10 04 15	1	M 1	07 28 52

7. SCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	8. CSC Retmt. (Yes-1 No-2) Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. (Mo. Da. Yr.)	11. FEGLI (Yes-1 No-2) Code	12. LCD (Mo. Da. Yr.)	13. Code
08 06 42	1	50 USCA 403 J			07 28 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 1 JAPAN OFFICE OF THE CHIEF		WASH. D. C.	

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	AREA OPS OF DEP BR CH	0110	GS	0136.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	25. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. Appropriation Number
14 5	$11180	01			8 3700 20

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT	56	12 09 57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FI CI STAFF	5113	WASH. D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	I.O. FI STF CH	3448	GS	0136.51

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade (Mo. Da. Yr.)	42. PSI Due (Mo. Da. Yr.)	43. Appropriation Number
14 5	$11180	01	09 28 52	03 22 59	8 3700 20

44. Remarks

POSTED
JP 12/27/57

FORM NO. 1150
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE 5	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
Vernet L. Gresham	14 Aug 57	Vernet L. Gresham

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560 SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
160947	WHEELER ROBERT P	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
14	4	$10,965	03	25	56	14	5	$11,180	09	22	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP

IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:

[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

PAYROLL BRANCH SEP 19 10 49 AM '57

E. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 1 MAR. 56 560b SECRET PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1v1

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. Robert Prentiss Wheeler 160947	4 Oct 1915		11 Dec 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment 01	BOB 16 Dec 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO (FI) BFP-2302	8. POSITION TITLE	Area Ops Off - Dep Br. Ch. BF-110
GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.01-14 $10,965.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 518301	DDP/FE Branch I/Japan Office of the Chief
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 2	Washington, D. C.
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT	10-POINT: WIFE	OTHER	14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL.	
			X							SD/DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: 7-3735-55-005 TO: 7-3700-20 750-13	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

1
1

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 09/28/52

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

[stamp] ECO ... ED 1956

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel
SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-373047

MJ 12/14/56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Robert Prentiss WHEELER	4 Oct 1915		2 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUN 3 1956

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
BFF 2302	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 $10,965.00 p/a
Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Branch 1/Japan Base Operations Staff Liaison Branch
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[XX] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL SD: DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
Henry P. GILBERT, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. Shultz (WAN)
Title: FE/CMS 7 May 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WAIVED | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT: DISAB. | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL.

SD: DIO

15. SEX | 16. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: | 17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) | 18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) | 19. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

CERTIFIED ... 1956 WAR

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	WAR	
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	BBB 5/4/56	
E.		

REMARKS.

F. APPROVED BY
per T.B. Bear, Jr. 10 May 56

SECRET

14-00000

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION (When Filled In)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1954-330030

1. Agency and organizational designation

2. Payroll period | 3. Block No. UV | 4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WHEELER, ROBERT P.

6. Grade and salary
GS-14 $10,750.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal													
8. New normal													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FE/5

12. Prepared by
afw 1/10

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	
25Mar56	26Sep54	$10,750.00	$10,965.00	AR Palmer, Chief, Personnel Branch, SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods): Period(s)

☑ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP) ☐ Repay ☐ In

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised.
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL
MANUAL, CHAPTER R1

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

1/24/55

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. Robert P. (PRENTISS) WHEELER	4 Oct 1915		20 Dec 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JAN 16 1955

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
I.O. (FI) BFF-459	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (FI) BFF-2302-14
GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10,000.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-14 ~~$9800.00~~ p/a 10,000.00
DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Japan Mission Deputy for FI Operations Staff Liaison Section
Tokyo, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan
XXX FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	XXX FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE
... 1955
SALARY ADJUSTED TO: 10750

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Avis M. Tallackson — x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (wmb)
Title: FE/CMO 1 Jan 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD ...

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 5-3735-55-005 TO: Same	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE: W. Va.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

... 4 Jan '55

1/24/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	PCH	1/10/55
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY
(signature)
1-14-55

14-00000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 - 087874

1. Agency and organizational designations

2. Pay roll no. | 3. Block No. UV | 4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary
GS-14 $9800

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

FINANCE DIVISION
Feb 50 12 43

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)
FS-4

12. Prepared by
mo 12 Aug 54

13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
26 Sep 54	27 Mar 53	$9800	$10,000	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
(Check applicable box to care of excess LWOP)
☐ In pay status at end of waiting period.
☐ In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP ______ (Initials of Clerk)

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. Robert P. WHEELER
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 5 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED: 14 Feb 1954
B. APPROVED: FEB 28 1954
7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. (Ops) S-7		I.O. (FI) BFF-459
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-132-14 $9800.00 p/a		GS-0136.51-14 $9800.00 p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief		Same Same Same Same
11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan		Same
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[XX] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[XX] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Avis M. Tallackson, x-3332

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: H. C. CLINKSCALE
Signature:
Title: FE Personnel Officer

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT (DISAB. | OTHER) — X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REAL — CD: FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 4-3735-55-005 TO: SAME
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[signature]	17 Feb 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	24 Feb 54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY: [signature] [signature] 15 Feb 54

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6/15/53

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname): [illegible], Robert Prentiss
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 15
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 8 May 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: JUN 7 1953

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	I.O. S-1		I.O. (OPS) Slot #7
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	CS-14 $[illegible]800		CS-1[illegible]-14 $9800
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit OPC Team		DDP/FE ~~[illegible]~~ Japan Composite Unit Military Element Office of the Deputy Chief
11. HEADQUARTERS	Tokyo, Japan		Tokyo, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD		FIELD

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From: JCU, OPC Team Slot #1 (old T/O) FE-1

Subject entered on duty in the field 28 Sept 1952

APPROVED BY FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD DATE: MAY 21 1953

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): Clarence E. W[illegible], Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Avis Tall[illegible]on, [illegible]

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: Signature: [signature] Title: FI/CMO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 2755-55-005 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO):
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: CLAIMED / PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

POSTED

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.		
E.		

REMARKS: NO CORRES

F. APPROVED BY: [signature] 5/[illegible]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

1. Agency and organizational designations
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2. Pay roll

3. Block No.
UY

4. Slip No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)
WEXLER, Robert Prentiss

6. Grade and salary
GS - 14 $9600

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F.I.C.A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks:
Delay due to admin error

11. Appropriation(s)
FZ

12. Prepared by
$n 4/7/53

13. Audited by

[x] Periodic step-increase [ ] Pay adjustment [ ] Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
29 Mar 53	30 Mar 52	$9600	$9800	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s):
[ ] No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP
(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
[ ] In pay status at end of waiting period.
[ ] In LWOP status at end of waiting period.
Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1120a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
Nov. 3, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

16—41111-2a * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1951 973785

14-00000

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS PERSONNEL ACTION

NAME	WHEELER, Robert Prentiss	DATE: 15 July 1952
NATURE OF ACTION	Excepted Appointment	EFFECTIVE DATE: 23 Sept. 52

	FROM	TO
TITLE		I.O.
GRADE AND SALARY		GS-14 $9600
OFFICE		DSO
DIVISION		FE
BRANCH		Japan Composite Unit C - OPC Team, Slot #1
OFFICIAL STATION		Tokyo, Japan 3739

APPROVAL

QUALIFICATIONS	FOR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR	EXECUTIVE
CLASSIFICATION	PERSONNEL OFFICER	

POST DIFFERENTIAL AUTHORIZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGENCY REGULATIONS YES [X] NO [ ]

OATH OF OFFICE AND NO-STRIKE AFFIDAVIT EXECUTED ON 23 Sept. 52

SECURITY CLEARED ON 28 July 52

OVERSEAS AGREEMENT SIGNED 23 Sept. 52

ENTERED ON DUTY 23 Sept. 52

DOG 07/23/52
CSEOD 07/23/52
LCD 07/23/52

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHENTICATING OFFICER)

REMARKS:

Request subject be processed against Japan Composite Unit, OPC Team Slot #1 (I.O., GS-14), Personnel No. 427. This action supersedes request for appointment dated 2 November 1951.

Resubmitted in accordance with JACO 0106 (IN 15330), dtd 30 Jun 52; WASH 48690 (OUT 88734), dtd 7 Jul 52; JACO 0114 (IN 17577), dtd 9 July 52.

Request that subject's security clearance be held open to permit him to EOD o/a 1 Sept 52.

Allot. #3739

FORM NO. 37-1

SECRET

14-00000

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	Robert P. Wheeler (060947)
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-17
SD:	D
Official Position Title	Ops Officer - Staff Chief
Current Station:	Headquarters
Type of Report:	Annual
Reporting Period:	1 April 1972 - 8 May 1973

During the past reporting period Mr. Wheeler has served his first full year as Chief of the newly-created Nonofficial Cover Affairs Division. He has worked hard and long to improve and simplify the procedures through which we recruit, train, and deploy our nonofficial cover personnel. He has identified accurately the bureaucratic roadblocks that stand in the way of our efficient use of nonofficial cover and if he has not succeeded in removing these barriers he has made some progress. His enthusiasm for the job and his belief that it can be done have been invaluable during a formative period, and his performance on the whole has been a strong one.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

I have noted this report:

Robert P. Wheeler

Date

E 2 IMPDET
CLY 008103

5 JUL 1973
119

14-00000

Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Concur - a committed and effective performance -

W E Colby

3 JUL 1973

Date

W.E. Colby, Deputy Director for Operations

14-00000

SECRET

30 May 1972

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FORM

Name:	Robert P. Wheeler (060947)
Date of birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-17
SD:	D
Official position title:	Ops Officer - Staff Chief
Current station:	Headquarters
Type of report:	Annual
Reporting period:	21 March 1971 - 31 March 1972

During the first part of the reporting period, Mr. Wheeler served as Chief, Missions and Programs Staff, and on 17 January 1972 he assumed his new duties as Chief, Non-Official Cover Affairs Division. As Chief, MPS, Mr. Wheeler effectively supervised the important planning and budgetary functions of that office and under his leadership the Clandestine Service has considerably improved its programming presentations to the 7th floor and, due to the effective staff work and Mr. Wheeler's guidance, the area divisions have been largely relieved of the many questionnaires and interventions with which they were once plagued.

Mr. Wheeler took over his new duties as Chief, NOCAD with enthusiasm and his wide field experience and good relationships with the area divisions should in the future bring about a much more secure and imaginative employment of our non-official

6 JUN 72

SECRET

SECRET

cover personnel. Unfortunately a heart attack during the past year slowed Mr. Wheeler down for a while but he has made a good recovery and his performance on the whole has been very strong.

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

I have noted this report:

5/30/72
Date

Robert P. Wheeler
Robert P. Wheeler

Comments of reviewing official:

Fully concur.

31 May 72
Date

THKaram
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

16 February 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) - Robert P. Wheeler

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 March 1970 through February 1971. It is submitted as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1971.

2. Mr. Wheeler's outstanding characteristics are his integrity and total dedication to the continuing upgrading of management within the CS at all levels. By background, interest and training; by service in OPPB; by full-time participation in the Federal Executive Institute; and by his abiding determination to instill others with a similar will for perfection within the CS, he has made a valuable contribution to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS) and to the Clandestine Services.

3. As chief of the Program Review Panel he has chaired the hearings of the various divisions with a great degree of sensitivity and knowledge, and has upgraded the quality and substance of those hearings. He has been especially helpful in those instances where divisions have proposed new approaches, as well as in the development of new and effective management techniques designed to simplify control and to coordinate the activities of headquarters elements and field stations.

4. Mr. Wheeler is a natural leader, bright and original. His is a creative mind, and innovative. He is articulate, rational, and thinks and talks sequentially. He has demonstrated clearly his ability to instill enthusiasm and continuing effort on the part of his subordinate officers who, taking their cue from him, are thoughtful, energetic and hard working. His officers demonstrate very high morale and great enjoyment and satisfaction in their work.

2 5 FEB 1971

5

SECRET

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler also has the gift of being able to absorb rapidly and commit to paper accurately and quickly, a characteristic and asset of his which has much to commend it.

6. He has been a superb deputy, acting in this capacity in my absence. He has excellent recall, is a gifted administrator, and has introduced a number of procedural changes that have increased MPS effectiveness. He has been effective in dealing with OPPB and in participation in the briefings of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) personnel. He is very cost conscious and has made several suggestions resulting in the saving of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Mr. Wheeler has always enthusiastically accepted assignments to panels designed to upgrade the quality of various trouble areas, the latest being the searching look into the nonofficial cover situation within the CS.

7. Mr. Wheeler is a searching individual who is totally committed to the Plans Directorate and has the high regard of most of the elements comprising the Clandestine Services.

8. As I have previously recommended, I believe Mr. Wheeler would make an outstanding Chief of the Missions and Programs Staff.

Sidney A. Stein
Sidney A. Stein
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — 2/16/71
Robert P. Wheeler — Date

Reviewing Official:

Cord Meyer Jr. — 18 Feb 71
Cord Meyer, Jr. — Date
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

9 February 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Special) - Robert P. Wheeler

060747-GS16 - M/S - D

1. This memorandum is submitted in lieu of the Fitness Report form to cover the performance of Mr. Wheeler from 1 April 1969 to February 1970. It is submitted as a Special Fitness Report to serve as the final report of the Rating Officer who is retiring at the end of February 1970.

2. As Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) of the Missions and Programs Staff, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison, except on budgetary matters, between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program portions of the annual Operating Program response; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; preparing DDP responses to requests of the Executive Director-Comptroller on CS programs, etc.; and, as required, advising CS components on those requirements of the PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

3. In carrying out the above-stated functions Mr. Wheeler has continued his superb performance in the field of management. His unusual dedication and sensible approach to and great enthusiasm for the tenets of PPBS have contributed immensely to the system's installation in the Clandestine Service. His energy, logical reasoning and sincerity have infected his numerous contacts within the CS and are goals which his officer-subordinates are striving to attain. He is so strong in his determination that good management will prevail in all components of the CS that he

SECRET

has never passed up an opportunity informally to discuss PPBS, to lecture at formal courses and to assist the DDP/TRO in his exhortations for management training. He has been a strong leader as Chairman of the Program Review Panel and supervisor of his subordinates. He has been outstanding in his ability rapidly to gather facts and produce a document in response to program and management queries levied on MPS. His wide CS experience, affability, sincerity, intelligence and dedication to the missions of the Agency, all of which have continued to be in evidence during the reporting period, make Mr. Wheeler, in the opinion of the Rating Officer, one of the CS' most valuable officers.

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — Date: 2/10/70

Reviewing Official: Cord Meyer

Cord Meyer, Jr.
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans — Date: 10 Feb 70

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 060947

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WHEELER, Robert P.	Oct. 1915	M	GS-16	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops Officer	DDP/MPS/PRG	Hqs

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 April 1969	1 January 1968 - 31 March 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: SEE ATTACHED	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER:

FORM 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

14-00000

7 APR 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report (Annual) - Robert P. Wheeler

1. In compliance with HR 20-20, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45 covering the performance of Mr. Wheeler from January 1968 to 31 March 1969.

2. In late 1967 it was determined that Mr. Wheeler would be reassigned in June 1968 from the Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting (OPPB) to the Missions and Programs Staff (MPS). Under an arrangement with the Director of PPB, Mr. Wheeler was lent to MPS on 1 January 1968 for the purpose of preparing himself to assume the functions of Chief of the Programs Group (PRG) in MPS. Accordingly, what follows covers the period of the loan, from 1 January to 11 June 1968, and the period as Chief, PRG, from 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969.

3. From 1 January to 11 June 1968. During the period of loan to MPS, Mr. Wheeler understudied the then Chief of PRG, acquainted himself with all Group files and responsibilities, attended the Advanced Management (Planning) Seminar and performed numerous ad hoc tasks assigned him by C/MPS. He prepared himself for the new assignment and performed the ad hoc tasks assigned with such dispatch, enthusiasm and intelligence as to augur well for the future. No minor task was too menial; every major task was readily accepted as a challenge. In short, his preparation for the new position soon to be assumed left little to be desired on the part of the Rating Officer.

4. From 12 June 1968 to 31 March 1969. As Chief of PRG, Mr. Wheeler is responsible for, inter alia, liaison on non-budgetary matters between the CS and OPPB; installing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) within the CS; advising and assisting CS components in the preparation of Operating Directives and the program

portions of the annual Operating Program responses; chairing the Program Review Panel; preparing and/or coordinating special studies and surveys on operational programs; and, as required, advising CS components on the requirements of PPBS that need to be addressed in CS documents requiring DCI or Executive Director-Comptroller action.

5. In carrying out the functions enumerated in paragraph 4, above, Mr. Wheeler has displayed drive, initiative, enthusiasm and understanding. He has pushed within the CS on those concepts of PPBS that are considered applicable to an intelligence organization and has argued with OPPB against forcing the CS to apply those concepts which are not considered to be applicable. He has worked diligently, alone and with the assistance of the DDP/TRO, to spread throughout the CS an understanding of the why and how of PPBS. He has prepared himself well for and has exercised sound judgment and tact in the handling of the chairmanship of the Program Review Panel, on the actions of which he has brought to bear his experiences in OPPB. He has given unstintingly of his time to lecturing at Agency management courses when requested. Although he understands the need for flexibility in the CS, he has to be slowed down at times so anxious is he to make the CS the best managed directorate in the Agency. His sincere interest in good management has made him and the two senior officers he supervises cost conscious. This affable, conscientious, dedicated, highly experienced, intelligent employee, who already has given evidence of a strong performance, is a pleasure to collaborate with and a valuable asset to MPS and the CS.

Michael G. Mitchell
Chief, Missions and Programs Staff

I have noted the above report:

Robert P. Wheeler — 7 April 1969
Robert P. Wheeler — Date

Reviewing Official Concur

Cord Meyer, Jr. — 8 April 69
Cord Meyer, Jr. — Date
Assistant Deputy Director for Plans

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

ADVANCED MANAGEMENT (PLANNING) SEMINAR (50 hours) 3-68

Student	: Robert P. Wheeler	Dates of Course	: 17-22 March 1968
Year of Birth:	1915	Office	: MPS
Grade	: 16	Service Designation	D
ECD Date	: September 1952	No. of Students	: 36

COURSE OBJECTIVE:

Course objective is to increase individual effectiveness on-the-job by developing better understanding of planning as a managerial skill and by providing familiarization with the Agency's overall planning system.

The course seeks to meet this objective by: a) providing an overall and systematic framework for managerial planning; b) identifying and analyzing basic styles of planning; c) covering selected techniques useful in planning; d) providing an orientation on the PPB system in use in the Agency and Federal Government; and by e) permitting feedback to students on their personal planning styles as revealed during course exercises.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in this course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[signature] 28 MAR 1968
Chief Instructor Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

SECRET

18 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB, Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report but in view of Mr. Wheeler's transfer to the Missions and Programs Staff, DD/P, in January 1968, it covers only the period April 1967 through December 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involved: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities, principally covert action programs; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing the Covert Action Program Memorandum for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency planning, programming, and budgeting system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. During the year, Mr. Wheeler participated in a survey by the Inspector General of Agency proprietary organizations. He contributed significantly to the study. In addition, he was the Office monitor for at least two studies for the Bureau of the Budget.

4. Mr. Wheeler was the principal analyst assigned to the review of the Agency's Covert Action Program. He reviewed Directorate program plans and proposals, identified issues to be raised with the Director, and prepared a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presented Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

7 MAY 1968

SECRET

14-00000

5. Mr. Wheeler's long operational experience, extensive contacts throughout the Agency, and exceptional writing ability have contributed to the realistic appraisal of programs and plans and to their effective presentation to the Director and to the Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency and has contributed useful suggestions for improving operations and analysis. In summary, Mr. Wheeler made a significant contribution while in the Office. In view of the similarity in functions between the two organizations, I would expect this contribution to be carried forward to his new assignment.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as Strong.

7. Mr. Wheeler had no supervisory responsibilities.

8. This report was not shown to Mr. Wheeler because of his earlier transfer to another Agency component.

Gene R. Koontz

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

I showed this report to Mr. Wheeler. He pointed out that he is still assigned to O/PPB; he has not been transferred to MPS/DDP.

Reviewed by:

Roy A. Burleigh 22 April 1968
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

14-00000

SECRET

11 APR 1967

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT : Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, GS-16, O/PPB, Employee Serial No. 060947, D Career Service

REFERENCE: HR 20-20c(2)

1. In accordance with reference, this memorandum is submitted in lieu of a Fitness Report (Form 45). This is an annual report and covers the period 1 August 1966 through 31 March 1967.

2. Mr. Wheeler's assignment as Program Analyst involves: (a) reviewing and evaluating Agency activities or programs, principally in the areas of clandestine collection and covert action; (b) participating in special in-depth studies of selected Agency activities; (c) preparing Program Memoranda for the Director's approval and submission to the Bureau of the Budget; (d) keeping abreast of Agency plans, programs, and progress toward defined objectives; (e) providing general staff assistance to the Director/PPB in implementing the Agency PPB system; and (f) preparing special presentations and correspondence for the Office of the Director.

3. Mr. Wheeler has many years of experience in clandestine operations and administration, both at Headquarters and in the field. This experience has proven to be of great value to this Office in assessing Agency activities. Mr. Wheeler has been quick to see the usefulness of the new planning, programming, and budgeting concept as a tool for assisting management at all levels in the Agency. He has enthusiastically supported the development of a system adapted to Agency needs and has made significant contributions toward this end.

4. Currently, Mr. Wheeler is participating in three studies of Agency activities: an Inspector General survey of Agency proprietary organizations and two studies which were requested by the Bureau of the Budget--Agency use of communications media for political-psychological programs and Agency air capabilities at two selected facilities. In addition, Mr. Wheeler is in the process of preparing a Program Memorandum for the Director's approval which presents Agency Covert Action plans and programs for the next five years.

21 APR 1967

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

5. Mr. Wheeler is effective in dealing with other elements of the Agency; he writes exceptionally well, has many useful ideas, and is most cooperative. His vast first-hand knowledge of operational problems permits realistic appraisal of operating plans and proposals. In summary, Mr. Wheeler has made a definite contribution during his eight months in this Office; and we expect this contribution to continue in importance.

6. I rate Mr. Wheeler's over-all performance during the period as <u>Strong</u>.

7. Mr. Wheeler has no supervisory responsibilities.

Gene R. Koontz
Chief, Program Analysis Branch
PPD/O/PPB

Shown to employee:

Robert P. Wheeler — 4/11/67
Robert P. Wheeler (date)

Reviewed by:

11 April 1967
Chief, Planning and Programming Division, O/PPB (date)

Concur: Mr. Wheeler has provided strong support to the functions of this office and contributes materially to value judgments of covert activities.

John M. Clarke
Director/PPB
12 April 1967

SECRET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name: [redacted] Whaley Robert P.

Date of Birth: 10/04/15

Sex: Male

Grade: GS-16

SD: D

Official Title: Chief of Base

Assignment: DDP/DOD/USS

Current Station: Honolulu, Hawaii

Appointment: Career

Reporting Period: 1 April 1966-15 August 1966

Report: Reassignment Supervisor
Reassignment Employee

POSTED ON

During the past four months Subject has been in Honolulu only a few weeks because of a TDY assignment to Headquarters, and has now been reassigned. There are no grounds for rating his performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Date: Emerson T. LEASKIS

BY SUPERVISOR

Months under my supervision
19 months

Date: 5 - AUG 1966 COS/US Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

23 AUG 1966

Date: 8 August 1966 C/DO C. Tracy Barnes

SECRET

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Transactions & Records Branch/OP

FROM: Chief, External Training Branch/RS/TR

SUBJECT: Completion of External Training

26 SEP 1966

This is to advise you that WHEELER, Robert P. training request # R-17992 attended the following external training program:

COURSE: Executive Orientation in Programming, Planning and Budgeting

INSTITUTION: Civil Service Commission

DATE: 18-19 August 1966

GRADE: None

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

[signature]

Attachments:

- ___ Grade Report
- ___ Certificate of Satisfactory/Successful Completion
- ___ Certificate of Completion
- ___ Roster of Participants
- ___ Training Report by Institution
- X Training Report by Student
- ___ None
- ___ Other: ____________

GROUP 1
excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T
(When filled in)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF TRAINING AT NON-CIA FACILITY
(Forward Original and One)

TO : Director of Training ATTN : Registrar/TR THROUGH: Training Officer	FROM : Robert P. Wheeler OFFICE: O/PPB DATE : 24 August 1966
1. FACILITY ATTENDED USCSC	2. DATES OF TRAINING 18 & 19 August 1966

3. NAME AND DESCRIPTION OF PROGRAM

Executive Orientation in PP&B

4. YOUR TRAINING OBJECTIVES

To get a broad introduction to the concepts of PPBS and to learn what some other non-military elements of the Executive Branch are doing with the PPBS.

5. EVALUATION OF PROGRAM (Include: a. Strengths and weaknesses of program. b. Identify any outstanding speakers and their specific topics or area of instructional competence.)

I thought that from a broad, general standpoint the orientation was worthwhile but that far more BOB participation would have enhanced the program greatly. There was too much of "we think this is what BOB means" and too little of BOB saying "this is what we mean". I found the movie presentation of Dr. E. S. Quade's speech terrible because of inept projection, faulty audio equipment, and out-of-place music. Dr. Quade had a message and fortunately the CSC planners must have known their film was inadequate, for we were provided with the written text. Outstanding possibly because he stood out so far in comparison to the others was Mr. Peter Szanton from BOB. Dr. Adams from the University of Maryland was quite good and Mr. Greenhouse of VA was one of the few others who really seemed to know what he was talking about beyond immediate low to medium level parochial application.

6. ATTACHED ARE		YES	NO
	TRANSCRIPT OF GRADES		x
	CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION		x

7. I CERTIFY THAT I ATTENDED THE TRAINING PROGRAM DESCRIBED ABOVE.

Robert P. Wheeler

Robert P. Wheeler
SIGNATURE

NOTE: Upon receipt of this report, with attachments as applicable, a certification of completion will be forwarded to the Office of Personnel for inclusion in your official folder.

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

CC-0947

Name:	[redacted]
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-16
SD:	D
Official Title:	Chief of Base
Assignment:	DDP/DOD/USS
Current Station:	Honolulu, Hawaii
Appointment:	Career
Reporting Period:	1 April 1965 - 31 March 1966

1. During the past year it has clearly emerged that the Honolulu area offers very limited opportunities for CS operational action. The main target of a Honolulu base, as originally conceived by FE Division, was the East-West Center with its large number of Asian students. Although, during the 1964-65 academic year several prospective candidates for the WUENVOY program were assessed and one recruited, political developments in Southeast Asia prevented the arrival of any students at the Center from the priority Southeast Asian countries: Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia.

2. It is against this perspective that Subject's performance during the past year should be evaluated. He approached his job with enthusiasm and vigor but soon found that there were no tangible operational activities he could devote himself or his supporting agents to. He has been frank to state officially and unofficially the absence of any targets to which an operational base could direct itself and has therefore been relatively unoccupied during this period except for an occasional item of local coordination or follow-up on a headquarters task. Subject has had under his direct supervision a long-term Staff Agent at the University of Hawaii and two Staff Agents assigned to the

11 APR 1966

SECRET

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SECRET

University as students for the current academic year. He has handled them well and has done his best to maintain their morale in spite of the fact that there were only a few specific targets on whom they could systematically work.

3. Subject is a mature, experienced and energetic officer with both operational and scholarly interests in Far Eastern, especially Japanese, affairs. His talents are obviously being wasted in Honolulu and arrangements have already been made to have him reassigned. The base itself will be phased down in the summer of 1966 with two of the three Staff Agents reassigned, the long-term Staff Agent kept on at the University, and a more junior officer replacing Subject as COB.

4. Subject has displayed an economical approach to the use both of funds and personnel.

5. In view of the limitations, outside his control, on operational activities in Honolulu, Subject's performance has been more than satisfactory and is rated as proficient.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

(not available for signature)

Date:

Mos. under my supervision
15 months

BY SUPERVISOR

Date: 30 MAR 1966

COS/US

Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur.

C. Tracy Barnes

Date: 8 A[illegible] 1966

C/DO

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

Name:	Wheeler, Robert 060947
Date of Birth:	10/04/15
Sex:	Male
Grade:	GS-16
SD:	D
Official Title:	Ops Officer
Assignment:	DDP/DO/USS
Current Station:	Honolulu, Hawaii
Appointment:	Career
Reporting Period:	27 October 1964 - 31 March 1965

POSTED ON ... 1965

Wheeler effectively assumed his duties as Chief of Base, DO/Honolulu in early January 1965. During the ensuing three months, he has devoted himself primarily to housing, cover, establishment of liaisons, and the orientation of his two outside people. Although he has begun to work on his operational program (directed at the recruitment of WUENVOY candidates), he has not been at work long enough to provide a basis for any evaluation of his operational performance.

CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

Date: Not Available ... Wheeler, Robert

BY SUPERVISOR

Date: 24 MAR 1965 COS/US Harry A. Rositzke

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Date: 25 Mar 65 C/DO C. Tracy Barnes

29 MAR 1965

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT

SUBJECT: [redacted]
DOB: 4 October 1915
Male
GS-15
Deputy Chief of Station
Tokyo
Annual Report For the Period 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

In preparing this memorandum in lieu of submitting Fitness Report Form 45, I can only set forth my yearly reiteration that Subject is a senior, well-experienced, well-motivated, high caliber KUBARK officer who has been in his present grade, GS-15, since 1957. His high standard of contribution to the Station as its Deputy Chief of Station continues unfailingly. Tokyo Station operations encompass a broad spectrum of internal and external targets emphasizing denied area operations. To keep on top of this activity it needs a man of energy backed up by sound operational knowledge and Subject has carried this job capably and with a will. I would certainly grade him "S" in performance evaluation.

Tokyo Station is widely dispersed and I have urged Subject on several occasions to get out to the various operational elements in an attempt to get closer to and stimulate the working case officers. After one or two starts he has not kept this up on a continuing basis, remaining at his Embassy desk and invariably working through the individual branch chiefs. I am convinced more effort on his part in this field could have resulted in more yield to the Station from his long area and operations experience.

Subject actively participates in the operational review and budget preparation of the Station and has shown a definite cost consciousness.

Subject's long tenure in Japan and experience with things Japanese are well-known and the pro's and con's of the value of an officer remaining in one area for the major portion of his time with KUBARK (possibly to the detriment of his career) have been discussed to a sufficient degree as to rule out further reference in this memorandum. Subject is scheduled to leave the Japan Station and enter an assignment where his operational talents will be of great value.

In any considerations concerning Subject being conducted by any personnel board or by any official of the Agency interested in KUBARK personnel, the significant points are Subject is a deeply motivated, highly capable officer who has been in his current grade too long.

Certification:
By Employee: This memorandum was read by Subject and discussed with him in draft. He left the area on TDY and so cannot sign it.

By Supervisor: 28 April 1964 /s/ William Broe Chief of Station

8 JUN 1964

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SUBJECT: [redacted] (P)
Robert Wheeler

Comments of Reviewing Official:

FE Division is in agreement with this balanced assessment of Subject's performance in Japan. We are also hopeful that he will respond well in a new environment and broaden his operational capabilities.

Signature of Reviewing Official: [signature] DCFE   28 MAY 1964 Date

CONFIDENTIAL

S E C R E T

TRAINING REPORT

READING TECHNIQUES (EXECUTIVE WORKSHOP)

Name	Sex	Dates of Course	No. of Students
WHEELER, Robert P.	M	24 Jun-19 Jul 57	3

Date of Birth	EOD Date	Grade or Rank	Office
4 Oct 1915	28 Sept 1952	GS-14	FI/FE

Projected Assignment or Present Position
Chief, FE/1

I. Objectives:

To inform senior personnel of efficient reading techniques, and to lay the groundwork for improved reading understanding, speed, and retention.

II. Specific Characteristics of Training:

This 20 hour course briefly reviews reading techniques for effective intelligence reading. The course sets forth the same principles of effective reading as Course I-7, Reading Techniques, emphasizing flexibility in reading different subjects for different purposes. Lectures, discussion, and practice exercises are used [illegible] reading skills, since these are the skills most often required in supervisory reading.

III. Certification of Completion:

Mr. Wheeler satisfactorily completed Reading Techniques (Executive Workshop) which was conducted each morning from 0730 to 0830.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Francis [signature]
Chief Instructor

S E C R E T

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD
160917	

PART I-GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-26)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (27-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
WHEELER Robert Prentiss	October	4	1915

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
JAPANESE 379	April	24	1957	☐ I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
$\textcircled{4}$ I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
$\textcircled{4}$ I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
$\textcircled{3}$ MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

MAY 29 53 AM '57

MAIL ROOM

CONTINUATION OF PART II-LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

Speaking (43)

SECTION D.

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS
$\textcircled{4}$ I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

Understanding (44)

SECTION E.

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
$\textcircled{4}$ I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
$\textcircled{3}$ BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV-CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 3C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
4/24/57	Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(46) C	(47) E

14-00000

Transmitted VIA
YJIT 10,344

SECRET

30 April 1963

MEMORANDUM IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT FOR PERIOD:

9 October 1962 - 31 March 1963

Robert P. Wheeler

A review of the file reflects that has been constantly rated as a well-motivated, superior officer always willing to spend the "extra effort" by a variety of supervisors. During the rating period there has been no diminution in the caliber of professionalism or in the time and effort this man has contributed to the work of the Tokyo Station. He is a distinct asset. Over and above his drive and professionalism, brings to the Station a full background concerning intelligence activities having been associated with such activities in Japan for the last seventeen years, either with the military or as a member of the Agency. All of this time he has been in Japan except for a period of almost three years in Washington.

has a proficiency in the Japanese language and due to his long tenure in Japan has contacts at a variety of levels.

In sum, the Agency has in a superior officer with long background and continuity in Japan, who can and is making a highly significant contribution to the Agency's objectives in Japan.

The above has stressed solely 's ability to contribute to KUBARK objectives in Japan. However, there is no doubt in the rater's mind that could perform in a superior manner no matter to what geographical area he was assigned.

Serial Number 060947, DOB: 4 Oct 1915, GS-15, D Designee, DCOS, Tokyo Station

William V. Broe /S/
COS

Read by

Robert P. Wheeler /S/

Date: 1 May 1963

20 JUN 1963

SECRET

14-00000

19 OCT 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT: Fitness Report - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Chief of Station, Tokyo was requested to forward a memorandum, in lieu of Fitness Report Form 45, on Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, Deputy Chief of Station, Tokyo to cover the period April 1961 to October 1962. His comments are as stated below:

> Mr. Wheeler is a superior operations officer of wide scope, experience and imagination. He has over a period of years been highly successful in a variety of supervisory roles both operational and staff. In addition to these attributes he has unique qualifications of an extensive, continuous operational span of time in Japan, Japanese contacts at a variety of levels and proficiency in the Japanese language. Because of these latter aspects of his ability, he is able to contribute extensively to Tokyo Station and CIA operational objectives.

2. I concur with the above.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Far East Division

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	M	GS-15

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Ops Officer D-COS	Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS						9. TYPE OF REPORT			
NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED		INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE	

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To	SPECIAL (Specify)
	1 Apr60 to 31 Mar61	

SECTION B EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief	6	NO. 4 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX	6
NO. 2 As Deputy Chief of Station, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production X) A 12	6	NO. 5	
NO. 3 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel	6	NO. 6	

SECTION C. EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO. 5

SECTION D DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES							X
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS					X		
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 1 2 52 PM '61
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a superior officer in every important respect. He is intelligent, imaginative, resourceful and has balanced judgment. He understands administrative procedures and knows how to make them work. As a supervisor, he is firm and fair, and achieves the respect of his subordinates. As a subordinate, he is unfailingly loyal and helpful. He has a good overall grasp of the intelligence business and maintains a healthy attitude of common sense with respect to operations. He is especially useful in Japan, because of his great knowledge of and long experience with Japanese affairs, personalities and psychology, yet I consider he would be a superior officer and supervisor in any other context. His personal character is of the best.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18	Report was prepared at headquarters.

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

[ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS	[ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
[ ] OTHER (Specify):	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	Chief of Station	John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [✓] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 MAY 1961	C F E	[signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

Recorded Copy

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	GS-15

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Ops Off (DCOS)	FE/Tokyo Station

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To
31 May 60	27 Jun 59-31Mar 60

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 DA 12 As Deputy for Operations, supervises Station operational effort and intelligence production.	6	NO. 4 In the absence of COS, acts as Station Chief.	6
NO. 2 Makes recommendations to COS on Station operational program, cover and personnel.	6	NO. 5	
NO. 3 Conducts liaison, as required, with ODACID and ODIBEX. DB-11	6	NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

SECRET

(When Filled In)

SECTION E **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

This is the first Fitness Report made by Rating Officer on Subject since the latter assumed duties as Deputy for Operations, Tokyo Station. He has worked out extremely well in this role. He is intelligent, energetic, hard-working and faultlessly loyal. He pays attention to detail while remaining mindful of larger considerations. He is effective as a supervisor and commands the willing allegiance of his subordinates. He has excellent judgment in both administrative and operational matters. Because of his extensive background in Japan, his knowledge of things and people Japanese and his fair-to-good command of the language, he is particularly well suited for his present position. However, he would be an asset to any station or element of Headquarters in a high supervisory position.

This report has been prepared in accordance with F E Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an 'average' rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 Apr 1960	Robert P. Wheeler (Signed)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 Apr 1960		John E. Baker

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		William V. Broe

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 160947

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Wheeler Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	M	GS-15

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI	IO (FI) (CI)	DDP/FE/POS

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify):

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30/04/59

11. REPORTING PERIOD: From Aug 58 31/03 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1: Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Division.	6	NO. 4:	
NO. 2: Conducts liaison with other components of the DDP, and agencies in general.	6	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Directs and supervises a staff component of nine people.	6	NO. 6:	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee.

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE						X	
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

MAIL ROOM

Subject is a well-seasoned, imaginative operations officer, who is extremely practical in his approach to operational situations. He is especially fine in his dealings with people whether superiors or subordinates. He did an excellent job as a member of the FE Division Staff in improving and expediting the FI and CI activities of the Division. Subject has an excellent background in all things Japanese and is extremely adept at building rapport with his Japanese counterparts.

He has the capacity to handle large volumes of work which many times leads him afield into activities that are not within his purview. His personality however allows him to do this without alienating others.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the principle of rating the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
18 months	[illegible handwriting]

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- [ ] OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 July 1959	Deputy Chief, FE Division	WILLIAM V. BROE

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 July 1959	Chief, Far East Division	Desmond FitzGerald

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Wheeler (First) Robert (Middle) P.
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Oct 1915
3. SEX: M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION: DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI/Hqs
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI   IC (FI)
7. GRADE: GS-15
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP:
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): December 1957 - August 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL / ANNUAL / X REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- X I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "U" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE: 2 SEP 1958
C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR: William V. Broe (signature) WILLIAM V. BROE
D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE: Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted For Control	[signature]	15 SEP 1958
Reviewed by F.O.	[signature]	SEP 1958 17

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the Supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE:
B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, FE Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

Sep 12 11 25 AM '58

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SEP 15 11 52 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing similar duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Coordinates and furnishes guidance for all FI and CI matters in the FE Div	6		
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Conducts liaison with other components of DDP and the Agency in general	6		
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Mr. Wheeler is a sound, well experienced imaginative officer. He is especially adept in dealing with people at all levels so as to earn their respect and cooperation.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Wheeler Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
DDP/FE/FI/Hqs	Chief, FE/FI TC (I.I.)

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-15		Dec 1957 - Aug 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
2 Sept 1958	William V. Broe	Deputy Chief, FE Division

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
2 Sept 1958	Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr.	Chief, FE Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
3		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SEP 15 11 52 AM '6?

MAIL ROOM

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Wheeler has displayed the operational and supervisory attributes that give every indication that he has an excellent potential to advance with this Agency.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 4 to 15 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Wheeler	Robert	P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI

7. GRADE: GS-15

8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 20 January 1958

9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): March 1957 - December 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [XX] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- [X] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- [ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- [X] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- [ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- [ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 Jan. 58	Vernet L. Gresham [signature]	Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[initials]	2/5/58
Reviewed by P.O.	[initials]	2/10/58

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Jan. 58	Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. [signature]	Chief, Far East Division

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

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MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO.	DUTY	RATING NUMBER
1	Acting Chief of Branch	6
2	Has and Uses Area Knowledge	6
3	Coordinates with other offices	6
4	Conducting External Liaison	6
5		
6		

D. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During most of the period for which subject is rated he was acting chief of an active and important branch (Japan - Okinawa). He is currently chief of the FI group of the Division's plans and operations staff. Subject is a hard-working, dedicated employe. He has initiative and imagination and is profiting enormously from his present hq. experience. He is a very fine employe.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

After many years in the field with virtually no hq. duty, subject is now obtaining both command and staff experience. He has adapted himself splendidly and has shown remarkable versatility.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Wheeler Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	DI
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/FI Hdqs.	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Chief, FE/FI		
7. GRADE: GS-15	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 20 January 1958	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): March 1957 - December 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL; XX ANNUAL; REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR; REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 Jan. 1958	Vernet L. Gresham [signature]	Deputy Chief, Far East Div.

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 Jan. 1958	Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr. [signature]	Chief, Far East Division

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 4

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (CLERK TYPISTS, STENOGRAPHERS, TECHNICIANS OR PROFESSIONAL SPECIALISTS OF VARIOUS KINDS) WHERE CONTACT WITH [illegible] (First line supervisors)
3		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS AND DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	3	A GROUP WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHERE IT [illegible] (Executive level)
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
3		[illegible]
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) SECRET Potential

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR [illegible]

14 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

After many years in Japan without any hq. duty, subject is now receiving badly needed hq. experience. He has shown great adaptability and versatility in two responsible hqs. positions.

9 03 AM '58

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Subject should remain at hq. at least another year in order that he may further broaden his experience.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject is married and has six children ranging in age from 3 to 14 years.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
5	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	5	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	5	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS [illegible] FACTS	4	18. IS [illegible]	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
4	10. CAN [illegible] WITH SUBORDINATES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	4	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Wheeler, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
DDP/FE/1	Deputy Chief, FE/1

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14	April 30, 1957	16November 1956 - 15 March 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [X] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- [X] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- [ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- [X] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- [ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "W" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- [ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
16 April 1957	William E. Nelson *William E. Nelson*	Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	*[signature]*	APR 1957
Reviewed by PUD	*[signature]*	

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section. [ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 April 1957	Vernet L. Gresham *[signature]*	Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: With additional experience on the job, his performance might be such as to warrant a 5 rating.

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(When Filled In)

[illegible] OF PERSONNEL

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MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Assistn Branch Chief in Management abd supervision of Branch	4/5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Provides operational and administrative guidance to field station.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Gen. Supervision of CE, liaison and CP ops. of Branch	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Conducts liaison with other Agency elements and outside agencies.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

His greatest strength is a warm and engaging personality, an unabashed friendliness that secures him an immediate willingness to cooperate from the people with whom he deals. He is an extremely hard worker, an accurate and meticulous reporter, has energy and enthusiasm and is generally sound in his judgment. On occasions he demonstrates a lack of depth in his assessment of a situation which leads him to jump too quickly to conclusions based on intuition and emotion. As the facts assert themselves, however, he is ready to revise his opinions. As his knowledge of the Agency and operations continue to grow, however, this tendency should diminish.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 4/5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [X] YES [ ] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

Although he is perfectly capable of conducting his current job with distinction, he would shine in any position involving liaison with the U.S. military in which his long experience in dealing with military men and his personality could be brought to bear.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Wheeler, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
DDP/FE/1	Deputy Chief, FE/1

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-14	April 30, 1957	16 Nov. 1956 - 15 March 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
16 April 1957	William E. Nelson /s/ William E. Nelson	Chief, FE/1

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
16 April 1957	Vernet L. Gresham /s/	Deputy Chief, FE

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER:
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
2		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
2		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	2	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
2		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

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4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

When he is unsure of himself in new problems, he tends to trade on his intellect and his emotional feeling for a situation or a person resulting in a vacillation of attitude and an inconsistency that limits his effectiveness. Where he has had past experience he generally makes sound decisions.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

He has a large family (six children) and would like to return to the field after enough Headquarters experience.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER

X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
4	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	4	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	3	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4/5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
3	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	5	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	3	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	3/4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	3	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4 -	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	3/4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS RESOURCEFUL	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
3	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4/5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

THROUGH: Staff Training Officer

SUBJECT: Completion of Operational Management Course for FE Personnel

1. Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, FE/FI, has completed a Special Management Course (Operational Management Seminar) held 7-18 January, 1957.

2. The course covered 38 hours of lectures and group discussions, together with a limited amount of reading. The course outlined the responsibilities of management at the Branch Chief level and selected problems of Headquarters management dealing with clandestine activities. The individual named completed all course assignments but received no grade, since no evaluation was made of the student's performance in this special course, or of his ability to perform a particular job assignment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Robert L. Welk
ROBERT L. WELK
Chief Instructor, Basic Management

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(When Filled In)

18 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Fitness Report on Robert P. WHEELER

1. The attached Fitness Report should be read with the following facts in mind. The Rating Officer arrived in the Japan Station on 21 January 1956. Mr. Wheeler left Japan on or about 19 March 1956 and was in the United States on TDY until 8 May 1956. From 8 May until he left Japan PCS on 7 June 1956, Mr. Wheeler was unassigned in the Japan Station. While the Rating Officer was Chief of Operations, Japan Station, Mr. Wheeler was in his assigned position simultaneously for less than one month and it is my understanding Mr. Wheeler did not report to Mr. Heckscher, but directly to the Chief of Station.

2. I question, therefore, whether Mr. Wheeler was under the Rating Officer's direct supervision for a sufficient period of time to insure that the attached report is a completely equable one. Inasmuch as the Chief of Station reviewed this report and made no comment, I am in no position to take issue with it, but suggest that it be viewed in the context of other Fitness Reports on Mr. Wheeler.

William E. Nelson
WILLIAM E. NELSON
Chief, FE/1

Attachment

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Robert P. WHEELER	4 Oct. 1915	M	[illegible] D 1

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	Japan Station

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
	1 November 1955 to 7 June 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
I.O. ([illegible]) (F 1)	April, 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Chief of Japan Station liaison section.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[signature]	11 JAN 1957
Reviewed by PUD	[signature]	1-14-57

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Henry D. HECKSHER	W. Lloyd GEORGE

3. THIS REPORT [ ] WAS [X] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
7 Dec 1956	William E. NELSON, CFF/1

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

FORM NO. 45a
1 SEP. 54

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(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

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SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left, then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.											X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.										X				
5. UNEMOTIONAL.										X				
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.											X			
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.											X			
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.												X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.									X					
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.						X								
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.											X			
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.											X			
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.								X						
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.						X								

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES: A "SPARK PLUG".
29. TOUGH MINDED.
30. OBSERVANT.
31. CAPABLE.
32. CLEAR THINKING.
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.
36. DELIBERATE.
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.
43. HAS DRIVE.
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.
45. VERSATILE.
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Intuitive adaptability to characteristics of professional contacts matched by warm human approach, facilitate easy and potentially useful rapport with Japanese officials. Good reporter of events, aided by retentive memory. Broad background of understanding of history and culture of Japan. Prone to work "off the top of his head," but assesses situations quickly. Well qualified liaison officer if properly backed and supervised.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

"Weather vane" in his attitudes, he frequently lacks discernment and consistency in his assessment of personalities and vacillates in the pursuit of objectives; this limits him in the role of supervisor and operations officer. Lacks toughness in presenting unpopular issues to Japanese liaison personnel.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Performance in Japan hamstrung by preoccupation with personal and professional status in the agency, unwarranted in terms of both personal popularity and quality of work.

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JAN 10 10 49 AM '57
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [ ] NO [X] YES. IF YES, WHY?

Shrinks from assuming full responsibility. Fits well into a system of checks and balances.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

In view of prospective return to Japan field assignment, should keep up his knowledge of the Japanese language. Tradecraft training designed to develop a basic facility for developing personal contacts into a control relationship and for turning contacts over effectively to other ops personnel.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY. OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [X] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [X] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [X] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET

CUMULATIVE TRAINING RECORD

DATE: 1 25 October 1956

NAME: Robert Prentiss WHEELER

PROJECTED PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION / X REASSIGNMENT / OTHER (Explain) / ROTATION / TRAVEL

FROM: I.O.(FI), GS-14, Tokyo

TO: Area Ops Off, GS-14, Hqs.

EOD: Sept 52

X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN	X	COURSE	DATE TAKEN
	BASIC ORIENT. ALSO BIC, BITC, SOC, BTP, PH I			AIR OPS. 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. M & T ALSO OC, PH II	27 Oct-26 Nov 52		MAR. OPS 1 2 3 4 5	
	CLAND. OPS. ALSO AIC, AITC, AOC, CAI, PH III			CLAND. FLD. ACT. 1 2 3 4 5 6	
	RESISTANCE OPS ALSO PM, I-III, III RAFT			SURVIVAL 1 2 3 4 5 6	
✓	CLAND. SERV.	24 Sept-11 Oct 56		BASIC PHOTO	
	WORLD COMMUNISM			DOCUMENTATION	22 Oct 52
	ANTI-COMM. OPS.			LOCKS	
	ADMIN PROCEDURES			SECRET WRITING	8-9 Dec 52
	OPS. SUPPORT			FLAPS & SEALS	
	TRADECRAFT PHASE			SMALL ARMS FAM.	
	ADMIN PHASE			OTHER TRAINING	
	REPORTS			BIC	1-5 Dec 52
	ORDER OF BATTLE				
	COUNTERESPIONAGE				
✓	ADV. COUNTER-ESPIONAGE				
	OPS. SECURITY				
	WAR PLANS				
	CLAND. POL. WARF.				
	STAYBEHIND OPS.				
	TECH. DEV. ORIENT.				
	INSTR. TECH.				
	EVASION-ESCAPE				
	SAB. OPS.				
	INVEST. TECH. ALSO CI TECH.				
	ADMIN REFRESHER				
	RDG. IMPROVE.				
	BASIC SUPV.			PRE-TEST	
✓	BASIC MGMT.			ASSESSMENT	
	BALLOON OPS.				

REMARKS:

1. CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT (CC) HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED FOR COURSES SO MARKED BASED UPON SUBJECT'S PREVIOUS ☐ BACKGROUND ☐ EXPERIENCE ☐ TRAINING.
2. SUBJECT HAS COMPLETED TRAINING OR RECEIVED CONSTRUCTIVE CREDIT AS SHOWN AT THE LEFT.

TRAINING OFFICER COMMENTS:

☑ A. THIS DOES (NOT) MEET TRAINING STANDARDS RE QUALIFICATION FOR THE PROJECTED ACTION. ☐ NO FURTHER TRAINING RECOMMENDED AT THIS TIME.

☐ B. SUBJECT IS CURRENTLY ENROLLED IN COURSES MARKED WITH AN "✓". THE COMPLETION OF WHICH WILL SATISFY BASIC QUALIFYING STANDARDS.

☐ C. UNLESS SUBJECT HAS HAD PREVIOUS HQ. OR FIELD EXPERIENCE WHICH CAN BE ACCEPTED IN LIEU OF TRAINING, SUBJECT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE ☐ QUALIFYING ☐ REFRESHER TRAINING AS CHECKED AT THE LEFT: ☐ SOONEST ☐ UPON RETURN TO HQ.

☐ D. WAIVER AND CC. SHOULD BE REQUESTED FOR THOSE COURSES MARKED WITH A "W".

☐ E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL TRAINING WERE MADE ______ (DATE). THESE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MET.

DIVISION TRAINING OFFICER: [signature]

HENRY P. GILBERT
STAFF TRAINING OFFICER

TO: Personnel Officer,

FROM: Career Management Officer

The above projected personnel action has been ☐ approved ☐ disapproved by the Career Service Board. Additional training as indicated above has been recommended by the Training Officer to satisfy requirements of the proposed personnel action.

Please schedule these courses as soon as possible through your Division Training Officer who will coordinate with the Senior Staff Training Officer.

DATE: 14 Nov. 56

SIGNATURE OF CAREER MANAGEMENT OFFICER: [signature]

FORM NO. 467 REPLACES FORM 50-77 1 JAN 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE. SECRET (12-4-45)

SECRET

TRAINING REPORT

CLANDESTINE SERVICES REVIEW NO. 14

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE		NO. OF STUDENTS
Wheeler, Robert P.	Male	24 September-12 October 1956		42
DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK		OFFICE
4 October 1915	28 September 1952	GS-14		FE/1
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION				
Chief, Japan Desk/FE-1				

I. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide familiarization with 1) the Clandestine Services' functional structure, current mission, operational programs, and support facilities; 2) other Agency offices and their capacity to support the Clandestine Services. It is not intended to impart basic operational knowledge, but is designed to make the returning case officer current with recent developments.

II. SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COURSE:

A description of current policy, objectives, organization, programs showing operational emphasis, methods of personnel management, fiscal administration, and existing capabilities for providing operational and intelligence support was presented by means of lectures, tours, and selected reading material. The course involved three weeks.

III. CERTIFICATION OF COURSE COMPLETION:

Mr. Wheeler has attended the entire course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Spencer L. Taggart

[illegible]
Chief Instructor
Clandestine Services Review

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

13

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915	M	——— DI

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	Japan Base

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
30 October 1955	31 October 1954 to 30 October 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
I. O. (———) (FI)	April, May, 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

a. As Acting Chief, FI, has been responsible for supervising all FI activities of the Base, and for coordinating those activities with Chief, PP.
b. With the above duties, has been concurrently Chief of Liaison Section and thus responsible for directing all liaison activities conducted by the Base.
c. Case officer for one important project involving a Japanese agent who is an influential member of the Diet.

BY [signature] DATE Sep 56
Posted Per. Control ______
Reviewed by FUD [signature]

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Robert H. LINN	Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.

3. THIS REPORT [ ] WAS [X] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
13 March 1956	Philip F. FENDIG, ACPE/1 [signature]

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FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. Each scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 36 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.										X				
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.												X		
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.						X								
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.											X			
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.												X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.										X				
11. CALM.						X								
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.											X			
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.										X				
14. GETS THINGS DONE.												X		
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.											X			
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.											X			
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.											X			
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.											X			
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.										X				
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.										X				
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.						X								
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.									X					

SECRET

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.										X				
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.											X			
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.										X				
31. CAPABLE.												X		
32. CLEAR THINKING.										X				
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.											X			
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.										X				
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.										X				
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.											X			
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.										X				
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.											X			
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.										X				
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.											X			
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.												X		
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.											X			
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.											X			
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.										X				
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.											X			

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is highly capable in several fields: he writes well and quickly; he speaks clearly and to the point; his sense of humor and breezy charm make him the center of any social group and able to get along with people on any level. He does a prodigious amount of work with great facility and is always willing to work long hours to get a job done. He is ideal as a liaison man for contacts with high level officials.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Has a tendency to do things "off the top of his head". Some what easily upset when difficulties arise or when he has worked himself into a combination of fatigue and depression. Sometimes allows his emotions or his moods to color his reports and his evaluations of others. Has some tendency to "fall in love" with his agent.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Versatility in dealing on a friendly and extremely effective basis with all kinds of people, particularly those in high level positions.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 3 1 58 PM '56
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

P&P training, and refresher course, if available, in FI ops.

F. OTHER COMMENTS *(Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person)*: Subject has an excellent knowledge of the area, its people, and language and is able to use this knowledge with great resultant benefits to his work.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A, B, C, & D

A. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY ... WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION ... IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS ... REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION .. BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS .. WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT .. HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE .. WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [X] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION .. MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION .. THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION .. BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION .. WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [X] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. ***DIRECTIONS:*** *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating .. skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY .. WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE .. DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE .. HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [X] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
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INSTRUCTIONS

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TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a oral way he knows where he stands.

BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control B7	2-15-55
	3/8/55

A

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
Mr. Robert F. [illegible]	4 Oct. 1925	M	[illegible] SD-P/

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-14	Japan Mission

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT
30 Sept. 1954	1 January 1953 to 30 October 1954 14 Nov. 1953 to 30 October 1954 (present supervisor)

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION 10 (FI) 0136.51	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Acting Depty for KUFIRE; Chief of Liaison	April-May 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is Acting Deputy for KUFIRE activities within the Mission. As such, he is responsible for organizing, directing, and coordinating the three sections charged with KUFIRE duties in Japan, as well as the Intelligence Staff which is in turn responsible for requirements, central intelligence files, CE carding and filing, and the preparation and dissemination of reports. Subject is also Chief of Liaison and in his capacity directs and coordinates the work of four liaison sections dealing with both U.S. and Japanese official agencies. Subject is also responsible for the development of one potentially important agent asset.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Mr. Robert H. [illegible]	Mr. Harry [illegible] Jr.

3. THIS REPORT [ ] WAS [X] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
14 Jan 55	Mr. William E. [illegible], Chief, [illegible] William E [illegible]

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SECRET

FORM NO. 45a
1 JUL 54

(4)

FEB 9 10 33 AM '55

MAIL ROOM

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The [illegible] words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.												X		
2. CAN MADE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.													X	
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.											X			
4. HAS INITIATIVE.													X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.										X				
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.												X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.													X	
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.													X	
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.													X	
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.												X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.													X	
14. GETS THINGS DONE.														X
15. [illegible] ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.												X		
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.											X			
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.												X		
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.												X		
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.												X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.												X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.													X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.												X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.													X	
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.										X				
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT [illegible]											X			

Item	Rating
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.	
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.	X
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES, A "SPARK PLUG".	X
29. TOUGH MINDED.	X
30. OBSERVANT.	X
31. CAPABLE.	X
32. CLEAR THINKING.	X
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.	X
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.	X
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	X
36. DELIBERATE.	X
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.	X
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.	X
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.	X
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.	X
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.	X
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.	X
43. HAS DRIVE.	X
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.	X
45. VERSATILE.	X
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.	X
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.	X
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.	X
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.	X
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.	X

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject has the outstanding ability to do a remarkable number of jobs remarkably well. He performs brilliantly and rapidly, if sometimes superficially, and completes a prodigious amount of work, meeting deadlines, and at the same time, unless deeply disturbed, maintaining a humorous and kindly attitude toward his associates that makes him almost always exceptionally pleasant to deal with. He is extremely well suited for almost any phase of intelligence work.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES? Subject tends at times to become elated or depressed to the extent that he sometimes loses his ability to make a carefully balanced judgement. When, as happens very rarely, he runs up against what he believes to be stupidity or serious incompetence, his strongly emotional reaction sometimes hampers a necessary working relationship. He is occasionally a little too easily swayed, like a weather-vane, by the opinions of his superiors. Some of these characteristics are, however, at times actually advantageous in his work, and are far overbalanced by his outstanding strengths.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

High capacity for competant and rapid accomplishment in almost any intelligence field, particularly as based on his long residence and interest in Japan.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 9 10 31 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [ ] NO [XX] YES. IF YES, WHY?

Subject has excellent balance in supervising others, but often requires guidance and direction in something in which he personally is closely concerned.

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

F&P course; refresher course in KUPIRE techniques.

F. OTHER COMMENTS (Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person):

Subject makes an invaluable contribution through his knowledge of Japan, and through the continuity resulting from his willingness to remain for an indefinite period in the area.

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. DIRECTIONS: *Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY. HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [ ] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [XX] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [XX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. DIRECTIONS: *Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [XX] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. DIRECTIONS: *Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AGENCY..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS..REGARDS AGENCY AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XX] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. DIRECTIONS: *Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XX] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

IMPORTANT EMPLOYEE INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 4	LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM	IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON PAGE 2

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read page 4 carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or print in ink.
- Do not detach.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last) (first) (middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
Wheeler Robert P.	Oct 4, 1915	
EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	AGENCY LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)	

HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE FILED THIS FORM? ☐ YES ☐ NO

If "YES," your last such form remains in effect and you should not file this new form unless you want to change the old one.

3 By law, a person, who can be covered, automatically receives regular life insurance, unless he waives all coverage. You have the choice of waiving all coverage, increasing your life insurance coverage through additional optional insurance, or declining the additional optional insurance. So, READ CAREFULLY AND THEN

MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW (DO NOT MARK MORE THAN ONE):

Mark here for BOTH OPTIONAL AND REGULAR Insurance. → ☐ **A** I WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE in addition to my regular insurance. I authorize deductions to pay the full cost.

Mark here for REGULAR BUT NO OPTIONAL insurance. → ☒ **B** I DO NOT WANT THE $10,000 OPTIONAL INSURANCE but I understand I still get my regular insurance. I understand I cannot get optional insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form, (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability.

Mark here for NO INSURANCE AT ALL. → ☐ **C** I DO NOT WANT ANY LIFE INSURANCE NOW. I understand that I cannot get any regular insurance, unless I: (1) wait at least one year after I sign this form; (2) am under age 50 when I apply, AND (3) give satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand I cannot get the $10,000 optional insurance unless I first have the regular insurance.

4 DATE AND SIGN. RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print)

Subject failed to elect optional insurance during the open period.

DATE

14 Apr 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

PERSONNEL OFFICE

APR 14 10 21 AM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176
MARCH 1973
FPM Supplement 870-1
176-103

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Control Division, Statistical Reporting Branch

SERIAL NO. (1-6)	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST (7-24)	MIDDLE
060947	Wheeler	Robert	P.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 1 - PCS (Basic), 3 - CORRECTION, 5 - CANCELLATION — CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 2 - TDY (Basic), 4 - CORRECTION, 6 - CANCELLATION — CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
05	16	73	06	17	73	2			EUROPE	801

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

X	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: NOCAD-000091-73

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 05/15/73 - 06/17/73

REMARKS

PREPARED BY:
- [ ] OCO
- [x] C & L DIVISION, CTOR.
- [ ] C & T DIVISION

REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT — DATE: Jul. 9/1973

ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED

SIGNATURE: [signature]

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 4-71 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

CERTIFICATION OF ATTENDANCE

NAME OF SCHOOL OR FACILITY: Federal Executive Institute

COURSE : Follow-up Seminar

COURSE DATES : 10 December 1970 (1 day only)

GRADE (IF GIVEN) : None

TRAINING REQUEST NUMBER : 031297

I certify the above to be true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

[signature] 1/5/71
SIGNATURE DATE

NOTE: This form is to be used only when the facility attended does not give official completion information.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 031297
Date 7/12/71

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

UNITED STATES GOVE... MENT

U.S. ... VIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Memorandum

Subject: Completion of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia

Date: July 15, 1970

In Reply Refer To:

From: FRANK P. SHERWOOD
Director, Federal Executive Institute

Your Reference:

To: Mr. Hugh Clayton
Registrar, Office of Training
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

This is official notice that ROBERT P. WHEELER has satisfactorily completed the eight-week session of "The Residential Program in Executive Education" at the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia. This session of that educational program was held from May 10 - July 2, 1970.

A certificate of completion has been issued to the above named person.

One copy of this memorandum is intended for filing in the employee's official personnel folder and the other copy for routing to the employee's immediate supervisor.

TRAINING COMPLETED
Request No. 2215
Date 29 1970

Keep Freedom in Your Future With U.S. Savings Bonds

CSC FORM 631
NOVEMBER 1961

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

GS-16 D

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444l, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.

Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct. 1915

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT: MAJOR	SUBJECT: MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
3. DATE OF BIRTH
4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION
6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
7. CITIZENSHIP
8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)
9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 2-69 444n

SECRET

14-511

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK (X)): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.				APR 9 9 37 AM '63				
2.								

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED; CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY):

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (Active) ☐ STANDBY (Inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP: FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 APR 1963	Robert P. [signature]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO: Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Print) 7-24 LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT 25-26
060947	Coheeler	Robert		43

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	ARRIVAL MONTH 28-29	ARRIVAL DAY 30-31	ARRIVAL YEAR 32-33	DEPARTURE MONTH 34-35	DEPARTURE DAY 36-37	DEPARTURE YEAR 38-39	COUNTRY	OMIT 40-42
1. PCS (Basic) 3. CORRECTION 5. CANCELLATION	1	08	26	64	06	12	66	Hawaii	730

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE 27	DEPARTURE MONTH 28-29	DEPARTURE DAY 30-31	DEPARTURE YEAR 32-33	RETURN MONTH 34-35	RETURN DAY 36-37	RETURN YEAR 38-39	AREA(S)	OMIT 40-42
2. TDY (Basic) 4. CORRECTION 6. CANCELLATION									

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
XX	CABLE Honolulu 3499		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.: IN NR 36523A

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD: 13 June 1966

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
C & L DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
X C & F DIVISION	7-1-66	[signature]

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-101

14-00000

Supplement to Staff Agent Personnel Action

For [redacted], Effective 25 October 1964

Mr. [redacted]

Dear Mr. [redacted],

In view of your contemplated cover assignment, you have been designated a Staff Agent. The purpose of this Supplement is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are so designated and to set forth certain obligations incident to your status as an appointed employee.

1. Payroll Administration. As indicated in your Staff Agent Personnel Action, your present salary and grade are $20,245.00 per annum and GS-16[3], respectively. As an appointed employee of the Government you are entitled to receive and retain only the salary, allowances and other benefits applicable to that status. However, procedural variations will be followed to preserve the security of your position.

(a) The gross emoluments that you receive from your cover activities will be retained by you as an offset against the gross emoluments due you from this organization. If cover emoluments ever exceed those due you from this organization, the overage is to be remitted to this organization on a monthly basis, unless a different period is specified.

(b) Federal income taxes will be withheld, reported and paid in conformance with Agency procedures designed to protect against the unauthorized revelation of your true relationship to the Government. You will be briefed thereon prior to your departure.

(c) This organization will deduct from the gross payments due you an amount equivalent to six and one-half percent (6 1/2%) of your gross salary for contribution to the Civil Service Retirement Fund. This amount will be deducted from the differential due you by this organization. If there is no differential or if it is insufficient, you will be required to make direct remittances to this organization in satisfaction of the required contributions.

(d) This organization will not reimburse you for mandatory Social Security deductions if such deductions are required by virtue of your cover employment. However, when for compelling cover, security or operational reasons this organization determines that you must ostensibly participate in a fringe benefit program of a cover facility you will be reimbursed therefor by this organization in an appropriate manner. In such event any benefit received by you, your heirs or any other party as a result of your ostensible participation therein while a Government employee is the property of the Government and will be disposed of at such time and in such a manner as this organization may require.

14-00000

SECRET

2. Furnished Quarters. If you and your dependents are furnished quarters by the Government while PCS Honolulu, Hawaii, you will be charged a reasonable rental therefor, as established under the Hawaii rental rate schedule of this organization.

3. Secrecy. You will be required to keep forever secret this Supplement and all information which you may obtain by reason hereof (unless released in writing by the Government from such obligation), with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations.

4. Place of Assignment. This Supplement is predicated upon an assignment in Honolulu, Hawaii, under nonofficial cover. Any deviation therefrom will require a new supplement or an amendment thereto.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Personnel Officer

14-00000

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS: [illegible]

TELEPHONE EXTENSION: Code 13-3040 | DATE: 27 Oct. 60

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. NAME [X] PSEUDO [ ] TRUE — [illegible]
2A. PROJECT:
2B. PERMANENT STATION: Honolulu, Hawaii
3. ALLOTMENT NO.: 5129-0369
3A. FUNDS: [ ] V [X] UV
4. SLOT NO.: 0261
5. PREVIOUS CIA PSEUDONYM OR ALIASES: BRENDLE, Adam M.
6. INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY CIA OR ITS ALLIED ACTIVITIES IN SOME CAPACITY PRIOR TO THIS CONTRACT. [ ] YES [X] NO (If yes, describe and include dates and salary.)
Staff Employee - Sept. 5? to Present - GS-14 to GS-16
7. SECURITY CLEARANCE (Type and date): Staff Clearance
7A. MEDICAL CLEARANCE: [X] OBTAINED [ ] INITIATED [ ] NOT REQ'D.
8. CONTRACT IS TO BE WRITTEN IN STERILE FORM I.E., "U.S. GOVERNMENT" [X] YES [ ] NO
9. INDIVIDUAL WILL WORK UNDER "CONTROLLED CONDITIONS" I.E., REGULAR OFFICE HOURS AWAY FROM SUBJECT'S HOME AND PERFORMED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A STAFF EMPLOYEE OR STAFF AGENT [ ] YES [X] NO
10. PROPOSED CATEGORY (Contract agent, contract employee, etc.): Staff Agent

SECTION II — PERSONAL DATA

11. CITIZENSHIP: U. S.
12. IF NOT U.S. CITIZEN, INDIVIDUAL IS A PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN [ ] YES [ ] NO
13. AGE: 45
14. DATE OF BIRTH (Month, day, year): October 4, 1915
15. LEGAL RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Washington, D. C.
16. CURRENT RESIDENCE (City and state or country): Honolulu, Hawaii
17. MARITAL STATUS (Check as appropriate): [ ] SINGLE [X] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] ANNULLED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED
18. NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS (Not including individual) RELATIONSHIP AND AGE:
Wife, 47
Daughters, 15, 13, & 9
Sons, 13 & 11
19. INDIVIDUAL IS RELATED TO A STAFF EMPLOYEE, STAFF AGENT OR AN INDIVIDUAL CURRENTLY WORKING FOR THE AGENCY IN SOME CAPACITY [ ] YES [X] NO RELATIONSHIP:

SECTION III — U.S. MILITARY STATUS

20. RESERVE:
21. VETERAN: Yes
22. IF RETIRED, INDICATE CATEGORY (Longevity, combat disability, service disability non-combat):
23. BRANCH OF SERVICE: Navy
24. RANK OR GRADE: Lt.
25. DRAFT ELIGIBLE [ ] YES [X] NO
26. DRAFT DEFERMENT OBTAINED BY CIA [ ] YES [X] NO

SECTION IV — COMPENSATION

27. BASIC SALARY: $20,295 GS-16 Step 3
28. POST DIFFERENTIAL: 15%
29. COVER (Breakdown, if any): See below under #40
30. FEDERAL TAX WITHHOLDING: COVER [X] YES [X] NO; CIA [ ] YES [ ] NO

SECTION V — ALLOWANCES (NORMALLY GRANTED ONLY TO RESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES)

31. QUARTERS: *
32. POST: N. A.
33. OTHER: N. A.
34. COVER (Breakdown, if any):
* Quarters handled locally by Honolulu Station

SECTION VI — TRAVEL

35. TYPES: [X] PCS [ ] DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL [ ] FOREIGN OPERATIONAL
36. WITH DEPENDENTS [X] YES [ ] NO
37. HHE TO BE SHIPPED [X] YES [ ] NO
37A. HHE TO BE STORED [X] YES [ ] NO
38. PERSONAL VEHICLE TO BE SHIPPED [X] YES [ ] NO
39. PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE TO BE USED FOR OPERATIONAL TRAVEL [ ] YES [ ] NO
40. IF WITH DEPENDENTS STATE RELATIONSHIP, CITIZENSHIP, AGE AND DATE OF BIRTH:
Same as 18 above

For #29: Cover Pay: W-2 - Proprietary - $10,000.00
1099 - 1st Devised Cover - 4,875.00
1099 - 2nd Devised Cover - 5,362.50

There will be a yearly adjustment for any amount due or owed by Subject.

Taxes will be withheld on the $10,000 paid through proprietary
No taxes will be held on the two devised covers.

41. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

SECTION VII — OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

42. PURCHASE OF INFORMATION: Yes
43. ENTERTAINMENT: Yes
44. OTHER:
45. PAYMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY WILL BE IN CONFORMANCE WITH [X] CIA REGULATIONS [ ] COVER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

CONTRACT INFORMATION AND CHECK LIST (CONTINUED)

CASE OFFICER: [illegible] | DIVISION: [illegible]
TELEPHONE EXTENSION: [illegible] | DATE: [illegible]

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON FIRST SHEET.

SECTION VIII — OTHER BENEFITS

46. BENEFITS (See HB 20-40, HB 20-41, HB 20-7, HB 20-33, and HB 20-620-1, HB 20-1000-1 and/or successor regulations for benefits applicable to various categories of contract personnel.)

Same as Staff Employee

SECTION IX — COVER ACTIVITY

47. STATUS (Check): PROPOSED [ ] ESTABLISHED [X]

48. TYPE (Check): PROPRIETARY [X] SUBSIDIZED [ ] CULTURAL [ ] EDUCATIONAL [ ] COMMERCIAL [X] MILITARY [ ] TOURIST [ ] OTHER [ ]

49. IF COVER PAYMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED, THEY WILL BE EFFECTED ON REIMBURSABLE BASIS: [X] YES [ ] NO [ ] COMPLETE [ ] PARTIAL

SECTION X — OFFSET OF INCOME

50. OFFSET OF INCOME AND OTHER EMOLUMENTS DERIVED FROM COVER ACTIVITIES (If less than total, justify in separate memo attached hereto.) [X] TOTAL [ ] PARTIAL [ ] NONE

SECTION XI — TERM

51. DURATION: DAYS [ ] MONTHS [ ] YEARS 2

52. EFFECTIVE DATE:

53. RENEWABLE: [X] YES [ ] NO

54. TERMINATION NOTICE (Number of days): 30

55. FORFEITURE OF RETURN TRAVEL FOR RESIGNATION PRIOR TO CONTRACT TERMINATION: [X] YES [ ] NO

SECTION XII — FUNCTION

56. PRIMARY FUNCTION (CI, FI, PP, other): FI

SECTION XIII — DUTIES

57. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES TO BE PERFORMED

As Senior operations officer at Honolulu Base, Subject will be responsible for all administration and operational activities of the Base. He will handle recruiting of agents once they have been spotted and assessed.

SECTION XIV — QUALIFICATIONS

58. EXPERIENCE

Subject has been employed by the Agency since 25 September 1952 --

59. EDUCATION (Check Highest Level Attained): GRADE SCHOOL [ ] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] TRADE SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] BUSINESS SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE [ ] COLLEGE (No degree) [ ] COLLEGE DEGREE [ ] POST GRADUATE [ ] MA [X] PHD [ ]

60. LANGUAGE COMPETENCY (Check Appropriate Degree Competency)

LANGUAGE	SPEAK	WRITE	READ
Japanese	X	X	X

61. INDIVIDUAL'S COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: U.S.A.

62. AREA KNOWLEDGE: Japan

SECTION XV — EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CIA

63. GIVE INCLUSIVE DATES, POSITION TITLE OR TYPE WORK, SALARY AND REASON FOR LEAVING

1941-42 - Univ. of Calif.
1942-46 - U.S. Navy
1946-52 - War Dept. Intel Specialist

SECTION XVI — ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

64. ADDITIONAL OR UNUSUAL REQUIREMENTS, JUSTIFICATIONS OR EXPLANATIONS (Use other side if necessary) [ ] OVER

APPROVAL

DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OPERATING OFFICIAL	DATE	TYPED NAME & SIGNATURE OF CONTRACT APPROVING OFFICER
	Stanley J. Gimes, [illegible]	2 NOV 1954	[illegible] F. Schreyer, [illegible]/EX

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

This document consists of 1 page, No 1 of 3 copies, Series A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Executive Registry
64-5841

DDP

AUG 21 1964

Dear Mr. McCone:

I am pleased to transmit Ambassador Reischauer's telegram to you in which he expresses his high opinion of Mr. Robert P. Wheeler, the acting Station Chief in Tokyo. In particular, the Ambassador cites Mr. Wheeler for his assistance with the recent case of the two Soviet musician defectors.

Sincerely,

George Denney

George C. Denney Jr.
Acting

Attachment:
Telegram 586, copy 2.

Mr. John A. McCone
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency,
Langley, Virginia

SECRET

14-00000

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

34-31
Action
INRD
Info
RMR

SECRET

CONTROL: 13542
RECD: AUGUST 17, 1964
6:19 A.M.

FROM: TOKYO

ACTION: SECSTATE 586

DATE: AUGUST 17, 2 P.M.

ROGER CHANNEL

002

PERSONAL FOR MCCONE FROM REISCHAUER

WE WILL BE REPORTING IN ANOTHER FORM OUR ANALYSIS OF THE CASE OF THE TWO SOVIET MUSICIANS. I JUST WANT TO TELL YOU, HOWEVER, THAT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THE RESULTS WE DID IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR PETE WHEELER. HE WAS ON THE JOB WITHIN MINUTES AFTER THE MEN WALKED IN, GOT HIS RUSSIAN SPEAKING PEOPLE WORKING QUICKLY, AND HELPED TO HANDLE THE WHOLE AFFAIR WITH EFFICIENCY AND DISPATCH. HIS EXPERIENCE IN JAPAN AND THE CONFIDENCE WHICH THE JAPANESE AUTHORITIES SHOWED IN WORKING WITH HIM WERE A DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE DEFINITE CHANGE WHICH TOOK PLACE OVER THE WEEKEND IN THE JAPANESE ATTITUDE ON HOW TO HANDLE CASES LIKE THIS.

HIS CONTRIBUTION HAS BEEN MAJOR AND THE RESULTS WILL BE LONG-LIVED. THIS IS ONLY ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE SERVICE WHEELER HAS PERFORMED HERE OVER THE YEARS. WE ARE SORRY TO SEE HIM LEAVE AND WILL MISS HIM VERY MUCH.

GP-1.

REISCHAUER

BA

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

Supplement to Staff Employee Personnel

Action for Integration of Robert F. Wheeler

Effective 8 May 1959

The purpose of this memorandum is to call your attention to existing policies which are particularly material to you while you are integrated and to set forth certain rights and obligations which are incident to your status as an appointed employee. It is hereby agreed and understood that:

1. As an employee of this organization, at the present grade and salary of GS-15 $12,770 per annum, you will accept cover employment with another instrumentality of the Government (hereinafter referred to as "your cover facility") effective as of 8 May 1959. You will, insofar as consistent with your basic responsibility to this organization, abide by all the rules, regulations, practices and policies of your cover facility, in order to appear as a conventional member of that establishment. Your appointment to your cover facility is being effected at FSR-3 and salary of $11,660 per annum. You are prohibited, except as specifically authorized herein, from retaining emoluments paid by your cover facility.

2. It is understood and agreed that the minimum period of your overseas tour of duty is governed by and coincident with the prescribed tour of duty of your cover organization. Currently, your prescribed tour consists of a period of 24 Months from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty. Your assignment may be terminated earlier for the convenience of this organization and the length of your tour of duty, as currently specified, may be unilaterally changed by this organization in order to conform with subsequent changes in the prescribed tour of your cover facility. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed the minimum period of service prescribed above from the date of arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will not be entitled to return travel or transportation for yourself or your dependents to the United States at Government expense. If you request termination of your overseas assignment solely for your own convenience, unless it is for circumstances that are considered by this organization to be beyond your control or if you are terminated for cause under the regulations of this organization before you have completed one (1) year of service from the date of your arrival at your overseas post of duty, you will be required to reimburse the Government for all of its expenses for your travel and transportation, and that of your dependents, from the continental United States to such overseas post of duty.

SECRET

3. Travel to your post of duty overseas and your return travel to the United States, as well as travel performed overseas which is consistent with your cover designation, will normally be at the direction of your cover facility. Such travel will be accomplished in conformance with applicable regulations of your cover facility except when you are directed for operational reasons to perform travel in accordance with the regulations of this organization.

4. Salary and (except as provided in paragraph three (3) above) allowances paid by your cover facility shall be retained by you to the extent that they are less than or equal to the salary and allowance payments due on the basis of your grade level with this organization. If such cover payments are less than the amount due, the difference will be credited to your payroll account with this organization. If such cover payments exceed the amount due, the overage will be remitted to this organization at designated intervals, presently (months if applicable). Computations hereunder will be made on the basis of the aggregate gross due and received provided, however, that in computing remittances for overage Federal and, if applicable, District of Columbia income taxes withheld by your cover facility against the overage may be deducted. To assure timely accuracy in your payroll account with this organization you are expected to immediately report cover facility payroll changes.

5. Your status as an employee of this organization will continue in full force and effect during your period of duty with your cover facility and you will continue to be entitled to all rights, benefits and emoluments of such status. Certain variations in procedure will be required, however, to preserve the security of your cover position.

a. Upon integration into your cover facility, you will continue to be covered by the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act, as amended, and at your personal expense you will be subject to payroll deductions for retirement purposes (now six and one-half percent) on the basis of your cover salary or your salary from this organization, whichever is the greater.

b. If you receive taxable income from both your cover facility and this organization, necessary adjustments for Federal, and if applicable, District of Columbia income tax purposes will be made in conformance with instructions received from this organization.

c. Consistent with your cover activity, you will continue to be responsible for compliance with the rules and regulations of this organization.

d. You are not assured upon the completion of your period of duty with your cover facility of any status with your cover based on your services performed with that organization at the request of this organization.

1535

SECRET

14-00000

e. A portion of your annual and all of your sick leave which has accrued to your credit at the time of your integration shall be transferred to your cover facility. The remainder of your annual leave will be held by this organization in escrow pending the completion of your integration. If the sum of your accumulated annual leave with your cover facility and this organization exceeds the maximum accumulation entitlement afforded you under the regulations of this organization, the excess will be forfeited. If possible, such forfeiture will be accomplished by reducing the leave credit in your escrow account with this organization. While integrated, you will be permitted annual leave, sick leave, home leave, and leave without pay in accordance with the regulations of your cover facility in lieu of the leave benefits of this organization. Upon completion of your integration, your accrued annual and sick leave will be transferred to your credit with this organization. If security conditions require that your cover facility make a lump-sum payment for accrued annual leave, you will be required to pay the gross amount thereof to this organization including income taxes withheld by your cover facility.

6. You will be required to keep forever secret this agreement and all other information which you may obtain by reason hereof, unless you are released in writing by this organization from this obligation. Violation of such secrecy may subject you to criminal prosecution under the Espionage Laws, dated 25 June 1948, as amended, and other applicable laws and regulations. The termination of your employment with this organization will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY [signature]
Personnel Office

ACCEPTED:

[signature]

SECRET

15 OCT 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Report of Gifts

REFERENCE: Memo for D/Pers from C/FE dtd 25 Sept 58, Subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel

Referenced memorandum reports the receipt of gifts by several Agency employees from recent visitors. These gifts are determined to be of insignificant intrinsic value and may be retained by the recipients for whatever use they desire.

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
0 & 1 - Addressee
1 - Ex O-DD/P
1 - Recorder, BAB
1 - D/Sec
1 - D/Pers Subject File
1 - D/Pers Reader Chrono
1 - Subjects' Files
Satoshi Hagase
William V. Broe
Robert H. Wheeler
William H. Cantor
Joseph C. Trabulsi

OD/Pers/RMDonald:mn (10 Oct 58)

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

4-2108

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
Attn: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from three Cabinet Research Chamber visitors during their recent visit to Washington:

	Approx. value
Satoshi Nagano	
Box of nori	$2.00
Set of chopsticks (laquered)	.75
William V. Broe	
1 woodblock print	1.50
Robert P. Wheeler	
Box of nori	2.00
William M. Center	
1 woodblock prints	3.00
Nageeb G. Trabulsi	
Woodblock print	1.50
1 jar Japanese sauce	.50

Signed Robert P. Wheeler
DESMOND FITZGERALD
Chief, Far East Division

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

31 OCT 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Far East Division

SUBJECT: Gift from Foreign National

REFERENCE: Memo to D/Pers from C/FE dated 22 Oct 57, subject: Gifts to Agency Personnel (DD/P 3-5838)

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated 22 October 1957 concerning the following gifts received by Agency personnel from FUJII Gaichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5"x8" charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., C/FE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John M. Maury, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Uberman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward H. Korn, C/FE-1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul E. Breitweiser, C/FE-6	picture
John R. Horton, C/FE-2/RO	picture
George E. [illegible], C/SR-5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/ICD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, OCI	picture
[illegible] C. [illegible], FE-1	pearl tie pin
Chester H. Ito, FE-1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand-painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Under the provisions of Regulation 20-[illegible], dated 10 October 195[illegible], it is my determination that these gifts are of such insignificant intrinsic value that they may be retained and utilized to whatever benefit desired.

Gordon M. Stewart
Director of Personnel

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DD/P
1 - D/Sec w/basic
1 - IAD w/basic
1 - Each individual's file w/basic
1 - OP Files: Foreign Awards and Decorations
1 - D/Personnel Reader Chrono
DD/Pers/[illegible] (30 Oct 57)

SECRET

27 ... 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

VIA: Director of Security
ATTN: Chief, Policy Staff

SUBJECT: Gifts to Agency Personnel

REFERENCE: Field Regulation 20-644

1. The following Agency personnel received gifts as noted from FUJII Goichiro, Director General of the Public Safety Investigation Agency, Japan, during his recent visit to Washington:

Allen W. Dulles, DCI	a 5' x 8' charcoal drawing
Desmond Fitzgerald, C/FE	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr., CFE	painted scroll (kakemono)
John M. Maury, Jr., C/SR	picture
Robert P. Wheeler, FE/PI/CI	incense burner
Katherine Sherman, FE/PO/PP	fan, picture and piece of brocade
Edward E. Horn, CFE/1	painted scroll (kakemono)
Paul B. Breitweiser, CFE/6	picture
John R. Horton, CFE/2/EO	picture
George E. Bolie, C/SR/5	picture
Lothar Metzl, C/CI/IOD	picture
Paul A. Chretien, CFE	picture
Nageeb G. Trabulsi, FE/1	pearl tie pin
Chester H. Ito, FE/1	2 silk scarfs, 1 hand painted tie and painted scroll (kakemono)

2. Additional gifts of small pictures were left by FUJII to be given to those people whom he did not meet but who worked behind the scenes to make his visit a pleasant one. No listing is believed necessary of these items or their recipients.

ALFRED C. ULMER, Jr.
Chief, Far East Division

Distribution:
2 - Director of Personnel
1 - Director of Security

SE[illegible]T

FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

DO NOT COMPLETE — FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF SIGNATURES AND VERIFICATION OF ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW:

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (true)	DATE (from item 1)	NAME OF SUPERVISOR (true)	DATE (from item 2)
Robert P. WHEELER	9 Nov 1955	Harry W. LITTLE, Jr.	9 Nov 1955

NAME AND SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE SIGNATURES AND VERIFY DATA IN ITEMS NOS. 1 THROUGH 7, BELOW.	DATE
William E. NELSON, Chief, FE/1	19 Dec 1955

TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE

1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. GRADE	3. CURRENT POSITION TITLE
4 October 1915	GS-14	Chief, Liaison
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION (if known)	5. CURRENT STATION OR FIELD BASE	
DI	Japan Base	ETA - 18 [illegible] 56
6. OTHER DUTY STATIONS OR FIELD BASES DURING CURRENT TOUR		7. EXPECTED DATE OF DEPARTURE
None		1 June 1956

8. WRITE A DESCRIPTION OF YOUR MAJOR DUTIES DURING THE CURRENT TOUR OF DUTY (see special note on Transmittal Form):

Formerly Deputy Chief of Mission; formerly Deputy Chief of Mission, KUTUBE and Chief, Mission Liaison; currently, Chief, Liaison, Japan Base. Current assignment involves responsibility for all Base Liaison activities with all Japanese agencies and Department of Defense agencies represented in Japan. Current assignment also involves case officer responsibilities for two KUTUBE operations and one developmental KUTUBE operation. Japanese contacts, to whom I represent KUBARK, range from the Prime Minister to case officers in various Japanese security and police agencies.

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT:

A. WRITE A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE TYPE OF WORK YOU WOULD PREFER FOR YOUR NEXT ASSIGNMENT IF IT DIFFERS FROM THAT INDICATED IN ITEM NO. 8, ABOVE. IF YOU HAVE MORE THAN ONE PREFERENCE, INDICATE YOUR CHOICES.

B. INDICATE WHAT TRAINING YOU BELIEVE YOU SHOULD HAVE IN ORDER TO INCREASE YOUR VALUE TO THE ORGANIZATION (refer to catalog of courses, if available):

1. Advanced CE course
2. Operational Security course

22 Dec 5[illegible]

FORM NO. 202
1 SEP 54

[illegible] / DI [illegible] SECRET [illegible] (4)

SECRET

9. PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT (continued)

C. INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT BY INSERTING NUMBERS 1, 2 AND 3 (for 1st, 2nd and 3rd choice) IN THE BOXES BELOW:

[1] RETURN TO MY CURRENT STATION

[2] BE ASSIGNED TO HEADQUARTERS FOR A TOUR OF DUTY

[3] BE ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION

WITH RESPECT TO A POSSIBLE REASSIGNMENT TO ANOTHER FIELD STATION, INDICATE YOUR 1ST, 2ND AND 3RD CHOICE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREA OR SPECIFIC STATION: See attachment.

1ST CHOICE:

2ND CHOICE:

3RD CHOICE:

10. HOW MUCH LEAVE DO YOU DESIRE BETWEEN ASSIGNMENTS?

INDICATE NUMBER OF WORK DAYS

11. INDICATE THE NUMBER AND AGE OF DEPENDENTS WHO WILL BE TRAVELLING OR MOVING WITH YOU:

7 dependents. Wife - 37, Daughter - 12, Daughter - 7, Daughter and son - 5, Son - 3, Daughter - 1

12. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-1, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF ABOVE PORTION OF THIS FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY SUPERVISOR AT FIELD STATION

13. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATION, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

14. SIGNATURE: COMPLETE ITEM NO. 5-2, TRANSMITTAL SHEET, TO INDICATE COMPLETION OF THIS PORTION OF THE FORM.

TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROPRIATE SUPERVISOR AT HEADQUARTERS

15. IN CONSIDERATION OF THE PAST EXPERIENCE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE EMPLOYEE, HIS EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR NEXT ASSIGNMENT, AND THE STAFFING REQUIREMENTS OF THE DIVISION TO WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY ASSIGNED, INDICATE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIS NEXT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINING:

Despite subject's lack of formal Headquarters assignment we feel for overriding operational reasons he should be returned to the field for another tour.

16. NAME OF SUPERVISOR: William E. NELSON	SIGNATURE:
TITLE: Chief, FE/1	DATE:

17. REMARKS (additional comment)

SECRET

14-00000

ATTACHMENT TO FIELD REASSIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE:

Re Paragraph C - Preference for Next Assignment:

1. I would like to state that while a tour at Headquarters should be my preference I believe that for me to leave my current assignment at this time for even one year would not be in the best interests of either KUBARK or ODYOKE. Therefore, I request home leave, with approximately one month at Headquarters for requested training and refresher work and one month of leave, returning to current assignment for at least an additional two-year tour with the proviso that after the first year the situation be re-examined with the ultimate view of possibly at that point considering a two-year tour at Headquarters.

2. In my years in work on Japan, approximately ten of which have been spent consecutively in Japan, I feel that I have been able to provide a certain degree of intelligence continuity which could be spoiled by a two-year break. Realizing that career-wise I should spend at least one tour at Headquarters in the future, I believe that, despite possible reflections against my career, that two year period should be delayed until (a) KUBARK is better established in Japan and (b) the Japanese governmental and economic situations are on more stable grounds. I believe that I can play a major role in both those situations, not because I have any special talent to offer but simply because I have the continuity which KUBARK as such lacks in Japan.

3. I believe that by experience, training and inclination I can better serve KUBARK in this country in the type of work in which I am now engaged than by any other assignment currently known to me.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

Combined Personnel Action in lieu of SF-52.

Change of Service Designation from D to DI.

Effective date: 19 June 1955

	GRADE
Office of DDP	
TOD, Roy S.	15
CI	
BURKE, Paul J.	14
DOUGLASS, John F.	13
MULLIN, Edward [illegible].	13
PENDLEY, Robert L.	13
EE	
HOLTZ, Oscar W.	13
HUGHES, Frank W.	13
FE	
KITCHENS, Henry G.	13
LALL[illegible], John F.	13
WHEELER, Robert [illegible]	14
NEA	
ANDREWS, E. Wyllys	15
BOWLING, Robert, Jr.	13
WE	
FULLER, Benjamin, II	14
SITRA, Alphonse G.	13
VANDERVOORT, Benjamin H.	14
WALSH, Rutherford T.	13

[stamp] ... 6/15/55

Robert A. Strickler by John J. Caldwell 10 June 1955

S-E-C-R-E-T

CONFIDENTIAL

NARRATIVE EVALUATION REPORT

Name: [redacted] GS-14   Period Covered: 1 June 1953 to 1 June 1954

Occasion for report: Annual X ; reassignment of reporting officer ____ ; proposed reassignment of employee reported on ____ ; covering initial 90 days of employment ____ .

Employee is to be rated upon following factors:

1. Knowledge of the job being performed.
2. Judgment in arriving at logical and workable solutions.
3. Dependability, not only in being on the job, but in accomplishment of assigned tasks within reasonable deadlines.
4. Stability under pressure and ability to adjust to changing conditions and circumstances.
5. Imagination, initiative, and originality.
6. Security consciousness.
7. Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others.

IN FAIRNESS TO EMPLOYEES, COMPLETED NARRATIVE EVALUATIONS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED WITH EMPLOYEE CONCERNED

1. Employee is well qualified in substantive fields concerning Japan and the long background of FEC intelligence activity in this area. This knowledge serves him exceedingly well in the performance of assigned duties. What knowledge he lacks concerning KUBARK policies or procedures is fast being supplied by practical field experience.

2. His judgment at arriving at logical solutions is good under normal conditions, and he generally comes up with solutions which are workable and realistic.

3. He is completely dependable and is particularly sensitive to deadlines, which he makes almost a fetish of meeting. In every sense of the word, he is a man of action in terms of treating with the recurring problems of the station.

4. Employee is somewhat excitable and emotional and, thus, at times of unusual pressure, he may require a steadying hand. This is not a serious fault and is one concerning which the employee is aware. He adjusts well to changing conditions and situations.

5. His imagination, initiative, and originality have shown time and again in his dealings with Army personalities in FEC with whom he has maintained excellent relations on behalf of this Station.

CONFIDENTIAL RYBAT

6. Security consciousness is excellent.

7. Tact and diplomacy in dealing with others is superior.

NOTE: See attached sheet for additional comments by Reviewing Officer

Date: 17 June 1954

Walt D. Newpher
Signature of Reporting Officer
Walter D. NEWPHER

Robert J. Kendall
Signature of Reviewing Officer
Robert J. KENDALL

(If Reviewing Officer or Chief of Station does not concur with this report, exceptions will be stated in space provided below)

CONFIDENTIAL

1. While the Reviewing Officer concurs generally with statements made in this report, it is felt that the over-all impression does not give Subject as much credit as he deserves. In the opinion of the Reviewing Officer, Subject's faults are somewhat over-emphasized. Subject's qualities as exhibited during past months have proven to be outstanding, particularly in his excellent judgement in arriving at logical and workable solutions and in his stability under operational exigencies in which Subject has performed exceedingly well under heavy pressures of both time and responsibility.

2. Working in an area where, in the past, there has been an unfortunate number of misunderstandings between KUFIRE and KUCOAN components, and where there have been the usual difficult personality conflicts, Subject has exhibited not only superior tact and diplomacy, but has also been able to smooth out many difficulties, and modify aggressively offensive actions. He has supplied a needed cooperative spirit and sense of humor to prevent, in many cases, serious antagonisms and unnecessary vituperation so detrimental to a smooth working organization. Subject's contribution to bringing about a friendly, cooperative relationship within the mission and with outside agencies including U.S. military organizations cannot be praised too highly.

14-00000

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. PJJA-1279

TO : Chief, FE
Through: Senior Representative, Tokyo
FROM : Chief, JCU

DATE: 17 AUG 1953

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative - Personnel
SPECIFIC- [redacted], Commendation of
Mr. Robert P. WHEELER

1. The purpose of this dispatch is to make a matter of record the excellence of performance of duties demonstrated by [redacted] over the period of his first ten months of assignment to JCU.

2. During that time [redacted] has shown himself to be a valuable addition to KUBARK as a whole and a great asset to this particular station. As JCU Chief of Staff, he has performed innumerable tasks in the operational, intelligence and support fields with effectiveness and dispatch. His aggressiveness, imagination and initiative in spite of recurring frustration have been an inspiration to all members of JCU. His diligence and selflessness have set an example throughout the ranks. From the first day of his arrival in JCU, [redacted] has dedicated his every effort to improving the efficiency and broadening the capability of the station.

3. [redacted] should be especially commended for his unceasing efforts in connection with the provision of new office space for this organization. Working tactfully but aggressively through the Army hierarchy here in Tokyo, he was able to accomplish many concessions of direct benefit to JCU which would have been most difficult to obtain through official channels.

4. Special mention should also be made of the excellent progress [redacted] has made in the fostering of truly cooperative and productive relationships with the various intelligence elements of the Far East Command. Capitalizing on a wide range of friends and former associates and combining a large portion of common sense and patience, [redacted] may be credited with the development of highly profitable JCU relations with military organizations in the area.

5. [redacted] has shown no task to be too large or too small to deserve his range of energy and talent. He has been a vital factor in the accomplishments of JCU to date.

15 August 1953

Walter D. NEWPHER

Distribution:
3 - Headquarters
1 - Sr. Rep, Tokyo

SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on OCT 1 1951 (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(NAME)

Robert P. Wheeler

FORM NO. 81-121
DEC 1951

(6)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

(Department or agency) (Bureau or division) (Place of employment)

I, Robert Prentiss Wheeler, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

22 September 1952
(Date of entrance on duty)

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
(Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 22nd day of September, A. D. 1952

at Tokyo (City) Japan (State)

[SEAL]

[illegible]
(Signature of officer)

Administrative Assistant
(Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

14-00000

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (*street and number, city and State*)
Great Heights #512 Tokyo, Japan (DRS, Hq. FEC / FEC 500)

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: 4 October 1915
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (*city or town and State or country*): Fitzgerald, Georgia

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: Adelia Callaway Wheeler
(B) RELATIONSHIP: wife
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: DRS, Hq. FEC / APO 500
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: 86-5303

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (*Give street number, if any*)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS, OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members of family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases are to be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

14-00000

Date 23 SEPTEMBER 1952

Name Robert P. Wheeler

Dear Mr. Wheeler:

1. This is to notify you that your employment has been accepted effective 28 SEPTEMBER 1952.

Position: I. O. GS-14

Base Salary: $9600.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave (only in accordance with existing rules and regulations.)

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with this Agency's regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside the Headquarters Area, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by regulations of this Agency.

3. As a condition of your employment by this Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the Headquarters Area. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by this Agency, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the Headquarters Area for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to a post outside the Headquarters Area, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first post outside the Headquarters Area, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by this Agency and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of six months from date of employment. In the event either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by this Agency, you will be offered other types of employment if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of this Agency. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by existing rules and regulations.

Walter D. Neupper
Chief of Station

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by this Agency.

Robert Prentiss Wheeler
Employee

23 September 1952
Date

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER (First) Robert (Middle) P.

2. DATE 29 November 1957

3. TO POSITION

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE

5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- [ ] Departmental
- [ ] U.S. State
- [ ] Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- [ ] EOD
- [ ] Overseas
- [ ] Returnee
- [ ] Pre-Employment
- [x] Annual
- [ ] Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- [ ] Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- [ ] Disqualified

Remarks:

QUALIFIED FOR CURRENT DUTIES ... 1957

MEDICAL OFFICER

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

MEDICAL ACTION REQUEST AND REPORT

I REQUEST FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION BY OPD

1. NAME (Last) WHEELER, (First) ROBERT (Middle) P.

2. DATE 7 Sept. 1956

3. TO POSITION I.O.

4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH FE

5. GRADE GS-14

6. TYPE OF POSITION
- [ ] Departmental
- [ ] U.S. State
- [ ] Overseas

7. EVALUATE FOR
- [ ] EOD
- [ ] Overseas
- [x] Returnee
- [ ] Pre-Employment
- [ ] Annual
- [ ] Special (Specify)

II REPORT OF MEDICAL EVALUATION
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (General)
- [ ] Qualified for Departmental Duty Only
- [ ] Qualified for Full Duty (Special)
- [ ] Disqualified

Remarks:

Subject is qualified for Departmental Duties. (9/13/56)
To be re-evaluated upon request.

MEDICAL OFFICER

RE..RT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss #1

DATE: 1/5/53

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION

TITLE OF POSITION

GRADE

[ ] DEPT. [ ] FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND [ ] FIT [ ] UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

[ ] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [X] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

NON-ARDUOUS O/S DUTIES.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-92 NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-92 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

REPORT OF PHYSICAL QUALIFICATIONS

NAME: Wheeler, Robert Prentiss Ret.

DATE: ~~XXXXXX~~ 12/24/52

FOR VOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

NATURE OF ACTION

TITLE OF POSITION

GRADE

[ ] DEPT. [ ] FIELD

SUBJECT FOUND [ ] FIT [ ] UNFIT FOR DUTY IN THE ABOVE GRADE AND POSITION.

FOR UNVOUCHERED EMPLOYEE ONLY

SUBJECT QUALIFIED FOR:

[ ] FULL DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] LIMITED DUTY OVERSEAS [ ] DUTY IN USA ONLY

PROFILE SERIAL (MILITARY ONLY) [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]

DEFECTS NOTED AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS:

Returnee examination O.K.

PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-92 NOV 1951 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 37-92 AND 37-57, WHICH MAY BE USED. (28)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD	GRADE
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	Oct 1915	D	GS-17

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH | 4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION | 6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP | 8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES) | 9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 7-69 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

	NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			APR 10 3 24 PM '72					
2.								

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY: ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

	NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.				
2.				
3.				

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
7 APR 1972	Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	Wheeler, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE
			☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO -	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.							
2.							

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
3. DATE OF BIRTH
4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION
6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
7. CITIZENSHIP
8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)
9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

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SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.		MAR 22	9 43 AM '71				
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM.
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE
2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK
3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION
4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED
5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT
6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 17 MAR 1971

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

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SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
060947	WHEELER, Robert P.	4 Oct 1915	D

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
3. DATE OF BIRTH
4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION
6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
7. CITIZENSHIP
8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)
9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 10-63 444n USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.			APR 24	2 15	PM '70		
2.							

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS — MAIL ROOM

1. TYPING (WPM)	2. SHORTHAND (WPM)	3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
		☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO	2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS	4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE	2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK	3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT	6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	
			RESIDENT
			AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
		FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4/23/70	Robert B. McCabe

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

Wheeler, Robt P.

QUALIFICATIONS SYSTEM RECORD CHANGE

APPLICANT CODING DATA

1. ID	2. APPL. NO.	3. NAME
< 2	6-DIGITS	MUST CONTAIN 20-DIGITS

4. DATE OF BIRTH			5. DATE CODED		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR

THE DATA ABOVE (ITEMS 2 THRU 5) WILL BE FILLED IN WHEN CODING AN APPLICANT FOR THE FIRST TIME. THIS FORM IS THEN ATTACHED TO FORM 1962, MASTER QUALIFICATIONS CODING RECORD.

LANGUAGE CODING DATA - FORM 444c

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME	4. LANGUAGE DATA CODE							
		3-LETTERS	BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< 3										

5. DATE SUBMITTED			6. DATE OF BIRTH		
MO	DA	YR	MO	DA	YR

WHEN FORM 444c DENOTES NO LANGUAGE COMPETENCE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING IN ITEM 4: "NON-LANGUAGE" (12-DIGITS)

LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST DATA

1. ID	2. EMPLOYEE NO.	3. NAME (3-LETTERS)	4. CODE (C-A-D)	5. LANGUAGE DATA BEFORE TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR
< 5	060947	WHE	C	BS96	0	0	7	0	0	3	69

6. LANGUAGE DATA AFTER TEST: BASE CODE	R	W	P	S	U	T	YR	7. DATE OF TEST: MO	DA	YR
NON	L	A	N	G	U	A	GE	09	02	69

DATA FOR ITEM 2 THRU 7 IS EXTRACTED FROM FORM 1273, LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY AND AWARDS DATA.

QUALIFICATIONS RECORD CHANGE

1. ID	2. EMP/APPL NO.	3. NAME
< 4		3-LETTERS

ENTER UNDER "TYPE" -
- A - ADDITION TO RECORD
- C - CHANGE TO EXISTING RECORD
- D - DELETION OF DATA FROM EXISTING RECORD

TYPE	CODE # 1 BASE	1	2	3	YR	CODE # 2 BASE	1	2	3	YR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LLC

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose. Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444j, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form. If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not. Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH
060 547	WHEELER Robert Prentiss	10/9/15

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM - TO	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1.						
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) (COUNTRY(IES))	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

	NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1.	☐ ADD ☒ DELETE WHEELER, Rosella C.	Daughter	1/26/45 Tokyo, Japan	USA	
2.	☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

FORM 444n — SECRET — (4-31)

8 9 MAY 1970

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(When Filled In)

SECTION V — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY—CHECK (X) RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	POST ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
APR 22 9 12 AM '68
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) | 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) | 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED—CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER (SPECIFY)

SECTION VII — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII — MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO
2. NEW CLASSIFICATION
3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS
4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE | 2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK | 3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT | 6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	☐ RESIDENT ☐ AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X — REMARKS

DATE: 4/18/68

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert P. [illegible]

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled in)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
060947	WHEELER ROBERT P		10/04/15	GS-16-04

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	IC PROGRAM EVAL	OPPB	WASH., D.C.

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	52/09/01	56/06/01
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	PCS RR	64/08/26	66/08/12
Japan	PCS 59	59/06/15	64/05/26
USA	PCS 56	56/06/15	59/06/18

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 31 MAY 67 INITIALS: [illegible]

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREES	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
BACH	POLITICAL SCIENCE (GOVERNMENT), GENERAL	CAL UNIV Berkeley	40
MSTR	INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, GENERAL	GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV DC	46

FORM 1-67 444

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8 JUN ENTD

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY (CHECK): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan	Economic, political, cultural						
		1946-56		X	X	XXX	X
		59-65					

SECTION V

TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card punch, etc.)

SECTION VI

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

Photography - fair, all phases

2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES, SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC? ☐ YES ☒ NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. (Include license registry number if known)

5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECRET

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SECTION IX — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:

2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)

3. DATE OF BIRTH | 4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)

5. OCCUPATION | 6. PRESENT EMPLOYER

7. CITIZENSHIP | 8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S), COUNTRY(IES) | 9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION X — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
Robert Prentiss Wheeler, Jr	Son	2/15/51 Tokyo	USA	Bethesda, Maryland
Melissa S. "	Daughter	2/15/51 Tokyo ~~xx/xx/xx~~	USA	" "
Charles Slayton "	Son	2/11/53 Tokyo	USA	" "
Mary S. "	Daughter	2/16/55 Tokyo	USA	" "

SECTION XI — PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
3/22/67	Robert P. Wheeler

14-00000

This form was completed by subject in pseudonym. We have deleted ~~as~~ pseudo. However, if it is not acceptable ~~[illegible]~~ as is, we will request another one from the field.

A. Tallackson
x-3332

FEDERAL AND MILITARY SERVICE

...ermining creditable service for *leave purposes* and retention credits ... complete Part I and the Personnel Office should complete Parts II

PART II.—THIS COLUMN IS FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE

2. DATE OF BIRTH: 4 October 1915

9. RETENTION GROUP

10. CSC STATUS (*For permanent employees only*) ☐ YES ☐ NO

...RICT OF COLUMBIA SERVICE YOU HAVE HAD ...) PRIOR TO YOUR PRESENT APPOINTMENT

NAME AND LOCATION OF AGENCY	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TYPE OF APPOINTMENT IF KNOWN
Department of the Army Tokyo, Japan ✓	1948 / 1948	June / 6	18 / 18	52 / 1952	Sept / 9	27 / 27	Excepted Appointment ✓
CIA	1952	9	28				SCD: 8-6-42 Verified 4-19-57 [illegible]

11. SERVICE

YEAR	MONTH	DAY

4. LIST PERIODS OF SERVICE IN ANY BRANCH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. IF YOU HAD NO MILITARY SERVICE, WRITE "NONE."

BRANCH	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	DISCHARGE (*Hon. or dishon.?*)
U. S. Navy	42	8	6	46	6	15	Inactive status

12. TOTAL SERVICE

5. DURING PERIODS OF EMPLOYMENT SHOWN IN ITEM 3, DID YOU HAVE A TOTAL OF MORE THAN 6 MONTHS ABSENCE WITHOUT PAY, INCLUDING PERIODS OF MERCHANT MARINE SERVICE, DURING ANY ONE CALENDAR YEAR? ☐ YES ☒ NO
IF ANSWER IS "YES," LIST FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

TYPE IF KNOWN (*LWOP, Furl, Susp, AWOL, Mer Mar*)	FROM— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TO— YEAR	MONTH	DAY	TOTAL YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS

13. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*Leave purposes only*):

14. NONCREDITABLE SERVICE (*RIF purposes only*):

6. DURING THE FEDERAL SERVICE LISTED IN ITEM 3, DID YOU ACQUIRE A PERMANENT COMPETITIVE CIVIL SERVICE STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO
(*If answer is "Yes," in what agency were you employed at the time status was acquired?*)

15. REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

16. RETENTION RIGHTS ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. EXPIRATION DATE OF RETENTION RIGHTS

7. ARE YOU:
A. THE WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
B. THE MOTHER OF A DECEASED OR DISABLED VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO
C. THE UNREMARRIED WIDOW OF A VETERAN? ☐ YES ☒ NO

8. TO BE EXECUTED BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC OR OTHER PERSONS AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS.
I swear (or affirm) that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(DATE) ——————— /s/ Robert P. Wheeler (SIGNATURE)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this ——— day of ——— (MONTH) 1952 at ——— (CITY) ——— (STATE)

SEAL

NOTE: If oath is taken before a Notary Public, the date of expiration of his Commission should be shown.

(OVER)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT | THIS DATE: SEP

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel records will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

GENERAL

SECTION I

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): WHEELER Robert Prentiss
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): Same
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO 6-6616
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: DISTRICT of Columbia

PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

SECTION II

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: WHEELER Adelia Callaway
2. RELATIONSHIP: Wife
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): Same
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE:
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: WO-6-6616
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER:
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION:
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE.

MARITAL STATUS

SECTION III

1. CHECK (X) ONE: SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [X] WIDOWED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] ANNULLED [ ]
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS: No CHANGE. See last PHS for data re ~~29~~ 1937 annulment

SPOUSE: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME: (First) Adelia (Middle) Belle (Maiden) Callaway (Last) WHEELER
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE: 19 Aug 1939
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
6. ADDRESS OF SPOUSE BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country): 1045 Madison Avenue Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
7. LIVING: YES [X] NO [ ]
8. DATE OF DEATH:
9. CAUSE OF DEATH:
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased): 3616 Rittenhouse St. N.W. Washington 15, D.C.
11. DATE OF BIRTH: 17 Aug 1917
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, U.S.A.
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S., DATE OF ENTRY: N.A.
14. PLACE OF ENTRY: N.A.
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.
16. DATE ACQUIRED: BIRTH
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country): Huntington, West Virginia, USA
18. OCCUPATION: Dental Hygienist
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers): U.S. Army 1946-1947
20. EMPLOYER'S OR BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country): N.A.

CODED FOR QUALIFICATIONS DATE 4 NOV 1959

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE OF SPOUSE (From and To) BY MONTH AND YEAR
N.A.

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE
N.A.

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED
N.A.

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN
Receptionist, CIA, Tokyo, JAPAN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

1
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): Mrs. Charles A. Wheeler
2. RELATIONSHIP: Sister-in-law
3. AGE:
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES: USA
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country): Australia
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT: Three times in 10 years
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT: 1956

2
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

3
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

4
1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)
2. RELATIONSHIP
3. AGE
4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES
5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT
7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES
Re 1above - alien is wife of my brother, U.S. Air Force Lt.Col. C.A. Wheeler, O-5304A. I saw this person in 1945, 1953 and 1956.

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [X] YES [ ] NO

2. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [ ] YES [X] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

3. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 3 ABOVE, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS.

5. WITHOUT REFERENCE TO YOUR SALARY, STATE OTHER SOURCES OF RECURRENT INCOME NOT INDICATED BY PRECEDING ITEMS.
Very limited dividends from mutual fund investment.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

6. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
Riggs National Bank	Conn. Ave, D.C., USA

7. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [ ] YES [X] NO

8. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 7 ABOVE, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. COUNTRY OF CURRENT CITIZENSHIP: U.S.A

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: [X] BIRTH [ ] NATURALIZ. [ ] OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

- [ ] LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
- [ ] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE
- [ ] TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE
- [ ] TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS
- [ ] OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
- [ ] BACHELOR'S DEGREE
- [ ] GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
- [X] MASTER'S DEGREE
- [ ] DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR HRS. COMPLETED (Specify)
MERCER University, Macon, Ga	Science B.C.	Pre-	1934	1937			
University of California, Berkeley Calif.	Poli Sci	Internl Relations	1940	1942	A.B	1942	
University of Colorado, Boulder	JAPANESE (NAV JAP)		1942	1943	Certificate in Japanese		
GeorgeWashington Univ, Wash, D.C.	Intern'l Law & Relations		1944	1946	M.A	1946	

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	TOTAL HOURS

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED FROM	DATES ATTENDED TO	TOTAL WEEKS
University of Colorado (NAV TRAINING JAP)	JAPANESE	June 1942	June 1943	54

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT OTHER THAN ORGANIZATION EXPERIENCE. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE," INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
Japan		Sept 45 - Dec 45 June 46 - June 56	X	X	X	X
Australia		Jan - Sept 45		X		X

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

Australia - Navy duty
JAPAN - Navy duty, DEPTAR civilian employ, CIA station

3. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE GAINED KNOWLEDGE AS A RESULT OF ORGANIZATION ASSIGNMENT OR ACTIVITY.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	HDQTS ASSIGNMENT	FIELD ASSIGNMENT	TRAINING

SECTION IX — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)
2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)
3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: GREGG / SPEEDWRITING / STENOTYPE / OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.) Mimeograph, Thermofax, etc

SECTION X — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH Photography - good-all phases   Tape recording
Hi-fi - handy at setting up, etc.   General radio interests

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION X CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED. Univ of Calif degree w/honors, same at Grad. Belonged to a Pol. Sci Honor Society, name forgotten.

SECTION XI ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): EOD to ~~Nov '53~~ Mar '54
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Deputy Chief, Japan Composite Unit/Tokyo
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

2
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): MAR '54 June '56
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: CFI/Japan Mission/Tokyo ~~and [illegible]~~
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: FI officer for Japan Mission when it succeeded JCU. Instigator of Liaison Activities.

3
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): APR '54 June '56
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: ?
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: CFI & Chief Liaison, JAPAN MISSION, TOKYO
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Continued FI duties and took more active role in liaison as Senior CIA Liaison Officer for Japan.

4
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): Sept '56 Sept '57
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE/1
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 28
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: Various but mainly CFE/1
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

5
1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): SEPT '57 —
2. GRADE: 14
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: DDP/FE
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 12
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: C/FE/FI
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES:

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 6

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING. ▷ 1

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS
Geraldine D. Wheeler	Daughter	1943		✓	USA	3616 Rittenhouse St NW Washington 15, D.C.
Rosella C. "	"	1948		✓	"	"
Robert Prentiss " Jr	Son	1951	X		"	"
Melosia C. "	Daughter	1951		✓	"	"
Charles S. "	Son	1953	X		"	"
MARY SLAYTON "	Daughter	1955		✓	"	"

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Addresses SINCE EOD:
1953-1956 TOKYO, JAPAN
1956-present Washington, D.C.

I believe in my 15 yrs gov't service, Navy, Army Civilian and CIA, I have acquired a fair degree of competence as a manager-executive. In all three agencies I held increasingly responsible managerial positions. In my CIA experience, more than five years, I have handled agents, developed training activities, managed a variety of offices, etc., and have worked [illegible] Division staff [illegible] which should call into play these experiences.

DATE COMPLETED: 10/4/57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Robert Prentiss Wheeler

SECRET

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? Yes

(Yes or No)

SECTION 1. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

A. FULL NAME: Mr. Robert ... [illegible]

PRESENT ADDRESS: [illegible] APO 500 c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.

PERMANENT ADDRESS: 1045 Madison Ave. [illegible] U.S.A.

WHAT OTHER NAMES HAVE YOU USED? [illegible]

UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE YOU USED THESE NAMES?

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

14-00000

2. CHILDREN OR DEPENDENTS (Include partial dependents)

1. NAME Geraldine Dossett Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE [illegible]

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(No. and Street) (City) (State) (Country)

2. NAME Rosella [illegible] Wheeler RELATIONSHIP Daughter AGE 12

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(No. and Street) (City) (State) (Country)

3. NAME Robert Prentiss Wheeler RELATIONSHIP son AGE 4 mos
Melissa Callaway Wheeler daughter 4 mos

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. ADDRESS Same as principal
(No. and Street) (City) (State) (Country)

3. FATHER (Give the same information for stepfather and/or guardian on a separate sheet)

FULL NAME Charles [illegible] [illegible]
(First) (Middle) (Last)

LIVING OR DECEASED Deceased DATE OF DECEASE [illegible] CAUSE [illegible]

ADDRESS, OR LAST ADDRESS [illegible] Avenue, [illegible], Georgia, U.S.A.
(City) (State)

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH [illegible], Georgia

[illegible]

14-00000

MOTHER-IN-LAW

FULL NAME Rosella [illegible] Hendrick [illegible]

[illegible] Alive [illegible]

PRESENT OR LAST ADDRESS 1043 Madison Ave., Huntington, West Va., USA

DATE OF BIRTH [illegible] PLACE OF BIRTH Huntington, West Va., U.S.A.

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY Not applicable

CITIZENSHIP U.S.A. WHEN ACQUIRED? Birth WHERE? See above

OCCUPATION Housewife LAST EMPLOYER Self

10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

NAME [illegible] RELATIONSHIP Sister-in-law [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

Washington, D.C.

ADDRESS

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER ... F.P.O. San Francisco

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON: Not applicable

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS

15. CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST 15 YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. LIST LAST POSITION FIRST. (List all civilian employment by a foreign government, regardless of dates.)

FROM June 1948 TO Present CLASSIFICATION GRADE (IF IN FEDERAL SERVICE) GS-13

EMPLOYING FIRM OR AGENCY U.S. Department of the Army

ADDRESS G-2, GHQ, FEC, APO 500, c/o PM San Francisco (Tokyo, Japan)

KIND OF BUSINESS [illegible] NAME OF SUPERVISOR [illegible]

TITLE OF JOB Intelligence Specialist [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

14-00000

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK FAIR READ FAIR WRITE FAIR

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ FAIR WRITE [illegible]

LANGUAGE [illegible] SPEAK [illegible] READ [illegible] WRITE [illegible]

LIST ALL SPORTS AND HOBBIES WHICH INTEREST YOU. INDICATE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN EACH.

[illegible]

14-00000

HAVE YOU A PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO WORK? IF ANSWER IS "YES," EXPLAIN:

No

DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? IF ANSWER IS "YES," GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS:

[illegible] WHO KNOW [illegible]

[illegible] Washington, D.C.

[illegible] Arlington, Virginia

[illegible] Washington, D.C.

[illegible] Arlington, Va.

[illegible] Pentagon [illegible] Washington, D.C.

[illegible] Navy Dept. [illegible] Washington, D.C.

[illegible] NAMES OF FIVE PERSONS WHO KNOW YOU SOCIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES [illegible] NOT REFERENCES, RELATIVES, SUPERVISORS, OR EMPLOYERS [illegible]

14-00000

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14-00000

[illegible] Present or Last Address: [illegible]
Date of Birth: [illegible] 1918 [illegible] Place of Birth: Bridgeport, Conn.
[illegible] I have never mentioned this marriage [illegible] was [illegible] annulment in the Superior Court of the State of California, San Francisco City and County, 10 May 19[illegible].
[illegible] This marriage was not known to anyone but the principals and the officials who performed the marriage and the annulment. Neither set of parents and few if any friends have ever known of it. Any investigation at this late date would only be the source of needless embarrassment to all concerned. Miss Taylor, as far as I know, has long since married and I have had no contact with her since Feb 19[illegible].
If there are further questions, it would be appreciated if only I am approached. There is nothing to hide or to be ashamed of, but there is a lot of unnecessary embarrassment that can so easily be avoided.
Re Sec. 5 My father was born in Coaticook, Quebec, while his mother was visiting there, so I have always understood. Both of his parents were US Citizens and he was the 10th generation in the US. He had some military service in the Spanish-American War, but I am totally ignorant of any details.
Re Sec 12 College: University of Colorado Address: Boulder, Colo. Dates Attended: June 1942-June 1943 (NTSCH JAP LAN) Certificate of Completion. College: George Washington University ADDRESS: Washington, D.C. 1945-46-4[illegible] B.A.
Re Sec 14 [illegible] Under heading of duties: My work with the Army in Japan is of necessity classified but my job description of Military Intelligence Specialist [illegible] a good idea of the work in general.
[illegible] Also under the heading of duties the work in the Navy was even more classified and I am not at liberty [illegible] information can be obtained [illegible] Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
[illegible]

14-00000

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

Field	Value
REQUEST NO. (1-6)	42076
REQUEST DATE (6-11)	5 Aug 66
NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE)	Wheeler, Robert P.
YEAR OF BIRTH	1915
POSITION TITLE	IO- Program Eval.
POSITION NUMBER	
OCCUP. CODE	
GRADE	GS-16
LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY)	Washington, D.C.
ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH)	DCI/PPB/Planning & Prog. Div/Prog. Anal. Br.
ORGN. CODE	
TYPE OF APPLICANT	REGULAR / CONSULTANT / CONTRACT / MILITARY
CONVERSION ACTION	SA-SE
IF OTHER, SPECIFY	
TYPE OF APPL.	
NAME OF REQUESTER OR OFFICIAL	Dow H. Luetscher, Chief/CPD
TYPE OF ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDS	HQS / USF / FF / V / UV
HDQTRS. & FUND	
CLEARANCE REQUIRED (PROVISIONAL FOR URGENT; NAME OF POOL OR GROUP)	Full Clearance
SECRET / FULL	
CLEARANCE	
ATTACHMENTS	PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT / PHOTOGRAPH(S) / APPENDIX I / APPENDIX II / REQUEST FOR WAIVER / REPORT OF INTERVIEW
RECRUIT. CODE	
VETERANS STATUS	MALE - VETERAN / MALE - NON-VETERAN / FEMALE - VETERAN / FEMALE - NON-VETERAN
VET. PREF. & SEX	

Security #: 60164

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Jo Ann Varney
5 8 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

FORM 3-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(MFG. 5-65) (9)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECURITY APPROVAL

DATE : 30 July 1966

YOUR REFERENCE: 42076

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Director of Personnel

ATTN : Jo Ann Varney

SUBJECT : WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to inform you that Subject has been approved for the appointment specified in your request under the provisions of Headquarters Regulations 10-3 and 20-5 including access to classified information through TOP SECRET as required in the performance of duties.

2. Unless arrangements are made for entrance on duty within 150 days, this approval becomes invalid.

3. As part of the entrance on duty processing:

[ ] A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged.

[XX] A personal interview is not necessary.

[ ] Please advise Chief, Clearance Branch, extension 5620 when Subject enters on duty.

4. This is a Conversion case.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY:

Steven L. Kuhn
Chief, Personnel Security Division

FORM 9-66 1173 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

STAFF AGENT CLEARANCE

DATE : 9 November 1964

YOUR REFERENCE: 15100

CASE NO. : 60164

TO : Chief, Contract Personnel Division

ATTN. : Staff Agents Branch

SUBJECT : [illegible]. (P)

1. This is to advise that a security clearance is granted for the employment of the Subject as a Staff Agent, GS-16, by DDP/DCD in the capacity of Operations Officer at Honolulu, Hawaii.

2. If your office should desire at a later date to change the status or use of the Subject, a request to cover any proposed change should be submitted to this office.

3. Unless arrangements are made within 60 days for entrance on duty within 120 days, this Approval becomes invalid.

4. As a part of entrance on duty processing:

☐ A personal interview in the Office of Security must be arranged by your office.

☐ A personal interview is not necessary.

☐

W. A. Osborne

W. A. Osborne
CHIEF, PERSONNEL SECURITY DIVISION, OS

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. (1-5)	15100
REQUEST DATE (6-11)	5 Nov 1964
YEAR OF BIRTH	10/04/15
GRADE	GS-16

NAME (LAST - FIRST - MIDDLE): [redacted] (P)

POSITION TITLE: Ops Officer

LOCATION (CITY, STATE, COUNTRY): Honolulu, Hawaii

ASSIGNMENT (OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH): DDP/DOD/Honolulu Base

CONVERSION ACTION: SF9SA

NAME OF REQUESTER: Joseph B. Ragan, Chief/CPD

CLEARANCE REQUIRED: COVERT SECURITY CLEARANCE

Security #: 60164

Case Officer: Bill Michael Code 11 x68060

Clearance memo to SA Branch/CPD
Attn: Margo Daish
5 E 69

SPACE BELOW FOR OS USE ONLY

(MFG. 5-61) (9)

FORM 5-61 377 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE 2? May 1959

PROT 9-258

TO : FE
Director of Security
Director of Personnel

FROM : Chief, Communications Security Staff

SUBJECT: Notification of Cryptographic Clearance - Robert P. Wheeler

1. Subject employee has been granted a cryptographic clearance under the provisions of CIA Regulation 90-500. Clearance is effective 25 May 1959.

2. Subject has been informed of the granting of clearance, has been briefed concerning cryptographic and related communications security matters, and has signed a Briefing Statement acknowledging responsibility for the protection of cryptographic information.

3. When Subject employee no longer requires the clearance in order to perform his assigned duties, it is requested that the Communications Security Staff (2411 "I" Bldg., Ext. 3021) be notified by FE, that the clearance may be revoked.

FOR THE CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS:

Chief, Protective Branch

Distribution:
1 - FE
1 - Security Office (Briefing Statement attached)
1 - Personnel Office
1 - OC-S/PROT File

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 1597a
3-59

Sec Ch Wheel

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

dism.

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 28 July 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division

Your Reference: L-5937-A

FROM: Acting Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

[X] Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

[ ] Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

[ ] The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

E. P. Geiss
E. P. GEISS

Not: Lynn
Will EOD in field.
Pouch sent out 17 Mar 52
Branch has cabled field on change of action & papers are to be forwarded back.
8/15/52
BB

EOD per Cable
9/28/52

SECRET
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FORM NO. 38-101
FEB 1952

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Covert Personnel Division

DATE: 8 May 1952

FROM : Chief, Personnel Security Branch

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss - 60164

Reference is made to a memorandum dated 1 May 1952 from Lloyd George, Chief, FE, which is as follows.

"1. Full security clearance was issued 11 March 1952 for Subject's employment in the field as an I.O. (CI) assigned to the Japan Composite Unit.

2. Our field representative advises that Mr. Wheeler is still on duty with the Security Division of G-2, FEC; however, he will be available for assignment to the Japan Composite Unit on or about 15 June 1952.

3. It is therefore requested that Subject's security clearance be extended for a period of sixty days."

This is to advise that the security clearance granted 11 March 1952 is extended to 30 June 1952.

W. A. OSBORNE

SECRET

FD2
68
UV

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 11 March 1952

TO: Chief, Covert Personnel Division   Your Reference: L-5937

FROM: Chief, Security Division   Case Number: 60164

SUBJECT: WHEELER, Robert Prentiss

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

[X] Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

[ ] Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

[ ] The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Called per M. Jones 14 Mar. Retd!

C. V. BROADLEY

Charles P. Michelet

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-101
JUL 1951

14-00000

RECORD OF

PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

SERVICE RETURNED TO

FEDERAL RECORDS CENTER IN

ST. LOUIS, MO.

DATE 1 OCT 1974 [illegible]

14-00000
104-10291-10003
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

SECRET

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: WIROGUE

INCLUSIVE DATES: 24 July 59 - 27 July 1961

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: OP

ROOM: 5E13

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE

MAYCRUNK, Ernest G.

14-00000

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION [illegible]	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [illegible]
TO: Chief, Finance Division Chief, [illegible]		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.
FROM: Chief of Station, Leopoldville		DATE: 27 JULY 1961
SUBJECT: Finance/WIROGUE Transfer of Accountability-[illegible] G. [illegible]		RE: "(3)" - CHECK "X" ONE MARKED FOR INDEXING X NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED: Credit Advance Account		

REFERENCES:

LEOP-1573 DIR-49325
LEOP-1568 LEOP-1599
DIR-48429 DIR-00712

1. On 7 July 1961 WIROGUE was advanced the sum of U. S.$100.00 for living expenses in Brazzaville while awaiting onward transportation to PBPRIME. (DIR-48429 requested WIROGUE return to PBPRIME). This is his only outstanding advance with Leopoldville Station. Receipt attached hereto.

2. DIR-49325 authorized Station to withhold money received from sale of personal car against outstanding advances. However, before his departure WIROGUE accounted for 11,500 BCF over what he owed the Station. The sum of 42,500 BCF from the sale of his automobile plus 11,500 BCF converted at 50/$1.00 (LEOP-1599 and DIR-49325) gave WIROGUE a credit of $1,081.60. In January 1961 WIROGUE was ordered to Thysville by the Station and was authorized $0.10 per mile for use of his personal car, therefore, 312.5 miles times $0.10 equals $31.25 leaving WIROGUE a credit of U. S. $1,112.85. (See attachment).

3. WIROGUE was paid his June salary of $500 on 26 June and also his housing for July ($250.00). (Station was notified on 1 July, DIR-48429 that WIROGUE was to return to PBPRIME). However, July rental was used in the final settlement of the lease for the usual damages claimed by local landlords and in lieu of 30 days termination notice. Receipt forwarded under Voucher: 1153.

4. Accountability in the amount of U. S. $100.00 is herewith transferred to Headquarters plus a credit of $1,112.85. As WIROGUE was specifically told he would have to account for the above $100.00 for living/traveling expenses Station did not subtract that amount from his credit.

Angela B. Desrlecto [illegible]

18 July 1961

Attachments: 1. Receipt for $100, h/w
2. Thysville certification by Outhman, h/w
3. Coquilhatville estimate, h/w
4. Breakdown of advances and accountings, h/w

Distribution:
Hqs - 4, w/a a/s

(Approved)
[illegible signature]
[illegible]

1

1 September 19[illegible]

Mr. [illegible] G. [illegible]

Dear Mr. [illegible]:

Reference is made to your contract with the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, effective [illegible] October 19[illegible].

bob

You are herein formally notified that said contract will be terminated by the Government as of 1 September 1961. You are reminded of the contents of paragraph eleven (11) of said contract, which reads as follows:

> "11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed through instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement."

~~[illegible]~~, You are herein authorized a one-time payment in the amount of $2,[illegible]. ~~[illegible]~~ In full consideration for said payment and effective as of the date of its receipt, you hereby release and forever discharge the United States Government and any agency, department or instrumentality thereof, and all its agents, officers, employees and representatives from any and all claims, demands and liabilities in any form whatsoever throughout the world arising from services performed by you for the United States Government under the contract effective [illegible] October 19[illegible].

Your signature in the space provided below is acknowledgement of the contents hereof.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

BY: OK
Contracting Officer

[illegible]

S

Date: 1-9-61

[illegible] G. [illegible]

WITNESS: [illegible]

APPROVED: Fields
[illegible] Contracting Officer

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Africa Division

SUBJECT : Termination of [illegible] Ernest J. Mayerink

1. Approval is herewith requested to relocate, terminate and make a final severance payment of $2000.00 to [illegible]. In return for this [illegible] will be required to sign a Quit Claim and Secrecy agreement.

2. It is presently planned to relocate subject in Europe, with the Office of Security transporting subject via MATS as far as Frankfurt, from whence he will proceed to any Western European country of his choice and at his expense. The $2000.00 payment will constitute his only assets until he can find gainful employment.

3. There are adequate funds available in the project to cover the termination bonus and transportation to Frankfurt via MATS.

4. Approval is also requested to write off and charge to expense the [illegible] loan given [illegible] of which approximately $3200.00 is still outstanding.

William H. Bunber
C/AF/N/2

Approved:

Amount requested in paragraph one is approved for payment. Based upon cover and operational circumstances, payment is not subject to Federal Income taxes.

JBR

Special Contracting Officer

14-00000

Mr. Ernest G. Maycrink

Dear Mr. Maycrink:

Effective 31 October 1960, all contracts, oral or written, by and between you and the United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, are hereby terminated by mutual consent of the parties thereto, and in lieu thereof the following agreement is substituted.

The United States Government, as represented by the Contracting Officer, hereby contracts with you as an independent contractor for the submission of certain information and related services of a confidential nature under the following terms and conditions:

1. Compensation. In full consideration for the submission of such information and service, you will receive from the Government, payable in such an approved manner as you may direct in writing, the following:

(a) Basic compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $6000 per annum.

(b) Additional compensation in an amount calculated at the rate of $3000 per annum for cost-of-living expenses (including quarters), effective upon your arrival at and applicable only to your contemplated permanent post of assignment overseas. Quarters will not be furnished you nor will you accept quarters provided by a cover facility without prior amendment of this agreement.

OK

2. Taxes. Monies paid you directly or guaranteed by the Government under this paragraph constitute income for Federal tax purposes. You will be advised as to the method to be followed in reporting and paying such taxes. The method as well as the procedures used by this organization to implement its tax reporting responsibilities will be based primarily upon cover and security requirements. You herein authorize this organization to withhold taxes on said income if it determines such requirements so necessitate.

3. Travel. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for travel and transportation expenses to and from your permanent post of duty overseas and for authorized operational travel. You may be entitled to per diem in lieu of subsistence during such travel and, when authorized, while on temporary duty away from your permanent post of assignment. All travel, transportation and per diem provided for under this paragraph must be properly authorized, and expenses incurred hereunder are subject to payment and accounting in substantial compliance with Government regulations.

4. Operational Expenses. You will be advanced or reimbursed funds for necessary operational expenses as specifically approved and financially limited by the Government. Such funds will be subject to payment and accounting in substantial conformance with applicable Government regulations.

5. Repayment. It is recognized that your failure to account for or refund any monies advanced you hereunder shall entitle the Government to withhold the total amount of such indebtedness or any portion thereof from any monies due you under the terms of this contract in such manner as it deems appropriate.

14-00000

6. Negotiated Benefits. (a) (1). If, in the performance of activities un this agreement, you incur an injury or illness which is not the result of y gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intemperate act, the Governme will provide medical, surgical, hospital, transportation and disability be fits in such amounts and under such conditions as the Government in its s discretion deems proper provided, however, that such benefits shall not exceed a total of $5000 for the same injury or illness.

(2) If you die in the performance of acti hereunder and your death is not the result of your gross negligence, will misconduct or intemperate act, the Government will pay the sum of $500 to your beneficiary(ies) less any amount paid to you under sub-paragrapl above if such injury or illness resulted in your death, provided that said beneficiary(ies) is acceptable to the Government at the time such paymer to be made. An acceptable beneficiary hereunder is an individual to who payment by the U.S. Government can be made without conflicting with its avowed principles and ideals.

(b) Outstanding performance by you under th agreement and your fulfillment of obligations hereunder in an efficient m ner will result in the Government undertaking your resettlement in an are mutually agreeable to both parties, to the extent deemed appropriate by the United States Government.

7. Execution of Documents. If, in the performance of services unde this contract, you assume the custody of Government funds or take title record to property of any nature whatsoever and wherever situate, whicl property has in fact been purchased with monies of the U.S. Government you hereby recognize and acknowledge the existence of a trust relationsh either express or constructive, and you agree to execute whatever docu may be required by this organisation to evidence this relationship.

8. Status. You are not an employee of the United States Government under this agreement and are not entitled to any benefits normally incide to an employee status.

9. Funding. If necessary to protect the security of this arrangement monies due you hereunder may be funded in other than a direct manner. is understood and agreed that any monies so funded constitute payment b the Government in satisfaction of its obligations under this agreement.

10. Cover. (a) It is anticipated that you will undertake a cover ventu in the course of your performance under this agreement. Such venture be approved by the appropriate Government representative overseeing y activities prior to its initiation. Any and all documents which you may execute in the course of said cover venture are subordinate to this agree ment and any contradiction in terms which in any way amplify, extend or restrict your rights and/or obligations hereunder shall be resolved by th agreement which shall always be dominant.

(b) To provide capital for your approved cover venture t Government will loan you $4000 to be secured by a non-interest bearing p isory note, payable on demand. Said loan will be deposited to an accoun in a foreign bank and a $3000 letter of credit will be issued you against t deposit. The additional $1000 will be released from said account, after approval by the Government representative overseeing your activities.

(c) You will submit to the Government quarterly income and expense statements on the cover venture and copies of all tax returns filed in connection therewith. Your cover accounts shall be kept separate and distinct from the bank account into which your personal compensation payments are made.

(d) You herein agree that monies loaned you by the Governm shall be repaid from the profits of the cover venture, in amounts and at periodic intervals to be established by the Government representative ove: seeing your activities. After said loan has been completely repaid and all other obligations, such as local taxes, etc., have been made, you may ret any further profit derived from said cover venture. However, it is clearl understood and agreed that your primary obligation under this agreement : the performance of Governmental activities.

11. Secrecy. All information related to this agreement conveyed thr instructions, this instrument, or otherwise, is secret and shall not be divulged to any person, organization or government in any form or manner, except as authorized by the undersigned Contracting Officer executing this agreement. It is agreed that any revelation whatsoever of the above information will constitute and be an immediate and final breach of this agreement and will result in forfeiture by you of any and all benefits which may then have accrued to you by reason of this agreement.

12. Instructions. During the term of this agreement, and in your official cover capacity you herein agree to act in conformance with instructions, oral or written given you by authorized representatives of this orga: zation.

13. Unauthorized Commitments. No promises or commitments pertaining to rights, privileges or benefits other than those expressly stipulat in writing in this agreement or any amendment thereto shall be binding on this organization.

14. Term. This contract is effective as of 1 November 1960, and sha continue thereafter for a period of two (2) years unless sooner terminated by the Government either:

(a) By sixty (60) days' actual notice to you from the Government, or

(b) Without prior notice, in the event of a breach of this contract by your violation of the security provisions hereof or by your otherwise rendering yourself unavailable for acceptable service.

Subject to the availability of appropriations, this agreement may be extend upon notice from the Government. In the event of voluntary termination on your part or termination for cause by the Government prior to the expirati of this agreement or any renewal thereof, you will not be entitled to return travel expenses to the United States. Termination or expiration of this agr ment will not release you from the obligation of any security oath you may be required to take.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN

BY ____________________

Contracting Officer

ACCEPTED:

____

Ernest G. Maycrink

WITNESS: ____________________

APPROVED: ____________________

Dan / / 10 Nov 60

14-00000

8 NOV 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Contract Personnel Division

SUBJECT : WIROGUE/1 Contract (Formerly AEASPIC)

1. A review of the WIROGUE/1 file showed that subject was under contract for a period beginning 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960. Since that date until 20 October 1960, subject was under SR/DOB OOA. On 21 October 1960, the African Division picked up the case and is preparing to dispatch him on 20 November 1960.

2. It is requested that the contract be brought up to date and amended to encompass the following points:

A. Effective date: 21 November 1960 through 20 November 1962. *option to renew*

B. Compensation: $500 per month, plus $3000 per annum for housing.

C. Medical: to extent it is necessary to maintain good health.

D. Insurance: $5000 payable to beneficiary.

E. Bonus: for outstanding performance, resettlement in another country. *mutually agreed upon*

F. Termination: ending of all benefits and monies.

3. This contract will have to be prepared for signing prior to 18 November 1960.

4. For further information, please contact Mr. Daniel R. Niescier, X8284.

Glenn Fields
Glenn D. Fields
Acting Chief, Africa Division

+ 4,000 operational [illegible] - non interest bearing - to be repaid from profits

Medical OK - per C.O.

Subject is on F.N. - no taxes.

14-00000

SECRET

SR/DOB/60-2074

20 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Contracting Officer

THROUGH: SR/SS
Attention: ~~Madge Hobbs~~ H. G. R[illegible]

SUBJECT: Project Termination of Ernest G. Maycrink (p) as independent contractor for SR Division

REFERENCE: SR/DOB/59-1735 dated 17 September 1959
SR/DOB/59-1660 dated 24 July 1959

1. Because of the indefinite postponment of Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual was engaged, subject has been terminated by this office on 20 October 1960.

2. Subject individual will be picked up on contract on 21 October 1960 by Africa Division. Subject was paid on 20 October 1960 by this office all monies remaining due him as per Engagement of Independent contractor agreement for Project AESENTINEL. Subject has no further remunerative claim against the U. S. Government.

Michael Rae
MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Approved: J. Keith Reid
J. Keith Reid

Joseph B. Ragan

14-00000

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 1735

17 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance Division

THROUGH : Special Contracting Officer

FROM : Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT : Engagement of Ernest O. MAICRINK (p) as Independent Contractor

REFERENCE : SR/DOB/59/ 1660, dated 24 July 1959 to Finance Division re same subject

1. Project AESENTINEL, under which subject individual has been engaged, was originally approved through the period 31 March 1960. A request for renewal and amendment of the project has been submitted to FI, and it is intended subject individual will be utilized under this project during 1960.

2. The following provisions will apply to subject individual during the interim period, i.e.: 20 September 1959 through 30 June 1960.

3. Term and Project Charge. Subject individual has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and has been extended through the period 31 March 1961, subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

4. Security Approval. The initial security clearance obtained for Subject's use, CI/OA No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959, has been suspended during the interim period. Requests have been made of the Office of Security (SSD and Alien Affairs Staff) for subject's use.

5. Citizenship. Subject is a foreign national.

6. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $400.00 per month, payable in United States currency.

7. Quarters and Subsistence. Basic quarters and subsistence costs will be borne by the Subject. Occasional incidental expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

8. Operational Expenses. No Operational Expenses are contemplated during the period covered.

9. Other Commitments. The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

SECRET

14-00000

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to maintain his physical status for his eventual use on his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. The initial provisions made for resettlement of Subject still apply.

d. Entertainment. Basic entertainment expenses will be borne by Subject. Occasional entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

10. Contingent Obligations. Although no such promise has been made the Subject, resettlement in the United States could possibly become necessary as a form of control, should this be deemed necessary from a security viewpoint.

11. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

12. At such time as Subject re-enters training for his proposed mission, about 1 July 1960, all provisions of his initial engagement will again apply.

APPROVED: [signature]

Special Contracting Officer

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

Dist:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - Contracting Officer

14-00000

SECRET

SR/DOB/59/ 11.60

24 July 1959

TO: Chief, Finance Division

VIA: Special Contracting Officer

FROM: Contract Approving Officer, Michael Rae

SUBJECT: Engagement of Ernest O. MAICRINK (P) as Independent Contractor.

1. Term and Project Charge. The subject individual has been engaged under oral contract, for use under Project AESENTINEL. The effective date of the oral contract is 20 April 1959, and shall continue thereafter for a period of one year subject to termination by the Government upon thirty (30) days actual notice.

2. Security Approval. The appropriate security approval for Subject's use has been obtained. Type Operational Approval, No. C-73532, dated 11 March 1959.

3. Citizenship. The Subject is a foreign national.

4. Compensation. Subject will be paid salary in the amount of $500.00 per month, payable in United States currency. Of this amount, he will actually receive $50.00 per month during training and the duration of the mission. All unpaid monies will accrue to his credit in an escrow account, the payment of which will be dependent upon the proper performance of his duties and be payable upon completion of mission for which engaged. Provisions also made for payment of bonus not to exceed $10,000.00.

5. Quarters and Subsistence. The Subject will be furnished quarters and subsistence. These costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

6. Operational Expenses.

Operational travel and expenses to be paid as officially authorized.

a. Domestic travel costs will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds. Travel costs to and from the United States, and foreign travel will be charged against Project AESENTINEL.

b. Operational expenses to be borne by Project AESENTINEL. Training expenses to be carried by Station Allotment.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

7. Other Commitments.

The following additional commitments have been made to the Subject:

a. Medical Benefits. Subject will receive such dental and medical benefits as may be necessary to permit him to properly perform his assigned mission. Costs to be borne by SR/DOB Station Funds.

b. Insurance. Insurance coverage for death or disability incurred in line of duty, not to exceed $5,000.00. Costs chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

c. Resettlement. Provisions made for resettlement of Subject in a country other than that in which he was recruited. Costs of resettlement will not exceed $1,000.00, and will be chargeable against Project AESENTINEL.

d. Entertainment. All normal entertainment expenses will be borne by SR/DOB Station funds.

8. Contingent Obligations. The following has not be promised the individual, but may have to be met by the Government:

a. Resettlement in the United States, either as an additional bonus for the Subject or as a form of control should this become necessary from a security viewpoint.

9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to the Subject.

MICHAEL RAE
Chief, SR/DOB

APPROVED: J. KEITH REID

104-10291-10004 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

STANDARD FORM 66
October 1960
PRESCRIBED BY U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM.
Federal Personnel Manual
66-102

SECRET

Official Personnel Folder

SECRET

29 SEP 1969

502-16-6560

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

03 AUG 1978

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 26 July 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: RETIREMENT - (VOLUNTARY) CIARDS
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 08 DAY 04 YEAR 78
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026-3430 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Section 253
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/IMS AND INFORMATION MGMT & PLANNING GROUP RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH AREAS UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)
12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2
17. SALARY OR RATE: $26,889

18. REMARKS

Last Working Day: 4 August 1978

CONCUR: [signature] 07/26/78
CNS/MSB Date

co-ordinated with Bernard RCB 7/31/78

[signature] CMS/MSB

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] Henry E. Walton C/PCS/CSS/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 7/26/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL CM13

19. ACTION CODE: 45
20. EMPLOY CODE: 10
21. OFFICE CODING: NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC
22. STATION CODE
23. INTEGREE CODE
24. FOOTES CODE: 1
25. DATE OF BIRTH: 02 20 28
26. DATE OF GRADE: MO. DA. YR.
27. DATE OF LEI: MO. DA. YR.
28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA. YR.
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSC 2—OPGM 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE: CI 65 00 02
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO DA. YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET PREFERENCE: CODE; 0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT
36. SERV COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE; 0—WAIVER 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE; 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE
45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 03 AUG 1978 [initials] 7/26
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 8/1/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

14-00000

25 July 1978

SUMMARY OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT

I entered on duty with the CIA in April 1952 and have been in records management for my whole career, seventeen years of it overseas.

James Woods
James S. Woods

NO SECURITY OBJECTIONS

14-00000

1C-21 25 May 78

SECRET

16 MAY 1978

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 May 1978

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 04 DAY 09 YEAR 78

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V to V / V to CF / CF to V / CF to CF

7. FAN AND NSCA: 8026-3430 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/~~NE~~ IMS
INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP
RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH
AREAS UNIT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: CG45

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 13 2

17. SALARY OR RATE: $26,889

18. REMARKS:

FROM: DDO/NE

CONCUR: John Diffley (telecord) C/NE/Pers   DATE

[signature] IMS/MSB 05/12/78

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] Henry E. Walton C/PCS/CSS/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 5/10/78

18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] DDO/CMS/07-12 — DATE SIGNED: 5/11/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HOURS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	53746	IMS	75013			02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OREN, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG. COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) | 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 30 MAY 1978 5-12-78 [initials] From NE

46 OP APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 5/26/78

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED	6 Feb 78
1 SERIAL NUMBER	010032
2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)	WOODS, JAMES S.
3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	PROMOTION
4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH DAY YEAR)	02 03 12 78
5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT	REGULAR
6 FUNDS	V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / CF TO CF
7 FAN AND NBCA	3033 4800 0000
8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)	
9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDO/NE DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION PLANS STAFF
10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION	WASH, D.C.
11 POSITION TITLE	RECORDS ADMIN OFF (13)
12 POSITION NUMBER	CG45
13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION	DCC
14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	GS
15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	0344.01
16 GRADE AND STEP	13 2
17 SALARY OR RATE	26589

18 REMARKS

CONCUR:

From: 12 5

Henry Walton (telecoord) — 6 Feb 78
ISS — Date

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
John F. [illegible], CNE/PERS	6 Feb 78	[signature]	2/8/78

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HQTRS. CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	46015	NE	75013		1	02 20 28	03 12 78	03 12 78

28 MTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ. NO	34 SEX
		1—CS 2—FICA 3—FICA 4—NONE					

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0—NONE 1—5 PT 2—10 PT				0—WAIVED 1—REG 2—REG/OPT 3—INELIGIBLE	

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA
0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)		FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO	FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 OP APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
3-6-78 AZO 06 MAR 1978	[signature]	8 MAR 78

FORM 6-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY. 007622

14-00000

18 August 1978

Mr. James S. Woods
304 Meadow Hall Dr.
Rockville, MD 20851

Dear Mr. Woods:

We are enclosing the employee copy of your retirement action (Form 1150) that you requested 04 August 1978.

Sincerely,

/S/

Abraham Schwartz
Chief, Control Division

Enclosure: 1 Form

Dist.
Orig. - Adse.
1 - TRB
1 - OPF/WOODS, James S.
OP/TRB/SEAllewelt;sea(18AUG78)

14-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

18 APR 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: James S. Woods

FROM: John N. McMahon
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Commendation for Exceptional Performance

1. The Directorate of Operations Records Review Task Force has finished its work in Warrenton. I want you to know that I realize that a large measure of the success of this effort was due to the exceptional performance of the Records Management Officers who worked long and hard during the six-month period, patiently guiding the 435 Directorate personnel who served on the component teams. Many of you performed additional duties, voluntarily and cheerfully, extending beyond the ten-hour work day, which kept the task force functioning smoothly.

2. This fine team effort and your personal contribution to it is in the best tradition of the Directorate of Operations. I commend you for a job well done.

Thanks Jim — John McMahon

John N. McMahon

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

FROM : Kenneth Corbat
Chief, Retirement Affairs Division

SUBJECT : Request for Voluntary Retirement -
Mr. James S. Woods

1. This memorandum submits a recommendation for your approval in paragraph 3.

2. The employee named above has applied for voluntary retirement under the provisions of Headquarters Regulation 20-50h.

Grade: GS-13 Position: Records Management Officer
Career Service : Operations
Office/Division : Information Management Staff
Date Requested for Retirement: 4 August 1978
Age at that Date : 50
Years of Creditable Service : 29
Years of Agency Service : 26
Years of Qualifying Service : 9

3. The applicant's Career Service and the CIA Retirement Board recommend that the request be approved.

/s/ Kenneth Corbat

The recommendation contained in paragraph 3 is approved.

(Signed) F. W. M. Janney

Director of Personnel

2 AUG 1978

Date

Distribution:
0 - Return to ROB
1 - Applicant
1 - OPF
1 - ROB Soft File
1 - ROB Reader

2 ... 00216

CONFIDENTIAL

3589

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 5 Oct 1977

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): Woods, James S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment AND CANCELLATION of NSCA

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: 07 | 11 | 77

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | CF TO CF

7. CAN AND NSCA: 8033 4801 0000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDO/NE Division
Office of the Chief, NE Division
Plans Staff

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Wash., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE: Records Admin Off ~~CH~~ (13)

12. POSITION NUMBER: CC45

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4

17. SALARY OR RATE: 24070 ~~$23,405~~

18. REMARKS:
replacing Peter Serra

#11 PER SUE 10.17.77

#3 PER NANCY 10.17.77

SAL, BLURB

Concur:

[signature] 10/7/77
AC/PCS/CSS/Personnel — Date

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: John [illegible] C/NE/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 10-05-77

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 11/1/77

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (Numeric / Alphabetic)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. VEOTES	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	46025 NE	7503		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—FICA, 3—NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA | FOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG. COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 01 NOV 1977 — 10.14.77 RSP

46. OP APPROVAL: [signature]

DATE APPROVED: 1 Nov 77

FROM: CCS

1152 ~~USE PREVIOUS EDITION~~

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

14-00000

C-NO

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 9 August 1976

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (Last-First-Middle)
010322	WOODS, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CHANGE OF FAN NUMBER	08 / 09 / 76	REGULAR

6 FUNDS		7 FAN AND NSCA	8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
XX V TO V	V TO CF	T230 0130 / 0002	
CF TO V	CF TO CF		

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDC/CCS REGISTRY	WASH., D. C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH (12)	BL 44	DCC

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 4	$ 21,324

18 REMARKS

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Donald E. McMahill, Admin Off	9 Aug 76		

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOOTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	39115	CCS	75013		1	02 20 25		

28 LEI EXPIRES · 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) · 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33 SECURITY REQ. NO · 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) · 36 SERV COMP DATE · 37 LONG COMP DATE · 38 CAREER CATEGORY · 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE · 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) · 42 LEAVE CAT CODE · 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA · 44 STATE TAX DATA

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
10 AUG 1976 [initials] 8-9-76	B Brai[signature]	

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

C-NO MAIN ABJ 7/16

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 July 1976

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032 ✓
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: Reassignment Change of Home Base — CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 DAY 13 YEAR 76
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | V TO C | C TO V | C TO C
7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 6230 0118 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CCS REGISTRY
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D. C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)
12. POSITION NUMBER: BL 44
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: DCC
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 12 4
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 21,324
18. REMARKS: DAC to DCC

DESIGNATION CHANGED FROM DAC TO DCC.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Donald F. Mc Mahill, CCS/ADM — DATE SIGNED: 13 Jul 76
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: — DATE SIGNED:

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 ADJUSTED CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
37	10	31	CCS	75013		1	02		

28 VET EXPIRES · 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE · 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-OTHER, 3-FICA, 4-NONE) · 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE · 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA · EOD DATA · 33 SECURITY REQ. NO. · 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) · 36 SERV COMP DATE · 37 LONG COMP DATE · 38 CAREER CATEGORY · 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVED, 1-REG, 2-REG/OPT, 3-INELIGIBLE) · HEALTH INS CODE · 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) · 42 LEAVE CAT CODE · 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) · 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 20 JUL 1976
46 OP APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 07/19/76

FORM 8-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

14-00000

CR
11-22-74 C Macy

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ØCF

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 13 November 1974

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	11 / 24 / 74	REGULAR

6. FUNDS					7. FAN AND NSCA	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	XX	V to V		V to CF	5230 0121 / 0002	50 USC 403 J
		CF to V		CF to CF		

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS ~~[illegible]~~ REGISTRY	WASH., D. C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)	0061	DAC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 3	$ 19,693

18. REMARKS

CONCUR: MARGARET SCOTT (TELECOORD)
SS/SE/7E25

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
Donald E. McMahill Donald E. Mc Mahill CCS/ADE	13 Nov 74	[signature]	15 Nov 74

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING (Numeric)	(Alphabetic)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 VOUCHER CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF SD
22	10	39157	CCS	75613		1	02 20 28	11 24 74	11 24 74

28 LTD EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. CD | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 37 LONG COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. STA. PROV./TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI—HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 1—WAIVED, 2—REG, 3—REG/OPT, 4—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YEARS, 3—BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YEARS) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46 O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
11-15-74 JFR 25 NOV 1974	[signature]	[illegible]

FORM 11-72 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E 2, IMPDET CL BY: 007622

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 21 August 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S.
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT, Transfer to Vouchered Funds, AND DELEGATION OF N.S.C.A.
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 09 DAY 16 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / CF TO V: XX / V TO CF / CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 4230 0121 0002
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDO/CCS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASH., D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF CH (12)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0061
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $16,326

18. REMARKS: HOME BASE: [illegible] SS

CONCUR FOR CIA W-2: [signature] CCS/OCB/S

CONCUR: GEORGE OWENS (TELECOORD) C/EUR/PERS

CONCUR: WILLIAM H. FLIPPEN (TELECOORD) DDP/RECORDS MGMT OFFICER

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: Erich W. Isenstead, C/CCS — DATE SIGNED: 8/21/73

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY. CODE	21 OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGRATE CODE	24 HQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
16	10	39100	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES: MO DA YR XX XX XX
29. SPECIAL REFERENCE
30. RETIREMENT DATA: 1—CSR 2—FICA 3—FICA 4—NONE; CODE
31. SEPARATION DATA CODE
32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA: TYPE, MO, DA, YR
EOD DATA
33. SECURITY REQ. NO.
34. SEX
35. VET. PREFERENCE: CODE 0—NONE 1—5 PT. 2—10 PT.
36. SERV. COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
37. LONG COMP. DATE: MO. DA. YR.
38. CAREER CATEGORY: CAR/RESV PROV/TEMP; CODE
39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE: CODE 0—WAIVED 1—REG. 2—REG/OPT. 3—INELIGIBLE; HEALTH INS. CODE
40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE: CODE 0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS) 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)
42. LEAVE CAT. CODE
43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS
44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED 1—YES 2—NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP.; STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 8-23-73 *FFJr. EUR [signature]
46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 25 Aug 73

FORM 1152 1-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET — CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible] — E2 IMPDET

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

NOTE TO PCS RETURNEES

Personnel processing in from a PCS foreign field assignment through Central Processing Branch are required to review the Employee Conduct Handbook and the information for PCS returnees. This information is contained in a notebook provided by the CPB receptionist.

M E M O R A N D U M   O F   U N D E R S T A N D I N G

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 9 July 1970 and the information for returnees dated 1 February 1972.

JAMES S WOODS
NAME
(Please Print)

James S Woods — Signature

11 Sept 73 — Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

Group 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

14-00000

SECRET

17 APR 1973

Certificate of Exceptional Service (for Vietnam)

Terrones, Aubrey F.
Taylor, Paul F.
Tilberry, Austin S.
Tilton, John S.
Tronnes, Sue Ann

Valetich, Steven T.
Vandaveer, Robert J.

~~Walker, Richard L.~~
Walsh, Frances M.
Ward, James R.
Ward, Loretta L.
Warren, Gail
Warren, Ward W.
Watson, William Bruce
Weagraff, Ross M.
Whelan, James W.
Whistler, Leonard
White, Walter W.
Whittinghill, Robert B. (no. 2)
Wickham, Ben, Jr.
Wilcox, Rose Marie
Williams, Bruce P.
Williams, Caryl Joyce
Williams, Edward, Jr.
Wilson, Carolyn J.
Wolfe, Mayme E.
Woods, James S.

Yellin, James H.
Young, Robert C.

VIETNAM (Contract Employees)

Allen, Maxwell J.

Bauso, Philip
Baylard, Robert W.
Bias, Louis
Bivens, Edmond
Bolton, William C., Jr.
Boos, Marvin L.
~~Bowman, David L.~~
Brown, Robert D.
Buckley, William F.

Chow, Gary Y. C.
Collins, Francis A.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 24 January 1973

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S. ✓
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 04 YEAR 73
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V / X CF TO CF
7. FAN AND NSCA: 3136 1267 0000
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION, FOREIGN FIELD, ITALIAN AREA, ROME STATION, SUPPORT BRANCH
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: ROME, ITALY
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ~~ADMIN~~ ADM OFF~~ICER~~ (09)
12. POSITION NUMBER: 0699
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 11.6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $16326

18. REMARKS:
HOME BASE: IS CONCUR [signature]
PRA HR 20-17e (1) (a) PROMOTION NTE 1 yr.
CONCUR: C/E/~~BC~~ ITALY [signature]

Mr. Woods will be assigned to DDP/CS/RMU position 0061 vice Mr. Evan.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: [signature] WILLIAM C. COOLEY, C/E/PERS — DATE SIGNED: 1/31/73
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature] — DATE SIGNED: 2/2/73

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. ROSTER CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
32	10	44750	EUR	36533		3	02 20 28	02 04 73	02 04 73

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OASDI, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE, MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ. NO	34. SEX
02 03 74	81						

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (LAB/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—REG, 2—REG/OPT, 3—INELIGIBLE), HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-2-73 [initials]
46. OP APPROVAL: [signature] — DATE APPROVED: 2/2/73

FORM 1152 6-72 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622

FEB 1973

14-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

JAMES WOODS

FROM:

EUR/PERS
4B0002 Hqs

EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/PERS/TEDDY			4Rb	
2. C/E/PERS			[illegible]	
3. C/E/~~SR~~ I			[illegible]	for concurrence
4. E/PERS/JON		1/31	Jon	
5. C/IS/PERS	1 FEB 1973	2 Feb 73	[illegible]	for concurrence
6.				
7. CSPS/SOB GG10		2/2/73	Jan	7. Subject will be assigned as Ch Reg. + RMO DDP/CCS upon his return to Hqs (about Aug 73), vice Evan. [illegible]
8.				
9. OP/PI 5E03				Mr. Woods will be assigned to CCS/RMO position 0061 vice Mr. Michael Evan.
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 15 MARCH 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (Month / Day / Year)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05 / 30 / 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	X V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
		X			1136-1267	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	ROME ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OF (09)	0699	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 7	$ 13,821

18. REMARKS

1 cc: Payroll

X HB: EUR

From: DDP/EUR
DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

No Language Required
PRA HR 20-17E(1) (B) NTE Two Yrs

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
[signature] WILLFORD C TAYLOR, C/E/Pers	3/15/71	[signature]	3/ /71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH (Mo. Da. Yr.)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	4 46	Sit	36533		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES (Mo. Da. Yr.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-ORGN, 3-FICA, 5-NONE)	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
05 29 73	82				EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP. DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR-RESV, PROV/TEMP)	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE (0-WAIVED, 1-YES)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (Form Executed 1-Yes 2-No; Code; No. Tax Exemptions)	44. STATE TAX DATA (Form Executed 1-Yes 2-No; Code; No Tax Exempt; State Code)

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O.P. APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
5-7-71 [initials]	C. Blake	5-10-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

P. 1

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 02 DECEMBER 1970

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS

4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 DAY 13 YEAR 70

5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / CF TO V: XX / CF TO CF

7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1236-1186

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT

10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER

12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997

13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS

15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01

16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7

17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,041

18. REMARKS

2cc: SECURITY & Other
cc: PAYROLL

HB EUR

FROM: DDP/EUR/FOREIGN FIELD
LONDON, ENGLAND SLOT# 0254

Security Approval Granted by Pers. 12/4/70
PL 12/10/70

NTE: 30 June 1971
Pending Reassignment

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers — DATE SIGNED: 3 Dec 70

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER — DATE SIGNED: [illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	18	49942	EUR	75313		1	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES; 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OZGN, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE; 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32 CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR.; EOD DATA; 33 SECURITY REQ NO.; 34. SEX

35 VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT, 2—10 PT); 36 SERV COMP DATE; 37 LONG COMP DATE; 38 CAREER CATEGORY CAR/RESV. PROV/TEMP CODE; 39 FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVER, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE; 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)); 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE; 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS; 44 STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 12-8-70 MW

46 OP APPROVAL: W Heat — DATE APPROVED: 12/8/70

A 25
A 1

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 — EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 20 JANUARY 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS (CORRECTION)
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 01 DAY 10 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V / V TO CF / XX CF TO V / CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1234-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821

18. REMARKS

HQ: EUR

cc: Payroll

TO CORRECT EFFECTIVE DATE TO READ 1/10/71 VICE 12/13/70

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
WILLIAM C. COOLEY, AC/E/Pers	1/21/71	[signature]	1/21/71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HDQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
58	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR.	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—ORGN, 3—FICA, 5—NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE	MO. DA. YR.	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
				76	12 13 70			

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	37. LONG COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR.	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV. PROV./TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) / CODE / NO. TAX EXEMP. / STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
1-26-71 [initials]	[signature]	1/26/71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

10

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 12 FEBRUARY 1971

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: CHANGE OF FAN
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 02 DAY 18 YEAR 71
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: XX V TO V | CF TO V | V TO CF | CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 1236-1186
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADM OFFICER
12. POSITION NUMBER: 9997
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 7
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 13,821
18. REMARKS:
FROM 1234-1186
cc: Payroll

KH/B EUR

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers
DATE SIGNED: 12 Feb 71
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 17 Feb 71

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	44999	EUR	15013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES MO. DA. YR. | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1—CSC, 2—OTHER, 3—FICA, 4—NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA TYPE MO. DA. YR. | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0—NONE, 1—5 PT., 2—10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE MO. DA. YR. | 37. LONG COMP DATE MO. DA. YR. | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR/RESV, PROV/TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0—WAIVED, 1—YES) HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0—NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1—NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2—BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3—BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE, NO TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1—YES, 2—NO) CODE, NO. TAX EXEMP., STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 2-18-71 [initials]
46. O P APPROVAL: W. R. [initials]
DATE APPROVED: 2-18-71

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4)

8

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
WOODS, JAMES S.	SELF	70-0961

There is on file in the Personal Affairs Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 6 MAY 1970.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
19 JUNE 1970	/s/ R. L. Austin, Jr.

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-69 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET

14 May 1968 *approved*

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion for Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10

1. FE Vietnam Operations concurs in the field recommendation for the promotion of Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10. Following is the recommendation from the Chief, Operational Services Branch, Vietnam Station.

"Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

"As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

"Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross-training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever-increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

"Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

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SECRET

"Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level."

2. If promoted, Subject will occupy the position of IO General, GS-11, Slot # 4984.

John Caswell
Douglas S. Blaufarb
Chief, Vietnam Operations

SECRET

SECRET

4 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station

SUBJECT : Recommendation for Promotion - Mr. James S. Woods

1. It is recommended that Subject be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Subject has been with the Organization since April 1952 and has served at Vietnam Station as Chief, RI since January 1967. Subject was last promoted in 1958.

2. As Chief, RI at Vietnam Station, Subject is responsible for the supervision of eleven personnel engaged in a highly diversified activities, all subject to tight scheduling and deadlines. Examples of some of the diversified activities for which Subject is responsible are courier service throughout Vietnam, cable secretariat functions and intelligence reports reproduction and distribution, in addition to the classic registry functions normally performed by a station registry.

3. Subject has energetically applied himself to improving procedures within his Section and to the cross training of employees under his supervision to provide flexibility in his operations. His efforts in these areas bore welcome fruit during the recent disturbances when his Section was placed on twenty-four (24) hour duty for several weeks. During this period, while operating with a reduced staff and an ever increasing workload, Subject kept all services operationally effective and on a timely basis with the exception of the in-country courier runs which were interrupted for a few days by circumstances beyond his control.

4. Subject is a dedicated, conscientious and loyal employee. He is cooperative, exercises initiative in accomplishing the tasks at hand and responds favorably to constructive criticism. Personnel in his Section perform their duties in a friendly, courteous and efficient manner. Their attitude, which is an expression of the direction received, has been brought to the attention of the writer on numerous occasions by various Station personnel.

SECRET

SECRET

5. Subject is an acknowledged expert in his chosen field. He constantly seeks out new methods, equipment and knowledge pertaining to his profession and is furthering himself academically through attendance at the local University extension. He has the background and drive to provide potential for assumption of more senior positions in his field. In view of Subject's strong performance, extensive overseas experience in a variety of situations and length of time in his present grade he is strongly recommended for promotion to the GS-10 level.

/s/John K. Smith
Chief, OSB

CONCUR /s/Vincent Lockhart
Acting Deputy Chief of Station

APPROVE: /s/Lewis J. Layham
Chief of Station

SECRET

14-00000

PCP SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 8 Oct 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 / / 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	CF TO V	XX	CF TO CF	9136 1214	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION LONDON STATION SUPPORT BRANCH REGISTRY SECTION	LONDON, ENGLAND

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OF (09)	0254	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 6	$ 10,847

18. REMARKS

PRA 20-F1-D(1)(a) (B)
NTE 2 yr.

CONCUR: Mary Boulger FE/Pers
By Phone

vice Imogene Lotrage

259a Attached

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
WILLFORD C. TAYLOR, C/E/Pers	9 Oct 68	[signature]	23 OCT 1968

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	44525	EUR	21025		3	02 20 28		

28. STE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
11 06 70	S3				EOD DATA		

35 VET. PREFERENCE | 36 SERV. COMP. DATE | 37 LONG COMP. DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
From FE 10-28-68 amw	[signature]	[illegible]

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 23 July 1968

1. SERIAL NUMBER: 010032
2. NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS JAMES S
3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: PROMOTION
4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 07 | DAY 28 | YEAR 68
5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR
6. FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF
7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE: 9137 1487
8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):
9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:
DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD
FE/VNO - VIET NAM STATION
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
COLLATION BRANCH
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION
BIOGRAPHIC UNIT
10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: Saigon, South Vietnam.
11. POSITION TITLE: RECORDS ADMIN OF D 11
12. POSITION NUMBER: 4984
13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D
14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.): GS
15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES: 0344.01
16. GRADE AND STEP: 10 6
17. SALARY OR RATE: $ 10847
18. REMARKS:

RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING IO GENERAL POSITION.

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: CFE/PERSONNEL, Mary T. Boulger
DATE SIGNED: 23 July 68
18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]
DATE SIGNED: 2[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOYEE CODE	21. OFFICE CODING	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOURS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE MO. DA. YR.	27. DATE OF LEI MO. DA. YR.
22	10	55200	FE	77205		3	02 20 28		

28. VET. PREFERENCE ... 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE ... 30. RETIREMENT DATA ... 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE ... 32. CORRECTION CANCELLATION DATA ... EOD DATA ... 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. ... 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE ... 36. SERV. COMP. DATE ... 37. LONG. COMP. DATE ... 38. CAREER CATEGORY ... 39. FEGLI, HEALTH INSURANCE ... 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE ... 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE ... 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA ... 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: [signature]
46. O P APPROVAL: [signature]
DATE APPROVED: 25 Jul 68

FORM 3-67 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 17 NOVEMBER [illegible]

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 / 1 / 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel)
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7137-1487	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE/FOREIGN FIELD FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE REGISTRY SECTION	SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF ~~GS-11~~ (11)	4127	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	09/7	$ ~~0001~~ 7262

18. REMARKS

FROM: JKO/TOKYO STATION/OFFICE OF THE CHIEF/
CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SECTION

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	DATE SIGNED	18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER	DATE SIGNED
[signature] W. T. BOULGER, CFE/PERS	22 Dec 66	[signature]	[illegible]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY CODE	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HOGTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH MO. DA. YR.	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	45500	FE	77265		5	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR) | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CS, 3-FICA, 1-NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE CODE (0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV., PROV/TEMP) CODE | 39. FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE CODE (0-WAIVED, 1-YES) HEALTH INS. CODE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE CODE (0- NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1- NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2- BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS); 3- BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO), CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS | 44. STATE TAX DATA: FORM EXECUTED (1-YES, 2-NO), CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION	46. O P APPROVAL	DATE APPROVED
1307 66 N	[signature]	11/1/66

'52 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

F-14

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 18 Nov 66

1 SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

2 NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOOLG, JAMES S.

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION: DESIGNATION AS A PARTICIPANT IN THE CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

4 EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED: MONTH 12 | DAY 18 | YEAR 66

5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR

6 FUNDS: V TO V | V TO CF | CF TO V | X CF TO CF

7 FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO CHARGEABLE: 7137-1566

8 LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel): PL 88-643 Sect. 203

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS: DDP/FE

10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION: TOKYO, JAPAN

11 POSITION TITLE

12 POSITION NUMBER

13 CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION: D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)

15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES

16 GRADE AND STEP: 9

17 SALARY OR RATE: $

18 REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

18A SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL | DATE SIGNED | 18B SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER | DATE SIGNED

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE | 20 EMPLOY CODE | 21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC, ALPHABETIC) | 22 STATION CODE | 23 INTEGREE CODE | 24 HOURS CODE | 25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO, DA, YR) | 26 DATE OF GRADE (MO, DA, YR) | 27 DATE OF LEI (MO, DA, YR)

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO, DA, YR) | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC, 2-CIA, 3-NONE) CODE: 2 | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO, DA, YR) | EOD DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT) | 36 SERV COMP DATE (MO, DA, YR) | 37 LONG COMP DATE (MO, DA, YR) | 38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR. RESV, PROV, TEMP; CODE) | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0-WAIVED, 1-YES; HEALTH INS. CODE) | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YEARS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YEARS)) | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1-YES 2-NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

45 POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: 11-21-66 EN

46 OP APPROVAL: See memo signed by D/Pers dated 16 NOV 66

DATE APPROVED

FORM 1152 USE PREVIOUS EDITION
1-4-7-66

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

14-00000

5 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: FE Career Management Committee

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Promotion of Mr. James S. Woods from GS-09 to GS-10

1. It is strongly recommended that Mr. James S. Woods be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and [illegible] Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958. He was previously recommended for promotion to GS-10 in November 1964 and June 1965.

2. In the promotion recommendation for the Tokyo Station, 9 November 1964, the [illegible] commented on Mr. Woods as follows:

"A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at [illegible] Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is [illegible] different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods in his are that action responsibility [illegible] incoming cables is rapidly and properly [illegible], dispatches and [illegible] routed and processed, correspondence from other local military [illegible] is correctly analyzed and routed. The [illegible] routing system is functioning effectively, and the [illegible] is rapidly [illegible] out [illegible] dispatch traffic.

"B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods [illegible] Chief of this [illegible]. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that [illegible] Registry [illegible] well-functioning unit.

Not Approved
3/1/66

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

5. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "strong" manner as indicated in his recent Fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Station Registry from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 9 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who [illegible] to achieve the maximum [illegible] of his personnel and materials."

6. The Acting Chief [illegible] recommended [illegible] qualification that Mr. Woods be promoted [illegible] GS-10 [illegible] Mr. Woods be promoted to GS-10 at the [illegible]

Terry T. Shima
for Richard G. Davis
Chief, FE/TRC

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Louise A. - wife	66-502

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 October 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 DEC 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last-First-Middle)	NAME AND RELATIONSHIP OF DEPENDENT*	CLAIM NUMBER
Woods, James S.	Wife - Louise A.	66-148

There is on file in the Benefits and Counseling Branch, Benefits and Services Division, Office of Personnel, an Official Disability Claim File on the above named employee (or his dependent*) for an illness, injury, or death incurred on 26 June 1965.

This notice should be filed in the employee's Official Personnel Folder as a permanent cross-reference to the Official Disability Claim File.

DATE OF NOTICE	SIGNATURE OF BSD REPRESENTATIVE
17 AUG 1965	B. DeFelice

NOTICE OF OFFICIAL DISABILITY CLAIM FILE

FORM 10-59 1076 USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-21-35)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

DATE PREPARED: 10 Feb 1961

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)
110032	WOODS, James S.

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE REQUESTED (MONTH / DAY / YEAR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
Reassignment and Transfer to Confidential funds	03 / 19 / 61	Regular

6. FUNDS: V TO V; X V TO CF; CF TO V; CF TO CF

7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE: 1137-7351-1000

8. LEGAL AUTHORITY (Completed by Office of Personnel):

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE FE/JAO Tokyo Station Office of the Chief Central Registry and Records Section	Tokyo, Japan

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	12A. PCR CONTROL NO.	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
Intel Analyst - Gen 12-D	3061		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.36	09 3	$ 6765

18. REMARKS

FROM: FE/Office of the Chief/2461 tray 1
1cc - Security

Form 259 forwarded to Medical Staff
Departure Date: 31 March 1961
FE/CMC Approved

Security [illegible] 2/16/61
mr 3/14/61

18A. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL: ROBERT D. CASHMAN, C/FE PERSONNEL

18B. SIGNATURE OF CAREER SERVICE APPROVING OFFICER: [signature]

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. EMPLOY. CODE	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. HQTRS CODE	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
4[illegible]	11	5130 / [illegible]			3	02 20 28		

28. DATE EXPIRES; 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE; 30. SECT. SEGMENT DATA; 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE; 32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA; EOD DATA; 33. SECURITY REQ. NO.; 34. SEX

35. VET. PREFERENCE (0 = NONE, 1 = 5 PT., 2 = 10 PT.); 36. SERV. COMP. DATE; 37. LONG. COMP. DATE; 38. MIL. SERV. CREDIT; 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE; 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 = NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 = NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 = BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 12 MOS); 3 = BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 12 MOS)); 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE; 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA; 44. STATE TAX DATA

45. POSITION CONTROL CERTIFICATION: Kearney 03/13/61

46. O.P. APPROVAL: [signature]

52 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS AND FORM 1152A.

SECRET

(4)

S-E-C-R-E-T

MEMORANDUM FOR: James S. Woods

VIA : Chief, FE

1. The problem of effective management of the operational records of the Clandestine Services is one of our most important responsibilities. In this connection, you have been selected by your Division, and authorized by the Clandestine Services Records Committee, to act as Records Officer for your component. Your selection is based on your professional qualifications to carry out an assignment requiring experience, judgment, and a knowledge of the objectives of the Clandestine Services. A copy of this memorandum will be placed in your official personnel folder to record your appointment as Records Officer.

2. You are to act on behalf of your Division or Staff element in authorizing the destruction of material of no value to the Clandestine Services in accordance with criteria established for this purpose. You are empowered to authorize the destruction of documents and index cards recommended for destruction by other members of your Branch, and to desensitize KAPOK and RYBAT material which is no longer sensitive or which has been restricted in error. Your signature will be recognized by RID as that of an officially appointed Records Officer.

3. At the meeting of 16 December 1958, you were briefed on the details of your duties as Records Officer. It is now considered that you will be able fully to execute your duties as Records Officer and thus make a real contribution to the CS Records Management Program.

Wendell E. Little

WENDELL E. LITTLE
DDP/RMO

cc: Personnel Jacket of Addressee

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2	Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28		1	M 1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2	Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2	Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2	Code
11	12	48		1	50 USCA 403 J					/	04	21	52		2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld- Frgn-	Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
	5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	01	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Date
Reassignment/Transfer Vouchered funds	01	3 22 59	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE Office of the Chief Secretariat	5112	Washington, D. C.	25013

33. Dept.-Field Dept.- USfld- Frgn-	Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
		Records Mgmt Of	2461		

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
	$								9 3700 20 001

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Harriet Weiler, CFE/Secretariat

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Mozelle Little X2957

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): M. L. Shobe, CFE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	3-12-59	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control			E.		
C. Classification			F. Approved By	[signature]	

Remarks

please transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered funds
2 Copies to Security

L/O File

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57 (4)

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

6 October 1958

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. / Da. / Yr.	4. Vet Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. / Da. / Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02 / 20 / 28	1	M 1	04 / 21 / 52

7. SCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. / Da. / Yr.	11. FEGLI Code	12. LCD Mo. / Da. / Yr.	13 Mil. Serv. Credit Code
XX / XX / XX	1	50 USCA 403 J			04 / 21 / 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept. - Field Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. / Da. / Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. / Da. / Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 8 4	$ 5430 (4795)	DI	~~04 10 55~~	04 06 59	9 8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. / Da. / Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
Promotion	30	11 / 16 / 58	Regular	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP/FE FE/PSH - Philippines Station Support Branch	5161		57557

33. Dept. - Field Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. / Da. / Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. / Da. / Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
9 1	$ 5985		11 / 16 / 58	11 / 15 / 59	9-3780-55-006

SOURCE OF REQUEST

A. Requested By (Name And Title): Arthur F. [illegible] C/FE/PSH

B. For Additional Information Call (Name & Telephone Ext.): Monelle Li[illegible] 2057

C. Request Approved By (Signature And Title): [signature] H. [illegible] Shobe, C/FE/Personnel

CLEARANCES

Clearance	Signature	Date	Clearance	Signature	Date
A. Career Board	[signature]	11/13/58	D. Placement		
B. Pos. Control		11/14/58	E.		
C. Classification	[signature]	7 Oct 58	F. Approved By	[signature]	11/14/58

Remarks: Request for upgrading slot to GS-9 submitted to Wage & Salary Division. (Hold promotion in Career Panel until slot approved.)

Recorded by CSPD Nov 1958

FORM NO. 1152 1 MAR 57 (4)

SECRET

14-00000

COPY AIR

HMM-A-9355
(50-1-5)

Chief, WH Division
ATTN : Chief, RI
Chief of Station, Mexico City

31 January 1958

Administrative

TDY Service - RI Team

ACTION REQUIRED: Routing copies to Personnel files of employees concerned

1. During the period of February to August 1957, Francis E. SUCY, James R. WOODS, Dorothy SPICKA, Virginia LONG, and Sarah J. BENNETT served the Mexico City Station as a Records Reorganization team. The Chief of Station, Mexico City, wishes to make it a matter of record that the RI employees listed above served efficiently and well and were a fine addition to this station during their service here.

2. Mexico City Station wishes to acknowledge at this time, not only the exemplary service rendered by these employees but also the splendid support that RI Division has given to this station.

3. The RI employees named in paragraph 1 worked hard (spending many hours more than the forty normal work hours each week) and efficiently on Mexico City Station files. In addition, they were congenial, friendly and a pleasure to have in the Station.

WINSTON SCOTT

ACP/cps

29 January 1958

Distribution:
8 - Hqs.
2 - Files

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs-One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
MR. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 1928		5 July 1957

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment * transfer to UV funds

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 8/17 arft
B. APPROVED: 8 Sept 57

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

FROM	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER / 9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY / 10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS / 11. HEADQUARTERS	TO
Intel Analyst BV-430.12 4795		~~Intel Analyst~~ Records Analyst BFF-3582 4795
GS-0132.35-7 ~~$4660.00~~ p/a		~~GS-0132.35-7~~ $4660.00 p/a GS-0306.01-7
DDP/FI	3761	DDP/FE
Records Integration Division		Branch 3 - Philippines Station
Analysis & Operations Branch		Administrative Section
Analysis Section		
Washington, D.C.		Manila, R.P
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☒ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
* Memo dtd 18 June 1957 to Mgm staff via SSA/DD/S requesting that three RI Positions (1 GS-9 and 2 GS-7s - Record Analyst) be established on the Manila T/O. Woods to be slotted against the GS-9 slot.
Please call FE/PT/III x 4009 for effective date.
2 copies to Security.

Raymond B. Wilson DDP/FI
Concur & Fit. Rep. [illegible]

B. REQUESTED BY: Ronald Gage
RONALD GAGE, FE/PERSONNEL OFFICER

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Jimmie Dewberry x 2957

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

SD:DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM 8-2309-23 TO: 8-3780-55-006 5-2332	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

DOC 04.10.55. No CW
PSI - 04.06.58

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	JJP		
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	D. L. REEDY		
E.			1 O.V. D.H. to be forwarded to agent

F. APPROVED BY
Robert [illegible] 9/12/57 - [illegible] 16 August 57

10-[illegible]

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		15 Aug 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Reassignment
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):

6. EFFECTIVE DATE: A. PROPOSED: B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	BV-430.02		Intel Analyst BV-430.12
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY			GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS			DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
11. HEADQUARTERS			Washington, D.C.
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Slot BV-430.02 was used for slotting purposes only--this action will eliminate double slotting.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): John M. Scott, Chief, RI [signature]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2519

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY: [signature], FI/PO
Signature:
Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER
			x		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	S.A.	REAL.

SD: DI [initials]

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-2309-23 TO: [illegible]

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (Yes—No): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY
FI CAREER SERVICE BOARD
DATE 16 Aug 56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	[initials]	8/17/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	17 Aug 56
E.		

REMARKS:

F. APPROVED BY: [signature] by [signature] C. [signature], 17 Aug 56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED TO VOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr. – Miss – Mrs. – One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		14 June 1956

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED:

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
IO-CI BFF 583.05	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel Analyst BV-430.02
GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-~~0136.53-7~~ 0132.35-7 $4660.00 pa
DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer from Unvouchered to Vouchered Funds.
Vice Lenore Johnson, transferring to ~~WH~~ EE
Copies of this action have been submitted to Payroll and Security offices.

CONCUR: [signature]

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
John M. Scott, Chief, RI [signature]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Ruth Robinson, Ext. 2510

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: [signature]
Title: FE/CMO 26 June 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER, 5 PT	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I.A.	REAL

SD: DI

15. SEX	16. APPROPRIATION	17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	19. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	FROM: 6-3740-55-096 TO: 6-2309-23	Yes		[ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: DC

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

APPROVED BY ... 26 June 56 RAS/cmo

Concurrently ... 21 June 56 ... 6/29/56

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE
A.		
B. CEIL. OR POS CONTROL	[initials]	6/21/56
C. CLASSIFICATION		
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	10 Jul 56
E.		

REMARKS:

E. APPROVED BY [signatures]

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

Name: WOODS, James S. Date: 15 June 1956

CS Designation: DI

Nature of Action: Reassignment

	FROM	TO
Pos. Title:	I. O. (CI)	Intel Analyst
Grade:	GS-7	GS-7
Division:	DDP/FE	DDP/FI
Staff:	Branch 1 - Korea Base	RI
Branch:	Records Integration	Analysis NH & Operations
Section:	Personality Files	Analysis
Hdqrs:	Yokosuka, Japan	Washington

I & R Comment [signature] 19 JUN 1956
Date

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. FKLA 5886

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 4 FEB 1955

TO : Chief, FE

FROM : Chief, Korea Mission

INFO: Chief, Support Mission, Okinawa

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Administrative/Personnel
SPECIFIC- Recommendation for Promotion - James S. WOODS

1. It is recommended that James S. WOODS be promoted from GS-5 to GS-7. Subject entered on duty with the Korea Mission 26 July 1954.

2. WOODS presently occupies proposed Slot No. 21 which has been recommended as a GS-9 slot. Subject has been in grade as a GS-5 since 6 June 1953 and has performed the duties of his present assignment since 10 August 1954.

3. Subject has had approximately two years of experience in the maintenance of agent records. This experience has enabled him not only to assume his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision, but also to initiate a completely new and improved system for the maintenance of the agent records of the Korea Mission. Due partially to the efficiency of the system that he has initiated and partially to the enthusiasm with which he approaches his work, FOSHAG has assumed the work load previously handled by two individuals and at the same time has managed to keep his backlog to a minimum.

4. WOODS is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours of overtime without additional compensation in order to maintain his section on a current basis. Subject individual devoted unusually long hours to reestablish himself during the recent move of this Mission to Japan. On the basis of work performance and motivation, subject is recommended as justly deserving of promotion to GS-7.

5. I certify that WOODS is performing the duties outlined in the job description attached hereto.

/s/ JOHN L. HART

1 February 1955

1 ENCL - a/s
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Chief, FE
1 - Chief, SM

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

POSITION DESCRIPTION - James S. WOODS

1. Nature and Purpose of Work:

My position is that of intelligence analyst in the Personality File section of the Records Integration Branch. I am responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files.

2. Duties:

a. To maintain all agent records. This takes a good percentage of my time as it includes the following:

(1) Make all KOMI file checks on PRQ's and file check requests, writing up the results and forwarding them to the proper agencies.

(2) Make sure that all PRQ's and file check requests have the correct classification, the proper number of copies for distribution, correct name and telecodes, and are forwarded to the proper case officer or foreign unit.

(3) See that the results of KOMI file checks received from Headquarters and CHIKI are properly carded and forwarded to the case officer concerned.

(4) Keep all agent records up-to-date with regard to cryptonyms, POC's, OC's and other additional information received.

(5) Keep files on all terminated agents and see that the proper records are filled out and forwarded when they are terminated.

b. To maintain the RI card index, assuring that all cards received in RI are properly filed and have the correct names and telecodes.

c. To analyze, card and file all documents forwarded to Personality Files; these include State Station memos, KOR's, Contact Reports, CCRAFE Reports, EPIC's, various intelligence summaries, etc.

3. Responsibility for the Work of Others:

N/A

4. Scope and Effect of Work:

I am responsible for making all KOMI file checks. I must see that they are made out thoroughly, quickly and accurately. My check may decide the outcome of hiring or refusing to hire a prospective agent or other employee for an operation or project.

5. Supervision and Guidance Received:

I receive no direct supervision or guidance in duties relating to the maintenance of agent records. I receive over-all policy guidance from the Chief of RI and some guidance from branch chiefs and case officers.

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6 Mental Demands:

a. Initiative: In order to maintain agent records properly, I must always keep alert for new ways to keep them up-to-date and meet any demands that may be made for drawing up new procedures for the maintenance of agent records.

b. Originality: To adopt new ways of maintaining agent records without losing control over the flow of daily material.

c. Judgment: I must decide what action should be taken on all KOMI file checks, regarding what information is to be sent to Headquarters and CHDMI.

7. Personal Work Contacts:

I must maintain close personal contact with all case officers and branch chiefs in order that I may maintain up-to-date agent records.

8. Other:

I must maintain files of all documents routed to Personality Files. Also I must resolve problems the branch chiefs or case officers may have in regard to agent records.

Also, I have recently established a 201 agent record system for the Mission and am responsible for its continual maintenance.

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14-00000

CHECK LIST FOR TRAINING

Woods James S
Name

1. Typing

2. Shorthand

3. English Usage

4. Office Practice
(Electric typewriter, filing, phones, Correspondence Manual, proofreading, office protocol.)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

VOUCHERED TO UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. WOODS	20 Feb 26		16 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: Sob, 25 Apr 54

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM		TO
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intell. Anal. ~~BT-469.08~~		IO(FI) EFF 602.02-5
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	~~GS-[illegible]~~, $3410.00 p.a. GS-0132.35-5		GS-0136.51-#5, $3410.00 p.a.
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Staff~~ DIV Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section		DDP/TE ~~Foreign Division~~ UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ~~[illegible]~~ Division ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~
11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.		Lorea
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL		FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Transfer to Unvouchered Funds from Vouchered Funds.

Concur John M. Scott CHIEF, RI

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): [signature] R. C. Clinkscale, FI Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): [signature] Edward F. Mitchell FI-1 X8761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/DO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER; 5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER
	X	X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 4-2309-20 TO: 7-3740-55-096	Yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Eff date okay Spec FE-FI 16 Apr [initials]

Conc. 26 Mar 54. 16 Apr [initials]

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	Jim	29 Mar 54	
C. CLASSIFICATION		[illegible]	
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	31 Mar 54	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY [signature] [signature] 30 Mar 54

SECRET

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		1 June 1953

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Promotion

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 7 June 53

7. C. S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08
GS-~~4~~-132 (132-4) $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-~~5~~-132 (132-5) $3410.00 pa
DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI Records Integration ~~Division~~ STAFF Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject has been in grade since ~~21 April~~ 17 Aug 1952.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI *John M. Scott*

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
2510

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: *Edward C. McNamara*
Title: *Ac. FI/PO*

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5 PT.	10 POINT DISAB	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL.

CD-FI

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO:	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

N/

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	*OCD*	*4 June*	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY *Orville A. Dawson 4 June 1953*

16—57190-3

14-00000

Mr. James S. Woods 25 1 June 1953

Washington, D. C.
Intel. Anal. FI/RI

GS-4 BV-469.08
GS-5 GS-4

BV-469.08
GS-5

High School Graduate, 2 years of Business College

Treasury Dept., Accounting Clerk, GS-2, May 1950 to Jan. 1952
GS-3, Jan. 1952 to April 1952

OSO/RI, File Section, File Clerk, GS-3, 21 April 1952 to 17 Aug. 1952
GS-4, 17 Aug. 1952 to 16 March 1953
DDP/FI/RI, Consolidation Section, Mail & File Clerk, GS-4, 16 March 1953 to present

Chief, RI

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52
PROMULGATED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
JANUARY 1951—FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL CHAPTER R7

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		15 Apr 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 26 Apr 53

7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM—		TO—
Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4
GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-132 $3175.00 pa
DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)
Position BV-364.08 has been deleted from the T/O.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI John M. Scott

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: C/FI/OO

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB	10-POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX | 16. RACE | 17. APPROPRIATION FROM: 11X2100 2319-00 TO: 2319-00 | 18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) | 19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) | 20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS:
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	OCD	20 April	
E.			

F. APPROVED BY Orville D. Dawson 20 Apr 1953

10—57833-2

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.—Miss—Mrs.—One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		2 March 53

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:	7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment		
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)	B. APPROVED: 15 Mar 53	

FROM—		TO—
File Clerk BV-356	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Mail & File Clerk BV-364.08
GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 pa
DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DD/P/FI/RI Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

From BV-356 to BV-364.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
JOHN M. SCOTT, Chief, RI [signature]

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Edward C. McNamara
Title: for FI/PO

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	SPT.	10 POINT DISAB.	10 POINT OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL

15. SEX | 16. RACE | 17. APPROPRIATION FROM: TO: 1125200 2309-20 | 18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO) | 19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) | 20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL			
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY James H. Pr[illegible] - 3/6/53

14-00000

PERSONNEL ACTION REQUEST

REGISTER NO.

NAME: James S. Woods	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: 17 Aug [illegible]
NATURE OF ACTION: Promotion	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE	File Clerk X-39.04	File Clerk X-102.22
GRADE AND SALARY	GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OFFICE	OSO	OSO
DIVISION	RI	RI
BRANCH AND SECTION	Processing & Records Branch File Section	Analysis & Operations Branch Service & Correspondence Section
OFFICIAL STATION	Washington, D.C.	Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]	DEPARTMENTAL [X] FIELD [ ]

REMARKS:

From X-39.04 to X-102.22

Subject has been in grade since 21 April 1952.

Approved: John M. Scott

31 July 52 Chief, RI

RECOMMENDED:

4 23 52 (DATE) [signature] (SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED

CLEARANCE REQUESTED DATE	TYPE	CLEARANCE APPROVED DATE	TYPE

DATE | SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

BUREAU NO.	C. S. C. NO.	DATE APPROVED

NEW	VICE	I. A.	REAL

DATE 8/13/52 SIGNATURE Thomas M. [illegible]

EFFECTIVE DATE

TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
APPROPRIATION: 1/12/00
ALLOTMENT: 2309-00
C S C AUTHORITY: [illegible] 6.116
DATE SIGNATURE 8-14-52 SIGNATURE B. Leidy

PERSONNEL RELATIONS
DATE | SIGNATURE

APPROVALS [ ] SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE
DATE | SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE

DATE 7 Aug 52 | SIGNATURE OF DIVISION CHIEF [signature]

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

14-00000

21. To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are requested to furnish promptly the leave data on

From 11 May 1950 to 19 April 1952
Fiscal Acct. Clerk GS - 3 $2950.00 per annum
SUPERVISOR: Miss Ryan
U.S. Treasury Department
Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.
PLEASE FORWARD FILE AND LEAVE RECORD TO:

WOODS, JAMES S.
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquiries should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 20a.

File

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

10—61956-1

22. Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

FORWARD OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER TO
R. H. J. HOPKINS,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

To: RELEASING ORGANIZATION—You are requested to furnish promptly the leave data on

FROM 11 May 1950 to April 1952
Fiscal Acct. Clerk GS 3 $2950.00
U.S. Treasury Dept.
15th & Penna. Ave N.W.
Washington D.C.

James S. Woods
(NAME OF EMPLOYEE)

NOTE

If this address is not the correct one to which future inquiries should be mailed, be sure to insert the correct address under item 18a.

FOLD HERE FOR MAILING
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE

10-61956-4

Return to: EMPLOYING ORGANIZATION

George E. Meloon
2430 E Street N.W.
Washington D.C.

SF 1150 was forwarded by your office in May 1952. Since this copy has been detached from our files it is requested that you forward a copy of same to the address at left.

1/15 P.S.L.

14-00000

ENTRANCE ON DUTY NOTICE

1. TO	2. DATE
OSO HY	22 April 1952
Notice of Final Processing of Applicant for Entrance on Duty	
3. NAME James E. Woods	4. ENTRANCE SALARY $2950.00
5. TITLE T - File Clerk	6. GRADE GS — 3

The applicant named in item 3 above meets all standards for full employment with CIA. Signed clearance for entrance on duty has been received from Inspection and Security and made a part of the personnel file of this individual. Effective this date he/she is assigned to duty with your office.

Full - 26 March 1952
Int. - 23 April at 1:00 P.M.

POSTED
APR 30 1952

Frank C. Jarema
PERSONNEL OFFICER

FORM NO. 37-114
JAN 1952 (4)

14-00000

Date
APR 4 1952

MR. JAMES WOODS
3505 MINN. AVE, SE
CITY

Dear MR WOODS,

Your employment has been approved by this Agency at $2950 per annum, subject to the satisfactory completion of additional processing on the day you enter on duty. It is requested that you report to the Receptionist, East End of Temporary "I" Building located at 17th and Independence Avenue, S. W., at 8:30 a.m. as soon as possible.

Please advise Mrs. Brown, 2430 "E" Street, N. W., by telephone, Executive 6115, Extension 3693 of your exact reporting date.

Sincerely yours,

EJS APR 4 - 1952
FRANK J. JAREMA
Personnel Division

Subject telephoned: 4-5-52 ; spoke with EJS
(date)

Subject will EOD 21 Apr 52 - Now w/ Treasury

SUBJECT WILL NOT EOD; (Reason)

Release obtained

Del mar 4/8

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

22 March 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
3505 Minnesota Avenue, S. E.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

In reference to your application for employment, this letter is to assure you that the processing of your papers as a GS-3, $2950 per annum is being continued by this agency. A definite offer of employment cannot be made, however, until such time as all processing has been completed.

The processing is a rather lengthy one; but when further information is available, we shall get in touch with you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you would advise us of any change in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Your continued interest and patience are appreciated.

Very truly yours,

FRANK G. JAMEMA
Personnel Division

14-00000

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

PAGE NO ....

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 5 Mar 52	ROUTINE ☐	PRIORITY ☐	URGENT ☐
FROM: PDC	(ORIGINATING OFFICER)		(PHONE EXTENSION)
TRANSMIT TO: MR. JAMES WOODS ~~2817 CONNECTICUTT AVE., N. W.~~ WASHINGTON, D. C.	re new address on route sheet (CLASSIFICATION)		

TYPE IN CAPITAL LETTERS, DOUBLE SPACED

TELEGRAM - NIGHT LETTER

EMPLOYMENT APPROVED THIS AGENCY $ 2750 PER ANNUM, SUBJECT SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF ADDITIONAL PROCESSING. DESIRE REPORT SOONEST POSSIBLE RECEPTIONIST, EAST END TEMPORARY "I" BUILDING, 17TH AND INDEPENDENCE AVENUE, SOUTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 8:30 A.M. ADVISE MRS. BROWN 2430 "E" STREET NORTHWEST, BY COLLECT NIGHT LETTER OR COLLECT PHONE, EXECUTIVE 6115, EXTENSION 3698 THE EXACT REPORTING DATE.

Frank G. Jarema
FRANK G. JAREMA

Is now a GS-3 (? PHS) won't take a GS-2. ? 8 March

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 35-7 JUN 1948

14-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

20 February 1952
In reply refer to ED-4

Mr. James Woods
2317 Conn. Avenue N. W.
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

This is to advise that actual processing of your application for employment with this Agency has been initiated. Specific details as to the type of appointment and salary will be contained in subsequent correspondence. Please direct all future correspondence to the undersigned.

If applicable, the attached form should be completed and returned within two weeks. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Very truly yours,

[signature]
Personnel Division

Enclosure
2 [illegible]
1 Append
1 [illegible]
Please forward three passport size photographs at your earliest convenience.
m D

14-00000

CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE

I certify that on APR 28 1952 (DATE) I have attended the Agency Indoctrination Course specified by Regulation 25-1.

James S. Woods
(NAME)

FORM NO. 51-121
DEC 1951

384

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

File
WD

TO: Medical Division

FROM: Transactions & Records

SUBJECT: Woods., James S.

Request that above named subject be given a physical examination.

POSITION: , File Clerk

GRADE: GS - 3

BRANCH: CSO .RI

SERVICE: DEPT.

NATURE OF APPOINTMENT: EXC.

OK

[illegible]Y DACEY
[illegible] BLDG.

FORM NO. 37-115
MAY 1950

14-00000

PERSO L ACTION REQUEST

NAME: James S. WOODS	REQUESTED EFFECTIVE DATE: APR 21 1952
NATURE OF ACTION: Excepted Appointment	WHEN LEAVING (VOUCHERED) LAST WORKING DAY: EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE:

	FROM	TO
TITLE		File Clerk I-39.04-2
GRADE AND SALARY	F. C. 26 March 52	GS-305-3 $2950.00
OFFICE		OSO
DIVISION		RI
BRANCH AND SECTION		Processing and Records Branch File Section
OFFICIAL STATION		Washington, D.C.
	DEPARTMENTAL ☐ FIELD ☐	DEPARTMENTAL ☒ FIELD ☐

REMARKS:

(To P-39.04) gw

Approved: John M. Scott
Chief, RI
15 FEB 1952

#57

In Status 4-28-52

RECOMMENDED:

15 Feb '52 (DATE) — Grace L. Greene (SIGNATURE OF OFFICE CHIEF, DIVISION CHIEF OR ADM. OFFICER)

FOR USE OF PERSONNEL ONLY

PLACEMENT	TRANSACTIONS AND RECORDS
DATE QUALIFICATIONS APPROVED: James H. Powell	APPROPRIATION: 2123900
	ALLOTMENT: 3009
CLEARANCE REQUESTED: DATE / TYPE — CLEARANCE APPROVED: DATE / TYPE	C.S.C. AUTHORITY: Sch A G. 116 (B)
DATE / SIGNATURE	DATE SIGNATURE: 21 Apr 52 — SIGNATURE: Margaret C. Deasy
CLASSIFICATION: BUREAU NO / C.P.C. NO / DATE APPROVED	PERSONNEL RELATIONS: DATE / SIGNATURE: Jer E.
NEW / VICE / L.A. / REAL	APPROVALS: DATE — SUBJECT TO SECURITY CLEARANCE — SIGNATURE OF EXECUTIVE
DATE: 27 Feb. SIGNATURE: Margaret P. Burke	DATE: 4 Mar 52 — SIGNATURE OF PERSONNEL CHIEF: R. J. Goodhart
EFFECTIVE DATE	

FORM NO. 37-3
JUL 1950

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. H-2007A

DATE [illegible]

FULL NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	YEAR OF BIRTH
[illegible],	JAMES	[illegible]	1928

POSITION TITLE	GRADE	CODE
FILE CLERK	GS-3	

LOCATION (OFFICE)	CODE	DIVISION	CODE	BRANCH	CODE
OCD		[illegible]		[illegible]	

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE)
W. [illegible], D.C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE 1. [X] REGULAR 2. [ ] CONTACT 3. [ ] CONSULTANT 4. [ ] MILITARY 5. [ ] OTHERS:

FUNDS [X] VOUCHERED [ ] UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

[X] PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group) D ST. POOL

[X] SECRET

[X] FULL

[ ] WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr)	EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)	RECRUITMENT SOURCE	CODE
			01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS 1. [X] M-V 2. [ ] M-NV 3. [ ] F-V 4. [ ] F-NV

REMARKS:

SECURITY INITIATED BY [illegible]. SUPERSEDES ACTION OF 1/5/52.
CHANGE OF OFFICE, DIVISION & BRANCH.

Attachments:
PHS
Append. I
Photos.

[illegible] SIGNATURE

[illegible] DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JAN 1951

(8)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Joanna

FROM :

DATE: 8 Feb. 1952

SUBJECT: WOODS, JAMES

In process as GS2 Clerk. He wants accounting clerk eventually, but there are no openings at present, & we have two other - better qualified - accounting clerks in process in reserve at present.

Possibility for microfilm trainee?

[signature]

14-00000

P.O. 12-26

MP

2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.

January 12, 1952

Dear Sir:

I received your letter dated January 5, stating that I was to inform you of any changes in my present status.

I am now a grade GS 2 with an one year increase. I am now being considered for a grade GS 3 in the Treasury Dept. I assure you, this does not lesson my zeal to get in the C.I.A.

I would like to know if your Agency would transfer or consider me for appointment at a grade GS 3.

Sincerely yours,

James S[illegible]

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

REQUEST NO. 11-2007
DATE 1/5/52

FULL NAME (Last) WOODS (First) JAMES (Middle) GAUVIN — YEAR OF BIRTH 1928

POSITION TITLE: Clerk — GRADE: GS-2 — CODE

LOCATION (OFFICE): Personnel — CODE — DIVISION: Personnel (O) — CODE — BRANCH: Personnel Pool — CODE

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE): Washington, D. C.

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE: 1. [XX] REGULAR 2. [ ] CONTACT 3. [ ] CONSULTANT 4. [ ] MILITARY 5. [ ] OTHER:

FUNDS: [XX] VOUCHERED [ ] UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

[XX] PROVISIONAL POOL (Show name of pool or group) D. Street Pool
[XX] SECRET
[XX] FULL
[XX] WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr): — EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr): — RECRUITMENT SOURCE: — CODE: 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS: 1. [ ] M-V 2. [XX] M-NV 3. [ ] F-V 4. [ ] F-NV

REMARKS:

Morris 1-17-52

Attachments:
PHS
Append. I — 1
Photos. — 1

CONFIDENTIAL

JOSEPH D. RAGAN [initials]
Chief, Personnel Division
DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

SECURITY INFORMATION

14-00000

5 January 1952

Mr. James S. Woods
2017 Conn. Ave. N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Woods:

You are being considered for employment with the Central Intelligence Agency at grade GS-2, salary ~~$2750.00~~ per annum.

The appointment, if offered, will be temporary indefinite in nature. Processing procedures require about 30 days to complete. Unless you are notified to the contrary during this period, you may assume that you are being actively considered for employment. Upon completion of this processing, we will contact you immediately.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if you will keep us advised of any changes in your present status, such as change of address, etc.

Please let us know immediately if during the interim you find that you will not be able to accept employment with this organization.

Very truly yours,

Joseph B. Ragan
Chief, Personnel Division

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE

SECURITY INFORMATION

REQUEST NO.

DATE: 4 JAN. 1952

FULL NAME (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE

YEAR OF BIRTH: 1928

POSITION TITLE: CLERK

GRADE: GS 2

CODE

LOCATION (OFFICE): POOL

CODE | DIVISION | CODE | BRANCH | CODE

GEOGRAPHIC DESTINATION (CITY AND STATE OR COUNTRY, AS APPROPRIATE)

TYPE OF EMPLOYEE: 1. [✓] REGULAR 2. [ ] CONTACT 3. [ ] CONSULTANT 4. [ ] MILITARY 5. [ ] OTHER:

FUNDS: [✓] VOUCHERED [ ] UNVOUCHERED

TYPE(S) OF SECURITY CLEARANCE REQUESTED

[✓] PROVISIONAL FOR: (Show name of pool or group)

[✓] SECRET

[✓] FULL

[ ] WAIVER

AVAILABILITY DATE (Da-Mo-Yr): asap

EST. CLEARANCE DATE (Mo-Yr)

RECRUITMENT SOURCE

CODE: 01

SEX AND VETERAN STATUS: 1. [✓] M-V 2. [ ] M-NV 3. [ ] F-V 4. [ ] F-NV

REMARKS:

89 to Med. Sec 1/5

Attachments:
PHS
Append, I ______
Photos. ______

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

[signature]
SIGNATURE

DIVISION

FORM NO. 37-104
JUN 1951

(9)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : File

DATE: 3 January 1952

FROM :

SUBJECT: James S. Woods

1. Contacted Treasury Dept. this date and Employee Relations Officer stated that subject had no efficiency ratings since he had not been there long enough before being granted military furlough and after his discharge. However, she stated that Mr. Woods had been a very satisfactory employee and there was nothing derogatory in his file.

L. E. BLAIS

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

THIS DATE: 18 Dec. 51

NAME: James Sauvie Woods

REFERRED BY:

HOME ADDRESS: 2817 Conn. Ave., N. W. Wash., D. C.
TELEPHONE: AD 8430

BUSINESS ADDRESS: Treasury
TELEPHONE: EX 6400 x2612

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)
2:20:1928	Forest River, N. D.	US

NAME OF SPOUSE: none - no expectations

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP (HOW ACQUIRED)

SALARY REQUESTED	NO. OF DEPENDENTS	INTERVIEWER
GS-2	none	WM. J. BINGHAM

EDUCATION (SCHOOLS, DEGREES, DATES, MAJORS, EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES)

Hadlich's Bus. Sch. Diploma in jr. accounting

MAJOR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION, SPECIAL SKILLS, SALARY LEVELS)

Present- Treasury Dept. L/A attached

MILITARY OCCUPATION (RANK, SERIAL NO., DATES OF SERVICE, DUTIES AND AREAS)

Oct 3, 1946 Apr 12, 1948

Oct 19, 1950 Aug 7, 1951

Pfc (Infantry)

FORM NO. 37-117
JAN 1951

CONFIDENTIAL

(4-11)

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

AREA KNOWLEDGE (RESIDENCE OR STUDY)

Japan, Korea (US Army) No 10-9

LANGUAGE FACILITY

None

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (BE COMPLETE AND JUSTIFY DECISIONS, NOTE ANY UNFAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.)

A CLEAN CUT, BRIGHT EYED, EAGER YOUNGSTER, VERY AMBITIOUS BUT HAS HAD LIMITED EXPERIENCE. HE WOULD LIKE TO GET INTO ACCOUNTING, BUT HE HAS HAD ONLY BASIC ACCOUNTING AND HAS NEVER HAD A JOB IN ACCOUNTING TO TEST HIM. HE IS WILLING TO TAKE A CLERK JOB IF HE WILL GET A ~~CLEARANCE~~ CHANCE AT ACCOUNTING. WILL GO O/S. FEELS HE IS BLOCKED IN HIS JOB IN TREASURY DEPT. SINCE HE WILL COME AS A GS-2, I WOULD TAKE A CHANCE ON ~~HO~~ HIM IF HIS TESTS SHOW ANYTHING ENCOURAGING. HE EXPECTS TO ENTER STRAYERS COLLEGE OF ACCOUNTING (NIGHT) IN FEBRUARY. DOES NOT DESIRE POOL. SUGGEST MISS MC KENNEY LOOK HIM OVER. FORMS ATTACHED. HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR GS-4 CLERK-ACCT. TEST ON 20 DECEMBER.

FORMS GIVEN: ☐ PHS ☐ MEDICAL ☐ RESERVE

WILLIAM J. BINGHAM
SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO: Personnel Division
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 "E" Street, N. W.
Washington, 25, D. C.

DEC 3 1951

SUBJECT: Availability of James S. Woods

1. This is to advise you that no objection is interposed to your consideration of the application for employment of the above-named individual who is presently employed by this office.

2. In the event this employee is accepted by your Agency, it is requested that the individual named below be contacted relative to the effective date of his ~~transfer~~ release.

[signature]
(Signature)

Acting Personnel Officer
(Title)

Bureau of Accounts
Treasury Department
(Agency)

Contact for further information:

Frances C. Murphy
(Name) Employee Relations Officer

Code 172, Extension 2628
(Telephone)

14-00000

SECERT

SECRET

REPRODUCTION MASTERS

BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE

SECRET

Handle With Care

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 12 May 1975
FILE NO.: 2542

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) CCS

SS NUMBER: 502-16-6806
EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032
ID CARD NUMBER:

ATTN: CHIEF ADMIN STAFF
REF: VERBAL REQUEST

OFFICIAL COVER: ESTABLISHED / X DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.
UNIT:

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER-UNBLOCK RECORDS
	X EFFECTIVE DATE: EOD
BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____	X SUBMIT FORM 3254 CIA W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TDY ____ OTHER (Specify)	X SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY 2 (HHB 20-7)
SUBMIT FORM 642 IMMEDIATELY TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)	X EAA: CATEGORY I X CATEGORY II
SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ (HHB 20-11)	X RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2e)	X SUBMIT FORM 24 ... CIA
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2e)	DO NOT ... THIS ...
EAA. CATEGORY I ____ CATEGORY II ____	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

THIS MEMO MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr52-Aug54	HQS/Overt
Aug54-Nov56	Korea and Japan/DAC
Nov56-Aug57	HQS/Overt
Aug57-Feb59	Philippines/DAEC
Feb59-Mar61	HQS/DAFC
Mar61-Jan67	Japan/DAC
Jan67-Oct68	HQS/STATE-NOM
Oct68-Nov70	London/DAC
Nov70-Jun71	HQS/DAC
Jun71-Aug73	Rome-STATE-NOM
Aug73-Present	Overt

COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SRACD
COPY 4 - OC-CO/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

EDF:JP

[signature]
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER BRANCH, COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF

FORM 1-74 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 0/7622

(13-20-43)

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF [illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

FILE NO.

SS NUMBER

EMPLOYEE NUMBER

ID CARD NUMBER

TO: (Check)
- CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION, OP
- CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN:

REF:

OFFICIAL COVER: ESTABLISHED / DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT

UNIT

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS EFFECTIVE DATE:
BASIC COVER PROVIDED EFFECTIVE DATE ____	SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ W-2 TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)
OPERATIONAL COVER PROVIDED FOR ____ TO ____ (Specify)	SUBMIT FORM 642 [illegible] TO CHANGE TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)
SUBMIT FORM 642 [illegible] TELEPHONE LIMITATION CATEGORY TO CATEGORY ____ (HHB 20-7)	EAA: CATEGORY I / CATEGORY II
	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS
SUBMIT FORM 3254 ____ TO BE ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD.
SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR 240-2)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR 240-2)	
EAA. CATEGORY I / CATEGORY II	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ____ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

[illegible]

DISTRIBUTION:
COPY 1 - CD or CPD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - OS/SH&CD
COPY 4 - OL/TFB
COPY 5 - CCS-FILE

James [illegible] Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER; CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 10 May 1971

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 010032

ID CARD NUMBER:

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, CONTROL DIVISION
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action) EUR

ATTN: EUR/Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1413 dated 6 May 1971

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED / DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT: Department of State

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPM 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ______ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE ______ B. CONTINUING AS OF From EOD	DATE
X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT State W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 FOR ______ HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52 - Aug 54 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 54 - Nov 56 - Korea/Japan - DAC
Nov 56 - Aug 57 - Headquarters - Overt
Aug 57 - Feb 59 - Philippines - DAFC
Feb 59 - Mar 61 - Headquarters - DAFC
Mar 61 - Jan 67 - Japan - DAC
Jan 67 - Oct 68 - Headquarters - Nom State
Oct 68 - Nov 70 - London - DAC
Nov 70 - June 71 - Headquarters - DAC
June 71 - Rome - Nom State

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - CD
COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT
COPY 3 - D/OS
COPY 4 - CL/TELEXEC
COPY 5 - ??
COPY 6 - CCS - FILE

RF:km

[signature] James A. Franklin

CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 12-70 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION SECRET (13-20-43)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF ESTA[illegible]SHMENT OR CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER BACKSTOP

DATE: 1? November 1970

FILE NUMBER: 2542

EMPLOYEE NUMBER: 10032

ID CARD NUMBER: [illegible]AG-542

TO: (Check)
- X CHIEF, RECORDS AND CONTROL
- CHIEF, CONTRACT PERSONNEL DIVISION
- X CHIEF, OPERATING COMPONENT (For action)

ATTN: EUR/ Chief Support Staff

REF: Form 1322

OFFICIAL COVER: X BACKSTOP ESTABLISHED / DISCONTINUED

SUBJECT: WOODS, James S.

UNIT: Records Analysis Group

KEEP ON TOP OF FILE WHILE COVER IN EFFECT

X ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICIAL COVER BLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)	CANCELLATION OF OFFICIAL COVER UNBLOCK RECORDS (OPN 20-800-11)
A. TEMPORARILY FOR ____ DAYS EFFECTIVE DATE COB ____ B. CONTINUING AS OF COB Aug 57	DATE (as of COB)
X SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)	SUBMIT FORM 642 TO CHANGE LIMITATION CATEGORY. (HHB 20-7)
X ASCERTAIN THAT Army W-2 BEING ISSUED. (HHB 20-11)	RETURN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION TO CCS.
X SUBMIT FORM 1322 FOR ANY CHANGE AFFECTING THIS COVER. (HR-240-2e)	DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK - FOR CCS INTERNAL USE ONLY
X SUBMIT FORM 1323 FOR TRANSFERRING COVER RESPONSIBILITY. (HR-240-2e)	
SUBMIT FORM 2688 [X] FOR HOSPITALIZATION CARD	

REMARKS AND/OR COVER HISTORY

Apr 52-Aug 54 Hqs Overt
Aug 54-Nov 56 Korea and Japan DAC
Nov 56-Aug 57 Hqs Overt
Aug 57-Feb 59 Philippines DAFC
Feb 59-Mar 61 Hqs DAFC
Mar 61-Sep 66 Japan DAC and DAFC
Sep 66-Jan 67 Hqs State Nom
Jan 67-Oct 69 Vietnam State Nom.
Oct 69-Nov 70 England DAC
Nov 70 Hqs DAC

DISTRIBUTION: COPY 1 - RCD; COPY 2 - OPERATING COMPONENT; COPY 3 - [illegible]; COPY 4 - [illegible]; COPY 5 - [illegible]; COPY 6 - [illegible]

HC/pt

James H. Franklin (signature)
CHIEF, OFFICIAL COVER, CENTRAL COVER STAFF

FORM 1551 USE PREVIOUS EDITION

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

6 Mar 59

File: 2542

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records and Services Division
Office of Personnel

SUBJECT : James Sauvie WOODS

1. Cover arrangements ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ have been completed for the above-named Subject.

2. Effective as 5 Mar 1959, it is requested that your records be properly blocked ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to deny ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Subject's current Agency employment to an external inquirer.

3. This memorandum confirms an oral request of 6 Mar 59 by Mr. E. C. Davies, Room 1608 "L" Building, Extension 2420.

Paul P. Stewart
for HARRY W. LITTLE, JR.
Chief, Central Cover Division

cc: SSD/OS

SECRET REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

FORM 1580a (6-12-40)

14-00000

SECRET

DEC 5 1956
(Date)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Records & Services Division
Office of Personnel

THROUGH : Security Support Division
Office of Security

SUBJECT : James S. WOODS

1. Cover arrangements have been completed for the above named subject who will be visiting a foreign country for a ________ day TDY trip.

2. Effective this date, it is requested that your records be properly (XXXXXXX) (re-opened) to (XXXX) (acknowledge) subject's current Agency employment by an external inquirer.

Edward J. Boston
for JOSEPH M. ADAMS
Chief, Official Cover & Liaison, CCB

CC: SSD/OS

THIS CARD MUST REMAIN ON TOP OF FILE

SECRET

7-11-54

SECRET
(When Filled In)

EMR 080878

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OFF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT (VOLUNTARY) UNDER CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	08 04 78	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					8026 3430 0000	PL 88-643 SEC 233

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/IMS INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH AREAS UNIT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE	CG45	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	13 2	26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ. Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hours Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
45	10					02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) / CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
			OBJ0000				

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP / CODE)	39 FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE, 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES, HEALTH INS CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO, CODE, NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO, CODE, NO TAX EXEMP, STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

ULS

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 — Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

153078

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCE

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	04 09 78	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	8026 3430 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/IMS INFORMATION MGMT AND PLANNING GROUP RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH AREAS UNIT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF NE	C045	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	13 2	26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	53740	IMS 75013			1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE) CODE | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

BOD DATA

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: NE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF R

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	03 12 78	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					8033 4800 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/NE DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION PLANS STAFF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF	CG45	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	13 2	26889

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	46075	NE	75013		1	03 20 28	03 12 78	03 12 78

28. TITLE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
		1 - CSC 2 - CIA 3 - FICA 4 - NONE		EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO
0 - NONE 1 - 5 PT 2 - 10 PT			CAR RESV PROV TEMP	0 - WAIVER 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE	

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA
0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS		FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS	FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

MAR 22 1978

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

1 SERIAL NO	2 NAME	3 ORGANIZATION	4 FUNDS	5 LWOP HOURS
010032	[illegible] S JAM[illegible]S	[illegible]		

6 OLD SALARY RATE				7 NEW SALARY RATE				8 TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	WGI	QSI	ADJ.
12	6	~~$2[illegible]~~ 24070	11/23/75	12	5	~~[illegible]~~ 24799	11/20/[illegible]			

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE 15 Sept 1977

☐ NO EXCESS LWOP

☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

☐ LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS ... AUDITED BY [initials]

FORM 10-73 560E Use previous editions

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

(4-51)

Nov 15 3 15 PM '77

LJF 110977

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND CANCELLATION OF NSCA	07 11 77	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			8033 4801 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/NE DIVISION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, NE DIVISION PLANS STAFF	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF	CG45	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WG, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 4	24070

18. REMARKS
THIS ACTION REFLECTS NEW LEGISLATIVE PAY INCREASE EFFECTIVE 10/09/77.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	46075 NE	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ. NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT.) | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE) | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS) | 44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

FROM: CCS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
NOV 18 1977

FORM 1150 5-74 Mfg 10-74 — Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

A11 L20 1C0 045

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5 U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 12010 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 09 OCTOBER 1977

NAME	ID NUMBER	ORG.	SCH-GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	0010032	CCS	GS 12 4	$24,070

15848

14-00000

KKK: 22 JULY 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT - CHANGE OF HOME BASE	07 13 76	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NOCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	T230 0118 0002	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS REGISTRY	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	BL44	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 4	21324

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	39115	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES — 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE — 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE) — 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE — 32. Correction/Cancellation Data — EOD DATA — 33. SECURITY REQ NO — 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.); 3 BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.)) — 42. LEAVE CAT CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

AEO: 13 AUG 76

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CHANGE OF FAN	08 09 76	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X V TO V / CF TO V	V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X		T230 0130 0002	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS REGISTRY	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	BL44	DCC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 4	21324

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hours Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	39115 CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28. FITE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO. | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 NONE, 1 5 PT, 2 10 PT) | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS, 3 BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
AUG 1976

FORM 1150 Use Previous

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

PJCS 01/31/76

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	01 23 76	

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	CF TO CF	6230 0118 0002	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	EL44	DAC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

30 205

Form 1150a 8-72 MFG. 7-74 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

"E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622"

(4-37)

SERIAL NO.	NAME	ORGANIZATION	FUNDS	LWOP HOURS
010032	[illegible] JAMES [illegible]	39 115	V	

OLD SALARY RATE				NEW SALARY RATE				TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	SI	ADJ
GS 12	3	20678	11/24/74	GS 12	4	21324	11/23/75		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE 12 Sept 1975

- [X] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [X] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS [illegible]

FORM 7-66 560E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-51)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11941 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1976

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 4	$22,485

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11883 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 12 OCTOBER 1975

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 12 3	$20,678

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	11 24 74	REGULAR

FUNDS	X	V TO V		V TO CF	7. FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V		CF TO CF	5230 0121 0002	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS REGISTRY	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN GE CH	0031	DAC

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	12 3	19693

18 REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 Employ Code	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21 OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27 DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	35115	CCS	75043		1	02 20 28	11 24 74	11 24 74

28 NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 5 - NONE) CODE	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36 SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37 LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38 CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, PROV, RESV, TEMP) CODE	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS.), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS.))	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44 STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES, 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
DEC 2 1974

FORM 1150 9-72 Mfg 8-73 Use Previous Edition

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET

14-00000

BBG: 19 SEPT 73

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1 SERIAL NUMBER	2 NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3 NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4 EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5 CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS AND DELEGATION OF NSCA	09 10 73	REGULAR

6 FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7 FAN AND NSCA	8 CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		4230 0121 0002	50 USC 403 J

9 ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10 LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDO/CCS OFFICE OF THE CHIEF RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND REGISTRY SEC	WASH., D.C.

11 POSITION TITLE	12 POSITION NUMBER	13 SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	0061	D

14 CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15 OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16 GRADE AND STEP	17 SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	11 6	16326

18 REMARKS

W-2 INFO: CIA

HOME BASE: SS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 ACTION CODE	20 EMPLOY CODE	21 OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21 OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22 STATION CODE	23 INTEGREE CODE	24 HDQTRS CODE	25 DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26 DATE OF GRADE	27 DATE OF LEI
16	10	35160	CCS	75013		1	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES	29 SPECIAL REFERENCE	30 RETIREMENT DATA	31 SEPARATION DATA CODE	32 Correction/Cancellation Data	33 SECURITY REQ NO	34 SEX
XX XX XX				EOD DATA		

35 VET PREFERENCE	36 SERV COMP DATE	37 LONG COMP DATE	38 CAREER CATEGORY	39 FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42 LEAVE CAT CODE	43 FEDERAL TAX DATA	44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM: EUR

POSTED
9-20-73

FORM 1150 5-72 Mfg 11/72 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11811 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 OCTOBER 1974

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$18,061

FOR PURPOSES OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, AS AMENDED, YOU ARE DESIGNATED EXEMPT.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF DESIGNATION: 01 MAY 1974.

WOODS JAMES S 010032 42300121

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5305 OF TITLE 5, U.S.C. AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11739 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 OCTOBER 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	39 115	V	GS 11 6	$17,116

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 U.S.C. 5305 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11691 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 08 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 07 JANUARY 1973

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$15,331

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT CORRECTED FROM 7 JAN 1973 TO 1 OCT 1972 U[illegible] EXECUTIVE ORDER 11777, DATED 12 APR 1974.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

LML: 13 FEB 73

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	02 04 73	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	3135 1267 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUROPEAN DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OF	0699	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	11 6	16326

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: IS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	44750	EUR	36533		3	02 20 28	02 04 73	02 04 73

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1-CSC 2-CIA 3-FICA 4-NONE)	CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Career Conditional Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
02 03 74	81							

35. VET PREFERENCE (CODE; 0-NONE, 1-5 PT, 2-10 PT)	36. SERV COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI/HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (CODE; 0-NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1-NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2-BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3-BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 92-210 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11637 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 9 JANUARY 1972

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 750	CF	GS 10 7	$14,581

14-00000

23 MAY 1971

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS	05 30 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	1136 1267 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DIVISION FOREIGN FIELD ITALIAN AREA ROME STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	ROME, ITALY

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OF	0699	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 7	13821

18. REMARKS

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Special Ref. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	44525	EUR	36533		3	02 20 28		

28. DATE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data		33. SECURITY REQ. NO.	34. SEX
05 23 73	82				EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE | 36. SERV. COMP. DATE | 37. LONG COMP. DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42. LEAVE CAT. CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
6-3-71

Form 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

DMB

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARS: 11 MARCH 71

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST FIRST MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
CHANGE OF FAN	02 18 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	X	V TO V / CF TO V		V TO CF / CF TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
					1236 1166 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OFFICER	9957	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 7	13621

18. REMARKS

OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19 Action Code	20 Employ Code	21 Office Coding Numeric	Alphabetic	22 Station Code	23 Integree Code	24 Hdqtrs Code	25 Date of Birth	26 Date of Grade	27 Date of LEI
37	16	44997	EUR	75013		1	02 20 28		

28 NTE EXPIRES | 29 SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30 RETIREMENT DATA (1 CSC, 2 CIA, 3 FICA, 4 NONE) | 31 SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32 Correction Cancellation Data | FOR DATA | 33 SECURITY REQ. NO | 34 SEX

35 VET PREFERENCE | 36 SERV COMP DATE | 37 LONG COMP DATE | 38 CAREER CATEGORY | 39 FEGLI HEALTH INSURANCE | 40 SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41 PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE | 42 LEAVE CAT CODE | 43 FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44 STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 3-12-71

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

800

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-656 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11576 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 JANUARY 1971

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES 3	010032	44 997	V	GS 10 7	$13,821

ARS: 27 JAN 71

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OKF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS, JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS-CORRECTION	01 10 71	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1234 1186 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OFFICER	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 7	13821

18. REMARKS

THIS ACTION CORRECTS FORM 1150 THE EFFECTIVE DATE WHICH READ 12/13/70 TO READ 01/10/71.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	21. OFFICE CODING (ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hrs/Qtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
58	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	02 20 28		

29. NTE EXP RES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data (TYPE)	32. (MO DA YR)		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
				16	12 13 70	EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE	36. SERV COMP DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. CAREER CATEGORY	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA	44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
1-29-71 [illegible]

FORM 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

BBG

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

ARS: 11 DEC 70

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER ~~TO~~ VOUCHERED FUNDS	12 13 70	REGULAR

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	X	CF TO V		CF TO CF	1236 1186 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR DEVELOPMENT COMPLEMENT	WASH., D.C.

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OFF	9997	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 7	13041

18. REMARKS
OTHER

HOME BASE: EUR

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Category Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
16	18	44997	EUR	75013		1	02 20 25		

28. NTE EXPIRES | 29. SPECIAL REFERENCE | 30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 3 - NONE) | 31. SEPARATION DATA CODE | 32. Correction/Cancellation Data | EOD DATA | 33. SECURITY REQ NO | 34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE | 36. SERV COMP DATE | 37. LONG COMP DATE | 38. CAREER CATEGORY | 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE | 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS); 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS)) | 42. LEAVE CAT CODE | 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA | 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
11 12-17-70

FORM 1150 5-66 Mfg. 6-70 | Use Previous Edition

SECRET
(When Filled In)
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

1. SERIAL NO	2. NAME	3. ORGANIZATION	4. FUNDS	5. LWOP HOURS
010032	WOODS JAMES S.	44 525	CF	

6. OLD SALARY RATE				7. NEW SALARY RATE				8. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff Date	Grade	Step	Salary	EFFECTIVE DATE	SI	ADJ
GS 10	6	$12,679	07/28/68	GS 10	7	$13,061	07/26/70		

CERTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE [signature] DATE 6/23/70

- [ ] NO EXCESS LWOP
- [ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
- [ ] LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

FORM 7-66 560 E Use previous editions PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION (4-81)

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 91-231 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11524 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 28 DECEMBER 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$12,679

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 212 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11474 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 13 JULY 1969

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	44 525	CF	GS 10 6	$11,942

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

4 NOV 68

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	11 04 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	9136 1214 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/EUR FOREIGN FIELD BRITISH COMMONWEALTH REGION LONDON STATION SUPPORT BRANCH REGISTRY SECTION	LONDON, ENGLAND

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADM OF	0254	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 6	10847

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC)	(ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Military Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
37	10	44525	EUR	21025		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction/Cancellation Data	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
11 03 70	83						

35. VET PREFERENCE — 36. SERV. COMP. DATE — 37. LONG COMP. DATE — 38. CAREER CATEGORY — 39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE — 40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE — 42. LEAVE CAT CODE — 43. FEDERAL TAX DATA — 44. STATE TAX DATA

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

FROM FE

11-7-68 ED

Dm

FORM 5-66 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

VD: 6 AUG 68

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
PROMOTION	07 28 68	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. Financial Analysis No. Chargeable	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V: X	CF TO CF	9137 1487 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
FE/VNO VIET NAM STATION INTELLIGENCE DIVISION COLLATION BRANCH CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SECTION BIOGRAPHIC UNIT	SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF	4984	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	10 6	10847

18. REMARKS

RECORDS ADMIN OFFICER OCCUPYING IO GENERAL POSITION

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING Numeric	Alphabetic	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
22	10	45500	FE	77205		3	02 20 28	07 28 68	07 28 68

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO DA YR)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - CIA, 3 - FICA, 4 - NONE) Code	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. Correction - Cancellation Data (Type, MO DA YR)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX

35. VET PREFERENCE (Code; 0 None, 1 5 Pt, 2 10 Pt)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	37. LONG COMP DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) Code	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (Code; 0 Waived, 1 Yes; Health Ins. Code)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT SERVICE (Code; 0 No previous service, 1 No break in service, 2 Break in service less than 3 yrs, 3 Break in service more than 3 yrs)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (Form executed 1 Yes 2 No; Code; No. Tax Exemptions)	44. STATE TAX DATA (Form executed 1 Yes 2 No; Code; No. Tax Exemp; State Code)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
[signature] 8/6/68

14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 212 AND 216 OF PL 90-206 AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 11413 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962"

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 14 JULY 1968

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,668	$10,154

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 90-206 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 8 OCTOBER 1967

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 500	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,262	$ 9,668

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCS 05/31/67

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	05 21 67	

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO CF	7. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	7137 1487 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE DIVISION	SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF	4965	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	09	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

[signature] 9/24/67

Form 1150B 7-66 MFG. 9-66 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(4-51)

MRT: 9 DEC 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
DESIGNATION AS PARTICIPANT IN CIA RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM	12 18 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X CF TO CF	7137 1566 0000	PL 88-643 SECT. 203

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE	Saigon, South Viet Nam (handwritten); ~~TOKYO, JAPAN~~

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
		D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
		09	

18. REMARKS

EMPLOYEE WILL RECEIVE NOTIFICATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THIS DESIGNATION AND RIGHT OF APPEAL TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ. Code	21. OFFICE CODING (NUMERIC / ALPHABETIC)	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO. DA. YR.)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO. DA. YR.)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO. DA. YR.)

28. MTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO. DA. YR.)	EOD DATA	33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
		2					

35. VET. PREFERENCE (CODE: 0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	37. LONG. COMP. DATE (MO. DA. YR.)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RES, PROV, TEMP; CODE)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE: 0 - WAIVER, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS. CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (CODE: 0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE (LESS THAN 3 YRS), 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE (MORE THAN 3 YRS))	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED 12-14-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

SECRET (When Filled In)

14-00000

MRT: 8 DEC 66

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

OCF

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO. DA. YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	12 08 66	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V	V TO CF	CF TO V	CF TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
			X		7137 1487 0000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE FOREIGN FIELD FE/VNC - VIETNAM STATION EXECUTIVE OFFICE REGISTRY SECTION	SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. SERVICE DESIGNATION
RECORDS ADMIN OF	4127	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0344.01	09 7	9262

18. REMARKS

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE (MO DA YR)	27. DATE OF LEI (MO DA YR)
37	10	45500	FE	77205		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES (MO. DA. YR.)	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)		33. SECURITY REQ NO.	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET. PREFERENCE CODE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT., 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP DATE (MO. DA YR)	37. LONG COMP. DATE (MO DA YR)	38. CAREER CATEGORY (CAR, RESV, PROV, TEMP) CODE	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (CODE; 0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA CODE (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE; 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE; 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 3 YRS; 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 3 YRS)	42. LEAVE CAT. CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO TAX EXEMP; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
12-12-66

FORM 11-62 1150 Use Previous Edition

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14-00000

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-504 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI DIRECTIVE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 3 JULY 1966

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN.	FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380	CF	GS 09 7	$ 9,003	$ 9,262

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS-09	6	08749	11/07/65	GS-09	7	09003	03/27/66			

8. Remarks and Authentication

QUALITY STEP INCREASE

/s/ Emmett D. Echols Date: 21 March 1966

"PAY ADJUSTMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SALARY SCHEDULES OF PL 89-301 PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF DCI AS PROVIDED IN THE CIA ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND A-DCI POLICY DIRECTIVE DATED 2 OCTOBER 1962."

EFFECTIVE DATE OF PAY ADJUSTMENT: 10 OCTOBER 1965

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN. FUNDS	GR-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	45 380 CF	GS 09 3	$ 8,200	$ 8,495

19

10F

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
010032	WOODS JAMES S	45 380 CF	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 8495	11/10/63	GS 09	6	$ 8749	11/07/65			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ ✓ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

4 7/2

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE.

SIGNATURE: [signature] DATE 11 October 65

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

14-00000

ADJUSTMENT OF SALARY RATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULES OF THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES SALARY REFORM ACT OF 1964 PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AS PROVIDED IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED, AND POLICY DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DATED 8 OCTOBER 1962.

SALARY CONVERTED TO RATE SHOWN FOR INDIVIDUAL'S GRADE AND STEP AS INDICATED IN CHART BELOW.

GENERAL SCHEDULE RATES

Federal Employees Salary Act of 1964

GRADE	*Per Annum Rates and Steps*									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
GS- 1	$3,385	$3,500	$3,615	$3,730	$3,845	$3,960	$4,075	$4,190	$4,305	$4,420
GS- 2	3,680	3,805	3,930	4,055	4,180	4,305	4,430	4,555	4,680	4,805
GS- 3	4,005	4,140	4,275	4,410	4,545	4,680	4,815	4,950	5,085	5,220
GS- 4	4,480	4,630	4,780	4,930	5,080	5,230	5,380	5,530	5,680	5,830
GS- 5	5,000	5,165	5,330	5,495	5,660	5,825	5,990	6,155	6,320	6,485
GS- 6	5,505	5,690	5,875	6,060	6,245	6,430	6,615	6,800	6,985	7,170
GS- 7	6,050	6,250	6,450	6,650	6,850	7,050	7,250	7,450	7,650	7,850
GS- 8	6,630	6,850	7,070	7,290	7,510	7,730	7,950	8,170	8,390	8,610
GS- 9	7,220	7,465	7,710	7,955	8,200	8,445	8,690	8,935	9,180	9,425
GS-10	7,900	8,170	8,440	8,710	8,980	9,250	9,520	9,790	10,060	10,330
GS-11	8,650	8,945	9,240	9,535	9,830	10,125	10,420	10,715	11,010	11,305
GS-12	10,250	10,605	10,960	11,315	11,670	12,025	12,380	12,735	13,090	13,445
GS-13	12,075	12,495	12,915	13,335	13,755	14,175	14,595	15,015	15,435	15,855
GS-14	14,170	14,660	15,150	15,640	16,130	16,620	17,110	17,600	18,090	18,580
GS-15	16,460	17,030	17,600	18,170	18,740	19,310	19,880	20,450	21,020	21,590
GS-16	18,935	19,590	20,245	20,900	21,555	22,210	22,865	23,520	24,175	.....
GS-17	21,445	22,195	22,945	23,695	24,445	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....
GS-18	24,500	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....

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(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

ADPD 09/18/64

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT	09 18 64	

6. FUNDS		V TO V		V TO G	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
		G TO V	X	G TO G	5137 1566 0000	

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP/FE DIVISION JKO TOKYO CEN REG REC	TOKYO JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTEL ANALYST CH	4466	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, LB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.39	09	

18. REMARKS

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED

9/24/64 [signature]

Form 1150a 1963 MAG 1-63 Use Previous Edition

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(When Filled In)

AES: 16 MARCH 61

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OCF

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. SERIAL NUMBER	2. NAME (LAST-FIRST-MIDDLE)
010032	WOODS JAMES S

3. NATURE OF PERSONNEL ACTION	4. EFFECTIVE DATE (MO DA YR)	5. CATEGORY OF EMPLOYMENT
REASSIGNMENT & TRANSFER TO CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS*	03 19 61	REGULAR

6. FUNDS	V TO V		V TO CF	7. COST CENTER NO. CHARGEABLE	8. CSC OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
	CF TO V	X	CF TO CF	1137 7351 1000	50 USC 403 J

9. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	10. LOCATION OF OFFICIAL STATION
DDP FE FE/JAO TOKYO STATION OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CENTRAL REGISTRY AND RECORDS SEC	TOKYO JAPAN

11. POSITION TITLE	12. POSITION NUMBER	13. CAREER SERVICE DESIGNATION
INTEL ANALYST GEN	3061	D

14. CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE (GS, WB, etc.)	15. OCCUPATIONAL SERIES	16. GRADE AND STEP	17. SALARY OR RATE
GS	0132.36	09 3	6765

18. REMARKS
*SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

SPACE BELOW FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

19. ACTION CODE	20. Employ Code	21. OFFICE CODING NUMERIC	ALPHABETIC	22. STATION CODE	23. INTEGREE CODE	24. Hdqtrs. Code	25. DATE OF BIRTH (MO DA YR)	26. DATE OF GRADE	27. DATE OF LEI
20	10	56380	FE	37587		3	02 20 28		

28. NTE EXPIRES	29. SPECIAL REFERENCE	30. RETIREMENT DATA (1 - CSC, 2 - FICA, 3 - NONE) CODE	31. SEPARATION DATA CODE	32. CORRECTION/CANCELLATION DATA (TYPE, MO DA YR)		33. SECURITY REQ NO	34. SEX
					EOD DATA		

35. VET PREFERENCE (0 - NONE, 1 - 5 PT, 2 - 10 PT)	36. SERV. COMP. DATE	37. LONG COMP DATE	38. MIL SERV. CREDIT/LCD (1 - YES, 2 - NO)	39. FEGLI / HEALTH INSURANCE (0 - WAIVED, 1 - YES; HEALTH INS CODE)	40. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

41. PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT SERVICE DATA (0 - NO PREVIOUS SERVICE, 1 - NO BREAK IN SERVICE, 2 - BREAK IN SERVICE LESS THAN 12 MOS., 3 - BREAK IN SERVICE MORE THAN 12 MOS.)	42. LEAVE CAT CODE	43. FEDERAL TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPTIONS)	44. STATE TAX DATA (FORM EXECUTED 1 - YES 2 - NO; CODE; NO. TAX EXEMPT; STATE CODE)

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

POSTED
03/22/61 WK

Form 1150 5-60 Obsolete Previous Editions

SECRET

Ç ... 3-16-61

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 5 JANUARY 1964.

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	49 380	CF	GS 09 5	$ 7,575	$ 7,950

1. Serial No.	2. Name			3. Cost Center Number			4. LWOP Hours		
010032	WOODS JAMES S			56 380 CF 11					
5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION	
Grade	Step	Salary	Last EH Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	4	$ 7,350	11/12/61	GS 09	5	$ 7,575	11/10/63			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP

/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

/ / LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

CLERKS INITIALS AUDITED BY

742 dd 11/7

I CERTIFY THAT THE WORK OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE IS OF AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF COMPETENCE. 11-14-63

SIGNATURE: DATE

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Form 9-61 560 Obsolete Previous Edition (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PUBLIC LAW 87-793 AND DCI MEMORANDUM DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS, EFFECTIVE 14 OCTOBER 1962

NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	FUNDS	OLD GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW GR-ST	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	010032	56 380	CF	09 4	$ 6,930	09 4	$ 7,350

14-00000

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR
GS 09	2	$ 6,600	11	15	59	GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11	13	60

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE [X] NO EXCESS LWOP [ ] EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
[ ] IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
[ ] IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION [ ] P.S.I. [ ] L.S.I. [ ] PAY ADJUSTMENT
13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 8-59 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a. AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1. Serial No.	2. Name	3. Cost Center Number	4. LWOP Hours
10032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE 11 UV	

5. OLD SALARY RATE				6. NEW SALARY RATE				7. TYPE ACTION		
Grade	Step	Salary	Last Eff. Date	Grade	Step	Salary	Effective Date	PSI	LSI	ADJ.
GS 09	3	$ 6,765	11/13/60	09	4	$ 6,930	11/12/61			

8. Remarks and Authentication

/ / NO EXCESS LWOP
/ / IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
/ / IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

E.D.ECHOLS WK

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

Obsolete Previous SECRET (4-51)

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF P. L. 86-568 AND DCI MEMO DATED 1 AUGUST 1956, SALARY IS ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS EFFECTIVE 10 JULY 1960.

SD	NAME	SERIAL	ORGN	GR-ST	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
01	WOODS JAMES S	110032	51 12	GS-09 2	$ 6,135	$ 6,600

14-00000

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 9	1	$ 5,985	11	16	58	GS 9	2	$ 6,135	11	15	59

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. TYPE OF ACTION
☐ P.S.I. ☐ L.S.I. ☐ PAY ADJUSTMENT

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

G. M. STEWART

PAY CHANGE NOTIFICATION

FORM 2-49 560 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITION REPLACES FORM 560a AND 560b. SECRET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 20 MAR 59

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. None-0 5 Pt-1 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
010032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28	1	M 1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Yes-1 No-2 Code
11	12	48	1	50 USCA 403 J				1	04	21	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	DI	11 16 58	11 15 59	9 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO VOUCHERED FUNDS	01	03 22 59	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SECRETARIAT	5112	WASH., D. C.	75013

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-2 USfld-4 Frgn-6) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
2	RECDS MGMT OFF	2461	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	DI	11 16 58	11 15 59	9 3700 20 001

44. Remarks

[stamp: COPIED 9 APR 1959]

FORM NO. 1150 1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

MCM 14 NOV 58

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo.	Da.	Yr.	4. Vet Pref. None-0, 5 Pt-1, 10 Pt-2 Code	5. Sex	6. CS-EOD Mo.	Da.	Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02	20	28	1	M 1	04	21	52

7. SCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo.	Da.	Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo.	Da.	Yr.	13. Mil. Serv. Credit Code
11	12	48	1	50 USCA 403 J					04	21	52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

16. Dept.-Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 4	$ 5430	01	04	10	55	04	06	58	8 3780 55 006

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo.	Da.	Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
PROMOTION	30	11	16	58	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE FE/PSH PHILIPPINES STATION SUPPORT BRANCH	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

33. Dept.-Field (Dept-1, USfld-3, Frgn-5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	RECDS MGMT ANAL	3382	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo.	Da.	Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo.	Da.	Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
09 1	$ 5985	01	11	16	58	11	15	59	9 3780 55 006

44. Remarks

POSTED
20 NOV 1958

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET

GENERAL SCHEDULE SALARY INCREASE RETROACTIVELY EFFECTIVE 12 JANUARY 1958 AUTHORIZED BY P. L. 85 - 462 AND DCI DIRECTIVE. SALARY AS OF 15 JUNE 1958 ADJUSTED AS FOLLOWS

NAME	SERIAL	GRADE-STEP	OLD SALARY	NEW SALARY
WOODS JAMES S	510032	GS-07-4	$ 4,930	$ 5,430

GORDON M. STEWART
/S/ DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL

SECRET

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
510032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FE	UV	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
GS 7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57	GS 7	4	$ 4,930	04	06	58

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE (LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP
10. INITIALS OF CLERK
11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR.

13. REMARKS

5430
500

14. AUTHENTICATION

CF

G. M. STEWART

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560a

SECRET

PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

LVL

1. Serial No.	2. Name (Last-First-Middle)	3. Date Of Birth Mo. Da. Yr.	4. Vet. Pref. Code	5. Sex	6. CS - EOD Mo. Da. Yr.
510032	WOODS JAMES S	02 20 28	1	M 1	04 21 52

7. SCD Mo. Da. Yr.	8. CSC Retmt. Yes-1 No-2 Code	9. CSC Or Other Legal Authority	10. Apmt. Affidav. Mo. Da. Yr.	11. FEGLI Yes-1 No-2 Code	12. LCD Mo. Da. Yr.	13. Mil. Yes-1 No-2 Code
XX XX XX	1	50 USCA 403 J		1	04 21 52	2

PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT

14. Organizational Designations	Code	15. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FI RECORDS INTEGRATION DIV ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONS BR ANALYSIS SEC		WASH., D.C.	

16. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	17. Position Title	18. Position No.	19. Serv.	20. Occup. Series
2	INTEL ANALYST	430.12	GS	0132.35

21. Grade & Step	22. Salary Or Rate	23. SD	24. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	25. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	26. Appropriation Number
07 3	$ 4795	D1			8 2309 23

ACTION

27. Nature Of Action	Code	28. Eff. Date Mo. Da. Yr.	29. Type Of Employee	Code	30. Separation Data
REASSIGNMENT TRANSFER TO UNVOUCHERED FUNDS	06	09 08 57	REGULAR	01	

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

31. Organizational Designations	Code	32. Location Of Official Station	Station Code
DDP FE BRANCH 3 PHILIPPINES STATION ADMIN SEC	5161	MANILA, R.P.	57557

33. Dept. - Field (Dept - 1, USfld - 3, Frgn - 5) Code	34. Position Title	35. Position No.	36. Serv.	37. Occup. Series
5	RECORDS MGMT ANALYST	3382	GS	0306.01

38. Grade & Step	39. Salary Or Rate	40. SD	41. Date Of Grade Mo. Da. Yr.	42. PSI Due Mo. Da. Yr.	43. Appropriation Number
07 3	$ 4795	D1	04 10 55	04 06 58	8 3780 55 006

44. Remarks
SUBJECT TO APPROVED MEDICAL CLEARANCE PRIOR TO BEING SENT OVERSEAS.

FORM NO. 1150a
1 MAR 57

SECRET

(4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI 29	V-20	

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA	YR	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO	DA.	YR.
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

REMARKS

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE SERVICE AND CONDUCT OF THE ABOVE NAMED EMPLOYEE ARE SATISFACTORY.

TYPED, OR PRINTED, NAME OF SUPERVISOR	DATE	SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR
JOHN M SCOTT	11 MAR 1957	John M. Scott

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - CERTIFICATION

FORM NO. 560 1 MAR. 56 — SECRET — PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

SECRET
(WHEN FILLED IN)

1. EMP. SERIAL NO.	2. NAME	3. ASSIGNED ORGAN.	4. FUNDS	5. ALLOTMENT
110032	WOODS JAMES S	DDP/FI	V-20	2301

6. OLD SALARY RATE						7. NEW SALARY RATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	LAST EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.	GRADE	STEP	SALARY	EFFECTIVE DATE MO.	DA.	YR.
7	2	$ 4,660	04	08	56	7	3	$ 4,795	04	07	57

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER

8. CHECK ONE ☐ NO EXCESS LWOP ☐ EXCESS LWOP
IF EXCESS LEAVE LWOP, CHECK FOLLOWING:
☐ IN PAY STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD
☐ IN LWOP STATUS AT END OF WAITING PERIOD

9. NUMBER OF HOURS LWOP

10. INITIALS OF CLERK

11. AUDITED BY

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. PROJECTED SALARY RATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE					
GRADE	STEP	SALARY	MO.	DA.	YR

13. REMARKS

14. AUTHENTICATION

C. W. STRUBE

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE - AUTHENTICATION

FORM NO. 560b 1 MAR. 56 — SECRET — PERSONNEL FOLDER (4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, FINANCE DIVISION

ATTENTION : Payroll Section

SUBJECT : Change in Allotment Account Designation - Personal Services of WOODE, James S.

1. [illegible] Division request [illegible] cost of personal [illegible] employee be changed effective [illegible] as follows:

FROM ALLOTMENT 6-3740-55-098

TO ALLOTMENT 6-2309-23

2. When this change is [illegible] copy of this request on Form No. [illegible] Budget Officer, with [illegible]

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

GRO

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
MR. JAMES S. WOODS 110032	20 Feb 1928		22 August 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
REASSIGNMENT 56	26 Aug 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
BV-430.02	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst BV-430.12
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-7 $4660.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L 2	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. [X] / 10 POINT

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / I.A. / REAL. — SD-FIX

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 7-2309-23 TO: Same 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES, NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

3 EOD 04/21/52

POSTED 8/29/56

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-373667

JWM 8/28/56

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PART)
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER 91, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1v1

1. NAME (MR.-MISS-MRS.-ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S) AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods 110032	20 Feb 1922		2 Jul 1956

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment 02	15 Jul 1956	50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
IO (CI) EVF-583.05	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel Analyst BV-430.02
GS-0136.53-7 $4660.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.33-7 $4660.00 per annum
DDP/FE Branch 1-Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS 410825	DDP/FI Records Integration Division Analysis & Operations Branch Analysis Section
Yokosuka, Japan	11. HEADQUARTERS 8	Washington, D. C.
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	[ ] FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5-PT: X | 10 POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL. — SD/RI

15. SEX: M

16. APPROPRIATION: V FROM: 7-3740-55-056 TO: 7-8309-25 — 750-13

17. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE:

20. REMARKS:

POSTED
[signature] 7/19/56

"Transfer TO Vouchered funds FROM Unvouchered funds."

3 EOD 02/21/52

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Director of Personnel

21. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1954-373947

7/17/56

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNVOUCHERED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb 28		5 May 56

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)
Change in Title and Service Number

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: 17 JUN 1956

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	Ops Off (CE) BFF 583.05-3		IO-CI BFF 583.05-4
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.52-7 4660		GS-0136.53-7 4660
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Korea Mission Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section		DDP/FE Branch 1 - Korea Base Records Integration Branch Personality Files Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Atsugi, Japan		Yokosuka, Japan
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL SD:DI

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

T/O Change

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title)
H. P. Gilbert, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension)
Iris S. Wilson Ex 8761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: Robert A. [illegible]
Title: FE/CMO 21 May 56

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WAR | OTHER 5 PT | 10 POINT DISAB | OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL

SD:DI

15. / 16. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 6-3740-55-096
TO: Same

17. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes

18. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)

19. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: D.C.

20. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

USED IN LIEU OF SF50 NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

21. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL	[illegible]	[illegible]	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.	[signature]	21 May 56	
E.			

E. APPROVED BY: By Gerald C. Liddell, 21 May 56

SECRET

PERIODIC STEP INCREASE CERTIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL
(When filled in)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1954-320020

1. Agency and organizational designations	2. Payroll period	3. Block No.	4. Slip No.
		UV	

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)	6. Grade and salary
WOODS, JAMES S.	GS-7 $4525.00

PAYROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	FEDERAL TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.	STATE TAX	GROUP LIFE INS.			NET PAY
7. Previous accrual													
8. New accrual													
9. Pay this period													

10. Remarks	11. Appropriation(s)	12. Prepared by
	FE/7	afs 1/10
		13. Audited by

☒ Periodic step-increase ☐ Pay adjustment ☐ Other step-increase

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18.
8Apr 56	10Apr 55	$4525.00	$4660.00	SERVICE AND CONDUCT ARE SATISFACTORY (Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods):
Period(s)

☐ No excess LWOP. Total excess LWOP

(Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP)
☐ In computation of end of waiting period
☐ LWOP deducted at end of waiting period

Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen., U. S.
October 26, 1954, General Regulations No. 102

CONFIDENTIAL

PAYROLL CHANGE SLIP — PERSONNEL COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION IN LIEU OF SF-52
CHANGE OF SERVICE DESIGNATION

Effective Date - 22 April 1956

D to DI

Name	Grade	Name	Grade
FE		**NEA**	
ACAMPORA, Tullius	12	FRIAR, John R.	12
GILLIS, Vincent A.	12		
WATERS, Harry C., Jr.	11	**FI**	
~~WOODS, James S.~~	~~07~~	BECK, Marian R.	07
McCOY, Leonard V.	09	ROY, Ruth R.	07
EE			
MONTGOMERY, Hugh	12		
SR			
TRECIOKAS, Aldona V.	07		
KAPUSTA, Peter P.	11		

D to DS

WE

Name	Grade
LOEBS, Virginia	05

D to DP

EE

Name	Grade
McLAUGHLIN, Mary S.	07

[signature] by [signature]

17 April 1956

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

SECRET

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

UNTOUCHED

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.–Miss–Mrs.–One given name, initial(s), and surname): Mr. James S. WOODS
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb 28
3. REQUEST NO.:
4. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 Feb 54

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED: A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.): Promotion
B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.):
6. EFFECTIVE DATE A. PROPOSED:
B. APPROVED: OPS. OFF. (CO) APR 10 1955
7. C S OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY:

	FROM—		TO—
8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BPF 602.02-5		~~IO (FI)~~ FF ~~602.02~~-7 583.05
9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-~~5~~ $3535.00 p/a		GS-0136.~~51~~-7 $4205.00 p/a
10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Korea Mission ~~Intelligence Division~~ ~~Positive Intelligence Branch~~ Uncon. Warf. Div.		Same Same ~~Same~~ Records Integration Br. ~~Same~~ Personality Files Section
11. HEADQUARTERS	Atsugi, Japan		Same
12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL		[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Attached herewith are Job Description, Dispatch, and DD/P Personnel Data Sheet.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H. C. Clinkscale, FE Personnel Officer
C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): O. A. Fenlow, FE/I
D. REQUEST APPROVED BY Signature: Title:

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE | WAR X | OTHER | 5 PT. X | 10 POINT DISAB. OTHER

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | T.A. | REAL — FI slot SD: D

15. SEX: M | 16. RACE: W | 17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5-3740-55-096 TO Same
18. SUBJECT TO C S RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

PURSUANT TO DCI DIRECTIVE ... 1955 ... TO: 1/525

[stamp] 4/11/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL. OR POS. CONTROL		3/28/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY R A Stricklin

SECRET

4/7/55

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 52

SECRET

UNVOUCHERED

REQUEST FOR PERSONNEL ACTION

REQUESTING OFFICE: Fill in items 1 through 12 and A through D except 6B and 7 unless otherwise instructed. If applicable, obtain resignation and fill in separation data on reverse.

1. NAME (Mr.-Miss-Mrs.-One given name, initial(s), and surname)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. REQUEST NO.	4. DATE OF REQUEST
Mr. James S. WOODS	20 Feb 28		28 Jan 55

5. NATURE OF ACTION REQUESTED:
A. PERSONNEL (Specify whether appointment, promotion, separation, etc.)
Reassignment

B. POSITION (Specify whether establish, change grade or title, etc.)

6. EFFECTIVE DATE
A. PROPOSED: 26 Oct 54
B. APPROVED: 26 Oct 1954

7. C.S. OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY

FROM		TO
IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5	8. POSITION TITLE AND NUMBER	IO (FI) BFF 602.02-5
GS-0136.51-5 [illegible].00 p/a 3535.	9. SERVICE, GRADE, AND SALARY	GS-0136.51-5 [illegible].00 p/a 3535.
DDP/FE Korean Mission ~~Unconventional~~ WARFARE Division ~~[illegible]~~	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Korea	11. HEADQUARTERS	Atsugi, Japan
[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPARTMENTAL	[X] FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL

A. REMARKS (Use reverse if necessary)

Subject arrived PCS Japan 26 Oct 54 per FKLA-5239 of 17 Nov 1954.

B. REQUESTED BY (Name and title): H. C. CLINKSCALE, FE Personnel Officer

C. FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL (Name and telephone extension): O. A. FERLOW, FE/1 X3761

D. REQUEST APPROVED BY
Signature: James P. Humphries (?)
Title: FE/CMO 8 Feb 55

13. VETERAN PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII [x] / OTHER / 5 PT [x] / 10 POINT (DISAB, OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / T.A. / REAL — SD [illegible]

15. SEX: M | 16. RACE: W | 17. APPROPRIATION FROM 5 3740-55-096 TO Same | 18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes | 19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY) | 20. LEGAL RESIDENCE [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: D.C.

21. STANDARD FORM 50 REMARKS

Sec Concur for [illegible] 18 Feb 55 2/24/55

E date per J. Martin, FE 2/24/55

2/24/55

22. CLEARANCES	INITIAL OR SIGNATURE	DATE	REMARKS
A.			
B. CEIL OR POS. CONTROL		2/14/55	
C. CLASSIFICATION			
D. PLACEMENT OR EMPL.			
E.			

F. APPROVED BY

SECRET

14-00000

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952

1. Agency and organizational designations

4. Pay roll ... d

5. Bl... UU

6. ... No.

5. Employee's name (and social security account number when appropriate)

WOODS, James S.

GS-5 $3410

PAY ROLL CHANGE DATA

	BASE PAY	OVERTIME		GROSS PAY	RET.	TAX	BOND	F. I. C. A.			NET PAY
7. Previous normal											
8. New normal											
9. Pay this period											

10. Remarks

11. Appropriation(s)

FB-9

12. Prepared by

jm 4/20/54

13. Audited by

[X] Periodic step increase [ ] Pay adjustment [ ] Other ... ADVANCE DIVISION

14. Effective date	15. Date last equivalent increase	16. Old salary rate	17. New salary rate	18. Performance rating is satisfactory or better.
6June53	7June53	$3410	$3535	(Signature or other authentication)

19. LWOP data (Fill in appropriate spaces covering LWOP during following periods).
Period(s)

[ ] No excess LWOP Total excess LWOP

Check applicable box in case of excess LWOP ... Initials of Clerk

STANDARD FORM NO. 1126a—Revised
Form prescribed by Comp. Gen. U. S.
Nov. 8, 1950, General Regulations No. 102

PAY ROLL CHANGE SLIP—PERSONNEL COPY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FR RL FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

Conc. 26 Mar 1954 Jan

NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
. James S. Woods	20 Feb 1928		16 Apr 1954

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Assignment	E.O.D. 25 Apr 1954	50 USCA 403 j

FROM		TO
Intel. Analyst EY 469.08	8. POSITION TITLE	IO (FI) EFF 602.02-5
-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0136.51-5 $3410.00 per annum
/FI Records Integration Division Processing and Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FE Korean Mission Unconventional Warfare Division
Washington, D. C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Korea
FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [X] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE
14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: SD:D CD-FI

16. RACE
17. APPROPRIATION
FROM: 4-2309-83
TO: 4-3740-55-096

18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES-NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: [ ] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: D. C.

REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

"Transfer TO Unvouchered funds FROM Vouchered funds."

Jim Mc

ANCE PERFORMANCE RATING
Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel — SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

4/16/54

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEN

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.–MISS–MRS.–ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME): Mr. James S. Woods
2. DATE OF BIRTH: 20 Feb. 28
3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.: 8CS
4. DATE: 27 Feb. 54

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY): Reassignment
6. EFFECTIVE DATE: 28 Feb. 54
7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY: 50 USCA 403 J

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Analyst BW 469.08
GS-132-5	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-0132.35-5 $3410.00 per annum
R I Staff	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	DDP/FI R I Division Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D. C.
☐ FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE / WWII / OTHER / 5-PT. X / 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW / VICE / L.A. / REAL. — CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: FROM: 4-2309-23 TO: same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES–NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY):
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE: ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Deputy Assistant Director for Personnel

RCV 3-1-54

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

sixth

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 February 1938		5 June 1953

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	7 June 1953	Sch A-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-4	8. POSITION TITLE	Same BV-469.08
GS-132-4 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-132-5 $3410.00 per annum
DDP/FI Records Integration Staff Processing & Records Branch Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII X | OTHER | 5-PT. X | 10-POINT (DISAB. / OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REALL. — CD-FI

15. SEX: M
16. RACE: W
17. APPROPRIATION: 1132100 FROM: 8309-20 TO: Same
18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO): Yes
19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)
20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

Extension
2027

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING

Chief, Personnel Division

BD 6-8-53

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 28		24 Apr. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	26 Apr. 53	ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
Mail and File Clerk BV-384.03	8. POSITION TITLE	Intel. Anal. BV-469.08-A
GS-4-303 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-132 Same
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. Consolidation Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	Same Same Same
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	Same
☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	☐ FIELD ☒ DEPARTMENTAL

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWI	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
X			X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION

NEW	VICE	L.A.	REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C.S. RETIREMENT ACT (FLS-40)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	~~1182100~~ FROM: 2309-00 TO: 2309-20	yes		☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED X STATE DC

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or cancel[illegible] all requirements.



ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

[illegible] IDENTIFICATION

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 50
REV. APRIL 1951
PROMULGATED BY
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
CHAPTER R1, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 28		9 Mar. 53

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Reassignment	15 Mar. 53	ScheduleA-6.116(b)

FROM		TO
File Clerk BV-356	8. POSITION TITLE	Mail and File Clerk BV-364.08
GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4
DDP/FI/RI Processing and Records Br. File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	SAME SAME Consolidation Section
	11. HEADQUARTERS	
Washington, D.C. FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [X]	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD [ ] DEPARTMENTAL [ ]

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE

NONE	WWII	OTHER	5-PT.	10-POINT DISAB.	10-POINT OTHER
	X		X		

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | L.A. | REAL.

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: 11X2100 TO: 2309-20	yes		[X] CLAIMED [ ] PROVED STATE: DC

21. REMARKS: This action is subject to all applicable laws, rules, and regulations and may be subject to investigation and approval by the United States Civil Service Commission. The action may be corrected or canceled if not in accordance with all requirements.

ENTRANCE PERFORMANCE RATING:

Chief, Personnel Division

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1952-210794

KA 3-9-53

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information

COMBINED PERSONNEL ACTION

Used in lieu of SF-52 and/or SF-50 to document the following types of personnel actions involving no change in grade or salary: (a) Change in title (b) Change of position number (c) Reassignment within Division without series code change (d) Reassignment within Division with series code change. (Note: For action (type d) a SF-50 will be prepared for vouchered positions from information on this form.

(1) Staff or Division RI (2) Date T/O Approved 17 November 1952 (3) Effective Date of Action 7 December 1952

(4) NAME	FROM (5) ORG. I.F. & POS. TITLE	(6) SCHEDULE SERIES-Grade	(7) SLOT NOS.	(8) ACTION	TO (9) ORG. I.F. & POS. TITLE	(10) SCHEDULE SERIES-GRADE	(11) SLOT NOS.
Johnson, Dorothy A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-353.01
Akers, Erma D.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.
Hallinan, Martha M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.01
Gawlor, Carol A.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.02
Law, Lois	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.03	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-354.03
Pruitt, Earl B.	File Supervisor	GS-5	X-33.	B	File Supvr.	GS-305-5	BV-355.
Service & Correspondence Section							
Woods, James	File Clerk	GS-4	X-102.22	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-[illegible]
File Section							
Lanapace, Marie J.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.03	A	File Supervisor	GS-305-4	BV-357.
Riter, Irene M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-32.02	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.
Lyddane, Mildred K.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-38.04	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.01
Ceppa, Loretta M.	File Clerk	GS-4	X-34.01	B	File Clerk	GS-305-4	BV-358.02

(12) APPROVED: [signature] (13) APPROVED: [signature] Class & Wage Div. (14) APPROVED: [signature] Personnel Div.

S-E-C-R-E-T

STANDARD FORM NO. 50 (5 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER R-1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

(ml)

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20Feb.'28		14Aug.'52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Promotion	17Aug.'52	Schedule A-6.116(h)

FROM		TO
File Clerk X-39.04	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk X-102.22
GS-3-305 $2950.00 per annum	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS-4-305 $3175.00 per annum
OSO RI Processing and Records Branch File Section	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI Analysis and Operations Branch Service and Correspondence Section
Washington, D.C.	11. HEADQUARTERS	
FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL X	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD ☐ DEPARTMENTAL ☐

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWI | OTHER | 5-PT. | 10-POINT (DISAB. | OTHER)

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE
M	W	FROM: TO: 11X2100 2300-00	Yes	X	☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED STATE:

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS

Chief, Personnel Division

ENTRANCE EFFICIENCY RATING:

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

RDY 8/15/52

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE (1950-600078)

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

V.C. 26 March 1952
RCD

STANDARD FORM 50 (8 PARTS)
OCTOBER 1949
PROMULGATED BY
CHAPTER 8 1 FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL ACTION

1. NAME (MR.—MISS—MRS.—ONE GIVEN NAME, INITIAL(S), AND SURNAME)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. JOURNAL OR ACTION NO.	4. DATE
Mr. James S. Woods	20 Feb. 1928	# 57	21 Apr. ' 52

This is to notify you of the following action affecting your employment:

5. NATURE OF ACTION (USE STANDARD TERMINOLOGY)	6. EFFECTIVE DATE	7. CIVIL SERVICE OR OTHER LEGAL AUTHORITY
Excepted Appointment	21 Apr. 1952	Sch. A — 6.116 (B)

FROM		TO
	8. POSITION TITLE	File Clerk GS - 3 E39.04
	9. SERVICE, SERIES, GRADE, SALARY	GS - 3 305 $2950.00 per annum
	10. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS	OSO RI PROCESSING AND RECORDS BRANCH FILE SECTION
	11. HEADQUARTERS	Washington, D.C.
FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL	12. FIELD OR DEPT'L	FIELD / DEPARTMENTAL X

13. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE: NONE | WWII | OTHER | 5 PT. | 10 POINT (DISAB. | OTHER) — X

14. POSITION CLASSIFICATION ACTION: NEW | VICE | I.A. | REAL

15. SEX	16. RACE	17. APPROPRIATION	18. SUBJECT TO C. S. RETIREMENT ACT (YES—NO)	19. DATE OF APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS (ACCESSIONS ONLY)	20. LEGAL RESIDENCE ☐ CLAIMED ☐ PROVED
M	W	FROM: 2123500 TO: 3009	Yes	21 Apr. 1952	X STATE: D.C.

21. REMARKS: THIS ACTION IS SUBJECT TO ALL APPLICABLE LAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND APPROVAL BY THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. THE ACTION MAY BE CORRECTED OR CANCELLED IF NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS.

(39.04)

This appointment is subject to a satisfactory trial period of one year.

Subject to a satisfactory medical examination.

SF # 61 Affidavit executed.

3441

DOE - 06/07/57
CSEOD - 04/21/52
LCD - 04/21/52

cc: Personnel Division

22. SIGNATURE OR OTHER AUTHENTICATION

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 11050-489875

4. PERSONNEL FOLDER COPY

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	WOODS, James S.	02/20/28	M	12	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (CS, 1)
RECORDS ADMIN OFF CH	DDO/CCS/REG	HQS	X HQS. / OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER; RESERVE; TEMPORARY; CONTRACT; SPECIAL; OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL; X ANNUAL; X REASSIGNMENT; SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 01 July 76 - 08 July 77

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 July 1977

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. **NO**

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U—Unsatisfactory** Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
- **M—Marginal** Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P—Proficient** Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S—Strong** Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O—Outstanding** Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of CCS Registry--Supervises employees in setting up and maintaining Staff files and necessary card indices; receiving, distributing and dispatching correspondence to and from the Staff; and processing requests for file traces and other information.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 CCS Records Management Officer--Responsible for overall management of CCS records management program. Monitors developments in DDO records management policies and procedures; maintains liaison with ISS and DDO Records Management Officers; seeks improvement in CCS records organization and discipline.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Works with personnel responsible for developing and launching the CCS computerized records system (CENCO) to ensure proper integration of Registry information.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

FORM 45 7-73 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 061088

14-00000

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods continued to perform in outstanding fashion as Chief of the CCS Registry during an extremely busy period. The figures cited in the last Fitness Report as to the workload of the CCS Registry continued to be representative of the volume and variety of Mr. Woods' responsibilities. He supervised the work of six subordinates with a successful combination of patience and firm professionalism. He continued to be the source of sound, constructive suggestions for coping with the paper "explosion" occasioned by the investigations of CIA and the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts.

Mr. Woods is a highly valuable, reliable, unobtrusively effective records manager. In moving on to new responsibilities in an area division he leaves behind a solid record of achievement and the admiration of those with whom he has served in CCS.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
24		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 August 1977	DC/CCS	Arthur C. Close

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE [ ] OR HAVE NOT [ ] ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
		James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Mr. Close's evaluation of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period agrees completely with my observations and conclusions. Mr. Woods is a first-class professional records officer and supervisor who has clearly earned an overall rating of OUTSTANDING.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 August 1977	Chief, Central Cover Staff	ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE [ ] HAVE NOT [ ] ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	18 Aug 1977	James S. Woods

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	WOODS James S.	02/20/28	M	GS-12	DAC

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (Ck. 1)
RECORDS ADMIN OF CH	DDO/CCS/REG	HQS	X HQS. / OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CONTRACT / SPECIAL / OTHER

12. TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT / SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (FROM-TO): 1 July 1975-30 June 1976

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 July 1976

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. **NO**

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U—Unsatisfactory**: Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
- **M—Marginal**: Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P—Proficient**: Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S—Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O—Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Chief of Registry Section--supervises 6 employees in maintenance of Staff files and required card indices; receiving and distributing Staff correspondence; and processing requests for file checks and other information	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Records Management Officer--responsible for the overall CCS records management program	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: [illegible]

FORM 45 7-75 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

E2, IMPDET CL BY 061088

CONFIDENTIAL
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods is a quiet, highly effective manager of a major repository of records within the DDO. The workload of his Section is staggering: over 8,000 documents filed each month, over 500 index cards prepared each month; close to 300 Freedom of Information or Privacy Act requests processed each month, etc. Mr. Woods organizes his Section well; he handles a group of six women with skill and understanding and he heads, as a result, a harmoniously working team.

Mr. Woods approaches problems with a positive attitude and brings his considerable experience and imagination to bear with appropriate initiative and follow-through. His response to the exceptionally heavy workload of the Staff over the past year of Congressional investigations and cover exposes was vital to the Staff's and the DDO's requirements for current and historical records. He volunteers ideas designed to improve the Staff's records; he works weekends and after hours to keep ahead of a growing avalanche of paper and requests for information. He is, in sum, a highly competent, knowledgable, yet flexible records manager upon whom the Staff relies heavily.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
12		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
27 July 1976	DC/CCS	Arthur C. Close [signature]

2. BY EMPLOYEE

I HAVE [ ] OR HAVE NOT [ ] ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE SUPERVISOR'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	27 July 76	James S. Woods [signature]

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I have no difficulty in agreeing with the letter ratings and the narrative evaluation in the above report. Mr. Woods established the high level of his professional competence very soon after his assignment in CCS and has maintained this standard without interruption. I again must emphasize his abilities as supervisor in one of the toughest supervisory assignments known to me. With a Registry Chief like Mr. Woods, it is easy to come to the conclusion that running a registry of the complexity and volume as that of CCS is a cinch - at least he makes it appear that way.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 July 1976	Chief, CCS	Erich W. Isenstead [signature]

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT. I HAVE [X] HAVE NOT [ ] ATTACHED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL'S EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	29 July	James S. Woods [signature]

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	Woods, James S.	02/20/28	M	GS-12	DAC

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CHECK (X) ONE
Records Admin OF-CH	DDO/CCS/REG	HQS	X HQS / DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER / RESERVE / CONTRACT / OTHER (Spec.) / TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT / SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
1 January 1975 - 30 June 1975	31 July 1975

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U—Unsatisfactory** Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.
- **M—Marginal** Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P—Proficient** Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S—Strong** Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O—Outstanding** Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
NO. 1: Chief of Registry Section - supervises 7 employees	S
NO. 2: Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	O
NO. 3:	
NO. 4:	
NO. 5:	
NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — SECRET CLASSIFICATION — E2 IMPDET CL BY 17 JUL 1975 (4)

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUL 8 11 29 AM '75

During the 6 months under review Mr. Woods has continued to fulfill his responsibilities in the same excellent manner which has been documented in his last two fitness reports and which led to his promotion to GS-12. Mr. Woods surefootedness as a records officer and manager of people, together with ability to take necessary initiatives where actions are required and his maturity and sound judgement, make him an ideal chief of this very active and complex registry and records management office. I dread to think that eventual rotation will deprive me of the services of this extraordinarily competent and effective officer.

SECTION E CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
1 year, 9 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
7 July 1975	Chief, CCS	Erich W. Isenstead

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
HAVE ATTACHED / HAVE NOT ATTACHED	7 July 1975	James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

There is no one in the chain of command who could act as reviewing officer.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	7 July 1975	James S. Woods

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.	02/20/28	M	GS-12	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (ck one)
RECORDS ADMIN OF-CH	DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	HEADQUARTERS	X HQS. / OF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER / RESERVE / CONTRACT / OTHER (Spec.) / TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT / X SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-): 1 June 1974-31 December 1974

14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 31 January 1974 (Retirement of Supervisor

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT.

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory: Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.

M—Marginal: Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section D and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P—Proficient: Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S—Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security - through 6 October 1974.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 008317

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Since his last Fitness Report, in June 1974, Mr. Woods has continued his extremely fine performance as a conscientious, hardworking and thoughtful records manager and registry supervisor. The CCS registry workload remains at about the same level as previously reported, and Mr. Woods regularly works an hour or so of uninterrupted overtime every working day personally reorganizing procedures, cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files. His enthusiastic determination in reducing the numbers of out-of-date and no longer useful files is most exemplary. Knowing the numbers of primary and supplemental files involved in this exercise, and as a retiring supervisor, I can only wish him "good luck"!

Mr. Woods also continues eager to learn and use new methods and techniques. During this reporting period, in July 1974, he took the Agency course "Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2."

Finally it gives me pleasure to note here that, effective ~~11~~ 24 November 1974, Mr. Woods will be given a well deserved promotion from GS 11/6 to GS 12/3.

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
15 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
20 November 1974	Deputy Chief, CCS	Carter H. Yates (signed)

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
HAVE ATTACHED [ ] / X HAVE NOT ATTACHED	20 Nov 74	James S. Woods (signed)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Both Mr. Yates' letter ratings and narrative comments accurately reflect the quality of Mr. Woods' performance during the reporting period. He is a thoroughgoing professional records officer who uses his extensive experience and his good judgement to take initiatives toward improving the Registry service and the management of records. Hand in hand with his high substantive competence goes his excellent ability as a supervisor. I can say nothing more laudable in this regard than that I have not had to deal with Registry personnel problems during the last year. He knows the job that needs to be done and so do his people. With this kind of leadership, the work gets accomplished with a high state of morale.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 November 1974	Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff	Erich W. Isenstead (signed)

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	25 Nov 74	(signed)

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A — GENERAL INFORMATION

1. EMPLOYEE NUMBER	2. NAME (Last, first, middle)	3. DATE OF BIRTH	4. SEX	5. GRADE	6. SD
010032	WOODS, JAMES S.	02/20/28	M	GS-11	D

7. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	8. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	9. CURRENT STATION	10. CODE (ck one)
RECORDS ADMIN OF - CH	DDO/CCS/REGISTRY	HEADQUARTERS	X HQS / DF

11. TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: X CAREER | RESERVE | CONTRACT | OTHER (Spec.) | TEMPORARY

12. TYPE OF REPORT: X ANNUAL | REASSIGNMENT | SPECIAL

13. REPORTING PERIOD (from-to-)	14. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
1 June 1973 - 31 May 1974	30 June 1974

SECTION B — QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

IF QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE FORM IS BEING SUBMITTED WITH CHANGES, AND IS ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT, PLACE THE WORD "YES" IN THE BOX TO THE RIGHT. IF NO CHANGES ARE REQUIRED, PLACE THE WORD "NO" IN THE BOX AT RIGHT. **NO**

SECTION C — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section D.

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S—Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

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Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Registry Section - supervises seven employees.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Records Management Officer - responsible for the overall CCS records management program, ensuring that it is in conformity with DDO and Agency records management policy and procedures.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: CCS Security Officer - Briefs all new and departing CCS employees on Agency and CCS security procedures. Also responsible for duty rosters and related security instructions, and maintains liaison with the Office of Security.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 9-73 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

E2, IMPDET CL BY 008317

14-00000

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

SECTION D — NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section C to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section D, attach a separate sheet of paper.

After a short overlap with his predecessor, Mr. Woods assumed his responsibilities as Chief of Registry, CCS, on 3 October 1973 - roughly nine months ago. In this position he is responsible, overall, for CCS registry and records management activities, including the supervision of seven other individuals. As could be expected from even a casual reading of his past fitness reports, Mr. Woods quickly took hold, and has been performing his new responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Despite the volume and variety of files with which he was required to become familiar, early on he systematically began cleaning out, consolidating, and retiring files as appropriate, reorganizing and updating the indexing system for individual and project files, and redistributing employee workloads. He also reorganized the placement of file machinery, desks, and service counter to achieve greater employee comfort and efficiency in the utilization of personnel. Although his task as Staff Security Officer is a secondary function, he also reorganized, simplified and re-wrote the security check and duty officer roster procedures.

Indicative of the work which he supervises are selected Registry statistics for May 1974: 7015 documents filed, 8200 files pulled (and re-filed) for Staff officers' use, 6642 cables processed and distributed, 9900 facility and name searches, 2353 documents logged, 833 index cards made and filed, and 200 new files opened. During his nine months with CCS, Mr. Woods not only has had to learn the CCS "system" himself,

SECTION E — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10 mos		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
25 June 1974	DC/CCS	Carter H. Yates

2. BY EMPLOYEE

STATEMENT CONCERNING THIS EVALUATION OF MY PERFORMANCE	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
HAVE ATTACHED / HAVE NOT ATTACHED (X)	25 June 74	James S. Woods

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

In the relatively short period of his assignment to CCS, Mr. Woods has completely lived up to his advance billing as reflected in past fitness reports. Mr. Yates has provided the specifics of Mr. Woods' accomplishments and has left me only to say that Mr. Woods is a first class professional Records Officer and supervisor who fully deserves an overall rating of Strong.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 Jul 74	C/CCS	Erich W. Isenstead

4. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN THE ENTRIES IN ALL SECTIONS OF THIS REPORT.	DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
	1 July 74	[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

SECRET

Fitness Report   Woods, James D.   010032

SECTION D NARRATIVE COMMENTS (continued)

but has been required, due to a turnover in personnel, to train three new Records Clerks.

Courses taken since the start of his tour with CCS include Operational Records I and III, ADP I, Forms Management Seminar, and Forms Analysis and Design Workshop.

Mr. Woods has proved to be a conscientious, hard-working and thoughtful records manager and supervisor, and CCS is glad to have him aboard. I am sure that the next records inventory will provide statistical evidence of his abilities as a "housecleaner."

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-11	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Officer	DDO/EUR	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL	X	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 June 72 - 31 May 73

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U—Unsatisfactory Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M—Marginal Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P—Proficient Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S—Strong Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O—Outstanding Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Station Records Management and Control Officer - responsible for the mediation, preparation, implementation and control of the Records Management Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Chief of Registry Section - in this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch and other correspondence; serves as the cable analyst, processing and distributing all cable traffic; and serves as Top Secret Control Officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: O

9 MAY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer has continued to perform with a high degree of effectiveness and accomplishment. He has concentrated on improving our records holding standards and on purging irrelevant and out dated files. In May 1972 he began a monthly series of progress reports for the Chief of Station outlining the month's accomplishments. Copies of these reports through January 1973 were sent to Hqs in OIRT-18014 and 18015, dated 9 Feb 73. These reports clearly show this officer's focus on records management activities, his ingenuity and agressiveness in launching programs of review of files and his tireless efforts in reducing Station holdings to a practical and useable minimum. His records inventory as of September 1972, reporting a total reduction in excess of 85 feet, speaks for itself. His next report also promises to show dramatic reductions.

This officer shows a sense of professional responsibility and determination in the oft neglected function of records management, deeper and more intense than any other witnessed by the rating officer in his career. He performs his other duties as Chief, Registry with an equally high degree of effectiveness. Subject officer may have been inadvertently hiding his talents under the proverbial bushel basket by having remained in the field for so long. It is the rater's hope that Hqs now has focussed on him and has discovered his potential for greater responsibilities. The records in this Station are tremendously improved for his having had a tour in Rome. We are certainly glad he came.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
30 April 1973	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
23 May 1973	Admin Officer	/s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

This officer has been remarkably effective during his tour in Rome. While we are very sorry to lose him, there is no question that his formidable talents should be used on a much broader range of records management and related problems than could be done in this Station. His next assignment in Headquarters appears to give him that additional scope. We are glad that he served in Rome and that during this tour here he received a well-deserved promotion. Rome Station's records have improved considerably as a result of this officer's tour here. I am in full agreement with the above comments and ratings.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 May 1973	Ops Officer	/s/ William Acon, Jr.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Officer	DDP/EUR/I	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 July 1972	1 October 1971 - 31 May 1972

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory	Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
M-Marginal	Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
P-Proficient	Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
S-Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O-Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and in the performance of other registry duties.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's Record Management Program.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Cable Analyst - Processes and distributes all incoming and out-going cable traffic.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Top Secret Control Officer.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

21 AUG 1972

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 7-66 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This officer's performance over the past year has been outstanding. He is a skilled professional records manager, an indefatigable worker and a highly imaginative and efficient supervisor. Since his last Fitness Report he has directed a TDY team of records officers in a concentrated program of records reduction. He devised the program and supervised its execution with most effective results. This officer is a driver and a doer. He constantly strives to improve the Station's records management posture and follows up with procedures designed to maintain the gains achieved by his efforts. It is highly gratifying and stimulating to work with him. He sees the broad dimensions of the task at hand and focuses constantly on improving the system. This quality convinces the rater that he is capable of greater responsibilities in a position of broader scope. I recommend that Headquarters begin to plan for the utilization of this officer on the completion of his tour of duty in Rome. He should be placed in a Headquarters position in which his skills and broad experience can be fully used and in which he can achieve the professional growth of which he is both capable and deserving.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 July 1972	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
17 July 1972	Admin Officer	/s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the comments of the rating officer and believe the overall outstanding rating is well deserved. Subject is a first-rate Records Management officer - deeply interested in his work, conscientious in the extreme and always looking for an innovative approach that will upgrade the functioning of Registry and better serve Station needs. Without losing sight of the unending pressure to reduce and periodically reorder the Station's holdings, this officer avoids assuming attitudes that are cast in cement. He works with the Branches and individual officers in solving problems rationally. He is unfailingly pleasant and courteous and is well-liked by all. The Station is fortunate to have him.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
25 July 1972	DCOS	/s/ Joseph A DiStefano

CN duty

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb. '28	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Off	DDP/EUR/I	Rome

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- X ANNUAL
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
- SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 4 July 1971-30 September 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U-Unsatisfactory** — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M-Marginal** — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P-Proficient** — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S-Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O-Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Registry Section - In this capacity he supervises one employee in the processing and pouching of all dispatch correspondence and other registry duties.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Station Records Officer - Responsible for the Station's record program and to give guidance and/or assist the Station officers when called upon to do so.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Cable Analyst - Process and distribute all incoming and outgoing cable traffic, this includes maintenance of the chrono files.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Top Secret Control Officer.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

21 OCT 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

I have worked with this officer just 2½ months, but this has been long enough to satisfy me that he is above average in registry work. He is a very knowledgeable registry technician, but most important, he is aggressive and imaginative in devising new procedures, or revising old ones to improve the quality of registry service to this Station. He is affable in dealing with his peers and confident and persuasive in dealing with the senior management of this Station. Shortly after his arrival he took over the analysing and distribution of the cables, and prepared a Station procedure for this purpose. Immediately following that, he devised a new procedure for handling correspondence and installed it. He had reviewed the multitudinous files at this Station and has plans to trim them back to more reasonable and appropriate dimensions. In every respect, this officer has taken charge of the function he is here to perform, and has devoted a great deal of time, thought and effort to improve it. We are indeed satisfied with his performance.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 October 1971	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
2½ months	

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Chief, Support	/s/ Thomas McKinley

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Since I have just arrived at the Station I have not had an opportunity to observe this officer's performance. However, I respect the rating officer's judgment which in this case coincides with other favorable comments I have heard about the Subject. I therefore defer to the rating officer's evaluation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
4 October 1971	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Joseph A. Distefano

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT	EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WOODS James S	20 Feb. 1923	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Adm. Officer	DDP/EUR/Italian	Rome, Italy

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		ANNUAL
	TEMPORARY		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	x	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):	x	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 January 1971 - 30 May 1971

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M-Marginal — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P-Proficient — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S-Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Reviewed, retired and rationalized Italian Branch Files and explained same system to Branch personnel	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

3 AUG 1971

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	O

FORM 7-68 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — SECRET — GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Mr. Woods first made a survey of the Augean stable that the Italian Branch files had become over many years of shifts in personnel and changes of direction. He then reviewed, downgraded, and retired approximately 350 Top Secret documents with appropriate Project and Subject files and copies destroyed. At the completion of this there was not one Top Secret document on the Branch. He devised, gained approval from FI/D, and carried out a new procedure for the downgrading of TYLOTE material from Top Secret to Secret so that it could be retired. He retired approximately 60 Project, 25 Subject, and fifty 201 files. He surveyed the Communist Party of Italy files and discovered that there were a total of 93 of which 19 were already closed. He closed 47 of the remainder and left 25 open and arranged for RID/ARD to retire all the material in the open files prior to 1 January 1971. He closed and retired Pian files dating back to the early 1950's. All in all, out of 76 feet of safe space filled with CS material, he retired 36 feet of files leaving a catalogue of where everything is or has been sent. A remarkable record (and done with a minimum of fuss and Branch dislocation)!

What he did in such a short time speaks eloquently of how he went about his duties for which see the accompanying memorandum of recommendation for promotion. Reporting officer has known him over fourteen years and has the unvarying impression of him as a quietly competent, diligent, reliable, self-reliant individual.

/continued/

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: Subject now in Rome Station	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION: 4 months	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION: See above	
DATE: 27 July 1971	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: ADC/EUR/Italy	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: R. Campbell James
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I concur in the above evaluation. Subject turned in a most impressive performance during his brief time on the Italian Branch. Largely as a result of his enthusiasm and initiative, the Branch was able to achieve what had never been accomplished before: a complete overhaul, cleaning, purging, and restructuring of its filing system. To his credit, Subject has a keen appreciation for operational requirements and all of this work was done without sacrificing the future utilization of information acquired in the past; on the contrary, the efficient use of this material has been so enhanced that it will surely be reflected in our future operations. Mr. Woods has a unique contribution to make in Rome or any other place he is assigned. The Station is fortunate to have him....his presence is sorely needed to do the same thing in Rome that he has just accomplished

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 July 1971	Chief/Italian Branch	Herschel F. Peake

SECRET

You give him a job and need not worry about whether or how it will be done.

The job offered no opportunity to observe his supervisory capabilities. He is cost conscious and security conscious.

Fitness Report James S. Woods (continued)

SECTION D.3. (continued).

in Headquarters. The importance of his contribution and his personal initiative and efforts should be rewarded by a promotion.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 23	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Recs Adm Off	DDP/EUR/BCR	London

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
X	CAREER		INITIAL
	RESERVE		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	TEMPORARY	XX	ANNUAL
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	XX	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 November 1970	30 June 1970 - 18 November 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **U-Unsatisfactory** — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **M-Marginal** — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.
- **P-Proficient** — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.
- **S-Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O-Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Responsible for organization and direct management of the Station Registry	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: First-line supervisor for two full-time registry assistants.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Organizes and implements review and purge of Registry and other Station files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares Station notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Top Secret Control Officer	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	Rating Letter
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

Reviewed by OP/SPD/PPB

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

In the four months he has been under my supervision, Subject has demonstrated that he merits in full measure the high opinion of him held by his previous supervisor. Conscientious, careful, fully knowledgeable of Registry procedures he has gone about his day-to-day tasks in an exceptionally proficient way without the need for constant supervision. He is prompt in his response to requests and has an excellent sense of "get the job done". He is an intelligent and concerned supervisor who has been meticulous in keeping his supervisors briefed on personnel and other problems as they have arisen in the Station Registry. He appears fully capable of assuming larger responsibilities in the records field. The rating officer regrets that Subject's family situation precludes his staying for another tour.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
17 Nov 1970	James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
17 November 1970	DCOS	/s/ Cameron J. LaClair

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although the rating officer is newly arrived in London, he has had numerous opportunities in the past to observe Subject's work and the results he has achieved in reducing London files to manageable proportions. As a result the ratings awarded in this report are endorsed without hesitation.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
23 November 1970	COS	/s/ Rolfe Kingsley

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb. 23	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Off	DDP/EUR/BCR	London

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 October 1969 - 30 June 1970

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

U-Unsatisfactory — Performance is unacceptable. A rating in this category requires immediate and positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

M-Marginal — Performance is deficient in some aspects. The reasons for assigning this rating should be stated in Section C and remedial actions taken or recommended should be described.

P-Proficient — Performance is satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in the manner expected.

S-Strong — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O-Outstanding — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Responsible for organization and direct management of station registry.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: First-line supervisor for two full-time and one part-time registry assistants.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Organizes and implements review and purge of registry and other station files.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares station notices and outgoing correspondence on registry matters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Top Secret Control Officer.	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

1 JUL 1970

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

With about nineteen months experience managing the station registry already under his belt, his usefulness here increases. He continues to demonstrate the same quietly effective leadership and talent for sound organization in his own shop as were noted on the last fitness report.

While maintaining a high standard in the more routine day-to-day services and processes a registry is normally expected to supply, he has also been the catalyst for a thorough, carefully phased and continuing review and, where appropriate, purge of registry and other file holdings. Administering this ambitious reduction program requires sound judgment and experience in handling the detail in our existing records. Subject has these qualities and has achieved impressive results. To complete this task, he has asked to extend his tour here for one year until November 1971 and Headquarters has approved this.

He is invariably completely responsive to guidance from the DCOS, his immediate supervisor, and conscientiously seeks to achieve the work goals which are identified during our occasional accomplishment and performance consultations. The spirit of cooperation with which he deals with other station personnel is equally commendable.

No criticism can be made of his security and cover deportment.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 18 June 1970	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ James S. Woods	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 18 June 1970	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR DCOS	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ David Whipple
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur entirely with this favorable assessment. Subject has been a dedicated and conscientious supervisor of his office. His achievements have been quite measurable and specific, as described in the above report. On the basis of his performance here, Subject should have excellent career prospects for further growth in his chosen field.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
22 June 1970	COS	/s/ Bronson Tweedy

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WOODS, James S.	20 Feb 23	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Officer	DDP/EUR/BCR	London

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
31 October 1969	18 November 1968-30 September 1969

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Responsible for organization and direct management of Station Registry.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: First-line supervisor for at first three, later two, full-time Registry personnel and one part-time Registry assistant.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Provides informal training and guidance to some Station officers and secretaries on records procedures.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Prepares Station Notices and outgoing correspondence on Registry matters.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Maintains and controls case file index and 201 file index.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: Top Secret control officer	S

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

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SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

He arrived ten months ago at this post with considerable experience in Registry work at Headquarters and at other field stations and with a thorough understanding of how a Station Registry should be organized and run. He immediately put this understanding to good use. While maintaining the overall efficiency of Registry programs already in effect when he took over, he enthusiastically began a carefully-planned and continuing effort to further reduce less than essential Registry paper holdings with results which are already impressive. His suggestions on new procedures designed to conserve space and man-power are usually imaginative and practical.

He himself is a remarkably well-organized, conscientious and cooperative person.

He has had to undertake his improvements while accommodating to the loss of one Registry slot which fell victim to a Foreign Service reductions program. Primarily due to his managerial talents, the Registry has been made to carry on almost as well with three regulars as with the previous four. Although his people are increasingly hard-worked, their morale is high. He himself appears to be a glutton for work but his Registry is obviously a happy shop.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 October 1969	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
9 October 1969		/s/ David D. Whipple

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with this very favorable assessment. Subject has a real talent for work in his chosen field and his professional accomplishments here have been impressive. Subject's career should be watched with care and there should be room for considerable advancement in the Records Management end of our business.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 November 1969		/s/ Bronson Tweedy

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-10	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Of	DDP/FE/VNO	Vietnam

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL	X REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	5 March 1968 - 5 October 1968

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief Station Registry DC 52	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Management and training of personnel under his supervision	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Overall Security of Registry operations	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: 8 OCT 1968 [initials]	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	S

FORM 6-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

This is Subject's final Fitness Report as Chief, Registry at Vietnam Station. He has worked long and hard but can look with pride at the many accomplishments that he has effected during his tenure. He will depart leaving a sound and well-functioning organization. His planning has been effective and his cross-training and development of the personnel under his supervision have been fully productive.

During this period, his unit has experienced heavy increases in work-load and assumed new or additional functions with no reduction in the service provided to Station components.

Subject has been responsible for many work saving innovations, procedural changes and a thorough updating and revamping of the highly important registry reference records.

The personnel under his supervision display enthusiasm and dedication in their work. Their pleasant manner is a reflection of Subject's management ability.

Subject performs his managerial and supervisory duties in a highly professional manner. He knows systems, writes lucid and concise procedures and reacts positively to situations. He is a "Doer".

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
2? Sept 1968	/s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
14		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
21 Sept 1968	Records Admin Officer	/s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the Rating Officer.

Subject has been most amenable and responsive to positive direction.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
21 Sept 1968	Ops Officer	/s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

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NARRATIVE COMMENTS, Section C. (Continued)

I have enjoyed serving with Subject, wish him success at his next post and look forward to serving with him again.

Subject is cost conscious.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-9	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Officer	DDP/FE/VNO	Vietnam

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
X	SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-) 1 October 67 - 31 March 68

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief Station Registry	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Management and training of Personnel under his supervision	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Overall Security of Registry operations	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

20 MAY 1968

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has done an excellent job in organizing the layout and arranging the work flow in the new Station Registry. As a result, his unit has been operating on a fully effective and productive basis, even during the recent emergency when certain workloads increased several hundred per cent. In operation and physical appearance the Station Registry may be considered a model registry.

He is very cooperative and works well with other offices in solving mutual problems or setting up new requirements.

Subject is industrious and dedicated and willingly works long hours to meet the daily demands of his position. He performed in an exemplary manner while working for an extended period under stress during the recent emergency.

Subject is a pleasant, dependable individual who is anxious to do the best job possible in a demanding and vital position at the Station.

He is properly cost conscious in the use of personnel, space and equipment.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE

2. BY SUPERVISOR		
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
7 mos	Subject has not reviewed this report inasmuch as it recommends him for promotion.	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 March 1968	Records Admin Officer	/s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
5 March 1968	Ops Officer	/s/Vincent Lockhart

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb. '28	M	GS-9	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Of	DDP/FE/VNO	Vietnam

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER	RESERVE	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
TEMPORARY		X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)		SPECIAL (Specify):	
SPECIAL (Specify):			

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	10 May 1967 - 30 Sep. 1967

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief, Station Registry Section	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Management and training of personnel under his supervision	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Scheduling of routine and exceptional work assigned to his unit.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Preparation of routine and other reports on the activities of his Section.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Overall security of Registry operations.	A
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6: 29 NOV 1967	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 4-66 45 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

Subject is responsible for the supervision and operation of one of the more diversified and complex field registry operations in the Organization. He is thoroughly knowledgeable and experienced in registry practices. Subject is a dedicated and hard working officer who will apply himself diligently to individual registry activities. Such diligent application occasionally causes him to overlook his overall supervisory role, the supervision and management of eleven personnel and the responsibility for providing a wide variety of services, locally and in-country. In the press of his activities, he does not always employ a high degree of tact in dealing with his subordinates. In this context it should be noted that he is performing proficiently in a position well above his present grade level.

During the past several months, the Section has undergone several changes and assumed additional functions under his guidance.

Subject is cost conscious in the use of supplies and equipment in his Section.

Subject is attending evening courses leading toward his degree to further himself professionally.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
14 Aug 1967	/s/James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 Oct 1967	Records Admin Officer	/s/John K. Smith

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in the ratings and comments of the supervisor. In fairness to the employee, it should be noted that the supervisor is a conscientious and conservative rater.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
14 Oct 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Vincent M. Lockhart

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb. 28	M	GS 9	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Records Admin Officer	DDP/FE/VNO	VIETNAM

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT	10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY	INITIAL / X REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)	ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):	SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	14 Jan 67 - 9 May 67

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
NO. 1: Chief, Registry with supervisory responsibility for 8 employees.	S
NO. 2:	
NO. 3:	
NO. 4:	
NO. 5:	
NO. 6:	

28 JUN 1967

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties and cost consciousness in the use of personnel, space, equipment and funds, must be commented on, if applicable. If extra space is needed to complete Section C, attach a separate sheet of paper.

JUN 12 10 44 AM '67

Although Subject has been at the Station for only a few months, he quickly established himself as a formidable leader in a very large Registry operation. He is resourceful and constantly strives to improve office procedures in order to increase efficiency and provide better service. He is an old hand in the Registry field, well indoctrinated in proper procedure and knows when and how to adjust to meet changing situations.

Subject effectively supervises 8 employees and displays cost consciousness in the management and operation of his office.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT		
DATE 8 May 1967	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/James S. Woods	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 4	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 8 May 1967	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Records Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/Richard Richardson
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur with rating and narrative comments. Subject is employing in this position his cumulative experience as a Registry supervisor at previous posts. Subject has contributed to the improvement of Registry procedures and in-country courier system of this large and fast moving station.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
15 May 1967	Ops Officer	/s/Terry T. Shima

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WOODS JAMES	20 Feb 28	M	GS-9	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel. Analyst - CH	DDP/FE/Pers/JKO	Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT		10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT	
CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY		INITIAL	XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)		ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):		SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	30 Sept 65 - 1 Sept 1966

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Supervises the analysis and distribution of incoming and outgoing cables.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Supervises the operation of the Station Flexowriters.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

06 SEP 1966

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE ... SEP ... 3 30 PM '66

FOSHAG has continued to perform at a "Strong" level. He is a fine supervisor and thereby gets maximum performance from a staff which is too small to handle a work load which has constantly increased over the past year. He is cost conscious in funds material and also strives to stream-line and improve the functioning of the Registry and its related functions.

FOSHAG has twice been recommended for promotion. He definitely deserves it and should be assigned next to a position above his present rating.

SECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 August 1966	James Woods /S/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
14		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 August 1966	OPS. Officer	Kenneth Miller /S/

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur in above rating.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
17 August 1966	Chief of Station	William E. Nelson /S/

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-09	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel Analyst Ch	DDP/FE/JKO	Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / X ANNUAL / SPECIAL (Specify): / REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: NOV 30 1965

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 July - 30 September 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak**: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate**: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient**: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong**: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding**: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Analyze and distribute all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Supervise the operation of the Station Flexowriter.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

15 DEC 1965

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

DEC 15 9 21 AM '65

During the four months Woods has been under my supervision he has demonstrated very real supervisory ability and a talent for getting maximum performance from a small staff which handles an increasingly large volume of work. He has also shown his ability to cut the costs of his operation.

Woods not only runs a most efficient Registry but is also constantly seeking ways to improve and stream-line its operation. He is a man who takes such interest in his job that his ideas and plans for improvement are carefully worked out and sound.

Though I have observed his work for only four months, I believe his over-all performance is "Strong" and close to "Outstanding." He has been recommended for promotion. He deserves it.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
27 October 1965	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
4		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
27 October 1965	Ops Officer	/s/ Kenneth P. Miller

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I agree with his supervisor that Subject is unusually competent in his field and fully deserving of a "Strong" rating. Subject displays unflagging enthusiasm for his job and constantly tries to improve his operation. He has displayed a high degree of imagination and inventiveness in making changes in our over-all CRR set-up. He very definitely deserves promotion.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
2 November 1965	DCOS	/s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

14-00000

13711

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 1923	M	GS-09	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel Analyst Gen	DDP/FE	Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)				
	SPECIAL (Specify):				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL	X	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1964 - 30 June 1965

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- **W - Weak** — Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- **A - Adequate** — Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- **P - Proficient** — Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- **S - Strong** — Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- **O - Outstanding** — Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Supervises the Station Flexowriter	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

29 JUN 1965

FORM 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As Chief of the Station Registry this employee continues to perform at an exceptionally proficient level with little supervision from his supervisor. His supervisor is being reassigned and is scheduled to be replaced by another officer who will necessarily need several months to become knowledgeable of Registry activities. However there is no concern that the flow of paper and the maintenance of accurate records will be affected due to the turnover of supervisors. This employee continues to use his native ingenuity and high standards of achievement to ensure that his office continues to be a well run and efficient unit. He continues to ensure that no government funds are wasted, even to the extent of arranging for the construction of certain modifications to the Registry office by Registry employees at little cost to the Government. This employee has been performing at a level above his present GS-09 grade. As recommended in November 1964, it is reconfirmed that this employee should be promoted to the next higher grade at the earliest possible opportunity.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
4 June 65	/s/ James S. Woods

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
45		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
4 June 65	Ops Officer	/s/ Frederick Randall

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject takes his job seriously and performs it in strong fashion. I would say that he displays more energy, interest, and continuing attention than just about anyone else I've seen in registry-type work.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 June 65	DCOS	/s/ Horace Z. Feldman

SECRET

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment No. _ to FJL 22242
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 010032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 23	M	GS-09	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel Analyst Gen	DDP/FE/JKO	Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT
- X CAREER
- RESERVE
- TEMPORARY
- CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See Instructions - Section C)
- SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT
- INITIAL
- X ANNUAL
- SPECIAL (Specify):
- REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
- REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.: 30 Nov 64

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 October 1963 - 30 September 1964

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises six Registry employees	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Supervises the Station Flexowriter	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

10 DEC 1964

FORM 4-64 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

This employee continues to be Chief of the Station Registry. During the past year his level of performance can be properly evaluated as exceptionally proficient. He continues to welcome hard work, is not bothered by constantly changing deadlines and is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit, and keep up his own work as well. He is quite conscious of the value of Government personnel and materiel, and does everything in his power to conserve these resources. He continues to come up with new ideas on how to perform his functions in a more efficient and effective manner. This results in benefits to the entire Station. It is regretable that the position this employee fills does not allow for promotion since he has been performing at a level above his present grade for several years.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS
1.	BY EMPLOYEE
I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE: 1 Oct 64	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: /s/ James S. Woods

2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE: 1 Oct 64	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: Ops Officer	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: /s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I fully concur with the rater's comments and sentiments. I have known this employee for a number of years during which time he has evidenced real growth in self-sufficiency and also in the handling of his responsibilities as a supervisor.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
29 Oct 64	COS	/s/ William V. Broe

SECRET

14-00000

ATT TO FJTT-10860

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 10032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Woods, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-09	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel Analyst Gen	DDP/FE/JKO	Tokyo

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: XX CAREER | RESERVE | TEMPORARY | CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) | SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL | X ANNUAL | SPECIAL (Specify): | REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR | REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
30 November 1963	1 Oct 62-30 Sep 63

SECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

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P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches, and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises six Registry employees	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises Station courier service which distributes classified correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Analyzes and distributes all incoming and outgoing Station cables.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

30 SEP 1963

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

FORM 6-61 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry, this employee has performed at a level of exceptional proficiency for the past year. He welcomes hard work, is able to fill in for any absent member of his unit and keep up his own work as well. He continues to bring up ideas for the improvement of his unit. These have been particularly welcome during the past year in view of the impending move of the Registry to a new location at Fuchu Air Station. The slight tendency to be arbitrary mentioned in the last fitness report has been eliminated during this reporting period. In view of this employees strong performance over the past year, he is being recommended for promotion to GS-10.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
10 Sept. 63	/s/ James S. Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
10 Sept. 63	Chief, Ops Support Staff	/s/ Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

I concur in this rating and add that this employee has not let the very serious personal problems thrust upon him during this period interfere in any way with his consistently dependable performance. In this key role, in any station of this size, dependability, reliability, and confidence are "musts" and while there are quite naturally small aggravating incidents of mis-routing or mis-direction of documents, I have been struck by the lack of them here, because ratee has the "must" qualities. His performance certainly warrants favorable consideration of the projected promotion action.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
11 September 63	Deputy Chief of Station	Robert Wheeler /s/

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
WOODS, James S.	20 Feb 28	M	GS-9	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Intel Analyst	DDP/FE	TOKYO

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY		INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X	ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):				SPECIAL (Specify):	

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 Oct 61 - 30 Sept 62

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of Central Registry and Records with responsibility for the receipt, analysis and routing of all incoming and outgoing cables, dispatches and memoranda of the Station, including all other organizations corresponding with the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Supervises four Registry employees.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Supervises a courier service which distributes correspondence to the five geographically separated elements of the Station.	P
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: P

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

As the Chief of the Tokyo Registry this employee has performed well. He has abundant energy and constantly comes up with ideas for the improvement of the efficiency of his unit. He welcomes hard work and is able to fill in and take over any job in his unit and keep up with his own duties as well. As a supervisor, he has a slight tendency to be arbitrary when convinced he is right. This may be due to the fact that the Registry frequently operates under conditions of pressure due to the recent reorganization, reduction, and relocation of the Station. The Station has been required to get the job done with fewer people and under more difficult working conditions.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
25 Oct. 1962	James S. Woods /s/

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
		Frederick Randall

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Subject has done and continues to do well what is expected of him. In amplification of the last sentence of the rater's comments (Section C) Subject has made the adjustment to "fewer people" and "more difficult working conditions" quite well, without trouble and more importantly with no impediment to the CRH service.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
26 Oct 1962		Robert P. Wheeler

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: CSPD

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
Woods, James	20 Feb 28	M	GS-9

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
D	Ops Officer	TOKYO STATION

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

	NOT ELIGIBLE		MEMBER		DEFERRED
	PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD From To	SPECIAL (Specify)
	15 Apr 61–30 Sep 61	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory	2 - Barely adequate	3 - Acceptable	4 - Competent	5 - Excellent	6 - Superior	7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Chief of local registry, supervising four persons.	4	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3		SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 4

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree	2 - Limited degree	3 - Normal degree	4 - Above average degree	5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE					X		
RESOURCEFUL					X		
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES						X	
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES					X		
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE		X					
WRITES EFFECTIVELY		X					
SECURITY CONSCIOUS						X	
THINKS CLEARLY					X		
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS						X	
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAIL ROOM

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Ratee has been in charge of station registry since 24 Apr 61. This has been a period of dramatic change in the station and especially in our paper management. He has responded well to these changes and shows a degree of adaptability that bodes well. His handling of our recent "holdings" inventory, his unceasing efforts to reduce unnecessary holdings, and his knowledge of his business (RI) have made him a valued addition to our shrinking team. In this short rating period there has been little opportunity for me to observe his supervisory abilities, but the lack of any problem on this count coming to my attention means to me that he is doing well. Another six months should tell us more on this score.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
6 Oct 61	Signed

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 Oct 61	Ops Officer	Wheeler, Robert P.

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
6 Oct 61	Ops Officer	Wheeler, Robert P.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

20 DEC 1960

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 110032

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
WOODS James S.	20 February 1928	M	GS-9

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI	Records Management Officer	DDP/FE/Secretariat

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS				9. TYPE OF REPORT	
NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER	DEFERRED	INITIAL	REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
PENDING		DECLINED	DENIED	X ANNUAL	REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD	SPECIAL (Specify)
31 October 1960	From Sep 59 To 30 Sep 60	

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
NO. 1 Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc., re implementation of DDP records management program	6	NO. 4 Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records	6
NO. 2 Training and assistance to FE personnel in records management procedures	5	NO. 5 Guidance to field records officers	5
NO. 3 Planning and development of Division vital materials program	5	NO. 6 Implementation of various records purges and records programs	5

DC 59

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE							X
WRITES EFFECTIVELY						X	
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY							X
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made to employee for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an excellent records officer. His interest in the subject and his perseverance in carrying out tasks connected with it have not only produced results in his own work, but have kindled enthusiasm and interest within the Division in developments in Agency records management. He has been able to improve records within the Division with a great deal of success, and at the same time avoided the usual aversion to records responsibility which too much emphasis on records creates in the case officer. His ability to get along well with others is important in his liaison function.

Mr. Woods' work on the vital materials program in the last year has resulted in a much more realistic program for the Division. The creation and ~~retention~~ up-to-date retention of vital materials has for some time been a problem for which little solution could be found. It appears that the present program will result in vital materials which will be current and usable if needed.

Subject is at present assigned to a part-time detail in MMU. This should help to broaden his knowledge of new approaches in the records field. A/EXO/DDP has expressed his complete satisfaction with the very effective work Mr. Woods is doing on this detail.

Mr. Woods' work during the last year was the basis for a commendation of the Division's records program by COP.

SECTION F — CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
16 DEC 1960	James S Woods

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
20	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- [ ] EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- [ ] REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 90 DAYS
- OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
16 December 1960	C/FE/ESEC	Harriet L. Weiler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- [x] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- [ ] I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	FE/EXO	Orrin R. Magill, Jr.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: [illegible]

SECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE
[illegible handwriting]	30 February 1923	F	[illegible]

5. SERVICE DESIGNATION	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT
DI	Records Mgmt Officer	[illegible]

8. CAREER STAFF STATUS

NOT ELIGIBLE	X	MEMBER		DEFERRED	
PENDING		DECLINED		DENIED	

9. TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT/SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT/EMPLOYEE

SPECIAL (Specify)

10. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	11. REPORTING PERIOD
31 October 1959	From 1 Jul 58 To 30 Sep 59

SECTION B — EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating number which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

1 - Unsatisfactory | 2 - Barely adequate | 3 - Acceptable | 4 - Competent | 5 - Excellent | 6 - Superior | 7 - Outstanding

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NO.
No. 1: Liaison with RID, DDP/RMO, DDP/MMU, other Division records officers, etc, re implementation of records mgt program	6	No. 4: Assistance to FE personnel in problems of retention and retirement of records	5
No. 2: Training and assistance for FE personnel in records mgt procedures	4	No. 5: Guidance to field records officers	6
No. 3: Planning and development of Division vital materials program	4	No. 6: Guidance in all records problems	5

SECTION C — EVALUATION OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position - performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the rating number in the box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

1 - Performance in many important respects fails to meet requirements.
2 - Performance meets most requirements but is deficient in one or more important respects.
3 - Performance clearly meets basic requirements.
4 - Performance clearly exceeds basic requirements.
5 - Performance in every important respect is superior.
6 - Performance in every respect is outstanding.

RATING NO.: 5

SECTION D — DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPLOYEE

In the rating boxes below, check (X) the degree to which each characteristic applies to the employee

1 - Least possible degree | 2 - Limited degree | 3 - Normal degree | 4 - Above average degree | 5 - Outstanding degree

CHARACTERISTICS	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT OBSERVED	1	2	3	4	5
GETS THINGS DONE							X
RESOURCEFUL							X
ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES							X
CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES						X	
DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT						X	
FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE						X	
WRITES EFFECTIVELY					X		
SECURITY CONSCIOUS							X
THINKS CLEARLY						X	
DISCIPLINE IN ORIGINATING, MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF RECORDS							X
OTHER (Specify):							

SEE SECTION "E" ON REVERSE SIDE

14-00000

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION E — **NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE**

Stress strengths and weaknesses demonstrated in current position. Indicate suggestions made for improvement of his work. Give recommendations for his training. Describe, if appropriate, his potential for development and for assuming greater responsibilities. Amplify or explain, if appropriate, ratings given in SECTIONS B, C, and D to provide the best basis for determining future personnel actions.

Subject is an excellent records officer. He is enthusiastic about his specialty and works hard at it, putting a great deal of energy into his work.

He is quick and understands records thoroughly. Because of this, he is at times inclined to jump ahead of others in records discussions and should attempt to slow down his approach to the subject to meet the level of persons who do not have the same records background.

Subject could fill any position in the records management field, and should advance quickly. He is interested in developing his capabilities and is at present enrolled in the Writing Workshop with this in mind.

This report has been prepared in accordance with FE Division standards which recognize the ... of ... ting the individual against the group. Thus an "average" rating reflects an entirely satisfactory performance.

SECTION F — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I certify that I have seen Sections A, B, C, D and E of this Report.

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
29 Oct 59	James S Toole

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION
7	

IF REPORT IS NOT BEING MADE AT THIS TIME, GIVE REASON.

- EMPLOYEE UNDER MY SUPERVISION LESS THAN 90 DAYS
- REPORT MADE WITHIN LAST 30 DAYS
- OTHER (Specify):

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
27 October 1959	C/FE/ESEC	Harriet Weiler

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

- X I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE ABOUT THE SAME EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A HIGHER EVALUATION.
- I WOULD HAVE GIVEN THIS EMPLOYEE A LOWER EVALUATION.
- I CANNOT JUDGE THESE EVALUATIONS. I AM NOT SUFFICIENTLY FAMILIAR WITH THE EMPLOYEE'S PERFORMANCE.

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Subject is a promising young records officer. He has demonstrated a capability for growth and for assuming greater responsibility. He is very much interested in records management and wants to make a career of it. His career development should be designed to afford him opportunities for maximum development both in terms of varied Headquarters experience and in field assignments.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
	FE/EXO	Orrin R. Magill, Jr.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) Woods (First) James (Middle) [redacted]
2. DATE OF BIRTH 20 Feb 1938
3. SEX M
4. SERVICE DESIGNATION DI
5. OFFICE DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/ FE/PBH/Manila
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Records Clerk 21 August 1958 - 4 Sept 1958
7. GRADE GS-7
8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP
9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates) 21 August 1958 - 4 September 1958
10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify) X For TDY Period--MELB

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Subject left station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

- X THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
- THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
- I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
- IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN SECTION D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
- I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE 18 Sept 1958 | C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR Collas G. Harris | D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE Chief of Station, Melb

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE
3 NOV 1958

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE — | B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL — | C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL —

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: This rating covers the period 21 August - 4 September 1958, while subject was in Melbourne surveying Station files and installing new RI standardized filing system.

SECRET

(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

C. RATINGS IN PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same work at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OCT 24 2 14 PM '7?

MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
No. 1: Installing new RI Filing System	5	No. 4: Develops new Programs	5
No. 2: Surveying Station Files	5	No. 5: Manages Files	5
No. 3: Oral Briefing	5	No. 6:	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job

STRENGTHS: Ability to see another's viewpoint and to work out satisfactory compromises between the RI system and operational requirements of the Melbourne Station.

WEAKNESSES: None observed.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents ...and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8. of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
XXXXX WOODS James S.	20 Feb. 1928	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Manila	Records Management Analyst

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7		8 December 1957 - September 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [X] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE; SPECIAL (Specify): Promotion

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT.

Absent from Station. Will be shown upon return.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS SEE ATTACHED REPORTS	X	I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify): Will upon return to Station.
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
4 Sept 1958	Ray F. Drummond	C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

BY DATE

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 Sept 1958	George E. Aurell	COS

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 17 AM '58
MAIL ROOM

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Supervises 2 Records Mgm. Analysts	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Processes files in accordance with Specific Records System	6
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Devises Records Systems to suit Station needs.	6	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Trains Station personnel in Records maintenance.	5	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Strengths: Works hard and fast. Able to analyze problems and organize work of Records Management Team in methodical sequence.

Weakness: No notable weaknesses.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct on the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO. IF YES EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS James S.	20 Feb. 1928	M	DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
Manila	Records Management Analyst

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7		8 December 1957 - September 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) [X] Promotion

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
4 Sept. 1958	Ray F. Drummond	C/Admin

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
4 Sept. 1958	George E. Aurell	COS

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: **6**

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	2	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
3		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

6 months

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

OCT 14 9 17 AM '58

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

None planned nor available while on current overseas tour.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

Subject single and willing serve geographic locations. Believe subject performs best in demanding assignments.

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
3	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	4	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	5	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	4	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
4	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	5	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	3	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACES	3	18. IS OBSERVANT	3	28. HAS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
4	9. GETS THINGS DONE	3	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

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(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS James S.			

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
		4 April - 30 June 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT:
Report prepared after subject departed this station

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM - A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND ~~SUBORDINATE~~ other SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 July 1958	Orrin R. Magill, Jr.	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted for ...	28	1 OCT 1958
	[signature]	15/10/58

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
	Nicholas A. Natsios	

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE. CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 56 REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
OCT 14 9 13 AM '59
MAIL ROOM

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of that specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING NUMBER
NO. 1: Analysis of records problems and establishing records procedures	6	NO. 4:	
NO. 2: Supervising	6	NO. 5:	
NO. 3: Keeping his owns records and reporting on work progress	5	NO. 6:	

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

Subject analysed difficult records problems quickly and precisely, discussed his recommendations forcefully and convincingly, and then proceeded to put them into effect with considerable energy. He not only supervised his subordinates effectively so that every minute was productive, but did a good share of the routine work himself, making certain that everything was done precisely as planned.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2 9 SEP R[illegible]

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS James S.			

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
		4 April - 30 June 1958

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR / REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify) T.D.Y.

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
10 July 1958	~~James~~ Orrin R. Magill, Jr.	

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
10 July 1958	Nicholas A. Natsios	

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 6

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [X] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
3		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	3	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	3	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	3	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	0	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
	0	OTHER (Specify)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION — OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

Three

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

From subject's performance here it appears that his potential in the records management field may be limited only by his lack of formal higher education, and I feel that even in this respect he could overcome this deficiency with some training. His forcefulness and boundless energy would unquestionably inspire any subordinates to higher performance. He has an intense interest in records work and an ability to grasp complex problems and make quick decisions.

Oct 14 ... 1 AM '58 ... ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

3

None

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

None

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	5	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
5	3. HAS INITIATIVE	5	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	3	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	5	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
5	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
5	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	5	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	3	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	X	27. IS VERSATILE
5	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	5	19. THINKS CLEARLY	4	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
X	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	4	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	5	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS James	20 Feb 1928	M	SD: DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FI RI A&O	GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7		21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE [X] SPECIAL (Specify) [ ]

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [ ] HAS [X] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: Mr. Woods is on temporary duty in Mexico City, Mexico.

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

X	THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.		IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
	THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.		I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):
	I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.		

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
22 July 1957	James L. Brogdon	Coordinator, 201 Control Unit, RI/Analysis Section

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	JB	7/23/57
Reviewed by PUD	D. L. REEDY	10-8-57

CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET [ ]

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
22 July 1957	[illegible] Murray, Jr.	Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER [ ]

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS: Mr. Woods departed for temporary duty on 9 Feb 1957. His last Fitness Report was completed on 5 Feb 1957, just prior to his departure. Reports from the station indicates the he is doing a commendable job.

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

SECRET
(When Filled In)

2. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES — MAIL ROOM PERSONNEL

DIRECTIONS:

a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during this rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise must be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER

1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING NUMBER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING NUMBER

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

SECTION C. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY...WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE...BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS James	20 Feb 1928	M	SD: DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FI RI A&O	GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7		21 January 1957 - 15 July 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] / ANNUAL [ ] / REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] / REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [X] / SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER [ ]

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No . If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
		A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
		A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
		A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
		WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
		WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

FORM NO. 45 (Part II) REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
1 NOV 55

SECRET Potential (4)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

SECRET
(When Filled In)

3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

AUG 16 3 19 PM '57

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

MAIL ROOM

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: *This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.*

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW		11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT		21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES		12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY		22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
	3. HAS INITIATIVE		13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES		23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING		14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS		24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS		15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION		25. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT
	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE		16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT		26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE		17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS		27. IS VERSATILE
	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS		18. IS OBSERVANT		28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
	9. GETS THINGS DONE		19. THINKS CLEARLY		29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES		20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS		30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part I) PERFORMANCE

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is designed to help you express your evaluation of your subordinate and to transmit this evaluation to your supervisor and senior officials. Organization policy requires that you inform the subordinate where he stands with you. Completion of the report can help you prepare for a discussion with him of his strengths and weaknesses. It is also organization policy that you show Part I of this report to the employee except under conditions specified in Regulation 20-370. It is recommended that you read the entire form before completing any question. If this is the initial report on the employee, it must be completed and forwarded to the Office of Personnel no later than 30 days after the date indicated in item 8, of Section "A" below.

SECTION A. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS, James S.	20 Feb 1928	M	SD:DI
5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FI RI A&O	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst		
7. GRADE: GS-7	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP: 21 Jan 57	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates): 21 January 1956 - 20 January 1957	

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): [ ] INITIAL [X] ANNUAL [ ] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION B. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: THIS REPORT [X] HAS [ ] HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL RATED. IF NOT SHOWN, EXPLAIN WHY NOT: JSW

A. CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE STATEMENTS:

[ ] THIS REPORT REFLECTS MY OWN OPINIONS OF THIS INDIVIDUAL.
[X] THIS REPORT REFLECTS THE COMBINED OPINIONS OF MYSELF AND PREVIOUS SUPERVISORS.
[X] I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THIS EMPLOYEE HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES SO THAT HE KNOWS WHERE HE STANDS.
[ ] IF INDIVIDUAL IS RATED "1" IN C1 OR D, A WARNING LETTER WAS SENT TO HIM & A COPY ATTACHED TO THIS REPORT.
[ ] I CANNOT CERTIFY THAT THE RATED INDIVIDUAL KNOWS HOW I EVALUATE HIS JOB PERFORMANCE BECAUSE (Specify):

B. THIS DATE	C. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	D. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
5 Feb 1957	James L. Brogdon [signature]	Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: RECORD ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE OF OPINION WITH THE SUPERVISOR, OR ANY OTHER INFORMATION, WHICH WILL LEAD TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THIS REPORT:

Mr. Woods since return from foreign assignment has completed one temporary duty assignment and is preparing for another. He has applied the present headquarters work at the station registry on a standard equating with this evaluation.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	[initials]	11 FEB 1957
Reviewed by RID	[initials]	2-11-57

[ ] CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET

I certify that any substantial difference of opinion with the supervisor is reflected in the above section.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
5 Feb 1957	John J. Murray, Jr. [signature]	Supervisor, RI/AN Section

SECTION C. JOB PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. RATING ON GENERAL PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

DIRECTIONS: Consider ONLY the productivity and effectiveness with which the individual being rated has performed his duties during the rating period. Compare him ONLY with others doing similar work at a similar level of responsibility. Factors other than productivity will be taken into account later in Section D.

INSERT RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE. ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES.
3 - PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
4 - PERFORMS DUTIES IN A COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
5 - A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
6 - PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE SUPERVISOR.

COMMENTS:

FORM NO. 45 (Part I) 1 NOV 55 — REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF FORMS 45 AND 45A WHICH ARE OBSOLETE. SECRET Performance (4)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
FEB 6 3 08 PM '57
MAIL ROOM

C. RATINGS ON PERFORMANCE OF SPECIFIC DUTIES

DIRECTIONS:
a. State in the spaces below up to six of the more important SPECIFIC duties performed during the rating period. Place the most important first. Do not include minor or unimportant duties.
b. Rate performance on each specific duty considering ONLY effectiveness in performance of this specific duty.
c. For supervisors, ability to supervise will always be rated as a specific duty (do not rate as supervisors those who supervise a secretary only).
d. Compare in your mind, when possible, the individual being rated with others performing the same duty at a similar level of responsibility.
e. Two individuals with the same job title may be performing different duties. If so, rate them on different duties.
f. Be specific. Examples of the kind of duties that might be rated are:

ORAL BRIEFING	HAS AND USES AREA KNOWLEDGE	CONDUCTS INTERROGATIONS
GIVING LECTURES	DEVELOPS NEW PROGRAMS	PREPARES SUMMARIES
CONDUCTING SEMINARS	ANALYZES INDUSTRIAL REPORTS	TRANSLATES GERMAN
WRITING TECHNICAL REPORTS	MANAGES FILES	DEBRIEFING SOURCES
CONDUCTING EXTERNAL LIAISON	OPERATES RADIO	KEEPS BOOKS
TYPING	COORDINATES WITH OTHER OFFICES	DRIVES TRUCK
TAKING DICTATION	WRITES REGULATIONS	MAINTAINS AIR CONDITIONING
SUPERVISING	PREPARES CORRESPONDENCE	EVALUATES SIGNIFICANCE OF DATA

g. For some jobs, duties may be broken down even further if supervisor considers it advisable, e.g., combined key and phone operation, in the case of a radio operator.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
1 - INCOMPETENT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
2 - BARELY ADEQUATE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY
3 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY ACCEPTABLY
4 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN A COMPETENT MANNER
5 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN SUCH A FINE MANNER THAT HE IS A DISTINCT ASSET ON HIS JOB
6 - PERFORMS THIS DUTY IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER FOUND IN VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS HOLDING SIMILAR JOBS
7 - EXCELS ANYONE I KNOW IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS DUTY

SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	RATING NUMBER	SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING NUMBER
Analysis - subjective analysis of CE, FI and PP material.	5	Assignment Management - Organization & scheduling of work.	5
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5**	**RATING NUMBER**
Analysis - Quantitative	5		
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	**RATING NUMBER**	**SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6**	**RATING NUMBER**
Has and uses area knowledge.	4		

3. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF MANNER OF JOB PERFORMANCE

DIRECTIONS: Stress strengths and weaknesses, particularly those which affect development on present job.

During the short time Mr. Woods has been assigned to this office, he has very quickly grasped the essentials of his assignment; he knows when to seek guidance and is constantly striving to increase his knowledge and understanding of his assignment. He is extremely conscientious, accepts the responsibilities of his job and performs his duties commendably.

SECTION D. SUITABILITY FOR CURRENT JOB IN ORGANIZATION

DIRECTIONS: Take into account here everything you know about the individual....productivity, conduct in the job, pertinent personal characteristics or habits, special defects or talents....and how he fits in with your team. Compare him with others doing similar work of about the same level.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED
2 - OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY....WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW
3 - A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE....BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION
4 - OF THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION
5 - A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS
6 - AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION
7 - EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER SUITED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER POSITION IN THE ORGANIZATION? [ ] YES [X] NO. IF YES, EXPLAIN FULLY:

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT (Part II) POTENTIAL

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER: Consult current instructions for completing this report.

FOR THE SUPERVISOR: This report is a privileged communication to your supervisor, and to appropriate career management and personnel officials concerning the potential of the employee being rated. It is NOT to be shown to the rated employee. It is recommended that you read the entire report before completing any question. This report is to be completed only after the employee has been under your supervision FOR AT LEAST 90 DAYS. If less than 90 days, hold and complete after the 90 days has elapsed. If this is the INITIAL REPORT on the employee, however, it MUST be completed and forwarded to the OP no later than 30 days after the due date indicated in item 8 of Section "E" below.

SECTION E. GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. SERVICE DESIGNATION
WOODS, James S.	20 Feb 1928	M	SD:DI

5. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT	6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE
FI RI A&O	GS-0132.35-7 Intel Analyst

7. GRADE	8. DATE REPORT DUE IN OP	9. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
GS-7	21 Jan 57	21 January 1956 - 20 January 1957

10. TYPE OF REPORT (Check one): INITIAL [ ] ANNUAL [X] REASSIGNMENT-SUPERVISOR [ ] REASSIGNMENT-EMPLOYEE [ ] SPECIAL (Specify)

SECTION F. CERTIFICATION

1. FOR THE RATER: I CERTIFY THAT THIS REPORT REPRESENTS MY BEST JUDGEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	C. SUPERVISOR'S OFFICIAL TITLE
5 Feb 1957	James L. Brogdon [signature]	Coordinator 201 Control Unit

2. FOR THE REVIEWING OFFICIAL: I HAVE REVIEWED THIS REPORT AND NOTED ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IN ATTACHED MEMO.

A. THIS DATE	B. TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	C. OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL
5 Feb 1957	John J. Murray, Jr. [signature]	Supervisor, RI/Analysis Section

SECTION G. ESTIMATE OF POTENTIAL

1. POTENTIAL TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES

DIRECTIONS: Considering others of his grade and type of assignment, rate the employee's potential to assume greater responsibilities. Think in terms of the kind of responsibility encountered at the various levels in his kind of work.

RATING NUMBER: 5

1 - ALREADY ABOVE THE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
2 - HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED
3 - MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME BEFORE HE CAN BE TRAINED TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
4 - READY FOR TRAINING IN ASSUMING GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES
5 - WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING
6 - ALREADY ASSUMING MORE RESPONSIBILITIES THAN EXPECTED AT HIS PRESENT LEVEL
7 - AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR EARLY ASSUMPTION OF HIGHER LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES

2. SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL

DIRECTIONS: Answer this question: Has this person the ability to be a supervisor? [ ] Yes [ ] No If your answer is YES, indicate below your opinion or guess of the level of supervisory ability this person will reach AFTER SUITABLE TRAINING. Indicate your opinion by placing the number of the descriptive rating below which comes closest to expressing your opinion in the appropriate column. If your rating is based on observing him supervise, note your rating in the "actual" column. If based on opinion of his potential, note the rating in the "potential" column.

DESCRIPTIVE RATING NUMBER
0 - HAVE NO OPINION ON HIS SUPERVISORY POTENTIAL IN THIS SITUATION
1 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A WEAK SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
2 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE AN AVERAGE SUPERVISOR IN THIS KIND OF SITUATION
3 - BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL WOULD BE A STRONG SUPERVISOR IN THIS SITUATION

ACTUAL	POTENTIAL	DESCRIPTIVE SITUATION
	3	A GROUP DOING THE BASIC JOB (truck drivers, stenographers, technicians or professional specialists of various kinds) WHERE CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS FREQUENT (First line supervisor)
	2	A GROUP OF SUPERVISORS WHO DIRECT THE BASIC JOB (Second line supervisors)
	0	A GROUP, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT BE SUPERVISORS, WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAJOR PLANS, ORGANIZATION AND POLICY (Executive level)
	0	WHEN CONTACT WITH IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES IS NOT FREQUENT
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES' ACTIVITIES ARE DIVERSE AND NEED CAREFUL COORDINATION
	2	WHEN IMMEDIATE SUBORDINATES INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX
		OTHER (Specify)

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3. INDICATE THE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF MONTHS THE RATED EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER YOUR SUPERVISION

Three Months

4. COMMENTS CONCERNING POTENTIAL

Mr. Woods is lacking in formal education, however, he has intelligence, initiative and ability and with continued on-the-job experience is capable of developing into a good supervisor of a section in RI or in operating the Registry Section of a field installation.

SECTION H. FUTURE PLANS

1. TRAINING OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL EXPERIENCE PLANNED FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

Training within the established FI/RI pattern.

2. NOTE OTHER FACTORS, INCLUDING PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN INDIVIDUAL'S FUTURE ASSIGNMENTS

SECTION I. DESCRIPTION OF INDIVIDUAL

DIRECTIONS: This section is provided as an aid to describing the individual as you see him on the job. Interpret the words literally. On the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. To the left of each statement is a box under the heading "category." Read each statement and insert in the box the category number which best tells how much the statement applies to the person covered by this report.

CATEGORY NUMBER
- X - HAVE NOT OBSERVED THIS; HENCE CAN GIVE NO OPINION AS TO HOW THE DESCRIPTION APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL
- 1 - APPLIES TO THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE LEAST POSSIBLE DEGREE
- 2 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO A LIMITED DEGREE
- 3 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN AVERAGE DEGREE
- 4 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE
- 5 - APPLIES TO INDIVIDUAL TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE

CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT	CATEGORY	STATEMENT
3	1. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW	5	11. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT	4	21. IS EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES
4	2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES	4	12. SHOWS ORIGINALITY	3	22. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS
4	3. HAS INITIATIVE	4	13. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES	4	23. IS THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS
4	4. IS ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING	3	14. ADMITS HIS ERRORS	4	24. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE
4	5. STRIVES CONSTANTLY FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS	3	15. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION	4	25. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT
3	6. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE	4	16. DOES HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT	4	26. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS
5	7. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE	4	17. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS	4	27. IS VERSATILE
4	8. HAS MEMORY FOR FACTS	4	18. IS OBSERVANT	4	28. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE
5	9. GETS THINGS DONE	4	19. THINKS CLEARLY	5	29. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE
5	10. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES	5	20. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS	3	30. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION

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FIELD FITNESS REPORT

The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff; and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

	BY	DATE
Posted Pos. Control	WHR	28 MAY 1956

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
James S. Woods	25 Feb. 1928	M	DI

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-7	KOBA/Hqs

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
April 1956	15 April 1955 - 15 April 1956

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Intelligence Analyst - CE	25 September 1954

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality File Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all KOBA file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Agnes M. Prime	Paul B. Breitweiser

3. THIS REPORT [X] WAS [ ] WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
1 May '56	William E. Nelson (signature) William E. Nelson, CFE/1

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FORM NO. 45a REPLACES FORM 45A, 1 SEP 54,
1 FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is not favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that apply in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The scale within each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so desire. Look at the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means that you have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE			APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE			APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE		
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X											
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.										X				
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.	X													
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.								X						
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.								X						
4. HAS INITIATIVE.											X			
5. UNEMOTIONAL.								X						
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.								X						
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.								X						
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.								X						
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.								X						
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.								X						
11. CALM.								X						
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.								X						
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.								X						
14. GETS THINGS DONE.											X			
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.									X					
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.									X					
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.										X				
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.										X				
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.								X						
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.								X						
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.									X					
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.								X						
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.								X						
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.								X						
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT								X						

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(When Filled In)

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".											X			
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.								X						
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.	X													
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.											X			
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.											X			
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.											X			
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working and more than willing to work long hours. Subject has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

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(When Filled In)

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C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weakness.

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A, B, C, & D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

- [ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
- [ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
- [ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
- [ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
- [XXX] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
- [ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [XXX] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

- [ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
- [ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
- [XX] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
- [ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
- [ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

- [ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
- [ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
- [ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS...WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
- [ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
- [XXX] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION
- [ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION...WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

- [ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
- [ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
- [ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
- [ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
- [XXX] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
- [ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
- [ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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FIELD FITNESS REPORT

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The Fitness Report is an important factor in organization personnel management. It seeks to provide:
1. The organization selection board with information of value when considering the application of an individual for membership in the career staff, and
2. A periodic record of job performance as an aid to the effective utilization of personnel.

INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE FIELD ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER: Consult current field administrative instructions regarding the initiation and transmittal of this report to headquarters.

TO THE FIELD SUPERVISOR: Read the entire form before attempting to complete any item. As the supervisor who assigns, directs and reviews the work of the individual, you have primary responsibility for evaluating his strengths, weaknesses, and on-the-job effectiveness as revealed by his day-to-day activities. If this individual has been under your supervision for less than 30 days, you will collaborate, if practicable, with his previous supervisors to make sure the report is accurate and complete. Primary responsibility rests with the current supervisor. It is assumed that, throughout the period this individual has been under your supervision, you have discharged your supervisory responsibilities by frequent discussions of his work, so that in a general way he knows where he stands.

A

Processed By: K.G.W. 5/23/55
Reviewed by FUD

IT IS OPTIONAL WHETHER OR NOT THIS FITNESS REPORT IS SHOWN TO THE PERSON BEING RATED

SECTION I

LEAVE BLANK - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY	1. DATE OF BIRTH	2. SEX	3. SERVICE DESIGNATION
James S. Woods	25 Feb 1928	M	~~[illegible]~~ SD-D

4. GRADE	5. STATION DESIGNATION (Current)
GS-5	Korea Mission Headquarters

6. DUE DATE OF THIS REPORT	7. PERIOD COVERED BY THIS REPORT (Inclusive dates)
	1 November 1954 - 14 April 1955

SECTION II (To be completed by field supervisor)

1. CURRENT POSITION	2. DATE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR POSITION
Intelligence Analyst - CE 0136.52	25 September 1955

3. STATE THE SPECIFIC ASSIGNMENTS OR TASKS WHICH ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE GIVEN TO THE EMPLOYEE DURING THE PAST THREE TO SIX MONTHS (List in order of frequency)

Subject is an intelligence analyst in the Personality Files Section of the Records Integration Branch. Subject is responsible for the maintenance of agent records and personality files, and is responsible for making all Korea Mission file checks.

SECTION III (To be completed at headquarters only)

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

AUTHENTICATION OF REPORT AND SIGNATURES

1. NAME OF RATER (True)	2. NAME OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL IN FIELD (True)
Agnes M. Irime	John L. Hart

3. THIS REPORT ☐ WAS ☐ WAS NOT SHOWN TO THE INDIVIDUAL BEING RATED.

4. DATE REPORT AUTHENTICATED AT HQS.	5. NAME AND SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL OFFICER AT HEADQUARTERS AUTHORIZED TO AUTHENTICATE FITNESS REPORT AND SIGNATURES
29 April 55	William E. Nelson (signature) William E. Nelson

DO NOT COMPLETE - FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV

This section is provided as an aid in describing the individual. Your description is [illegible] favorable or unfavorable in itself but acquires its meaning in relation to a particular job or assignment. The descriptive words are to be interpreted literally.

On the left hand side of the page below are a series of statements that [illegible] in some degree to most people. On the right hand side of the page are four major categories of descriptions. The [illegible] each category is divided into three small blocks; this is to allow you to make finer distinctions if you so wish. [illegible] of the statement on the left - then check the category on the right which best tells how much the statement applies to the person you are rating. Placing an "X" in the "Not Observed" column means you have no opinion on whether a phrase applies to an individual. Placing an "X" in the "Does Not Apply" column means [illegible] have the definite opinion that the description is not at all suited to the individual.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 [illegible] '55
AR ROOM

STATEMENTS	NOT OBSERVED	DOES NOT APPLY	APPLIES TO A LIMITED DEGREE	APPLIES TO A REASONABLE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN ABOVE AVERAGE DEGREE	APPLIES TO AN OUTSTANDING DEGREE
SAMPLES: A. ABLE TO SEE ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW.			X			
SAMPLES: B. PRACTICAL.					X	
1. A GOOD REPORTER OF EVENTS.			X			
2. CAN MAKE DECISIONS ON HIS OWN WHEN NEED ARISES.			X			
3. CAUTIOUS IN ACTION.				X		
4. HAS INITIATIVE.					X	
5. UNEMOTIONAL.				X		
6. ANALYTIC IN HIS THINKING.				X		
7. CONSTANTLY STRIVING FOR NEW KNOWLEDGE AND IDEAS.				X		
8. GETS ALONG WITH PEOPLE AT ALL SOCIAL LEVELS.				X		
9. HAS SENSE OF HUMOR.				X		
10. KNOWS WHEN TO SEEK ASSISTANCE.				X		
11. CALM.				X		
12. CAN GET ALONG WITH PEOPLE.				X		
13. MEMORY FOR FACTS.				X		
14. GETS THINGS DONE.					X	
15. KEEPS ORIENTED TOWARD LONG TERM GOALS.					X	
16. CAN COPE WITH EMERGENCIES.					X	
17. HAS HIGH STANDARDS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT.					X	
18. HAS STAMINA; CAN KEEP GOING A LONG TIME.					X	
19. HAS WIDE RANGE OF INFORMATION.				X		
20. SHOWS ORIGINALITY.				X		
21. ACCEPTS RESPONSIBILITIES.					X	
22. ADMITS HIS ERRORS.				X		
23. RESPONDS WELL TO SUPERVISION.				X		
24. EVEN DISPOSITION.				X		
25. ABLE TO DO HIS JOB WITHOUT STRONG SUPPORT.				X		

SECRET

26. CAN THINK ON HIS FEET.								X						
27. COMES UP WITH SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.								X						
28. STIMULATING TO ASSOCIATES; A "SPARK PLUG".										X				
29. TOUGH MINDED.								X						
30. OBSERVANT.								X						
31. CAPABLE.								X						
32. CLEAR THINKING.								X						
33. COMPLETES ASSIGNMENTS WITHIN ALLOWABLE TIME LIMITS.										X				
34. EVALUATES SELF REALISTICALLY.								X						
35. WELL INFORMED ABOUT CURRENT EVENTS.					X									
36. DELIBERATE.								X						
37. EFFECTIVE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSOCIATES.								X						
38. IMPLEMENTS DECISIONS REGARDLESS OF OWN FEELINGS.									X					
39. THOUGHTFUL OF OTHERS.								X						
40. WORKS WELL UNDER PRESSURE.										X				
41. DISPLAYS JUDGEMENT.								X						
42. GIVES CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE.								X						
43. HAS DRIVE.										X				
44. IS SECURITY CONSCIOUS.										X				
45. VERSATILE.								X						
46. HIS CRITICISM IS CONSTRUCTIVE.								X						
47. ABLE TO INFLUENCE OTHERS.								X						
48. FACILITATES SMOOTH OPERATION OF HIS OFFICE.								X						
49. DOES NOT REQUIRE STRONG AND CONTINUOUS SUPERVISION.										X				
50. A GOOD SUPERVISOR.								X						

SECTION V

A. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS?

Subject is conscientious, hard-working, and more than willing to work long hours. He has a good background and experience in maintaining agent records. Subject has assumed his present responsibilities with a minimum of supervision.

B. WHAT ARE HIS OUTSTANDING WEAKNESSES?

Subject is weak in his ability to express himself in writing.

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

C. INDICATE IF YOU THINK THAT ANY SINGLE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:

Subject's stamina and persistence in accomplishing his tasks in a minimum amount of time outweigh his weaknesses.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAY 16 8 43 AM '55
MAIL ROOM

D. DO YOU FEEL THAT HE REQUIRES CLOSE SUPERVISION? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHY?

E. WHAT TRAINING DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS INDIVIDUAL?

Recommend training in Phase II and III

F. OTHER COMMENTS (*Indicate here general traits, specific habits or characteristics not covered elsewhere in the report but which have a bearing on effective utilization of this person*):

SECTION VI

Read all descriptions before rating. Place "X" in the most appropriate box under subsections A,B,C,&D

A. *DIRECTIONS: Consider only the skill with which the person has performed the duties of his job and rate him accordingly.*

[ ] 1. DOES NOT PERFORM DUTIES ADEQUATELY; HE IS INCOMPETENT.
[ ] 2. BARELY ADEQUATE IN PERFORMANCE; ALTHOUGH HE HAS HAD SPECIFIC GUIDANCE OR TRAINING, HE OFTEN FAILS TO CARRY OUT RESPONSIBILITIES COMPETENTLY.
[ ] 3. PERFORMS MOST OF HIS DUTIES ACCEPTABLY; OCCASIONALLY REVEALS SOME AREA OF WEAKNESS.
[ ] 4. PERFORMS DUTIES IN A TYPICALLY COMPETENT, EFFECTIVE MANNER.
[X] 5. A FINE PERFORMANCE; CARRIES OUT MANY OF HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EXCEPTIONALLY WELL.
[ ] 6. PERFORMS HIS DUTIES IN SUCH AN OUTSTANDING MANNER THAT HE IS EQUALLED BY FEW OTHER PERSONS KNOWN TO THE RATER.

IS THIS INDIVIDUAL BETTER QUALIFIED FOR WORK IN SOME OTHER AREA? [X] NO [ ] YES. IF YES, WHAT?

C. *DIRECTIONS: Based upon what he has said, his actions, and any other indications, give your opinion of this person's attitude toward the organization.*

[ ] 1. HAS AN ANTAGONISTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL DEFINITELY LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY.
[ ] 2. HAS STRONG NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION...IRKED BY RESTRICTIONS...REGARDS ORGANIZATION AS A TEMPORARY STOP UNTIL HE CAN GET SOMETHING BETTER.
[ ] 3. TENDS TO HAVE AN UNFAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BOTHERED BY MINOR FRUSTRATIONS..WILL QUIT IF THESE CONTINUE.
[ ] 4. HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION IS INDIFFERENT...HAS "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE..WOULD LEAVE IF SOMEONE OFFERED HIM SOMETHING BETTER.
[ ] 5. TENDS TO HAVE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGANIZATION..MAKES ALLOWANCES FOR RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY WORKING FOR ORGANIZATION..THINKS IN TERMS OF A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
[X] 6. DEFINITELY HAS FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..BARRING AN UNEXPECTED OUTSIDE OPPORTUNITY, WILL PROBABLY ENDEAVOR TO MAKE A CAREER IN THE ORGANIZATION.
[ ] 7. HAS AN ENTHUSIASTIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ORGANIZATION..WILL PROBABLY NEVER CONSIDER WORKING ANY PLACE BUT IN THE ORGANIZATION.

B. *DIRECTIONS: Considering others of this person's grade and type of assignment, how would you rate him on potentiality for assumption of greater responsibilities normally indicated by promotion.*

[ ] 1. HAS REACHED THE HIGHEST GRADE LEVEL AT WHICH SATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE CAN BE EXPECTED.
[ ] 2. IS MAKING PROGRESS, BUT NEEDS MORE TIME IN PRESENT GRADE BEFORE PROMOTION TO A HIGHER GRADE CAN BE RECOMMENDED.
[ ] 3. IS READY TO TAKE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE, BUT MAY NEED TRAINING IN SOME AREAS.
[ ] 4. WILL PROBABLY ADJUST QUICKLY TO THE MORE RESPONSIBLE DUTIES OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
[X] 5. IS ALREADY PERFORMING AT THE LEVEL OF THE NEXT HIGHER GRADE.
[ ] 6. AN EXCEPTIONAL PERSON WHO IS ONE OF THE FEW WHO SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR RAPID ADVANCEMENT.

D. *DIRECTIONS: Consider everything you know about this person in making your rating..skill in job duties, conduct on the job, personal characteristics or habits, and special defects or talents.*

[ ] 1. DEFINITELY UNSUITABLE - HE SHOULD BE SEPARATED.
[ ] 2. OF DOUBTFUL SUITABILITY..WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED HIM IF I HAD KNOWN WHAT I KNOW NOW.
[ ] 3. A BARELY ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYEE..DEFINITELY BELOW AVERAGE BUT WITH NO WEAKNESSES SUFFICIENTLY OUTSTANDING TO WARRANT HIS SEPARATION.
[ ] 4. A TYPICAL EMPLOYEE..HE DISPLAYS THE SAME SUITABILITY AS MOST OF THE PEOPLE I KNOW IN THE ORGANIZATION.
[X] 5. A FINE EMPLOYEE - HAS SOME OUTSTANDING STRENGTHS.
[ ] 6. AN UNUSUALLY STRONG PERSON IN TERMS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORGANIZATION.
[ ] 7. EXCELLED BY ONLY A FEW IN SUITABILITY FOR WORK IN THE ORGANIZATION.

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

BY DATE

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
WOODS, James S.	GS-5	Intel. Anal. CD-FI

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	DEPT'L. / FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DDP/FI/RI	P & R Branch	Consol Section	[XXX] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT
From 21 Apr. 53 To 20 Apr. 54

6. TYPE OF REPORT
[ ] Initial [XXX] Annual [ ] Special
[ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

As senior anaylist on the EE/FI/G/Z area my duties consist of:

(A) Consolidating personality files which entails the following: (1) Make a complete search in Index on all references pertaining to the subject, (2) gathering all references in RI/Files, (3) anaylyzing documents for inclusion in 201, (4) preparing a summary of reference sheet which notes the disposition of all the documents put in the case.

(B) Liaison with the area desk.

(c) Supervising the work of the junior anaylist.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
NONE			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Intelligence work at the desk level.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years experience in RI.

10.

12 April 1954 — DATE

James S Woods — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods has performed his duties conscientiously and well. He possesses a great deal of energy, is extremely industrious and has maintained excellent relations in his liaison with the area desk.

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has performed his duties most outstandingly by virtue of his formation and maintenance of excellent liaison relations.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has handled his present responsibilities admirably and I am certain he would be capable of handling additional ones as the opportunity occurs.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Mr. Woods could qualify as an Intelligence Analyst in any of the appropriate section of RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

13 April 54 — DATE

Harry D. Randall — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in item 20.)

18 May 1954 — DATE

John K. Smith — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

Subject transferred to FE effective 25 April 1954.

over

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT

Items 1 through 6 will be completed by Administrative or Personnel Officer

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. GRADE	3. POSITION TITLE
WOODS	James	S.	GS-4	File Clerk

4. OFFICE	STAFF OR DIVISION	BRANCH	[X] DEPT'L. [ ] FIELD	IF FIELD, SPECIFY STATION
DD/P	FI	RI		

5. PERIOD COVERED BY REPORT From 4-21-52 To 4-21-53

6. TYPE OF REPORT [ ] Initial [X] Annual [ ] Special [ ] Reassignment [ ] Reassignment of Supervisor

Items 7 through 10 will be completed by the person evaluated

7. LIST YOUR MAJOR DUTIES IN APPROXIMATE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH. OMIT MINOR DUTIES.

Review and analize material for consolidation of 201 Personality Files. This includes making a complete impartial name check in RI/SC index and a complete search for all material pertinent to the subject in the RI/Files. Also maintain liaison with the [illegible].

After reviewing documents, make up Cross References and any Document changes as necessary. Complete a Summary of References Form listing all references reviewed and the action taken on each.

8. LIST COURSES OF INSTRUCTION COMPLETED DURING REPORT PERIOD.

Name of Course	Location	Length of Course	Date Completed
None			

9. IN WHAT TYPE OF WORK ARE YOU PRIMARILY INTERESTED?

Accounting.

IF DIFFERENT FROM YOUR PRESENT JOB, EXPLAIN YOUR QUALIFICATIONS (APTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS).

Two years of Accounting and law school.

10.

9 April 1953 — DATE

James S Woods — SIGNATURE

Items 11 through 18 will be completed by Supervisor

11. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON THE MAJOR DUTIES LISTED UNDER ITEM 7 ABOVE.

Mr. Woods' performance in this section has been very satisfactory. While still in a trainee position, he is learning the procedure of this section very well. He is extremely industrious and shows little inclination to waste time.

FORM NO. 37-151
MAY 1952

SECRET

(Over) (4)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

12. IN WHAT RESPECT IS THIS PERSON'S PERFORMANCE ON PRESENT JOB MOST NOTICEABLY GOOD OR OUTSTANDING?

Mr. Woods has been most outstanding by virtue of his industry.

13. ON WHAT ASPECT OF PERFORMANCE SHOULD THIS PERSON CONCENTRATE EFFORT FOR SELF IMPROVEMENT?

14. COMMENT ON THIS PERSON'S ABILITY TO HANDLE GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES NOW OR IN THE FUTURE.

Mr. Woods has had little opportunity to show his ability, in this line, so far.

15. ARE THERE OTHER DUTIES WHICH BETTER SUIT THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS? (Recommend appropriate reassignment, if possible.)

Due to his position as trainee, other duties cannot be considered, but I feel that he is quite capable of filling any number of jobs in RI.

16. WHAT TRAINING OR ROTATION DO YOU RECOMMEND FOR THIS PERSON?

None at this time.

17. IF PERFORMANCE DURING REPORT PERIOD HAS BEEN UNSATISFACTORY, THERE IS ATTACHED COPY OF MEMORANDUM NOTIFYING THIS PERSON OF UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE.

18. THIS PERSONNEL EVALUATION REPORT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE PERSON EVALUATED. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS INCLUDING COMMENT ON ITEMS 7, 8 AND 9, ARE SHOWN BELOW UNDER ITEM 20.

20 April 1953 — DATE

Harry D. Randall — SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

19. I HAVE REVIEWED THE ABOVE REPORT. (Comments, if any, are shown in Item 20.)

[illegible] — DATE

John K. Smith — SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

20. COMMENTS: (If necessary, may be continued on reverse side of cover sheet.)

SECRET

SECRET

ELECTION, DECLINATION, OR WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE INSURANCE PROGRAM

IMPORTANT AGENCY INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK OF ORIGINAL

TO COMPLETE THIS FORM—

1 FOLLOW THESE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

- Read the back of the "Duplicate" carefully before you fill in the form.
- Fill in BOTH COPIES of the form. Type or use ink.
- Do not detach any part.

2 FILL IN THE IDENTIFYING INFORMATION BELOW (please print or type):

NAME (last)	(first)	(middle)	DATE OF BIRTH (month, day, year)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
WOODS	James	Sauvie	FEB 20 1928	502 16 6806

EMPLOYING DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY	LOCATION (City, State, ZIP Code)
010032	

3 MARK AN "X" IN ONE OF THE BOXES BELOW. (do NOT mark more than one):

Mark here if you WANT BOTH optional and regular insurance — [ ] (A)

ELECTION OF OPTIONAL (IN ADDITION TO REGULAR) INSURANCE

I elect the $10,000 additional optional insurance and authorize the required deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to pay the full cost of the optional insurance. This optional insurance is in addition to my regular insurance.

Mark here if you DO NOT WANT OPTIONAL but do want regular insurance — [X] (B)

DECLINATION OF OPTIONAL (BUT NOT REGULAR) INSURANCE

I decline the $10,000 additional optional insurance. I understand that I cannot elect optional insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this declination and unless at the time I apply for it I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that my regular insurance is not affected by this declination of additional optional insurance.

Mark here if you WANT NEITHER regular nor optional insurance — [ ] (C)

WAIVER OF LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE

I desire not to be insured and I waive coverage under the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program. I understand that I cannot cancel this waiver and obtain regular insurance until at least 1 year after the effective date of this waiver and unless at the time I apply for insurance I am under age 50 and present satisfactory medical evidence of insurability. I understand also that I cannot now or later have the $10,000 additional optional insurance unless I have the regular insurance.

4 SIGN AND DATE. IF YOU MARKED BOX "A" OR "C", COMPLETE THE "STATISTICAL STUB," THEN RETURN THE ENTIRE FORM TO YOUR EMPLOYING OFFICE.

SIGNATURE (do not print): James S. Woods

DATE: 4 MAR 1968

FOR EMPLOYING OFFICE USE ONLY

(official receiving date stamp)

RECEIVED OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MAR 20 1 47 PM '68

See Table of Effective Dates on back of Original

ORIGINAL COPY—Retain in Official Personnel Folder

STANDARD FORM No. 176-T
JANUARY 1968
(For use only until April 14 1968)
176-101

SECRET

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods   Dates: 23-24 February 1978

Employee No: 010032   Office: ISS

Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
2. Understand their roles as supervisors in the Performance Evaluation part of the overall Program;
3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective FR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell — Instructor   1 0 MAR 1978 — Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

14-00000

DATE: [illegible]

Name (Last-First-Middle)

CERTIFICATION OF SEPARATING EMPLOYEE

Ghorbs, James S.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD - ATTACH TO OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the following forms and/or information concerning separation from CIA as indicated by check mark:

/	1.	Standard Form 8 (Notice to Federal Employee about Unemployment Compensation
NA	2.	Standard Form 55 (Notice of Conversion Privilege, Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance).
NA	3.	Standard Form 56 (Agency Certification of Insurance Status, Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act of 1954).
NA	4.	Standard Form 2802 (Application for Refund of Retirement Deductions).
	5.	Form 2595 (Authorization for Disposition of Paychecks).
/	6.	Only applicable to Retiree - Returnee (resignee from overseas assignment) I have been advised of my right to have a medical examination before my separation from this Agency and of the importance of such a medical check to my health and well-being.
	7.	CSC Pamphlet 51 (Re-employment Rights of Federal Employees Performing Armed Forces Duty).
	8.	Instructions for returning to duty from Extended Leave or Active Military Service.

Signature of Employee	Date Signed
James S Ghorbs	

Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)	Correspondence
304 MEADOW HALL DR. ROCKVILLE, MD. 20851	[illegible] ☐ Overt ☐ Co[vert]

14-00000

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

TRAINING REPORT

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WORKSHOP

Student: James S. Woods **Dates:** 23-24 February 1978

Employee No: 010032 **Office:** ISS

Service Designation: D

COURSE OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this Workshop, students should:

1. Be familiar with the principal parts of the Agency's Personnel Evaluation Program;
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3. Be better prepared to deal with some of the more troublesome problems encountered in performance evaluation;
4. Know how to prepare more useful Fitness Reports and conduct more effective PR interviews;
5. Understand how the Letter of Instruction relates to the performance evaluation process.

ACHIEVEMENT RECORD

This is a certificate of attendance only. No attempt was made to evaluate student achievement in the workshop.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Ralph E. Bell 10 MAR 1978

Instructor Date

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
(when filled in)

14-00000

3 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM : ISS/Training Staff

SUBJECT: Document Analysis II for Records Management Officers

1. Jim Woods -OPF ______________ has satisfactorily completed the Document Analysis II Course given for Division and Staff Records Management Officers by ISS Training Officer, JoEllen S. McCann. Classes were held daily from 0900 to 1230 hours from 29 November through 10 December 1976.

2. The topics covered in the course were records principles and processing procedures used by Data Management Section analysts for initial input of correspondence into the DDO Records System. The students also covered the official files system and indexing criteria as they currently exist and discussed some of the drawbacks and possible systems changes we might expect in the next few years. Periodic exercises were given to test the students comprehension of topics discussed.

JoEllen McCann
JoEllen McCann

14-00000

20 JUL 1976

I, the undersigned, authorize the Office of Personnel to give to: CartBlanche whatever information is necessary for me to obtain a credit card.

James S. Woods

James S. Woods

MG 7-21-76

14-00000

CERTIFICATE OF TRAINING

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

JAMES WOODS

SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

SUPERVISORY COUNSELING WORKSHOP

ON

26 - 27 AUGUST 1976

INFORMATION SERVICES GROUP

Peggy Hall
CHIEF, ISG TRAINING

14-00000

TRAINING REPORT

OFFICE OF TRAINING

This certifies that James S. Woods has successfully completed the Introduction to Micrographics Seminar #2 which was conducted from 24 July to 25 July 1974.

This seminar provides basic information on microphotography and explores the application of this technology in controlling overburdened and sometimes inefficient paperwork systems. Specific blocks of instruction include: Image Recording Techniques, Microfilm Formats, Viewers and Viewer-Printers, Indexing Methods, Computer Output Microfilm (COM), Micropublishing, and Development and Implementation of Agency Applications. Participants receive a portfolio of various samples of microforms, a Glossary of Micrographic Terms, and a Primer on Information Science.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Edward A. Seroskie
Course Coordinator

14-00000

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
A – Superior Scholarship
B – Good Scholarship
C – Average Scholarship
D – Passing Scholarship
F(a) – Failure Academic
F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
I – Incomplete *
WX – Withdrawal during first half of term
WP – Withdrew Passing during second half of term
WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
X – Emergency approved official withdrawal

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. — Student Copy

Term 1, Acad. Yr. 1971/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 111	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings. Indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc.

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ________

The student is responsible for arranging with the instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 (50 000 - 6X - 69)

Final Grade Report

Grading System:
A – Superior Scholarship
B – Good Scholarship
C – Average Scholarship
D – Passing Scholarship
F(a) – Failure Academic
F(n) – Failure Non-Attendance
I – Incomplete *
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WF – Withdrew Failing during second half of term
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UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

EUROPEAN DIVISION - UNIVERSITY COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR

Report of WOODS, James S. — Student Copy

Term 2, Acad. Yr. 19 71/72 at Rome Center

COURSE	Semester Hours	GRADE
ITAL 112	3	B

Signature of Instructor: DeSantis

* If Incomplete is to be assigned, student must have attended three-fourths of class meetings, indicate below remaining work, e.g. final exam, term paper, reports, etc.

Grade to Date ________ Deadline date for completion, if established ________

The student is responsible for arranging with the instructor for completion of these requirements.

UMR 18 (50 000 - 6X - 69)

[illegible]
(When Completed)

TRAINING REPORT

Americans Abroad Orientation - Japan

16 Hours | 20-21 March 1961 | 6 Students

Student: BYRD, James S. | Year of Birth: 1928

EOD Date: April 1952 | Grade: GS-9 | Office: FE

[illegible]

[illegible] or [illegible] travel in the general area or country of destination. Included was a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the Agency, practical [illegible] for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes cues for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information includes an analysis of the importance of the region to the United States and descriptions of the people, their institutions, and current living conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, [illegible] and selected [illegible] for a recommended program of self-study. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 25 April 1961

/s/ KENNETH R. COLVOS

[illegible]
(Course Completed)

[illegible]

Japan

16 [illegible] Area Orientation **20-21 March 1961** **6**

Name **WOODS, Louise (Dependent, James R.)** [illegible]

Student: Year of Birth

[illegible] Grade: Office

[illegible]

[illegible] for conditions of travel in the general area and country of destination. Included are a briefing on "the Americans Abroad problem," its implications for the individual employee or dependent and the [illegible], practical advice for successful personal adjustment to everyday problems of working and living in the area of assignment, useful information on the area, and guide lines for understanding its major problems. Advice includes [illegible] for effective interpersonal relations in the particular country or region. Area information [illegible] of the importance of the region to the United States and description of the people, their institutions, and current [illegible] conditions. The course offers lectures, panel discussions, films, [illegible], and selected readings for [illegible] of self-study. [illegible]

[illegible]

This is a certificate of attendance [illegible] this course.

26 April 1961

/s/ **[illegible] E. COLEMAN**

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

WRITING WORKSHOP (INTERMEDIATE) NO. 2

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

NAME	SEX	DATES OF COURSE	NO. OF STUDENTS
WOODS, James S.	M	26 October - 19 November 1959	17

DATE OF BIRTH	EOD DATE	GRADE OR RANK	OFFICE
20 February 1928	April 1952	GS-9	FE/Administration

PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION

Records Officer

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for 10 to 15 students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Mr. Woods added to the good improvement in mechanics of expression he had achieved in the Basic Writing Workshop. He has now developed the ability to write smooth, compact, and readable sentences. He also learned to organize topics more effectively, and with further writing experience, he can develop the ability to write analytical papers of a professional caliber.

[signature]
Chief Instructor

S-E-C-R-E-T

WRITING WORKSHOP (BASIC) NO. 8

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION				
NAME WOODS, James S.		SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 21 Sept. - 15 Oct. 1959	NO. OF STUDENTS 13
DATE OF BIRTH 20 February 1920	EOD DATE April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-9	OFFICE FE/Administration	
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Records Officer				

SECTION II: OBJECTIVE OF THE COURSE

To stimulate habits of thoughtful, self-critical writing for intelligence production.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

The class is conducted for ten to fifteen students. It meets for nine three-hour morning sessions over a period of four weeks. There are three sessions during the first week and two thereafter for three weeks. The course is run on the "learn by practice" system. A number of writing tests are given in class, and they are evaluated against national and Agency norms. The trainees also prepare written exercises and have an opportunity to rewrite some of them during later sessions. Students may use the form and substance of their own office's written product. Special attention is paid to logical organization, diction, sentence structure and other mechanics of writing. The trainees receive detailed comments on their papers and are encouraged to discuss special writing problems with the staff.

SECTION IV: HOW THE STUDENTS ARE EVALUATED

Staff members observe the student's writing ability, any change demonstrated, and application to the course material. The evaluation represents their agreed comments based on the student's total performance.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECTION V: REPORT OF STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

Mr. Woods considerably improved the clarity of his writing during the course, by reducing sentence errors and roundabout phrasing. His written papers reflected his gains in knowledge of basic rules of English usage. His achievement in the Writing Workshop (Basic) shows that Mr. Woods can develop good writing skills, and that he and the Agency would benefit if he took the Writing Workshop (Intermediate).

Frances C. Gemmill
Chief Instructor

-2-

S-E-C-R-E-T

TRAINING EVALUATION

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT COURSE # 9

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION			
NAME Woods, James S.	SEX M	DATES OF COURSE 10 - 28 May 1954	NO. OF STUDENTS 1st week-49 2nd & 3rd weeks-44
DATE OF BIRTH 21 February 1928	EOD DATE 21 April 1952	GRADE OR RANK GS-5	OFFICE FE/FI
PROJECTED ASSIGNMENT OR PRESENT POSITION Registry Analyst			

SECTION II: OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this course are to provide the student with (1) an understanding of the inter-relationships between operating functions and administrative support functions; (2) an understanding of some of the basic principles and techniques of Agency operations and the organization and functions of the various clandestine components; (3) a knowledge of procedures, regulations, and problems peculiar to Logistics, Finance, and other areas of administrative support.

SECTION III: SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COURSE

One week of the course is devoted to lectures in the area described in category 1 on reverse of this page. The material in categories 2 and 3 is presented both by lecture and by practical exercises during the remaining two weeks of the course. Categories 4 through 9 are concerned with the application of knowledge of Agency organization, structure, procedures and regulations in practical situations.

SECTION IV: STUDENT ASSESSMENT

[illegible] students' performance in the course with no allowance made for differences in age, education, experience, etc. These ratings are defined as follows:

EXCELLENT: The student indicated exceptional ability or proficiency in meeting this goal or objective; he demonstrated an unusually thorough knowledge of the material presented.

SATISFACTORY: The student met this objective in a competent and effective manner; he demonstrated a good grasp and understanding of the material presented.

UNSATISFACTORY: The student did not achieve this goal or objective; the student's performance indicated a serious lack of knowledge concerning material presented.

S-E-C-R-E-T

14-00000

MAJOR CATEGORIES	UNSAT	SAT	EXCELLENT
1. Orientation in basic principles of clandestine activity.	2	30 ●	17
2. Knowledge of clandestine services command structure and organization.	5 ●	14	25
3. Knowledge of Agency and clandestine services regulations and administrative procedures.	2	28 ●	14
4. (A) Preparation of advance form; travel voucher (DOMESTIC) and entertainment reimbursement (DOMESTIC).	0	17	[illegible] ●
(B) Preparation of travel voucher (FOREIGN) including computation of per diem and currency conversion.	1	15 ●	28
5. Preparation of Station Finance Reports.	3	5	16 ●
6. Preparation of forms used in a detached station for property records; knowledge of responsibility for property at the station.	2	20 ●	22
7. Preparation of form required for project presentation to the Project Review Committee.	2	30 ●	[illegible]
8. Preparation of cable form used at Headquarters writing message from material given, with use of accepted digits, punctuation, and abbreviations.	[illegible]	33 ●	[illegible]
9. Preparation of Headquarters and Field dispatch form and Field pouch manifest.	0	24 ●	13

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits and characteristics, with particular reference to strong or weak points of the individual or anything that might have influenced his performance in the course.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING:

Evelyn S. Burghe
Signature of Chief Instructor

14-00000

SECRET

TRAINING EVALUATION

SECTION I: IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

Name	Sex	Course and Beginning Date
Woods, James S.	M	PHASE I - ORIENTATION #9 - 19 April 54

Date of Birth	E O D	Grade or Rank	Office
23 February 1928	April '52	GS-5	FE/FI

Projected Assignment or Present Position
Registry Analyst

This evaluation is based on a course of 120 hours given over a period of 3 weeks in which there were 89 students. The length of the course, number of students, nature of the course, skills and knowledge taught, and the opportunity for observing the individual student determine which sections of this report are used. These facts must also be considered in interpreting the evaluations which, therefore, *should not be used as the sole basis for personnel decisions.* THIS REPORT IS INTENDED PRIMARILY TO FURNISH INFORMATION AS TO HOW WELL THE STUDENT LEARNED THE SUBJECT MATTER OR SKILLS TAUGHT. In addition, observations of interest and importance are reported which can have significance only as they are related to other information. Unless otherwise stated, performance is evaluated in terms of standards set by instructors or in relation to the performance of others who have taken the course. For further information, consult the Training Evaluation Branch, Assessment and Evaluation Staff, Office of Training.

SECTION II: KNOWLEDGE

Subject	Hrs	Rating: Fail	Poor	Sat	Exc	Sup
Introduction to Intelligence	80	5	12	26*	34	12
Communism and the U S S R	40	5	17	35*	31	7

The numbers show how many students received each rating. An asterisk (*) shows the rating this student received.

SECTION III: SKILLS

The 'Course Instruction' column contains scores and/or ratings given by the instructional staff for skills which are specifically intended to be outcomes of the course. The 'Observation' column contains ratings by instructors and/or students concerning skills which have been observed for every student in a class but which have not been the subject of intensive instruction or practice.

Skill	Hrs.	Course Instruction: Objective Score	Course Instruction: Rating or Evaluation	Observation: Av. Rating by Instructors	Observation: Av. Rating by Students

SECTION IV: OBSERVATIONS of ATTITUDES or OTHER PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

During the course incidents were observed which suggested that this person:

	Yes	No		Yes	No
Had difficulty in getting along with others.		X	Lacked motivation for an Agency career.		X
Interfered with instructional and classroom activities.		X	Lacked sufficient security-mindedness.		X
			Lacked interest in the course.		X

Explanations of any 'Yes' answers to items above. Frequency of occurrence and number of persons observing these attitudes or characteristics are included.

SECTION V: COMMENTS

Comments, especially on habits or characteristics, with particular reference to strong and weak points of the individual, or anything that may have influenced his performance in the course are reported here.

Edward A. McBarra [signature]

Chief-Instructor

SECTION VI: ADJUSTED OVER-ALL EVALUATION

FOR OPTIONAL USE BY INSTRUCTORS		FOR OPTIONAL USE BY TRAINING OFFICERS	
In terms of all factors observed during the course and taking into account this student's experience in the Agency, grade, and general area of work, an 'X' in one of boxes shows the instructor's judgment of his performance in the course.		This evaluation, shown by an 'X' in one of the boxes, takes into account this training record, the student's age, grade, Agency experience, and projected assignment. It is included for the purpose of giving supervisors an estimate of the implications of the training evaluation report for the student's assignment and career potential.	
He was inadequate in his performance.	☐	☐	This is an inadequate performance.
He was barely adequate in his performance and performed acceptably only in a limited range of assignments.	☐	☐	This is a barely adequate performance and raises questions concerning his suitability for his assignment.
He performed acceptably, but was barely adequate in some respects.	☐	☐	This is an acceptable performance but discloses possible areas of weakness.
He was a typically effective student who performed in a competent, dependable manner.	☐	✓	This is a satisfactory performance revealing a typically competent person.
He performed at a high level of competence.	☐	☐	This performance reveals a high level of competence.
He performed at an extremely high level that only a few students have surpassed.	☐	☐	This is an extremely competent performance that only a few persons of his background and position have surpassed.

Training Officer's Comments

[signature]

Training Officer

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Clandestine Service Personnel Staff

SUBJECT: James S. WOODS - Recommendation for Promotion

1. Subject has been in grade GS-10 since June 1968. Based on his outstanding performance as Chief of Registry in the Rome Station since June 30, 1971, he strongly merits promotion to grade GS-11 at this time. When Subject took over the responsibility for Registry a year ago, he found a system glutted with paper and bound up by a policy which discouraged getting rid of it. He found many procedures in force which were out of date, if not obsolete, and proposed streamlined procedures, which were adopted, to replace them. He asked for and was given the responsibility to analyze and distribute the cables, which had previously been a function of the Chief of Station's secretary. He recommended the discontinuance of the abstract system, which proposal had been adopted by most elements of the Station. He recommended a reduction in the retention period for cable and dispatch chronos. With the help of a TDY team here for the first half of CY 1972, he devised and instituted a program of purging the files. This program has resulted in the disposition of most of the departed Soviet files, a severe trimming of the true name files, and the review, reduction and up-dating of the project and operational files. All of this work was accompanied by appropriate name checks, entries on the index cards and selection of pertinent documents for transmittal to Headquarters. In summary, Subject performed a thorough "house-cleaning" of Station records in the full meaning of that phrase. This program is by no means finished. In fact, Subject has plans for continuing efforts along these lines which may exceed his tenure at this Station since he intends to return to Headquarters not later than May 1974. The on-going program includes a review and reorganization of the subject files, the encrypted 201's and the disposition (hopefully) of about 50 feet of micro-film. A corollary to these projects will be a significant reduction in the index cards, which at present lead to the micro-film and to other superfluous material we either have or will destroy.

2. The equally important aspect of records management, namely the introduction of procedures to lessen the likelihood

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY C-26-44
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY: § 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
IMP. DET.
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

if not prevent the reoccurrence of this pile-up of paper is not lost on this officer. He constantly thinks in terms of procedures and controls to accomplish this end.

3. Subject is dedicated, highly motivated, conscientious, and hard working. He reports to work each day an hour before the Station opens in order to distribute the cables by opening of business. He never hesitates to respond positively to any request for help. Indeed, he solicits work which he believes can be done more easily or more simply in his unit. In all respects, Subject is a trained, professional records management officer who is thoughtful as well as enthusiastic about his work.

4. It is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to grade GS-11.

Roosevelt

Archibald B. Roosevelt, Jr.
Chief, European Division

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RESIDENCE AND DEPENDENCY REPORT

AN ORIGINAL OF THIS FORM WILL BE EXECUTED BY EACH EMPLOYEE AT THE TIME OF HIS APPOINTMENT AND WHEN A CHANGE OCCURS IN THE INFORMATION SHOWN BELOW. ITEMS OF CHANGE MAY BE REPORTED IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCKS WITHOUT COMPLETING THE REMAINDER OF THE FORM EXCEPT THE EMPLOYEE'S SIGNATURE AND DATE. WHEN EXECUTING ITEM 4 ALSO COMPLY WITH HHB 20-7, PERSONNEL EMERGENCY AND LOCATOR RECORDS. THIS FORM WILL BE COMPLETED ONLY BY HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL AND NOT SENT TO THE FIELD. FORM WILL BE FILED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER.

GENERAL

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (Last) (First) (Middle): WOODS, James Saul[?]ie
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 502 16 6806

1. MARITAL STATUS (Check one)

SINGLE	MARRIED	SEPARATED	DIVORCED	WIDOWED	ANNULLED
	X				

IF MARRIED, PLACE OF MARRIAGE: Washington, D.C.
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 6 Aug 60
IF DIVORCED, PLACE OF DIVORCE DECREE:
DATE OF DECREE:

2. MEMBERS OF FAMILY

NAME OF SPOUSE	ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code)	TELEPHONE NO.
Louise Anne	432 College Pkwy Rockville	424-0163

NAMES OF CHILDREN	ADDRESS	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH
LAURA RENEE WOODS	432 College Pkwy Rockville, MD.	F	20/2/71

NAME OF FATHER (or male guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Ross A. Woods - Deceased		

NAME OF MOTHER, INCLUDING MAIDEN NAME (or female guardian)	ADDRESS	TELEPHONE NO.
Susan A. Woods	Forest River, N. Dak.	

WHAT MEMBER(S) OF YOUR FAMILY IF ANY, HAS BEEN TOLD OF YOUR AFFILIATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION IF CONTACT IS REQUIRED IN AN EMERGENCY.
Mother & Sister (husband is [illegible])

3. OTHER RELATIVES WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON ME FOR AT LEAST 51% OF THEIR SUPPORT AND MEET OTHER REQUIREMENTS IN TRAVEL REGULATIONS (HR 22-1??). SPECIFY NAMES AND RELATIONSHIPS.

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	RELATIONSHIP

4. PERSON RESIDING IN U.S. TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

NAME (Mr., Mrs., Miss) (Last-First-Middle): FIALA, Richard
RELATIONSHIP: Brother-in-Law
HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: 521 Hamline St. Grand Forks, N. Dak.
HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 701-775-4472
BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Zip Code) AND NAME OF EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE / BUSINESS TELEPHONE & EXTENSION:

IS THE INDIVIDUAL NAMED ABOVE WITTING OF YOUR AGENCY AFFILIATION? (If "No" give name and address of organization he believes you work for.) YES ✓ NO

IS THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHORIZED TO MAKE DECISIONS ON YOUR BEHALF IN THE EVENT YOU ARE INCAPABLE? (If "No" give name and address of person, if any, who can make such decisions in case of emergency.) YES NO ✓
Union Trust Co. of D.C.

DOES THIS INDIVIDUAL KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS YOUR EMERGENCY ADDRESSEE? (If answer is "No" explain why in item 6.) YES ✓

The persons named in Item 2 or 3 above may also be notified in case of emergency. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE IN ITEM 6 ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM.

CENTRAL PROCESSING BRANCH MAR 15 2 27 PM '71

FORM 61 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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14-00000

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5. VOLUNTARY ENTRIES

Experience in the handling of employee emergencies has shown that the absence of certain personal data often delays and complicates the settlement of estate and financial matters. The information requested in this section may prove very useful to your family or attorney in the event of your disability or death and will be disclosed only when circumstances warrant.

INDICATE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS AND THE NAMES IN WHICH THE ACCOUNTS ARE CARRIED.

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

ARE YOU A MEMBER OF THE NORTHWEST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION? [X] YES [ ] NO

IF YES, DO YOU HAVE A JOINT ACCOUNT? [ ] YES [X] NO

HAVE YOU COMPLETED A LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT? [X] YES [ ] NO. (If "Yes" where is document located?)

UNION TRUST CO. OF D.C.

HAVE YOU PREPLANNED AN ARRANGED GUARDIANSHIP OF YOUR CHILDREN IN CASE OF COMMON DISASTER TO BOTH PARENTS?

[X] YES [ ] NO. (If "Yes" give name(s) and address)

In the will

HAVE YOU EXECUTED A POWER OF ATTORNEY? [ ] YES [X] NO. (If "Yes", who possess the power of attorney?)

6. ADDITIONAL DATA AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

7. RESIDENCE DATA - TO BE COMPLETED ONLY BY EMPLOYEES ENTERING ON DUTY
(No Approval Required)

RESIDENCE WHEN EMPLOYED (Full Address)	PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS DEFINED IN HR 22-3 (Full Address)

8. CHANGE IN PERMANENT PLACE OF RESIDENCE (See HR 22-3)
(To Be Completed by Employee Desiring Such Change While Assigned to Headquarters)

FULL ADDRESS	DEPUTY DIRECTOR OR DESIGNEE	DATE
	DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (when applicable per HR 22-3)	DATE

SIGNED AT	DATE	SIGNATURE
Hqs.	9 Mar 71	[signature]

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14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
010032	WOODS	JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 58, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			11	1	70		1			ENGLAND	210

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	X	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.

DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCR		
C & L DIVISION, CTRS.	DATE 1/5/71	SIGNATURE [illegible]
X C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

14-00000

30 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, European Division

FROM : Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT : Promotion Recommendation - James S. Woods

Subject, who has been in grade as a GS-10 just two years, has been Chief of the Registry of the London Station for eighteen months. Subject, fresh from a Saigon assignment, brought with him a broad and varied background of field experience (Far East) and several Headquarters' assignments. He has been in one or another aspect of records management work since he started with us as a very junior clerk in 1952.

Subject's fitness reports, since he has been in London, testify to the high regard in which he is held by the Station and the excellent results he has managed to achieve. When he arrived at the Station, the start had been made on a file reduction program but an enormous amount of organized work remained to be done. Subject set about it with great enthusiasm and a high degree of professional organization. As a result, the Registry inventory today is the leanest and the most efficient the Station has seen for many a long day, if ever before. To a great extent this can be laid at Subject's own door and he personally did much of the work. At the same time, Subject surveyed and reorganized the overall workload of the Registry and was finally able to recommend to the Station management a reduction of one Registry clerk. The smaller staff has certainly required a more intensive work effort on the part of Registry personnel, which has been attained without any loss of morale; in fact, quite the reverse.

Subject, therefore, emerges as a records management officer who has thoroughly learned his business and a hard-driving, sympathetic and successful supervisor. In the opinion of the Station management, Subject is already quite capable of taking over broader and more senior responsibilities in the records management field. In this respect, however, we do not believe he will be wasting his time in London by spending, as he currently plans to do, an additional year here on the completion of his tour in November. The London Registry, reflecting the multi-faceted work of the Station, is sufficiently complex an operation to warrant

Subject's continued attention.

In view of his really excellent performance and high promise, it is strongly recommended that Subject be promoted to GS-11.

/s/ Bronson Tweedy
COS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO.	NAME		
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
1-6	(Print)	7-24	
010032	WOODS	JAMES	S

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 50, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
11	15	68				1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	1			England	210

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	ARRIVAL O/S DAY 27-28	ARRIVAL O/S YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DEPARTURE O/S DAY 33-34	DEPARTURE O/S YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42
						2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION					

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DATE STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (Specify)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 11-15-68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
AREA		
C & A DIVISION, etc.	DATE 10 DEC 1968	SIGNATURE
X T & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 8-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET 14-101

14-00000

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IMPORTANT

Central Processing Branch has been charged with responsibility (OMI 20-6-dated October 1961) for ensuring that all employees processing PCS to the field have reviewed the field version of the Employee Conduct Handbook. You will not be checked out for your proposed travel until you sign the following statement and return it to CPB. Your Personnel Officer can provide you with a copy of the Handbook.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Field Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 30 July 1962.

James S. Woods — 15 Nov 68

Signature — Date

JAMES S. WOODS

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(When Filled In)

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME (Print) LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE
010032	Woods,	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OPI NO. 30, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
			10	03	68		1			Vietnam	710

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (Specify) telepouch	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. FVST 31976	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD 10/3/68

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO / C & L DIVISION, CTOR. / C & T DIVISION	DATE 10/15/68	SIGNATURE R. R. Klee

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

REPORT OF SERVICE ABROAD

TO: Office of Personnel, Transactions and Records Branch, Status Section

SERIAL NO. 1-6	NAME LAST (Print)	FIRST 7-24	MIDDLE
010032	Ward	James	S.

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR. REFER TO OFI NO. 98, REVISED.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	COUNTRY	CODE 40-42
01	14	67					1			Vietnam	772

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

ARRIVAL O/S MONTH 25-26	DAY 27-28	YEAR 29-30	DEPARTURE O/S MONTH 31-32	DAY 33-34	YEAR 35-36	TYPE OF DATA: 2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	CODE 37	O/P USE ONLY 38	39	AREA(S)	CODE 40-42

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL USE ONLY - PUNCH AREA

SOURCE DOCUMENT AND CERTIFICATION

TRAVEL VOUCHER	DISPATCH
CABLE	✓ DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
OTHER (Specify)	
DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. 764	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON CONTROL DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA CERTIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
OCO		
C & L DIVISION, CTRO.	DATE 5/22/67	SIGNATURE L. Howard
✓ C & T DIVISION		

THIS REPORT WILL BE FILED IN THE OFFICE OF PERSONNEL IN THE INDIVIDUAL'S OFFICIAL PERSONNEL FOLDER

FORM 3-67 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

(4-10)

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

I hereby acknowledge that I have read and understand the contents of Handbook 20-4, Employee Conduct, dated 7 October 1963, and the information brochure for PCS returnees, dated May 1964.

James S. Woods
Signature
JAMES S. WOODS

28 NOV 66
Date

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

19 December 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Woods

THROUGH : Head of CS Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Designation as a Participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System

1. I have determined that you meet the criteria outlined in HR 20-50 for designation as a participant in the CIA Retirement and Disability System. Your designation as a participant was made effective 18 December 1966.

2. You are hereby notified of your right to appeal this action to the Director of Central Intelligence as specified in HR 20-50. Such appeal must be received in the Office of the Director not later than 30 calendar days from the date of this memorandum.

Emmett D. Echols
Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 5 E 2506 Headquarters

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE			OFFICE/COMPONENT
	LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
010032	Woods	James	S	45

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION *(One only)*. REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS *(Basic)* 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	01	20	61	09	24	66	Japan	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY *(Basic)* 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	X	DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER *(Specify)*		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD
	5/28 - 9/24/66

REMARKS

PREPARED BY		X	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
	C & L DIVISION		DATE	SIGNATURE
X	C & T DIVISION		10/14/66	[signature]

FORM 10-64 1451a USE PREVIOUS EDITION. SECRET (4-10)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 2 Years from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

Evelyn M. Flagg
Office of Personnel
Evelyn M. Flagg

James S. Woods
(Employee)
James Sauvie Woods

Date: 23 Nov 66

14-00000

SECRET

23 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Head, Clandestine Services Career Service

SUBJECT : Notification of Approval of Quality Step Increase - James S. Woods

1. I am pleased to send to you the attached official notification of the approval of the Quality Step Increase which you recommended for this employee.

2. As this award is designed to encourage excellence by recognizing and rewarding the employee, may I ask that you arrange to have this Quality Step Increase presented at an appropriate ceremony.

Emmett D. Echols
Director of Personnel

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

29 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James S. Woods

SUBJECT : Quality Step Increase

1. I was pleased to learn that you have been granted a Quality Step Increase. Such a recognition is proof of the high esteem in which you are held by your supervisors in the Clandestine Services.

2. Please accept my personal best wishes. I am confident that your future performance will be of a continuing high quality.

Desmond FitzGerald
Deputy Director for Plans

SECRET

14-00000

4 MAR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

ATTENTION: DDP/OP

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

1. On the basis of the information presented below, it is recommended that a Quality Step Increase be approved for Mr. James S. Woods.

2. Mr. Woods entered on duty with the Agency in April 1952 as a GS-03 Records and File Clerk assigned to RID. Since that time Mr. Woods has served as a Records Analyst at Headquarters, in Korea and Atsugi, Manila, and since 1961 in the Central Registry Section of the Tokyo Station. Mr. Woods is 37 years old and has been in grade as a GS-09 since 1958.

3. Mr. Woods' exceptional performance is described by the Tokyo Station as follows:

"A. Mr. Woods is now on his second tour as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry. This unit is located at Fuchu Air Station and handles all correspondence for all Station elements. In view of the fact that the Station is located in five different geographic locations, a great deal of responsibility is given to Mr. Woods to ensure that action responsibility on incoming cables is rapidly and properly assigned, dispatches are correctly routed and processed, correspondence from other local military agencies is correctly analyzed and routed, the twice-a-day courier system is functioning effectively, and the Station flexowriter is rapidly churning out priority dispatch traffic.

"B. The Registry is presently composed of six employees in addition to Mr. Woods, who is Chief of this unit. Mr. Woods does an exemplary job in supervising these employees with the result that the Station Registry is a smooth and well-functioning unit.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

14-00000

SECRET

"C. In addition to his normal duties, Mr. Woods is constantly thinking of ways to increase the efficiency of the Station Registry, and to be of greater assistance to the Station as a whole. Several of his ideas have been adopted by the Station with a resulting increase in effectiveness. His positive approach to all problems and his cheerfulness and willingness to perform any task have benefited both the Station and the Agency.

"D. In view of Mr. Woods' demonstrated ability to provide leadership to the Station Registry unit, his positive approach to the solution of the many problems which daily beset this unit, it is strongly recommended that he be promoted from GS-09 to GS-10 at the earliest opportunity."

4. Mr. Woods has continued to perform in an over-all "Strong" manner as indicated in his recent fitness report. He recently planned and effectively implemented the move of the Cable Secretariat from one location to another. In a dispatch, dated 22 November 1965, the present Chief of Station, Tokyo, stated, "There is little I can add to my predecessor's recommendation, dated 9 November 1964, for promotion of Mr. Woods. He is performing his duties as Chief of the Tokyo Station Registry with efficiency and dispatch. He is a strong supervisor who constantly strives to achieve the maximum economy in the use of his personnel and materials."

5. Consideration has been given to the granting of an Honor and Merit Award to Mr. Woods, but in this particular case it appears that a Quality Step Increase is more appropriate.

William E. Colby
Chief, Far East Division

APPROVAL RECOMMENDED:

Secretary, CS Panel Section C — MAR 11 1966

MAR 11 1966
Date

SECRET

14-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Request for Quality Step Increase
for Mr. James S. Woods, GS-09

CONCUR:

Grace E. Miller 15 March 66
DDP/OP Date

APPROVED:

for John J. Caldwell 18 Mar '66
Director of Personnel Date

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE)	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print) 7-26	26-28
10032	WOODS, JAMES S.	56

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	ARRIVAL DAY	ARRIVAL YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1	04	15	61				JAPAN	375

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DEPARTURE DAY	DEPARTURE YEAR	RETURN MONTH	RETURN DAY	RETURN YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE	✓	DUTY STATUS ~~OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE~~ REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO.	DOCUMENT ~~DATE~~/PERIOD
—	30 MAR - 15 APR 1961

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓ FINANCE DIVISION SKB	26 JUNE 1961	[illegible signature]

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

3LL 0?(1?)

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-1 F.P.M.
6 C/AI-3000

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read Inst... on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball... pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 078338

PART A — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): WOODS James S
2. DATE OF BIRTH: MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 28
3. Are you now married? YES [X] 1 NO [ ] 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): AICD APO 925 San Francisco, Calif.
5. SEX: MALE [X] 1 FEMALE [ ] 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES [X] NO [ ]
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 [ ] 1 — $4,000 TO $5,999 [ ] 2 — $6,000 TO $9,999 [X] 3 — $10,000 OR OVER [ ] 4

PART B — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
Association Benefits Plan - Family	High	4 2 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3, if applies.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband: Louise A.	8 May 37	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES [ ] NO [X]

PART C — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box).
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. [ ] 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. [ ] 2
(c) Any other reason. [ ] 3

PART D — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan: 4 2 5
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.): 8
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH March DAY 22 YEAR 1964

PART E — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

[signature] 3-17-64
YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT — DATE

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F — TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE: [signature] HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER (ALTERNATE)
SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 3-17-64
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 3-15-64
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY. / LE — 5010

Triplicate — To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

SECRET
(When Filled In)

1 S

VERIFIED RECORD OF OVERSEAS SERVICE

TO:
Office of Personnel, Statistical Reporting Branch, ROOM 192 Curie Hall

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NO.	NAME OF EMPLOYEE LAST	FIRST	MIDDLE	OFFICE/COMPONENT
1-6	(Print)	7-24		25-26
100321	Woods,	Jones	S.	57

INSTRUCTIONS

USE APPROPRIATE SPACE BELOW TO REPORT DATA FOR EITHER PCS OR TDY. INSERT APPROPRIATE CODE NUMBER IN "CODE" COLUMN TO DESIGNATE WHETHER SUBMISSION IS OF BASIC DATA, CORRECTION, OR CANCELLATION (One only). REPORT DATES BY USING THE NUMBER FOR THE MONTH, AND LAST TWO DIGITS ONLY FOR YEAR.

PCS DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	ARRIVAL MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	COUNTRY	OMIT
1 - PCS (Basic) 3 - CORRECTION 5 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42
	1				03	19	59	Philippines	575

TDY DATES OF SERVICE

TYPE OF DATA	CODE	DEPARTURE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	RETURN MONTH	DAY	YEAR	AREA(S)	OMIT
2 - TDY (Basic) 4 - CORRECTION 6 - CANCELLATION	27	28-29	30-31	32-33	34-35	36-37	38-39		40-42

SOURCE OF RECORD DOCUMENT

✓	TRAVEL VOUCHER		DISPATCH
	CABLE		DUTY STATUS OR TIME AND ATTENDANCE REPORT
	OTHER (Specify)		

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION NO. | DOCUMENT DATE/PERIOD

REMARKS

PREPARED BY	REPORT ANNOTATED ON SOURCE DOCUMENT	ABOVE DATA VERIFIED CORRECT, BASED UPON SOURCE DOCUMENT CITED
FISCAL DIVISION	DATE	SIGNATURE
✓ FINANCE DIVISION [illegible]		

FORM 9-58 1451a OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

(4-10)

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
5 GAO 5 00

[HEA]LTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FOR[M]

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read [instructions] on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ba[ll point pen.])

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 082697

3372

PART A ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL)
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH DAY YEAR
3. Are you now married? YES [X] 1 NO [ ] 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE)
5. SEX MALE [X] 1 FEMALE [ ] 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES [X] NO [ ]
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 [ ] 1 $6,000 TO $9,999 [X] 3
$4,000 TO $5,999 [ ] 2 $10,000 OR OVER [ ] 4

PART B FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if it applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible] Benefit Plan	Low	4 2 5

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible]	[illegible]	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES [ ] NO [ ]

PART C FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3.

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. [ ] 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. [ ] 2
(c) Any other reason. [ ] 3

PART D FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan: 4 2 2
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.): 7
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH MAR DAY 31 YEAR 1961

PART E ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

[signature] 27 MAR 61
(YOUR SIGNATURE—DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 3/27/61
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 4/16/61
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

REMARKS (FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY): FE 11632
X-2579

Triplicate—To Employing Office

April 1960

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of Twenty-four months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

James S. Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Anna C. Phillips
Office of Personnel
Anna C. Phillips

Date: 21 Feb. 1961

FORM NO. 911a REPLACES FORM NO. 35-104
1 FEB 56 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(41)

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER I-5 F.P.M.
6 GAO 1-400

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM 3367

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959

(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ball point pen.)

CARRIER'S CONTROL NO. 088300

PART A — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Woods James S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 2 / DAY / YEAR 23
3. Are you now married? YES [X] 1 NO [ ] 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE): VA
5. SEX: MALE [X] 1 FEMALE [ ] 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES [X] NO [ ]
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range. UNDER $4,000 [ ] 1; $4,000 TO $5,999 [ ] 2; $6,000 TO $9,999 [X] 3; $10,000 OR OVER [ ] 4

PART B — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible]	[illegible]	4 1 2

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

If enrollment is for self only, answer Item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer Item 2 and Item 3 if it applies.

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)		NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	
Wife or Husband [illegible]	[illegible]	1			6
		2			7
		3			8
		4			9
		5			10

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES [ ] NO [ ]

PART C — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO REGISTER OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box)
   - (a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. [ ] 1
   - (b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. [ ] 2
   - (c) Any other reason. [ ] 3

PART D — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.

1. Enrollment code number of present plan: 4 2 1
2. Number of event which permits change (See table on back of duplicate for proper number): 2
3. Date of event which permits change: MONTH Aug. DAY 6 YEAR 1960

PART E — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

James S. Woods [signature] 8/11/60
(SIGNATURE) (DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F — TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE: J. L. [signature] HEALTH BENEFITS OFFICER (SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE: 8/11/60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION: 1/1/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS — FOR USE ONLY BY CARRIERS AND AGENCY.

FB 116032

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

14-00000

Standard Form No. 2809
CHAPTER 1-1 F.P.M.
6 GAO 5161

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACT OF 1959
(Read instructions on back of last page. Use only typewriter or ballpoint pen.)

3362

CARRIER'S CONTRACT NO. ~~033078~~

PART A — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) WOODS (FIRST) JAMES (MIDDLE INITIAL) S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers) MONTH 2 DAY 20 YEAR 28
3. Are you now married? YES [ ] 1 NO [X] 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET) (CITY AND ZONE NUMBER) (STATE) FORREST RIVER NORTH DAKOTA
5. SEX MALE [X] 1 FEMALE [ ] 2
6. Are you covered by, or is any family member listed below covered by or enrolling in, a plan under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (through the enrollment of another United States or District of Columbia Government employee or annuitant)? YES [ ] NO [X]
7. Place an "X" in proper box to show your annual basic salary range.
UNDER $4,000 [ ] 1 — $4,000 TO $5,999 [ ] 2 — $6,000 TO $9,999 [X] 3 — $10,000 OR OVER [ ] 4

PART B — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for self only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for self and family, also answer item 2 and item 3 if applies.

THIS PART MUST ALSO BE FILLED IN IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions to be made from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from inside cover of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
ASSOCIATION BENEFIT PLAN	HIGH	4 2 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception. List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 19, including legally adopted children, and stepchildren and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 19 who became disabled before age 19 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 19 or over.)

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

3. If you are a female (employee or annuitant)—does the family listed above include a husband who is incapable of self-support by reason of mental or physical disability which can be expected to continue for more than one year? (If answer is "Yes," attach a doctor's certificate.) YES [ ] NO [ ]

PART C — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR ITEM 2, WHICHEVER APPLIES AND ANSWER ITEM 3

1. I elect not to enroll in any plan under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
2. I elect to cancel my present enrollment under the Health Benefits Act. [ ]
3. The reason for my election is (Place an "X" in proper box):
(a) I am covered by a plan under the Health Benefits Act through the enrollment of my husband, wife, or parent. [ ] 1
(b) I am covered by a health insurance plan which is not under the Health Benefits Act. [ ] 2
(c) Any other reason. [ ] 3

PART D — FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT.

I elect to change my enrollment as shown by the enrollment number and other information in Part B.
1. Enrollment code number of present plan.
2. Number of event which permits change. (See table on back of duplicate for proper number.)
3. Date of event which permits change. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E — ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART

James S Woods 14 June 60
(SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or willful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F — TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY.

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING OFFICE
(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)
2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE 6/30/60
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION 7/10/60
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.
5. PAYROLL ACTION (INITIALS AND DATE)

REMARKS — FOR USE ONLY BY ANNUITANTS AND AGENCY.

FE

Triplicate—To Employing Office

APRIL 1960

10564

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TRAVEL AGREEMENT BY STAFF EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO PERMANENT DUTY STATION OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

1. In accordance with the policy of the Central Intelligence Agency, I agree to serve outside the continental United States a minimum tour of 24 months from the date of my arrival at my permanent post of duty, unless said tour is sooner terminated by the Government for its convenience, or it is terminated by the Agency for circumstances that are considered by it to be beyond my control.

2. It is understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control in less than 12 months from the date of arrival at said post, I shall reimburse CIA for all travel expenses, including storage and per diem, incurred in the transporting of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to my permanent post of duty, and shall pay all return travel and transportation expenses to the United States.

3. It is further understood and agreed that if I terminate for reasons within my control subsequent to the twelfth month but prior to the completion of my tour of duty, I shall pay all return expenses for the travel and transportation of myself, my dependents, my household and personal effects and my automobile to the United States.

WITNESS:

James S Woods
(Employee)
James S. Woods

Lorene E. Norbeck
Office of Personnel
Lorene E. Norbeck

Date: 23 Aug 57

CONFIDENTIAL

29 November 1956

Korea Station wishes to express its appreciation to JAMES S. WOODS for his most diligent performance of duty during his recent TDY here, his highly cooperative attitude and above all, his extreme eagerness to get a job done well and expeditiously.

It was largely with his help that Korea Station was able to screen and process the voluminous material which needed to be handled in order to establish a coordinated and integrated record and file maintenance system.

All Korea Station personnel connected with the work of the TDY Team members were impressed and gratified by the eagerness with which they assisted with details and helped with problems that were outside the responsibilities of their assigned task. Their pleasant manner, apt suggestions, their excellent cooperation and untiring efforts to complete more than the initially estimated workload, all created a most favorable impression which reflects much credit not only on the team members themselves but on the Records Integration Branch as well.

Leland H. Carlisle

Leland H. CARLISLE
Chief, KOSTA (Rear)

CONFIDENTIAL

144 Bull NRLL-
Ins. Branch
10-3

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

1. NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	2. THIS DATE
Woods	James	S.	6 August 1958

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME

- [x] GOVERNMENT AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (GAEPA)
- [x] GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED (GHI)
- [x] MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA - HOSPITALIZATION
- [x] UNITED LIFE INSURANCE (UBLIC)
- [x] AIR TRIP INSURANCE
- [x] DREAD DISEASES *
- [x] INCOME REPLACEMENT *

Fed. Emp.

* CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS AT THE TIME EMPLOYEE APPLIES FOR INSURANCE MUST COVER THE PERIOD OF TIME HE WILL BE AWAY FROM HEADQUARTERS.

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance)

WDC - Tokyo - WASH - TDY

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSURANCE PROGRAMS LISTED BELOW.

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James S Woods

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
AIR TRIP	✓		2017	———	4.00
FEGLI		✓			

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE:

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY	CPD (Signature)	ICD (Signature)
	Watton	Esther Patterson

8. REMARKS

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to TARB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPD files.

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

FORM NO. 797 REPLACES FORM 37-190
1 SEP 55 WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Date 23 July 1954

Dear James S. Woods

1. This is to notify you that the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, has accepted your employment effective 25 April 1954

Position: I.O.

Base Salary: GS-5 $3535.00

2. You will be:

a. Entitled to annual and sick leave in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and regulations, or such other provisions of law or regulations as may be established in lieu thereof.

b. Reimbursed for travel expenses in accordance with CIA Regulations or Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended.

c. If stationed outside continental United States, granted such monetary allowances as are prescribed by CIA Regulations.

3. As a condition of your employment by the Central Intelligence Agency, you are subject to assignment to tours of duty at posts outside the continental United States. Each time you are so assigned, unless otherwise specified in advance by CIA, you will be required to remain at the post to which assigned for a period of 24 months from the date of arrival thereat, unless sooner transferred, reassigned or separated for reasons beyond your control. If you wish to return to the United States for personal reasons during that period, all travel and transportation costs incident to such return will be borne by you, with no expense to the Government.

4. If this employment is for assignment to an overseas post, it is understood and agreed that, unless earlier separated for reasons beyond your control, you will remain in Government service for 12 months after your arrival at your first overseas post, and if you violate this agreement, any money expended by the United States on account of your travel and the transportation of your immediate family and household goods will be considered a debt due to the United States.

5. Employment is conditioned upon satisfactory completion of the training courses prescribed by CIA and satisfactory performance of duty for a total period of ~~six~~ 12 months from date of employment. In the event

14-00000

either training or performance of duty is deemed unsatisfactory by CIA, you will be offered other types of employment, if available, or your employment will be terminated.

6. Your appointment is for such time as your services may be required and funds are available for the work of CIA. Notice of termination will be given you by procedure similar to that provided by Civil Service rules and regulations.

Official authorized to sign letters of appointment.

I accept the above agreement as a condition of my employment by CIA.

James S Woods — Employee

23 July 54 — Date

Form No. 51-104
June 1948

14-00000

2202 [illegible] PE-1

INSURANCE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME (Last) Woods (First) James (Middle) S

2. THIS DATE 10 June 54

3. THE FOLLOWING AGENCY SPONSORED INSURANCE PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME:

- [x] WAR AGENCIES EMPLOYEES PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION (WAEPA)
- [x] MUTUAL BENEFIT OF OMAHA
- NI [x] GROUP HOSPITALIZATION INCORPORATED
- [x] AIR TRIP INSURANCE

4. ITINERARY (To be completed only for individuals making application for Air Trip Insurance):

Lvg Wash. 2 July 54 To Minneapolis, Seattle, & Tokyo

5. I AM NOW PARTICIPATING, OR WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

TYPE OF POLICY	DESIRED	NOW HAVE	POLICY NUMBER	DEDUCTIONS AUTHORIZED EACH PAY PERIOD	CASH PAID
WAEPA	✓		#2574	P/R - $8.33 - 8/04/54	$ 29.[illegible]
Air Trip Ins	✓		28354		$ 4.00

James S Woods
SIGNATURE

6. I DO NOT ELECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY OF THE STATED INSURANCE PROGRAMS:

SIGNATURE

7. EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWED BY:

CPD: [signature] SIGNATURE   I&CB: [signature] SIGNATURE

8. REMARKS:

When completed, the original of this form should be forwarded to T&RB for incorporation in the employee's official personnel folder. The copy should be forwarded to CPB for retention in CPB files.

FORM NO. 37-190
1 MAR 54

(4)

STANDARD FORM 61 (REVISED AUGUST 1950)
PROMULGATED BY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL

APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS

IMPORTANT.—*Before swearing to these appointment affidavits, you should read and understand the attached information for appointee*

C.I.A. (Department or agency) | (Bureau or division) | Washington, D.C. (Place of employment)

I, James S. Woods, do solemnly ~~swear (or affirm)~~ that—

A. OATH OF OFFICE

I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, SO HELP ME GOD.

B. AFFIDAVIT AS TO SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY AND AFFILIATION

I am not a Communist or Fascist. I do not advocate nor am I a member of any organization that advocates the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force or violence or other unconstitutional means or seeking by force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States. I do further swear (or affirm) I will not so advocate, nor will I become a member of such organization during the period that I am an employee of the Federal Government.

C. AFFIDAVIT AS TO STRIKING AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I am not engaged in any strike against the Government of the United States and that I will not so engage while an employee of the Government of the United States; that I am not a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States, and that I will not, while a Government employee, become a member of such an organization.

D. AFFIDAVIT AS TO PURCHASE AND SALE OF OFFICE

I have not paid, or offered or promised to pay, any money or other thing of value to any person, firm or corporation for the use of influence to procure my appointment.

E. AFFIDAVIT AS TO DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

The answers given in the Declaration of Appointee on the reverse of this form are true and correct.

April 21, 1952 (Date of entrance on duty) | James S. Woods (Signature of appointee)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 21st day of April, A. D. 1952,

at Washington (City), D.C. (State)

[SEAL]

Margaret C. Casey (Signature of officer)

5 USC 16 & 16A (Title)

NOTE.—*If the oath is taken before a Notary Public the date of expiration of his commission should be shown.*

16—68160-5

14-00000

DECLARATION OF APPOINTEE

This form is to be completed before entrance on duty. Answer all questions. Any false statement in this declaration will be grounds for cancellation of application or dismissal after appointment. Impersonation is a criminal offense and will be prosecuted accordingly.

1. PRESENT ADDRESS (street and number, city and State)
3505 Minn. Ave. S.E. Washington 19, D.C.

2. (A) DATE OF BIRTH: Feb. 20, 1928
(B) PLACE OF BIRTH (city or town and State or country): Forest River, N. Dak.

3. (A) IN CASE OF EMERGENCY PLEASE NOTIFY: Mr. Rose A. Hoode, Forest River, N. Dak.
(B) RELATIONSHIP: Father
(C) STREET AND NUMBER, CITY AND STATE: Forest River, N. Dak
(D) TELEPHONE NO.: —

4. DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY, IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY, ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (EITHER BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? [X] YES [ ] NO
If so, for each such relative fill in the blanks below. If additional space is necessary, complete under Item 10.

NAME	POST OFFICE ADDRESS (Give street number, if any)	(1) POSITION (2) TEMPORARY OR NOT (3) DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY IN WHICH EMPLOYED	RELATIONSHIP	MARRIED	SINGLE
Miss Marilyn Hoode	3143 W 18th St. Denver, Col.	1. Clerk 2. Temporary 3. V.A.	sister		✓
		1. 2. 3.			
		1. 2. 3.			

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN	YES	NO
5. ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
6. ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes", give details in Item 10.*		X
7. DO YOU RECEIVE ANY ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 reason for retirement, that is, age, optional, disability, or by reason of voluntary or involuntary separation after 5 years' service; amount of retirement pay, and under what retirement act; and rating, if retired from military or naval service.*		X
8. SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT HAVE YOU BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes", give in Item 10 the name and address of employer, date and reason in each case.*		X
9. HAVE YOU BEEN ARRESTED (NOT INCLUDING TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH YOU WERE FINED $25 OR LESS OR FORFEITED COLLATERAL OF $25 OR LESS) SINCE YOU FILED APPLICATION RESULTING IN THIS APPOINTMENT? *If your answer is "Yes", list all such cases under Item 10. Give in each case: (1) The date; (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any; or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken.*		X

10. SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS

ITEM NO.	WRITE IN LEFT COLUMN NUMBERS OF ITEMS TO WHICH DETAILED ANSWERS APPLY

INSTRUCTIONS TO APPOINTING OFFICER

The appointing officer before whom the foregoing certificate is made shall determine to his own satisfaction that this appointment would be in conformance with the Civil Service Act, applicable Civil Service Rules and Regulations and acts of Congress pertaining to appointment.

This form should be checked for holding of office, pension, suitability in connection with any record of recent discharge or arrest, and particularly for the following:

(1) *Identity of appointee.*—It is the duty of the appointing officer to guard against impersonation and to determine beyond reasonable doubt that the appointee is the same person whose appointment was authorized. The appointee's signature and handwriting are to be compared with the application and/or other pertinent papers. If the appointee qualified in a written examination, the signature on this form should be compared with the signature on the declaration sheet, which was signed in the examination room. His physical appearance may be checked against the medical certificate. The appointee may also be questioned on his personal history for agreement with his previous statements.

(2) *Age.*—If definite age limits have been established for the position, it should be determined that applicant is not outside the age range for appointment. Until such determination is made, the appointment may not be consummated.

(3) *Citizenship.*—The appointing officer is responsible for observing the citizenship provisions of (1) the Civil Service Rules and (2) appropriation acts. Form 61 constitutes an affidavit for both purposes and is acceptable proof of citizenship status in the absence of conflicting evidence. In doubtful cases the appointment should not be consummated until clearance has been secured from the certifying office of the Civil Service Commission.

(4) *Members of Family.*—Section 9 of the Civil Service Act provides that whenever there are already two or more members of a family serving under probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service, no other member of such family is eligible for probational or permanent appointment in the competitive service. The appointments of persons entitled to veteran preference are not subject to this requirement. The members-of-family provision does not apply to temporary appointments. Doubtful cases may be referred to the appropriate office of the Civil Service Commission for decision.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—[illegible]

14-00000

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND MILITARY SERVICE

OFFICE: 050 — DIVISION: RA

NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE): WOODS JAMES SHAVIE — BRANCH: Processing & Records — SECTION: File

I FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE (BEGIN WITH THIS AGENCY AND FOLLOW IN REVERSE CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

AGENCY	LOCATION	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
C.I.A. ~~April 21, 1952~~		21	4	1952				14	8	
Treasury Dept	15th & Penn	7 / 5	11	1951	20 / 19	4	1952	18	5	-
Treasury Dept.	15th & Penn	19	5	1950	12 / 19	9	1950	1	4	

SCD 11/12/48 verified 10/23/57 JK

Total Civilian Service: 18 | 9 | —

II MILITARY SERVICE (INCLUDE ONLY PERIODS OF ACTIVE DUTY; DO NOT INCLUDE TERMINAL LEAVE)

BRANCH OF SERVICE	FROM DA.	FROM MO.	FROM YR.	TO DA.	TO MO.	TO YR.	TOTAL SERVICE DA.	TOTAL SERVICE MO.	TOTAL SERVICE YR.
Army	3	10	1946	12	4	1948	10	6	1
Army	19	~~10~~ 9	1950	7	8	1951	18	7	

Total Military Service: 9 (~~20~~) | 2 | 2

III CERTIFICATION

I hereby swear (or affirm) that the above Civilian and Military service is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge.

April 21, 1952 (DATE) — James S. Woods (SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE)

IV REMARKS: (CONCERNING ABOVE SERVICE)

Margaret C. Lacey
50 USC 16016A
SCD 11-8-48

MAY BE CONTINUED ON NON-DETACHABLE REVERSE SIDE

V FOR PERSONNEL OFFICE USE ONLY

TOTAL CREDITABLE SERVICE

DAYS	MONTHS	YEARS
25	1	3

as of 21 April 1952

14-00000

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Serial No. (no entry)	2. NAME: (last) (first) (middle) WOODS JAMES SAUVIE	3. Office RI/FI
4. Date of Birth Feb. 20, 1928	5. Sex: ✓ male (1) ___ female (2) — Marital Status Single; Nr. Dependents 1	6. Employment Date: April 1952
7. Citizenship: ✓ U.S. ___ Other	8. Acquired By: (1) ✓ Birth (2) ___ Marriage (3) ___ Naturalization (4) ___ Other (specify) — Year U.S. citizenship acquired, if not by birth ______	

SEC. I. EDUCATION

1. Extent: (circle one)

1. Less than high school
2. High school graduate
3. Trade, Business or Commercial school graduate
$\textcircled{4}$ Two years college, or less
5. Over two years, no degree
6. Bachelor degree
7. Post-graduate study (minimum 8 sem. hrs.)
8. Masters degree
9. Doctors degree

2. College or University Study:

Name and location of College or University	Major	Minor	Dates att'd From	Dates att'd To	Yrs Compl Day	Yrs Compl Night	Degree Recd Title	Degree Recd Date	Sem Hrs
Aakers Business School - Grand Forks N. Dak.	accounting	Law	Oct Feb	48 50			Junior accounting Diploma		
Strayers College Washington D.C.	accounting	Law	Now attending						

3. Trade, Commercial, and Specialized Training:

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization

4. Military, Intelligence or Investigative training (full time duty as a student in specialized schools such as intelligence, communications, ordnance disposal, etc.)

School	Attendance Dates From	To	Tot. mo's	Study or Specialization

14-00000

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE

1. State the nature of duties performed with this organization, starting with your present position. Approximate dates (month and year) are sufficient. Use a continuation sheet, if necessary, to adequately describe your duties.

From April 52 To Nov 52 Tot. mos. 7 Grade GS-4 Salary 3175 yr. Office RI/FI Position Title: CLERK Duty Title: General Office Work	Description of Duties: Supervise the changing of the folders from [illegible] to the single documents, [illegible] documents for RI. Do requests and other general office duties. Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:
From ___ To ___ Tot. mos. ___ Grade ___ Salary ___ Office Position Title: Duty Title:	Description of Duties: Duty Station, if overseas:

14-00000

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D.)

2. Previous Employment: Describe your previous work experience in sufficient detail to permit full recognition of your qualifications. Include military work experience. List last position first.

From Jan 52 To April 52 Tot. mo's 4 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-3 Salary 2950 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Investments	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk Description of Duties: Working with Mexican Claims Duty Station if overseas:
From May 50 To Jan 52 Tot. mo's 7 Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) GS-2 Salary 2750 Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Treasury Dept. Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility) Div. of Disbursements	Exact Title of your position Fiscal accounting Clerk Description of Duties: Verified checks for correct names, addresses and money. Other 13 months of this period spent in the Army Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:
From To Tot. mo's Classification Grade (if in Federal Service) Salary Number and Class of Employees Supervised: Employer Kind of Business or organization (i.e., paper products mfr, public utility)	Exact Title of your position Description of Duties: Duty Station if overseas:

SEC. II. WORK EXPERIENCE (CONT'D)

3. Special Work Experience: Check any of the following organizations by which you may have been employed.

01___	U.S. Secret Service	24___	Air Force A-2
02___	Civil Police	25___	Foreign Economic Admin.
03___	Military Police	26___	Counter Intelligence Corps
04___	U.S. Border Patrol	27___	Immigration & Naturalization
05___	U.S. Narcotics Squad	28___	Strategic Services Unit
06___	FBI	29___	Foreign Service, State Dept.
07___	Criminal Investigation Div.	30___	Central Intelligence Group
21___	Office of Naval Intelligence	31___	Armed Forces Security Agency
22___	Office of War Information	32___	Coordinator of Information
23___	Army G-2	33___	Office of Facts & Figures
20___	Office of Strategic Services	34___	Board of Economic Warfare
		35___	Federal Communications Comm.

SEC. III. FOREIGN LANGUAGES

List below the foreign languages in which you have some competence. Be sure to include uncommon modern languages. Check (X) your competence and how acquired.

LANGUAGE	COMPETENCE						HOW ACQUIRED			
	Equivalent to Native Fluency *	Fluent but obviously Foreign *	Adequate for Research **	Adequate for Travel	Limited Knowledge		Native of Country	Prolonged Residence	Contact (Parents, etc.)	Academic Study

* If you have checked 'Fluent' for a language that has significant difference in spoken and written form (e.g., Arabic), explain your competence herein ___

** Specialized Language Competence: Describe ability to do specialized language work involving vocabularies and terminology in the scientific, engineering, telecommunications, and military fields. List the language with the type of speciality. ___

SEC. IV. AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. List below any foreign countries or regions of which you have knowledge gained as a result of residence, travel or study. Study can mean either academic study, or study of a foreign country resulting from an intelligence, military, commercial or professional work assignment.

Country or Region	Dates of Residence, Study Etc.	Manner in Which Knowledge Was Aquired (check (X) one)		
		Residence	Travel	Study
~~Tokyo, Ja~~				
Tokyo, Japan	Jan 47 - March 48	X (army)		
Korea	Dec 50 - June 51	x (army)		

2. Specialized Knowledge of Area
List specialized knowledge of foreign country such as knowledge of terrain, coasts and harbors, utilities, railroads, industries, political parties, etc., gained as a result of study or work assignment. Include name of employer or organization.

Country	Type of Knowledge	How and When Gained

SEC. V. TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS (PRESENT UTILIZATION)

Skill	Per Cent of Time Used	Not Used	WPM (Approximate Proficiency)	Prefer Assignment Using Skill Oftener
Typing	1. 5%	2.	35	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand	1.	2. ✓	—	1. Yes 2. No
Shorthand System: 1. Manual 2. Machine 3. Speedwriting.				

SEC. VI. LICENSES, HOBBIES, SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Licenses: List any licenses or certification such as teachers, pilot, marine, etc.	2. Hobbies: List any hobbies such as sailing, skiing, writing, or other special qualifications.

SEC. VII. PROFESSIONAL AND ACADEMIC HONORS

List any professional or academic associations or honorary societies in which you hold membership.

SEC. VIII. PUBLICATIONS

List below the type of writing (non-fiction: professional or scientific articles, general interest subjects, current events, etc; fiction: novels, short stories, etc.) of any published materials of which you were author or co-author.

SEC. IX. INVENTIONS

Describe any devices you have invented as to type of work for which intended and whether patented.

Device	Patented	
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No
	(1) Yes	(2) No

SEC. X. TESTS (Within present organization)

Describe below the type of tests which you have taken.

Type of Test	Date Taken

SEC. XI. PHYSICAL HANDICAPS

List any physical handicaps you may have.

None

SEC. XII. OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

Are you willing to accept periodic tour of duty overseas?

(1) 2 year Tour ✓ (2) 4 year Tour ___ (3) Not interested ___

SEC. XIII. WORK ASSIGNMENT

In view of your total experience and education, for what assignment do you think you are best qualified?

One in which I may be able to use my accounting experience, such as [illegible] finance work or administrative work.

14-00000

SEC. XIV. MILITARY STATUS

1. Present Draft Status
   Have you registered under the Selective Service Act of 1948? ✓ Yes ___ No.
   If yes, indicate your present draft classification 4 A

2. Present Reserve or National Guard Status
   Do you now have Reserve or National Guard Status ___ Yes ✓ No.
   If yes, complete the following.
   1. ___ National Guard
   2. ___ Air National Guard
   3. ___ Active Reserve Status (member of organized unit)
   4. ___ Inactive Reserve Status

   Service ARMY Grade P.F.C Serial Number ER17214704

   Reserve Unit with which currently affiliated ______

   Service Mobilization Assignment, if any ______

   Location of Service Records, if known Washington 25, D.C

SEC. XV. TRAINING

List the training courses or subjects you have taken in this organization.

Course or Subject	(from) Dates (to)	Hours

SEC. XVI. REMARKS

Use this space to indicate any other qualifications you may have which you do not describe above.

DATE Nov. 13, 1952 SIGNATURE James S[illegible]

14-00000

WEAR

REPORT OF QUALIFICATIONS

NOTE: THIS REPORT MUST NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH APPLICANT OR EMPLOYEE.

NAME OF EMPLOYEE (OR APPLICANT)		THIS DATE
WOODS, James S.	Acct Clk.	20 December 1951

TEST RECORD

NOTE: PRINTED BLACK LINE REPRESENTS MEAN PERCENTILE RANKINGS OF GS-4'S. COLORED LINE REPRESENTS PERCENTILE RANKINGS FOR THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT.

PROFILE



TYPING			SHORTHAND			
GROSS	NET	ERRORS	1	2	3	TOT. TIME
28	18	10				

EVALUATION OF EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

TYPE OF POSITION		OUTSTANDING	SUPERIOR	ADEQUATE	WEAK	INADEQUATE
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	EDUCATION	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	DIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	INDIRECT EXPERIENCE	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

QUALIFICATIONS TECHNICIAN

FORM NO. 37-70C
JAN 1950

14-00000

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(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR MEDICAL EVALUATION

1. DATE OF REQUEST
25 August 1976

2. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	3. POSITION TITLE	4. GRADE
Woods, James S.	Records Admin Officer	GS-12

5. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH	6. EMPLOYEE'S EXT.
DDO/CCS/RSO	6352

7. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

- [ ] PRE-EMPLOYMENT
- [ ] ENTRANCE ON DUTY
- [ ] TDY STANDBY
- [ ] SPECIAL TRAINING
- [XX] ANNUAL
- [ ] RETURN TO DUTY
- [ ] FITNESS FOR DUTY
- [ ] MEDICAL RETIREMENT
- [ ] HDQS/TDY
- [ ] OVERSEAS ASSIGNMENT

ETD
STATION
TDY OR PCS
TYPE OF COVER
NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
NO. OF DEPENDENTS' REPORTS OF MEDICAL HISTORY ATTACHED

- [ ] RETURN FROM OVERSEAS

ETA
STATION
NO. OF DEP.'S

8. OVERSEAS PLANNING EVALUATION (One block must be checked)

- [ ] YES
- [ ] NO

9. REQUESTING OFFICER

SIGNATURE
Donald E. McGahill

ROOM NO. & BUILDING	EXT.
[illegible] HQS	6344

10. COMMENTS

11. REPORT OF EVALUATION

Annual Exam Completed.

DATE	SIGNATURE FOR CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF
4 October 1976	William T. Golder, OMS/PEO

FORM 259 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 9-73

SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 007622

SECRET

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. GRADE
WOODS, James S.	20 February 1928	GS-10
4. OFFICE, DIVISION, BRANCH (or overseas station and existing cover if lateral assignment)	5. PRESENT POSITION	6. EMPLOYEE EXTENSION
DDP/EUR	Records Admin Officer	c/o7152
7. PROPOSED STATION	8. PROPOSED POSITION (Title, Number, Grade)	
Rome, Italy	Records Admin Officer 0699 (09)	
9. TYPE OF COVER AT NEW STATION	10. ESTIMATED DATE OF DEPARTURE	11. NO. OF DEPENDENTS TO ACCOMPANY
SS# 502-16-6806 Nominal (Light State)	31 May 1971	-2-

12. COMMENTS

Please evaluate for proposed assignment.

No language is required for this position

Form 58 attached

13. DATE OF REQUEST	14. SIGNATURE OF REQUESTING OFFICIAL	15. ROOM NUMBER AND BUILDING	16. EXTENSION
8 March 1971	Floyd G. Lanter, E/Pers	4B0002 Hq.	7152

17. OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES DISPOSITION

18. OFFICE OF SECURITY DISPOSITION

19. OVERSEAS CANDIDATE REVIEW PANEL DISPOSITION

QUALIFIED [illegible]

REQUEST FOR PCS OVERSEAS EVALUATION

FORM 4-60 259a USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

GROUP 1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

(4)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS UPDATE

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING, TYPE OR PRINT, AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

Now that your qualifications are a matter of computer record, they must be periodically updated. This is done automatically for much information; however, some must be obtained directly from you. This form is for that purpose.
Section I must be completed in all cases. You need provide other information only if there have been changes since you submitted your Form 444, "Qualifications Supplement to the Personal History Statement," or a previous update form.
If you are in doubt whether information has been previously submitted, enter it in the appropriate section. The signed and dated form should be returned through administrative channels to the File Room, Office of Personnel, Room 5E-13 Headquarters, whether information is added or not.
Additionally, a qualifications update may take place at any time there is information to be added or changed simply by completing and returning an update form on your initiative.

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

EMP. SER. NO.	NAME (Last-First-Middle)	DATE OF BIRTH	SD
010032	WOODS JAMES SAUVIE	20 FEB 28	

SECTION II — EDUCATION

HIGH SCHOOL

LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From-To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT MAJOR	SUBJECT MINOR	YEARS ATTENDED FROM--TO--	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM/QTR. HRS. (Specify)
1. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND			1964-1970			48 SEM HRS
2.						

IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.				
2.				

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY:
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden)
3. DATE OF BIRTH
4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
5. OCCUPATION
6. PRESENT EMPLOYER
7. CITIZENSHIP
8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S) COUNTRY(IES)
9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED

SECTION IV — DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
1. ☒ ADD ☐ DELETE	Daughter	Bethesda, MD.	American	432 College Pkwy Rockville, MD
2. ☐ ADD ☐ DELETE				

14-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION V	GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL						
NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY--CHECK (X): RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
1.							
2.							

MAR 11 9 21 AM '71
MAIL ROOM

SECTION VI	TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (WPM) | 2. SHORTHAND (WPM) | 3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED--CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER SPECIFY:

SECTION VII	SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HOBBIES, SPORTS, LICENSES, PUBLISHED MATERIALS OR DEVICES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE INVENTED.

SECTION VIII	MILITARY SERVICE

CURRENT DRAFT STATUS

1. HAS YOUR SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSIFICATION CHANGED? ☐ YES ☐ NO | 2. NEW CLASSIFICATION

3. LOCAL SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER AND ADDRESS | 4. IF DEFERRED, GIVE REASON

MILITARY RESERVE, NATIONAL GUARD STATUS

CHECK RESERVE OR GUARD ORGANIZATION TO WHICH YOU BELONG: ☐ ARMY ☐ NAVY ☐ MARINE CORPS ☐ AIR FORCE ☐ COAST GUARD ☐ NATIONAL GUARD ☐ AIR NATIONAL GUARD

1. CURRENT RANK, GRADE OR RATE | 2. DATE OF APPOINTMENT IN CURRENT RANK | 3. EXPIRATION DATE OF CURRENT OBLIGATION

4. CHECK CURRENT RESERVE CATEGORY ☐ READY RESERVE ☐ STANDBY (active) ☐ STANDBY (inactive) ☐ RETIRED ☐ DISCHARGED

5. MILITARY MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT | 6. RESERVE UNIT TO WHICH ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED

MILITARY SCHOOLS COMPLETED (Extended Active, Reserve Duty, or as Civilian)

NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATE COMPLETED	RESIDENT / AGENCY-SPONSORED

SECTION IX	PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP	
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	FROM	TO
1.			
2.			
3.			

SECTION X	REMARKS

DATE | SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
X James Sauvie Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When Filled In)

QUALIFICATIONS SUPPLEMENT TO PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

READ INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY BEFORE COMPLETING. TYPE OR PRINT. AVOID USING LIGHT COLORED INKS

SECTION I — BIOGRAPHIC AND POSITION DATA

1. EMP. SER. NO.	2. NAME (Last-First-Middle)	3. SEX	4. DATE OF BIRTH	5. SCHEDULE/GRADE/STEP
030032	WOODS JAMES S	M	02/20/28	GS -09-07

6. SD	7. POSITION TITLE	8. OFFICE OF ASSIGNMENT	9. LOCATION (Country, City)
D	RECORDS ADMIN OF	FE	SAIGON, SOUTH VIET NAM

SECTION II — AGENCY OVERSEAS SERVICE

AREA	TYPE TOUR	FROM	TO
JAPAN	PCS 56	54/08/01	56/07/01
JAPAN	TDY 56	56/08/01	56/11/01
MEXICO	TDY 56	57/02/01	57/08/01
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	PCS 56	57/09/01	59/03/19
JAPAN	PCS 45	61/04/24	66/09/24
VIETNAM	PCS 6	67/01/14	68/10/3

OVERSEAS DATA
CODED
DATE: 16 OCT 1968
INITIALS:

SECTION III — EDUCATION

DEGREE	MAJOR FIELD	COLLEGE	YEAR
	NO COLLEGE DEGREE ON RECORD		

FORM 1-67 444J
Mfg 2-67

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

29 FEB 1968 (4-51)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION III	EDUCATION (Cont'd)		
	HIGH SCHOOL		
LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)	YEARS ATTENDED (From - To)	GRADUATE ☐ YES ☐ NO

COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

	NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		YEARS ATTENDED	DEGREE RECEIVED	YEAR RECEIVED	NO. SEM / QTR HRS (Specify)
		MAJOR	MINOR	FROM - TO			
1	U. OF MD. TACHIKAWA, JAPAN		ENG I	1966			3
2	U. OF MD. TACHIKAWA, JAPAN		BH 10	1966			3
3	U. OF MD. SAIGON		HIS 127	1967			3
	U. OF MD SAIGON		ECN 31	1967			3
4	U. OF MD SAIGON		PSY 1	1967			3

5 IF A GRADUATE DEGREE HAS BEEN NOTED ABOVE WHICH REQUIRED SUBMISSION OF A WRITTEN THESIS, INDICATE THE TITLE OF THE THESIS AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ITS CONTENT.

DATA ... CS ... DATA

TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					

OTHER NON-AGENCY EDUCATION OR TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

AGENCY-SPONSORED EDUCATION

Specify which, if any, of the education shown in Section III was Agency sponsored

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	FROM	TO	NO. OF MONTHS
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IV NONE **GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL**

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE	DATE & PLACE OF STUDY	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY - - CHECK (X)			
				RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT

SECTION V NONE **TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS**

1. TYPING (WPM)
2. SHORTHAND (WPM)
3. INDICATE SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM: ☐ GREGG ☐ SPEEDWRITING ☐ STENOTYPE ☐ OTHER: SPECIFY:
4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (comptometer, mimeograph, card-punch, etc.)

SECTION VI NONE **SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS**

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH.
2. EXCLUDING BUSINESS EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES WHICH YOU MAY HAVE LISTED IN ITEM 4, SECTION V, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT AND MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF RADIO TRANSMITTERS (indicate CW speed, sending & receiving), OFFSET PRESS, TURRET LATHE, EDP AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC & PROFESSIONAL DEVICES.
3. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION SUCH AS PILOT, ELECTRICIAN, RADIO OPERATOR, TEACHER, LAWYER, CPA, MEDICAL TECHNICIAN, PSYCHOLOGIST, PHYSICIAN, ETC.? ☐ YES ☐ NO
4. IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES" TO ITEM 3 ABOVE, INDICATE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATION AND THE ISSUING STATE, MUNICIPALITY, ETC. Provide license registry number if known.
5. FIRST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
6. LATEST LICENSE/CERTIFICATE (year of issue)
7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (do NOT submit copies unless requested). INDICATE THE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (non fiction or scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)
8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED
9. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

SECTION VIII — **AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
Jan 67 - Oct 68	Saigon Vietnam	
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
APR 61 - SEPT 66	TOKYO, JAPAN	FE
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
CHIEF OF REGISTRY		GS 9
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		
SUPERVISED 7 EMPLOYEES IN REGISTRY WORK.		

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE-OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
FEB 59 - MAR 61	Wash. D.C.	FE
4. TITLE OF JOB		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB
Records Admin Officer		GS-9
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES		
ASSIST THE FE RMO IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FE RECORDS. INCLUDED CLOSE LIAISON WITH RID. ALSO INVOLVED 4 MONTHS OF HALF-DAY WORK WITH DDP/MACHINE RECORD GROUP IN SETTING UP THE APERTURE CARD SYSTEM.		

14-00000

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When Filled In

SECTION VIII — AGENCY EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (Cont'd)

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
AUG 57 - FEB 59	MANILA, P.I.	FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: Chief of Records Management Team		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-7 & GS-9

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Chief of a team of three individuals stationed PCS Manila but travelled throughout the F.E. (Including Australia) to set up record systems, including registry, according to Headquarters regulation. This was to ensure that field systems would be in line with Hqs procedures.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
FEB 57 - July 57	MEXICO CITY, MEXICO	WH
4. TITLE OF JOB: Team member of Records Management Team		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-7

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Member of a team of 4 sent to Mexico to establish and streamline a system of Records. This involved setting up a 201 system, better name trace system, charge-out system for files and the microfilming of FBI records. My main specialty was 201's.

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From-To-by month & year)	2. LOCATION (Country, City)	3. DIRECTORATE OFFICE OR DIVISION, BRANCH
AUG. 54 - NOV 56	Seoul, Korea & Yokosuka, Japan; Tuchun ?	FE
4. TITLE OF JOB: Admin Assistant		5. GRADES HELD IN JOB: GS-5 & GS-7

6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES

Name traces and other regular registry duties.

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION IX	MARITAL STATUS		
1. PRESENT STATUS (Single, Married, Widowed, Separated, Divorced, Annulled, Remarried) SPECIFY	MARRIED		
2. NAME OF SPOUSE (Last) WOODS	(First) LOUISE	(Middle) ANNE	(Maiden) FALLON
3. DATE OF BIRTH 8 MAY 1937	4. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country) BROOKLYN, NEW YORK		
5. OCCUPATION HOUSEWIFE.	6. PRESENT EMPLOYER NA		
7. CITIZENSHIP AMERICAN	8. FORMER CITIZENSHIP(S), COUNTRY(IES) —	9. DATE U.S. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED —	

SECTION X	DEPENDENT CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS OTHER THAN SPOUSE			
NAME	RELATIONSHIP	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	PERMANENT ADDRESS
CHRISTINE MARIE	DAU.	TOKYO, JAPAN APR 14, 1963	American	DECEASED July 63

SECTION XI NONE	PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS		
NAME AND CHAPTER	ADDRESS (Number, Street, City, State, Country)	DATE OF MEMBERSHIP FROM	TO

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
9 OCT 68	James L. Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PERIODIC SUPPLEMENT
PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT

THIS DATE

Return to CAB 1604 Curie

INSTRUCTIONS

This form provides the means whereby your official personnel file will be kept current. Even though it duplicates information you have furnished previously, it will be necessary for you to complete Sections I through VI in their entirety. You need complete Sections VII through XIII only if there has been a change since you entered on duty with the organization or if you believe the item requires more complete coverage than you have previously reported.

SECTION I — GENERAL

1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): WOODS, JAMES SAUVIE
2. CURRENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): 2224 F. ST. N.W. WASH. D.C.
3. PERMANENT ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State): FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA
4. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: [illegible] 4791
5. STATE, TERRITORY, POSSESSION OR COUNTRY IN WHICH YOU NOW CLAIM RESIDENCE: U.S.A.

SECTION II — PERSON TO BE NOTIFIED IN CASE OF EMERGENCY

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) PREFERABLY RESIDING IN U.S.: MR. ROSS A WOODS
2. RELATIONSHIP: FATHER
3. HOME ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country): FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA
4. BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, Zone, State, Country). INDICATE NAME OF FIRM OR EMPLOYER, IF APPLICABLE: FOREST RIVER, NORTH DAKOTA — NA
5. HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER: 4791
6. BUSINESS TELEPHONE NUMBER: NA
7. BUSINESS TELEPHONE EXTENSION: NA
8. IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES (Spouse, Mother, Father) MAY ALSO BE NOTIFIED. IF SUCH NOTIFICATION IS NOT DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, PLEASE SO STATE. NA

SECTION III — MARITAL STATUS

1. CHECK (X) ONE: [X] SINGLE [ ] MARRIED [ ] WIDOWED [ ] SEPARATED [ ] DIVORCED [ ] ANNULLED
2. FURNISH DATE, PLACE AND REASON FOR ALL SEPARATIONS, DIVORCES OR ANNULMENTS

12 SEP

WIFE OR HUSBAND: If you have been married more than once, including annulments, use a separate sheet for former wife or husband giving data below for all previous marriages. If marriage is contemplated, provide same data for fiance.

3. NAME (First) (Middle) (Maiden) (Last)
4. DATE OF MARRIAGE
5. PLACE OF MARRIAGE (City, State, Country)
6. HIS (or her) ADDRESS BEFORE MARRIAGE (No., Street, City, State, Country)
7. LIVING: YES / NO
8. DATE OF DEATH
9. CAUSE OF DEATH
10. CURRENT ADDRESS (Give last address, if deceased)
11. DATE OF BIRTH
12. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State, Country)
13. IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. DATE OF ENTRY
14. PLACE OF ENTRY
15. CITIZENSHIP (Country)
16. DATE ACQUIRED
17. WHERE ACQUIRED (City, State, Country)
18. OCCUPATION
19. PRESENT EMPLOYER (Also give former employer, or if spouse is deceased or unemployed, last two employers)
20. EMPLOYER'S OR OWN BUSINESS ADDRESS (No., Street, City, State, Country)

CODED

10 DEC

SECTION III CONTINUED TO PAGE 2

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SECTION III CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

21. DATES OF MILITARY SERVICE (From- and To-) BY MONTH AND YEAR

22. BRANCH OF SERVICE

23. COUNTRY WITH WHICH MILITARY SERVICE AFFILIATED

24. DETAILS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT SERVICE, U.S. OR FOREIGN

SECTION IV RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION LIVING ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT U.S. CITIZENS

	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle)	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
1	NA		
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
2	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
3	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT
4	1. FULL NAME (Last-First-Middle): NA	2. RELATIONSHIP	3. AGE
	4. ADDRESS OR COUNTRY IN WHICH RELATIVE RESIDES		
	5. CITIZENSHIP (Country)	6. FREQUENCY OF CONTACT	7. DATE OF LAST CONTACT

5. SPECIAL REMARKS, IF ANY, CONCERNING THESE RELATIVES

NA

SECTION V FINANCIAL STATUS

1. ARE YOU ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON YOUR SALARY? [X] YES [ ] NO

2. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "NO" TO THE ABOVE, STATE SOURCES OF OTHER INCOME

NA

3. BANKING INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH YOU HAVE ACCOUNTS

NAME OF INSTITUTION	ADDRESS (City, State, Country)
UNION TRUST CO.	WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECTION V CONTINUED TO PAGE 3

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(When Filled In)

SECTION V CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

4. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN, OR PETITIONED FOR, BANKRUPTCY? [ ] YES [X] NO

5. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE PARTICULARS, INCLUDING COURT AND DATE(S)

NA

6. DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT, PENSION, OR COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? [ ] YES [X] NO

7. IF YOUR ANSWER IS "YES" TO THE ABOVE QUESTION, GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS

NA

8. DO YOU HAVE ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN, OR OFFICIAL CONNECTION WITH, NON-U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES OR IN OR WITH U.S. CORPORATIONS OR BUSINESSES HAVING SUBSTANTIAL FOREIGN INTERESTS? [ ] YES [X] NO IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED "YES", GIVE COMPLETE DETAILS ON A SEPARATE SHEET AND ATTACH IN A SEALED ENVELOPE.

SECTION VI — CITIZENSHIP

1. PRESENT CITIZENSHIP (Country): U.S.A.

2. CITIZENSHIP ACQUIRED BY - CHECK (X) ONE: [X] BIRTH [ ] MARRIAGE [ ] OTHER (Specify):

3. HAVE YOU TAKEN STEPS TO CHANGE YOUR PRESENT CITIZENSHIP? [ ] YES [X] NO

4. GIVE PARTICULARS: NA

5. IF YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR U.S. CITIZENSHIP, INDICATE PRESENT STATUS OF YOUR APPLICATION (First papers, etc.)

NA

SECTION VII — EDUCATION

1. CHECK (X) HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION ATTAINED

[ ]	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	OVER TWO YEARS OF COLLEGE - NO DEGREE
[ ]	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	BACHELOR'S DEGREE
[X]	TRADE, BUSINESS, OR COMMERCIAL SCHOOL GRADUATE	[ ]	GRADUATE STUDY LEADING TO HIGHER DEGREE
[ ]	TWO YEARS COLLEGE OR LESS	[ ]	MASTER'S DEGREE [ ] DOCTOR'S DEGREE

2. COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY STUDY

NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	SUBJECT		DATES ATTENDED		DEGREE REC'D	DATE REC'D	SEM/QTR. HOURS SPECIFY
	MAJOR	MINOR	FROM	TO			
~~[illegible]~~ NA							

3. TRADE, COMMERCIAL AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
HadLick's PRIVATE Business school GRAND FORKS, N. DAK.	Accounting	NOV-48 OCT-49	APR-49 FEB 50	9 month

4. MILITARY TRAINING (Full time duty in specialized schools such as Ordnance, Intelligence, Communications, etc.)

NAME OF SCHOOL	STUDY OR SPECIALIZATION	DATES ATTENDED		TOTAL MONTHS
		FROM	TO	
NA				

5. OTHER EDUCATIONAL TRAINING NOT INDICATED ABOVE

NA

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(When Filled In)

SECTION VIII — FOREIGN LANGUAGE ABILITIES

LANGUAGE (List below each language in which you possess any degree of competence. Indicate your proficiency to read, write or speak by placing a check (X) in the appropriate boxes)	COMPETENCE - IN ORDER LISTED: EQUIVALENT TO NATIVE FLUENCY (R W S)	FLUENT BUT OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN (R W S)	ADEQUATE FOR RESEARCH (R W S)	ADEQUATE FOR TRAVEL (R W S)	LIMITED KNOWLEDGE (R W S)	HOW ACQUIRED: NATIVE TO COUNTRY	PROLONGED RESIDENCE	CONTACT (WITH PARENTS ETC.)	ACADEMIC STUDY (ALL LEVELS)
	CANCELLED								

R - READ W - WRITE S - SPEAK

2. IF YOU HAVE CHECKED "ACADEMIC STUDY" UNDER "HOW ACQUIRED", INDICATE LENGTH AND INTENSIVENESS OF STUDY

3. DESCRIBE YOUR ABILITY TO DO SPECIALIZED LANGUAGE WORK INVOLVING VOCABULARIES AND TERMINOLOGY ON THE SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MILITARY OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIZED FIELD.

SECTION IX — GEOGRAPHIC AREA KNOWLEDGE

1. LIST BELOW ANY FOREIGN REGIONS OR COUNTRIES OF WHICH YOU HAVE KNOWLEDGE GAINED AS A RESULT OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, STUDY OR WORK ASSIGNMENT. UNDER COLUMN "TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE", INDICATE TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE SUCH AS TERRAIN, COASTS, HARBORS, UTILITIES, RAILROADS, INDUSTRIES, POLITICAL PARTIES, ETC.

NAME OF REGION OR COUNTRY	TYPE OF SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE	DATES OF RESIDENCE, TRAVEL, ETC.	KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED BY: RESIDENCE	TRAVEL	STUDY	WORK ASSIGNMENT
NA						

2. INDICATE THE PURPOSE OF VISIT, RESIDENCE OR TRAVEL FOR EACH OF THE REGIONS OR COUNTRIES LISTED ABOVE

NA

SECTION X — TYPING AND STENOGRAPHIC SKILLS

1. TYPING (W.P.M.)	2. SHORTHAND (W.P.M.)	3. SHORTHAND SYSTEM USED - CHECK (X) APPROPRIATE ITEM
30	NA	GREGG / SPEEDWRITING / STENOTYPE / OTHER (Specify):

4. INDICATE OTHER BUSINESS MACHINES WITH WHICH YOU HAVE HAD OPERATING EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING (Comptometer, Mimeograph, Card Punch, etc.)

NA

SECTION XI — SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

1. LIST ALL HOBBIES AND SPORTS IN WHICH YOU ARE ACTIVE OR HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED. INDICATE YOUR PROFICIENCY IN EACH

NA

2. INDICATE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS, RESULTING FROM EXPERIENCE OR TRAINING, WHICH MIGHT FIT YOU FOR A PARTICULAR POSITION OR TYPE OF WORK

NA

3. EXCLUDING EQUIPMENT NOTED IN SECTION X, LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS RELATING TO OTHER EQUIPMENT OR MACHINES SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORTWAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC AND PROFESSIONAL DEVICES, ETC.

NA

4. IF YOU ARE A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (Pilot, Electrician, Radio Operator, Teacher, Lawyer, CPA, Medical Technician, etc.), INDICATE THE KIND OF LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE, NAME OF ISSUING STATE, AND REGISTRY NUMBER, IF KNOWN.

NA

5. FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)	6. LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (Year of issue)
NA	NA

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XI CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

7. LIST ANY SIGNIFICANT PUBLISHED MATERIALS OF WHICH YOU ARE THE AUTHOR (Do not submit copies unless requested). INDICATE TITLE, PUBLICATION DATE, AND TYPE OF WRITING (Non-fiction, scientific articles, general interest subjects, novels, short stories, etc.)

NA

8. INDICATE ANY DEVICES WHICH YOU HAVE INVENTED AND STATE WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE PATENTED

NA

9. LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE

NA

10. LIST ANY PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIC OR HONORARY ASSOCIATIONS OR SOCIETIES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW OR WERE FORMERLY A MEMBER. LIST ACADEMIC HONORS YOU HAVE RECEIVED.

NA

SECTION XII ORGANIZATION WORK EXPERIENCE - SINCE LAST COMPLETION OF A PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

1

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): APR-1952-JUNE-1954
2. GRADE: 4
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: FILE CLERK
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Worked in FILES doing Filing and other Related duties. Worked in Conscolidation with 201's

2

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): July 54 - June 56
2. GRADE: 5
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: FE/6 OVERSEAS
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: ~~[illegible]~~ INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: HEAD OF PERSONALITY FILE (201 FILES) SECTION FOR BASE, which involded ALL Agent FILES.

3

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): AUG 56 - NOV 56
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI ~~[illegible]~~ TDY OVERSEAS FOR FE/6
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: 5
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: RETIREMENT OF RECORDS TO Hqs FROM BASE. SET up NEW SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR BASE

4

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): DEC 56 - JAN 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: Worked in RI/AN 201 SECTION in FILLING out 831's

5

1. INCLUSIVE DATES (From- and To-): FEB 57 - AUG 57
2. GRADE: 7
3. OFFICE/DIVISION/BRANCH OF ASSIGNMENT: RI TDY - MEXICO
4. NO. OF EMPLOYEES UNDER YOUR DIRECT SUPERVISION: NONE
5. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE: INTELL ANALYST
6. DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES: SET up SYSTEM OF RECORDS FOR STATION

(Use additional pages if required)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION XIII — CHILDREN AND OTHER DEPENDENTS

1. NUMBER OF CHILDREN (Including stepchildren and adopted children) WHO ARE UNMARRIED, UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE, AND ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

2. NUMBER OF OTHER DEPENDENTS (Including spouse, parents, stepparents, sister, etc.) WHO DEPEND ON YOU FOR AT LEAST 50% OF THEIR SUPPORT, OR, CHILDREN OVER 21 YEARS OF AGE WHO ARE NOT SELF-SUPPORTING.

3. PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR ALL CHILDREN AND DEPENDENTS

NAME	RELATIONSHIP	YEAR OF BIRTH	SEX M	SEX F	CITIZENSHIP	ADDRESS

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND/OR CONTINUATION OF PRECEDING ITEMS

Can't recall addresses but lived in the following places since Apr 1952 -

Conn. Ave. N.W. D.C.
Minnesota Ave. S.E. D.C.
Colonial Terrace, [illegible] Arlington, VA.
Greenbrier St, Arlington, VA.

DATE COMPLETED: 10 Sept 57

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: James S Woods

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

(1-6)	
116632	LANGUAGE DATA RECORD

PART I—GENERAL

1. NAME (Last-First-Middle) (7-24)	2. DATE OF BIRTH (25-30) MONTH	DAY	YEAR
Woods, James S	Feb	20	1928

3. LANGUAGE (31-33)	4. TODAY'S DATE (34-39) MONTH	DAY	YEAR	5.
000	9	9	57	[X] I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGE

PART II—LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION A. Reading (40)

1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OR IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (*newspapers, reference materials, etc.*), USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC., USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION B. Writing (41)

1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.
2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.
4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.
5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.

SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)

1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.
2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.
3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.
5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.

CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE

CONTINUATION OF PART II–LANGUAGE ELEMENTS

SECTION D. Speaking (43)

1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.
2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS; I CAN CONVERSE IN MOST FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR AND I EMPLOY SOME POPULAR SAYINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS.
3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS.
4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.
5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.

SECTION E. Understanding (44)

1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.
3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE; I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.
5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.

BEFORE CONTINUING – CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.

PART III–EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)

1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.
2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.
3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.
4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.

PART IV–CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 25-115, PAR. 1C(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.

DATE SIGNED	SIGNATURE
9 Sept 57	James S [illegible]
(46)	(47)

14-00000

STANDARD FORM 57 - NOV 1947
U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

...CATION FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYM...

INSTRUCTIONS. In order to prevent delay in consideration of your application, answer every question on this form clearly and completely. Type, write or print in INK. In applying for a specific United States Civil Service examination, read the examination announcement carefully and follow all directions. If you are applying for a WRITTEN examination, follow the instructions on the admission card regarding disposition of this application. If you are applying for an UNWRITTEN examination, mail this application to the office named in the announcement. Be sure to mail to the same office any other forms required by the announcement. Notify the office with which you file this application of any change in your address.

APPLICATION NO. — ANNOUNCEMENT

1. Name of examination or kind of position applied for: Accountant
2. Option(s) (if mentioned in examination announcement):
3. Place of employment applied for (City and State): Washington D.C.
4. Date of this application:
5. Mr. / Mrs. / Miss (First name) (Middle) (Maiden, if any) (Last): James Sauvie Woods
6. (A) Street and number or R. D. number: 2817 Conn. Ave. N.W.
(B) City or post office (including postal zone) and State: Washington 8, D.C.
7. Legal or voting residence (State): N. Dak.
8. (A) Office phone: ex 6400 et 2612 (B) Home phone: AD 8430
9. Date of birth (month, day, year): Feb. 20, 1928
10. ☐ Married ☒ Single
11. Place of birth (city and State; if born outside U. S., name city and country): Forest River, N. Dak.
12. ☒ Male ☐ Female
13. (A) Height without shoes: 5 feet 6 inches (B) Weight: 156 pounds
14. (A) Have you ever been employed by the Federal Government? ☒ Yes ☐ No
(B) If so, give last grade and date of last change in grade: GS-2

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOCK
For Use of Civil Service Commission Only

☐ Appor. ☐ Non Appor.	Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned	Entered Register
Notations:	App. Review: Approved:	

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Augm. Rating
			☐ 5 Points (Tent.)	
			☐ 10 Points	
			☐ Wife or Widow	
			☐ Disal.	
			☐ Being Investigated	
Initials and Date				

15. (A) What is the lowest entrance salary you will accept? $ 2950 per year
You will not be considered for any position with a lower entrance salary.
(B) Check if you will accept short-term appointment if offered, for ☐ 1 to 3 months ☐ 4 to 6 months ☒ 6 to 12 months
NOTE. *Acceptance or refusal of a temporary short-term appointment will not affect your opportunity to obtain a probational appointment.*
(C) If you are willing to travel, specify ☐ Occasionally ☒ Frequently ☐ Constantly
(D) Check if you will accept appointment, if offered: ☒ In Washington, D. C. ☒ Anywhere in the United States ☒ Outside the United States
(E) If you will accept appointment in certain locations only, give acceptable locations.

16. EXPERIENCE. It is important for you to furnish all information requested below in sufficient detail to enable the Civil Service Commission and the appointing officers of agencies to give you full credit in determining your qualifications. Use a separate block for each position. Start with your present position and work back, explaining clearly the principal tasks which you performed in each position, accounting for all periods of unemployment. Experience gained more than 15 years ago which is not pertinent to the work for which you are applying may be summarized in one or more of the blocks. If your duties changed materially while working for the same employer, use a separate block to describe each position. You may include any pertinent religious, civic, welfare, or organizational activity which you have performed, either with or without compensation, showing the number of hours per week and weeks per year in which you were engaged in such activity. Military experience should be described in the spaces below in its proper sequence.
(a) If you were ever employed in any position under a name different from that shown in Item 5 of this application, give under "Description of your work" for each position, the name used.
(b) If you have never been employed or are now unemployed, indicate that fact in the space provided below for "Present Position."

① PRESENT POSITION

Dates of employment (month, year): From May, 1950 to present time
Exact title of your present position: Fiscal Accounting clerk
Classification grade (if in Federal Service): GS-2
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 2450 per year; Present $ 2830 per year
Place of employment (city and State): Washington D.C.
Name and title of immediate supervisor: Mrs. Gervias
Name and address of employer (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Treasury Dept. Penn. Ave.
Kind of business or organization (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Division of Disbursements
Number and kind of employees supervised by you:
Reason for desiring to change employment: Better Position

Description of your work:
Working with vouchers and checks; checking them for names, dates, money, etc. Doing other clerkical duties of a general nature.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

16 CONTINUED

② DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Feb. 1950 TO May. 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Clerk & Salesman

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ — FINAL $ 180 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Grand Forks, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. or Mrs. Pat M. Byrne

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): General Tobbacco & Candy Company Grand Forks, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Wholesaler of Tobacco & Candy

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: None

REASON FOR LEAVING: To work for the Government

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Selling tobacco and candy. Doing office work such as taking inventorys and making out sales tickets.

③ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM Oct. 1949 TO Feb. 1950

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: In school

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER — FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State):

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR:

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division):

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.):

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU:

REASON FOR LEAVING:

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:

④ DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year)
FROM April, 1949 TO Oct. 1949

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: Farm Laborer

CLASSIFICATION GRADE (if in Federal service):

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ — FINAL $ 150 PER month

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State): Inkster, N. Dak.

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Mr. Zeck Thomas

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person; if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division): Zeck Thomas Inkster, N. Dak.

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.): Farming

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU: none

REASON FOR LEAVING: To go to school

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK:
Doing general farm duties.

16—83069-1

14-00000

(5) DATES OF EMPLOYMENT (month, year) FROM Oct, 1948 TO April, [illegible]

EXACT TITLE OF YOUR POSITION: In School

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT (city and State)

NAME AND TITLE OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (firm, organization, or person, if Federal, name department, bureau or establishment, and division)

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION (e. g., wholesale silk, insurance agency, manufacture of locks, etc.)

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED BY YOU

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF YOUR WORK

If more space is required, use a continuation sheet (Standard Form No. 58) or a sheet of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

17. MILITARY TRAINING In the space below, describe any training received in the Armed Services (not already listed under Item 16) that would assist appointing officers in placing you most effectively. Indicate actual amount of training received, such as hours per week. Detailed information regarding any special service schools you attended is especially important. (Extra pages may be used to give full descriptions.)

DATES FROM	DATES TO	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING

18 EDUCATION. (Circle highest grade completed): 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (12)

MARK (X) THE APPROPRIATE BOX TO INDICATE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION OF: ☐ ELEMENTARY SCHOOL ☐ JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL ☒ SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL

(A) GIVE NAME AND LOCATION OF LAST HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED: Forest River High, Forest River, N. Dak.

(B) SUBJECTS STUDIED IN HIGH SCHOOL WHICH APPLY TO POSITION DESIRED: English, Bookkeeping and Math

(C) NAME AND LOCATION OF COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY	MAJOR AND SPECIALTY	DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	NIGHT	DEGREES CONFERRED TITLE	DATE	SEMESTER HOURS CREDIT
Hadlich's Priviate Business School Grand Forks, N. Dak.	Accounting & Tax	Oct. 48 / Oct. 49	April / Feb.	49 / 50		Junior Accountancy Diploma		

(D) LIST YOUR CHIEF UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS — SEMESTER HOURS

LIST YOUR CHIEF GRADUATE COLLEGE SUBJECTS — SEMESTER HOURS: Accounting; Income Tax

(E) OTHER TRAINING, SUCH AS VOCATIONAL, BUSINESS, STUDY COURSES GIVEN THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE (show name and location of school) OR "IN-SERVICE TRAINING" IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT

SUBJECTS STUDIED	DATES ATTENDED FROM	TO	YEARS COMPLETED DAY	NIGHT

19 INDICATE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES — READING / SPEAKING / UNDERSTANDING (EXC. GOOD FAIR)

22 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A LICENSED OR CERTIFIED MEMBER OF ANY TRADE OR PROFESSION (such as pilot, electrician, radio operator, teacher, lawyer, CPA, etc.)? ☐ YES ☒ NO GIVE KIND OF LICENSE AND STATE.

FIRST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

LATEST LICENSE OR CERTIFICATE (YEAR)

20 IF YOU HAVE TRAVELED OR RESIDED IN ANY FOREIGN COUNTRIES, INDICATE (1) NAMES OF COUNTRIES (2) DATES AND LENGTH OF TIME SPENT THERE, AND (3) REASON FOR TRAVEL (e. g., military service, business, education, recreation) Jan. 1947 to March 1948 in Japan. Nov. 1950 to June 1951 in Korea.

23 GIVE ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS NOT COVERED ELSEWHERE IN YOUR APPLICATION SUCH AS (1) YOUR MOST IMPORTANT PUBLICATIONS (do not submit copies unless requested) (2) YOUR PATENTS OR INVENTIONS (3) PUBLIC SPEAKING AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERIENCE (4) MEMBERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES, ETC. (5) HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED.

21 LIST ANY SPECIAL SKILLS YOU POSSESS AND MACHINES AND EQUIPMENT YOU CAN USE SUCH AS OPERATION OF SHORT WAVE RADIO, MULTILITH, COMPTOMETER, KEY-PUNCH, TURRET LATHE, SCIENTIFIC OR PROFESSIONAL DEVICES

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF WORDS PER MINUTE IN TYPING 35 SHORTHAND

16—63040-1

14-00000

24 REFERENCES. List three persons living in the United States or Territories of the United States who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 16 (EXPERIENCE).

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (Give complete current address, including street and number)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
1. Robert Hadlich	Box 659, Grand Forks, N. Dak.	Teacher
2. Calmer Hovland	521 Maple Ave. Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher
3. Merland W Berg	618 Cottonwood St., Grand Forks N. Dak.	Teacher

INDICATE "YES" OR "NO" ANSWER BY PLACING "X" IN PROPER COLUMN

Question	YES	NO
25 MAY INQUIRY BE MADE OF YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER REGARDING YOUR CHARACTER, QUALIFICATIONS, ETC.?	X	
26 ARE YOU A CITIZEN OF OR DO YOU OWE ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES?	X	
27 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION?		X
28 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?		X
29 ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR OF AN ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP, OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH HAS ADOPTED A POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF SEEKING TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?		X
If your answer to question 27, 28, or 29 above is "yes," state in Item 39 the names of all such organizations, associations, movements, groups, or combination of persons and dates of membership. Give complete details of your activities therein and make any explanation you desire regarding your membership or activities therein.		X
30 SINCE YOUR 16TH BIRTHDAY, HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ARRESTED, INDICTED, OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (EXCLUDING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS FOR WHICH A FINE OR FORFEITURE OF $25 OR LESS WAS IMPOSED)? *If your answer is "Yes," list all such cases under Item 39 below. Give in each case (1) the date, (2) the nature of the offense or violation; (3) the name and location of the court; (4) the penalty imposed, if any, or other disposition of the case. If appointed, your fingerprints will be taken*		X
31 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DISCHARGED, OR FORCED TO RESIGN, FOR MISCONDUCT OR UNSATISFACTORY SERVICE FROM ANY POSITION? *If your answer is "Yes," give in Item 39 the name and address of employer, date, and reason in each case*		X
32 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN BARRED BY THE U. S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FROM TAKING EXAMINATIONS OR ACCEPTING CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS? *If your answer is "Yes," give dates of and reasons for such debarment in Item 39*		X
33 HAVE YOU ANY PHYSICAL HANDICAP, DISEASE, OR OTHER DISABILITY WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN ASSIGNING YOU TO DUTY? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39 so that consideration can be given to your physical fitness for the job.*		X
34 DO YOU RECEIVE AN ANNUITY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT UNDER ANY RETIREMENT ACT OR ANY PENSION OR OTHER COMPENSATION FOR MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE? *If your answer is "Yes," give complete details in Item 39*		X
35 ARE YOU AN OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF ANY STATE, TERRITORY, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPALITY? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 39*		X
36 DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EMPLOY IN A CIVILIAN CAPACITY ANY RELATIVE OF YOURS (BY BLOOD OR MARRIAGE) WITH WHOM YOU LIVE OR HAVE LIVED WITHIN THE PAST 24 MONTHS? *If your answer is "Yes," show in Item 39 for EACH such relative (1) full name, (2) present address; (3) relationship; (4) Department or Agency by which employed, and (5) kind of appointment*		X

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLAIMING VETERAN PREFERENCE

A. If you are claiming preference as a **PEACETIME VETERAN** who has been awarded a campaign badge or service ribbon, or as a **DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIFE OF A DISABLED VETERAN**, or as the **WIDOW OF A WAR OR CAMPAIGN VETERAN**, attach Veteran Preference Claim, CSC Form 14, together with proof specified therein.

B. If you are a **WAR-TIME VETERAN** not claiming disability preference, you should **NOT** submit your discharge with this application. Preference will be tentatively credited to you and if appointed, you will be required to submit to the appointing officer *prior* to entry on duty, official evidence of separation from active service in the armed forces of the United States in time of war.

Question	YES	NO
37 (A) WERE YOU EVER IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING TIME OF WAR?	X	
(B) IS THE WORD "HONORABLE" OR THE WORD "SATISFACTORY" USED IN YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION PAPERS TO SHOW THE TYPE OF YOUR DISCHARGE OR SEPARATION?	X	
(C) WAS SERVICE PERFORMED ON AN ACTIVE FULL-TIME BASIS, WITH FULL MILITARY PAY AND ALLOWANCES?	X	

(D) DATE OF ENTRY OR ENTRIES INTO SERVICE	DATE OF SEPARATION OR SEPARATIONS
Oct. 1946	April, 1948
Oct. 1950	August, 1951
BRANCH OF SERVICE (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, etc.): Army	SERIAL NO. (If none, give grade or rating at time of separation): ER 17 214 704

Question	YES	NO
38 (A) IF YOU SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES MILITARY OR NAVAL SERVICE DURING PEACETIME ONLY, DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN A CAMPAIGN OR EXPEDITION AND RECEIVE A CAMPAIGN BADGE OR SERVICE RIBBON?		X
(B) ARE YOU A DISABLED VETERAN? *If so, and you have not listed your disability in answer to Item 33, explain in Item 39 below*		X
(C) ARE YOU A VETERAN'S WIDOW WHO HAS NOT REMARRIED?		X
(D) ARE YOU THE WIFE OF A VETERAN WHO HAS A SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY WHICH DISQUALIFIES HIM FOR CIVIL SERVICE APPOINTMENT?		X

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER ONLY

The information contained in the answers to Question 37 above has been verified by comparison with the discharge certificate on .... 19.....

Agency: .... Title: ....

39 SPACE FOR DETAILED ANSWERS TO OTHER QUESTIONS (Indicate item numbers to which answers apply)

ITEM No.		ITEM No.	

If more space is required, use sheets of paper the same size as this page. Write on each sheet your name, address, date of birth, and examination title. Attach to inside of this application.

Before signing this application check back over it to make sure that you have answered ALL questions correctly.

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me in this application are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

False statement on this application is punishable by Law (U. S. Code, Title 18, Section 80)

SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT: James L. [signature]

(Sign your name in ink, using your first name, initial or initials, and surname. If female, give your given name, e.g., "Mrs. Mary L. ...")

14-00000

PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT 1008

Instructions: 1. Answer all questions completely. If question is not applicable write "NA." Write "unknown" only if you do not know the answer and cannot obtain the answer from personal records. Use the blank pages at the end of this form for extra details on any question or questions for which you do not have sufficient room.

2. Type, print, or write carefully; illegible or incomplete forms will not receive consideration.

HAVE YOU READ AND DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS? [illegible]

I. PERSONAL BACKGROUND

[illegible]

14-00000

14-00000

[illegible]

FATHER (Give [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

DATE OF BIRTH N/A PLACE OF BIRTH N/A

IF BORN OUTSIDE U.S. INDICATE DATE AND PLACE OF ENTRY

CITIZENSHIP N/A WHEN ACQUIRED

OCCUPATION N/A

SEC. 10. RELATIVES BY BLOOD, MARRIAGE OR ADOPTION, WHO EITHER LIVE ABROAD OR WHO ARE NOT CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES:

14-00000

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible] MILITARY SERVICE [illegible]

[illegible] Age [illegible]

[illegible]

SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARD NUMBER [illegible] ADDRESS [illegible]

IF DEFERRED GIVE REASON N.A.

INDICATE MEMBERSHIP IN MILITARY RESERVE ORGANIZATIONS [illegible] 1940 [illegible] August [illegible] 1941 [illegible] to Present [illegible]

CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT FOR PAST [illegible] YEARS. ACCOUNT FOR ALL PERIODS. INCLUDE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT. INCLUDE ALSO PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. GIVE ADDRESSES AND STATE WHAT YOU DID DURING PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT. [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

14-00000

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

14-00000

[illegible]

14-00000

14-00000

[illegible]

CLUBS, SOCIETIES AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL CLUBS, SOCIETIES, [illegible] OR OTHER GROUPS OR ORGANIZATIONS OF ANY KIND [illegible] OF ANY ORGANIZATION HAVING HEADQUARTERS [illegible] WHICH YOU BELONG OR HAVE BELONGED [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

DATE OF [illegible]

[illegible]

DATE OF [illegible]

SEC. [illegible] MISCELLANEOUS

DO YOU ADVOCATE OR HAVE YOU EVER ADVOCATED, OR ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF, OR HAVE YOU SUPPORTED ANY POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION WHICH ADVOCATES [illegible]

[illegible]

14-00000

[illegible]

[illegible] I attended [illegible] school [illegible] from the first grade to the [illegible] at which time I entered Forest River school. The address of [illegible] school is Inkster, N. Dak. As I've stated I entered Forest River school in 1936.

[illegible] From June 1948 to October 1948 I worked on [illegible] Thomas Farm located at Inkster, N. Dak.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Aaker's School of Business

Grand Forks, North Dakota

REPORT OF PROGRESS

NAME WOODS, James S. ADDRESS Forest River, N. Dak. COURSE OF STUDY Accountancy DATE December 14, 1951

SCHOLASTIC ACHIEVEMENT

SUBJECTS COMPLETED:

Subject	E	D	C	B	A
Elementary Accounting					X
Advanced Accounting					X
Income Tax					X
Cost Accounting (Elem.)				X	
Typewriting				X	
Spelling					X
Business Mathematics					X
Business Law					X
Penmanship			X		
Salesmanship				X	
Business English				X	
Office Machines					X

KEY
- A Superior
- B Above Average
- C Average
- D Fair
- E Slow

COMPLETED SUBJECTS

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

	E	D	C	B	A
INITIATIVE					X
QUALITY OF WORK				X	
QUANTITY OF WORK				X	
ENTHUSIASM					X
PUNCTUALITY					X
COOPERATION					X
ADAPTABILITY				X	

KEY

	E	D	C	B	A
INITIATIVE	Needs Supervision	Routine Worker	Fairly Progressive	Resourceful	Marked Ability
QUALITY OF WORK	Careless	Inaccurate	Passable	Good Quality	Highest Quality
QUANTITY OF WORK	Very Low Output	Low Output	Average Output	High Output	Very High Output
ENTHUSIASM	Indifferent	Occasionally Enthusiastic	Average	Determined	Confident
PUNCTUALITY	Undependable	Improvement Needed	Occasionally Absent or Late	Seldom Late	Always Punctual
COOPERATION	Reluctant	Passive	Usually Agreeable	Co-operative	Co-operative
ADAPTABILITY	Limited	Slow	Average	With Ease	Exceptional

Manager [signature]

Please keep this report for future comparison

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY APPROVAL

Date: 26 March 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

Your Reference: N-3007A

FROM: Chief, Security Division

Case Number: 61415

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sarvis

1. This is to advise you of security action in the subject case as indicated below:

[X] Security approval is granted the subject person for access to classified information.

[ ] Provisional clearance for full duty with CIA is granted under the provisions of Paragraph D of Regulation 10-9 which provides for a temporary appointment pending completion of full security investigation.

[ ] The Director of Central Intelligence has granted a provisional clearance for full duty with CIA under the provisions of Paragraph H of Regulation 10-9.

2. Unless the subject person enters on duty within 60 days from the above date, this approval becomes invalid.

3. Subject is to be polygraphed as part of the EOD procedures.

C. V. Bradley
C. V. BRADLEY

Mr. Clements
will call back
called
ok

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-151
JUL 1951

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 29 Feb. 1952

TO: Chief, Personnel Division

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sauvie 61415 Request No. N-3007-A

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position: File Clerk, GS-2, OSO, RI, Proc. & Rec., Washington, D. C.

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. [ ] Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity:

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. [x] Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. [ ] Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

C. V. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 25 January 1952

TO: Chief, PersonnelDivision

FROM: Chief, Security Division

SUBJECT: WOODS, James Sauvie #61415 Request No. N-3007

1. Reference is made to your request for security clearance of the subject person who is being considered for employment in the following position:

2. This is to advise you of the following security action:

a. [X] Provisional security clearance is granted to permit subject's employment on a temporary basis in the following area or in the following capacity: D Street Pool.

This clearance is granted upon the condition that subject: 1. not have access to classified material; 2. not have access to secure areas; 3. not be issued a badge or credential; 4. not represent himself as a CIA employee; and 5. not be assigned to any unclassified duties other than indicated above.

b. [ ] Name-checks have been completed on this person. Arrangements should now be made by your office for an interview in this Division. Upon completion of this interview further consideration will be given to the requested Limited clearance for access to information classified no higher than Secret. If subject has not entered on duty under a previously granted provisional clearance the interview should be arranged after entrance on duty.

c. [ ] Subject is security approved for temporary appointment to a position requiring access to information classified no higher than Secret.

Officials of the employing office should be advised of this security limitation and should be instructed to supply future supervisors with advice as to the limitation so as to insure continued compliance.

Security action to effect full approval is continuing and your office will receive advice of full clearance upon completion of this action. Upon receipt of full security clearance, the present limitation will be rescinded and supervisors should be advised accordingly.

3.

1952 FEB 13

C. V. Broadley
C. V. BROADLEY

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM NO. 38-106
JUL 1951

14-00000

OAF OF TERMINATED FILE BEING MICROFILMED

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS

FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: PERMINDEX CORP.
DCD DOCUMENTS

INCLUSIVE DATES:

CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: DCD

ROOM:

DELETIONS, IF ANY:

DATE RECEIVED	DATE RETURNED	REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME)	SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.

14-00000

Permindex Corporation

F 776.9

CONT 359

NYCR CITE VA 47261

SAME FROM SUPPORT (GRANT)

CASE 31735 RPT 31735, REOUR VA 46689 RPT 46689

577619

CAN YOU GIVE US ANY IDEA OF WHEN AND IF WE WILL GET A D RPT D AND D RPT D REPORT ON PERMINDEX AND WORLD TRADE CENTER?

A-59621

59621

F-79697

Chief, New York Office 30 November 1959

Chief, Contact Division (Support)

New Case 31785

CASE 82

B-79677

MCS-59621

1. Commercial Staff has requested a Dun & Bradstreet report on Permindex Ltd., a Swiss Corporation Registered in Bern, Jan 1956, and its affiliate formed in Rome, Centro Mondiale Commerciale (World Trade Center). We are advised that Dr. Ferenc Nagy, former Prime Minister of Hungary, is president of Permindex. A-79697

2. Attached is outline of information desired on the two organizations. If the D & B report does not contain the financial information desired, would you please try to obtain this information through your bank sources.

E. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment
LJGrant:ge
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

14-00000

P-1:011

SEC

JA CITE NYOR 9195

SUPPORT (GRANT) FROM DASE

CASE 31785 (31785 - PERMINDEX

CASE 59

1. SEE THESE TWO PAPERS FOR BACKGROUND

A) N.Y. TIMES, 31 AUGUST 1959 (31 AUGUST 1959

B) DAILY AMERICAN, ROME (ROME, 9-15 NOV 1958 (9-15 NOV 1958

use S-79699

2. ONE OF DIRECTORS ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO (ENRICO MANDEL-MANTELLO WAS RECENTLY IN US (US, EXPECTS TO BE BACK TO N.Y.C. ABOUT 17 JAN 1962 (17 JAN 1962. HE IS ONE OF DIRECTORS AND ALSO DESCRIBED AS IN CHARGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS.

3. ADDRESS: DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL (DUFOURSTR 11, BASEL

CAPITAL - (APPT 1 MILLION FRENCH FRANCS

S-79699

OFFICERS - DR. FERENC NAGY (DR. FERENC NAGY, PRESIDENT

use S-79699

FRITZ SCHURCH (FRITZ SCHURCH, V.P.

use S-79699

DR. ERNST W. INFELD (DR. ERNST W. INFELD, DELEGATE

use S-79699

DR. ERNST FEISST (DR. ERNST FEISST

14-00000

DR. ERNST FOLLENDORF. DR. ERNST FOLLENDORF

(HEAD OFFICE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM ... BERN TO BASEL IN 1956 X 1956.

4. THEY PLAN TO OPEN A NEW OFFICE IN JAN 1960 / JAN 1960.

5. WILL TRY TO OBTAIN MORE DETAIL LATER.
LITTLE ELSE AVAILABLE NOW.

6. SHALL WE SEND ANY REPORT NOW FOR ... CREDIT.

SOURCE: ALFRED BARTH A-116
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

14-00000

F-79677

SECRET

Chief, DD/S-CM
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

23 December 1959

CASE 87

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79699 A-59621

Ferrindex, Ltd and World Trade Center

REF : Your memorandum dated 23 Nov 1959 - CD/OO Case 31785

1. As you were previously advised, Dun & Bradstreet had no available information on either of the subject concerned. However, a bank source of this office has provided the following preliminary information.

2. For background our source suggested that we refer to the New York Times, 31 August 1959 and the Daily American, Rome, 9-10 November 1958. One of the directors, also described as being in charge of administrative affairs, Enrico Mandel-Mantello, was recently in the US and expects to return to New York City about 17 Jan 1960. S-79699

A-79699

3. The address of Permindex is Dufourster 11, Basel (office transferred from Bern to Basel in 1956). They plan to open a New York City office in January 1960. Capital: One million French Francs. Officers: Dr. Ferenc Nagy, President; Fritz Schurch, Vice President; Dr. Ernst W. Infeld, Delegate; Dr. Ernst Feisst; Dr. Ernst Fellender. S-79699 S-79699 S-79699

4. We will forward additional information as it becomes available. We are also trying to obtain information from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers. A-5199 A-2442

5. If you have any questions please contact Lillian I. Grant, extension 2268.

K. M. ASHCRAFT

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Copy filed 59621

SECRET

14-00000

F-79699

Chief, DD/S - CM
ATTN: Mr. Charles P. White

22 January 1960

Chief, Contact Division, OO

S-79679 A-59612

PERMINDEX, Ltd. and World Trade Center

REF : Your memorandum dated 23 November 1959, CD/OO Case 31785

1. Attached for your retention is a brochure on subject organizations which was received by National Association of Manufacturers about early November 1959. A-2442

2. NAM also suggested that additional information might be obtained from Lloyd McMahon, now Federal Judge of Southern District Court, New York City, who was formerly General Counsel for PERMINDEX, Ltd. If you wish our New York Office to pursue this lead, please let us know. S-67972

3. As we believe Mr. Crowley advised you, the Foreign Department of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce does not maintain records of individual foreign companies. C of C suggested that the World Trade Division, Dept. of Commerce might have some information which we presume you have already checked out.

4. Please advise Lillian I. Grant, CD/OO, Support Branch, extension 2268, of further wishes concerning this subject.

Z. M. ASHCRAFT

Attachment

LIGrant/fet
cc: Index

Not orig

Copies filed in above jackets

29 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of S/W Training and Issuance of Materials.

AGENT : AMLASH/1

PLACE : Paris, France

DATE : 17-22 August 1962

TRAINER: Richard M. Fallucci, TFW C/O.

1. AMLASH/1 was instructed in S/W techniques by the undersigned in a Paris Station safehouse on 17 and 18 August, and was given an S/W review in the final briefing session held in the hotel room of Wallace A. Growery (Madrid Station C/O) on 22 August. Instruction was given in the use of carbon writing system No. 15136 and in the use of liquid developer system No. 56638 . The "scorch" method of development was also demonstrated to A/1 as an alternate system. A total of five hours was devoted to this instruction.

2. A/1, who was recruited a short time prior to coming to Paris, was introduced to the idea of using S/W by the undersigned during discussions held in Copenhagen. Although for security considerations, he was skeptical at first about using such a means of communication, he was without undue effort convinced that any productive relationship depended upon his being able to communicate with his C/O on a regular basis through the medium of S/W letters sent through normal mail channels. It was apparent from his early questions that he was unfamiliar with the principles of S/W and clandestine communications in general. After further talks in Paris with Growery on 16 August, A/1 was fully prepared to accept the concept of S/W communications, and arrangements were made for this instruction to begin the following day.

3. The first training session on 17 August lasted a little more than two hours, and was devoted to an explanation of the S/W system of communication, including careful instruction in the preparation of a letter containing S/W. A/1 also prepared an S/W letter of his own under the supervision of the undersigned. He seemed to grasp readily the principles of the preparation of an S/W

message and experienced only a little difficulty at first in remembering all the steps in sequence necessary for the preparation of an S/W message. He was generally attentive to the instruction given. However, in keeping with his temperment, he was a little impatient during the preparation of the S/W message itself upon the cover letter. At the end of this session, he demonstrated that he remembered the basic steps in a satisfactory manner, particularly considering that it was his first day in S/W instruction.

4. The second period of instruction took place in the same safehouse, lasting about two hours. This session was devoted to a review of the S/W procedures and the preparation by A/1 of another practice S/W letter. Following this, A/1 was instructed in the development of S/W messages, using the liquid developer No. 56638 The scorch system of development was also demonstrated. A/1 was impressed by the simplicity of the liquid developer and the immediate reaction which it produced. The undersigned developed one message; then A/1 was allowed to prepare the developer from its dry pill form and to develop a second practice S/W message for himself. Following the period devoted to S/W development, a general review of S/W communications was held, the basic points apparently being well-fixed in A/1's mind.

5. During the final formal meeting with A/1 on 22 August with Growery and the undersigned participating, the latter gave A/1 a general review of all the S/W procedures which were to be used in his contact with KUBARK. He also was provided with the following items:

- A. Two sheets of S/W carbon paper (No. 15136)
- B. Forty-seven pills of developer (No. 56638)
- C. One tablet of writing paper provided by TSD and known to be compatible with the carbon sheets.
- D. 3 No. 2 pencils of French manufacture.
- E. One ball-point pen with water-resistant ink.
- F. Two accomodation addresses: one in Madrid for regular contact; one in New York City for rapid emergency contact (see attached S/W data sheet).
- G. Appropriate indicators (see S/W data sheet)

It is noted that A/1 did not have a secure accomodation address in PBRUMEN to give us at this time. He was told, however, that it was imperative that he provide one for us by S/W letter within two weeks of his return to PBRUMEN. This he stated he would do.

6. During the last S/W review, A/1 was shown a photograph of one of his practice messages which he had prepared. He was quite interested in seeing this, which served to illustrate a number of the training points which had been covered during previous instruction.

SECRET

Generally, A/1 was an interested pupil and it is believed that he will be able to carry out the instructions in a proper manner. He is quite security conscious, a factor which it is believed, will add to his attempts to seek perfection in his S/W correspondence and in the secure storage of his S/W materials when not in use. It is also known that A/1 practiced his S/W techniques in his hotel room after leaving the 22 August meeting. This is known because he had an additional question to ask us at a brief meeting on 23 August.

7. It should also be noted that the TSD technician who developed A/1's practice letters recommends that for best results, all letters from A/1 be subjected to ammonia fuming before immersion in the developer.

Richard M. Fallucci

Richard M. Fallucci

Attachments:
Agent S/W Record
Form #H-55900

14-00000

29 Aug 62

REPORT OF S/W TRAINING, PARIS.

14-00000

AGENT S/W RECORD Date 29 August 1962

1. Agent Cryptonym: AMLASH/1

2. SW supplies issued to the Agent (date and quantity):
 2 sheets of carbon S/W paper #15136 and 48 pills of developer #56638 both issued on 22 August 1962.

3. Cover correspondence to the agent will be in Spanish and handwritten or typed; from the agent will be printed or typewritten (in Spanish).

4. Location assigned for placement of S/W text: S/W text will be placed on the face of the cover letter; agent has, however, been instructed to check both sides of letters received for S/W. Letters from the agent on face of cover text.

5. Accommodation addresses:
 To be supplied by agent in first S/W letter he sends (this to be by 15 September 1962 at the latest.)

Accommodation addresses for letters from the agent:

Regular accommodation address:	Senorita Maria Dolores Gomez Apartado 1231⁵ Madrid, Spain
Rapid/Emergency accommodation address:	Mr. Humphrey R. Roncavil P. O. Box 892 General Post Office NYC 1, N. Y.

Agents letters to be signed "Ramon".

6. Re-suppl arrangements:
 If carbons lost: Agent writes cover letter to Madrid address in normal manner. Absence of S/W message indicates loss of carbons and Agent is to expect next letter he receives to be a re-supply of carbons (in the form of the letter itself).

 If developer lost: Agent so indicates in letter to Madrid (in S/W): re-supply will take place through one of the three Dead Drops which Agent has been told to locate and report soonest by S/W. Identity of Drop utilized and date loaded to be conveyed to Agent through S/W message developed by "scorch" method... see below.

7. Required indicators:
   A. For presence of S/W on letters to the agent: All letters to agent will contain S/W.

   B. To indicate loss of writing materials: Carbon sheets: Agent writes to Madrid, letter with no S/W. Developer: Agent writes in S/W and so indicates.

   C. Indicate carbon re-supply by mail: Upon indication of loss of carbon sheets (see above), preferably the next letter sent to Agent will be a carbon sheet. In any case agent understands that any cover letter containing the word "finca" (Spanish for farm) has been written on a carbon sheet, which he is then to use for S/W correspondence as needed.

8. Optional indicators: Any letter received by Agent containing the word "hacienda" in the cover letter is understood to indicate that the S/W message contained therein is to be developed by the "scorch" system.

Danger or control indicators:

Letters from Agent: Any word, mark, phrase, etc., after the Spanish word "FIN" at the end of the S/W message indicates agent is under control.

Letters to the Agent: Acknowledgement of Agent's control indicator is to be made by duplicating his "control indicator" in the next S/W message to him.

14-00000

AMLASH-Staty

AGENT S/W RECORD

Date 29 August 1962

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   Madrid, Spain

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   General Post Office
   NYC 1, N. Y.

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VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH NO. HKH-A-3418

201-32723

TO : Chief, WHD

FROM : Chief of Station, Habana

DATE: 21 February 1957

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Administrative

SPECIFIC— Arthur G. VAIVADA

Ref: HKH-W-2092, 8 February 1957

1. With regard to the contents of reference dispatch, which were communicated to the Subject, VAIVADA has no objections and is agreeable to conversion to the career agent category as described therein.

2. VAIVADA requests, however, that the plans already proposed for acquisition of U.S. citizenship by his wife be carried through. He, and the Station, believe that this step will provide him with greater security in non-official cover assignments. In addition, such action will minimize the red tape he must cut each time he has to obtain new visas for himself and family.

3. The Station will submit a new request for VAIVADA's training several months prior to the desired new training dates.

James R. Palinger

Distribution:
3-Washington
2-Files

20 February 1957

JRP/mfm

CS COPY

FORM NO. 51-28A

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

201-168881

19-1-1-7856

RI COPY

DBA 3/1/3

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Miami, Florida
April 16, 1963

RE: CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

The April 9, 1963, issue of the "Miami News" carried an article entitled, "Exiles Say Miro To Quit". This article stated that informed exile sources claim that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA would resign his post as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The article said exile sources gave two possibilities for his resignation. One faction believed that MIRO's recent trip to Washington from which he returned Sunday (April 7) was to pin down the United States Government to a statement of positive policy regarding Cuba. Another school of thought was that the Council head was retiring from his post in protest of Government curbing of hit-and-run raids on the Communist island of Cuba.

The article went on to state that Dr. MIRO's leadership in the Council, aimed at uniting all Cuban exiles, has been burdened by problems since his appointment in March 1961.

On April 10, 1963, MM T-1, a former Cuban business executive, who is employed by the Cuban Revolutionary Council and who is a close personal friend of Dr. MIRO CARDONA, who has furnished some reliable information in the past, advised that an all-night session of the Council was held beginning April 9, and ending at about 6:00 A.M., on April 10, during which time MIRO CARDONA presented his resignation but the Council refused to accept his resignation and MIRO CARDONA was persuaded to remain as President of the Council.

MM T-1 said that MIRO's resignation consisted of a 25-page statement which was in effect an indictment against the administration of President JOHN F. KENNEDY of the United States. In rejecting his resignation, the Council backed up

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MIRO but in the interest of both the United States and the Cuban exiles, decided upon a public statement which reads as follows:

"CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

"The Cuban Revolutionary Council, having studied the report of its President, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, concerning present relations with the United States Government, agrees:

"1. Not to accept the resignation of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, and declare its full support for the basic plans contained in his resignation.

"2. To affirm that there is a serious crisis, brought about by the present policy of the government of this country.

"3. To express the Council's hope of overcoming the present crisis and calling upon all of America, including the United States, for moral and material support in their fight to regain their sovereignty and independence, and the strict fulfilment of American treaties and agreements, as well as the joint resolution of the U. S. Congress, calling for effective action against Soviet intervention in America.

"4. To affirm that the Council has always insisted, and still insists, upon the necessity of Cuban participation in the process of liberating Cuba. The only procedure which the Council would accept would be coordination of forces, on a plane of complete respect for national dignity. Cuba will never renounce her legitimate right to be in the first line of combat.

"5. To reaffirm their unshakeable decision to continue the fight against the Soviet-Castro regime, under any circumstances whatsoever.

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"6. In these difficult times, the Cuban Revolutionary Council urges all Cubans to close ranks to achieve the national unity needed to hasten our march towards Freedom.

"Miami, April 10, 1963.

"Movimiento Democrata Cristiano
(Christian Democratic Movement)
JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE

"Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria
(Movement for Revolutionary Recovery)
CESAR BARO

"Agrupacion Montecristi
(Montecristi Group)
FRANCISCO CARRILLO

"Unidad Revolucionaria
(Revolutionary Union)
FERNANDO FERNANDEZ CABADA

"Rescate Democratico Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Democratic Recovery)
RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ

"Movimiento Revolucionary 30 de Noviembre
(30th of November Revolutionary Movement)
ORLANDO RODRIGUEZ

"Accion Revolucionaria Democratica
(Democratic Revolutionary Action)
GERARDO QUESADA

"Frente Obrero Revolucionario de Cuba (FORDC)
(Revolutionary Labor Front of Cuba

"Military Section
JOSE E. MONTEAGUDO

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CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

"Sector Profesional
(Professional Section)
ENRIQUE HUERTAS

"Corporaciones Economicas
(Economic Branch)
Dr. TULIO DIAZ RIVERA
MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA
SERGIO CARBO
RICARDO LORIE
ANTONIO MACEO
ANTONIO SILIO, Secretary "

MM T-1 explained that when Dr, MIRO CARDONA returned to Miami from a trip to Washington, D. C., on Sunday, where he contacted high government officials, he came away with the feeling that:

1) The United States has no plan to free Cuba of Communism.

2) If the United States ever does formulate any plans, it will do so without consideration for the Cuban exiles in the United States.

3) The United States policy is now one of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

MM T-1 said that in his opinion, the Cuban exiles are frustrated, confused, losing faith in the United States and there is a growing feeling of abandonment of them by the United States.

The April 10, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried a headline article entitled, "Miro Resigns as Exile Chief; Raps U. S. Policy". This article stated that MIRO CARDONA resigned because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force, according

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to government sources. The article said that exile leaders close to MIRO said he resigned not only because of disagreement with United States policy, "but because he feels Washington does not have any concrete plans to deal with the dictator".

The April 11, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled, "Cuban Exile Council Vows to Continue the Freedom Fight". In this article it was stated that the Cuban Revolutionary Council had vowed to continue its fight against Castro-Communism whether the United States likes it or not. The article said that Dr. MIRO CARDONA denied reports from U. S. Government sources that he offered his resignation to the Council because the United States refused to allocate fifty million dollars to train a Cuban invasion force. The article stated that an informed source said that MIRO decided to quit "because of the change in the U. S. - Cuban policy".

The April 16, 1963, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "JFK Accepts Demand, Fidel Says". This article by the UPI bearing a Havana dateline reported that FIDEL CASTRO told Cubans on Thursday (April 11) that the KENNEDY Administration has accepted one of his five demands for an end to tension in the Caribbean. This article stated that in a one hour and forty minute speech, CASTRO said that Washington in forbidding exiles to carry on further armed attacks on Cuba, has fulfilled one of "five points for peace" advanced by him and endorsed by the Soviet Union. The article then went on to state that FIDEL announced that there are still four conditions to be fulfilled and that acceptance of them is the only sensible thing the KENNEDY Administration can do. One of the five conditions, according to the article, is U. S. evacuation of the big Naval base at Guantanamo.

On the morning of April 15, 1963, Miami radio news broadcasts announced MIRO CARDONA would again offer his resignation to the Council on that same day.

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CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

On April 15, 1963, MM T-1 advised that he was positive that MIRO CARDONA did not intend to again tender his resignation on Monday, April 15, 1963, but was contemplating taking that action on the following Thursday, April 18, 1963. MM T-1 said that the Council was meeting on Thursday to take a definite attitude or tough line of action and that it was entirely probable that all of the members of the Council might resign in protest to the present policy of the United States with regard to the Cuban situation. He said that the present feeling of the Council towards the United States is basically "to hell with it".

MM T-1 expressed the personal feeling that U. S. policy towards Cuba is presently in a vacuum and consequently everything is at a standstill. The Cuban exiles in the Miami area feel that the U. S. is abandoning their cause and has now adopted a course of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba.

On April 16, 1963, MM T-2, a Cuban exile who has furnished some reliable information in the past and who is associated with fellow Cubans who belong to several different organizations, advised that reaction among the Cuban exiles is "very bad against the United States". He explained that the Cuban exiles allege that President KENNEDY has made promises to help them in their fight against CASTRO but is now opposing them and consequently they feel that the U. S. is now committed to a policy of peaceful co-existence with Communist Cuba. The Cuban exiles are fearful as to the future, confused as to why the U. S. has changed its policy and the exiles feel that they have been abandoned in their fight.

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19-124-25/2

PA

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE : 27 MAY 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : JMWAVE

ACTION: TFW 10(MR CHARLES KATT, TFW, NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1630 27 MAY)

INFO : DCI, DDP, ADDP, CA 2, CA/PRG, CA/PROP, S/C 2

ROUTING

MAY 27 22162 62

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 41885

OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 4277

GYROSE

1. MIAMI HERALD 27 MAY CARRIES FRONT PAGE ITEM BY JAMES BUCHANAN ENTITLED "MIRO FADES AS EXILE CHIEF: THREE LATIN LEADERS BEHIND RAY". ARTICLE FLATLY STATES MIRO AND COUNCIL HAVE BEEN REPLACED BY MANUEL RAY WITH BACKING GOV MUNOZ MARIN, PRES ROMULO BETANCOURT AND FORMER PRES JOSE FIGUERAS, THAT RAY HAS TAKEN OVER POST "WITH THE BLESSING OF THE UNITED STATES". FURTHER, ARTICLES STATES "FROM VARIETY SOURCES HERALD LEARNED THAT MIRO WAS NOTIFIED OF CHANGE ONLY THIS WEEK" AND THAT RAYS REAPPOINTMENT AS "CHIEF IN EXILE" CAME FROM "UNDER-GROUND IN CUBA" ACCORDING TO JOAQUIN GODOY, PROVISIONAL MRP HEAD IN MIAMI. AFTER FURNISHING RESUME CUBAN ACTIVITIES SINCE ORIGIN OF AMBUD, ARTICLE CREDITS CUBANS IN MIAMI WITH SAYING "NEW MAN IN FIELD" IS ADOLF A. BERLE JR. WHO HAS BEEN SPECIAL ASST TO STATE DEPT AND IS ALSO "MEMBER OF PRES KENNEDY'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON LATIN AMERICA". IMPLICATION BEING THAT BERLE IS RUNNING NEW UNITED STATES SPONSORED CUBAN EFFORT.

2. THIS RELEASE CAUSING SOME FUROR IN LOCAL CUBAN COLONY TO EXTENT AT LEAST ONE CPS AGENT DESTINED FOR ISOLATION TRAINING HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED IF THERE ANY TRUTH THIS STORY. MEANWHILE WAVE

SECRET

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FORM 1389

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Copy No.

14-00000

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

DATE :

TO :

FROM :

ACTION:

INFO :

RS Filing (check one):
No CS Report Value. Destroy.
RI file this copy as indicated
Detach copy filed as indicated

RS Indexing (check one):
Marked ____ None required____
Signature: ____

ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

PAGE 2

WAVE 4077 IN 41885

CHECKS WITH KNOWLEDGEABLE CONTACTS HAS PRODUCED LITTLE OTHER THAN WILLIAM S. WIBALDA'S STATEMENT THAT BUCHANAN JOURNALISTIC REPUTATION INDICATES HE INACCURATE AND SENSATIONALIST. AMCLATTER-1 AND PASSOVOY ATTEMPTING DISCREETLY TRACE BUCHANAN SOURCE FOR "U.S. BLESSING."

3. BUCHANAN HAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED MIRO IE DURING RETURN PLAYA GIRON PRISONERS MIAMI. HAVE NO REAL INSIGHT INFO SIGNIFICANCE THESE ATTACKS BUT BELIEVE THEY COULD REFLECT BUCHANAN OR MIAMI HERALD ATTEMPTS FORCE CHANGES IN UNITES STATES POSTURE RE CUBA.

4. EXPECT ARTICLE WILL HAVE FURTHER REPROCUSSIONS AS IT SPREADS. WISH ALERT HQS THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY INITIATE ACTION DISCREDIT BUCHANAN STORY AS WELL AS REASSURE MIRO. WILL FORWARD SUGGESTIONS THIS REGARD AFTER WE HAVE OPPORTUNITY FURTHER ASSESS STORY'S IMPACT.

5. POUCHING CLIPPING 28 MAY

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

GROUP 1
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1009

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

104-10300-10124 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM :

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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Document Number 1271-1029
for FOIA Review on FEB 1977

13-00000

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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on [illegible] /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on [illegible] in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project [illegible] with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

[illegible signature]
M. D. Stevens

SECRET

GROUP 1
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Description of JMWAVE Components

Support Branch

The Support Branch provided routine administrative services to JMWAVE. These included finance, logistics and records management and clerical support. The Branch had 19% of JMWAVE's staffing.

Operations Branch

The Operations Branch was divided into two sections, the FI Section and the Special Operations Section. Staffing, consisting of operations officers and clerical support, was 17% of JMWAVE's total.

The FI Section (Foreign Intelligence) was responsible for the collection of intelligence from the target country through covert HUMINT means.

The Special Operations Section was responsible for paramilitary operations.

Covert Action Branch

The Covert Action Branch was responsible for covert propaganda operations. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

External Operations Branch

The External Operations Branch was responsible for collecting HUMINT on the target country through assets in areas other than the target country. Staffing was 13% of JMWAVE's total and consisted of operations officers and clerical support.

Reports Section

The Reports Section prepared intelligence reports for Headquarters and intelligence community consumers. Staffing was 10% of JMWAVE's total.

Technical Services Section

The Technical Services Section provided photographic support to JMWAVE. Staffing was 6% of JMWAVE's total.

Communicators

The communicators were responsible for secure communications between JMWAVE and Hqs. Staffing was 8% of JMWAVE's total.


JMWAVE
ORGANIZATION
SECRETARY
CHIEF OF STATION
SECRETARY
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION
COMMUNICATORS
SUPPORT BRANCH
OPERATIONS BRANCH
FI SECTION
SPECIAL OPS SECTION
CA BRANCH
EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
REPORTS SECTION
TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION

4/10/98 - OKd
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1963

- Deputy Director for Plans
  - Western Hemisphere Division
  - Western Europe Division
  - Soviet Russian Division
  - Eastern Europe Division
  - Africa Division
  - Far East Division
  - Near East Division
  - Special Operations Division
  - Technical Services Division
  - Domestic Operations Division
  - Counter-Intelligence Staff
  - Foreign Intelligence Staff
  - Covert Action Staff
  - Operational Services Staff
  - Special Activities Staff

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DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS - 1961



JMWAVE ORGANIZATION

- CHIEF OF STATION — SECRETARY
- DEPUTY CHIEF OF STATION — SECRETARY
- SIGNAL CENTER — 4 COMMUNICATORS

SUPPORT BRANCH
- 1-Chief, Support
- 1-Secretary
- 1-Finance Officer
- 1-Finance Asst
- 1-Logistics Officer
- 1-Logistics Asst
- 1-Records Officer
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Clerk

OPERATIONS BRANCH

FI SECTION
- 1-Officer (Refugee Debriefings)
- 1-Officer (On Island Assets
- 1-Officer (Liaison with Local Services
- 1-Officer (FI Third Country)
- 1-External Ops Rep (AMOT)
- 2-Intel Assts (Management of On-Island Ops
- 1-Secretary Steno

SPECIAL OPS SECTION
- 2-Operations Officers
- 1-Training Officer
- 1-Property and Supply Assistant

CA BRANCH
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer (Radio)
- 1-Ops Officer (Pol Action Press and Publication)
- 1-Admin Asst
- 1-Secretary

EXTERNAL OPS BRANCH
- 1-Chief
- 1-Ops Officer
- 1-Ops Officer (JMCHALK)
- 1-Ops Officer (Referent with Station FI Branch)
- 1-Intel Asst
- 1-Secretary Steno

REPORTS SECTION
- 3-Reports Officers (One of these AMOT officer to handle AMOT reporting)
- 1-Secretary Steno
- 1-Clerk Typist

TECHNICAL SERVICES SECTION
- 1-Photo General
- 1-IO Tech Aide
- 1-Clerk Typist

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with a limited number of people. We believe the direction of the station is of high caliber, but not all the station effort is carefully directed at priority targets. Under current personnel ceilings, there is little hope of increasing the manpower available for this critical effort. Thus, both Headquarters and the station must carefully place emphasis on assignment of priorities and upon selective execution of the activities to meet those priorities.

Organization for Operations

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5. The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations. It has high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, joint operations with the host government, and Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. It has local collaborative liaison with other U.S. agencies: the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the military. To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station is organized into the Soviet Branch, Cuban Branch, Satellite Branch, Covert Action Branch, Communist Party Branch, and an operational catch-all which is called the "Operational Support Branch." This latter branch is headed by a senior operations officer who has two assistants, but the branch in reality is an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, giving force and effect to that facet of the chief of station's personality as an operator. The deputy chief of station, in addition to his administrative duties, also personally handles the operations of three projects.

Cuban Operations

6. Mexico City is the only direct air link which Cuba has with the Western Hemisphere. It is the major transit point for all air travel to and from Cuba. Approximately 150 persons per week travel each way to and from Havana via Mexico City. This fact plays a prime role in shaping the station's operational activities. For example, over 70 per cent of the station's FI reporting on Cuban activities in the past year dealt with travel, both Cuban and non-Cuban, between Mexico City and Havana.

[Significant]

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7. The station has no agents reporting from in place in Cuba. Two operations have had problems in loss of communications, but have some promise of future success. One agent, a Cuban refugee

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now working in Mexico City, had recruited three sub-agents before leaving Cuba but his channel of communications with them has been severed. Another station agent is in a good position in Cuba to obtain intelligence from foreign telephone communications. The station will attempt to re-establish contact with him through a legal traveler to Cuba. The station has a number of sources with access to Cuba in third country nationals who are debriefed each time they return to Mexico City from Cuba. Best of these is a Western European who was the source of some 15 disseminated intelligence reports last year. He travels to Cuba four or five times a year and is contacted by a station case officer after each visit. An operation, presently under development, is aimed at exploiting the presence of a religious order. A recruited agent will be in the high levels of the Mission. It is expected that the Mission will have secure communications facilities as is the case in other countries. Primary control, however, will be maintained by Mexico City Station through contact with the agent each time he travels to Mexico City from Havana.

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9. A major objective of station operations is the recruitment of personnel in the Cuban Embassy. There are about 20 Cubans on the embassy staff of whom [six] are believed to be members of the Cuban Intelligence Service. As with operations directed against the Soviet Embassy, [heavy reliance] is placed upon surveillance through telephone, photo, physical, and audio operations as well as on access agents. The effort has been rewarded [with some success albeit limited. One official has been recruited, but his value is generally low due to lack of access to information of prime importance and to a reluctance to accept operational assignments. A Mexican woman employee in the embassy is also a station agent, but she has no access to classified documents and provides only meager information.] A recruitment pitch to another officer [was unsuccessful and he was subsequently recalled to Cuba.] Through station efforts a "hot mike" was successfully placed in a key office. Unfortunately, the target officer moved, and his old office is now being occupied by an officer of lesser potential, [who is the supervisor of the recruited officer.] This audio device is at the moment of little value except to provide an excellent check of the [agent's] activities.

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10. As might be expected, Mexico City has a constant stream of refugees from Cuba, estimated at about 350 per month. Through an American contract agent the station runs the Cuban Refugee Reception and Orientation Center which screens refugees for possible

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operational leads and debriefs those with information of intelligence value. Heretofore this project has suffered from lack of adequate facilities and trained personnel. Only 29 positive intelligence reports were disseminated by Headquarters during the past year. It is planned to correct these deficiencies and expand capabilities to the end that the intelligence product will be improved and the operational leads increased. An experienced officer from the JMWAVE refugee center has been detailed to the station to assist in training the personnel there.

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11. The station's Cuban case officers must devote a substantial effort to responding to requests for support from other stations, chiefly JMWAVE, with involvement in Cuban operations. Approximately 47 per cent of the station's cable traffic is concerned with Cuban operations. This volume alone is testimony to the relative effort which must be devoted to the support of Cuban operations originating in other CIA stations. The Cuban case officers in Mexico City feel that the requirements to keep abreast of day to day activities and to handle the volume of paper left insufficient time for planning and development of an effective station operational program.

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12. Operations are being conducted against the Cuban Embassy, and the results, while limited, are as satisfactory as may be expected in view of the target. Given Mexico City's strategic location astride the only direct air link to Cuba, more success should be achieved in recruiting agents in place in Cuba. This target has been assigned as Priority 1 to many Latin American countries and, if it is to be achieved at all, it is logical to expect that it will be done in Mexico City. To the extent possible, the Cuban case officers should be freed from the excessive support to other stations so they can concentrate on this target. The Chief, WH Division, should direct other stations to carefully screen Cuban requirements on Mexico City, with a view toward reduction of such requirements.

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It is recommended that: No. 67

The Chief, WH Division:

a. Instruct the Chief of Station, Mexico City, to concentrate Cuban case officer efforts on developing agent assets resident in Cuba; and,

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evidence that the ambassador would strongly object to Agency support for IISE propaganda activities. In addition, of a total annual budget of $16,000, $6,000 goes for the salary of a U.S. businessman cutout (LIHUFF-1) while $6,000 goes to the support of MURO and $4,000 to support other activities of the IISE. This is an inordinately high sum for the services of a cutout in proportion to the total cost of the proposed project. These points, taken together, constitute a valid basis for terminating operations in connection with LIHUFF.

<u>It is recommended that:</u> No. 70

The Chief, WH Division, disapprove the proposal of Chief of Station, Mexico, for Project LIHUFF and direct him to terminate operations in connection therewith.

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18. The station has a highly successful project directed at the rural and peasant targets. The principal agent is a Catholic priest through whose efforts an extensive network of regional organizations have been established including youth groups, credit unions, agricultural co-ops and peasant unions. Some 26 regional centers of the Mexican Institute for Social Studies, a project mechanism, have been set up and 12,000 people were enrolled in special training courses during the year. This operation is now largely self-sufficient but the station should continue to give it support and direction. The project shows promise of expanding into Guatemala where the Archbishop of Guatemala has asked for assistance and training to set up a similar organization. In view of the present lack of Agency-sponsored peasant projects in Guatemala, every effort should be made to exploit this possibility.

<u>It is recommended that:</u> No. 71

The Chief, WH Division, expand Project LINOODLE to include assistance in establishing a similar covert action project targeted on peasant groups in Guatemala.

<u>Soviet Operations</u>

19. Mexico is one of the four Latin American countries which maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union thereby permitting the establishment of diplomatic installations in these

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countries. Because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Mexican police and security services, Soviet activities in Mexico are not subjected to the same scrutiny as they are in the U.S. by the FBI and in Canada by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Soviet personnel in Mexico thus have a freedom of movement which facilitates the conduct of clandestine operations targeted not only against the U.S. but also against other Latin American countries where there is no Soviet official presence. In addition, Mexico's long border with the U.S. has only minimum guards. Travel between the U.S. and Mexico is heavy and clandestine border crossing can be relatively simple. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, therefore, assumes more than the usual interest normally attached to similar Soviet installations as targets for U.S. intelligence.

20. Soviet operations conducted by the station are directed primarily at the personnel of the embassy. At the present time, there are fifty-one officers attached to the embassy of whom thirty-three have been identified as members of either the KGB or the GRU. It may be assumed that dependents and nonintelligence personnel, by performing various support functions, swell the total of those engaged in intelligence assignments. In its operations against the Soviets, the station is heavily dependent upon technical collection through telephone taps, photographic coverage of the embassy, physical surveillance, and hidden microphones. These operations produce masses of information daily on the activities of the Soviet personnel, such as telephone conversations with persons outside the embassy, complete photographic records of the coming and going of all persons--Soviet and non-Soviet--at the embassy, contacts of embassy personnel outside the embassy, etc. Because of the strict security indoctrination of Soviet overseas personnel, the bulk of this information is low-level and not disseminable as positive intelligence. Its chief value, aside from occasional items of intelligence interest or operational import, derives from its compilation in depth to reveal patterns of activities and contacts, indicative of intelligence missions or associations, and to disclose behaviorial characteristics of individual Soviets which might be symptomatic of a vulnerability to recruitment. By analyzing this material over a period of time, the station has identified Soviet officers in the KGB and GRU, and gained an insight into their modus operandi in executing intelligence assignments. This in itself is of value from a counterintelligence point of view even though exploitation against Soviets has been limited. Also, by collating the mass of collected data into personality reports on persons attached to the Embassy, the station hopes to be able to detect, foster, and eventually exploit any vulnerability to recruitment or detection--the

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number one priority of Soviet operations here as elsewhere in the world.

21. The station is seeking to supplement its collection through technical means with a program to acquire at least one access agent for each member of the Soviet Embassy staff. These access agents serve two purposes: first, they provide additional information on the activities and personalities of those with whom they are in contact; and second, they afford a channel for "getting at" a Soviet individual should it be found advantageous to bring some sort of recruitment pressure to bear on him. Consideration is now being given by the station to expanding the effort to recruit Mexican nationals who are known, through technical collection sources, to have been in touch with the Soviets on intelligence missions and to work through them to develop information on Soviet clandestine activities. Additional case officer strength will be needed if this approach is to be effective.

22. The station currently has six double-agent operations. Like most such cases they move slowly. The chief purpose in running these operations is to direct the agents into the U.S. where, in cooperation with the FBI, they might be used to identify Soviet illegals. Three of these double agents have all received intelligence assignments from the Soviets of an as yet undefined nature in the U.S. Another appears destined for some Soviet assignment in the Philippines. Since the Soviets have no official representation in the Philippines, it is hoped that this agent may be put in touch with illegals. Still another is considered a poor double agent operation by the station, but shows some promise of developing into a penetration of the Mexican Foreign Ministry. The sixth is rated very low as a station operation, and is being continued only at the specific request of the U.S. Army. The station's technical collection assets provide a useful means for checking these double agents in their contacts with the Soviets.

23. To evaluate properly the Soviet operations at Mexico City, which rely heavily on expensive technical collection devices would involve a basic assessment of the whole concept of Soviet operations, which is beyond the scope of this report. Despite the exploitation of material collected by technical means for over ten years at the station, the primary objective of recruiting a Soviet national has not been achieved. Although the station's knowledge of Soviet intelligence activities centered about the embassy in Mexico City has been greatly widened, it has led to little positive

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action to counter these activities as they might affect U.S. interests. While all the U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions are targets of vital importance for U.S. intelligence, the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City has special significance because of its proximity to the U.S. The Mexico City Station has attacked this target with determination and imagination. The Chief, SR Division, and his principal officers have commended highly the Soviet operations in Mexico City Station. The failure thus far to achieve the major objectives is testimony more to the impregnability of the target than to a lack of resourcefulness in attacking it. Thus, we believe that until some new methods, offering greater promise of ultimate success are developed, the present mode of attack should be continued at the present level. 24 24 24

24. Probably the most significant contribution which the station's operations against the Soviets in Mexico City has made to the U.S. security has been peripheral to the Agency's mission there. The embassy has long been a magnet for disaffected Americans who want for one reason or another to establish contact with the Soviets. Through its technical coverage of the Soviet Embassy, the station has been able to spot and, through subsequent action, to thwart a number of such Americans, several of whom might have done untold damage to U.S. interests had they not been apprehended. In this respect, the station works closely with the FBI. The Warren Commission's report on the assassination of President Kennedy made reference to information collected by station assets in connection with Oswald's activities in Mexico City. 08 24 24

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Satellite Operations

25. The Satellite Branch, which is staffed by EE Division personnel, has been diverting much of its recent time from its EE targets to a Communist-Chinese presence in Mexico City. Although there is no official government representation by the Peking regime, the New China News Agency (NCNA) has several people in Mexico City. At least three of these individuals have been identified as CHICOM intelligence officers. Project STPESO is an audio operation against three rooms of their offices, and their telephone lines are tapped under the LIFEAT Project. Some of their mail has been examined through the LIKAYAK Project. The raw results of these operations have been forwarded back to Headquarters. The Mexico City Station has no capability for the translation of the material. As of the time of the inspection, the station had heard nothing from Headquarters

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responsible to control from the female operations officer who has recently been transferred to LILINK control. It is possible that this operation will be transferred to a covert action project, where some improvement is expected.

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41. The station has a unilateral physical surveillance team, five of whom have been on the team for more than three years. Only one case of trouble has shown up in this project. One agent had to be terminated because he talked too much and tried to blackmail his case officer. The use of the polygraph has been most effective in control of this team, which has been generally effective.

Technical Operations

42. The station is heavily committed in the technical field with a large audio operation run jointly with the Mexican Government (LIENVOY), as well as a unilateral audio operation (LIFEAT). The station has been imaginative in approaches to problems and willing to examine and experiment with the unusual. An example of this is the communications link between the station and the principal agent of LILINK, which will be discussed later. 24 24 24

43. The LIENVOY operation, previously mentioned in connection with Soviet operations, resulted from an approach six years ago from President Lopez Mateos. After considerable discussions, the operation was approved, providing the Mexican Government would include Soviet and Satellite targets, and such other communist targets as were obvious to the Mexican Government to be of concern to the United States. This project is manned by selected Mexican Army personnel, who are carefully screened and paid high incentive wages, reducing their vulnerability to bribery. Other privileges add to the high esprit de corps essential to such an operation. The unit is managed by a career agent who transmits the take regularly to the station by clandestine means. This project has been fruitful in intelligence reports and has been of value in operational leads and in CE/CI information. The project also has a visual surveillance and a photo-surveillance capability. It was this project which provided data on the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald in his famous visit to Mexico City. 24 29, 24 29 24 08 24

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44. Obviously, the station cannot be content to have the Mexican Government knowledgeable of all its anti-communist operations. Therefore, the station has continued its unilateral audio

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c. Exclude routine travel information and CI/CE information from TDCS and CS reports; and,

d. Use the cable channel only for reports that are perishable or are of special intelligence interest.

Organization for Administration

56. As in his direction of operations, the chief of station maintains a close personal hold upon the administrative life of his station. Such delegation as he makes does not include the granting of usual authority to a subordinate. For example, although the deputy has been delegated authority over the Registry, which will be discussed in detail later, in reality the chief continues daily activities which have a marked effect on the Registry. The station has a small, hard-working support section, handling financial and property matters, and the usual fine communications section.

57. Morale and health were generally good, although for a city as modern as Mexico there is an unusual amount of abdominal disorder known in Mexico City as "Montezuma's Revenge." The embassy furnishes adequate medicines, and medicines are available on the open market, although not always to be trusted. One incident was recently uncovered in which sulfur was capsuled and sold as an antibiotic. Medical facilities have recently been improved by the opening of a new hospital which meets United States standards. Physicians and surgeons are well trained and quite competent. Insofar as social life is concerned, morale in the station was excellent. Mexico City offers some of the finest social activities in the world, from honky-tonk to opera. There is local television, radio, and a great interest in music. There is a great deal of outdoor activity available--swimming, tennis, golf, exploration of ruins, and vast city parks. Some sports activities are comparatively expensive. Membership in country clubs is prohibitive except for persons on the diplomatic list.

58. One of the principal administrative problems facing the Chief of Station, Mexico City, is his Registry. The Registry handles the station files which are more complete than in any other station in the WH Division. There are more than 9,000 personality files and a vast accumulation of 3x5 card files (mostly biographic) which continue to increase at the rate of 23 linear inches per month. The station's present level of activity precludes any reduction in the card index file, but aperture cards

are assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occasion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.

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59. The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Personnel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of all, with the limited number of personnel and the great burden of work, a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it has been difficult to get people to accept an assignment to the Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry. In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers accept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used in determining material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to time.

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60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person assigned to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrading to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.

<u>It is recommended that:</u> No. 78

The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of Personnel to conduct a review of the function of Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to determine whether or not such a position should be established in an appropriate grade.

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61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between Headquarters and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy chief of station, who primarily had supervisory responsibility over the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the workload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Headquarters' files rather than station files. We were told that on several occasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a size comparable to other stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be a concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963, when Mexico City's files brought forth detailed information on Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City.

62. The nature of Mexico City's operations, particularly its technical operations LIENVOY and LIFEAT produce [voluminous files.] 24 Until some system is devised for this [information] 24 to be quickly 24 [digested and retrieved] in Headquarters, we believe that there is no alternative to the present system Mexico City is employing. However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters for [processing and retrieval of] 24 such information.

It is recommended that: No. 79

> The Chief, WH Division, in collaboration with the Chief, Records Integration Division, devise a system for reducing the volume of files held in Mexico City, while maintaining a capability for rapid retrieval from Headquarters of information essential to present and future operations in Mexico.

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63. Mexico City is one of the great metropolises of the world and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It is difficult to find housing which compares exactly with United States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters, large space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life. However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection of housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but such apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection, adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the

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6 December 1963

DAILY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

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TOP SECRET

DAILY SUMMARY

6 December 1963

This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.

CONTENTS

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CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - cont'd

opposed the Second Agrarian Reform Law and is willing to use "doctrinally unwelcome" measures to increase production. (Page 3)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry, including several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River, the launching of 18 fishing boats, and the sending of an official mission to Spain in connection with the fishing industry. (Page 4)

INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary elements apparently attacked an observation post on Cayo de Cristo on a recent undetermined date. (Page 4)

A suspected counterrevolutionary was arrested on 3 December in Guantanamo. (Page 5)

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

The Cuban ambassador to the USSR is in Havana for a short "vacation." (Page 5)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

The Soviet-made AN-12 transport plane being ferried to Cuba reached Recife, Brazil, on 5 December, and left there for its last stop before it is scheduled to arrive in Cuba on 7 December. (Page 5)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms. (Page 5)

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

Wang Yu-ping has been named the new Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. He is a senior diplomat, but not as high ranking an individual as the recently appointed Chinese Communist ambassadors to Algeria and the UAR. (Page 5)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

A Bulgarian arms negotiator has returned from Havana to Sofia. (Page 6)

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BLOC RELATIONS:

A four-man Soviet delegation to revise social science curriculum at Havana University has arrived in Havana. (Page 6)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totaling $1 million, was being negotiated. Meanwhile, a Cuban group, which had probably planned to complete negotiations on the sale, was delayed because of lack of visas. (Page 6)

The US Embassy in Tokyo sees little hope of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the implementation of a contract under which Japanese private firms have reportedly agreed to purchase 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar. (Page 7)

The director of a Spanish optical firm has gone to Havana to negotiate the sale of movie projectors; he is being sponsored by CILASA. (Page 7)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister; the US Embassy believes this may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. (Page 7)

The Swiss ambassador believes that Frank Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the current OAS investigation of Venezuelan charges against Cuba; Emmick's preliminary hearing has been completed and the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend him. (Page 8)

The government of Trinidad gave a "chilly reception" to a visiting Cuban official and turned down a suggestion for trade talks, at least for the present. (Page 8)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:

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The (Chilean Embassy) in (Havana) has received information from sources in Cuba it considers reliable which supports

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Venezuelan charges that Cuba has been shipping arms to South America. (Page 8)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas in the Dominican Republic have established "six operational zones"; Cuban exiles in Miami feel that the failure of pro-Castro terrorists in Venezuela may force him to turn to terrorism in the Dominican Republic. (Page 9)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to information received by an official (West German) service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. (Page 9)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache, but has expressed interest in looking into other evidence of Cuban activities directed against Venezuela. The Venezuelan Government has agreed to furnish all possible evidence on its complaint. (Page 10)

On 5 December an American woman told a minister in New York that her boy friend had left that day for an unknown destination in Central America from which he planned to fly in a pro-Castro Venezuelan coup on Saturday. (Page 10)

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MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

An intercepted Cuban military message of 5 December indicated that the Cuban armed forces are giving instruction in defense against chemical warfare. An unidentified military unit in Las Villas Province reported the selection of two officers and four sergeants to attend a "chemical defense course." (USN-856, 2X/SL/CUM/T407-63, 6 December, SECRET SABRE)

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: #4 99

Moscow has given rather standard treatment to the OAS meeting which heard the Venezuelan Government charge Castro with illegal arms shipments. On 4 December, TASS correspondent Leonid Shokin reported that "the weavers of plots against revolutionary Cuba are still at it...accusing it of delivery of arms to Venezuela for 'subversive purposes'." Shokin found "certain US circles are the most interested in this, as is evident from the fact that representatives of the US State Department declared at the meeting that the United States would 'firmly support' additional economic and diplomatic sanctions by the OAS against Cuba." He thought it unexceptional that "these provocative attempts were not supported by the largest Latin American countries" and warned that "such attempts to interfere in Cuban internal affairs are fraught with extremely harmful consequences for the cause of peace." (CIA/FBIS, Moscow, 4 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:

Several weeks ago there were CAS reports that the storm-tossed peasants of Oriente looked on Hurricane Flora as the vengeance of God--a God, who in the tradition of the Old Testament's stern and sometimes vengeful Jehovah, had loosed his fury on a people first seduced and now impressed by an alien regime. Now a report from the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay provides yet another insight into the frame of mind of the Cuban populace. While the incidents pictured in this report do not necessarily reflect anything other than a combination of religious fervor and superstition, they are significant to the extent that they reflect the unrest--and, perhaps a growing feeling of hopelessness and despair--current among the Cubans.

In any case, there are prevalent locally tales of St. Barbara's appearing several times to prophesy a change in the regime or admonish errant youths to mend their ways. /Barbara, virgin daughter of the heathen Diosorus, was beheaded by her father near Heliopolis in 235 A.D. for embracing Christianity. A fearful thunderclap is alleged to have greeted her execution. Symbolized by a windmill-like tower with three windows, the type of fortress in which her father was wont to confine her while he was absent from home, Barbara is the patroness of artillerymen and miners.

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

/In the Church's calendar, her feast is marked on 4 December. Apart from her significance in the Christian ritual, Barbara figures prominently in a neo-pagan cult known as the Santeria. Devotees of Santeria regard themselves as Catholics and believe that the names of the Catholic saints are translations into Spanish of the Nigerian names of African gods. Catholicism is viewed as the Spanish tribal version of Santeria. The association between Catholicism and Santeria is based on a largely superficial similarity between Catholic saints and the pantheon of African spirit gods. Saint Barbara is thought to be Shango, the God of War./

According to one of these tales, a woman dressed in martyr's red stopped a bus outside Guantanamo City on 25 November, stepped inside and berated the Castro regime. The woman is alleged to have said that the Cuban people could not live forever in such misery and to have predicted that Castro would be taken from them sometime between 4 and 7 December. A militiaman passenger told her that she would be arrested when the bus arrived in the city. When it had, she'd disappeared. Continuing on to Caimanera, the bus stopped in the town square with the same woman sitting on one of the seats inside the vehicle. The militia again was summoned and again the woman was nowhere to be seen.

On 26 November the same woman allegedly appeared outside a school in Caimanera and admonished several children not to thrown stones at a nearby shack. The children fled into the school and the woman followed. Challenged by a teacher, the woman said she was Santa Barbara and vanished. The next day neither the teacher nor the children would return to the school, though it subsequently has been reopened. (COMNAVBASE GTMO, 01731/T1/JFK/3, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Fidel Castro was "frightened, if not terrified," by the possible consequences of President Kennedy's murder, according to the Portuguese ambassador in Havana. Cabling his government on 27 November, the Portuguese diplomat described what he called "a large movement of troops" late on the afternoon of the President's death--"they were sent to take up positions around Havana and the northern coast of the island." He found it surprising that Castro "jumped into the arena to denounce insinuations which were merely from news and nongovernmental agencies," but added that "it is the general opinion in diplomatic circles that the assassination will be the spring which will unleash passions and violent and blind hysteria of the American people against Cuba and Russia and provide the excuse which up to now was lacking.... There is talk again about the coincidence of rumors concerning a crisis at the end of the year...." Finally, the ambassador noted that "the assassination did not cause a great deal of consternation in counterrevolutionary circles in the interior." (NSA, 3/O/POD/T1463-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

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CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION - cont'd

Two government soldiers were killed in southern Oriente Province on 3 December when members of Unit 1948 at an unidentified location within the First Army area, uncovered and fired on a dice game, which apparently included personnel from their own unit. A 3 December message from military unit 1948 to South Sierra Maestra Sector Headquarters stated that "when the players attempted to flee, the soldiers commenced firing without orders, causing the death of one unnamed player and the chief of organization and personnel of Unit 1948." The message added that the bodies and the "civilian and military prisoners" were being sent to sector headquarters. (USN 835, 2/LR1/CUM/R196-63, 5 December, SECRET KIMBO)

Dolores Ibarruri, "La Pasionaria" of Spanish Civil War fame and secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, arrived in Havana from Moscow on 5 December, according to press reports. Ibarruri, who resides in Moscow, was invited to Cuba by Castro during his visit to the Soviet Union. (The New York Times, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, minister of INRA, has expressed serious dissatisfaction with Cuba's current agricultural situation and revealed that he disagrees with Castro's emphasis on "ultimate aims" in place of current "tactics." In a long talk with the British ambassador in early November, Rodriguez agreed "with surprising enthusiasm" that the two main problems facing Cuban agriculture were the lack of competent personnel to run the appropriated farms, and the lack of consumer goods which are necessary to stimulate production, especially by the remaining private farmers. Rodriguez had advised Castro that there were not sufficient agricultural experts to run the state farms which had been previously organized, and he had counseled against taking over medium-size farms (as the Second Agrarian Reform Law did) until sufficiently trained and experienced personnel were available; he commented on Soviet complaints about the low educational level of Cubans sent to the USSR for agricultural training. Rodriguez said that despite his advice, Castro had gone ahead with the Second Agrarian Reform Law for two "political" reasons: to push ahead with the progress of Cuba's Socialist economy, and to destroy the support for counterrevolutionaries which Castro believed existed among the "rural bourgeois." Rodriguez thought it ironical that US pressure on Cuba (presumably he meant aid to counterrevolutionaries) had forced Cuba to seize lands faster than it would otherwise have done. He also stated his belief that the seizure of medium-size farms would lead to a drop for several years in many branches of Cuban agriculture, particularly in market gardening and dairy farming.

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CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - cont'd

Rodriguez also agreed with the British ambassador that the second problem facing Cuban agriculture was the lack of consumer goods which were necessary to stimulate production. However, Rodriguez said that Cuba was in a vicious circle: farmers did not have incentive to produce because there were few consumer goods available, yet such goods could not be obtained until farm production had been raised. Rodriguez' main concern seemed to be the scarcity of many consumer goods; in fact, he admitted that he was willing to undertake temporary expediencies which might help raise production, even though they might be "doctrinally unwelcome." Rodriguez referred the ambassador to Lenin's New Economic Policy, and made no attempt to disguise his disagreement with Castro's insistence on "ultimate aims" instead of current "tactics." (British Embassy Havana, 13 November, CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuba is taking further steps to improve its fishing industry. A Havana radiobroadcast reported the completion of several construction projects in the Chuyima shipyards in the Almendares River in Havana, including a pier 307 meters in length, a concrete esplanade measuring 17,000 square meters with a capacity of 24 ships, two launching ramps, and the dredging of the Almendares River in front of the pier, pending partial completion, as well as several minor jobs. It also reported that the shipyard has launched 18 Lambda-75-class ships; 14 more are expected to be launched by January. 24 According to a 29 November intercepted message, an official mission in connection 10 with the fishing industry was expected to arrive in Madrid 10 in early December. The delegation 24 was composed of Jose Lavia and Juan de la Fe 06 Flores. (CIA FBIS 03, 6 December 96 OFFICIAL USE ONLY; NSA 2X/O/CUD/T2523-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

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INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:

Counterrevolutionary 10 elements apparently attacked the 10 Selva Marina observation post at Cayo de Cristo on a recent undetermined date. A partially garbled message from Central Army Headquarters 24 in Santa Clara informed Havana that personnel in the observation post, 10 located on a cay 10 off Isabela de Sagua, "repelled the aggression and caused the flight of the attackers. 10 . In a probe of the place by air, land, and sea, nothing more than some footprints were observed." Because of the garbles at the beginning of the message it is impossible to determine the time and nature of the attack. (USN 856, 2/SL/CUM/R297-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

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INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST - cont'd

An unidentified military unit informed First Army Sector E Headquarters at Mayari Arriba that a suspected counterrevolutionary had been arrested in Guantanamo. The suspect, militiaman Esteban Mendez Almaquel, was arrested in the home of Genaro Moya on 3 December. Moya was identified as being implicated in the counterrevolution and as an informer. (USN 835, 2X/LR1/CUM/T675-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

CUBAN FOREIGN SERVICE:

Carlos Olivares, Cuba's ambassador to the USSR, arrived by plane yesterday in Havana for what Prensa Latina described as a "short vacation." (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:

Intercepted civil aviation communications indicate that the Soviet-made AN-12 transport aircraft being ferried to Cuba from the Soviet Union is adhering to its schedule. It arrived at the Brazilian airport of Recife from Conakry on 5 December and left there the next day for Belem, Brazil. It is scheduled to leave Belem on 7 December for Havana. The intercepts also indicated that Jamaica has granted permission for the plane to use Kingston as a reserve landing point in the event of necessity. (USA-51, 2/J8/RUT/R894-63, 6 December, SECRET KIMBO)

SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:

The US Embassy in Beirut believes that Lebanon may act to curtail the use of its ships in the Cuban trade. This would result in a significant decline in Cuban shipping in free world bottoms because Lebanese companies provided ten of the thirty-two free world ships which called at Cuba in October. The Lebanese foreign minister planned to ask the cabinet for a provisional measure whereby he would be able to demand that all ships carrying Lebanese flag must call at Lebanon periodically and report their destinations. He believed this would cut the Cuban traffic quickly by 60 percent. Because US aid to Lebanon is almost nonexistent, the US Embassy believes that this Lebanese action would be prompted by motives of principle rather than fear of losing US aid, an action which is being discussed by the US Congress. (Am Emb Beirut 520, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS:

A Havana Prensa Latina broadcast of 6 December announced that President Dorticos has assented to the appointment of Wang Yu-ping as Chinese Communist ambassador to Cuba. This is the first information indicating that Ambassador Shen Chien, who has served in Cuba since December 1960, is about to be replaced. The new Chinese Communist ambassador is a 53-year-old senior diplomat; since 1950 he has served three- to four-year terms as Communist ambassador in Rumania, Norway, and Cambodia. He is married and has two children.

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CUBAN - CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS - cont'd

While he is, of course, a member of the Chinese Communist party, he is not a ranking party member. He appears to be a lower ranking person than newly assigned Chinese Communist ambassadors to such countries as the UAR and Algeria. The earliest biographic references to him have him as a member of the Chinese Communist Army in 1931. He subsequently became an army political commissar and rose to the rank of general. It is not unusual, however, for Chinese Communist diplomats to be generals. He speaks Russian, but there is no information that he speaks Spanish. For the last year and a half, however, he has been stationed in Peiping and he could have learned the language then. He accompanied Chinese Communist chief of state Liu Shoa-chi on the latter's visit to Cambodia last spring. (CIA FBIS Havana, 6 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; BACKGROUND DATA: SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:

L.P. Kyuchukov, chief of the Engineering Directorate of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Trade, was to arrive in Prague from Havana yesterday and fly on to Sofia today. Kyuchukov, who is thought to have negotiated Bulgarian arms shipments to Cuba, was noted traveling between Havana and Santiago de Cuba on 21 and 23 November--the third time he has been in Cuba since November 1962. (DIRNSA, 2X/0/QOC/T2810-63, 5 December, SECRET SABRE)

BLOC RELATIONS:

A 4-man Soviet delegation, headed by USSR Deputy Minister of Education Serafim Nikichev, arrived in Cuba on 5 December to spend a month "working on the curriculum of Havana University's School of Social Sciences." Nikichev was accompanied by "academicians" Aleksandr Smirnov, Vassiliy Rayike, and Maria Filipova. The group was welcomed at Jose Marti airport by the Rector and Deputy Rector of the university, Juan Mier Febles and Mariano Rodriguez Solveira, and the school's protocol specialist, Professor Pedro Canas. The delegation's trip to Cuba is the first tangible result of the Soviet-Cuban educational exchange agreement signed in Moscow two months ago. That agreement provides for the loan of Soviet academicians and educational administrators to Cuban schools, the exchange of students and instructors between the two countries, and the use of Soviet texts in Cuba. (CIA/FBIS, Havana, 5 December, UNCLASSIFIED)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS:

The US consul in Antwerp has been informed by the Varmi Company of Brussels that it will not sell construction equipment to Cuba; there have been reports that such a sale, perhaps totalling $1 million, was being negotiated. (See Daily Summary of 7 and 13 November.)

NON-BLOC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS - cont'd

The director of Varmi confirmed to US officials that he had been negotiating with a Spanish firm (probably CILASA) for the sale of US-origin construction equipment; after being informed that the material was destined for Cuba and having been warned of the consequences of such a sale, the director agreed on 2 December to stop negotiations. The US consul comments that it is not sure whether the knowledge of the eventual sale to Cuba or the fact of US intervention in the matter caused Varmi to stop the arrangements.

Meanwhile, a source with access to CILASA's files reported on 28 November that a Cuban comission headed by Rene Narbona of the Cuban tractor importing agency would be unable to arrive in Brussels on 30 November because of inability to obtain visas. This group had probably been scheduled to complete negotiations for the purchase of the Varmi construction equipment. (Am ConGen Antwerp 29, 3 December, CONFIDENTIAL; CIA Madrid TDCS-3/566,653, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The US Embassy in Tokyo, in receipt of a report that private Japanese companies have contracted for 325,000 tons of Cuban sugar for delivery between July 1964 and June 1965, sees little prospect of inducing the Japanese Government to interfere with the transaction. The Japanese Government would have difficulty intervening because of the general world sugar shortage, the unavailability of sugar from other sources at comparable prices, and the political problem which rising sugar prices is causing the Ikeda administration. (Am Emb Tokyo 1688, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The director of the Spanish firm Empresa Nacional de Optica, Vicente M. Cabanillas Gonzalez, left Madrid for Havana on a 29 November IBERIA Airlines flight. As reported earlier (see <u>Daily Summary</u>, 11 October), Cabanillas is negotiating through CILASA for the sale of a large quantity of movie projectors to the General Administrator of University Inspection in Havana. According to a CILASA employee with access to company files, Cabanillas' travel expenses are being paid by CILASA. Cabánillas had hoped to get a Cuban visa which would not appear in his passport, as he hoped to visit the US later. He was unable to arrange this, however, and finally had to accept the Cuban visa in his passport. (CIA, Madrid, IN 74453, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

NON-BLOC RELATIONS:

A Cuban good-will mission was received by the Moroccan acting foreign minister on 2 December, according to information received by the US Embassy in Rabat. The mission was probably composed of Antonic Carrillo Carreras, Enrique Vian Audivert of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Dr. Enrique Rodriguez Leoches, Cuban ambassador to Morocco. (See <u>Daily Summary</u> of 29 November for recent Cuban-Moroccan relations.)

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NON-BLOC RELATIONS - cont'd

Despite the Moroccan announcement of its break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, the Cuban ambassador is still in Rabat and attends functions he normally attended. The chancery offices are open and the Cuban flag is flying. This situation has been a source of some embarrassment to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry. However, the US Embassy believes that the reception of the Cuban delegation by the Moroccan Government may presage the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations. An officer in the Spanish Embassy in Rabat believes this is entirely possible; he believes the Soviets are using their influence to keep the Cuban Embassy in Rabat. The US Embassy also feels that the Moroccan King may not feel he received sufficient benefit to justify continuing the break in diplomatic relations with Cuba. (Am Emb Rabat 860, 4 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

The Swiss ambassador in Cuba was informed by the deputy foreign minister that the preliminary hearing had been completed for the US citizen Frank Emmick, who reportedly will be charged with being a CIA agent. (See Daily Summary of 5 December.) The ambassador believes that Emmick's trial will be held shortly after the completion of the OAS investigation into charges by Venezuela of Cuban intervention in Venezuelan affairs. Currently, the ambassador is trying to find a Cuban lawyer to defend Emmick. He is considering the lawyer hired by the Canadian Embassy to defend the Cuban pilots Lippert and Milne, an attorney who handles Swiss Embassy affairs, or a member of the Havana University Law School faculty. (Am Emb Bern 363, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

Prime Minister Williams of Trinidad Tobago gave a "very chilly" reception on 4 December to a visiting Cuban official, Robert Gerardo Sanchez, commercial officer in the Cuban Consulate in Kingston. A Foreign Ministry official informed the US Embassy that Williams was annoyed that Sanchez had presumed on a scant acquaintance with him to visit Port-of-Spain, despite advice from the government of Trinidad that such a visit would be inopportune. Reportedly, the prime minister turned down Sanchez' suggestion for trade talks, on the grounds of Cuba's involvement with Venezuela and Trinidad, Tobago's delicate and difficult relations with Caracas. He did not, however, close the door on such discussions at some appropriate time in the future. The government of Trinidad expects Sanchez to leave the country soon. (Am Emb, Port of Spain 223, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES: 24 10

In a message of 3 December, the (Chilean Embassy) in (Havana) reported to its Foreign Ministry information it had received from "reliable sources" in Cuba on Cuban efforts to ship weapons to Venezuela and other Latin American countries.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

The embassy stated that "everything leads to the belief that" the arms recently discovered in Venezuela had come from Cuba. According to one of the Chilean Embassy's sources, two ships had left Cuba at an unspecified date en route to British Guiana with "packages consigned as machinery consigned to an industrialist of known Communist tendencies whose property is adjacent to the Venezuelan border." Various of the Chilean Embassy sources "accept the rumor" that the arms are of Belgian and British (sic) make and that the shipments have been made from various Cuban ports. The embassy report also expressed the belief that Cuba not only sends arms to various points in South America, but also Cuban guerrilla leaders. (NSA 3/0/CLD/-T1129-63, 5 December, TOP SECRET DINAR)

Havana Radio announced yesterday that pro-Castro guerrillas have established "six operational zones" in the mountains around Santiago and Puerto Plata in the Dominican Republic. The Havana radiobroadcast credited the announcement to "the first communiqué issued by the command." Meanwhile, press dispatches from Miami report that most Cuban exiles feel that the Havana announcement is an attempt to cover up the failure of Castro terrorists to stop Venezuela's presidential elections last Sunday. Other exile sources predict that the announcement and the setback in Venezuela mean that the Castro regime will launch a concerted terrorist campaign against the military-installed provisional regime in Santo Domingo. Batista Falla, leader of the Cuban exile Christian Democratic Movement (MCD), said yesterday in Miami that the failure of terrorism in Venezuela "has put Castro in a difficult position and damages his chances in the rest of Latin America." He added that he expects Castro to "make desperate attempts to picture terrorism as successful, despite its miserable failure in Venezuela."

All reporting by the Dominican Government indicates that its forces are in effective control of the areas of guerrilla activity. About 40 insurgents of the outlawed pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) are said to have been captured, with only isolated bands yet to be apprehended. (UPI, Miami, A-11, 6 December, UNCLASSIFIED and Background Information, SECRET)

Cuba is reportedly making preparations to recognize a Venezuelan government-in-exile, according to an official West German service from a fairly reliable source with contacts in Havana. Reportedly, the Cuban Foreign Ministry is consulting the USSR and other bloc countries to induce them to recognize this government-in-exile. The Cubans, according to the source, do not expect the USSR and other countries to agree to this; nevertheless, the attempt is being made.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Although this is the first report on the possibility of a Cuban-sponsored Venezuelan government-in-exile, the Cuban radio and press have been emphasizing the slogan that the Betancourt government does not represent the people and that the real representatives of the people are to be found in the ranks of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). According to Cuban newspapers, Pedro Duno, a former professor of the Central University of Venezuela, arrived in Havana to join the "mission" of the FALN in Havana. (CIA Munich TDCS-3/566,731, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

The OAS Investigating Committee which is looking into the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela does not intend to limit its investigation to the cache. The group has no intention to expand its study to cover domestic political aspects of the FALN or Communist Party activities; however, the members expressed interest in looking into such aspects as Cuban broadcasts inciting to violence, possible transfer of funds from Cuba, training of Venezuelans in Cuba in subversive techniques, and evidence of other clandestine arms shipments. In addition to examining the arms cache, the committee also voiced interest in hearing tapes of recent Cuban broadcasts, examining transcripts of interrogations and documents seized from captured terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas, talking to Venezuelan authorities responsible for combating terrorism and insurgency, and possibly interviewing some prisoners. In a meeting with the Committee, the Venezuelan foreign minister placed emphasis on verification of the Cuban origin of the arms cache, but also indicated his government would furnish all possible evidence on the Venezuelan complaint that the committee might want. (To Am Emb Caracas 485, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

An American woman told a Unitarian minister in New York on 5 December that her "boy friend," a former RAF flyer and soldier-of-fortune, has left for an unknown destination in Central America from which he will fly in a pro-Castro coup in Venezuela tomorrow. Dr. Walter Kring, minister at the All Souls Unitarian Church, told a USUN official yesterday that he had been approached by an American woman who asked him to get her story "into the proper channels." The woman stated that her friend left New York on 5 December by unknown means for an unidentified location in Central America. He told her that he would fly to Venezuela on 7 December in connection with a pro-Castro coup which she would read about in the Sunday papers.

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CUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES - cont'd

Dr. Kring said that he was impressed by the woman's utter sincerity and normal behavior. He believed she was convinced of the truth of her story and of the honesty of her friend. The woman had apparently, at some earlier date, contacted the FBI in connection with her friend's participation or knowledge of a coup in Honduras. She later retracted her story because she felt it seemed "too implausible and silly." (USUN, New York 2376, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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27 December 1963

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WEEKLY REVIEW

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 December 1963)

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EUROPE (continued)

SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST

Within a week after the central committee approved Khrushchev's plan for the chemical industry, Soviet traders apparently had their instructions and budget allocations and were renewing their activity in trade circles of the industrial West.

Contracts for fertilizer installations, plastics and synthetic plants, petrochemical equipment, and mining machinery are already in various stages of negotiation. Officials in Bonn report they have under consideration a proposal by a West German consortium to supply the USSR with $400 million worth of petrochemical equipment. A Soviet mission is negotiating with the British Imperial Chemical Industry (ICI), which heretofore has supplied the USSR with technical know-how. ICI reportedly has offered to deliver equipment and processes for the production of fertilizers, herbicides, rubber chemicals, and plastics. Negotiations also are under way for large numbers of Japanese chemical fertilizer plants.

Another Western consortium, involving US equipment and processes, is discussing delivery of a large oil refinery. In addition, contracts for a wide range of other machinery and equipment will probably soon be signed. These contracts apparently had been postponed until the new chemical equipment buying program was presented to the plenum and allocations for various trade corporations for next year were approved.

The Soviet need for additional credit to finance planned expanded purchases is crucial. The USSR presumably can generate sufficient funds to meet down payments on sizable orders. However, credit arrangements must be set now to spread out the heavy crush of payments which otherwise would fall due in 1965-66 when equipment contracted for next year will be delivered. Soviet ability to increase hard-currency reserves is not likely to improve in the near future. Moscow's current grain imports will reduce its gold reserves by 25 percent. If these continue beyond mid-1964, the Soviet hard-currency position will be under further strain.

Despite the bleak foreign exchange prospects for the USSR, Soviet officials appear hopeful that Western competition for Soviet orders will be adequate to foster Western governmental and banking opinion favorable to more and longer term credit. Moscow may also hope that a continuation of its relatively restrained foreign policy will be helpful in this context. While viewing the USSR as an acceptable commercial risk, the banking community has heretofore been unwilling to extend credits beyond a five-year period because of uncertainty about future political developments. (SECRET)

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR

With two weeks of their projected two-month tour of Africa completed, Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi can claim high marks for their efforts to project an aura of Afro-Asian amity and to identify Peiping with African aspirations. There is no evidence, however, that they have scored any comparable success in the political or economic fields.

The joint communiqué issued on 21 December at the conclusion of the Chinese leaders' visit to Cairo contains few surprises, and reports from Algiers suggest that discussions with Ben Bella are following predictable lines. Thus far the Chinese have attempted to minimize differences, play up past contacts, and press such themes as militant struggle against colonialism and "US imperialism."

In both Algiers and Cairo, Chou's hosts sought to demonstrate their nonalignment by actions designed to play down the impact of the Chinese leaders' arrival. Chou was greeted in Cairo with a 21-gun salute, but Nasir was not on hand. In Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand to greet his guests, but the top-level delegation he sent to the Soviet Union just before Chou's arrival is receiving more publicity than the Chinese guests.

It has become increasingly apparent that a major objective of the trip has been to undercut Soviet influence throughout the continent. Criticism of the USSR was reportedly a recurrent theme in Chou's four lengthy talks with Nasir. Nasir reportedly said that Chou talked about the USSR the way the Soviets used to talk about the US. He accused the Soviets of trying to colonize China, of breaking political and economic promises, and of becoming tools of the US, and he warned that any Afro-Asian country which became dependent on Moscow would suffer the same fate as Peiping.

In Algeria, Chou sounded a similar note. He cited China's early support for Algerian revolutionaries--support which actually pre-dated that of the USSR. He has also undoubtedly scored Soviet unreliability. The Chinese may be pressing the Algerians to use some of the $50-million credit offered in October. This offer was made to counter a $100-million Soviet credit offered earlier the same month.

Sino-Soviet rivalry for African support also flared at the UN, where Peiping outmaneuvered Moscow on the question of enlarging the representation in principal UN organs to accommodate the African bloc. Soviet delegate Fedorenko had attempted to make it appear that the Chinese were opposed to the African-sponsored expansion plan because they insisted that any change in the UN be tied to Peiping's own admission to the Security Council. The USSR found itself holding a suddenly emptied bag,

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however, when Peiping loudly repudiated Fedorenko's statement and accused the Soviets of using the issue as a pretext for opposing Afro-Asian demands.

Chou can be expected to capitalize on this during next week's visit to Morocco and in subsequent stops in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. No details of Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat have been made public by Peiping. Such secrecy may well be prompted by security considerations. Chinese officials were apparently seriously shaken by the abortive plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in Cambodia last spring. The Chinese envoy in Cairo reportedly told Nasir of concern for Chou's safety and asked that travel plans during the Chinese leader's visit to the UAR not be made public. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

EAST GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL

Reaction of East Germans to the agreement to let West Berliners visit relatives in East Berlin is hopeful but still fairly cautious, judging by reports from local party officials.

The party central headquarters, obviously concerned that the agreement might have domestic repercussions, ordered district officials to submit immediate reports and detailed follow-ups on reactions to this partial relaxation of travel curbs imposed in connection with the building of the Berlin Wall. Most of the responses state that the people are elated but are publicly voicing hope that they may be permitted to visit their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany. Many East Germans express hope that the present move will be followed by other relaxations--a reaction probably quite unpalatable to the regime.

Public comment--at least as reported by the various party headquarters--is still fairly cautious: One party member in Magdeburg said: "The reason we don't let our citizens go to West Germany is that we are afraid they will defect." But he was promptly silenced by comrades who parroted the party line on "the terror against our GDR citizens in West Germany."

Public expression of dissatisfaction with harsh travel and internal controls has been recurrent in recent months, reaching a peak prior to the 20 October parliamentary elections.

The people's reaction to the pass agreement with West Berlin points up one of the regime's major problems: how to project an image of itself as a sovereign state and of East Berlin as its capital without increasing discontent among its population, who still risk shooting if they attempt to escape to West Berlin. (SECRET KIMBO)



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WONSAN
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ONCHON
HWANGJU
CHANGJON
SEA OF JAPAN
SINGYE
PYONGGANG
Demilitarized Zone
KOKCHONGNI
YONAN
KAESONG
Seoul
YELLOW SEA
SOUTH KOREA
SAM site
Bomber elements
Fighter defense elements
Combined command headquarters
Radar station
East coast filter center
Early warning radar coverage
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NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

North Korea has recently taken several steps which significantly strengthen its air defenses. MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, which were first detected only at Pukchang-ni airfield, now are being stationed at other airfields. Pyongyang has also apparently just acquired a large number of relatively sophisticated types of radar sets. In addition, the North Korean bomber force, which has a total of about 100 IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers, is in part now equipped with, and has been training with, an improved blind bombing and navigational system.

Testing of and flight training with the new fighters--10 to 14 of which were apparently obtained from the USSR in the fall of 1962--were first noted in communications intelligence in June 1963. Since that time the MIG-21s have been detected frequently in flight activity involving ground controlled intercept exercises.

Beginning in October, MIG-21s have been noted operating from Wonsan on the east coast of North Korea. Their deployment to this airfield places supersonic fighters on both the east and west coasts of North Korea.

The North Koreans have recently expanded their radar coverage. Six new types of radar, at least one of which is believed to be exclusively of Chinese Communist manufacture, have been detected. For the present these radars will apparently supplement rather than replace North Korea's original three types--Kniferest A, SCR-270, and Token.

The identifiable new types include Kniferest B, Spoonrest A, and a new type of Chinese Communist origin which is probably a substantial modification of the SCR-270. Spoonrest A is sometimes used as the acquisition radar for surface-to-air missile sites, but it is also used in an early warning role and is probably intended for that use in North Korea. Acquisition of these new radars reflects North Korea's efforts to extend the range of its early warning detection system. To improve height-finding capability, Pyongyang has also introduced more sophisticated radars such as Rockcake and Stonecake.

Another improvement in North Korea's air capability is the equipment of about twenty IL-28s with an improved blind bombing and navigational radar system designated Shorewalk. When properly used, this system permits precision navigation and blind bombing without the use of ground communications which would betray the direction of the flight and the target designation. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

13-00000

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING

Communist guerrilla activity increased only slightly in connection with the third anniversary, on 20 December, of the Viet Cong's Liberation Front, despite advance Communist propaganda exhortation for a major military effort. The Viet Cong continued to direct attacks and harassing activities primarily at strategic hamlets.

South Vietnam's new government is showing extreme sensitivity to discussion of a "neutralist solution" to its insurgency problem. The Communists' Liberation Front has repeatedly proposed such a settlement, and the idea is gaining new advocates as a result of Cambodia's call for an international conference. Saigon's military rulers last week closed down a newspaper which was expressing interest in neutralism. However, editorials in the vernacular press, even though attacking neutralism, have kept the debate in the public eye. On 20 December, Saigon students--possibly encouraged by the regime--demonstrated against neutralism.

On the military front, the government is beginning to take some steps to overcome the lethargy that has affected its counterinsurgency effort since the coup. A long-range pacification program has been launched in one of the most troublesome provinces in the northern part of the country, and broad command changes have been introduced in two provinces south of Saigon where security has been deteriorating.

In the political field, the government has named 60 members of the civilian advisory Council of Notables. Returned exiles apparently are not represented, and there is a dearth of direct provincial representation. Many appointees, however, are prominent political, professional and lay religious leaders who could provide effective guidance to the regime if they are given a chance.

Apathy and disenchantment over the new government are widespread among such key elements as middle-grade officers, students and politicians. Criticism centers on the lack of firm direction by the ruling generals, on repeated reshuffling of local officials deemed incompetent, corrupt or close to the Diem regime, and on the rise in Viet Cong activity. There are signs that junta members themselves are beginning to share the disillusionment of some circles with Premier Tho's provisional cabinet, which is described as ineffective and regional in outlook.

Leading generals nevertheless seem to have few effective steps in mind to rally popular support. Three generals recently complained to US officials that they were having trouble finding qualified Vietnamese to fill government positions and that press criticism of their efforts was unhelpful. General "Big" Minh, the chief of state, has indicated a personal distaste for a prominent role, and has asserted that the people would gradually come to appreciate the new government as problems were solved on a province-by province-basis. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

13-00000

LAOS



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LAOS

Communist forces have moved to erase recent gains made by rightist units in central Laos. Pathet Lao troops, reportedly supported by substantial numbers of North Vietnamese, on 19 December captured Kam Keut and the nearby airfield, three days after occupying the key route junction at Lak Sao. Right-wing messages have described a key rightist parabattalion as "completely smashed." Communist units have advanced south of Lak Sao toward neutralist positions along Route 8-A, but there have been no indications that they intend to press their advantage by a major drive on Nhommarath, which is still held by rightist forces. In other areas, there have been reports of only limited activity, involving scattered skirmishes and artillery exchanges.

Meanwhile, neutralist and Pathet Lao representatives are continuing their efforts to negotiate an easing of tensions between the two factions. At a meeting on 20 December in the Plaine des Jarres, both sides called for an "early" meeting between Premier Souvanna and Prince Souphannouvong. They also agreed, in principle, that elements of the coalition government should be transferred from Vientiane to the royal capital at Luang Prabang, which would be neutralized and placed under tripartite control. Both factions reiterated their support for the formation of a mixed police force in a neutralized Vientiane.

General Phoumi's right-wing faction, which was not represented at the meeting, remains skeptical of Pathet Lao intentions. Phoumi apparently believes that an agreement for the neutralization of Luang Prabang is unlikely, but he may join in talks on the subject. He has indicated, however, that the neutralization of Vientiane is contingent on the willingness of the Pathet Lao to allow free movement in areas of Laos now under their control. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

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13-00000

FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA

Armed Forces Minister Pierre Messmer's visit to Cambodia from 4-7 January is designed primarily to strengthen French influence there in the wake of Prince Sihanouk's call for an end to the US aid program. Messmer's high-level entourage, which includes the chiefs of the Foreign Ministry's Indochina and Cultural and Technical divisions, will probably recommend some increases in aid, but De Gaulle apparently has no intention of taking on any large new commitments.

French-grant aid to Cambodia since 1956 has amounted to only $15 million. Current assistance is threefold: a military training mission of at least 250 men; cultural aid in the form of a university mission and 319 teachers in Cambodian schools; and the maintenance of about 40 experts in the fields of health and public works. In addition, a number of French nationals hired by the Cambodian Government hold positions of considerable influence in the Ministry of Finance, the Treasury, and the premier's office, and are among Prince Sihanouk's advisers.

Paris has indicated it has no intention of equaling the US aid program. Any increase in military aid probably would be limited to reconditioned and obsolete equipment, such as trucks and light armored vehicles. Increased cultural and technical assistance probably would include further help for the French university mission, more teachers, and 30 or 40 additional technical experts, especially agriculturalists.

The extension of French aid will be complicated by Cambodia's claims for compensation for losses incurred as a result of the 1958 devaluation of the French franc. Since 1958 France has asserted that a large-scale aid program would be impossible until there is agreement on an exchange rate, but a compromise may now be in sight.

Sihanouk has sought French help in maintaining Cambodia's policy of neutrality, and in recent talks with the US and the UK, France has supported his call for an international conference on Cambodian neutrality, despite US objections. Indeed, De Gaulle has consistently sought to meet Sihanouk more than half way, and Paris may now encourage Sihanouk to press this issue. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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

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ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT

The Arab states evidently do not plan any overt military action against Israel when in late January or early February the Israelis begin pumping tests for their Jordan River diversion project, but sabotage of the project's facilities may be attempted.

The Arab military chiefs who met in Cairo in mid-December apparently decided that direct military attacks are not feasible. The chiefs reportedly agreed, however, that the states bordering on Israel should mount independent and uncoordinated clandestine operations.

The Arab League Defense Council, which meets in January, probably will approve this recommendation, but its implementation is another matter. Egyptian, Jordanian, and Lebanese officials have indicated privately that their governments have no intention of taking aggressive action of any kind against the Israeli project.

Nasir, however, told the Canadian ambassador in early December that he was worried that Syria might act unilaterally and present the other Arab states with a dilemma. Damascus will be under strong pressure to fulfill its threats against the Israeli scheme, particularly in view of the close proximity of the Syrian border to Israel's pumping station on Lake Tiberias.

Nasir's wariness about becoming involved in a war with Israel over Jordan waters was also evident in a speech he made on 23 December. He emphasized that the problem is political rather than military in nature and that the chiefs of staff cannot solve it. He called for a summit meeting of Arab presidents and kings to seek a solution.

Israel, according to the chief of Israeli military intelligence, considers there is an outside possibility that Syria might bomb or shell the pumping facility's transformer station. However, the Israelis believe the primary threat stems from former Palestinians now living in Syria, Jordan or Lebanon, who might make a dramatic effort to sabotage the project even though they probably could not cause serious damage. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

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CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN

Fighting between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which began on 21 December and was continuing on 26 December despite efforts to obtain a cease-fire, is the culmination of a steady growth of tension on the island during the past few weeks. The new tension followed President Makarios' presentation to Turkish Cypriot leaders of proposals for changing the Cyprus constitution. The proposals, which essentially involved removing the guarantees to the Turkish minority that had been written into the Cyprus settlement of 1959, were rejected by the Turkish Government even before the Turkish Cypriots had made their views known.

Most of the initial fighting appears to have been between Greek Cypriot police and the Turkish underground, and to have taken place in the Turkish areas of Nicosia.. The situation there deteriorated progressively during the week, as the police lost control to extremist groups of irregulars from both communities. A cease-fire, to be supervised by the British, had not been effective as of the morning of 26 December. Fighting had also continued at the port city of Larnaca; the rest of the island was quiet but tense.

In the face of these developments, the Turkish Government threatened to exercise its right under the 1959 agreement to intervene on Cyprus. Three Turkish jet fighters flew over Nicosia on 25 December, and Turkish naval units appeared off the island. Part of the 650-man Turkish garrison on Cyprus left its barracks to move into one of the Turkish quarters of the capital. Part of the 950-man Greek contingent then moved to protect Greek areas. The situation evidently prodded Athens and London into a more active role, and Greek, Turkish and British forces on Cyprus have been placed under a unified British-led command. Britain has announced it is sending 150 additional troops.

The violence may make leaders of both sides more cautious in pressing political demands. Soon after the outbreak, Makarios told the US ambassador he would go more slowly in pushing his constitutional revisions. Both ethnic groups, however, will be further embittered--particularly the Turkish community, which is believed to have suffered much the heavier casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

13-00000

AREA NOTE

Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Faysal appears to have weathered his latest dispute with King Saud without making any concessions. The details of a new arrangement between the two are not known, but Faysal is still firmly in control of the government. Royal Guard elements which the King ordered to positions around his palace at the height of the dispute have now been withdrawn.

The dispute centered on Saud's attempt to resume personal control of the government, which he relinquished to Faysal a year ago when his health broke. The immediate issues were variously reported to have been the new budget, which cuts funds allotted to the royal family, and Faysal's refusal to give cabinet posts to two of Saud's sons.

In blocking Saud's challenge, Faysal apparently was supported by most of the important members of the royal family. Throughout the crisis the Saudi regular army remained under the orders of the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, a Faysal adherent. Some observers have reported that the King's action has actually served to strengthen Faysal's position. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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THE TARIFF DISPARITIES ISSUE

The tariff disparities issue which has plagued preparations for the Kennedy Round for many months originates in the fact that there are substantial differences between the EEC and US tariffs on individual items, even though over-all tariff levels are roughly the same. Because the EEC common external tariff was arrived at by averaging the tariffs of the member states, the EEC tariff schedule is characterized by the absence of "peaks and lows"; in the US schedule, on the other hand, the rates vary much more, and some individual tariffs remain very high in comparison with those of the EEC. Accordingly, the EEC and the French in particular have long insisted that a 50-percent cut in tariffs by both the US and the EEC would leave the US with substantial protection on certain items and deprive the EEC of bargaining power to effect their future reduction.

The disparities issue was believed to have been settled at the GATT ministerial meeting last May with a formula which provided that tariffs on industrial items would in general be reduced equally and across the board, except that "special rules" would apply "where significant adverse effects on trade would result from disparities in tariff levels." In fact, however, this formula merely shifted the argument to the problem of determining what disparities are "significant" or "meaningful in trade terms." Because the "special rules" would mean in most cases a smaller tariff reduction by the EEC than by the US, the EEC has attempted to maximize the area to which these rules would apply while the US has sought to minimize their application.

After lengthy negotiation, a GATT subcommittee reached a considerable measure of agreement last month on a formula which would identify a "significant" tariff disparity in the first instance as one in which the high rate is at least 30 percent of value and at least 10 percent above the lower rate. Because this formula would identify some 850 US items as eligible for "special treatment," the subcommittee proposed seven additional qualitative criteria which would reduce considerably the number of eligible items. The three to which the US attaches special importance would (1) require that there be substantial imports of the item concerned from the high tariff country into the low; (2) exclude items where there are substantial imports into the high tariff country; and (3) exclude items on which the low tariff country maintains quotas.

The formula approved by the EEC on 23 December would substitute for the 30/10 criterion a 2/1 formula. A disparity would be identified as one in which the high tariff is twice as high as the low one, apparently with the additional qualification that, in most cases, there would have to be a ten-point percentage spread between the two rates. This formula would provide for special treatment for far more than 850 items, including items of special US export interest. The arrangements for qualitative criteria also seem to have been modified to the US' disadvantage.

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THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS

The Common Market appears to have averted disaster for the second time in less than a year. The eleventh-hour agreements reached on agricultural policy on 23 December are apparently sufficient to discourage De Gaulle from carrying out his threat to break up the community. Moreover, the Germans and Dutch succeeded in extracting limited commitments from Paris on EEC participation in the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations. These agreements do not cover all the outstanding issues, however, and the manner in which they were reached will leave a residue of bitterness. Nor is it certain that major US interests have fared well.

The main agricultural elements in the "package" deal are the regulations concerning intracommunity trade in beef, rice, and dairy products and the rules governing the community farm fund. Their effect is to open the large West German market to farm exports of France, Italy, and the Netherlands--generally at a substantial advantage over the exports of nonmembers. Although approval of these and the financial regulations is an important step forward, the key question of grain price unification is still unsettled. Further consideration of the formula proposed by Commissioner Mansholt has been delayed until next year.

The agreement on a Kennedy Round position is likewise an advance for the community, but from the US view not necessarily favorable. On the long-standing problem of tariff "disparities," the EEC adopted a formula which would exempt from the proposed 50-percent linear reduction in tariffs a far larger number of items than the US hoped for. The EEC position on farm products in the trade negotiations--although an improvement over the initial Mansholt proposals--also leaves much to be desired from the US view. In general, the EEC proposes that, if its levy system operates in such a way as to cause difficulties for the exports of nonmembers, then the EEC Commission will be called on to propose "appropriate," but unspecified, measures. These would not apply if it is technically impossible to determine how much protection is actually involved in the levy system.

The general relief within the community which greeted these agreements reflects both the depth of the crisis and some optimism that the Common Market's unity may have been restored. The prominent role played by the EEC's commission in achieving the compromise has in particular encouraged those who hope to strengthen the community's institutional structure.

In France the conviction was evidently widespread, however, that both Bonn and The Hague were quite prepared to see the French "leave" the Common Market, and in the event of its breakup, to seek alternative ties with the Outer Seven. Moreover, while it may prove healthy that Bonn "stood up" to De Gaulle in this instance, its motive was strongly colored by a desire to protect its inefficient farmers. Nor does it augur well for US-EEC relations that the French blame the US for much of the opposition they encountered. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

13-00000

UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY

British shipping and official circles are incensed over recent US demands for information relating to rate discrimination against US exports. The British Government has advised against compliance on the grounds that this information is commercially confidential, and that the US cannot demand what the UK Government cannot obtain.

Following a recent congressional investigation into alleged rate discrimination against American exports, the US Maritime Commission asked the North Atlantic Freight Conference to explain the differentials on a long list of items, setting a 20 January deadline for compliance under penalty of heavy fines. The US position is that US exporters are being penalized because outward rates are higher on the average than the inward rates.

British and other shipping lines regard the differentials as economically justified. The tonnage of US exports is much greater than import tonnage, and shipping lines--anxious to avoid half-loaded or in-ballast westbound voyages--have traditionally charged lower rates for items imported into the US than for exports from this country.

Thus, what are seen as American efforts to regulate international shipping lines in order to improve the unfavorable US balance of payments have caused increasing rancor in Britain. Before Parliament adjourned for its Christmas recess on 20 December, some Conservative MPs called for retaliatory restrictions on US ships arriving at UK ports. Although the MPs did not specify what restrictions they had in mind, the government cannot afford in the present pre-election period to leave itself open to charges that it is not attentive enough to domestic interests.

The Douglas-Home government, while hopeful of some compromise before the 20 January deadline, is busily lining up international support. At the recently concluded conference of transport ministers of 10 European maritime nations, Britain proposed that Japan be invited to join the united front of European maritime countries in a general protest against US shipping policies, thereby aligning roughly three quarters of the world's shipping business against the US position. Japan agreed to do so, and the collective protest was filed with the State Department on 23 December. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

13-00000

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The opening of the Berlin Wall during the holiday season and the death of Social Democratic Party (SPD) chairman Erich Ollenhauer have placed Willy Brandt once again in the center of the German political stage.

The agreement to open the Wall resulted from Brandt's unceasing efforts to ease conditions for Berliners. His willingness to reach agreement with the East Zone authorities on the pass issue is being criticized by some Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leaders and by the CDU-oriented press in West Germany. Brandt, however, is banking on the expectation that most West Germans, like the Berliners, will approve his action. He has even hinted that there may be further negotiations with the East Germans to extend the period of the passes beyond the 5 January cutoff date. There is also speculation that both East and West Germany will find the pass agreement a model for agreement on other issues.

Brandt, who was the most logical choice, was named acting chairman of the SPD immediately after Ollenhauer's death on 14 December. Deputy Chairman Herbert Wehner has proposed that Brandt's position be formalized at a special party convention next month. Fritz Erler, the party's foreign and defense expert, is slated to take Brandt's place in the hierarchy as second deputy chairman. As the SPD leader, Brandt would stand to be candidate for chancellor in the 1965 general elections. If current opinion polls are any indication, the SPD will give the CDU a strong race in that contest.

Brandt, however, has not yet committed himself, since to accept the SPD chairmanship might require him to resign as mayor of Berlin and move to Bonn. In so doing he would have to operate at a distance from his political bastion.

Whatever Brandt decides, the SPD is bound to miss the conciliating influence of Ollenhauer, who was able to hold together the often highly antagonistic factions of the party. Brandt, with his ideas of greater flexibility in foreign policy, may be expected to clash more frequently with Wehner, who--despite his Communist past--has come to represent the SPD's right wing. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

13-00000

AREA NOTES

NATO: The NATO ministerial meeting in Paris, which ended on 17 December, avoided serious discussion of the more contentious issues facing the alliance. There was, for instance, only passing reference to the matter of nuclear sharing. While NATO's military posture was generally recognized as still inadequate, the Force Planning exercise--which is designed to help correct this situation--was not discussed at all. The dispute over basic strategy, the chief stumbling block to the exercise, was put off until after De Gaulle's press conference sometime in January.

All but the French agreed that the alliance should explore possibilities of negotiating with the Soviets on outstanding East-West issues. The Germans, as usual, indicated some reservations because of their sensitivity regarding Berlin and German reunification. The question of restricting Western credits to the Soviet bloc was reserved for future consideration. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Iceland's near general strike was settled on 21 December when labor and management agreed to a 25-percent wage increase. The 11-day work stoppage was led by Communist-dominated unions seeking, as in the past, to force the resignation of the Conservative - Social Democratic government by discrediting its economic policies. The settlement is regarded as a political victory for Prime Minister Benediktsson's government, since the Communists were unable to maintain a solid grip on labor.

The settlement, however, will intensify inflationary pressures and will probably force Benediktsson to take extraordinary measures to maintain economic stability. For political reasons he will try to avoid another currency devaluation, but it is doubtful that the government can maintain its economic stabilization program without resorting to this measure. (CONFIDENTIAL)

13-00000

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA

Fidel Castro is continuing his effort to reduce the influence of the veteran Communists who were leaders of the Moscow-oriented, pre-revolutionary Communist party of Cuba. Castro's campaign against them, launched in a bitter attack in March 1962, subsequently seemed to lose steam. Recent reports from knowledgeable clandestine sources, however, indicate that the old liners are again on the defensive and are likely to suffer further in government shake-ups which may be in the offing. Castro nevertheless continues to move slowly in order to avoid undue disruption within his regime.

The only major veteran Communist figure to remain in Castro's good graces is Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, the head of the National Agrarian Reform Institute. Rodriguez' position has actually been strengthened in recent weeks with the raising of his job to cabinet level. He has evidently convinced Castro of his personal loyalty and of his ability as an administrator. It is also possible that Rodriguez performs a useful and trusted liaison role between Castro and Soviet leaders. He returned to Havana on 22 December after a two-week trip to the USSR and several Soviet satellites where, according to press accounts, he was in contact with high-ranking Communist Party officials.

The old-line Cuban Communists remain strong, according to a recent clandestine report, in the intermediate and lower echelons of the military and party hierarchies. Wherever possible, they continue their "sectarian" efforts to secure positions for their comrades at the expense of Fidelistas. A clandestine source reported hearing "rumors" in high regime circles late last month that veteran Communists have banded together in clandestine cells to work against Castro.

Che Guevara continues to be the Cuban leader most openly critical of the Soviet Union and the most insistent on the "necessity" of accelerating the revolution in Latin America. Fidel Castro is said to agree with Guevara's position, but awareness of Cuba's own self-interest still compels him to be more cautious in pursuing policies that could be interpreted as anti-Soviet. It nevertheless remains a key regime policy to encourage Communist revolution in Latin America.

A clandestine source who is a high-level Cuban diplomat asserts that Cuban leaders privately recognize that popular discontent with the regime is widespread. He claims, however, that they are confident their unpopularity has reached its nadir, and that they are beginning to make up lost ground. They expect, for instance, that economic difficulties--a major source of discontent--will be largely overcome within three years. The strategy of the government, this source reports, is to hold on until the economy improves and until Cuban subversive efforts elsewhere in Latin America result in the establishment of one or more Communist allies in the hemisphere. Then, the regime feels, it will be secure. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

13-00000

DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES

The killing of 15 guerrillas by Dominican Army troops on 21 December apparently removes the last pocket of insurgents opposing the government. However, the incident could provoke dangerous political repercussions.

Emilio De Los Santos, head of the governing military-installed triumvirate, resigned in protest over what he regarded as the brutal and unnecessary killing of the insurgents, including the president of the pro-Castro 14th of June Political Group. The army commander of the area in which the incident took place insists the deaths were the unavoidable result of a fire fight. If stories of armed forces "brutality" become widespread, however, they could provoke dangerous hostility toward the regime from rank-and-file Dominicans, who recall the repressive measures of former dictator Trujillo.

The resignation of De Los Santos precipitated frantic maneuvering within the government among civilian and military elements. Only the prompt appointment of Foreign Minister Donald Reid to the vacant post in the triumvirate appears to have helped avert a serious political crisis for the moment.

The triumvirate has asked the cabinet--which was chosen from and is responsible to six minority political parties--to resign to permit the appointment of a more independent group. This move has prompted strong protests from four of the splinter parties backing the regime, who stand to lose patronage; the outcome is unclear.

However, the National Civic Union, the only sizable party in the government, backs the cabinet reorganization. More important, the key leaders of the armed forces are providing the triumvirate with their support, which could prove crucial in a political showdown. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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13-00000

BRAZIL

Further changes in the Brazilian cabinet are expected following the resignation last week of Finance Minister Carvalho Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney Galvao, was appointed Pinto's successor, but there remains a possibility that Leonel Brizola--who had been actively pushed for the post by the extreme left--may eventually receive some ministry. There is widespread belief in the army that War Minister Jair Ribeiro will also be replaced in the near future. As one responsible Brazilian commentator has remarked, with Goulart "every minister is an interim one."

Ney Galvao's appointment actually reduces the previously slight prospect that Brazil's critical financial problems would be handled effectively. Galvao's qualifications in the economic field are weak at best and his record as head of the Bank of Brazil does not command confidence within the business community. Before taking his new post, he served as minister without portfolio in charge of coordinating foreign trade policies, a job he performed without any particular distinction.

Although his views are perhaps somewhat to the right of Goulart's, Galvao can be expected to toe the adminstration line faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's appointment may be a temporary expedient designed to allay fears that Brizola would succeed Pinto. Galvao is a personal friend of Brizola and there is speculation that Brizola will, in fact, eventually move into the Finance Ministry.

The new finance minister inherits almost insurmountable economic and financial problems. Chief among these are a rampant inflation that may see the cost of living increase 80 percent this year, and a staggering foreign debt involving approximately $1 billion in payments due over the next two years.

The severity of the economic situation and Goulart's apparent intention to assume greater personal direction over financial policies increase the possibility of radical measures that might be detrimental to foreign creditors and investors. Goulart reportedly is considering nationalization of all public utilities and cancellation of mining concessions. Measures such as these could lead to further deterioration of Brazil's economic position. (SECRET)

AREA NOTE

Bolivia: The political competition between Bolivian Vice President Juan Lechin and President Victor Paz Estenssoro is bound to intensify sharply as each maneuvers to line up support for the presidential nomination at next month's convention of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Lechin probably still hopes to pull an upset by dislodging Paz or at least to demonstrate sufficient strength to assure himself of retaining his vice-presidential post. Paz seems certain, however, to be able to control the party's convention, assure his renomination, and designate his own running mate.

If the forthcoming convention repudiates Lechin, he may well withdraw from the MNR and establish a "popular front" political party. He probably could count on the support of political groups ranging from leftist extremists to disgruntled factions within right-wing parties. It would seem unlikely, though, that these disparate groups could coalesce into an organization powerful enough to defeat Paz' well-organized machine in the elections set for June. (SECRET)

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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

KENT EXTRACT

Mr. William M. Kent joined the Agency in December 1951. He had previously received a degree in diplomatic and public relations from the Latin American Institute, New York City and had served time in the U.S. Army from 1946 to 1948. He graduated from the Latin American Institute with the highest honors and 4 awards.

Mr. Kent was initially assigned to the Office of Special Operations as a clerk typist and, after six months, in June 1952, was assigned to [Panama] as an intelligence officer under non-official cover. In July 1956 he returned to Headquarters where he worked as an area operations officer in the Western Hemisphere Division. After a successful stint in the Cuba section he was assigned as an operations officer to [Caracas]. After an excellently productive tour in [Caracas], Mr. Kent was selected to join JMWAVE in Miami. There he really shone as attested to in the following quote from his fitness report: "He has been placed in most difficult positions, particularly in the handling of incompatible people and groups which he has managed without alienating either side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible by satisfying everyone concerned." After his tour in Miami, he headed several sections in Headquarters in the Western Hemisphere Division. In 1967 he was transferred to New Orleans and then to the Washington Base. In both places he worked under [non-official cover]. From 1970 until his retirement he served in several capacities ranging from the planning and guiding of Covert Action programs to occupying managerial positions. During these eight years he received seven strong and three outstanding overall ratings. Of special note are the various commendation and laudatory reports concerning Mr. Kent's performance during the "Chilean crisis". Because of his excellent performance during the Chilean crisis he again was asked to help the Latin American Division during several investigations. He performed admirably as reflected in a commendation written by the Deputy Chief of LA Division on 5 December 1975: "When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, but to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15 July. On the second occasion his contribution

4/N

CONFIDENTIAL

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was used by the DDO in his appearance before the Senate Select Committee on 28 October. Both of these papers were excellent and have withstood critical scrutiny."

Mr. Kent has now left the Agency after 26 years of distinguished service as an operations officer and as a manager both in the field and at Headquarters. On the occasion of his retirement, it is appropriate that Mr. Kent's career achievements be suitably recognized. It is recommended that he be awarded the Career Intelligence Medal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.

104-10304-10000 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

PERS 79-1222

all T-1-12-79

A11x 790112

8 January 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel

SUBJECT : Annual Fitness Report - George Joannides
Operations Officer
GS-16
ESN 064818 23
DOB 5 July 1922
067180743

1. This Memorandum in Lieu of Fitness Report is prepared in accordance with HR 20-20, for the period mid-June 1978 through 12 January 1979. The occasion of the Fitness Report is the retirement of the rating official.

2. The undersigned was detailed in mid-May to serve as the Agency's Principal Coordinator for work with the House Select Committee on Assassinations. As it became apparent that the volume of the work required assignment of additional full-time personnel, the decision was made that one experienced officer was needed to handle the DDO account. A senior officer experienced in DDO work and available to serve for several months was requested. Mr. Joannides was known to the undersigned by reputation, although not personally, and arrangements were made for his detail to the work. While there is no way to outline the qualifications that one should have for this sort of work, it became quickly clear that Mr. Joannides was the perfect man for it.

3. Mr. Joannides was responsible for a new procedure in recording of exchanges with the HSCA. As it developed, the Agency's logs and records on the status of requests by the HSCA and the Agency's responses became the only reliable record; it was clear that the HSCA often did not know the status of business in this respect and time and time again had to come to this office for clarification. Beyond that early contribution to the ordering of the affairs of the office, Mr. Joannides handled day-to-day follow-ups of requirements by telephone with the DDO focal point as well as throughout the DDO. Further, the firm position that he took with the young investigators in response to aggressive harassment on some occasions was exactly what the situation called for. A person of his maturity and experience handled the job exactly as required by the situation. If the peculiar nature of the work did not call on Mr. Joannides for all the talents of his wide experience, it nonetheless was his experience and quick perceptions that ensured a superior performance. His advice and

2/mc 1/19

counselling on courses of action to cope with unique situations was always sound and responsible.

4. The work in this assignment provided little occasion for Mr. Joannides to demonstrate attitudes on either EEO matters or economy, considerations that are required by regulation for comment in Fitness Reports. As a result, no comment is made.

5. Not because of the demands on his superior talents, but because of the cool efficacy with which he handled an unusual special assignment, Mr. Joannides' work is evaluated as Outstanding.

S. D. Breckinridge

I certify that I have seen the comments in the Narrative section of this memorandum.

George Joannides — Date: 8 Jan 79

KC 1/14

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: [064818] 08

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Joannides, George	7-5-22	M	[GS-14]	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
Ops. Officer	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*: 1 April 1963 - 31 March 1964

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

- W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
- A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
- P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
- S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
- O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Supervises and manages the Station's covert action branch which employs [ten] staff officers and [seven] contract employees.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Serves as senior case officer for a student project which involves distribution of printed propaganda, production of radio programs, and the development of political action programs.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Maintains liaison with the FI, CI and PM branch chiefs, in order to insure that the Station's covert action effort is appropriately supporting the missions of the other branches.	[P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Conducts production and security reviews on the Station's covert action operations.	[P]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5:	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: [S]

8 JUN 1964

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
JUN 4 8 05 AM '64
MAIL ROOM

Subject is a hard working, dedicated and effective officer who has proven by performance that he can accomplish assigned operational tasks in allowable time limits. The period covered by this fitness report represents Subject's initial Agency exposure to those first echelon management responsibilities which are implicit in a branch chief's assignment in a Station that has [313] employees. Subject responded to the challenge of the first echelon supervisory responsibilities in an exemplary manner. Subject managed a branch that had a yearly budget of two million four hundred thousand dollars. These funds were judiciously spent on printed propaganda, white and black radio programs, and on political action operations which were implemented via labor, student and professional groups. Subject has the knack of judiciously blending quality with quantity and in this melding effort, Subject reflected cost consciousness and effectiveness in the use of personnel, space equipment and funds. Subject has a distinct flair for political action operations and can translate policy directives into meaningful action programs by all of his assets. Subject has the ability to delegate authority and to appropriately fix responsibility with those officers whom he supervises. In the management field, Subject's only discernible weakness is a tendency to be abrupt with subordinates. It is believed that this minor shortcoming will be overcome with the acquisition of added experience in the field of personnel management. On balance therefore, Subject's overall performance as a supervisor and as an intelligence officer warrants an evaluation of "[Strong]"
(CONTINUED)

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
15 May 1964	/s/ [redacted] (signed in pseudo on Field Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
22 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
15 May 1964	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Although I have had few chances to personally observe [redacted] work, I concur in the supervisor's comments and rating due to my general impression of [redacted] capabilities and performance of duty received in occasional meetings extending over a number of years.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
1 June 1964	Deputy Chief, WH (SA)	Bruce B. Cheever

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CONTINUATION SHEET

Section C - Narrative Comments

Subject has additional growth potential as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Ethnic origins, foreign language fluency and experience acquired to date generally dictates a career for Subject in the general arena of Greek operations. While the major thrust of Subject's career orientation should be geared toward Greece and its related problems, it is believed that it is essential that, on a periodic basis, Subject be directed into non-Greek areas of interest, in order that the continued challenge of new horizons will stimulate Subject to develop to his full capacity. In practical terms, this means that out of any eight-year time cycle, at least two years should be spent by Subject on non-Greek or even non-European affairs. This officer has the potential to be a broad-gauged officer but he must be stimulated and led in that direction which will fully harness the totality of his potential.

The rating officer would be pleased to have Subject work with him at any other Field Station that might be entrusted to the rating officer.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER: 064818

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Joannides, George E.	5 Jul 1922	M	GS-14	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
OPS OFFICER	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT: CAREER / RESERVE / TEMPORARY / CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C) / SPECIAL (Specify):

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL / XX REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR / ANNUAL / REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE / SPECIAL (Specify):

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.:

12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-): 1 January 1963 - 31 July 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

Specific Duty	Rating Letter
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects of political action and psychological warfare activity and supervising (fourteen) case officers and clerical personnel.	O
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Case officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and a hemisphere-wide apparatus.	S
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

POSTED ON 17 Oct 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.

RATING LETTER: S

17 OCT 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Reference is made to paragraph C of subject's previous fitness report dated 10 January 1963 which is still applicable. During the period covered by this report subject has done an excellent job in the handling of a significant student exile group which hitherto had successfully resisted any important degree of control. Under subject's direction an exile teachers' group reached a high level of effectiveness in the propaganda field and was turned over to another case officer.

Subject has effectively terminated unproductive operations in the prop field (one magazine and a news letter) and is building up Station radio capability directed at the maintarget.

His high professional standards, complete comprehension of the problems faced by the Station and strong urge to win in our struggle with the opposition make it a distinct pleasure to see him take over as Chief of the PW branch.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

1. BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
JUL 31 1963	/s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed in pseudo on Fld. Transmittal)

2. BY SUPERVISOR

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
15 months		
DATE	**OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR**	**TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE**
31 July 1963	Chief, PW	/s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

3. BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL - The Reviewing Officer is familiar with Subject's work based primarily on discussions with Subject and Subject's supervisor, general observation of Subject during the past year and frequently reviewing his completed work. Subject is an extremely hard working, dedicated individual with an ability to develop rapport quickly with his contacts. Subject works long hours including weekends without complaining and is always available when there is a job to be done. Subject has demonstrated those qualities of management, initiative, drive and devotion to duty that are necessary to perform the many and varied tasks of a fast and continually changing situation. The Reviewing Officer concurs with the Rating Officer's overall evaluation of [Strong] 99

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
SEP 24 1963	Deputy Chief of Station	/s/ Frederick J. INGHURST (signed in pseudo on Fld. Trans.)

SECRET

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C	NARRATIVE COMMENTS

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

No change from previous report submitted 19 January 1963.

SECTION D	CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS	
1.	BY EMPLOYEE	
	I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT	
DATE 27 March 63	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE /s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)	
2.	BY SUPERVISOR	
MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION 12	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
DATE 27 March 63	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR Chief, PW Branch	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)
3.	BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL	
COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL		
DATE 2 April 1963	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL Chief of Station, JMWAVE	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE /s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
~~037717~~ [064818]

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Joannides, George E.	5 July 1922	Male	GS-14	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
OPS OFFICER	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*			X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL *(Specify):*			SPECIAL *(Specify):*		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
	1 January 1963 - 31 March 1963

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised).*

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	

Annual fitness report covering the Period 1 January - 31 December 62 still current.

POSTED ON OF-45
10 Apr 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance. | RATING LETTER

16 APR 1963

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

Sof Agent

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER
08 [064818] 037747

FITNESS REPORT

SECTION A GENERAL

1. NAME (Last) (First) (Middle)	2. DATE OF BIRTH	3. SEX	4. GRADE	5. SD
Joannides, George E.	5 July 1922	Male	[GS-14]	D

6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT	8. CURRENT STATION
OPS OFFICER	DDP/S.A.S.	JMWAVE

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT			10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT		
CAREER	RESERVE	TEMPORARY	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
CAREER-PROVISIONAL (See instructions - Section C)			X ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
SPECIAL (Specify):			SPECIAL (Specify):		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.	12. REPORTING PERIOD (From- to-)
	1 January 1962 - 31 December 1962

SECTION B PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak: Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.

A - Adequate: Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.

P - Proficient: Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.

S - Strong: Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.

O - Outstanding: Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

List up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the manner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees with supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise (indicate number of employees supervised).

SPECIFIC DUTY	RATING LETTER
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 1: Deputy Chief of Branch handling (in absence of Chief) all aspects political action and psychological warfare and supervising [fifteen] case officers and clerical personnel. 24	[O]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 2: Case Officer for student project involving political action, propaganda, intelligence collection and hemisphere-wide apparatus.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 3: Case Officer for teacher's organization engaged in hemisphere-wide press and radio propaganda.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 4: Case Officer on project producing news letter aimed at press outlets in Latin America.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 5: Maintains contacts with key elements of a veteran's type organization as a developmental project.	[S]
SPECIFIC DUTY NO. 6:	

POSTED ON 26 Feb 63

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

	RATING LETTER
Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and particular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, place the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	[S]

FORM 4-62 45 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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SECRET
(When Filled In)

SECTION C — **NARRATIVE COMMENTS**

Indicate significant strengths or weaknesses demonstrated in current position keeping in proper perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject's strengths lie in his ability to analyze a problem quickly and skillfully, to strip it of unnecessary detail and to render a decision without waste of motion. He has contributed greatly to the efficiency of the Branch by eliminating unproductive ventures, counseling the members and promoting the principles of correct tradecraft. He has been successful in resolving complicated problems involving control of an unruly group. He has a strong personality and firm convictions about the proper manner of carrying on covert operations and voices his convictions without fear. He is an excellent supervisor and is respected by the members of the branch for his forthrightness and his sober judgment and sound advice. His handling of agents and contacts on the outside both directly and indirectly mixes to a proper extent firmness and friendliness. In short he is a distinct asset to the clandestine services both administratively and operationally.

SECTION D — **CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS**

1. **BY EMPLOYEE**

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

DATE	SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE
19 JAN 63	/s/ Walter D. NEWBY (signed on Field Transmittal)

2. **BY SUPERVISOR**

MONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN UNDER MY SUPERVISION	IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION	
10 months		
DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
19 JAN 63	Chief/PW - JMWAVE	/s/ Robert K. TROUCHARD (signed on Field Transmittal)

3. **BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL**

COMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Subject is an unusually competent officer in the field of covert action operations in that he blends a flair for this activity with sound tradecraft principles and a firm adherence to valid reporting techniques. Subject is dedicated and hard working and he has proven by performance that he is willing to work long hours in order to accomplish his operational objectives. Subject's overall performance warrants an evaluation of "strong". Subject has growth potential both as an intelligence officer and as a first echelon supervisor of individuals doing a basic intelligence task. Subject's activities come to the attention of the reviewing officer on a weekly basis.

DATE	OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL	TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE
FEB 15 1963	Chief of Station, JMWAVE	/s/ Andrew K. REUTEMAN (signed on Field Transmittal)

SECRET

104-10306-10007 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DCI

1 October 1963

NOTES FOR MR. McCONE:

1. DDP has prepared for your information a summary of General Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to the U.S. Attached to this summary are the four most important papers as follows:

   a. Your position paper;
   b. CIA commitments paper;
   c. Memorandum for the record on DDP briefings;
   d. Record of conversation with the President.

   The visit is considered to have been a success and Chiang Ching-kuo returned with an understanding that any abrupt move by his government to recover the mainland with military force would not be supported by this country. Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the position paper and CIA's commitments paper, and our station is now working out cooperation on intelligence and operational activities against the mainland.

2. In commenting on the proposal to send Dr. Cavanagh to Rome, Bill Harvey suggests that Cavanagh be certified to the Vatican as your personal representative, and suggests you might do this through Cardinal Cicognani or Archbishop O'Connor. Request your guidance.

3. DDP has run another assessment of the reliability of the documentary material provided by Penkovskiy and see no reason to change their statement of 31 May to USIB that it was "a most serious penetration of Soviet officialdom and one that will hurt them for years to come". Helms suggests you have this assessment checked with DDI and OSI and if they concur, re-assure USIB along the above lines.

4. Dez FitzGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs recently on his overall program against Cuba. In the discussion the main thing that emerged was General LeMay's view that the present program was far too small to

13-00000

overthrow Castro. General LeMay wondered why we did not use bombings. There was also a discussion of Navy and Air Force programs to protect raiders in international waters and in the event of hot pursuit. It was agreed that further planning would be conducted.

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5. [John Warner has reviewed the record of recent congressional debates on the test ban treaty and finds 13 senators made reference to you. No one criticized you. Senators Pastore, Humphrey, and Anderson praised you.]

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6. [John Warner has prepared a recommendation based on his reading that our standing in Congress is currently on the decline. He suggests that you meet privately with such members as Russell, Saltonstall, Vinson, and Arends to seek advice and develop a strategy for public statements by these members and other Subcommittee members.]

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7. [Mr. Kirkpatrick has forwarded a memorandum on efforts to obtain a replacement for Colonel Grogan.]

8. Dick Helms has forwarded a memorandum of his briefing of the Bureau of Budget officials on the Agency's covert action programs. McGeorge Bundy attended and offered 2 opinions: (a) that there be a regular annual briefing of the Special Group on covert operations as a whole, and (b) that during the present period of apparent detente there might well be very good reasons for investing even greater resources in covert actions.

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9. [John Bross has forwarded a memorandum for the record on your meeting with Generals Carter, Blake, and Carroll about personnel security. Bross is presently drafting a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this subject which is being reviewed by Houston and Bannerman.]

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10. [Mr. Gilpatric has written you a letter confirming his conversation about assigning Frank Hand as Special Assistant to General Carroll. I suggest I pass this to General Carter for Agency action.]

W. Elder

18 June 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1. Item I: Autonomous Operations

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for $25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement, that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico, and that we will give him financial support.

2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S. or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless courses of action.

3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group. It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action against the individuals involved.

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

SECRET EYES ONLY

I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been no conversation on the subject.

ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release of the leaflets.

J am/mfb

13-00000

TOP SECRET

NON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143

1 of 3

ACTION: FE 1-8

TEIF034

OO RUEPIA

A

DE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z

O 180627Z

FM COMUSMACV

TO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSE

RUEPDA/SECSTATE

RUEPDA/OSD

RUEPIA/CIA

RUEKDA/JCS

INFO RUHPA/CINCPAC

ZEN/AMEMB SAIGON

RUHPA/CAS HONO

BT

TS 941

9-DCI
10-DDCI
11-DDP
12-ADDP
13-SOD
14-FILE
15-VR
16-RF

18 JUN 64 IN 09143

T O P S E C R E T MAC SOG 5050

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECAT

EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHIS

WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND

HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGE

AND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.

A. OPLAN 34A

1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND

JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS

#9

TOP SECRET

13-00000

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVAILABILITY OF OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.

2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN 34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.

3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES MUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES:

A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OBTAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND IS ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS COULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO US COULD BE MORE READILY SUBSTANTIATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENT PERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS TEAM OPERATIONS.

C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM, BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE PRINTED MATTER.

D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TO IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER. USE OF US PAPER AND INDIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENT

13-00000

TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.

E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.

F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.

4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PRE-PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY WITHIN 48 HOURS.

GP-1

BT

13-00000

3 April

4/14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A. All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing. I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of organization had past, we might get some better results.

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[The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting On Wednesday, the 8th.]

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2. [Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an interim basis.

ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appropriate actions by the Department of Defense through their representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, compensation and care of these captains.]

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3. [Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia. It was agreed that the field would be instructed to carefully observe operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians, the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.

ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV.]

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4. [Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined. Secretary Vance's paper was approved.]

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5. [The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view against Laotian overflights.]

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved. Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.

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7. [The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about the handling of funds.]

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8. [Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in London.]

OTHER MATTERS:

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1 [Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2 was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.]

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2. [Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile intrusion into Cambodia and Laos. Indications were that the photography had produced no useful information for MACV.

ACTION: This question should be studied and brought up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable Carter to investigate fully.]

JAM/mfb

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13-00000

27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

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1. [The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's letter of February 26th.

1. Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.

2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast line.

3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South Vietnamese border.

4. That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles from South Vietnam.

With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the 21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they should cover the entire country.]

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and

1/mc

medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached. Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant progress.

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3. [The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.]

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4. [The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.]

JAM/mfb

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13-00000

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

File

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached is a paper which I would like to table for discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.

Cyrus Vance
Cyrus R. Vance

Attachment

Mr Jessup,
Will you circulate to members &
ask U.A. Johnson's people to bring Mann
or [illegible] Alexis' [illegible] closely with him/
McGB

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

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TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks. Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba. In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba

1. Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships (such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible, it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subsequently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.

SECRET EYES ONLY

COPY No. 1 of 6 COPIES

3. Covert Economic Activities.

a) Intensify covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.

b) Make it known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."



c) Form a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow, Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose (such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).

Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin America against whom a concentrated program of bribery, blackmail and coercion can be instituted.

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping, and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow supporters.

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and political activity designed to increase internal dissension within Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition, surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.

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104-10306-10011 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
	Apr 6	DCI, Fubini, Bross	Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Mr. Bross
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Brewster	Breakfast at Hqs. M/R to be prepared by Warner.
	Apr 7	DCI, Sen. Saltonstall Warner, Helms	M/R to be prepared by Warner.
--	Apr 8	DCI, [Gen. Dethleffsen C/Intel Directorate W. German Intel Serv.] [Dr. Klaus Ritter, Gen. Quehlin,] R. Jack Smith Bronson Tweedy	See TAPE #121
~~48~~	~~Apr 8~~	~~DCI, Harriman,~~ Helms, G. Fields	~~M/R to be prepared by Glenn Fields--Also M/R by DCI--[Tshombe & Nyerere, Brazzaville; Equatorial Africa & French; Zanzibar]~~ Destroyed MBrand 1-28-72
	Apr 8	DCI, Dr. John Foster	Met at the Residence--
--	Apr 9	DCI, Amb Jack Hood Vaughn, Rufus Z. Smith, Herbert & Cline	See TAPE # 122
	Apr 9	DCI, Amb. Kohler	At the residence--
--	Apr 10	DCI, Wm. Manchester Chretien	Met in DCI's ofc See TAPE #123
	Apr 13	DCI - Lee Col. Mark Killen - SST	(see separate SST file)
--	Apr 14	DCI, [Augustine Edwards] [Chile], FitzGerald, Herbert	See TAPE # 124 [Edwards is a newspaperman in Chile]
~~48.5~~	~~Apr 14~~	~~DCI, Hadyn Williams,~~ Russell Smith (Asia Found) Helms, Lapham, Ned Barnes	~~M/R to be prepared by Helms? Barnes?~~ Destroyed MBrand 1/28/72
--	Apr 15	DCI, Secy Vance	Lunch/meeting with Vance See TAPE #125
~~48.6~~	apr 16	DCI, Cannon Comte Warner	Briefed Cannon Comte (M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Warne See Congressional Comte file
~~49~~	~~Apr 16~~	~~DCI, Robt. Anderson~~	~~Met with Anderson in Bundy's ofc - campaign funds to [Panama]~~ Destroyed MBrand 1-28-72
	Apr 16	DCI, Ch Justice Warren, Sen Cooper Stern, Rankin, Willens	Met in DCI's office
--	Apr 18	DCI, SecDec, Black, Dillon, Lindbergh, et al	re: SST (Accompanied by Alexander) (see separate SST file)
--	Apr 21	DCI, Ted Lewis, Ch, Wash Bureau, NY Daily News Chretien	M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #
	Apr 21	DCI, Frank Wisner	
~~50~~	~~Apr 22~~	~~DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara Majority & Minority Ldrs~~	~~Breakfast Mtg at White House (See M/R #22 of Pres. File)~~

9/mc

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
50	22 Apr	DCI, Pres, Rusk, McNamara, Majority & Minority Ldrs	Breakfast meeting at White House (See M/R #22 in President's File)
51	22 Apr	DCI, Rusk	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 Cambodia-Laotian border, Italian SecGen of NATO, visit of [Eshkol, Cyprus, Brazil, Barrington of Burm Italian talk deal, exchange of W and L.] 11
52	22 Apr Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72	DCI, Eisenhower	Organ. of Pres. office, Soviet Military & Economic strength, Sino-Soviet Dispute, SVN, [Cyprus, Zanziba] 11,11 presidential elections (SEE SEPARATE FILE MARKED, "M/R #52 - Mtg w/Eisenhower - 22 Apr 64
52.5	27 Apr	DCI, Gen. Pakravan (Iran), Conway, Critchfield	See TAPE #127 also M/R prepared by Critchfield. Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	28 Apr	DCI, David Wise & Tom Lambert of Herald Tribune & Paul Chretien	Luncheon meeting - M/R to be prepared by Chretien See TAPE #129
--	28 Apr	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 128
53	29 Apr	DCI, McNamara	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 Col. Walters, problems w/satellite reconnaissance,
54	29 Apr	DCI, [Archduke Otto] 6	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 [Baodai and Vietnam; Angola, Mozambique] 6 11,11
	30 Apr	DCI, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Wheelon	re: types of aircraft--M/R to be prepared by Wheelo No M/R per Wheelon - see M/R of 5 May mtg attended by DDCI + Wheelon - M/R in Wheelon's ofc
--	1 May	DCI, [Gen. Dogu (Turkish] 6,8 Intel), Phil Dibble, Bill Doyle	See TAPE # 131
	1 May	DCI, Mr. Bundy	Lunch at Bundy's ofc--
55	2 May	DCI, Secy McNamara	Destroyed MBeard 1-27-72 SST, ECM equip. over Cuba, OXCART
--	2 May	Paragraphs 1-4 in SST file DCI M/R	PFIAB Report on NRO (see "NRO Package" in NRO file)
56	3 May	DCI, [Mrs. Fleur Cowles Montague-Meyer] 6	[Harold Wilson, Labor Govt, England] 6,8 and his relationship with the Soviet Union Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	4 May	DCI, [Sir Kenneth Strong] 6 [Alan Crick,] 6 Cline	See TAPE # 132
56.5	4 May	SecState, AG, Bundy A. Johnson	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 re: Angola and Mozambique M/R prepared by Glen Fields
57	5 May	DCI Memo	Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72 Re: The Invisible Government, by Wise and Ross
57.5	5 May	DCI, Meany, Meyer	M/R Cuba prepared by Cord Meyer [Chile, Brit. Guia] 11,11 Brazil, SVN Africa etc Destroyed MBeard
--	7 May	DCI, [ex-Pres Somoza] 6,8 Col King	Re: Cuba? See TAPE # 134
58	11 May	DCI, Clyde Weed, Brinkerhof & parttime Helms, FitzGerald, Col King	re: Elections in Chile Also see TAPE #135 MBeard Destroyed 1-28-72

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Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	13 May	DCI & Bundy	re: NRO report and NSAM on Communications
	14 May	DCI, Rankin (No MR expected)	Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms) ~~M/R to be prepared by Mr. Helms~~ Helms saw Commission transcript & returned it to the Comm.
--	14 May	DCI, Bundy	
~~58.1~~	~~14 May~~	~~DCI, Scotty Reston~~ Yerxa, Frankel, Szulc, Helms, Cline Chretien	Lunch at N.Y. ~~Times of M/R to be prepared by~~ Chretien- Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
--	15 May	DCI, Gov. Rockefeller Kent	Presidential candidate briefing - ~~M/R to be prepare by Dr. Kent~~
~~58.3~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, David Wise,~~ Tom Ross, Kirkpatrick Chretien	~~See TAPE # 136 re: The Invisible Govt.~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.5~~	~~15 May~~	~~DCI, Hedley Donovan~~ Chas Murphy, Tom Griffeth, John Steele, Geo. Hunt, Cline, Helms, Chretien, Elder	~~Working dinner at residence -- M/R to be prepare~~ by Elder Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
~~58.7~~	~~17 May~~	~~DCI, Rusk, McNamara~~ Harriman, Wm Bundy McNaughton	~~Southeast Asia -- settled on cable for Lodge~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
59	18 May	DCI, Rusk, McNamara Wm & Mac Bundy	Southeast Asia --Laos & SVN; US forces to Thailand; T-28's; military action against NVN; telecon to Amb Unger
~~60~~	~~18 May~~	~~DCI, Wm. Hearst, Jr.~~ Conniff, Considine, Kaplan, Warner, Chretien	~~Lunch--M/R to be prepared by Warner or Chretien~~ Sov Policy & Mil posture; Sino-Sov Rift; Diem coup; SEA; Cuba; Bay of Pigs; Sov Economy; U-2 & All MBeard to ER to destroy - 1-28-72
--	18 May	DCI, Fubini	(Partially taped) TAPE #137
--	19 May	DCI, Sam Papich	SEE TAPE #138
--	19 May	DCI, Russell Comte	M/R to be prepared by Warner (see Congressional Contacts...)
~~61~~	~~19 May~~	~~DCI, J. J. McCloy~~	~~Dinner at residence -- re: Oswald~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72
	21 May	DCI, Joe Alsop	Lunch at residence
--	21 May	DCI, Gov. Scranton	Presidential Candidate Briefing
~~62~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI, Gen. Eisenhower~~	~~Briefed at Gettysburg~~ Destroyed
	27 May	DCI, Mike Forrestal	Lunch at residence
	28 May	DCI, Mr. Greenwood	Friend from Seattle, Wash.
	28 May	DCI, Dr. McMillan	See TAPE # 139
~~63~~	~~25 May~~	~~DCI paper~~	~~Notes on draft memo of May 25th re SVN~~ Destroyed MBeard 1-28-72

CONTINUED IN FILE #4

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File #4
Page 1
1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
64	1 Jun	DCI memo	2 May Repoet of President's Board on NRO
65	1 & 2 June	HONOLULU Mtgs	Oservations and Agreed Actions on SVN
--	3 June	DCI, Gov. Harriman	Lunch
	4 June	DCI, [Gen. Meir Amit (Israel)] Ephraim Levy, Helms, Angleton, [Millett] [John Hadden]	See TAPE # ~~139~~ 140
65.2	4 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Room on Laos M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Colb
65.5	5 June	DCI, Colby	White House Mtg on SEA (M/R prepared by Colby)
	5 June	DCI, For Min Quat (Vietnam) Colby, [Paragellis]	See TAPE # 14?
--	4 June	Rusk, McNamara, Bundy et al	Mtg at State Dept fr 8:30 to midnight?
66	6 June	McGeorge Bundy	Problems re getting Joint Resolution to commit troops to Laos. Problems with Clifford Report recommendations. Provisions for CIA's re-entry in active role in SVN.
66	6 June	Mike Forrestal	DCI request for research of SEATO Agreement. Also attached memo fr Forrestal re AID Rep for Saigon
	9 June	Joseph Alsop	Dinner at Alsop's residence--
67	10 June	DCI, Colby	Mtg in Sit Mr re Laos & SVN (M/R to be prepared b Colby)
68	11 June	DCI Memo	Thinking paper for internal mtg on Course of Action in Laos
69	12 June	DCI, Mr & Mrs. Henry Luce	Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME No Distributed
70	15 June	DCI, Colby, Cooper	ExCom Mtg on SEA M/R prepared by Colby DCI [illegible]
	15 June	DCI, W. W. Rostow	Lunch in SDR
	15 June	DCI, Amb. Bowles, James Grant, Dep Asst Secy For NE; Meyer, Critchfield, [Loch Phillips]	See TAPE # 142
--	16 June	DCI, Mahon Comte Houston	(See Congressional Comte file)
~~70.5~~	~~17 June~~	~~DCI, John Steele,~~ Ed Reingold, Richard Clurman, Chretien, Geo Daniels, Helms	~~Luncheon M/R to be prepared by Chretien~~ (Background papers) Destroyed M Beard 1-28-72
71	17 June	DCI, McNamara	at Pentagon--SEA; SST; NRO
	17 June	DCI, Peter Grace, Walter Donnelly, Col King, FitzGerald	at residence M/R to be prepared by FitzGerald 6??-7323 - [illegible]

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Item #	Date of Meeting	Participants	Subjects Covered
--	18 June	DCI, House Armed Services subcomte	Briefed committee--see Congressional Comte File
--	19 June	DCI, Amb Blair et al	Luncheon--
	19 June	DCI, Dr. Fubini	See TAPE # 143
72	21 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Cyprus; SEA; briefing Harold Wilson; Congo
	22 June	DCI, Amb Gordon (Brazil) FitzGerald	See TAPE # 144
~~73~~	~~22 June~~	~~DCI, [PM Inonu]~~ 6,8	~~Luncheon at White House--re: Dr. Z. Peykoe,~~ Professor of Medicine [at Turkish University] Destroyed WMBeard 1-28-72
	23 June	DCI, Adrian Fisher, Dr. Scoville	See TAPE # 145 29
73.5	23 June	DCI, Drew Pearson, Kent, R. J. Smith	M/R to be prepared by ~~Smith or Kent~~ Smith. Adds little to what has already been said in his column
74	24 June	DCI M/R	Discussions re Joint Resolution by Congress in Connection with SEA
74.5	25 June 1	DCI, Dr. Land Panel	Mtg in Conf Rm--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by Wheelon re: FULCRUM Also see TAPE #146
75	25 June	DCI Memo	Re memo of 19 June to SecDef proposing changes in wording of Presidential Directive as proposed by PFIAB on NRO
76	26 June (orig. ... 7/31/64)	DCI Memo McMillan, Fubini Wheelon, Maxie	Talking paper for Meeting w/Fubini, McMillan, re: FULCRUM project incorporation into NRP Also see TAPE # 147 also m/r by Wheelon att
77	26 June	DCI, Gen. Kuehlin, Eric Eisenstadt	to say good by to Gen. Kuehlin. M/R to be prepared by Eisenstadt (discussed Soviet agriculture)
78	28 June	DCI, Secy Rusk	Laos, communication fr [Pres Segni] 6; [Sihanouk] 6 contact in Paris
79	29 June (... 7/1/64)	DCI, Sulzberger, Sr. Arthur Sulzberger, C. L. Sulzberger, et al	Lunch in N. Y. -- CIA publicity, The Invisible Govt. estimates, Bay of Pigs situation, coordination - 5412 Committee, SVN/Laos
80	29 June	DCI, Secy McNamara Secy Vance	NRO
80.1	7 July	DCI, DDCI, Bross, Clark, Kirkpatrick, Wheelon	Heads of Agency Budget Preview--M/R to be prepare by Clark -Third Party COMINT, Missile & Space Intell, Advanced Tech Research, CIA commo support to NCS & State
80.2	8 July	DCI, Robert Kleiman of TIME, R. Jack Smith	Lunch--M/R ~~to be~~ prepared by R. Jack Smith
	8 July	DCI, Mr. Wm. Webster	Mtg in East--
80.3	8 July	DCI, Marengo, Foster McNamara	Informal session of the Principals--nuclear vehicle freeze verification

CONTINUED IN FILE #5

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104-10306-10016 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent Brazilian intercept and report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

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The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.
2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.
3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.
4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.
5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio ~~immediate~~ officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.
2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.
3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.
4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.
5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.
6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.
7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

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Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

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John A. McCone

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President from the Secretary regarding the problem presented by Cuban refugee groups

The President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

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grading and de-
classification

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

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occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

March 28, 1963

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29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

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29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

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Noted by DCI

TOP SECRET

#6

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

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The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation -- the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

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In thematter of Europe, [the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . . nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.]

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De Gaulle [did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.]

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Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically, Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.

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After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can dO so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

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Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

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[We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying half of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.]

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. [There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade]

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the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

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Turning to the domestic scene, [we will have a deficit of about $12 of $12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have ~~xxx~~ increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.]

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I think this Tax Bill [is very important. If we get another recessiOn in this country it will ~~xxxxxxxx~~ have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.]

Furthermore, the deficit [is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.] 98

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The Military [are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more]

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[This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense — and perhaps we should spend more.]

98 [One of our big jobs will be to persuade] our colleagues in Europe to to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days — if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.]

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Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. [We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)]

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Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

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File ___

23 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m., 22 March, 1963

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others

The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported qualified success, indicating reservations by the German, Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent ones being:

a. Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.

A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the extent of the control of the United States versus control by European countries since it seemed to mean that control should shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no country or group of countries exclusive of the United States should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time. The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

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SECRET - EYES ONLY

With respect to submarine versus surface ships, McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without its failure being used against the United States or his administration to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the "European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no viewpoint at this meeting.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb

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19 December 1963

Noted by DCI.
W Elder

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on 19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson, General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen, Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready, Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-Gerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting was that the President would continue to approve smaller FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the ball rolling.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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9/23/98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963

PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W. Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.

USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.

The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedy and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.

CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.

2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the

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declassification

principal soft spots among free world countries appeared at the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain. The President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these three countries together with recommendations as to what could be done to stop these leaks. He requested Under Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the governments of these three countries as well as any others engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. He appeared particularly interested in the subject of economic denial and returned to it several times.

3. After hearing a brief description of our progress in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban military, the President said that it did not seem to him that we had gone very far along this line and that one day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself, would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out that the program being presented was, with the exception of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and, if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they would have to be within the overt field.

4. After a brief description of the sabotage and harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the President stated that he did not feel that the present time was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong direction with respect to Cuba, i.e, increase their economic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly lower economic and psychological impact, should be conducted. He further stated that planning for such operations as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed that in view of the fact that preparations would take at least three months, these preparations should proceed and the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have been perfected.

5. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.

6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.

7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No further discussion.

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.

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8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents. Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indicating the manner in which the arms would have been used to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election. Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed by the OAS to investigate had called for additional evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of surveillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba, were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because of its effect on Latin American countries. The President strongly concurred with the Department of State position. He said that he did not propose to change or relax present regulations.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

14-00000

F6

13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a.m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his responsibilities.

2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government in the Saigon community.

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3. Reviewed the Checklist. [I emphasized (a) the dangers of the hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the consequence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the Italians and possibly the French.]

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4. [Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demonstration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.]

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

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5. [I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy, drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc. for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the]

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14-00000

[Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very much when they lean on the Soviets.]

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

> NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments, responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife, Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave. I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials, either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet Foreign Aid.

JAM:mcm

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14-00000

652

6 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

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[Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States.]

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[McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost.]

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. [I brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods.] 98

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

JMC

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[The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge Bundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as included in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I would prepare for the President some special graphics which would show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.

> NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include aid to satellites. His position is that since we include aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece, South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their satellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined. I do not know whether the figures are available.]

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following comments:

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1. [I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent information on the LASER beam.]

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2. [I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were broadcasting unfavorably against them.]

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3. [I noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over Malaysia.]

I then explained to the President the source of our information that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon. I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge. He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be

4/MC

tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communication. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm

14-00000

3 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 - 10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.

2. [The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly concerned about Chenault.]

3. [Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.]

4. [Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.]

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government. Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group. He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.

7. [I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to pursue the SST problem.]

8. [I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed.

NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later with the President who agreed that such distribution should be automatic except in very special circumstances in which he wished distribution held to his own personal files for reasons of his own choice. I could take no exception to this decision.]

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.

JAM/mfb (tape)

14-00000

TOP SECRET

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a number of very personal problems and asked my help and also asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve some of his problems.

1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes. By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Administration.

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2. [He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and myself.]

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might be a very able ambassador.

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4. [He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard for Ayub.]

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5. [He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS, Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for a replacement.]

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years." Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of any of them.

JAM:mcm

(tape)

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14-00000

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a.m., November 30th, in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately 1 1/2 hours

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1. Reviewed the Checklist. [The President immediately raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault. He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.]

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with the Caribbean states or with the OAS for my use in the policy meeting.

14-00000

4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.

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6. [The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.]

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.

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8. [Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.

> ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.]

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9. [I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.]

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10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.]

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11. [Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General Carter and instructed him to proceed.]

JAM:mcm

(tape)

Z/mc

14-00000

TOP SECRET

29 November 1963

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of Oswald's activities

1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received. Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.

2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been received.

3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request of Ambassador Mann.

4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request of the FBI.

NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until FBI request received because FBIis in control of the investigation.

5. Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963 with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

29 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following comments:

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a. [Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations and our activities.]

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal and any recommendations that I might have for modification of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate of what is the outlook. The President continues to be concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as to who would be a good man and who could run the American team.

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated that I would do this.

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[We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an unfavorable indicator.

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR, India military aid and Burma.]

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c. [The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our]

Noted by DDCI & LBK

noted by DDCI & Kirkpatrick

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14-00000

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[withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal to do with his loss of office.]

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d. [I pointed out to the President that we could expect some trouble in Brazil.]

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e. [The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall and that he would lose office soon after his return.]

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f. [I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Colby.]

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g. [Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.]

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.

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3. [The President then raised the question of the deal between the Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could]

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serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good representative in South Vietnam.]

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill. I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. [I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for a discussion of this problem.]

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No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's briefing.

JAM/mfb (tape)

2/mc

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President, although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about 15 or 20 minutes.

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this. (DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)

4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed. Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment secretary will be a Mr. Moyers. We should get to know him.

14-00000

7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally "killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/TMLee/mfb

14-00000

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball, Messrs. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge
Nov 24th - 3 PM Exec Office Bldg.

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and his intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims. Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 9/22/98

I see no basis for CIA's excision.

At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect preparations for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in completing the political organization of the government and were receiving little if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in and being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point or time give a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure that we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own devices, he would not have supported the courses of action which led to the coup.)

The President then stated he has never been happy with our operations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissension and divisions within the American community and he told the Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capable administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again repeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man and he, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economic situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossible at this particular time.

The President then said that he supported this, but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to get along, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.

Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone" for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders"; and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and Ball.

JAM (tape)/mfb

References: 1. IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
2. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 November 1963

DAILY BRIEF

*South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.

While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during the week ending 18 November are a drop from the previous week's record high of 233, the number is still about 50 percent above normal for this year. The attacks continue to be on a small-scale. They are targeted primarily against strategic hamlets and outposts, with government paramilitary forces bearing the brunt.

Continuing high message volumes on Viet Cong military and political networks may reflect preparations for sustained guerrilla pressures.

The Saigon government apparently is proceeding with a purge of military officers holding high military, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 officers. Some of these are under arrest. The purges may be partly in response to the demands of student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against prominent figures who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET DINAR)

14-00000

26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday, November 24th at 10:00 a. m.

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m. Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the Checklist and I made the following points:

98

1. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred.]

2. I stated I felt the President should, at an early opportunity, receive a briefing on Soviet long range ~~defensive~~ offensive capability, their current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.

3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation, the condition of their economy and our operational plans against Cuba.

4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

1/mc

14-00000

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd, about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and no one was present during the conversation.

2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.

3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the future as I have in recent months.

4. The President then asked of any world developments. I reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the future as we had in the past.

5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no intermediary.

14-00000

6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States. Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful. He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm
(tape)

104-10306-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

General Carter:

Here is your written message. I have taken no actions.

WElder

13-00000

SECRET

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:

1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.

NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.

NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

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13-00000

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

/s/

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb
Orig & 3cc to addressee
1cc - DCI chrono
1cc - DCI #5 file

13-00000

The above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

13-00000

SECRET-EYES ONLY

November 14, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI

Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction. In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs. Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.

It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest on the part of the United States Government in securing the release of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter.

SIGNED

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

JAM:at
1 cc - DCI Chrono
1 cc - DCI Memoranda
1 cc - Memo for the Record

SECRET-EYES ONLY

[illegible] ONLY

14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.

McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA has 20 million dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada and that two Letters of Credit had been issued by the Bank, one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government

3/mc

SECRET-EYES ONLY

connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money from the [Bank of Canada]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

Copy to General Carter w/
covering memo

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

SECRET-EYES ONLY

13-00000

November 6, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)

SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.

I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21, we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.

Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more. This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establishment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S. commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is about zero.

13-00000

Having reached this point, the Soviets have at least three alternatives:

One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse. Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground equipment and a large number of technicians.

Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, including those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of military support than before in order to provide operational readiness, training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not mean more economic support, although I think Castro could insist upon it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.

13-00000

Third, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives, that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be workable at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.

Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences, favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.

It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else, will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28 issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and demand our non-invasion commitment.

He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.

Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries.

This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set of conditions and commitments which will make the third case mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention should be given to the first two alternatives.

In further reference to the paper, the historical background is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.

John A. McCone

13-00000

26 September 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam

1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.

The CIA station created about a dozen training centers throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully. About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.

13-00000

CIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organization, established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel. In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligence apparatus within the SVN military.

In addition a variety of activities were supported designed to assist the basic objective of winning the war.

Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam were coordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA took no unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA has been represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSC and Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-Pearl Harbor meetings held to review progress. The activities of the station were examined by all inspection teams such as General Wheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions, Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surge of critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reported other than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreed policy.

2. CIA Reporting.

In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam. I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhu regime were causing considerable criticism and that there was

13-00000

danger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable. A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors of coups were received by our station and were reported to the Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhu, explored all problems relating to the situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the Ambassador. Contacts were also maintained with many groups in South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable citizens.

A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.

During this period we also analyzed the progress of the war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins were able to persuade Diem to reorient and redeploy his forces, gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.

3. Attitude of the Station and Others

In any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observers arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the difficulties involved. Furthermore Americamaccustomed to our civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual of these privileges. Finally an American community living among natives, many of whom are viciously critical of the government (and this is the case in Saigon and Hue), are bound to be influenced by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisms.

For these reasons there have been serious differences within the American community.

13-00000

Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion. Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power. Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.

Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.

Many people have become highly emotional, have talked too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.

orig - used by DCI at Reston luncheon - 9/26/63
2 cc - W. Elder

13-00000

4. Situation in the last several weeks.

The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hue area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.

The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasion to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant removing the regime.

The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime and no plan for a successor regime.

At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the

13-00000

SECRET

resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the Security Forces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a new government. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week of August 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should or should not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointed out that to act precipitously and without assurance of success a civil war would inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost and the Communists would take over.

This position was highly exasperating to those who wished to move precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action to move precipitously without coordination and without intelligence support are now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agency and the Station.

see page 5

SECRET

13-00000

2 September 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter

You will note from the very brief memorandum of my discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests -- the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI memorandum on my return.

The second question was concerning clandestine channels to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not effective. Perhaps the [Taipei Station] would have some thoughts on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the [Canadian] representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official" channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.

Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points next week.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

Attached:
Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk

#5 file

104-10306-10025 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1998

Thu | **31**

LAST MONTH — NOVEMBER

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DECEMBER—1959

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NEXT MONTH — JANUARY

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A. M.		P. M.	
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9:00	NSC Mtg. Cancelled	1:15	
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New Years Eve Party w/ the [illegible]

Bush

Fri | **OCTOBER—1959** | **30**

LAST MONTH						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45	Mr. Obie Webb	1:00	
9:00	Mr. Benesch	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Visit Bldg Site
10:15		2:30	Col. White & Gates
10:30		2:45	Mr. Carmen Lloyd
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - Dr. Kistiakowsky's	3:15	3
11:15	275 EOB office	3:30	x [Alden Chapin] (JOT)
11:30		3:45	John Hart 3
11:45		4:00	xx [Gyalo Thondup] DDP
12:00		4:15	& Mr. Hart
12:15	Alibi Club Mtg re	4:30	
12:30	Membership	4:45	
12:45	Lunch - Alibi Club	5:00	John Case & Adm Kelly

7:3 Min. Casey - 27239

8 - Dinner w/ Min. & Mrs Casey - Aust. Belie 2723

The Kinkaids, The Beales, Wayne Jackson

Will ask: The Bruces, McGuires, Mr. Longworth, The Jerry Greenes, The Jack Irwins

2/MC

FRIDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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18

NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. ....

13-00000

Mon 19

LAST MONTH	OCTOBER—1959	NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

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OCTOBER—1959

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NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	The President	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	~~Leave for~~ High Point	2:45	
10:45	at 10:30 - All Agency Heads	3:00	
11:00	to Afternoon of 10/20	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Return to Wash, DC
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Operation Alert

8 - Dinner at the Tracy Barnes home, Inf.
3410 Volta Pl.

Bush

Sat-Sun 11-12

LAST MONTH	JULY—1959	NEXT MONTH
JUNE		AUGUST

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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JULY—1959

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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AUGUST

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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:45		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15	6		2:30		
10:30	[de Marenches]		2:45		
10:45			3:00		Mrs. Foster
11:00			3:15		Dulles
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00	Mr. Kafka	
12:00	Sen. Hayden		4:15		
12:15	133 SOB		4:30		
12:30	Mr. Sheldon		4:45		
12:45	et al		5:00		Cocktails — Mrs. Ackerman

7:30
7/11: Dinner w/ Sen. & Mrs. Bush. (Mr. D. only)
7/12: 6 - Supper w/ Mrs. Eleanor Dulles Informal
Baltimore - Mrs. Dulles

1/m

Dinner w J.J.

Cherne & Gomez

Fri 20

LAST MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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MARCH—1959						
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NEXT MONTH

APRIL						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Dr. Herbert York
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	~~Staff Mtg.~~	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Ben Shute, Thorne &
10:00		2:15	Meek re "Dewark"
10:15	Gates Lloyd	2:30	Duggan, Timm,
10:30		2:45	Lenimore, Harper; Leo Cherne & Gomez
10:45	[Robert Reynolds], Cuban Desk	3:00	Sir Patrick Dean,
11:00		3:15	Briance, Cabell, Bissell
11:15		3:30	Sheldon, Scoville, Paul
11:30		3:45	Barnes, Crane, Kent
11:45	Kenneth Miller	4:00	Gen. Balmer & DDCI
12:00	Award Presentations	4:15	
12:15		4:30	Governor Harriman
12:30	Justin O'Donnell	4:45	et al
12:45		5:00	

6:30-8:30 Reception - Emb of Tunisia - 5131 Broad Branch Rd
8 Dinner w/ Mrs. Fowler for Lawrence Lowman
2903 N. Blk tie

1/mc

Tue 23

JUNE—1959						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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LAST MONTH

MAY						
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NEXT MONTH

JULY						
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5:00 Pill for DCI

Sen & Mrs. Bush

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Mr. Amory	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Geo. Messersmith
10:00	Mr. Gregerson & John Hart	2:15	3:00–4:00
10:15		~~2:30~~	Manpower Discussion IG & Deputies
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	4:00
11:15		~~3:30~~	Movie (Training) Sugg. Awards Prog. 1117 Central
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mr. Brundage
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	NSC Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:15 OCB Briefing

Dinner at home for the Walter Robertsons
14 Guests (The McElroys, Sen & Mrs. Bush,

The Tom Gates, The Brosio's (?).

13-00000

Reviewed by Michelle 5/4/98

Box 10 Folder 145

LAST MONTH							JUNE—1959							NEXT MONTH						
MAY														JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa	Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat	Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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31																				

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	180-4151	1:45	
9:45	DD/P, DD/I, DD/S, Warner	2:00	
10:00	Briefing - CIA Armed	2:15	
10:15	3140 HD Services Intcom	2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg. (DDCI)	2:45	Paul + Bissell 82-2625
10:45		3:00	Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
11:00		3:15	(Arthur Jacobs)
11:15		3:30	PCB Briefing
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	~~Reveal for Gen. Taylor~~
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Briefing - Legal Corp. Conf Rm.

6 - Mtg Bd of Trustees, FSEF + SAIS - 1830 - 19th - hold

8 - Dinner w/ Mrs. John Laylin. Blk tie (at farm - Vienna)

DCI mtg 181 **Tuesday, June 30, 1959** 184

13-00000

FEBRUARY						1960
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28	29					

FRIDAY

5

FEBRUARY

36 9:00 General Erskine 330

10:00 Kilday Comm.

1- Lunch - John Hanes
2:30 Adml. Martell
3:15 Boy Scout Presentation
~~3:30 Mr. Parrott~~
4 - Cord Meyer

Dinner w/ Mrs. Margaret Bryan

Bush

SATURDAY

JANUARY						1960
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6

FEB. 1960

MARCH						1960
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37 APPOINTMENTS 329

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. Dr. Scoville

10:30 Mr. Helms

11 A. M. Mtg - Secy Herter's off.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

1:30 Lunch - Mr. Rauhni

2 P. M. 2723 Q

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

8:00 - Dinner - Sen. Bush - Alibi - Bl.

APRIL						1960
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FRIDAY

29

APRIL

120 246

9:30 Staff Mtg

11:30 Mr. Amir-Ibrahimi & Mr. Paul
Press. Cons. Iran Emb.

12 - Mr. Parrott

3:00 - Amb. Jones, Djakarta & DDCI

4:00 Leo Cherne & DC/IO.
John Richardson, Jr.

4:30 - Hans Sprecht - [Robt. Crowell] 3

6 Schiller (home)

6-8: Reception, Japanese Emb.

8:00 - Dinner - Robert Bliss in honor of
Bl. Archduke Otto - (Mr & Mrs D.)

Kmc

SATURDAY

MARCH						1960
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APR. 1960

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121 245

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

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JULY						1960
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FRIDAY

22

JULY

204 9:30 Staff mtg. 162

10:30 Joint Chiefs of Staff

11:45 Mr Parrott

12:15 Special Meeting at State

1 Chris Herter

3:00 Harvey E. Bumgardner, Debriefing

3:30 Mr. de Vosjoli

3:45 Mr Copley

4:00 Amb Summers (Luxembourg)

Mr Robert Miller (State) + Team

4-30 – DDCI Kennedy Briefers

6-7: Dinner w/ Amb + Mrs. Lacy

Inf.

SATURDAY

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JULY 1960

AUGUST						1960
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APPOINTMENTS **161**

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. Senator John Kennedy
Hyannis Port

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

13-00000

JULY						1960
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31						

WEDNESDAY

27

JULY

209 9:30 Staff Mtg. 157

10:15 Sir Patrick Dean

11 - Mtg. Budget

11:30 Gerald Miller, DDCI, Limm

12 - Azzam Pasha & Mr. Paul

1 - OCB Luncheon

2 - Leave for Texas to brief Sen. Johnson

6-8: Cocktails w/ Steve Millett Anderson House

Fraser Wilkins for Mrs. D.

THURSDAY

JUNE 1960						
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JULY 1960

AUGUST 1960						
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

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SEPTEMBER						1960
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MONDAY

19

SEPTEMBER

263 9:30 Sprague Comm. 103

10:45 Sen. Kennedy Briefing
3307 N

5:30

-5 Bob Kleberg
5:45 Mr. Kent - [illegible]

TUESDAY

AUGUST						1960
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SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

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4 P. M. ....

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6 P. M. ....

9:45 Mr. Bissell

SEPTEMBER						1960
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THURSDAY

22

SEPTEMBER

10 - ADCI, ~~AAP~~, AD/SI, Col. Beerli

266 10:45 [Verne ³Gresham] C/FE 3 100

11:15 Messrs. McCoy, [McCabe] [Mitchell] 3

3 [Stan Vac] + C/FE

11:45 Medal Presentation

12:15 Special Mtg. - State

1:30 Tom Bali lecture home

3 - [John ~~2~~ 3 Whitman]

3:30 - Gen. Bakhtiar, C/Iranian Sec. Service

DDCI + C/NE

4:30 Amb. Young (The Hague)

5:15 Charles Willis

FRIDAY

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SEPT. 1960

OCTOBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. ....

2 P. M. ....

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OCTOBER						1960
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30	31					

FRIDAY

7

OCTOBER

281 Hold - BREAKFAST - Dr Wolff 85

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 - Frank Holcomb, Chief War Plans Staff (Former [C/S Buenos Aires]) 27, 21-29

12:00 Drs Cole + Tietzen

1:00 Lunch - Dr. Wolff

3:00 Secy. Gates, DDP, C/FE

4:00 Dr. Halvard Lange, C/WE

5:00 Atty Gen. Hans Fuerst
C/EE - Henry Eckardt

8:00 Reception - Bakhtiar Wedding - Shoreham Hotel

7.30 - 830 Nixon - Kennedy debate -

1/MC

SATURDAY

SEPTEMBER 1960						
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OCT. 1960

NOVEMBER 1960						
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282 APPOINTMENTS 84

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

10 A. M. ....

10:30 Henry Hyde

11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

1 P. M. Lunch - Mr. Von Gaevernitz

2 P. M. ....

3 P. M. ....

4 P. M. ....

5 P. M. ....

6 P. M. Sor Ccir - Dinner

after dinner - French Embassy Leightons -

NOVEMBER						1960
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WEDNESDAY

16

NOVEMBER

321 45

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11- Adm. Jerauld Wright
11:30 Hugh Cunningham + C/EE
12- Mr. Arondfit, Bissell, King
12:30- OCB Briefing
1- OCB Luncheon
OCB Mtg

3:50 Messrs. [Briance] + [Oldfield]
4:15 Cuba briefing
5- NSC Briefing

2/mc

NOVEMBER						1960
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THURSDAY

17

NOVEMBER

322 9:00 NSC Mtg. Augusta, Ga. 44

To Palm Beach

THURSDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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APPOINTMENTS

7 A. M. ....

8 A. M. ....

9 A. M. ....

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11 A. M. ....

12 Noon ....

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NOVEMBER						1960
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FRIDAY

18

NOVEMBER

323 9:30-11:30 Brief Senator Kennedy - Florida 43

8:00 - Dinner - David Bruce
Bl. - (Mr. + Mrs. D)

13-00000

SATURDAY

OCTOBER						1960
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NOV. 1960

DECEMBER						1960
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324 APPOINTMENTS 42

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M. {Mr Allen — Gen Kuehlin
9:30 {Gen Dettheffson + Mr Graaen

10 A. M. ~~Special Mtg - State~~

11 A. M.
11:30 Norman Paul

12 Noon ~~[Locke Campbell]~~ + C/EE
3

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

1/mc

13-00000

Box 3
Folder 42

Season's Greetings 1961

Reviewed by Michelle 5/1/98

13-00000

SATURDAY

NOVEMBER						1960
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31

DEC. 1960

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366 APPOINTMENTS 0

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

11:30 Mtg at H. H. "Lavi"

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Mrs. Bryant

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

13-00000

JANUARY						1961
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TUESDA

3

JANUAR

3 362

9- Mtg - Pres. Off. (off the record)
Mtg of Principals at W.H.

12- Amb Burden, C/WE, C/AF

3:30 USIB Briefing
4:30 NSC Briefing - (Cannon Committee)
5:15 OCB Brf.

JANUARY						1961
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TUESD[AY]

1[0]

JANUA[RY]

10 355

10:30 USIB Mtg

2:15 Secy McNamara
3:00 White House

3:30 [illegible]

4:00 John Steele (Time)
430 NSC Brf
5:15 OCB Brf

7:00 - Cocktails - CANUS-61 Conf.
Ft. McNair Off. Club - Inf.

7:30 Dinner w/ Gen. & Mrs. White
Blk tie. Bolling AFB, Officers Club

JANUARY						1961
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THURSD

26

JANUA

26 9 30 – Muny Main 339

1230 Lunch – Am. Bar Assn. Statler
2:40–4:10 Briefing – The President
5:20 Juan Carlos Quagliotti, Mr. Morse & Mr. Briggs

6–8: Reception – Emb of India

JANUARY			1961			
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FRIDA
27
JANUA

27 338

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Mr. Critchfield
12 - Ralph W. Reid (Rex Reid)

12:30 Lunch - Alibi

2:30 Mr. Vorpatel
3:00 Amb. Gufler (Ceylon)
Mr. Blee
3:30 Briefing on Cuba - DDP et al
4:30 Briefing on Vietnam - DDI et al
+ David Smith of DDP

Go to Hospital

7:00 State of the Nation Dinner Blk tie
(Reception at 6:00) Sheraton Park

13-00000

SATURDAY

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28

JAN. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 337

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. The President - Cuba
So. Vietnam

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M. Lunch - Chas. Murphy + Mr. Elder

2 P. M.
2:30 Gen. Lansdale

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Dinner at the Gary National

JANUARY						1961
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SUNDA

29

JANUAR

29 10 Pres. Cuba - Sat.
South Vietnam -

12-1:30 Cocktails for the Seligmans
at the Julian Eisensteins

5 - Reception at the White House
6 - 8 Walter Lippmann's
8:00 - Bl. - Dinner - British
Embassy for Sir Patrick Dean
(Mr. & Mrs. D.)

JANUARY						1961
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TUESDA
31
JANUAF

31 9:30 Staff Mtg.
10:30 USIB Mtg.

2:30 Ted Kennedy

4:00 Deane + David Heller
4:30 NSC Briefing

SATURDAY

18

FEB. 1961

MARCH						1961
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APPOINTMENTS 316

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. [illegible]

10:15 Mtg White House

11 A. M.

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

8: Reception Amb of Nepal

6 P. M. Shoreham Terr. Banquet Rm

8- Dinner w/ The Herters

MARCH						1961
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WEDNES[DAY]

1

MARC[H]

60 305

9:30 Staff Mtg.
11:30 Mr. Parrott
12 Naval Briefing
1:00 - Lunch - Gen. Clarke
DC Commissioner
Large Dining room

3:00 Saul Pett + Mr. Claussen

4-5: Nat'l Cdr. Am. Legion, Wm. R. Burke, Mr. McInally, Mr. Hauck, Mr. Claussen
5- Briefing for Mtg of Principals

7:30 - ~~[illegible]~~ Bl. - 4700 Chain Bridge Road
Dinner w/ The Atty Gen + Mrs. Kennedy

MARCH						1961
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FRIDAY

3

MARCH

62 9:00 New Zealand P. M. Holyoake 303

10:30 Speak at Marine Corps School Quantico, Virginia

2:45 The President

6:00 Mr. Lloyd Free - 2723 Q

Dinner w/ Mrs. Magruder for Mr. Praeger

MARCH						1961
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THURSD

9

MARC

68 297

9:00 Briefing - Amb. Gavin (France) C/WE. Mr. [illegible] 3

12:15 Dr Cole + Dr. Tietjen

1 - Lunch, Mr. John McCone

2 - Amb. A.J. Drexel Biddle (Spain)

3 - ~~White House~~ Briefing - Cabinet. DDP. C/FE
Mr Cord Meyer - briefing

5 - Swearing in - Amb. Merchant (Canada)

YMC

Mrs. Dulles in Santa Fe

SATURDAY

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11

MAR. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 295

M.

M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. - Pres. Kennedy - Vice Pres. ~~Sec Rusk~~ [illegible] DDP - Barnes

11 A. M.

12 Noon Alibi

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

Gridiron Club Dinner - White tie

MARCH						1961
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TUESDA

14

MARCH

73 9:30 M. Jacques Chaban-Delm
10 - Paul Hoffman + Mr. [Italia] 3
10:30 USIB Mtg.

1 - Lunch, Sen. Pell

3 - Messrs. [Rothschild] 3, Bissell, Treel, Audley, Pfeiffer, C/IO

4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Gen Gray
W. H. Rep. re Cuba
6:00 Mr. Parrott

8:00 - Inf. - Dinner - Dr. Kamel
UAR Emb. (Mr. Dulles alone)

2/mc

MARCH						1961
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74

WEDNESD

15

MARCH

291

9:30 Staff mtg.

11:30 Park Armstrong

12 Bill Webster

1 - Lunch, Ernst Mogens-Jensen C/Danish IS

2:30 Dr. Kent

3 - Robert Abdesselam + C/WE

~~4 - [illegible]~~ 3

4 - mtg - The White House - DDCI

8 30

Dinner at Home

1/mc

MARCH						1961
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THURSD
16
MARCH

75 9:30 Mr. Kirkpatrick 290

~~10:30 Reception - Unification of Italy - State Dept. Auditorium~~

10:45 Adm. Burke

12 - Special Gp Mtg.

1 - Lunch Mr. Bundy's Off.

2:15 DDCI, DDP, Barnes, Esterline

4 - Mtg at W.H., Cabell, Bissell, Barnes

6:30 - 8:30 Cocktails, Brit Emb.

MARCH			1961			
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MONDA[Y]

20

MARC[H]

79 286

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Hugh Farley, Dr. Kent, C/FE, Rady

12:15 AP Photographer + Claussen

12:30 Tef McCrary (lunch)

2:30 Briefing - Amb. Gufler (Finland)

3:00 - M. Jacque Piette - Mr [Dulin] 3

4 - John Scali

4:30 USIB Briefing

5:30 White House DDP + C/FE

YMC

MARCH			1961			
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TUESDA
21
MARCI

80 285

10:30 USIB Mtg.

1 - Lunch & Briefing - Secy Connally (Navy

to 3 - 2:30 Mtg at W. H. "Laos"

5:00 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:00-7:00 - Reception - Dr. Kent - Sheraton Park

7:30 Dinner - Secy McNamara for Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson
Bl. -
(Stag) 3E880 Pentagon

MARCH			1961			
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WEDNES[DAY]

22

MARCH

81 284

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Ray Cline

2:00 Congressional Leaders
Secy Rusk + Vice Pres.
P-38-Capitol

3- Briefing, Amb. Macomber
4- Gen. Cabell, Col. White, Gen McClelland
4:30 Dr. Lorenz Stucki
5:00 Mr. Zuckerman, DDI + AD/SI
5:30 Mr. Sheldon

MARCH						1961
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THURSD

23

MARCH

82 283

10 - Dr. Karl Brandt
10:30 Philip Clark (State)
11 - Henry Mann
11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12 - Special Gp mtg.
1 - Lunch - Mr. Bissell's off.
3 - Wm. Hillman
3:30 V. F. W. Rep.
4:00 Chas. Spofford
4:30 [James Kim] C/Atr. Barracks, Mill
4:45 Dr Kent
5:00 Col. Edwards + Mr. Harvey

1/mc

SATURDAY

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MAR. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 281

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

11 A. M.

12 Noon
12:45 The President

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.
3:30 Tennis, Mrs. Ackerman
4 P. M. The Norman Pauls

5 P. M.

6 P. M. 8' Reception, Greek Emb.

Dinner w/ The Hunts

(9:30 Arr. Wash. from N. Y.

MARCH						1961
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WEDNESDAY

29

MARCH

88 10:00 NSC Mtg 27

11:30 DDCI - Col Edwards - Mr. Winters & McCord

(12:00 FOSTER COLLINS

12:45 Philip Coombs + Av. Kent

1- Lunch, Peyton Ford

2:30 Hugh Cumming

3:00 Amb. Henry Taylor + C/EE

4:00 Mtg at W. H., DDCI, DDP + Barnes

5:30 Mr. Papich

8:00 Bl

Dinner w/ Mrs. Francis Biddle

per Mrs. D.

(8:30 White House

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WEDNESD

5

APRIL

95

10- Dr. Tietjen

(11:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrot

12:00 - Mrs. Oswald Lord

12:30 Medal Presentation - Mr Van Slyck

12:45 Fred Rheinhardt Lunch.

2:30 Amb. Francis Wellie (Ceylon)

3:30 Frederick King - DDS Chandler DDCI

5:30 Elizabeth von Thurn

6:00 Edw. R. Murro

8:00 - Dinner - British Emb.
Bl in honor PM Macmillan
(Mr. & Mrs. D.)

13-00000

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THURSD
6
APRII

96 269

9.15 White House -

10:30 Special USIB Mtg.

12:30 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

1 - Lunch, Mr. Bundy's off.

2 - Special Gp. Mtg.

DDP + C/FE

3 - Amb. Reischauer Brf. (Japan)

3:30 Whitney Shepardson

4:00 Ed Kretzman, Berne + Mr. Schardt

4:45 Gen. C. Rodney Smith + C/IO

APRIL						1961
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WEDNES[DAY]

12

APRIL

102

9:30 Staff Mtg.

10:15 Mr. Bissell et al

12:30 Lunch & Briefing - Sen. Goldberg

3:30 Leonard Shapiro & Jack Maury

5 Wohltat (Shoreham)

5⁴⁵ President -

6-8: Tulip Reception - Neth. Emb.

8 - Dinner w/ the Coleman Jennings

[illegible]

APRIL						1961
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TUESDA

18

APRIL

108 9.00 Breakfast Blair House · Kennedy 257.

10:30 NSC Mtg.
12:00 The White House

2:30 Briefing, Amb. Loeb - Peru

3:00 Phil Emb. presenting Legion of Honor to Mr. Ackerman

3:45 Col. King + Mr. Herbert
4:30 Cabell, Bissell, Barnes, Poston, King
5:30 The White House
5:15 Briefing - Mr. Parrott

6:30-8:30 Reception for Mr. Lochlin Mr. + Mrs. Frost, Hosts
8:00 - White tie - Secy + Mrs. Rusk for P. M. Caramanlis
State Dining Rooms - Dept of State

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109

WEDNESD

19

APRIL

9:30 Staff Mtg.

12:30 The President

12:45 P.M. Manley (Jamaica)

1 - Lunch - P.M. Manley

2:30 Mrs. Rudolph von Ripper

3:15 Col. White

3:30 Gen Cabell Gene Winters, et al

4:00 Mr. De Sapio

5:30 White House -

5:45 Gen. Frontistis, C/EE + Mr. ADCI, Milton, Kirkbeck

6:45 Mr. Nixon, 4308 Forest Lane

8 - Dinner w/ Sen + Mrs. Monroney
Berkie

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THURSDAY

20

APRIL

110 255

10:30 Amb. John L. Rice, Netherlands
11:00 Cong. Cannon
12:30 Mr. Parrott
1- Lunch, Mr. Brinkhoff
2:00 Special Gp Mtg.
2:30 Bfg, Amb MacArthur, Belgium
3- Col. Nicanor Jimenez (Manila) C/FE
3:30 The President
4:00 Mr. Karamessines - DDCI
5:00 William Tharp - DDCI
5:15 AAP, Barnes, C/WH, Stimulus
6:30 Mr Cannon & Bradley
7:00 John Steele
7:30 Cocktails
8- Dinner for Mr. Lochnis - [illegible] Club
7:30 Annual Spring Dinner - Alibi

MAY						1961
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TUESDA

16

MAY

136 229

10:00 Gen. Taylor Committee

1:00 - Pres. Kennedy + Gen. Taylor
Adm Burke
Lunch

3:30 - William Hillman - Col. Grogan
4:00 Gen. Lemnitzer -
4:30 - Peter Maas - "Look" (C1)
Col Grogan - Jean Evans

5:30 - Charles Bartlett, Col. Grogan
6:00 - Amb. Julius Holmes
2723 Q

8:00 - Dinner - Australian Emb
Bl. for Hon. H. H. Townley, Min. Def.

MAY						1961
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WEDNESD

24

MAY

144 221

9:15 Mr. Parrott
9:30 Staff Mtg

11:30 - Amb. Willauer
12:00 - Mr. Sam Halper (Time-Life)
Col. Grogan + Arch Bush (OC!)
12:30 Lunch - Amb. Pawley
3:00 Richard Linthicum (Cyprus)
3:30 Wm Scott + C/WH
4:30 Killian Com.
5:00 Salvador de Madariaga

5:30 - Amb. Karl Rankin (Yugoslavia) + C/EE

6:00-8:00 Canadian Embassy - Queen's Birthday

8:00 - Bl -

Dinner w/ Amb + Mrs Beale for Indian Amb.

13-00000

MAY						1961
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MONDA
29
MAY

149 9:30 Staff Mtg. 216

11:00 – House App. Committee
DDCI – DDS
Mr. ~~Saunders~~ – Helms
~~Mason~~ – Eiseman

3:00 Norris Darrell at Mr. Belin's

~~4:30 NSIC Briefing~~

~~5:15 Mr. Parrott~~

6:30 Messers Angleton + Hunt 2723Q

8 Bob Thayer - Dinner

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TUESD[illegible] 13 JUNE

10:30 USIB Mtg.

1:00 – Lunch, Amb of Vietnam for Secy of State Thuan

3:30 NSC Mtg.

5:15 Mr. Parrott – Briefing

6 – The President –

7.00 Tennis Supper Delins?

8:00 – Supper – Kermit Roosevelts

Inf

JUNE						1961
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THURSD

15

JUNE

166 9:45 Sec State Thomas(?) [illegible] 199
DACI + C/FE

10:30 Amb. Geo Laking, N.Z.

11:15 Harry Rositzke + D ADCI

12 - Ivan White + C OPS

12:30 Gen Griffiths + D ACI

12:45 Walt Rostow - Lunch

3:30 William Hillman + Grogan

4:30 The President (at the Mansion

6:15 Amb. Galbraith, DDP

7:30 Dinner w/ Mrs. + Mrs. Helms
[illegible]

SATURDAY

1961		
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17

JUNE 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 197

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M. 6

11 A. M. [J. Monnet]

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M. – Secty State –

4 P. M.

5 P. M. Tennis - Belins –

7:30 Party at the Robert Kennedy's

6 P. M.

5-8: David Dulles Engagement Party

1/mc

JUNE						1961
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MONDA

19

JUNE

170 9:3. Staff Mtg. 195

11- Amb. Radean (UAR)
11:45 USIB Brf.
12:30 NESC Brf.
1:00 Lunch - George Carey (OO)
2:30 ~~Henry Suydam~~
2:00 Col. Butler
3:15 [Conrad La Gueux] C/Ltr. Rangers + DCI
~~4.~~ The President
4:30

↓

7:45 Women's Press Club Dinner
Mr. & Mrs. Dulles

1/mc

13-00000

JUNE						1961
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TUESDA
27
JUNE

178 187

10:00 USIB Principals
10:30 USIB Mtg.

12:30 Lunch, Secretary Udall

3 Link Gordon -
4 - Col. Y (Vietnam)
4:30 - The President at Mansion
5:15 - Mr Parrott
~~7:30~~ 6:00 Harry Kern
Dinner - Mrs Gross -
Bl. tie

JUNE						1961
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WEDNESD.

28

JUNE

179 9:30 Staff Mtg. 186

11 - Pat Coyne

12:00 Mtg - The President

12:45 Hausek Baldwin

2:30 Brf., Amb. Philip Kaiser (Senegal)

3:30 The President

~~5 - Gen. Lederer + C/EE~~

7:45
Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

13-00000

Pres. Bd Meets

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FRIDAY

30

JUNE

181 9:30 Staff Mtg. 184

11- Adm. Frost

11:30 Amb Doyle ([illegible])

12- Blood Donation Award

1- Lunch, Amb. Harvey

3- Amb. [illegible]

4- Dr. Harold Wolff

5- Carlos Gonzales & C/WH

JULY						1961
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TUESDA

11

JULY

192 173

9:30 USIB Briefing
10:20 General Taylor
10:30 USIB Meeting

2 Atty - General -
3 - Mr. Campaigne, Alfred Vanderbilt & C/FO

4:30 Mr. Schreyer Briefing

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, Naval Weapons Plant
8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub
Mt. Vernon, White Dinner Jacket
Pres. + Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts

JULY						1961
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THURSDA

13

JULY

194 171

7:45 Pres. Appt, Blair.
10 - ADICI
11:30 Chad Braggiotti
12:00 Amb. Robt. McKinney
12:45 Elmer Staats + AAP
1:00 - Lunch - Elmer Staats

4 - NSC Meeting

6 - Mr. Angleton

JULY						1961
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FRIDAY

14

JULY

195 9:30 Staff Mtg. 170

11:00 The President

12:15 Warren Rogers + Col. Grogan

2- Greet Incoming J O T Class

2:30 Mr. Elder

3:30 The Pres., Secy McNamara, Gen. Lemnitzer

5- Mr. Durkee

JULY						1961
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WEDNES
19
JULY

200 — 165

~~9:30 Staff Mtg.~~
10:45 Bfg for Spec. Hp.
11- Briefing, Amb. Snow (Paraguay)
11:30 Don Levine & Jack Maury
12:15 Amb. Zahedi (Iran)
1- Lunch Amb. Tyler
2:30 Amb. Trimble & D/FE (Cambodia)
3:00 The Pres., Sec State, Sec Def, Atty Gen
4:00- NSC (Berlin)
6- Mr. Papich

13-00000

JULY						1961
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THURSDA[Y]

20

JULY

201 104

10:00 - NSC Mtg.

12:15 Webster Panel

12:30 Briefing for Special Gp.

1 - Luncheon - Mr. Bundy's off.

2:30 Special Gp Mtg.

Gen Taylor

5:00 - The President

Steering Committee

on Berlin

Dean - Dinner

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MONDA[Y]

31

JULY

212 153

9:30 Staff Mtg
11:00 - Gen Lansdale
11:30 R. Jack Smith (Promotion)
11:45 Bill Harvey
12:15 Gordon Stewart
1:00 Lunch - White House in honor VP & Mrs Chen, Rep. of China

2:15 } 4: Gardner Cof
2:30 }

4:00 Mr. Bannerman
4:30 USIB Briefing
5:30 Mr. Fitz Gerald

AUGUST						1961
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WEDNESD

2

AUGUS

214 — 151

9:30 Staff Mtg.

11:30 Mr. Tweedy

12:30 M. de Vosjoli

2:15 Howard Hunt

2:30 - Brf. - Amb. to Leopoldville Edmund A. Gullion

3:00 Mr. Marengo (Briefing)

4:00 Secy. Rusk's office Steering Group (Berlin)

— Mr. Maury

8:00 - Bl. - Dinner - Chinese V.P. Chen, host - Mayflower Grand Ballroom

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AUGUST						1961
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THURSDA[Y]

3

AUGUST

215 150

~~9:00 the President - White H~~

10:00 Courtney Evans + Sam Papich + Mr Harvey.

11:00 - Mr. Marengo

11:30 - Gordon Stewart

12:30 Briefing - Mr. Schreyer
Home for lunch

1:30 Special Gp Mtg.

2:30 - Disarmament Committee
Sec/State Conf. Room

6:30 Bellevue - Tennis + Dinner -
Mr. Walter Rostow

AUGUST						1961
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THURSDA[Y]

10

AUGUST

222 143

10:00 Cord Meyer & Mr. Blum
11:30 The President
12:30 Hqd - Special Group Briefing
~~1:00 Hqd Lunch Mr. Bundy's Office~~

Special Group
2:00
3:30 Mr. Eckhardt, Pakistan
4:00 William Hillman
4:30 Bob Donovan & Col. Grogan
5:00 Mr. Blum
6:00 Tennis - British Embassy
8:00 - Dinner at the Bissell's
Inf.

13-00000

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THURSDA[Y]

17

AUGUST

229 136

9:30 Mr. Helms
11:30 Gen. Rodney

2 - Special Gp Mtg.

3:15 Mr. Schreyer

4 - Mtg of Prins on Disarmament
Pres. Office

5:00 - The President (Steering Group Berlin)

Advisory Council - Woodrow Wilson School

7:00 Dinner at Princeton

DCI will stay at Princeton.

AUGUST						1961
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230

FRIDAY

18

AUGUST

135

mtg at Princeton

2: Return from Princeton

2:30 Mr. Bill Harvey

AUGUST						1961
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SUNDA'
20
AUGUS'

232 133

8:15 Lv. for Gettysburg
to brief Gen. Eisenhower

3:15 Lv. Getty. Gen.

AUGUST						1961
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MONDA

21

AUGUS

233 9 30 - Deputies Mtg 132

~~10 30 Sen. Dodd debriefing~~

11 00 Gen Taylor's office

12:30 Bfng for 2:30 Mtg

2:00 Mr Bill Harvey

2 30 Senate Armed Services & Approp Subcomittee

7:30 Dinner - Chinese Emb - Inf.

AUGUST						1961
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FRIDAY
25
AUGUST

237 128

9:15 Staff Mtg.
11 - Dr. Brown
~~11 Mtg ... (SEC)~~
12:00 Pres.
(1) Averell Harriman -
2:30 Osborne
330 Tom Parrott

(at home)
Dinner, Jake Lloyd

13-00000

AUGUST						1961
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TUESDA[Y]

29

AUGUST

241 124

9:30 Joe Charyk-
11- Mtg The Pres. in 5 EA

2:15 Mtg. - Gen Taylor, Gen Lemnitzer, Dr. [illegible]

4:30 Mr. Oppenheimer
5:15 Spec. Gp. Bfg
6 - Jack Maury & Mr. Osborn

AUGUST						1961
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WEDNESD[AY]

30

AUGUS[T]

242 9:30 Staff Mtg. 123

Tracy Barnes 3

11 - Messrs Raymond [Mc Cafferty], [Enright] 3

4 - Gen Taylor

4:30 U.S.I.B. Bfng

5:30 The Press.

Dennis & Supper - Amb Caccia & The Belmo - 2723 Q

2/mc

AUGUST						1961
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THURSD[AY]

31

AUGUS[T]

243 ... 122

9:30 Dr. Scoville

10 – mtg at the White House

10:30 USIB Mtg. (& ACI + AD/SI)

11:30 Spec. Gp Bfng

11:45 Mr. Bissell

12:30 Lunch Secy McNamara & Secy Gilpatric

2 – Spec. Gp Mtg.

3: Mtg, Cuban Task Force – Mr. Goodwin's off. + Tracy Barnes

5 – mtg – Gen Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr McMurrow

6-9: Reception – Emb of Malaya

SEPTEMBER						1961
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WEDNESD

20

SEPTEMB

263 102

9:30 Staff Mtg
11:30 Mr. Wallenberg
12:30 Cord Meyer
1:00 Lunch - George McGhee for Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
3:00 Brf. - Amb. Gordon (Brazil)
3:30 Gen. Taylor
4:00 White House
5:15 USIB Brf.

6:30 Chris Herter

5:45 Reception - Pres. of Peru
3001 Garrison St

13-00000

SATURDAY

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23

SEPT. 1961

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APPOINTMENTS 99

7 A. M.

8 A. M.

9 A. M.

10 A. M.

10:45 Mr. Nardone + C/PA
Howard Hunt

11 A. M.

11:30 Gordon Stewart + Dave Murphy

12 Noon

1 P. M.

2 P. M.

3 P. M.

4 P. M.

5 P. M.

6 P. M.

7:30 Dinner - Mrs. Lane - Inf.

Bush

6

goes

SEPTEMBER						1961
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269

TUESDAY

26

SEPTEMBER

96

12 - Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:15 - Gen'l Breece
2:30 Special Group Brf.
3:30 Mr. De Vosjoli
4:30 Mr. McCone

7³⁰ Bush

13-00000

OCTOBER						1961
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TUESDA

3

OCTOBE

1- Lunch, Harold Linder

3:00 Special Group Bf.
3:45 Gordon Stewart
4:15 - White House

13-00000

OCTOBER						1961
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WEDNESDAY

4

OCTOBER

277 9:00 ~~Gen.~~ Eisenhower 88

9:45 Staff Mtg

11:00 Air Vice Marshal Raza (Pakistan) C/NE

11:30 C/IO + Dudley Bonsal

12:30 Gen. Anders - C/E E + Paul 3

1:00 Lunch - Gen. Anders (Haynes)

2:00 M/G. George Bush c/Jusmag - Greece

2:30 HS/B. Brfg DDP + C/FE

4:30 Leave for New York

8:00 Dinner - Mr + Mrs John Hughes

Bl. - 63 E. 74th

1/mc

OCTOBER						1961
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WEDNESD

11

OCTOBEI

284 81

9:30 Staff Mtg
10:45 Mtg w/ the Pres (SEA)
12:30 Brig. Riaz Hussain & C/NE
1 - Lunch, Cornelius, Alan Conway, Ryan(
2:00 Special Gp Bfng

3- [Rob'n Ledbie] 3

4:30 USIB Brf

7:15 Inf. Dinner - Helms -
afterdinner - Drama Fest.

1/MC

OCTOBER						1961
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293

FRIDAY

20

OCTOBEI

9:00 Dave Murphy
10:00 The President
11:00 DIA Organization
12:00 Tom Schreyer

2:30 Special Gr. Mtg
Situation Room
White House

5:00 - Deputies' Mtg

NOVEMBER						1961
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318

TUESDAY
14
NOVEMBER

47

10:30 Pres -
11:30 NSC Bfng (JIC)
1:00 Lunch - John Starnes

4:00 Special Group Brf.

5:15 Mr Amory (NSC Bry.)

8:00 - Dinner - Sec Rusk -
for Gen Park - Blair House
(Stag) Bl. tie

13-00000

NOVEMBER					1961	
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TUESDAY

21

NOVEMBER

325

10:30 USIB Brf.

1.00 White House—

2:30 Special USIB Mtg.

4- mtg at White House

5- Spec. Gp. Bfng

5:30 -7:00 } J E. Hoover - [illegible] Party Sheraton Carlton

10:00 Min. Von Lilienfeld - Inf. Crystal Rm.

8:00 - Dinner - Per Jacobsson

1925 F St. Blk tie

NOVEMBER						1961
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MONDA

27

NOVEME

331 9:30 Staff mtg. 34

2 - John Scali + Col. Grogan
2:30 Mr. Millett
2:55 Baird
3:30 Mr. Staats' office
Alexis Johnson
Edward Murrow
DDS

5:30 The President

6:00 Mr. McCone + G. Meany
2723 Q

7:30 Stag Dinner at the Alibi for Mr. Dulles Lkts

Tue 11

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NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	USIB Briefing	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Atty. Gen. Kennedy
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	USIB Mtg.	2:45	
10:45		3:00	Mr. Campaigne & Alfred Vanderbilt & CI/O
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	Cord Meyer
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Briefing - Mr. Parrott
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:10 Depart from Pier 1, naval Weapons Plant

8:15 Dinner for Pakistan Pres. Ayub. Mt Vernon. White dinner jacket

Pres. & Mrs. Kennedy, Hosts.

Fri 14

LAST MONTH — JUNE						
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NEXT MONTH — AUGUST						
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A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Greet Incoming Class
10:00		2:15	of JOT's,
10:15		2:30	Mr. Elder
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/ The Pres. Sec	3:15	
11:15	State, Sec Def, Gilpatric	3:30	The Pres. Secy McNamara
11:30	Hilsman & RKIP	3:45	Gen Lemnitzer
11:45		4:00	Go to Airport ~~to see~~
12:00		4:15	~~Mc's~~ party off.
12:15	Warren Rogers & Col. Grogan	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Mr. Kirkee

7:15 - Dinner - Charles Murphy

Wed 19

LAST MONTH JUNE						
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JULY—1961						
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Amb Tyler
9:00		1:15	(alone)
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Gordon Stewart - "Berlin"
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Amb. Trimble (Cambodia
10:30		2:45	~~NASC~~ C/FE + Mr. Myers c/ Str. Phnom Penh
10:45	Mr. Bissell, Barnes, Collins	3:00	The Pres., Sec State,
11:00	Briefing-Amb. Snow (Paraguay)	3:15	Sec Def, Atty Gen,
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Don Levine & Jack Maury	3:45	
11:45		4:00	NSC Mtg on Berlin
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Amb. Zahedi (Iran)	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6- Mr. Papich

7- Mr. Hunt

8- Dinner - Mr. Hunt - 3200 L.

13-00000

Thu 20

JULY—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

LAST MONTH

JUNE						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

NEXT MONTH

AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

Ray Bette 10

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr. Bundy's
9:00		1:15	off.
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	NSC Mtg - Rpt of NESC	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special Gp Mtg.
10:30		2:45	300 EOB
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gen Taylor
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Webster Panel & Av.	4:30	
12:30	DDCI Scoville	4:45	
12:45		5:00	The President - Berlin O'Donnell's off.

Dinner at home - Arthur Dean

13-00000

Bush

Fri **28**

LAST MONTH	JULY—1961	NEXT MONTH

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	

JULY—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - F. King
9:00	Parrott	1:15	Chandler
9:15		1:30	Col. White
9:30		1:45	King + Harrison
9:45		2:00	Gen McClelland
10:00	- Indonesian Brf.	2:15	
10:15	Economic Survey Team	2:30	→
10:30		2:45	
10:45	6.	3:00	Spencer Taggart XX 8443
11:00	- King + [Harrison]	3:15	
11:15	[illegible]	3:30	John Hart-Bronson
11:30		3:45	TDY Rabat Tweedy
11:45	IG — NAct	4:00	Promotions - [Huizenga / Bennett / Bush] 3
12:00		4:15	- [Mitchell] 3 + [Miller] 3
12:15		4:30	- Amb. Myron Cowen
12:30		4:45	
12:45		~~5:00~~ 5:15	Lloyd George
		6:00	McBissell

7:30 - Dinner - no dress - Frances Pickens Miller

~~Freddie King - staying at 2773 Q~~

2810 P Ad. 6-3231 1826 5867

4/mk

Mon 31

LAST MONTH	JULY—1961	NEXT MONTH

JUNE

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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JULY—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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30	31					

AUGUST

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr Mrs Dulles at White House honor
9:00		1:15	VP & Mrs Chen; Rep of China
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Gardner Cox
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	6742 Van Lansdale	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	R. Jack Smith (Supergrade	3:45	
11:45	Wm. Harvey promotion category)	4:00	Bob Bannerman
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Gordon Stewart	4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:30 Mr. FitzGerald

Dinner at Lorne-Arthur Dean and Mr McCloy

13-00000

Light lunch w/milk

Wed 2

LAST MONTH — NEXT MONTH

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

61-6261

5/4/56

Large

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	Howard Hunt
10:15		2:30	Brf. Amb to
10:30		2:45	Congo-Leopoldville
10:45		3:00	→ (Mr. Mairenga)
11:00		3:15	Brf.
11:15		3:30	
11:30	- Mr. Tweedy	3:45	- Attorney Gen.
11:45		4:00	Meeting of Steering
12:00		4:15	Group - Secy Rusk's
12:15		4:30	office
L 12:30	- Mde Vasipli XX	4:45	Gordon Stewart
12:45		5:00	

3 AUG 1961

5:30 Mr. Maury

8:00 - Dinner - Bl. - Chinese V P Chen

Mayflower - Grand Ballroom

13-00000

Schreyer 2044 K

Thu 3

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

8:00 The President /w Sheldon

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch at home w/ Mrs D
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	** Spec Group Mtg:
9:30		1:45	(will meet there Bissell
9:45	William Harvey	2:00	Gen McClelland & Edwards)
10:00	Courtney Evans + Sam Papich	2:15	**
10:15	+ Mr Harvey	2:30	(Mtg. of Principals) Disarmament Cmte -
10:30		2:45	Sec State Conf. Room
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mr Morengo	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Gordon Stewart + Mr Ralph Brown	3:45	
11:45	(Berlin)	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15	Mr Schreyer - Brief	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:30 Tennis w/ [illegible] + dinner

Thu 10

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	~~Hold~~ ~~Lunch - Mr. Bundy's~~
9:00		1:15	~~FH~~
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	Special Gp Mtg.
10:00	Bob Blum ~~& SE~~	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	Mr. Eckardt [illegible]
11:30	Mtg w/Pres. (Mil Gng	3:45	Pakistan
11:45	and SEA Planning for	4:00	Adm. Hillenkoetter & Col.
12:00	DD/I, DD/P, C/FE [illegible]	4:15	Grogan
12:15		4:30	Bob [illegible] and Col Grogan
12:30	Briefing for Special Gp	4:45	NY [illegible]
12:45	Mtg.	5:00	

6 - [illegible] Int. Conf. (Rostow & Bundy)

8^00 Dinner at Bissell's - Informal

Fri 11

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

Heggen

A. M.		P. M.	XX Dep Dir-Gen
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Mr Richards
9:00		1:15	[Australian Security Intell
9:15		1:30	Org.] DDCI host
9:30	~~Staff Mtg.~~	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Mtg w/ Pres. on Brit.	2:15	
10:15	DDP Guiana	2:30	L. N. Y.
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Col. Meyer & Col. Edwards	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Mr. Heggen + IG	3:45	
11:45		4:00	Party for Mr. Heggen
12:00		4:15	
12:15	1:25	4:30	
12:30	Lv for N.Y.	4:45	
12:45	via Aerocommander	5:00	

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1/mc

Call Thomas Hogan notary

Fri 18

LAST MONTH						
JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH						
SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	Mtg at	1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45	Princeton	2:00	Returned from
10:00		2:15	Princeton via Aero-Commander
10:15		2:30	Wm. Harvey
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:30		4:45	Thomas Hogan, Notary
12:45		5:00	

at home Arthur Lian (architect)
Mr Angleton (carpenter)

Sat-Sun 19-20

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45		8:15 Lv for Hattiesburg?	1:00		
9:00		P.I. w/ the	1:15		
9:15		Atty Gen	1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30			~~2:45~~		3 15 Atty General here
10:45			3:00		
11:00	James Cosley		3:15		
11:15	from		3:30		
11:30	Cecil Hourani		3:45		
11:45	& Bronson Tweedy		4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15			4:30		
12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

Sat 8/19 - Dinner at Jim Hunt's
3210 S St NW

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Mon 21

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch – Small D.R.
9:00		1:15	Lloyd, Kernel, Mason
9:15		1:30	Saunders, Carey, Cabell
9:30	Staff Mtg	1:45	Bissell
9:45		2:00	Bill Harvey
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Bfing of Senate Armed
10:30	~~Debriefing – Gen Todd~~	2:45	Services + Appropriations
10:45		3:00	[illegible] 212 Old SOB
firm 11:00	Gen Taylor's office re	3:15	180 - 3871
11:15	"Propaganda" Hatty Gen,	3:30	
11:30	Tom Hughes, State, MR Anderson, USIA	3:45	
11:45	Rm 300 E.O.B.	4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Bfing for S.G. Mtg.	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

7:30 Dinner at Chinese Emb – Inf. Stag. 3225 Woodley Rd.
Mr. FitzGerald will also attend.

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Tue 22

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
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20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
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30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Gp. Bfing
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Sam Scott & John Warner
11:00		3:15	Mr. Rizzell
11:15		3:30	R. C. Kenney
11:30		3:45	
11:45	Gen. Bradley	4:00	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Atty
12:00		4:15	Gen., Mr. Murrow, Alexis Johnson
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:30 Tennis & supper w/British Amb. & Jack McCloy

Fri 25

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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27	28	29	30	31		

LAST MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Amb Harriman
9:00		1:15	+ Bfing ODCI/FE, ~~DDI~~ Walt Smith Barnes
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Mr. Osborn
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Dr. Brown (Med. Staff)	3:15	
11:15		3:30	Lord Barnett
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	The President	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

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Tue 29

LAST MONTH JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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NEXT MONTH SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Dr. Charyk 4E886	1:45	
9:45	Pres. ent.	2:00	
10:00		2:15	Mtg - Gen Taylor, Gen
10:15		2:30	Lemnitzer, Dr. Wiesner
10:30	Mr. Kirkpatrick	2:45	+ 1015I
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Mtg - The Pres. on SEA	3:15	
11:15	+ C/FE	3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Mr. Pforzheimer
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Bfng for Spec. Gp.

5:30 Wm Koyle, C/S, Ankara

6 - Jack Maury + Mr. Osborn

7 Tracy Barnes

7:30 Drinks at Mrs Magruder's

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Wed 30

LAST MONTH

JULY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45	x x Tracy Barnes	3:00	
11:00	Walter Raymond [Chas. 3	3:15	
11:15	Enright] [Arthur McCafferty] (Afon. X4853)	3:30	Haircut
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Gen Taylor
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	USIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	
		5:30	The Pres.

6 - Supper + Tennis at home - Amb. Caccia + the Bohlens

2/mc

Thu 31

LAST MONTH	AUGUST—1961	NEXT MONTH

JULY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
						1
2	3	4	5	6	7	8
9	10	11	12	13	14	15
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
30	31					

AUGUST—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	Debriefing, Gen Bruce	1:15	
9:15	Clark, ONE	1:30	
9:30	Mr. Scoville	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Spec. Gp Mtg.
10:00	Mtg at the W. H. + AD/SI	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	NSIB Mtg (AADCI to	2:45	
10:45	take)	3:00	Mtg, Cuban Task Force
11:00		3:15	Mr. Goodwin's off.
11:15		3:30	Tutz, Woodward,
11:30	Spec. Gp Bfng	3:45	Bell, Schlesinger
11:45	Mr. Bissell	4:00	Tracy Barnes
12:00		4:15	2nd Fl Conf Rm West Wing, W.H.
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Lunch - Secy McNamara	4:45	
12:45	+ Secy Gilpatric (Pent. 3E880, Riverside 11-55261)	5:00	Mtg - Gen. Taylor, Amb. Johnson, Mr. Mc... ~~+ Mr Herbert Little~~

6-9: Reception - Emb of Malaya - 2701 Albemarle

6:15 Ostrom & Murphy

8:15 Dinner at home - John McCloy - 27238

Wed 20

LAST MONTH						
AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
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27	28	29	30	31		

SEPTEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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NEXT MONTH						
OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

call Roy Gasthoff

8:15 - John McCone - breakfast at DCI's

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - George McGhee
9:00		1:15	for Hams, Fish Armstrong
9:15		1:30	8th Flr. - Secy's Dining
9:30	[illegible] Mtg.	1:45	Room. ((State))
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Bf. Amb. Gordon
11:00		3:15	(Brazil)
11:15		3:30	Gen. Taylor
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Mtg at Taylor's office
12:00	Cord Meyer	4:15	Gen. Cabell
12:15		4:30	
12:30	Bill Harvey	4:45	
12:45		5:00	

5:15 [illegible]
6:30 [illegible]

5:45 - Reception - Pres. of Peru - 3001 Garrison St
Mr + Mrs D

Tue — SEPTEMBER—1961 — 26

LAST MONTH: AUGUST						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	14	15	16	17	18	19
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
27	28	29	30	31		

SEPTEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH: OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

Lunch Helm

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	Spec. Gp. Brfg.
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	John McCone
12:00	Mr. Helms & Mr. Maury	4:15	
12:15	Amb. David Bruce	4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6 – McCone, DCI, Col. White & Chandler to Bldg.

7:30 Dinner w/ Mr. & Mrs. Pres. Bush & John McCone

Tue 3

OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
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10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Harold Linder
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Special Gp Bfng
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	Gordon Stewart
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	Mtg at White House
12:15		4:30	Cabinet Rm. (Norstad)
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

Maj. Gen. George Bush

Wed 4

OCTOBER—1961

LAST MONTH — SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH — NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Gen Anders
9:00	Gen. Eisenhower, Statler	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Bfg - Maj Gen Geo Bush
10:00		2:15	C/JUSMAG, Greece
10:15		2:30	USIB Briefing
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00	Air Vice Marshall Loza + C/NE	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30	Lindley Boncil + C/IO	3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Lv. for N.Y. via Aero-Commander
12:30	Gen. Anders, C/EE +	4:45	
12:45	[Paul Haines], C/Polish Desk, Mr. Latomerski	5:00	

8:00 Dinner - Mr + Mrs John Hughes - BL
63 E. 74th

Staying at Drake Hotel, Suite 1212.

1/mk

Sat-Sun 7-8

LAST MONTH: SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH: NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45	Mr Shelton		2:00		
10:00	Mr Amory		2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30	Gen. Miller		2:45		
10:45	Clint Staff		3:00		
11:00	+ H/OSI + HDSI		3:15		
11:15	Mr Harvey		3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15	Wm Bundy +		4:30		
12:30	Dr Kent +		4:45		
12:45	Amory		5:00		

13-00000

Tue 10

OCTOBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

LAST MONTH

SEPTEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15	KK	1:30	Adm De Florez
9:30	Col. Holland	1:45	KK
9:45		2:00	Joan Rohrer & Mr. Larocque
10:00	USIB Bfng	2:15	
10:15		2:30	Special USIB Mtg.
10:30		2:45	
10:45	Dave Murphy	3:00	
11:00	Mtg w/ the Pres. on Berlin Mil. Planning	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	~~Mr. Fitz Gerald~~
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	Ad. Frville

5:30-7:30 Reception - Japanese Emb.

5:30 Gov Harris - NESC 6 - Mtg of Principals - State - Secy's conf. [illegible]

Dinner at home for the Arthur Dalters - (Leon will help)

The Harlans regret - previous engagement

13-00000

Wed 11

LAST MONTH	OCTOBER—1961	NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - Cornelius Ryan
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30	Staff Mtg.	1:45	
9:45		2:00	Special Gp Bfng
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	3
10:45	Mtg. w/ the Pres. on	3:00	[Bob Wheelbee]
11:00	Pres. Off. + KD/SEA	3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
✓12:00 (30)	Brig. Rias Hussain + Alan Conway. C/NE	4:15	
12:15		4:30	NSIB Briefing
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

7:15 Dinner - Mr. + Mrs. Helms. Inf. 3901 Fessenden, NW
Iranian Emb. after the Helms Dinner

1/mc

Do letters for DC

set up Bulich + Durkee

Fri 20

LAST MONTH	OCTOBER—1961	NEXT MONTH

SEPTEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

OCTOBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Family Dining Room
9:00	Dave Murphy	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	White House	2:15	
10:15	Cabinet Room	2:30	Special Gr.
10:30		2:45	Situation Room at White House
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	Tom Schreyer	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	Deputies Mtg
12:45		5:00	~~[illegible] Award Ceremony~~

~~5:30 Mr Archer~~

6:00 Mr Schreyer

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Tue 14

NOVEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

LAST MONTH

OCTOBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31				

NEXT MONTH

DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

Federal Cl x 6345

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - John Starnes
9:00		1:15	Chmn - Canadian JIC
9:15		1:30	Large Dining Rm.
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	The President	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	Spec. Gp Bfng & Mr.
12:00		4:15	McCone
12:15		4:30	
12:30	N S C Bfng.	4:45	
12:45	Col. King & L.A. Survey Team	5:00	N S C Bfng

8 - Dinner - Secy Rusk for Gen Oak - Blair House
Stag. Blk tie.

13-00000

Kansas City

Fri 1

LAST MONTH — NOVEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

DECEMBER—1961						
Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

NEXT MONTH — JANUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

A. M.		P. M.	
8:45		1:00	Lt. Lunch in office
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Tom Ross + David Lucas	2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	David Murphy
10:45		3:00	[Geo. Merten] 3
* 11:00	[Geo. Merten] 3 (has CS file)	3:15	(Note: D. Murphy was
11:15		3:30	given CS official file on [Geo. Merten] 3
11:30	Frank Reynolds	3:45	to review & return to MJD.)
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

6:15 Attorney General
Rm 5115 Justice (10th St Gate)

Dinner for TSD Research Bd (Alm de Florez)
Alibi Club 7:30 - Informal

3/mc

Sat-Sun 30-31

LAST MONTH — NEXT MONTH

NOVEMBER

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
			1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30		

DECEMBER—1961

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

JANUARY

Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

A. M.	Sat.	Sun.	P. M.	Sat.	Sun.
8:45			1:00		
9:00			1:15		
9:15			1:30		
9:30			1:45		
9:45			2:00		
10:00			2:15		
10:15			2:30		
10:30			2:45		
10:45			3:00		
11:00			3:15		
11:15			3:30		
11:30			3:45		
11:45			4:00		
12:00			4:15		
12:15			4:30		
12:30			4:45		
12:45			5:00		

? Dated ?

12/31 - New Year's Eve. Dinner - Mrs & Mr. Walter Lippman

13-00000

LAST MONTH

DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

JANUARY—1962

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31			

NEXT MONTH

FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28			

8:45	1:00
9:00	1:15
9:15	1:30
9:30	1:45
9:45	2:00
10:00	2:15
10:15	2:30
10:30	2:45
10:45	3:00
11:00	3:15
11:15	3:30
11:30	3:45
11:45	4:00
12:00	4:15
12:15	4:30
12:30	4:45
12:45	5:00

13-00000

Bush

Tue 9

LAST MONTH — DECEMBER						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
					1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31						

Sun	Mon	Tue	Wed	Thu	Fri	Sat
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7	8	9	10	11	12	13
14	15	16	17	18	19	20
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NEXT MONTH — FEBRUARY						
Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
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Time		Time	
8:45		1:00	Lunch - T. Barnes
9:00		1:15	(Lge. Dining Rm)
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30		2:45	
10:45		3:00	Mr Lewis Gulick AP
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	Sir John Wheeler Bennett
12:30		4:45	(2723 Q)
12:45		5:00	

5:30 - Sen Prescott Bush

A

D R A F T

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

27 November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba

1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.

C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.

D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.

E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will

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severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.

F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.

G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two" course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.

H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.

I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commando and sabotage operations, except in rare selective instances will serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productive since, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelligence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those very few instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated. Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for action against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authority will insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligence coverage of Cuba.

J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use of facilities, real estate and basing outside the United States, particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary and desirable.

K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue. (Validity of this assumption is questionable)

II. **OBJECTIVES**:

Based on the above assumptions, the following objectives appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against Cuba:

A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate and assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cuba from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the Free World.

B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the world.

C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.

D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter-intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:

1. Capabilities and intentions of the government.

2. Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.

3. Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.

4. State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.

5. Militia and military order of battle and equipment.

6. The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.

7. Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.

8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.

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E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.

III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:

A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.

1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection

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with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.

2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the (131) 24 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba

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and through the development of additional legal travellers.

4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.

5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

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particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (twenty) 24 officers and crew members aboard (six) 24 Cuban vessels we are now running as controlled agents.

6. <u>Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad</u>: At the present time we are running (12) 24 Cuban diplomats stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable operations aimed at an additional (20) 24 Cuban diplomats. We propose to continue and intensify the current program of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official representative abroad to whom we can gain access and concerning whom we have any reason to believe a susceptibility to approach exists. These additional penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral operations and where appropriate in conjunction with liaison services.

7. <u>Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations Abroad</u>: At the present time we have audio and/or telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations in (Chile), (Italy), (Mexico), (The Netherlands), (England), (Uruguay), (Greece), (Spain), (France), (and Canada). No major expansion of this coverage is presently contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional targets of opportunity and wherever possible install coverage in those cases where the additional intelligence from this type of source over and above what we are now receiving would appear to make such installation worthwhile.

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8. <u>Communications Intelligence</u>: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban communications. 24

9. <u>Communist Party Operations</u>: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are (65) 24 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this (65) 24 the survey we have conducted indicates that 24 (23) have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these (23) 24 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of (65) 24 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.

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10. <u>Illegally Infiltrated Agents</u>: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.

11. <u>Exfiltration</u>: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.

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SPLITTING THE REGIME

B./1 Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.

C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.

D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations: Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.

E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.

F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare: In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:

1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.

to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.

2, Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.

3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.

4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.

5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.

6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.

7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.

8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.

H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:

Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:

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A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.

B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.

C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.

D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.

V. <u>RECOMMENDED ACTION</u>:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.

D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

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subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.

E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.

F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

104-10308-10023 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PRO-POSED	ACTION	ACCOM-PLISHED
X	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, Task Force W

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

MICROFILMED JUL 17 1963 DOC. MICRO. SER.

SUBJECT: Operational/GYROSE
Operational Debriefings

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None.

Reference: UFGA-4088.

CUBA

possible use by U.S. Gov. Agency

During the month of May 1962 the following persons, processing through the CAC, were considered to be of operational importance to JMWAVE.

1. Rafael *ARRIBAS Rodriguez (A 12 895 148). Subject, a former Medical Products Salesman, had contacts with two employees of the Post Office in Cuba. The leads he provided were considered marginal and dropped for further operational exploitation.

2. Jose Francisco *AZOR Ores (A 12 911 733). Subject, a former rural census taker for the INRA, is undergoing a thorough debriefing on OB and cartographic information by the AMOTs.

3. Manuel CABRERA Rodriguez (A 12 911 477). Subject, a former railroad worker in Camaguey and ex-Rebel Army Battalion Commander, was debriefed on positive intelligence information. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Reports for dissemination.

4. (Dr.) Jaime *CARBONELL Rivero (A 12 907 852). Subject, a former night club owner in Havana, submitted two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Headquarters in UFGA-4176, dated 31 May 1962. att.

5. Abel Julio *COLIMORIO Vasquez (A 12 971 774). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence.

6. Rafael Rinaldo *DIAZ Veira (A 12 444 465). Subject, a pharmacist and co-owner of a medical testing clinic in Pinar del Rio, was recruited, trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. JMWAVE plans to start a new collection network centered

(continued)

Distribution:
3-Headquarters

CS COPY

INDEX

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 25 June 62

DATE DISPATCHED: JUL 9 1962

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-4543

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-120-33

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

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around this agent into the medical profession in Havana and Pinar del Rio. Subject had come to PBPRIME to visit his son who had been injured in an automobile accident.

7. Carlos Fernando *GALBAN Perez (A 12 895 062). Subject, a former theatre employee in Havana, was contacted by fnu *LLANO, a private detective in Havana who was his neighbor, just prior to his departure and asked that, when Subject arrived in Miami, he contact Freyre JORGE in the Catholic Bureau in Miami. Allegedly LLANO had information concerning airfields, pilots and radar installations which he wanted to send to Freyre JORGE. Upon contacting the Catholic Welfare Bureau, Freyre JORGE was unknown to them. At the request of JMWAVE, Subject wrote to LLANO in order to obtain more information concerning LLANO's potential. JMWAVE is waiting for an answer to this letter.

8. Antonio *GOICOCHEA Cosculluela. Subject, a former member of the Legal Department of Cubana, was debriefed on positive intelligence and on the activities of AMWARM-1. The result of the intelligence portion of the debriefing is being disseminated.

9. Antonio *GOMEZ Hernandez (A 12 419 493). Subject, a medical doctor, returned to Cuba without giving any indication of his plans to CAC, consequently JMWAVE was too late in recruiting him; however, he is scheduled to return to PBPRIME about November. It is possible that Subject will return again to Cuba at that time. If this proves to be the case, serious consideration will be given to recruiting him.

10. Ruben Arturo *HERNANDEZ Garcia (A 12 911 621). Subject was an MRAC coordinator in Santa Fe, Isle of Pines. Several leads of marginal value were provided.

11. Jose *MONTALVO Urruti (A 12 911 895). Subject, a pediatrician, came to PBPRIME to visit his daughter who is in a Miami high school and to visit a patient. Subject has an invalid wife and one son currently serving in the Isle of Pines prison after he was captured at Playa Giron. Although he originally expressed an interest in working as an ODYOKE singleton in PBPRIME once he returned, he later changed his mind.

12. Tomas *OLIVERA Gandoa (A 11 266 803). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the FND, is being debriefed on operational leads and on positive intelligence concerning the Cuban micro-wave system.

13. Valentin *PADRON (A 12 900 229). Subject, a former grocer in Las Villas, was debriefed on operational leads and positive intelligence. The leads which subject provided were considered marginal for further exploitation. Subject had planned to return to Cuba legally but was prevented from doing so for family reasons.

14. Jesus Gregorio *PEREZ, CKA 183. Subject, working an independent resistance network in Cuba, specialized in exfiltration of friends and members of his group. He offered to exfiltrate any technicians and professional people. After debriefing him, Subject was turned over to the PM Branch for exploitation.

201-325597 Re possible use of sub. by U.S. [illegible]

15. Federico Gaspar *SALVADOR Rodriguez. Subject, a dentist from Camaguey, came to PBPRIME to attend the funeral of his father. He was recruited and trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. He will be used as a communications link for the AMTAUP Net.

16. Gumercindo *SIMON Sanchez (A 12 911 019). Subject, a former chauffeur in Las Villas, offered to provide bona fides for contacting "Titi" MARTINEZ, a communicator for Capt. Felix *TORRES, a militia commander in Remedios, Las Villas. Subject

also offered to re-infiltrate to contact (MARTINEZ) 06. Subject could not provide sufficient detailed biographic data on 06 (MARTINEZ) with which to risk using a KUBARK internal asset to contact him. An investigation was initiated through the AMOTs to determine more biographic data so serious consider-ation could be given for contacting (MARTINEZ) 06

17. Manuel Felix SUAREZ Pozo (A 12 903 186). Subject, a lawyer and a former underground member in Havana, was debriefed further on operational leads. Letters to the more important members of his group have been written in an effort to establish communications and to exploit their operational potential.

18. Miguel Archangel *SUAREZ Valdez (A 12 895 991). Subject, a former resistance group member, was debriefed further on operational leads and is currently expecting a courier from the resistance group leader in Havana, who allegedly has agents who have access to a Soviet COMINT station. in Cuba

19. Miguel Angel *YANES Garcia (A 12 903 525). Subject, a former employee in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the FND, was debriefed for operational leads and positive intelligence. Subject refused to reveal any FND assets in Cuba and he had only margianl intelligence to provide.

END OF DISPATCH

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SECRET

MEMURANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMCANOE

Job # 65-535/28

File # 19-6-91

Dated included:

Volumes: 11

1. Description:

This project concerns U.S. contacts for a resistance group in Cuba. Support of the Unidad de Liberacion Naćional (ULN) and their plans and efforts to overthrow CASTRO. Principle players are:

AMCANOE-1 (201-0283570) Eduardo GARCIA Molina

AMCANOE-2 (201-0726572) Enrique Alfredo GARCIA Molina

AMCANOE-3 (201-0727185) Antonio Jose RAMIREZ Mendez, captured and executed in Jan 64;

AMCANOE-4 (201-0729621) Armando SOSA Rodriguez

AMCANOE-5 (201-0727186) Marcelino PEREZ Diez

AMCANOE-6 (201-0729610) Orlando OROPESA Perez

AMCANOE-7 (201-0729080) Benjamin ACOSTA Valdes, captures tried and killed by firing squad 15 Sept 63.

AMCANOE-9 (201-) Juan AMESTOY Dominguez, killed 29 Sept 63 in a gun battle.

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2. Review of these files turned up the following documents:

TDCSDB-3/654-571, dated 9 May 63: Concerns efforts of Cuban lawyer Paulino A SIERRA of Chicago to unify exiles and an offer by Chicago businessmen to support the overthrow of CASTRO.

Memo for the Record dated 3 March 1964: a friend of AMCANOE-1 who is a businessman and ship owner, with interests in a slot machine business (placing them in gambling houses), placed him in contact with elements of the underwrold, through a former St. Louis police officer. Through the police officer there was reportedly a tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The latter reportedly offered to assassinate CASTRO at a price of $150,000 dollars.

UFGA-15233, dated 15 April 1964: Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F. JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

UFGA-15954, dated 11 May 1964: CAMERON mentioned contact with unidentified group willing to assassinate selected Cuban leaders: Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. CAMERON made fairly clear that the MAFIA was involved.

Jane Zerance
Researcher

104-10308-10044 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMBRUSH Organization

Job # 63-345/6

File # 19-5-6

Dated included: Apr 61 - Jan 62

Volumes: 1

1. Description:

Revolutionary Council Anti-Castro Security and Counter-Intelligence Team.

2. Findings:

No findings in relation to the terms of reference.

Of possible interest: A document dated 19 August 1961 source: AMPAL-1, hand carried to Hqs. from WAVE in August 1961. The document mentions "Cuban Communist penetration agents in all branches of importance of the U.S. Government" ... Mentions a possible "Castro penetration into the Frente (FRD - Revolutionary Democratic Front) and U.S. activities".

3. Other Agencies with Knowledge of this Activity:

Apparently, none.

03
(Barbara Boyle)
Researcher

02 [CDH comment: Check out Eugenio MARTINEZ again. (SL)IPSTREAM-1 said in 1976 that one Eugenio MARTINEZ was working for the Cubans. A Eugenio MARTINEZ was involved in the Watergate; a former JMWAVE Station agent.]

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from WAVE to HQ by Victor Wallen, Dec. 1961 Source AMPRIZE-1

2. August 19/61
Enclosed find an approximate list of expenses that (Armando Munero) gave me for consideration. However, he would like to talk it over as to the rest of his stay in the U. S.
(Armando Munero) enclosed a note he asked to have sent over, "La Voz d las Americas" (onda corta--short wave). This is supposed to be some sort of signal to his O. P. C. group in Cuba to get behind and cooperate with information and sabotage.---------
I did not talk to him as yet since I am awaiting word from you as t this Monday's meetings with him.-----

3. August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga, a friend from Cuba and former sugar mill owner, and father-in-law of Lino Fernandez (MRR, now in jail at the Isle Pines), told me that Dr. (Antonio Valdes Rodriguez) (30th of Noviembr Movimiento) was taken to jail after returning to Cuba from Miami last time here, and not as yet released. Jacinto arrived here wi his wife and 3 grandchildren about 5 days ago. He was formerly a member of the famous old Cuban A B C group. It should be remembe that Dr. (Valdes) received training in S/W, his last trip here.-----

4. August 19/61
Ben Volpe, now working at Holiday Tours, Biscayne Blvd., Miami, t me that his father, having come from Cuba a few days ago, told hi that Federico Claramont, 1100 10th St., Miami Beach (living close them), is a suspected member of Castro's G-2 and known as such si being in Cuba. He arrived in the U. S., Miami, as a political ex which is a cover for his true mission here, and status.------

5. August 19/61
Jacinto Luzarraga and his relative told me that it is being rumor that since only men are taken to Opa Locka by Immigration for 48 Fidel Castro is sending in many G-2 women instead of men for his clandestine operations here, between here and Cuba. I also heard rumored that some of these agents are sent to tie in with Communi in the U. S., various regions of the U. S. I have no other info. this as could not find out more since it was told to me as a rumc

6. August 19/61
(Armando Munero) told me that he gets information from his uncle Guillermo Rojas, a long time Cuban Communist who is presently wo in the Imprenta Nacional at Havana. He helped (supposed to be one

5/M

13-00000

Cont'd.6.-- the main) organize the library of the Communist throughout Cuba
His uncle told him that Kruschev promised Fidel Castro that he have missles in Cuba(this was a few months ago). Also, his unc that the Russians have spies in the Pentagon that pull for Fidel Castro, and they have already plenty of agents belonging to the Communists in all branches of importance of the U. S. Gov't., an even in the CIA. He said that all people in Cuba that worked wi the CIA were picked up through their agents and those presently working with same are being watched closely. (Munero) told me th he is kind of suspicious of Eugenio, his being Cuban and because a sort of sixth sense, as he calls it.-------------

(7) August 19/61

-Bart told me last week that Juez Garceran was the one that sent letter you received to Carlos Prio as he recognized the handwrit on both envelopes. The above judge told Bart that some have bee given Salvo Conductos to Mexico and that the Italian Embassy is emptying out some. This judge is the one that made the list of people held up in the Italian Embassy, that you received from Ba

-Bart told me that he thought that Alberto Del Junco(MDC),that I in touch,with is getting aid from someone from the U. S. Gov't. Del Junco's sister saw him this past Friday night at his home an gave him $5,000.00 in U. S. Dollars(money) to send through the Po to Cuba to be given to her brother down there. She didn't want t disclose to Bart where and from whom she received the money, and only said that it was from his group(MDC) here. Bart thinks that this is not true. He sent the money down already.

-Enclosed(marked in pencil, #7) find photostatic copies of letters sent to Oscar Diaz from former F.Castro Pres. Urrutia and from a Macaroni that Bart knows. It is self explanatory in Spanish and Bart says that he knows that the air strips shown on enclosed map are truely in existence. Bart received these photostatic copies to his suggesting same to Oscar Diaz upon delivery. I couldn't t this letter to you a few nights ago as he had to deliver same in hour of the time I visited him. However, I suggested his trying t stand by when the letter was opened. Oscar Diaz liked Bart's idea making photostatic copies of same and Bart asked for one for himse (OVER)

Cont'd. 3.- It seems that Captain Despain wants to break up the Intell.Servi of the Frente due to lack of funds, says Dr. F'dez. However, d having tried to find out whether this Captain Despain was Ernest we were not sure. Having been introduced upon our 2nd visit las Friday, 9:30 A. M.(first visit was 2 days previously at 9:30 A.M we were presented to Ernesto Despain, the person we were looking some time now(due to his relations with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2) an Josefina Socarras(Ceferino's girl friend, of whom I have been wr about for some time now). We started to get places, with all fu cooperation, the first time there as we spoke only to Dr. F'dez. second time, with Despain present, we felt that we should not go many details. Dr. F'dez. told us that Despain was planning on s him with a delegation to Puerto Rico. I feel, as well as Frank, this Dr. F'dez.(around 60 yrs. old) is a person that could very e organize his office to be of very valuable service against Castro his Communists here in the States, as well as in Latin America wh they already have their own agents operating. It is felt that De is trying to get Dr. F'dez. out of the way because he recognizes importance of the planned Intelligence Service the Frente , throu F'dez., ~~xxx~~ which could produce a very strong arm against Castro. Dr. F'dez. says that they are now working on the ABC form as used against a former president of Cuba known as Machado. Enclosed is an idea of how this group functions and are placed into many walks life of importance to this cause. Their work is mainly of Intell Service and in a form of cooperating with the U.S.Gov't. in all wa possible without trying to get monies, if possible, to function. H presently trying to get donations to $300.00 to keep his office go for a month. Upstairs in the same building, they have radio operat (very well experienced) continuously monitoring all phases of impo ance in Cuba(sugar mills, etc.). Frank Asked Despain if the file had in his hands was for us. Despain was caught a little off bounds as he became somewhat unnerved, but soon rallied and opened the fil showing data on boats, but taking great pains to keep us from seein the contents. I didn't want to press the point arousing any suspic Dr. F'dez. introduced me as a Joe Anderson, FBI man. I had formerl cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

(3)

Cont'd.8-----did anyway. I let it go at that to see the developments as it w
no use to refute him again. However, when we parted, I did menti
him again that he should not do so at random as I did not think i
necessary nor what we had agreed upon. Dr. F'dez. did say so as
introduced us to Despain as his Jefe(chief) and wanted to show hi
loyalty at the same time explaining to him that he was cooperatin
with us in all ways possible against Castro and Communism, which
plainly seen that Despain didn't like at all. Despain sat silent
no questions asked, hard, eyeing us as if waiting to see how far
FBI had gotten into matters of the Frente. I did not ask the Dr.
questions I wanted to and only said that I would like to be in to
with him at all times. Enclosed you will find photostatic copies
letters sent by Cubans here to Prague and the answers of same. Y
told me to ask him how he got this information. Idid not feel th
should have done so at the moment. However, I will be in touch w
Dr. F'dez. again soon as I said I would. I will not go to the of
of this Intell. again as I was almost seen by a Frank Paez, Pepe
Aguero's friend. Pepe Aguero is Paula Grau's husband, now here.
turned my head away, I think, in time. Dr. Fdez. says that he ha
of more information to give me and that loads of stuff reaches hi
daily, all of which he can turn over to me for study. He said th
will get for me CIA files that the Frente has hidden and want to
with him. I feel, if Despain, is out of the way, I could do much
getting what is needed of them. I do not feel safe with him arou
I may be wrong, but that is the way I feel abo ut security with h
I promised to return the enclosed photostatic copies but feel tha
of the files can be taken over for copy for the asking, as Dr. F'
said he would cooperate to the fullest.

Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez: Office(9 to 11 A.M.):FR-1-5133
Home(from 8 P.M. to 8 A.M.):HI-4-1853
Frente(from 11:30 A.M. to 1 P.M.):
FR-4-2630-38-39

He holds a Frente Carnet No. 102, Frente Revolucionario Democratic
(F.R.D.), Delegacion de: El Salvador(Rescate) and receives $200.00
monthly as a salary from the Frente.

8.

August 19/61
Frank Arias has given me the following information (about Despain).
Captain(Lieutenant, known formerly as) Ernesto Despain, head of t
Frente Intelligence Service at 174 14th Lane, Miami, with entranc
in back of building at 197 15th Street, off Brickell Ave., worked for
with Ceferino Alvarez(G-2, known as) in Government Insurance(Segu
Gobierno) and formerly in the now non-existent BANSECO(branch of
National Bank of Cuba). Josefina Socarras worked with them also
Seguro del Gobierno . I have written of Josefina before through
findings of Frank, who knew them all in Cuba(not Despain directly,
only his family). This Captain Despain is an intimate friend of
Ceferino and Josefina(planning to go to New York soon). She has b
trying to get something started here, as reported before. It is
strongly urged that this Josefina be surveilled constantly as I,
as well as Frank, think that she is affiliated with Castro's cland
activities here in the States. She received monthly checks from th
Centro Refugiado. Cap tain Despain is planning on going to join th
U. S. Army. He is definitely strongly suspected of giving everyth
of Intelligence to Castro and is tied in with the Communist and Cas
groups here. He may even soon plan to disappear from the scene and
should not be allowed to get off easily. He has been keeping Dr.
Jose Julio Fernandez from organizing his anti-Castro and Anti-Commi
files due to lack of funds(says Despain). It seems that this was ju
an excuse before and was done to keep the ball functioning as shoul
be. I think that this Dr. Jose Julio Fernandez is very sincere an
is innocently giving everything into the hands of Despain without
knowing. How Despain got into this position is not known by us yet.
As far as we are concerned he is a Castro penetration into the Frent
and U. S. activities.

The above is the result of being sent to see Dr. Jose Julio Fernande
head of Intelligence Servence of the Frente(as told us by Former
Cuban Grl. Socallanes, friend of Frank. I went with Frank to try t
find out abo ut a woman whose son(one of two of them) had taken data
and pictures for Castro of all (most) military and naval installations in t
State of Florida.

cautioned him against referring to me as anything special, which he

(4)

Cont'd.8--- Enclosed find the groups belonging to the Frente that was writt-
for me by this Dr. F'dez.

Enclosed find(#8 marked)"Reporte and Informe"(2 sheets) given me
Dr. F'dez. to show what they are doing now.

Dr. D'dez. informed me of the following:

(a). A Communist militant; Alberto Iglesias, 425 Cedar Lane, E
Meadow, New York(Phones:IV-1-4368 and IV-6-4547). He is a
Resident of the U. S. for more than 20 years. He has his
business,"American Welding and Boiler Works Co.". This i
man to be watched as he even uses his business as a front.

(b). Mario Garcia, Miami Ventilated Awning Co., Inc.(works at):
presently asking Immigration permission to go to Cuba and
considered as one of Fidel Castro's heads here with a gre
many ties.

Enclosed find a break down of expenses of the Frente Intell. Offi
given me by Dr. F'dez., my asking him for same. Frank Aries is
helping the Dr. get funds for the maintenance of this office for
least another month. I think that this set up should be taken i
study. --------

9. August 21/61
Enclosed find marked #9, 2 documents, given me by Emanuel Carvaja
last night which are self-explanatory in Spanish. One is a list
exiles in their Costa Rican Embassy in Havana, and the other is a
document(copy) signed and given today to the Minister of Foreign
Relations of Cuba in Havana. It seems that there was very much
discussions concerning same amongst the foreign diplomats in Cuba
The Egyptian Embassador(RAU:Syria, etc.) went to the first meetin
the diplomats had in Habana concerning the new monetary exchanges
He first agreed strongly with the rest and promised to sign the
enclosed type document concerning the new $ exchange in Cuba. T
first meeting was held last Monday, Aug.13th, and they met again
a second time on Thursday in order to sign. He(name not known by
Carvajal) then refused to sign and did not even show up which indi
ted to the remainder of the diplomats that his money must have bee
exchanged in the full amount to keep him off the list of signature
The Swiss Charge D'Affairs informed at the same meeting, to the
Diplomats, that he received information from his Government that t
Swiss Gov't. was checking all present Cuban bank accountants exist
in Switzerland and were readying themselves to act accordingly in
case the Cuban Gov't. should not reach any agreement in regards to
the exchange with the Diplomats.

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Cont'd. 9--

- The Japanese Embassador said he informed his Gov't. about these difficulties as a protest against the behavior of the Cuban Gov' This he told at the Diplomatic meeting.
- About a week ago, there was a hunger strike at the Brazilian Emb by the exiles there. However, they gave up as a gesture to only obedience to the Embassador. They protested against not receivi salvo conductos and other things.
- This coming week, Monday or Tuesday, the Diplomats again are get together at a meeting to protest before the Cuban Gov't. about t lax and ~~[illegible]~~ designing ways of handling this affair, and remind the Gov't. of their obligations in extending the courtesy according International agreements.
- Carvajal asked me not to mention this, but later said that he informed us about Embassador Quiros leaving Havana this Thursday as he was being recalled by the Costa Rican Gov't. for consultati Carvajal will be in charge of the Embassy for the time, but said he didn't expect the Embassador to return as he is taking his fa[illegible] and house hold items.

He also told me again that Eduardo Odio, Costa Rican Consul in Havana, was a person not to be trusted by many experiences they h already had with him.

— DO NOT MENTION CROWN NOW!

(ARMANDO MORALES) WIFE CALLED LAST NIGHT SAYING HE ENTERED CUBA THROUGH AIRPORT WITHOUT ANY MISHAP! HE AND SHE WERE TOLD TO INFORM ME OF SAME!)

I have money for him? [illegible] you want to give it to him

~~[illegible]~~

— Thurs or Sat - [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

JPN

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/WE 2 (WE NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED 1400 22 APR 63 [illegible])

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/TSD 3, C/EE 3, C/SAS 5, S/C 2

S E C R E T 221452Z

OPIM DIR INFO PRITY (HAMB) (FRAN) CITE (HAGU) 3698 IN22804

RYBAT KEYWAY PBRUMEN AMLEG

22 APR 1963

REF DIR 33866

1. REF DISCUSSED BY STA WITH EDMENT AND WARMBOLD. DUE INABILITY AND UNDESIRABILITY (USING LIAISON) AND LACK OF INDEPENDENT ASSETS WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN SHIPS, ONLY POSSIBILITY IMPLEMENT REF AT THIS TIME BY USE OF AMLEGS. IF SUCCESSFUL OP MOUNTED, ASSUME FOLL POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES ALREADY CONSIDERED BY HQS:

A. UNLESS ACTION TAKEN ON NUMBER OF CUBAN VESSELS AT ROUGHLY SAME TIME AMLEGS USED FOR ANY SPORADIC ACTIONS ON ONLY SOME SHIPS WILL PROBABLY BE RELUCTANT CONTINUE ACTIVITIES FOR KUBARK. IN GENERAL BELIEVE AMLEGS WILLING COOPERATE THIS EFFORT ONLY IF THEY CONVINCED IT PART OF "FINAL EFFORT" OVERTHROW CASTRO. (AMLEGS 12 AND 29 EXPRESSED GENERAL DISILLUSIONMENT OVER ODYOKE RESTRICTIONS SIMILAR ACTION BY EMIGREES IN PBPRIME AND FOUND IT DIFFICULT RECONCILE OUR REQUEST FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE THIS OP WITH APPARENT ODYOKE POLICY STOP OTHERS FROM CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ACTIVITY.)

B. IF CASTRO GOVT SUSPECTS SABOTAGE, LIKELY HE WILL ATTEMPT REPRISALS IN SIMILAR KIND AGAINST WESTERN CARRIERS, SUCH AS PAA FLIGHTS. ALSO, CUBAN G-2 LIKELY ATTEMPT MAJOR EFFORT BREAK AMLEG COMPLEX (WHICH WILL BE SUSPECTED) AND MAY TAKE REPRISALS AGAINST KUBARKERS & ODACID INSTALLATIONS THEREBY IDENTIFIED.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

13-00000

C. IF (DUTCH) AUTHORITIES SUSPECT SABOTAGE OPS ORIGINATED (ROTTERDAM) IN SINGLE INSTANCE POSSIBILITY EXISTS CONVINCE THEM CUBAN EMIGREE GROUP AND NOT KUBARK INVOLVED, BUT AS SIMILAR ACTIONS CARRIED OUT IN FUTURE HIGHLY UNLIKELY THEY WOULD ACCEPT THIS PLOY. ALSO, ALMOST CERTAIN (DUTCH) AUTHORITIES WOULD DRASTICALLY INCREASE SECURITY IN PORT AREA WHEN CUBAN VESSELS HERE, THUS MAKING FUTURE CONTACT ANY AMLEGS VERY DIFFICULT. SIMILAR SITUATION MIGHT OBTAIN (BELGIAN) AND (GERMAN) PORTS AS CONSEQUENCE. (DUTCH INTEL AND SECURITY SERVICES HIGHLY AWARE KUBARK KEEN INTEREST DUE TO THEIR HEAVY INVOLVEMENT OTHER ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN TARGET.)

2. RE SPECIFIFIC ACTION AGAINST (HAVANA) (WHICH ARRIVED ROTTERDAM 19 APR AND DEPARTING DIRECT TO HAVA 26 APR), SABOTAGE RAISED BY WARMBOLD AND EDMENT WITH AMELEGS 12 AND 29 WITH FOLL RESULTS:

A. AMLEG 12 IS OBVIOUSLY RELUCTANT TAKE PART SABOTAGE ACTION UNLESS ASSURED MANY OTHER COUNTRYMEN CARRYING OUT SAME TYPE ACTION OTHER AREAS. HE NOT WILLING TAKE ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT CAUSE DEATH ANY CREW MEMBER. HE DISTURBED BY RECENT NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS ODYOKE POLICY AND WANTS CLARIFICATION PURPOSE SABOTAGE ACTION. HE NOT INTERESTED ACTION IF IT PART OF GENERAL HARASSMENT CAMPAIGN NOT CONNECTED TO MAJOR ODYOKE PLAN OF ACTION. BELIEVE POSSIBLE HE WOULD BE MORE AMENABLE IF SOME INDICATIONS SUCH A PLAN OCCURRED PRIOR HIS NEXT VOYAGE.

B. AMLEG 29 APPEARED GENUINELY INTERESTED PERFORMING INTERNAL SABOTAGE ON SHIP BUT (AS CHIEF ENGINEER) WOULD REQUIRE COLLABORATOR (IN ENGINE ROOM) SINCE HE DOES NOT TAKE (REGULAR ENGINE ROOM) DUTY AND HIS PRESENCE (THERE ALWAYS FOR SPECIFIC INSPECTION WHICH) OBSERVED BY MEN WHO ARE ON DUTY. HIS MOTHER IN PBRUMEN ON VERGE NERVOUS BREAKDOWN AND ACTION HIS PART NOW WOULD REQUIRE HIS IMMEDIATE

12/PV

DEFECTION WHICH HE NOT WILLING DO BECAUSE OF MOTHER. IF ANOTHER 24 (ENGINE ROOM) AMLEG TRANSFERRED HIS SHIP PRIOR NEXT VOYAGE HE WOULD BE WILLING CAUSE SERIOUS DAMAGE WHICH COULD PLAUSIBLY BE EXPLAINED AS NATURAL ACCIDENT OR BREAKDOWN.

3. BELIEVE AMLEG 29 WOULD POSSIBLY BE WILLING TO PLANT FOUR-HOUR DELAY EXPLOSIVE "CLAM" TO ONE OF 34 DRUMS OF "TETRAHYDROFURAN" WHICH TO BE LOADED ON DECK. MANIFEST LISTS SUBSTANCE AS HAVING FLASH POINT OF MINUS 20 DEGREES CENTIGRADE. CLAM WOULD BE PLANTED AFTER SHIP ARRIVES HOME PORT. HAVE NOT DISCUSSSED THIS ACTION WITH AMLEG 29 YET. PLS ADVISE OPIM PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH AMLEG 29 WHICH SCHEDULED EVENING 23 APRIL. AMLEG 9 SHIP WILL DEPART (FOR HAVANA 26 24 APRIL.) 15-6

5. EDMENT REMAINING (HAGU) PENDING REPLY.

6. SINCE OBVIOUS UNPREDICTABLE, SERIOUS AND FAR REACHING LOCAL CONSEQUENCES CAN FLOW FROM ANY STAGE IMPLEMENTATION REF ACTION, REQUEST COMMENT RE ANY INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO CHIEF OF MISSION RE THIS MATTER OR GUIDANCE TO BE FOLLOWED IN BRIEFING HIM BY STA PRIOR ENGAGING IN REF TYPE PROGRAM.

S E C R E T

C/S COMMENT: *APPROVAL HAD BEEN GRANTED FOR SABOTAGE OF CUBAN SHIPS.

3/17

104-10308-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT 1035, 22 APR JEV)
INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

S E C R E T 221152Z

OPIM DIR INFO PRIITY WAVE (FRAN) MADR CITE [ ]

RYBAT TYPIC CALL

22 APR 63 IN22657

1. AMLEO 29 MET (IN ROTT BY VARMBOLD AND AMLEO 1 ON 20 APR. HE EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT RECRUIT IDEN A AS PLANNED BECAUSE IDEN B TOLD HIM IDEN A IS NOW BEING WATCHED CLOSELY DUE HIS RECENT ATTEMPTS TO RESIGN FROM MILITARY. A 29 HAD NO FREE TIME TO SEE AND MAKE OWN ASSESSMENT IDEN A SITUATION DUE SERIOUS ILLNESS MOTHER AND HIS REQUIRED PRESENCE ABOARD SHIP DURING REPAIRS.)

2. INFO IN REF OBTAINED BY AMLEO 29 FROM IDEN C. REQUEST TRACES. SHE IS FORMER GIRL FRIEND OF AMLEO 29 AND PARENTS ARE NEIGHBORS. SHE VERY ACTIVE IN RESISTANCE GROUP WHOSE NAME SOUNDS LIKE "FRENTE LIBERACION NACIONAL - FRENTE LIBERACION ESCAMBRAY." A 29 SEES HER IN HAVANA EACH TIME HOME ALTHOUGH SHE SPENDS CIRCA TWO OF EVERY THREE WEEKS WITH GRANDPARENT IN MATANZAS.

3. A 29 CERTAIN IDEN C WOULD ACCEPT RECRUITMENT BY HIM TO WORK WITH ODYOKE. VARMBOLD SEEING HIM AGAIN EVENING 23 APR. REQUEST OPIM PERMISSION PRIOR NEXT MEETING WITH A 29 TO INSTRUCT HIM TO RECRUIT IDEN C, TRAIN AND GIVE HER SW AND ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS PREVIOUSLY PLANNED FOR IDEN A.

S E C R E T

SECRET GROUP 1

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ACTION: C/SAS 5 (SAS NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1035, 22 APR 1963)

INFO: DCP, ADDP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 2, S/C 2

SECRET 221152Z

CPIN DIR INFO PRITY WAVE FRAN MEXI CITE (MAGU) 3696

22 APR 1963 IN22624

RYBAT TYPIC CALL

REF MAGU 3695 (IN 22657)

IDEN A: ANTONIO CONCEPCION.

IDEN B: MANUEL JUSTO RUINOS, BROTHER-IN-LAW OF ANTONIO CONCEPCION. SEE PREVIOUS INFO ON RUINOS FROM AMLEB 29.

IDEN C: NORMA FLORES, DOB CIRCA 39, RESIDES WITH MOTHER AND FATHER AT CALLE NO. 18332, ENTRE PRIMERA Y SEGUNDA, RESIDENCIAL MONTERREY, SAN MIGUEL DEL PADRON, GUANABACOA, HABANA. RESIGNED FROM JOB AS TEACHER IN UNIVERSITY OF VILLANOVA IN HAVANA IN 62. HAD PBPRIME VISA PRIOR BLOCKADE BUT BLOCKADE NULLIFIED CHANCE TO LEAVE. FATHER FORMER SERGEANT IN BATISTA ARMY NOW GARDENER. SISTER, NANCY FLORES, DOB CIRCA 36, IS OFFICE CLERK IN LA ISLA DE CUBA DEPARTMENT STORE, HAS APPLIED FOR PBPRIME VISA. GRANDFATHER AND UNCLE LIVE IN MATANZAS.

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWN-

SECRET

104-10308-10062 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMLEO
Unsuccessful Exfiltration Attempt by M/V ADA, 9-12 May 1964

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

References:

A.	BARR-1606,	dated 13 May 1964
B.	BARR-1607,	dated 13 May 1964
C.	WAVE-6458,	dated 13 May 1964
D.	WAVE-6433,	dated 13 May 1964
E.	WAVE-6463,	dated 13 May 1964
F.	BARR-1612,	dated 14 May 1964
G.	BARR-1614,	dated 14 May 1964
H.	BARR-1619,	dated 15 May 1964
I.	UFGA-15986,	dated 20 May 1964
J.	WAVE-6844,	dated 21 May 1964
K.	UFKA- 130,	dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated, and kept under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist him in obtaining asylum for his wife and family in a third country diplomatic installation in Cuba. Since the failure of the last asylum attempt for Mrs. AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in reference I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his wife and children out of Cuba. After the failure of the asylum attempt in March 1964, Mrs. AMLEO-3 again renewed her attack upon AMLEO-3 by phone and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get her or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission successfully. Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discontinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

Continued.....

CS COPY

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

Distribution:
3 WH/SA

CROSS REFERENCE TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION: S E C R E T

DATE TYPED: 25 May 1964

DATE DISPATCHED: JUN 2 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-15995

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-75/3

19-6-75/3

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15995

exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can carry out such exfiltration attempts on his own in a completely independent manner.

2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts inside Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result AMLEO-3 has borrowed money from AMSHED-1 and family relatives in the U.S. attempting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in debt to these individuals to the tune of $4-$5,000.00. On 5 May 1964, AMLEO-3 informed his C/O that he had recently heard from his wife via the (Japanese diplomatic courier channel) and in her letter she had told him that she planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt from inside the island the weekend of 10 May 1964. AMLEO-3 requested the C/O to alert QKMAGNET to this attempt, and said that he expected to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964. Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the following morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O and gave him the following information:

> "The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11 adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West, Florida sometime on 12 May 1964."

AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group planned to use, nor the exact time of departure, route the boat would follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C. FLUTEO, during a routine operational meeting, that he had sponsored and masterminded the aborted exfiltration operation, and that the operation had been mounted from the U.S., and not from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to the C/O.

3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation. AMLEO-3 claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his part to KUBARK, since KUBARK had refused to continue its effort to rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following individuals in the operation.

A. Mario REMIS, probably identical with Mario REMIS-CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB, Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small boat with five other Cuban refugees. AMLEO-3 claims he used this individual as his principal organizer in the expedition, and REMIS had agreed to go into Cuba acting as a guide and leader of the group. REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go to A-3's home and bring his family out. REMIS did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because of other committments and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos.

B. Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963 Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him with a recent photograph of Mrs. AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3 wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the photograph and also listed his home address without revealing (he says

FORM 53a USE PREVIOUS EDITION.	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	[X] CONTINUED	PAGE NO. 2

the true name of his wife. (This photograph was brought back by RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's family and the family of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not supposed to exceed 15 persons.

C. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and AMBIG-4 were recruited by RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and supposedly AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG-4 was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ, his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO-3 has never indicated in any way that he knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG-4 was obviously not desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

4. AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his wife that something was to happen the weekend of 10 May 1964, and that someone would be coming to see her with bona fides from him. Mrs. AMLEO-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them. Since the abort of the mission, Mrs. AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least three times, and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is reportedly not under control or surveillance by the Cuban Intelligence Services.

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ADA

4 May - 8 May 1964

5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons. These weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only. The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Florida.

9 May 1964

6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla for Cuba. The crew was made up of Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIG-4. The M/V ADA was enroute to Cuba during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964

7. The infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approximately ½ mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours. There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and walked across the highway 'Via Blanca'. There were several empty trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could detect no vigilance in the area. LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to meet RODRIGUEZ' contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one Paulo MARTINEZ as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo. AMLABEL-1 states he asked the name of this contact several times, but each time LOPEZ

06

maintained that he did not know. AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or else fabricated a name.)

8. LOPEZ began to count cars to while away the time. During the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of Matanzas. One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites, who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same easterly direction. LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy in both directions. RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ went back to the boat. RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are located. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ.)

9. In the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from LOPEZ, AMLEO-3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A-3 would not say how these contacts were carried out, but due to the time factor it is assumed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims the contacts were as follows:

A. A high level civilian official of the GOC, with the rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is willing to collaborate with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their missions.

B. Some unnamed high level Cuban military officers.

A-3 claims that these officials are willing to listen to the Rebel Army exiles, but do not intend to do anything positive with them unless they demonstrate their power by eliminating AMTHUG-1, or carrying out some type of strong action that would prove they had strong outside backing. AMLEO-3 stated that he would be more than willing to collaborate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals if KUBARK would support him in a future exfiltration to rescue his family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964, and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the night. A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef, and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964

10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours to find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indicating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to go in anyway and investigate. When approximately 20 yards off shore, they were fired upon by automatic weapons and a spotlight came on searching for them. The boat party was not hit by the fire and retreated to the open sea.

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CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-15995

11. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided not to attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line (about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach. RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught a bus to Guanabo, and they went back to the safehouse of (Paulo MARTINEZ) 06 At the safehouse he found the pickup team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had acquired as passengers. These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable to locate the homes of Jesus GOMEZ Calzadilla and AMLEO-3 and therefore had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3 and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, never even tried to find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo, and arranged recognition signals. RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat, leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to the exfiltration point.

12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about 30 minutes after the appointed hour of 2300, and halted the boat about 100 meters offshore. They saw a light on top of the reef at which point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal. (When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did not know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directio of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get women and children down these steep cliffs. LOPEZ replied that the difficulties involved had not occurred to them. By the same token, they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families.)

13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUEZ was hit as he jumped overboard. RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the boat. LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle (FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward land rather than out to sea toward their boat. LOPEZ states that this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

14. LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on the deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely conscious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward Matanzas hugging the coastline. The patrol craft (or fishing boats) had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage, and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. Their last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approximately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West, Fla. on 12 May 1964.

15. Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated throu his arm. He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and the pleura and the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

of 13 May 1964. RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida. His condition is now satisfactory.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt by the M/V ADA, various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various individuals. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl and debriefings of Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964. (She was supposed to have co out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated (English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all, embrace. Your daughter.", and supposedly indicated the daughter was safe.

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated "Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

C. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while trying to leave Cuba, and that the police had let the children free, but continued to hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only one car had been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being As of 23 May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG-4, or the passengers who were at the exfiltration point.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA

17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the exfiltration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba. WAVE is of the opinion that some of these inconsistencies can be attributed to genuine confusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts by AMLEO-3 who considers this activity was his own personal business and had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infiltration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withhol information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Mario REMIS, has been visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla. Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to AMLEO-3's family etc., will ever be completely clarified.'

18. As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba, and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family. AMLEO-3 is

definitely acting out of desperation, and although he does not desire to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under our control. WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in paragraph 9 of reference J. On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to contact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Anthony B. Wellbrake

Andrew K. REUTEMAN

POUCH SECURITY VIOLATION
NO FIELD DISTRIBUTION

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
XX	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Deputy Chief, WH/SA

INFO

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: RYBAT/TYPIC/AMWORLD/AMLILAC
Report on Activities of AMWORLD

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: FYI

REFERENCE : NONE.

1. AMLILAC/33 obtained the following information from IDEN A and IDEN B, former members of the AMWORLD Group. The date of the information is mid-july 1964.

a. IDEN A was an instructor in a commando section headed by IDEN C, in a camp located near IDEN D. He was given the job of instruction in the AR-15 and AR-10 rifles. Since no manuals were available he had to use the book, Small Arms of the World. The men in IDEN C's command are unhappy because they do not trust the planning judgement of IDEN C. The second in command, IDEN E, is so hated by the men that when IDEN C leaves the camp he has to take IDEN E with him.

b. The Intelligence Chief of AMWORLD is IDEN F. He maintains that the prerequisite for men in the INTEL section is personal loyalty to AMBIDDY/1. At one time a PBPRIMER, who works with AMBIDDY/1, presented IDEN F with a list of men for duty in the Intel section. IDEN F accepted the list and the men but after the PBPRIMER left he transferred the men to other sections. Recently IDEN F arrested a man in the Group and charged him as a spy for AMBANG/1. The man was physically beaten and jailed. Later IDEN F admitted he made a mistake, released the man, gave him several hundred dollars and told him to forget the incident.

CONTINUED

Attachment: U/S/C
3 cys, IDENS

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - Addressee w/att U/S/C

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 3 Sept 64

DATE DISPATCHED: SEP 10 1964

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-17603

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-124-27/4

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

c. The Navy section is composed of a Chief, IDEN G, Chief of Operations, IDEN H, and Assistant Chief of Operations, IDEN I. The morale of the ship's crews is low and many of them state that they will jump ship at the first port of call. A large powered barge is anchored at the Navy Base and contains all the arms, and ammunition. There is a staging base in IDEN J. A new base of ships is being set up in IDEN K along with an airstrip. Teams for operations will be flown to this base from IDEN J, go by ship on the operation, return to this base, and then fly back to IDEN J.

d. For operational briefings AMWORLD uses the same photos KUBARK uses (The men who have worked for KUBARK and AMWORLD are aware of this.).

e. AMBIDDY/1 spends most of his time flying around Central America in a light plane. He has hired IDEN L, a free lance PBRUMEN photographer, to film the camps and activities and to publicize AMWORLD.

f. IDEN M stated that AMBIDDY/1 acknowledged that he planned one operation per month for the next 3 months and then make an all out push with the guerrilla teams. IDEN M commented that if things did not improve AMWORLD would not be in existence 3 months from now.

g. AMWORLD has 3 large houses in the capital of IDEN J for recreation. Small groups are escorted to these houses from the camps. There is no limit to expenses for drinking and eating.

h. The chief engineer for the group is IDEN N. He is in charge of building the airstrips.

i. The infiltration team with the mission of assassinating AMTHUG/1 is headed by IDEN M. Date of the operation is unknown.

ANDREW K. REUTEMAN

13-00000

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT TO:

UFGA-17603, 3 September 1964

IDEN A: Humberto CASAS

IDEN B: Tulio LEISECA

IDEN C: FNU ACEBO

IDEN D: Puerto CABEZAS

IDEN E: Reynaldo GARCIA

IDEN F: "Chino" MOLE

IDEN G: Manoline GUTIERREZ

IDEN H: Ricardo "The Mexican", ex-crewman of the BEE

IDEN I: Generoso BRINGA

IDEN J: Nicaragua

IDEN K: Dominican Republic

IDEN L: Guayo HERNANDEZ

IDEN M: Marco ULLOA

IDEN N: "Juan Jose" ABREU

104-10308-10127 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

AMFAUNA 26

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

PROCESSING: MARKED FOR INDEXING / NO INDEXING REQUIRED / ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING / ABSTRACT / MICROFILM

MICROFILMED JAN 20 1964 DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO: Chief, Special Affairs Staff

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL/TYPIC/AMFAUNA
AMFAUNA-26 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For Your Information

Reference: UFGA-11700, dated 14 October 1963

Operational Developments:

1. Seven SW messages were received from AMFAUNA-26 during the period, and two were sent to her. Two SW messages written by AMFAUNA-26 no. 34 and no. 36, have not been received and it is not known what has happened to them. It has been observed that mail to and from Cienfuegos is very slow and uncertain; SW message no. 10 sent to AMFAUNA-26 on 6 November did not reach her until 22 December.

2. A continuing effort was made during the period to activate AMFAUNA-26's OWVL and medium speed radio systems. OWVL transmissions were begun on 16 October with message no. 1 warning AMFAUNA-26 of the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 the week before (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963) and the fact that AMCUTLER-2 was under surveillance. AMFAUNA-26 was unable to receive this message. In her SW message no. 35 of 25 October, she reported that her radio set is calibrated in meters instead of kilocycles and she had been unable to find the correct frequency. JMWAVE then sent AMFAUNA-26 instructions for converting kilocycles to meters, and began transmitting dummy messages, giving AMFAUNA-26 a simple code for reporting by commercial telegram whether she was receiving them, and whether and with what books she was able to decipher.

3. Two sets of deciphering materials had been sent to AMFAUNA-26. One package was buried by AMGLEN-9 in Pinar del Rio Province (see WAVE-5887 of 16 October 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 was informed of its location in OWVL message no. 1 of 16 October and SW message no. 10 of 6 November. A previous set of number groups had been sent to her by SW early in

Continued............

Distribution: INDEX
3 - Hqs

DATE TYPED: 9 Jan 1964

DATE DISPATCHED: JAN 15

CROSS REFERENCE TO: CS COPY

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-13428

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-6-50/3

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

October. It now appears that AMFAUNA-26 never received either of these sets of groups. As of 22 November when AMFAUNA-26's sister Olga arrived in Mexico (see paragraph 5), AMFAUNA-26 already had in her possession the letter containing the groups written in SW, but either had tried and failed to develop it, or had hesitated to try to do so, not knowing in what strength to use the reagent and erroneously thinking that this was a critical factor. As mentioned previously, AMFAUNA-26 did not receive SW message no. 10 until 22 December; on the following day she sent an open telegram to the son of AMFAUNA-32 in Miami, confirming her willingness to travel to Pinar del Rio and recover the material. It is not known whether she actually did so.

4. It had been planned, once AMFAUNA-26 was receiving OWVL and her ability to recover caches confirmed, to have AMWEE-1 cache AMFAUNA-1's radio and to inform AMFAUNA-26 of its location by OWVL. Events did not permit this.

5. AMFLORA-1 sent a telegram to his JMWAVE area accommodation address on 16 November 1963, reporting that his wife, the sister of AMFAUNA-26, was due to arrive in Mexico City on 20 November. Mexico City Station was so informed on 18 November (see WAVE-7762), but by the time confirmation arrived (MEXI-7031 of 23 November) the lady had already departed for Caracas. The oral messages which she brought from AMFAUNA-26 therefore did not reach JMWAVE until 20 December when HVCA-10780 was received. This dispatch transmitted a typewritten note from AMFLORA-1's wife containing the following information:

a. AMFAUNA-26 had run out of developer pills. (In retrospect, this does not seem to be true, because AMFAUNA-26 was evidently able to develop SW message no. 10 which she received on 22 December (see paragraph 3). What AMFAUNA-26 had probably been trying to convey was that she was running very short of pills. AMFAUNA-1 does not remember how many he gave her, but the most probable number appears to be twelve.)

b. AMFAUNA-26 had been unable to develop the SW message containing her cipher groups, because she had not been told how to mix her reagent.

c. AMCUTLER-2 was very worried by the fact that AMFAUNA-14 had been telephoning her frequently, and was afraid that AMFAUNA-14 was betraying her to the DSE.

d. AMFAUNA-26 was uneasy about being left in Cuba without a responsible leader to report to.

e. AMFAUNA-26's cover was wearing very thin, due to indiscretions by AMFAUNA-31.

6. In her SW message no. 29, which was received at JMWAVE on 21 October, AMFAUNA-26 reported that AMFAUNA-38 had been arrested on 7 September and taken to Santa Clara. At 0200 hours on the following morning, fourteen policemen came to AMFAUNA-26's house and searched it on the pretext of looking for a burglar. However, the only part of the house which they searched was the part inhabited by AMFAUNA-26.

7. In her SW message no. 30, AMFAUNA-26 reported the full names of two individuals who had approached her sub-agents AMFAUNA-29 and AMFAUNA-31, claiming to be doing underground work against CASTRO. These persons are one Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and one Raul SIMON Delgado. While neither JMWAVE nor Headquarters (DIR-78835 of 30 October 1963) had any traces on these persons, JMWAVE has a carded reference to a sensitive source document which carries the full name of Amable SANCHEZ Borroto and the implication that he enjoys the confidence of the Cuban Government. Unfortunately, an error was made in typing the card, and the document is unrecoverable. In SW message no. 10, AMFAUNA-26 was told to be careful with the person.

MIS card for Bitt [illegible] 201-[illegible]

8. On 12 October 1963, AMFAUNA-26 was in Havana where she saw AMCUTLER-2. About 23 or 24 October she was again in Havana and again saw AMCUTLER-2. On both occasions the problems posed by the arrest of AMFAUNA-14 were the prime topic of discussion.

9. In outgoing SW message no. 9 of 30 September, AMFAUNA-26 had been asked to investigate a Cuban naval officer named Carlos *LOPEZ Avalos with a view to forming an opinion as to his political attitude. She reported in SW message no. 37 of 3 November that all reports on this individual were derogatory except for one given by AMLAME-5. This report reached AMFAUNA-26 via AMFAUNA-31 who got it from a man identified only as Ramon *PEREZ who said that AMLAME-5 had told him that he had a contact to the Swiss Embassy, and that LOPEZ was already connected with people outside of Cuba and had recently performed a great service for the counterrevolution.

10. When the arrest of AMCUTLER-2 became known to JMWAVE (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November and December 1963), the son of AMFAUNA-32 was asked to phone his mother in Cienfuegos and instruc her to tell AMFAUNA-26 to go into hiding. On 3 January the son reported completion of the call and said that his mother had told him that AMFAUNA-26 had been arrested on 29 December and taken to the Santa Clara prison.

11. The reason for AMFAUNA-26's arrest remains obscure, or rather there are so many acceptable explanations that the problem is to select the right one. She could have been implicated by AMFAUNA-38, as would seem to be suggested by the fact that her house was searched immediately following AMFAUNA-38's arrest; if so, however, it is hard to explain why AMFAUNA-26 herself was not arrested until three and one-half months later. She could have been denounced by AMCUTLER-2 who was herself arrested two or three days before AMFAUNA-26's arrest; this seems unlikel in view of the fact that AMCUTLER-2 and AMFAUNA-26 are friends, that when AMCUTLER-2 reaches the point where she is ready to implicate other members of the AMFAUNA net she could be expected to begin with people who are not her friends, and that at least one such person (AMFAUNA-25) was known to be at liberty as recently as 4 January 1964, as were two of the cutouts between AMFAUNA-26 and AMCUTLER-2 (AMFAUNA-32 and AMFAUNA-33). AMCUTLER-2 is believed to have been under surveillance by the DSE, at least sporadically, between 12 and 24 October (see AMFAUNA-1 Progress Report for October, November, and December 1963), and AMFAUNA-26 could have been observed and identified when she visited AMCUTLER-2 during this period and marked for subsequent arrest and interrogation in connection with AMCUTLER-2's activities. AMFAUNA-26 could have made an attempt between 22 and 29 December to recover the cached cipher groups (see paragraph 3), and either been detected in the act or arrested while trying to contact AMCUTLER-2 on the same trip; in this case, however, it would seem that the DSE would not have transported her all the way back to Santa Clara but would have kept her in Havana for concurrent interrogation with AMCUTLER-2. The open telegram sent to the son of AMFAUNA-32 on 23 December was rather indiscreet and could have caused difficulties for the sender, but some of these difficulties ought in this case to have brushed off on AMFAUNA-32 herself, and as of 3 January 1964 she was still at liberty.

12. Information received from HULAKE-1 on 8 January 1964 indicates that a general roundup began in Cienfuegos on 26 December, possibly in connection with a suspected plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, and that at least seventeen persons had been taken. One of these persons appears to be AMLAME-5. To the best of JMWAVE's knowledge, neither AMFAUNA-26 nor AMLAME-5 had been involved in any plot against the life of Fidel CASTRO, but both could have been high on a general suspect list. The only known factor common to both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26 is the Ramon *PEREZ mentioned in paragraph 9. AMLAME-5 evidently was extraordinarily indiscreet when he talked with this man. AMFAUNA-31 has also spoken with him, and according to the oral message brought out by AMFAUNA-26's sister (see paragraph 5-e) AMFAUNA-31 has been habitually indiscreet. Ramon PEREZ was thus in a position to denounce both AMLAME-5 and AMFAUNA-26. If so, AMFAUNA-31 also ought to have been implicated, and it is perhaps significatn in this connection that, of all of

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-13428

AMFAUNA-26's sub-agents, AMFAUNA-31 is the only one believed to be in hiding as of 3 January (see WAVE-9940 of 4 January).

13. There has been no previous mention of Ramon PEREZ in the AMFAUNA operational reporting, and JMWAVE has no identifiable traces on him. AMFAUNA-1 was asked about him on 6 January, and produced the following information which he had obtained from Antonio Remigio *ESTRADA Diaz (born 1 October 1939, Cienfuegos), now residing at 1425 S.W. 5th St., Apt. 10, Miami, and a former collaborator of the AMFAUNA net in Cienfuegos. Ramon PEREZ is an employee of the Consolidado de Transporte, lives on Calle Arguelles in Cienfuegos between Prado and Gacel, and has a son, name unknown, who drives a taxi. Re: subject identifying Ramon Perez to 201-291236

14. On 5 and 6 January 1964, warning messages were sent to AMFAUNAs 29, 30, 31 and 33 by Antonio Remigio ESTRADA Diaz and by AMFAUNA-1 (see WAVE-0045 of 7 January 1964).

Production:

15. The following reports were made:

UFG-3918	Loading of a Ship at La Isabela with trailers Carrying 40-foot Long Covered Objects
UFG-3941	Relocation of Radar Installations & Other Activities at the Cienfuegos Surface-to-Air Missile Site, Las Villas Province
UFG-3947	Installation of an unusual Light at Cifuentes SAM Missile Assembly Base, Las Villas Province; Dress, Habits, & Expected Departure of Soviets at Cifuentes
UFG-3948	Increase in the Number of Tanks & Soviet Personnel at the Sagua la Grande SAM Missile Site; Relocation of a Sagua la Grande Soviet Headquarters
UFG-3974	Departure of Soviets from the Remedios Area; Movement of Trucks, Guns, & Soviet Personnel in Las Villas Province
UFG-3998	Military Defense Measures at Cayo Loco, Las Villas Province
UFG-4088	Arrival of Unexplained Vehicles at Las Auras, Cienfuegos & Dismantling of that Base
UFG-4141	Cuban Military Occupation of Former Soviet Camps Near Yaguaja & at Fincas La Puntilla, La Bajada, & Rojas
UFG-4180	Removal of Some Equipment & Personnel from the Soviet Base at Itabo, Las Villas Province
UFG-4266	Field Comment Only
UFG-4272	Alleged Transfer of all Cuban Militiamen to the Central Army. New Defense Measures Along the Southern Coast of Las Villas Province

Expenses:

16. Three separate remittances each of $270.00 or a total of $810.00 were sent to AMFAUNA-26 during this period. By previous agreement one quarter of the money was to be given to AMFAUNA-32 and three-quarters was to be retained by AMFAUNA-26. The first two remittances were sent to AMFAUNA-32 by her son, and each was acknowledged by telegram. The third remittance, at the telegraphed request of AMFAUNA-26, was sent to AMFLORA-1 in Caracas. Evidently his wife came to some arrangement with AMFAUNA-26 before she left Cuba.

Future Plans:

17. Communication will be maintained with AMFAUNA-33, first by telephone and later if possible by clandestine means, for the purpose of

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learning the status and whereabouts of affected members of the AMFAUNA-26 group. As soon as the situation has crystallized, the whereabouts of burned agents learned, and secure communications established, an attempt will be made to exfiltrate endangered personnel.

End of Dispatch

104-10308-10163 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

10 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Requirements Briefing to FBI Informant Going to Cuba

1. In accordance with arrangements previously made with the FBI by SAS/CI/Liaison, the undersigned went to New York on 8 July to brief an FBI informant who is going to Cuba for two weeks. I had a short session at the FBI office in NYC with Dale Schwant, the case officer, and we then met with the informant for about two hours in a room at the Prince George Hotel. The informant had been told that I would be at the meeting and that I represented the Agency, but I was not introduced to him by name.

2. The FBI informant - Victor Thomas * Vicente - is an American-born Puerto Rican born in NYC in 1930. He has been under FBI control for nearly 3 years penetrating the three pro-Castro organizations in NYC: the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC); the Casa Cuba, and the Jose Marti Club. Through the first two years Subject was only a marginal asset, in the last six months he has become a valuable penetration for the FBI into the above 3 organizations as well as the Cuban UN delegation having apparently won the complete confidence of the pro-Castro leaders and Cuban officials in NYC. Recently he was asked to join the CPUSA. Subject works as a shipping clerk in a coffee plant in Brooklyn. He has the appearance and other attributes, according to Dale Schwant, for the role of pro-Castro revolutionary. The Cubans have expressed an interest in his moving to Cuba to work. He is willing to go but his wife is against it, but idea is still alive.

Cuban Sponsorship

3. Subject is leaving NYC for Mexico City on 13 July and he expects to go on to Cuba illegally on 15 July. The Cuban Ambassador to the UN, Raul Primellas, has arranged for a Cuban visa to be ready at the embassy in Mexico City, and also passage to Habana on a Cubana flight. Subject is also

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armed with a letter of introduction from the National Director of the FPCC, Vincent Theodore Lee. On 6 July the 3 pro-Castro organizations named above held a party for Subject and raised $100.00 for his trip.

Informant's Contacts in Cuba

4. Subject will contact several friends in Cuba who are milicianos, one of them in Santiago, Oriente Province. They were fellow activists in pro-Castro organizations in NYC who have returned to Cuba. He also has been given (by his Cuban friends) the address of a family whose son is the chauffeur of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Arrangements have also been made for Subject to talk to the American Communist in Habana, Robert Williams. Subject, who will be accompanied by his wife on this trip, has been instructed by his Cuban superiors to take a camera with him to take pictures of Cuba for showing at organizational meetings in NYC. Something similar had been done previously by the head of the FPCC on his trip to Cuba in December 1962. The note-taking in connection with the photos will be a device enabling Subject to record intel information difficult to remember.

5. I briefed Subject during a two hour period using as a guide the attached requirements outline, prepared with Henry Kitchens, SAS/Intel/Requirements, and Antia Potocki, SAS/CI/Sov-Sat. I had also discussed Subject's mission to Cuba with SAS/SO/Rodriguez and DC/SAS/EOB. I stressed, as did the FBI case officer, that while fully exploiting his militia and other contacts for the desired information, he must always be guided by security considerations. After an agent role for three years, Subject expressed confidence in his ability in carrying out his mission successfully.

6. I should add that I was very cordially received at the NYC FBI office and that Mr. Schwant was most cooperative. I referred to our memorandum to his headquarters indicating that the Agency had a world-wide program to send controlled CP and front penetrations on missions to Cuba, and I expressed the hope that this might be only our first joint effort. He agreed wholeheartedly, adding that he personally would be particularly happy to cooperate if Subject informant should move permanently to Cuba and play the role of resident agent. As soon as Subject returns from Cuba Mr. Schwant will let us know and arrange for the debriefing.

L.D.S.
Louis De Santi
SAS/CI/CP

Attachment: Herewith

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RETURN TO CIA
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMSANTA Project

Job # 65-427/38 Box 7

File # 19-6-73/3

Volumes: 5

1. Description:

Coverage of Castro Communist regime through use of existing Communist Party and front penetration assets. File was opened in December 1962.

2. Findings:

Memo for the Record dated 10 July 1963 by Louis De Santi SAS/CI/CP

FBI informant Victor Thomas VICENTE, Puerto Rican citizen, who penetrated CP's in NY City left NY for Cuba via Mexico as guest of ICAP. Was debriefed by CIA staffer Lou DeSanti upon return to U.S. in July-Aug 63. VICENTE stated he had interviews with CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. VICENTE penetrated the FPCC, the Casa Cuba, and Jose Marti Club in New York City. Page 127 of IG 1967 report mentions unnamed Puerto Rican who claims he participated in Castro inspired assassination plot in Dallas. Don't know if VICENTE could be that individual.

Attachment: LAD/JFK Task Force

Researcher: KGB

3. Checked VICENTE 201-731222.

6/Rs

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Requirements Outline

1. Details of Cuban-Soviet agreements and Castro-Khrushchev understandings re:

   a. Soviet economic aid

   b. Soviet military presence

   c. Cuban rapprochement and posture vis-a-vis U. S.

   d. Training of Cubans in Soviet bloc to man weapon systems under Soviet command; question of whether Cubans to acquire command control over these weapons systems.

   e. How far and how fast is Castro to go in exporting violent revolution in Latin America.

2. Demobilization of regular militia and what relation it has (if any) to the take-over by Soviets of some internal security functions.

   a. What part or percent of militia has been demobilized.

   b. To what extent has civilian militia been disarmed of automatic weapons.

   c. Have Soviets actually taken over control of police stations in certain cities or towns. Which cities.

   d. Purposes behind demobilization and disarming of militia.

      (1) To minimize resistance potential?

      (2) Are Soviets telling Castro to put more people to work on the farms and they will take care of internal security?

   e. Reaction of milicianos to demobilization and disarming.

3. Hard information on missiles (all types) and Soviet troops. (Differentiate between facts and propaganda for foreign and/or domestic consumption.)

4. Communism:

a. Secret existence of PSP

b. PURS - when First Congress to be held

c. Reactions of rank and file party members - and general public - toward Fidel and Soviet Union.

d. Economic conditions, popular support of regime especially in provinces and outlying areas

e. Pro-Soviet or pro-Chicom alignments of party leaders or rank and file.

5. Addresses of places where Subject is taken to attend meetings, lectures, get instructions, etc. --- also, of his contacts and Communist leaders.

6. ICAP, its role in this trip

a. Contacts and methods of arranging illegal trip in Mexico

- person in charge

- financing

- route

b. Arrival in Habana

(1) Who there to receive him

(2) Entry formalities; what papers or forms to fill out, etc.

(3) Guided tour or free to go any place on his own; lodging arrangements, etc.

c. What Soviets, Sats, or foreign Communists does he meet

d. Take note of, and bring back if possible, any materials printed in Soviet Bloc or Red China.

e. What use are Soviets/Cubans making of American defectors in Cuba; what role are they playing.

Excluded ... downgrading ...

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
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TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : RIO DE JANEIRO

ACTION : C/SAS 3

INFO : DDP, VR

S E C R E T 181909Z

IN 83322

DIR [illegible] WAVE CITE RIOD 2944

[illegible] TYPIC YOBITE AMSTRUT

1. AMSTRUT-1 VISITED 13 DECEMBER BY (MARIO ROGERIO MESTRINHO DE MELLO OFFICIAL IN BRAZILIAN EMBASY) HAVANA NOW ON LEAVE (RIOD.) (MESTRINHO) REPORTED FOLL:

A. (BRAZILIAN EMB BASTIAN PINTO INTOXICATED) [illegible] FREQUENTLY [illegible] FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME.

B. WIDE RUMOR ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FIDEL CASTRO AFTER HIS TV. APPEARANCE ON 6 DECEMBER RESULTED KILLING MAN NEXT TO HIM. CASTRO UNINJURED. WOULD-BE KILLER STILL AT LARGE.

C. RECENT BRAZILIAN FOREIGN TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS RESULTING DIFFICULTIES BRAZIL COMMIES DESIRING VISIT CUBA. NO DETAILS GIVEN.

D. WIDE RUMOR CUBAN JOSE "PEPE" GLANUZA MET LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO BEFORE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION.

E. (MESTRINHO) RETURNING CUBA LATE JANUARY 1964. AGREED TAKE PERSONAL ITEMS REQUESTED BY A-1'S FRIENDS.

2. (MESTRINHO) ALSO DELIVERED TO A-1 LETTER FROM (MARIANNA ARGUELLES) WHO WROTE:

A. COMOTE ELISERO ALEN[illegible], FORMER CHIEF OF [illegible] ICE IN HAVANA HAS NOT YET RETURNED FROM ALGIERS WITH GROUP CUBANS [illegible] THERE

SECRET

19-[illegible]

FOR TRAINING MISSION.

B. (HUSBAND) RAUL DIAZ ARGUELLES, WHO STILL STRONG [illegible], WILL SOON GO WITH CLASS TO MOSCOW FOR SIX MONTHS ADDITIONAL TRAINING AFTER FINISHING COURSE SUPERIOR WAR SCHOOOL ON CUBA.

C. (MARIANNA) WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW SHE CAN AGAIN WRITE TO "PANCHO." COMMENT: A-1 SAYS THIS INDICATION (MARIANNA) WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH ANTI-COMMUNISTS AGAIN.

3. IN ANOTHER LETTER, AMSTRUT-2 WROTE A-1 FOLL:

A. SHE HAD HEARD FROM "FRIENDS" AND HAS FURNISHED REQUESTED DATA TO OBTAIN THEIR (TRAVEL) DOCUMENTATION, BUT TO DATE NO ACTION.

B. HER SITUATION VERY DIFFICULT, BUT VOICED STRONG HOPE CUBA WOULD EVENTUALLY OVERCOME ITS CURRENT PROBLEMS. SAID A-1 WAS RIGHT ABOUT WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER MOTHER DIED. LETTER OTHERWISE HOLIDAY GREETING.

4. A-1 SAID (MESTRINHO) WHO HAD (BROUGHT LETTERS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE AMBASSADOR PINTO) DID NOT KNOW CONTENTS. NOR BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOWN ORIGINATORS OTHER THAN (MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA) A-1 HAS CONFIDENCE (MESTRINHO AS BEING TRUSTED COURIER) A-1 HOWEVER ADVISED (MESTRINHO) ACTED VOLUNTARILY UPON REQUEST FROM HER FRIENDS, SINCE A-1 HAS WRITTEN NO LETTERS AS PER KUBARK INSTRUCTIONS.

5. SINCE A-1 INTENDED TO PURCHASE LOCALLY SHOES, SOAP, SHAMPOO, ROLL FILM, ETC.. REQUESTED BY (MARIANNA ALEMJEIRA) STATION OFFERED TO SUPPLY SAME AS FAVOR A-1

6. OTHER THAN NOTED ABOVE, DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY INTEREST (MESTRINHO AS COURIER) FROM RIOD.

S E C R E T

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

11 OCTOBER 1964

MGE 27. RECEIVED YOUR RM 44 AND 45. WHEN WE SAID THAT JUAN MANUE FERNANDEZ (A-27) COULD NOT BE INSTRUCTED, IT WAS BECAUSE HE EXPEC TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY. IN THE SAME MGE, WE ASKED YOU THAT HE BE SEPARATED FROM THE JAGUAR GROUP. HE WANTS TO LEAVE CUBA BECAU HE THINKS THAT CUBAN COMMUNISM WILL LAST A LONG TIME BEFORE BEING ELIMINATED FROM POWER AND THAT LIFE IN CUBA IS DIFFICULT FOR ALL MEN WHO DO NOT SUBMIT TO ITS DOCTRINE. THAT'S WHAT HE TO US. WHEN WE TOLD YOU OF OUR DESIRE TO TAKE LUIS RODRIGUEZ INTO OU JAGUAR GROUP, WE DID SO ASKING YOUR PERMISSION. AFTERWARD WE WII TELL HIM YOUR DECISION IN THIS CASE. WE FURTHER PROPOSED THAT HE (RODRIGUEZ) BE GIVEN NUMBER A-27 WHICH WAS ABANDONED BY FERNANDEZ. WE REMEMBER. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR AUTHORIZATION T(INSTRUCT A-35 IN SW. WE KNOW OF NO CASES OF OFFICIALS WHO ARE IN PRISON FOR AFFECTING THE ECONOMY. ON THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST FIDEL, WE KNOW THEY TOOK TWO CIVILIANS WOUNDED BY SHOOTING TO THE CALIXTO GARCIA HOSPITAL. MOMENTS LATER, TWO XXXXXX SOLDIERS FROM FIDEL'S GUARDS PRESENTED THEMSELVES IN SAID HOSPITAL TAKING AWAY THE WOUNDED. WE DO NOT KNOW MORE DETAILS. IN THE LAST DAYS OF LAST MONTH, 70 TRACKED TANKS ENTERED A CAMP LOCATED BETWEEN SANTA MARIA DEL ROSARIO AND EL COTORRO. THE TA WERE TRANSPORTED ON TRAILERS FROM WHERE WE DO NOT KNOW. (A-24) THE 4TH OF OCTOBER, THE RUSSIAN SHIP "SIRHOTE ALIN" ENTERED THE MARIEL PIER COMING FROM THE USSR WITH TOTAL CARGO OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZER IN BULK. REPORT JULIO CAMBAS WHOSE SECOND last NAME IS TEXCIDO. XXX REPEAT. SECOND last NAME OF JULIO (TEXCIDO). A-7 = A-9.

SPB 12/01128-64 LX 1958

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THE CREW OF THE SHIP IS SOVIET AND NORMAL. THE NEWS OF THE FLEEIN(
OF COMMANDANT "CONTRERAS", CHIEF OF THE CUARENTENARIO BASE,
TOGETHER WITH A GROUP OF OFFICERS AND FRIENDS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.
THERE ARE NUMEROUS PERSONS UNDER ARREST IN SAID BASE FOR NOT
HAVING PREVENTED THEIR FLIGHT. ANOTHER SIMILAR GROUP FLED
FROM THE GRAMMA BASE. ALL THE DESERTERS FLED IN CUBAN NAVY
LAUNCHES. WE SUSPECT THAT AT THIS MOMENT, THEY ARE IN U.S.
TERRIROTY. IF IT IS SO, WE ARE VERY HAPPY BECAUSE OF THE GREAT
DEAL THESE REPENTANT ONES KNOW. A-7 = A-9 = A-15. TO BE
CONTINUED IN 28. ALSO REPORT ON NATIONAL BANK. GREETINGS. JUAN.
END END END

SDB, 12 10 1080-64, cx. 1923

104-10308-10189 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OUTGOING

SECRET

Charge: Classification Control: ROUTINE

Date: 11 JULY 63

DIST: 1 - SIG
1 - CHRON
1 - INDEVOUT 3 OPS

20-18 2010 20-11

ZURC INFO BERN CITE GNVA CN

DOMARK FROM MIDDAUGH

RYBAT INDEVOUT 3 01

1. AS PART OF NEW G-2 COOPTED STATUS SUBJ MUST PROVIDE BOOKS ON ESPIONAGE. HE HAS SENT SUCH AS HE AND WE HAVE ACCESS TO IN LOCAL SHOPS AND HAS URGENT NEED TO SEND MORE VERY SOON. WE PLANNING ASK LONDON MAKE EXHAUSTIVE PURCHASE BUT IN MEANTIME HAVE NEED PASS HIM CIRCA TEN FOR IMMEDIATE POSTING TO G-2.

2. CAN YOU AT EARLY POINT RANSACK ZURC BOOKSTORES FOR ANY TYPE OF WORK ON ESPIONAGE OR COUNTER ESPIONAGE OF LITERALLY ANY COUNTRY. WORKS CAN INCLUDE HISTORIC ITEMS LIKE WORLD WAR I BLACK ROOM, WORLD WAR II LIKE BREAKING OF JAPANESE CODE, OPERATION NORTH POLE IN HOLLAND, AND WHAT HAVE YOU, AS WELL AS WORKS BY COMMUNIST DEFECTORS AND THE NEWER CROP OF ESPIONAGE STUDIES. THEY MUST BE IN ENGLISH OR FRENCH.

3. BOOKS HE HAS ALREADY SENT INCLUDE: RESEAU DE SPIONS, L'HISTOIRE DE GESTAPO, CIA, MI 5, SECRET WAR, MANUEL DE ESPIONS, HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE, TREASON IN TWENTIETH CENTURY, AND SEVERAL UNIDENTIFIED BOOKS ON FASCISM.

4. WOULD APPRECIATE PHONE CALL AS SOON AS YOU KNOW HOW MANY BOOKS YOU CAN GET. MAIL BOOKS COMMERCIALLY TO MIDDAUGH PRIVATE ADDRESS.

ORIG: MIDDAUGH RELEASED: ELWARD

SECRET
Classification

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104-10308-10208 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: WH/4/ExO

NO.

DATE 5 July 1960

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/Prop			[illegible]	
2. (TOOMEY) 03			[illegible]	
3. (MANEY) 03			[illegible]	
4.				FILE TEMPO KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
5. PROP			[illegible]	[illegible]
6. Alice			[illegible]	
7. Kay				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				6-7 File Guidance
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O - 476731

13-00000

SECRET

5 JUL 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only and does not require action.

2. An invitation by the Government of Cuba to Khrushchev to visit that country has been officially accepted, but as yet no definite time has been set. There has been speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Habana for the 26th of July celebrations, while a press report, confirming a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, predicts the arrival for August. Earlier reports had suggested December 1960 or January 1961 as possible dates.

3. It is felt that a successful visit by Khrushchev to Cuba would assist further in the establishment of a solid Soviet understanding with that country, with disturbing overtones on the possible establishment of closer Soviet relationships in other parts of Latin America. For this reason it is desirable to prevent the visit or to counteract it by a show of massive opposition by the Cuban people.

4. On 21 June the Habana Station was asked for its views on possible plans. In the exchange of cables that has followed, the Station and Headquarters are now in agreement that the best course of action lies in two operations. First, a massive church manifestation or rally to be called for some other purpose would afford the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. Second, the instigation of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger while in Cuba from a well-planned assassination attempt would be propagated from other Latin American countries.

5. Because of the need of avoiding action in Cuba in this matter that would imperil Station assets, it has been determined that such assets would be used only as a means of instigating the church to hold the rally.

6. The latest report from Habana indicates that plans are going satisfactorily. (Bishop Boza Masvidal) is described as enthused about the

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idea. With Jose Lavastida, a prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaguey to solicit the support of the local Bishop. Lavastida will seek similar support in Santiago. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

7. The Station has asked that the entire effort begin with Cuba, without initial outside support from Cuban exile groups or the sponsors of the anti-Castro programs on Station WRUL. A cable has been sent to Bogota to have the CELAM spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. WH press assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban assets when plans are firmer.

8. The Argentine liaison service will be asked to send one of its contacts in the field of journalism to Habana to contact officials and to visit the offices of the New China News Agency. He will be instructed to ask Communist staff members there what substance there might be to rumors he has heard that an assassination attempt on Khrushchev will take place. The same technique is being used through three Cubans living in Miami who are in constant contact with Cuba. Speculation on such attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program and in certain controlled Latin press media.

J. C. King
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

EHHinkle:lrh
5 July 1960

Distribution:

Original and 1 - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - C/WHD
1 - C/WH/4
1 - Originator
1 - WH/4/Crono

5/NJ

13-00000

Mr.

[illegible]

Hawke

13-00000

2 July 1960

TO : C/WH/4

Subject: Khrushchev Visit to Cuba

1. Background. An invitation to visit Cuba has been extended to Khrushchev by the Government of Cuba. The invitation has been accepted, but do definite time has been set. There has been some speculation that Khrushchev would arrive in Havana in time for the celebrations of the 26th of July. The press has reported that he will arrive in August (a date confirmed by a statement of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico). Other reports say the visit will not take place for several months, probably in December or January. In any event we must plan for the possibility of the July visit.

It has been stated from several sanguine quarters that we should "do the same thing to Khrushchev that the Japs did to Eisenhower". This is a completely unrealistic dream.

It is true that a successful Khrushchev visit to Cuba would be the final stone in the construction of a solid Soviet base in Cuba, with disturbing overtones for the possible construction for more Soviet ideoligical bases in all of Latin America. For that reason we are trying to do what we can to prevent the visit, or at least to show a massive ~~sk~~ opposition to it.

2. ExploitatiOnPlans. On 21 June Hqs sent a cable to Havana asking for views on possibility of a major effort to force cancellation of the visit. A resulting series of cables shows that the station and headquarters are now in agreement that our best hope lies in

a. A massive Church manifestation or rally, which though called for some other purpose, would be to the people of Cuba an obvious way to express their protest. And

b. from outside Cuba, instigating of rumors that Khrushchev's life will be in danger ~~fer~~ from a well-planned assassination attempt.

3. Mr. Helms has told ~~k~~ us that he wants CIA to undertake no action that will imperil Station assets. This injunction was placed on us while we were exchanging cables with Havana. The result is that station assets are actively instigating the church to hold the rally. A [illegible] cable from Headquarters has instructed the station to continue this course of action as long as there is "safety in numbers", i.e., as long as it is a church action rather that an AMPALM one.

4. The latest cable from the field (IN 18883) reports that that plans are going satisfactorily. Bishop Boza Masvidal is ~~XX~~ ~~xx~~ "enthused" about the idea. With Jose Lavastida, a ~~px~~ prominent lay leader, he is now visiting Camaguey to solicit the support of the local ~~Exx~~ Bishop. Jose Lavastida, a promient lay leader, is in Santiago to seek the help ~~k~~ of the Santiago Bishop. Tentative plans call for a congress or rally on Assumption Day, 15 July.

The station has asked that the entire effort at least begin within Cuba, without ouside support from FRD or WRUL.

5. Hemisphere Plans. A cable has gone out to CELAM (in Bogota) asking this Church organization to spark similar rallies throughout Latin America. JMRAKE assets will be called upon to support these and the Cuban meeting when ~~xx~~ plans are firmer.

On the assassination ~~xxxxx~~ angle: BIOGENISIS, a controlled agent (in B.A), is soon to visit high officials in Havana. He has been instructed to ask these leaders what substance there might be to the rumors he has heard that an attempt will take place.....Rivas, a friend of Rudy Gomez, is using the same ~~xxxxxxxxxxx~~ technique through three Cubans living in Miami who are constant contact with Cuba.

Speculation on the assassination attempts will be surfaced on the WRUL program, in AMPACA'S paper, etc.

David A. Phillips

71lN

SECRET

ROUTING 1 2 3 4 5 6

DIRECTOR

FROM HAMBURG

Relay to Paris (FYM) INFO ATTN: CONTRERAS

ACTION: C/EE 3 (EE NOTIFIED AND COPY ISSUED AT: 1145, 30 OCT 63 OJ)

INFO: DDP, ADDP, C/SOD 4, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/WE 2, C/SAS 5, RF, VR

3012Ø7Z

30 OCT 63 IN 50477

PRIORITY DIR INFO FRAN LOND BRUS HAGU MADR WAVE CITE HAMB 388Ø

TYPIC AYXIS ZRWAGON (CASAILOR) MHAPRON

REF HAMB 3879 (IN 50361)

IDENTITY A - ISIDRO CONTRERAS, COMMANDING OFFICER OF PINAR DEL RIO NAVAL DISTRICT WITH HQS IN BAHIA HONDA. CLASSMATE AND VERY CLOSE FRIEND OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPS AZTERAIN WHO APPEALED TO HIM TO TAKE PRESENT POSITION.

IDENTITY B - FNU IGNARRA MATAPRAN, COMMANDING OFFICER OF EASTERN NAVAL DISTRICT (ORIENTE).

IDENTITY C - JOSE PONCE, FORMER COMMANDER OF "ARMY OF THE CENTER" WITH HQS IN SANTA CLARA. BEGAN SIX MONTH GUIDED MISSILE COURSE IN [illegible] FORTRESS JULY 63 WHICH BEING CONDUCTED BY HIGH SOVIET ARMY OFFICERS. PONCE TOOK PART IN GRAMMA LANDING AND IS BROTHER IN LAW OF RAMIRO VALDEZ, MINISTER OF INTERIOR.

IDENTITY D - ORLANDO FERNANDEZ, REFERRED TO AS "SABORIT" BY FRIENDS, COMMANDER IN NAVY NOW EMPLOYED AS EXECUTIVE IN MAMBISAS HQS IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY E - FNU JOMARON, BORN CIRCA 31, CAPTAIN IN NAVY EMPLOYED AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER TO IDEN B ABOVE. WIFE, WHOSE BROTHER KILLED WITH REBELS AT BAY OF PIGS, NOW IN US WITH TWO CHILDREN.

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

24/PJ

IDENTITY F - (JOSE CASTANEDA) BORN CIRCA 39, COMMANDER WHO HOLDS NO FIXED TITLE IN HAVANA ARMY HQS.

IDENTITY G - (ROMAN ALVAREZ) (MAMBISAS DIRECTOR)

IDENTITY H - (ENRIQUE CAMARA) BORN CIRCA 31, (CHIEF OF POLICE IN SANTA CLARA) MULATTO. MONCADO VETERAN AND LANDED WITH GRANMA.

IDENTITY I - FNU SAURET, BORN CIRCA 33, CAPTAIN IN ARMY, EMPLOYED IN HAVANA POLICE HQS. FORMER MEMBER CASTRO ARMY IN SIERRA MAESTRA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY J - (JOSE SUAREZ) BORN CIRCA 25, NICKNAME (PEPE), NOW COMMANDER SERVING WITH WESTERN ARMY IN PINAR DEL RIO. MONCADA VETERAN. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE IN HAVANA DURING BATISTA REGIME.

IDENTITY K - (ENRIQUE SANTANA) BORN CIRCA 28, CHIEF OF POLICE IN WESTERN CUBA. MONCADA VETERAN. MARRIED WITH FIVE CHILDREN IN CUBA.

IDENTITY L - FNU BENTURA, BORN CIRCA 26, MEDICAL DOCTOR EMPLOYED IN HAVANA HOSPITAL WHICH TREATS POLICEMEN AND THEIR FAMILIES EXCLUSIVELY. ALSO WORKS AS HAVANA PORT DOCTOR WHO BOARDS EACH VISITING VESSEL. WIFE, NAME UNKNOWN TO SOURCE, IS ALSO MEDICAL DOCTOR IN HAVANA. HE VETERAN OF ESCAMBRAY ACTION AGAINST BATISTA.

IDENTITY M - (PEPIN ARRUTI) SEE HAMB 3820.

IDENTITY N - ORLANDO MIRRET, BORN CIRCA 33, FORMER (FIRST LIEUTENANT) IN ARMY. FOUGHT WITH UNIDENTIFIED RESISTANCE GROUP IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES DURING FIRST HALF 63. NOW IN HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY O - FNU (OJEDA) BORN CIRCA 23, FORMER (LIEUTENANT) IN CASTRO ARMY, FORMERLY FOUGHT AGAINST BATISTA IN SIERRA MAESTRA.

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[illegible] IDEN N ABOVE FOUGHT DURING FIRST HALF 63 IN ESCAMBRAY AGAINST CASTRO FORCES AND NOW HIDING IN HAVANA.

IDENTITY P - FNU LLANERAS, BORN CIRCA 28, FORMER CAPTAIN OR LIEUTENANT IN CASTRO NAVY NOW UNEMPLOYED IN HAVANA. MONCADA VETERAN AND WORKED IN UNDERGROUND IN HAVANA AGAINST BATISTA. ARCHITECT BY PROFESSION.

IDENTITY Q - ROBERTO ROQUE NUNEZ, BORN CIRCA 18, LT COMMANDER IN NAVY SERVING NOW AS CHIEF OF "COMMANDOS" (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED). GRAMMA VETERAN.

IDENTITY R - PEDRO MIRET, BORN CIRCA 25, COMMANDER IN ARMY AND CHIEF OF CABANA FORTRESS. MONCADA VETERAN. FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

IDENTITY S - FAUSTINO PEREZ, BORN CIRCA 23, COMMANDER IN CASTRO ARMY IN HAVANA HQS. GRAMMA VETERAN AND FORMER MINISTER IN CASTRO GOVT.

S E C R E T

(7/PJ

104-10310-10020 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: DDCI 1-

ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. GPO 1957—O-439445 (47)

13-00000

(CLASSIFICATION)

65-1582

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. A-459

Date 7 April 1965

ACTION MEMORANDUM

TO : Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Deputy Director for Support

SUBJECT : Agreement Between the United States Secret Service and the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Presidential Protection in the United States

REFERENCE: Memorandum from DDCI to DD/I, DD/P, and DD/S, dated 8 June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support of Presidential Trips Abroad

1. Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret Service and me, in accordance with the recommendations of the Warren Commission and the actions of the President's Committee on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring Agency compliance with this agreement and for maintaining the active liaison with the Secret Service. The staff function in this regard is being performed in the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DD/P. All Agency components in liaison with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence Staff informed of their dealings with the Secret Service. The Counter Intelligence Staff will provide advice to other Agency components who receive requests for support from the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does not amend or alter current Agency policy as expressed in my memorandum of 8 June 1963 concerning support of Presidential trips abroad. An additional agreement with the Secret Service, involving CIA and other Government agencies dealing with Presidential travel abroad, is in process of development.

(Signed) Marshall S. Carter
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

SUSPENSE DATE:

Attachment

cc: OGC
n/s
C/CI

(CLASSIFICATION)

13-00000

Executive Registry
65-1507

CONFIDENTIAL

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I. Purpose of Agreement

A. The purpose of this Agreement is to define the types of information, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, the Vice President-elect and former Presidents.

II. General Responsibilities

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the person of the President. It undertakes to identify individuals who, because of their individual propensities or characteristics, are dangerous or who may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever action is required to counteract any threat to the person of the President posed by such individuals.

[illegible stamp]

CONFIDENTIAL

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B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter intelligence. It gathers and maintains biographic and other data on organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of performing its statutory functions. It also originates, and receives from other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the Agency has no police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.

III. Information to be Reported by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in Appendix B to this Agreement. The information may be furnished in more than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reporting an individual to the Secret Service, the CIA will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service intelligence and intelligence information that becomes available concerning:

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate assassination of government officials as a political weapon and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate a Chief of State or other high official.

D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA and the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions as either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be protected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may, at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

to the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carry out its protective functions in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers of the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards established by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accordance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA. Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an active liaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerning individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by the Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such steps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement are fully carried out.

Central Intelligence Agency

Dated: 27 March 1965 By [signature]
Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

United States Secret Service

Dated: [illegible] By [signature]
James J. Rowley
Chief

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Identification Data - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or statement as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;

3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CIA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.

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APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;

2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;

3. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

4. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the contról of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of special interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;

5. Subversives, communists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:

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(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;

(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.

The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.

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LAST MONTH

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Friday 22 November

[illegible]

A.M.		P.M.	
8:45		1:00	
9:00	~~Intelligence Briefing~~	1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		2:15	
10:15		2:30	
10:30	[illegible]	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	General Carter
12:00		4:15	returned from ISO
12:15		4:30	due to death of
12:30		4:45	Pres Kennedy
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA

LAST MONTH

1963 OCTOBER 1963						
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NEXT MONTH

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Sat. - Sun. 23-24 November

A.M.		P.M.	
SAT 8:30	w/ DCI, Helms, Cline, R. Jack-		
8:45	smith, Col. White, Dr. Wheelon, Mr. Kirkpatrick	1:00	
9:00	at EAST	1:15	
9:15	Whip, Helms, Cline, LBK – at East	1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00		SAT 2:15	Mr. Bross, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Elder, Mr. Knoche
SAT 10:15	Met w/Wheelon + Kirkpatrick	2:30	
10:30	at Langley. Colonel White joined for a while	2:45	
10:45		3:00	
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00		4:15	
12:15		4:30	
SAT 12:30	went to White House to	4:45	
12:45	pay respects to President Kennedy w/Mr Kirkpatrick	5:00	

MEMORANDA

SUNDAY – 8:30 meeting at East Bldg w/DCI & Intell Briefing briefers. General Carter left at 12:00 for 12:15 meeting at DCI's house (w/Cline, Colby, + Elder); then he was to go home

327 Sat., Nov. 23, 1963 38 328 Sun., Nov. 24, 1963 37

LAST MONTH						
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NEXT MONTH						
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Monday 25 November

A.M.		P.M.	
8:30	~~DCI, Karamessines, R. J. Smith,~~		
8:45	clinic — at East	1:00	
9:00		1:15	
9:15		1:30	
9:30		1:45	
9:45		2:00	
10:00	Left to pick up Mrs. Carter	2:15	
10:15	and Mrs. McCone to go to St. Matthew's	2:30	
10:30		2:45	Returned from Funeral
10:45		3:00	after going to Quarters
11:00		3:15	
11:15		3:30	~~3:30 Mr. Helms~~
11:30		3:45	
11:45		4:00	
12:00	President Kennedy's funeral at St. Matthew's	4:15	
12:15		4:30	
12:30		4:45	
12:45		5:00	

MEMORANDA ~~6:30 Stag Cocktail-Dinner hosted by General Burns and Dr. Mindinger — Army Navy Town Club (Red Room) in honor of visiting British JIC Team. Informal~~

~~(DCI will stop by for a drink — or may go to another engagement)~~

Cancelled due to death of President Kennedy

13-00000

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann, General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban item.

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip, he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while. In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM committee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time. Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with Mr. McCone early next week.

4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

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the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.

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b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

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friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two airplanes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

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to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest, most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI
1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGO
Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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EYES ONLY

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
at the White House

1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of determining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then

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said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we chose. This position was agreed.

4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights. Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a number of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Africa for example. The President said that when the crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some problem areas that could develop in a number of these points, particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany, and particularly France, that should be considered. The President then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy

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level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.

7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.

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b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been

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bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

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Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.

d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in ~~North~~ South Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions on

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the advice and guidance he had received from his principal advisers whom he considered professionals and experts in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and was certainly no more immune than anyone else from making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional Committee leadership had been a complete success and that he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from the people who had attended and many of them indicated it was the first time they had ever been in the White House and certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by the Administration leadership. The President said that he had received a phone call saying that he should continue this and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been promised that at least in large measure as a result of this briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday. The President then said we could do a lot better. He told Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the after-noon prior to these two dinners so they would be much fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have been better. The President said he had planned for the briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He

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then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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4 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Johnson on 31 December 1963

1. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to Independence to see Mr. Truman.

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before 3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made comfortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch, Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr. Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90% on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have prevented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA. The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover, President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on the international situation as well as on the domestic situation and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some other agency handle the domestic situation.)

4. The President then made a number of statements which seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President. Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was concerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist -- on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

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own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the form of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long as he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more effort in the way of more money and more support of United States policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on 1 January, pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

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later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.

8. The President then said that he had been totally dissatisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that he had read recent Checklists.

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10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our present policies and actions connected therewith and said that shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner and similar preparations should be made for other free world countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

11. There was then a discussion with Staats and Murphy about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA.

12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjustment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14, would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and not for the rest of the group.

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13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia. This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat confused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of $60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any action on PL 480 funds.)

14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill, they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to provide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

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type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads where they would see the results of what they were doing and the purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get off the ground before the year was out and would merely result in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy. He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the runway lights, and the dam across the river.

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Ranch

Airport
Pernales River
Born - Cemetery
Cattle - Lincoln Cont.
Guns
No Secret Service
Mrs. Johnson

President:

M/R

Erhardt - much taken - smart - articulate - appealed more than Adenauer -
Pres says he's going to stay home + think of ways to get peace -
If others want to come talk OK - but he not make trips just for trips -
He want Peace do anything to get it but never at expense of our own Security - told Erhardt not to play off debacle against US -
Germany to say which way they go - put more into it or We had
to fight 2 World Wars because of Germany - this Pres. wasn't going
to be a party to any shilly shallying like that - Then Erhardt was OK -

Pres. wants round-up from FBIS (CIA) and USIA on world reaction to
Erhardt visit - said if didn't make money on that deal might as well
give up - we get criticized as to foreign policy - build up a story -
highly favorable reporting -

1 January 1964

Paragraphs for message to DCI   *Mr. Enright handled sending of message on 2 Jan*

1. The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion. Further cuts are quite obviously in the mill. The '65 total request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense, State, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor. With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years that there has been a decrease in personnel, amounting to approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period was 7200 in 1957.

2. Major legislative proposals will be those that are left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut, etc. New programs will include a procedure for attack on poverty, new program for aid to education below college level, new program for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid bill, etc. Major emphasis on human needs continues.

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of our Cuban policy after returning to Washington. He particularly wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4. President personally wrote New Year's message to Khrushchev, released today.

5. President faced with decision on whether or not to continue $25 million aid program to Indonesia. As you know, this is primarily civic action. He wants a study of pros and cons with recommendations in writing from you, Secretary of State, and others. Also wants reaction from Senator Russell and others on Hill. Will take up when he returns.

6. Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he wrote on conversations with the Russians as to President's intentions.

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7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation in South Vietnam.

9. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman, and Mr. Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not argued at Independence.

10. President much interested in foreign reaction to Erhard talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.

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2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section, Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job in organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters, and with materials training that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, sent down to him.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly important tasks for the good of the station. These were as follows:

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami, the so called 26th of July organization.

c. Preparation of biographical information on all prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three months.

e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.

f. Screening of all persons recruited for the ~~grade~~ Brigade (but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300 or 400 men had already gone to camp). This AMOT screening of the military trainees really amounted to a field check since the various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information present in Miami.

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g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of this' were sent back to Cuba with instructions to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as fast as possible with the troops and identifying and seizing records and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were ~~was~~ known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve in intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April 1961 for eventual legal return.

4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavored to change the AMOTS into a political organization and remove the chief leaders of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of the AMOT organization had been microfilmed (see my interviews with Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver). The chief AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.

6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the foregoing with the aid of only two girls, one a GS-9 analyst. He tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer assigned, but in vain. This request was forwarded through Simmons, the CI Chief in WH/4. Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training. Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in

TOP SECRET

three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the other sections of Miami Base.

7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future, Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; (b) more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.

R. D. Shea

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5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section, 1 June 1961

(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)

1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff, apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the WH Division Staff and his replacement will be Louis Napoli who will head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer will head the FI part, both under Napoli.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told Simmons that he had a Chilean CI officer who was available for training Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of training the AMFATS (future CI service) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve intelligence corps consisting of substantial older men. These matters are discussed in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOTS have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top men thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to microfilming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new service doesn't know the identity of the AMOTS who are presently in Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has from 18 to 22 of them of whom four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had produced 1,800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.

not controlled by Cardona or Varona

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3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other perfectly and there was no ~~other~~ obstacle of any sort in their collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering in CI matters.

4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly from Headquarters. He referred to the following:

a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance among the top Castro people.

b. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various countries.

c. A certain former Spanish intelligence officer, Amshad, who has been living in Havana in the home of the chief of G-2. Unfortunately, an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this operation has not proved to be of much value.

d. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office, now out of office.

5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.

Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service, late August 1960

Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961

Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).

6. <u>Relations with PM Section:</u> Simmons' relations with the PM section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction, perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,

also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for the use of freedom signals. When the absence of such signals was pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.

7. Simmons and his section prepared a 225-page study* of Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also some extensive studies on Cuban block wardens. They also issued CS/CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities by the Cuban services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration agent in 1960.

* This document contains the identities of 492 Castro G-2 staff officers.

8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Simmons spent half of his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e., the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before departure they would have been warned not to go. Simmons regards this matter as of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:

a. His section was not fully staffed until October 1960, although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people. He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals thus disclosed. He sent the names thus selected to the WH/4 personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able to get a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance of such a project so that the latter will cooperate when their valuable men are requested. After borrowing Melberg from covert training for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a further request, and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office to help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so informed his senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have received better cooperation. The result of lack of personnel was that they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case of a directed assignment to the project. As it was, he personally had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with the result that he could only spend 20 per cent of his time on operations. His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists and one secretary.

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b. Working space was also a great problem. From May through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single room.

c. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to release two JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.

10. For the future Simmons recommends:

a. That an LCFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man at times can be very urgent.

b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room. This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality and report cards, so that, for instance, a CI analyst can go there and do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a "gold mine".

c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for document seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.

11. Despite "difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that the results of his section's work were very good, and that one indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.

12. In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent communicating by radio was not using his safety signals, CI would help the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communications so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG. Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken off the air and Simmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

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JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

TAB 4

I. **MISSION**

To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are conducted by the U.S.S.R., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI and CA operations through analysis of their operational plans and through examination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated CI matters with the CI Staff and with staff and geographic components of WH Division.

II. **REFERENCE**

JMARC OPERATIONAL PLAN

III. **CONCEPT OF OPERATION**

It is essential that an aggressive counterintelligence program be devised and implemented to ensure sound operational security for JMARC operations. The JMARC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMARC operational proposals and steps in light of what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical activities directed against JMARC assets and operations.

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IV. ORGANIZATION

The following personnel and facilities are required for successful attainment of JMARC CI objectives.

a. Personnel: One senior CI officer; four operations officers; five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of "high" in reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one secretary. Initially, two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JMARC Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed below. Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain information reports. Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk typist will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations unit for the CI section at Headquarters.

b. Facilities: The CI section a t Headquarters will require working space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equipment: eight desks and chairs; eight standard typewriters; one card safe; three four-drawer safes. Standard office supplies should be provided. The CI operations unit at the FOB will require support commensurate to its size.

V. PHASING

A. PREPARATORY PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information.

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2. Operational Tasks:

a. The Branch/4/CI officer will:

(1) Keep Chief, Branch/4 informed on CI requirements, opportunities and developments affecting his branch.

(2) Keep FI Deputy, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff, and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor Wallen, Robert Brown, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), informed on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).

(3) Direct assistance CI personnel in performance of those jobs relating to the responsibilities cited below.

(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by Chief, Branch/4.

The senior CI officer and individual section officers designated by him will accomplish the following:

(1) Familiarize themselves with selected Branch and CI Staff redord assets and with designated branch and division personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on CI operations with the appropriate persons.

(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI operations affecting Cuba which are directed by Branch/4, by CI Staff, and/or by WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility for these.

(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI Staff.

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(4) Prepare draft CI requirements for FI/D analysts (accomplished). In addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/4 officers pertinent CI requirements and operational guidance papers pertinent to these officers' assigned responsibilities. (To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of Exile Groups in Clandestine Operations" to Jerry Droller.)

(5) Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations officers reviewing cases (accomplished).

(6) Prepare a defector register format card (accomplished) and organize and maintain a register of defectors.

(7) Exploit certain research and operational support assets of the Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/4 sections in the achievement of their objectives. To this end, one analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff.

(8) Examine current operations and/or programs in the FI and CA fields in order to ensure that CI opportunities are fully exploited and to identify operational security threats and to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or counter such threats.

b. CI Staff components (cited in each instance) will have the following responsibilities:

(1) Chief, SID, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

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(2) Deputy Chief, ICG, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries, using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.

(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen will:

(a) Prepare and maintain a briefing notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).

(b) Prepare a guide for screening WH/4/Reports personality cards and other record assets in order to identify suspect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activities (accomplished).

(c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these lists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/4 sections and other Agency components with operational interest. (Initial lists have been prepared in 13 books).

(d) Prepare or assemble CI requirements, as requested, which pertain to the maintenance of CI notebooks on the Cuban services. (Initial requirements have been drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.)

(4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Communist Party. To this end, questionnaires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist Party personnel and activities.

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(5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

B. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE

1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. WH/4/CI: During this second phase, WH/4/CI personnel will:

(1) Screen operational correspondence and cable traffic for leads to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent leads and CI information to appropriate CI Staff component and/or authorized security officers of agencies of U.S. intelligence community.

(2) In coordination with Political Action Section of WH/4, outline an organization for a security intelligence service for the Cuban Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.

(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.

(4) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst to perform those functions necessary to the initiation and conduct of secure CI operations and CI protection activities.

b. CI Staff: The SIG, ICG, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will carry out the following activities:

(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH).

(2) Prepare organizational studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelligence and Security Services personnel, and black lists of persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in

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three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by designated members of the United States intelligence community, and by authorized components of the Cuban Government-in-Exile. (OPS/WH)

(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH)

(4) Prepare special studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and on the Cuban Communist Party and other groups and organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (OPS/WH)

c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.

VI. COORDINATION

Coordination on CI operations and on operational support activities which involve WH/FI, CI Staff and WH/4/CI will be effected by senior CI officer of WH/4. Communications on these matters will be by telephone and/or personal meetings. CI aspects of WH/4/FI and CA operations will be discussed by appropriate section officers and the senior CI officer or the latter's designates.

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TAB B

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE

B

I. MISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD, its personnel, installations, secrets and activities from sabotage, subversion and espionage.

II. REFERENCES

A. Project Operational Plan

B. Project Political Action Plan

C. Project Counterintelligence Plan

D. Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1961

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new Government of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file members of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members. To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.

The Agency's objectives in establishing and supporting a security service for the FRD are:

A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD; and

B. To acquire counterintelligence information through participation in FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:

A. Screening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;

B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;

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C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel;

D. Maintaining physical security of FRD installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;

F. Enforcing personnel security regulations;

G. Indoctrinating FRD members on personal security;

H. Monitoring malcontents; and

I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agency:

A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of eight candidates;

B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York, Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure safehouse training site in Miami;

C. To create an organization which can fulfill assigned security functions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates to staff the organization;

E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by providing sanitized record data, special training, financial backing, and, at need, operational facilities; and

F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's day-to-day activities.

To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to select seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assessment of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and functions of the security service by a representative of the BENDER-CARR group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer who will be recommended to the FRD by the BENDER-CARR group. The training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day-to-day

security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plan. The FRD security components in Mexico City, Washington and New York will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will be assigned to Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.

IV. ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure of the FRD security service and of the Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A"; the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these structures are discussed below:

A. Facilities

1. Security office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of Security; the Office of Security will identify these sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct their use by appropriate FRD components.)

2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will recommend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

3. One four-drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of Security for use in each office site in the above-named cities.

4. Appropriate office supplies will be assembled by the FRD component in each site.

B. Foreign Personnel

1. A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited as training officer for the security service. The BENDER-CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENDER-CARR organization.

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2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, to immediately select seven officers for processing and training prior to assignment in the FRD security service. Later, thirty-two additional officers will be selected for processing and training.

C. Staff Personnel

1. BENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters pertaining to the security service.

2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR representatives all advice, guidance and support to the security service and its chief.

V. PHASING

A. Preparatory Phase (25 August - 15 September):

1. Primary Objective:

To implement the plan for the security service by selecting, assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers, including chief of the proposed service.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York, by dispatch where appropriate, before 26 August, of the Agency's plan and objectives regarding an FRD security service.

b. Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate with him in processing and training for assignment to the FRD security service.

c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation from as many FRD sponsors.

d. Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through the Project security office.

e. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate training site in the Miami area which will accommodate a minimum of eight trainees and an instructor.

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f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

g. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief trainer on his assignment.

h. Quarter trainer in training site.

i. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimum office supplies from list to be provided by the Project CI officer.

j. Provide trainer with a curriculum and a training schedule which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and skills.

k. Discuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, the organization and functions of the proposed security service.

l. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief of the service) and processing of others.

m. Get signed secrecy agreement and loyalty oath from each student.

n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent candidates as Agency-controlled sources.

B. Development Phase: (16 - 30 September)

1. Primary Objective:

To build the security service in a way which will enable it to perform its assigned functions.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the cities named above.

b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above or check the sites previously selected.

d. Initiate training of remaining candidates.

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e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it with sanitized record data.

f. Forward physical security plan and physical security regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER.

g. Forward operational security regulations for security service to Chief, through BENDER.

h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communications among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to Chief, through BENDER.

i. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.

j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

C. Action Phase (30 September on):

1. Primary Objective:

To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists, members of the Cuban Security Services, and Orbit espionage and sabotage personnel.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Move the security apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.

b. Provide FRD security service with black lists and record data pertinent to the above objective.

c. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR group.

D. Consolidation Phase:

1. Primary Objective:

To direct the FRD security service in its efforts to maintain public security and to contain foreign services activities.

2. Operational Tasks:

a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.

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b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.

c. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.

VI. COORDINATION

The above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of the Project.

VII. SUPPORT

See SUPPORT ANNEXES.

FOR FUTURE (present) TAB C

20 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/4

SUBJECT : CI Program for JMATE Project

1. Objectives:

a. To add to our knowledge of objectives, operations and assets of the CASTRO services.

b. To bring about the defection of selected key personalities in the Castro Government and military services.

c. To plan and mount deception operations involving Agency-controlled double agents and W/T play backs. To date, four W/T operators in Cuba are deemed suspect. The fate of our two double agents, who may have accompanied the BRIGADE in the assault on Cuba, will be determined during the course of the next few days. It is anticipated that other candidates for double agent operations will be identified in the States; their exploitation will be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

d. To support and direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security Service in Miami in the fulfillment of agreed upon objectives.

e. To support and direct 44 AMOT officers and agents now in Cuba, in the collection of intelligence pertinent to Project needs, and in the fulfillment of such other covert action assignments which may be deemed within their competence.

f. To introduce into Cuba unilaterally-controlled counter-intelligence agents.

g. To intensify the Project's Communist Party penetration program.

h. To increase counterintelligence operations run into Cuba in conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.

i. To counter the espionage, subversive and sabotage operations directed by the Castro services against other States within the Western Hemisphere. This to be done in conjunction with the services of those countries with which we maintain liaison.

C

13-00000

2. **Assets:**

a. AMOT Security Service: The AMOT complex is made up of 97 AMOT staff and clerical personnel, 34 AMFASTS (security-counterintelligence teams) located in the Miami area, and 63 AMCHEERS (senior Cuban citizens drawn from banking, commercial and ranching circles in Cuba), also located in Miami.

b. An Agency-controlled Communist Party penetration agent located in Havana.

c. An Agency-controlled agent with access to leftist and Communist circles in the Western Hemisphere, now in New York City.

d. An agent candidate with access to engineering circles in Havana, who will be available for assignment in Cuba in June of this year.

e. A third country agent under diplomatic cover now assigned to, and in place at, Havana.

f. Other CI assets inside Cuba:

Through the AMOT and other clandestine channels approximately 30 individuals, the majority of whom are Army officers, had indicated a willingness to defect in place and help the opposition forces when the strike came. Although the rebellion was crushed before it could advance sufficiently for the 30 individuals to fulfill their commitment, it may be assumed that some of these people are still willing to cooperate and may be recruited for the purpose of furnishing information now denied us and possibly for performing certain operational functions such as establishing nets and recruiting agents. At the Granma Base, for example, where approximately 4,000 troops are stationed (according to AMOT-34), three captains have indicated willingness to cooperate. The Infantry commander agreed to try to take the base and the nearby cadet school. Assuming that he had that capability, it may be further assumed that he could recruit agents and informants at these bases.

Other possible assets of this type include the chiefs of the Fourth and Fifth INRA Zones in Pinar del Rio and the Chief of Police in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province.

In addition we have on hand a list of potential defectors who have shown disillusionment with CASTRO, and who have been approached but who have not yet declared themselves. It is possible that the turn of events may have heightened their disillusionment; may be worth trying to recruit them at this time.

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4. Problems and Resolutions:

a. AMOT-KUBARK Relationship. The Agency must recognize the possibility of strained feelings because of the failure of the invasion. It is believed that the Agency representative in Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal relationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain a satisfactory working relationship.

b. Status of AMOT Agents in Cuba. The Agency must anticipate the need to exfiltrate AMOT agents now in place in Cuba in the event their positions become untenable.

c. Operational Climate. The Agency must anticipate the development of an increasingly unfavorable operational climate inside Cuba in view of the increased security measures being implemented by the Castro services.

d. Compromised Agent Assets Inside Cuba. The Agency must assume that the paramilitary assets inside Cuba have probably been compromised by Castro security counter measures taken at the time of the invasion. Each of these assets or net must be examined to determine their continued usefulness. The inclusion of trained CI officers, such as the AMOTS or [illegible], in various teams infiltrated into Cuba can serve to ferret out and neutralize identified penetrations.

Clark W. Simmons
Chief, WH/4/CI

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - WH/4/CI Chrono

13-00000

SECRET

TAB D

29 April 1961

MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, WH/4/OPS

FROM : Chief, WH/4/CI

SUBJECT : [illegible] Intelligence Assets

Reference : [illegible]
[illegible] (dated [illegible] April 1961)

[illegible]

"CI Program For [illegible] Project", dated 20 April 1961. This paper was prepared at the request of Chief, WH/4 on 20 April 1961, to indicate CI capabilities in the post-strike phase.

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13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Chief, Task Force W

NO.

DATE 10 July 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Deputy Director (Plans)				By Hand
2. Mr. Elder for DCI				
3.				
4. ER-file				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				EYES ONLY
10.				
11.				SECRET
12.				BY HAND
13.				
14.				
15.				180151

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

80 62-4791

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-regime elements. In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time personal friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3. On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until 1 July 1962. She discussed the current regime quite frankly with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel. According to Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to Cuba after discussions with "the Americans".

4. We are making the necessary arrangements with Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct recruitment. You will be kept advised of any future developments of importance in this case.

William K. Harvey

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
C/TFW

SECRET
EYES ONLY

GROUP 1
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Executive Registry
62-310

FROM:

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
1317 Barton Hall

NO.

DATE 10 January 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCI DDCI 203 Admin. Building	Admin File			orig to DDCI - 1/13/62
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180085

FORM 1 DEC 56 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☑ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

EYES ONLY
SECRET

DD/S-2-0171
DD/S-62-0173

Executive Registry
62-310

10 January 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

SUBJECT : Project JMATE

REFERENCES : a. Recommendation approved by the President, 4 August 1961, Subject: Covert Action Program Against Cuba

b. C/WHD Memorandum to DCI, Subject: Action with respect to the Agency Reserve for Contingency held by the Bureau of the Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961

1. The references cited established the current JMATE activity and obtained funds in the amount of $5.36 millions to operate the project during the period 1 July - 31 December 1961.

2. As set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" it is intended that the financial and audit requirements of this project be regularized to the extent possible consistent with operational requirements.

3. In the Project Authority, reference "a", on 4 August 1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved covert operations including the funding of various persons, groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in our opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of JMATE. These individuals, groups, and activities are and will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able to exercise little or no control over the funds, materiel, arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable accounting from them.

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4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans) to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATE monies, materiel, arms and equipment as in his opinion may be necessary to support such persons, groups and activities. The Deputy Director (Plans) is authorized to delegate this authority to the COP/DDP, the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the Chief, WH/4, and Chief, JMWAVE, as he may desire.

5. Funds advanced in accordance with this authority shall be accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except, that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered by the Agency, such as those described in paragraph 3 above, certifications by the person passing funds to the activity may be accepted as final accounting when approved by an official designated above. Such certifications shall state the amount passed, date, and general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not practical.

6. During the Project development, writing of sub-projects as set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" will be deferred. In lieu, thereof, the project will provide you with copies of reference "a" which will be supplemented by more formal documentation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited in paragraphs three and four above, activities which in the opinion of the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization through administrative plans or fiscal annexes will be so documented.

7. This authority does not amend regulatory authorities in respect to administrative matters covering Agency personnel.

SIGNED
JOHN A. MC CONE
Director

CONCUR:

/s/
Comptroller

12 Jun 62
Date

/s/ CPC
DDCI
Date 1 Jun 62

CC: DDCI
DDP
DDS
Comptroller
C/Audit Staff

SECRET

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DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

PROCESSING		
PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.

FROM: Chief of Base, JMWAVE

SUBJECT: Operational/JMWAVE/AMCT Status Report

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: For information and files

1. Following is a brief summary of JMWAVE/KUDESK current assets in the Target Area (CUBA):

a. AMCT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Habana. We are maintaining contact via SW. Subject had a W/T set, cached it and no longer has access to it. AMBUD-1 has been instructed to deliver another one to him.

b. AMCT-48: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Oriente Province. We are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanamo Naval Base.

c. AMCT-106, 107 and 108: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide AMCT-34 with operational intelligence in Habana.

d. Rolando MANGUART Julia: Subject is an AMCT sub source in Pinar del Rio. Subject is currently reorganizing his assets in that Province.

e. Jose Manuel FERNANDEZ Quintana: Subject is an AMCT sub source in the Port of Habana.

f. Violeta MACIAS is an AMCT live drop in Habana and is still active.

g. Norberto MARTINEZ is an AMCT sub source and is active in Habana and Pinar del Rio Provinces.

2. JMWAVE/KUDESK current and future plans are to continue to support and direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in paragraph 1 above. Moreover plans are now in motion for the following:

a. Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MANGUART and MARTINEZ for further training and return to the target area

Distribution:
3- WHD

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DATE TYPED: 22 May 61

DATE DISPATCHED:

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UFGA-1639

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-5-3

CLASSIFICATION: S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGINATING

b. Recruit and dispatch in the near future of at least four other agents to the target area.

c. Exfiltrate AMOT-[illegible] for training and return to the target area. Plan is also to provide him with a trained radio operator.

3. WAVE/KUDESK is in the process of reorganizing both the AMOT and AMFAST complex as follows:

a. AMOT is being reorganized as a unilateral anti-Castro Cuban Security Service.

b. AMFAST will [illegible] a unilateral anti-Castro [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] WAVE/KUDESK also plans to continue to support and direct such agents as [illegible]-7 (political within [illegible]), AMWATTER-5 (military matters independently and/or [illegible] in the WAVE area), AMOT-[illegible] and AMOT-16 (controlled penetrations within AMOT and AMFAST and for general independent reporting on anti-and pro-Castro activities in the WAVE area), [illegible]-1 (general political matters) and AMPUTEE-1 (general Cuban matters as well as retaining as a future technical asset for telephone tappings).

[illegible] For the present time the AMCHEER Group is being held in abeyance as [illegible] operation. This group, however, will be tapped for information as it becomes necessary.

7. In support of other Base JMWAVE Sections, the KUDESK Section will spot, develop and recruit assets for use in the target area. An example is making available at least twelve AMOT/AMFASTS for commando type raids on the Cuban coast and mainland.

8. WAVE/KUDESK will continue its primary mission of:

a. The detection, identification and neutralization of hostile intelligence action.

b. Provide security checks on agents, potential agents and assets, and

c. Provide, with the security section of Base JMWAVE, security checks on ODYOKE covert relationship with Cubans and Cuban organizations. In addition the KUDESK Section will continue to develop an apparatus to be used as an Agent Corps which can be used in the rollup of Castro and Communist agents [illegible] support of the post-Castro government. AMOTS, AMCHEERS, AMFASTS and AM[illegible] will be the main source for this

104-10310-10118 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CONFIDENTIAL

30 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, Chief Counsel of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

This meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.

Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.

Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CL BY 064737

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He gave two examples of this. One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed, this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach agreed.

Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.

Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.

Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.

13-00000

Comment

Mr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.

At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.

R. G. Wall

Robert G. Wall
Deputy Chief, CI/OG

cc: Chief, CI
ADDO
SA/DDO
Review Staff - Walt Elder

104-10322-10056 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

24 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Supplementary Information on James Earl Ray

REFERENCE: DDO Memorandum for DCI dated 23 October 1975
Subject: Background for Rather Interview - James Earl Ray

Dick Ober (then in CI) who wrote all the early Ray cables, recalls that he had numerous discussions with the FBI on the matter, and is certain that whatever we did was undertaken at the request of the FBI. Because of the fast moving situation, most of his discussions with the FBI were on the phone, and not the subject of written memoranda. The paper clipped outgoing cable in referring to Eric Galt (the man initially identified by the FBI as the assassin of Dr. King) requests "addressees make every effort determine if Galt is or has been in your area. Information para one should be passed to liaison and any other likely sources. FBI requests that any information reported be evaluated as to reliability and that as much detail as possible be provided. Cable any positive reply priority to HQS. and pass to legal attache if any in your country." There is a scribbled note in the file, presumably in Ober's hand, which reads: "4. Ray fingerprints: FBI agreed to my proposal we send to field for liaison." Ober, also logically points out that the FBI would not have provided us later with a fingerprint formula (see attached cable), a detailed physical description and photos unless they wanted this passed on to overseas liaison services. (Note that our cables did not go, for example, to Ottawa or Mexico City.)

David H. Blee
Associate Deputy Director for Operations

Attachments

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MESSAGE FORM
TOTAL COPIES: 17

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ORIG: Richard Ober
UNIT: CIOP/DO
EXT: 6537
DATE: 18 Apr 68

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION
BY 28 PER ORIGINATOR

INDEX / DESTROY / RETURN TO ____ BRANCH / FILE RID
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CONF: C/CI RID COPY

INFO: FILE, VR CS/RF, DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NE

(classification) SECRET

(date and time filed) 19 01 32 Z

(elite) (reference number) CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTION
Book

ASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA, BRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, ~~CARACAS~~ CARACAS, COPENHAGEN, FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY, GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, ~~[illegible]~~ HELSINKI, HONG KONG, KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO, NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS, PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE, RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO, SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO, STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH.

RYBAT WOMUSE

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGO CONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHN WILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TO

RAY
c. Assassin
c. CSDO

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pi

(reference number)

TO CITE DIRECTOR 92664

FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUM BUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES, MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDING LEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDED DANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED ~~XXX~~ COURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE DESIRING IT. ADVISE.

3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.

4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. ~~XXXXX~~ INFORMATION PARA ONE SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

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INFO: FILE , VR ,

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

CITE DIRECTOR 92664

TO

LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATED AS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS ~~MX~~ MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE BE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS AND PASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY ~~AT~~ IN YOUR COUNTRY.

DC/CI (in draft)
(Mr. Hunt)

E/COPS [signature]

WH/FI (by phone)
(Mr. Smyth)

DC/FE (by phone)
(Mr. Smith)

DDP Richard Ober by direction/SH.

for C/NE R. Ober

ⓧCI/OP/DO Richard Ober

RELEASING OFFICER

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COPY NO.

MHFNO: 98-1333007 SENSIND: RYBAT SECRET

PAGE: 1

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STAFF

CONF: CE/EXO INFO: CE/LGL, CE/R/IO, CE/ST, CE/STR, CE/STSWE, CE/WUMB, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/R, CE/W, (3/P)

98 1333007 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 012139Z MAY 98 DIRECTOR 795035

S E C R E T
STAFF 012139Z DIRECTOR 795035
TO: PRIORITY MOSCOW INFO MINSK.

FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/EXO INFO CE/R, CE/R/IO, DC/CE, CE/LGL, CE/WUMB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD AND DEPT OF STATE REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING FSB/SVR FOR OSWALD FILE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: WOULD APPRECIATE STATION THOUGHTS ON
*BELOW PROPOSAL TO APPROACH FSB/SVR SEEKING ACCESS TO FILE ON<LEE>
*<HARVEY ((OSWALD)).>

* 2. THE<ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB), ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-526 IN OCTOBER 1992, HAS THE PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE TO IDENTIFY, SECURE, AND MAKE AVAILABLE ALL
*RECORDS RELATED TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> THE IDENTIFIED (DECLASSIFIED) RECORDS WILL BE HOUSED IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. CE HAS HAD SOME DEALINGS WITH THE ARRB, BEGINNING WITH THEIR REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO THE RESTRICTED MOSCOW STATION HISTORY FROM THE 1960'S. THE ARRB'S PREMISE IS TO DECLASSIFY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, EVEN
*DOCUMENTS ONLY MOST TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO THE<KENNEDY>
*<ASSASSINATION.>

3. PL 102-526 SPECIFICALLY STATES:
"THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA AND SEEK THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL RECORDS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF THE KOMITET GOSUDARSTVANNOY BEZOPASNOSTI (KGB) AND THE GLAYNOYE
*RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVIENIYE (GRU), RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>
*OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>AND CONTACT ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
*THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF
*<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION."

4. THE ARRB HAS REQUESTED STATE AND AGENCY HELP IN GETTING ACCESS TO THE KGB RECORDS ON OSWALD. THE RECORDS, ORIGINALLY HELD

SECRET

*IN MINSK, WERE FLOWN TO MOSCOW IN '63 FOLLOWING THE<ASSASSINATION,> THEN RETURNED TO MINSK WHERE THEY ARE STORED TODAY. WHEN APPROACHED BY STATE AND THE ARRB, THE BELARUSIANS HAVE SHOWN SAMPLES FROM THE FILE BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO COPY. THE ARRB CHARTER EXPIRES ON 30 SEPT 98 AND THE OLD KGB FILE(S) IS A MAJOR OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENT. STATE HAS MANAGED TO GET THE SUBJECT AS THE NUMBER ONE TALKING POINT ON VICE PRES GORE'S RECENT CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. THE BELARUSIAN RESPONSE WAS TO TRY IT AGAIN LOCALLY IN MINSK, OFFERING INCREASED "COPY FEES".

5. THE ARRB CHAIRMAN HAS COME BACK TO STATE TO ASK THEY CONTACT THE AGENCY WITH THE FOLLOWING REQUEST: CAN THE STATION CHECK WITH THE FSB/SVR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS RETAINED *A COPY OF THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>KGB FILE IN MOSCOW? CAN WE GET ACCESS TO THE FILE AND, PRESUMABLY, OBTAIN A COPY FOR THE ARRB? WE NOTE THAT THE ARRB WILL PROBABLY PUSH HARD TO DECLASSIFY THE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS AS WELL. OBVIOUSLY SUCH A REQUEST COULD HAVE SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER, I.E., THE RUSSIANS MIGHT ASK FOR FILES OF THE ROSENBERGS OR OTHER NOTORIOUS PERSONALITIES. THE HQS CONTEXT IS THAT WE ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE ARRB ON A VARIETY OF OTHER SERIOUS DECLASSIFICATION/DISCLOSURE ISSUES AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION IF WE COULD BE SEEN AS ASSISTING THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE OSWALD FILE.

6. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN ACTION HAS TREMENDOUS IMPLICATIONS AND WE WELCOME A FULL DIALOGUE FROM STATION ON THIS MATTER.

REGARDS.

6. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 714549, CL REASON: 1.5(D), DECL ON: X5, DRV FROM: LIA 3-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>
RELNO: DORELS0100952954
ORIG: CE/EXO(CHENGMD,39263); AUTH: AC/CE/R (BANNERMAN); COORD: C/CE/R/IO (ZERRUSEN), C/CE/WUMB (WARD); INFO: CE/LGL (WATSON); REL: DC/CE (LEVEN).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

13-00000
104-10326-10013 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MHFNO: 98-0748996 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/WUMB (276) INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, DCCE/OPS, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CE, PCS/CAB, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/W)

98 0748996 ASR PAGE 001 IN 0748996
TOR: 061335Z MAR 98 MNSK 17622

SECRET 061332Z MAR 98 STAFF

CITE MINSK 17622

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB, DCCE/OPS, DC/CE, CE/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL JYVAPOROUS

*SUBJECT: BKGB ACCESS SUPPORT TO USG<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD

REF: NONE.

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW; TRACES ON SUBJS IN PARA 5; GUIDANCE ON ARRB-BKGB ACCESS REQUEST.

2. ON MORNING 6 MAR 98 POLECON OFFICER AND DCM MET WITH COS TO ALERT HIM TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR STATION SUPPORT TO FACILITATE FUTURE MEETING(S) WITH BKGB BY EMBASSY OR OTHER USG PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN *FOLLOWUP INQUERIES ON BEHALF OF USG'S<ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD (ARRB). ARRB IS CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED AND FUNDED BODY *LOOKING AT ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO<ASSASSINATION>OF PRESIDENT<JOHN> *F.<KENNEDY.> OF INTEREST IN MINSK ARE RECORDS HELD BY THE BKGB *RELATED TO<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND THE TIME HE SPENT HERE. ARRB APPARENTLY WANTS COPIES OF ALL THESE BKGB RECORDS TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE FOR SCHOLARLY REVIEW AND RESEARCH PURPOSES.

3. PER POLECON OFFICER, THE ARRB CHAIRMAN (A RESPECTED RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGE) HAD REPORTEDLY MADE INQUERIES HERE IN OCTOBER 1996, AT WHICH TIME STATION HAD, WITH HQS CONCURRENCE, FACILITATED BKGB MEETINGS (BUT STATION WAS APPARENTLY DIRECTED BY HQS TO AVOID ALL OTHER INVOLVEMENT). BKGB TOOK REQUEST FOR COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS UNDER REVIEW, BUT NO DOCUMENTS WERE EVER PROVIDED. WHEN PRESSED, BKGB SAID THEY WOULD ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, BUT THEIR "PRIVACY LAWS" WOULD NOT LET THEM RELEASE RECORDS WHICH RELATE TO LIVING BELARUSSIANS (PER POLECON, THIS SPEFICALLY INCLUDED OSWALD'S FORMER WIFE, MARINA). ARRB PRESENTED LENGTHY LIST OF DETAILED, LEGALISTIC, AND (WHAT POLECON OFFICER, HERSELF A LAWYER, DESCRIBED AS) ONEROUS QUERIES. BKGB NEVER RESPONDED.

SECRET

4. EMBASSY UNDERSTOOD THAT LEGISLATIVE MANDATE FOR ARRB HAD EXPIRED IN FALL 1997, SO DID NOT FOLLOWUP FURTHER. HOWEVER, MANDATE WAS APPARENTLY EXTENDED TO FALL 1998, AND ARRB'S INTEREST IN BKGB INFORMATION HAS BEEN REACTIVATED. ARRB TEAM MAY WISH TO COME TO MINSK TO TRY AGAIN TO OBTAIN THESE RECORDS FROM BKGB, OR AT LEAST GET EMBASSY TO REVITALIZE EFFORTS TO DO SO.

5. FOR THE RECORD (AND HQS TRACES), AT THE TIME OF THE ARRB'S OCT 1996 MEETINGS WITH BKGB, ARRB MET PRINCIPLY WITH THE FOLLOWING BKGB OFFICIALS:

-- ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI)
-- ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPT.

AT SOME POINT DURING MEETINGS THEY WERE JOINED BY:

-- GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)) (PHONETIC), A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, BKGB. (THIS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY IDEN.)

REQUEST HQS TRACES ON FOUR BKGB OFFICERS ABOVE.

6. COMPLICATING ALL THIS IS FACT THAT AT SOME POINT, AUTHOR NORMAN MAILER (APPARENTLY WITH EMBASSY ACCESS ASSISTANCE) WAS GIVEN ACCESS TO (SOME/ALL? OF) THE BKGB'S OSWALD RECORDS, WHICH MAILER REFERS TO EXTENSIVELY IN HIS BOOK "OSWALD'S TALE: AN AMERICAN MYSTERY," PUBLISHED IN 1995. AFTER THE FACT, PER POLECON OFFICER, BKGB REALIZED THAT MAILER MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROFITS FROM THIS BOOK, AND THAT THE BKGB HAD GOTTEN NOTHING FOR PROVIDING ACCESS TO THEIR RECORDS, THUS THEY REPORTEDLY FELT THEY HAD BEEN CHEATED.

7. BALL IS NOW IN STATE'S COURT, BUT THEY AND EMBASSY EXPECT THAT REQUEST WILL BE FORTHCOMING FROM ARRB IN NEAR FUTURE, AND THENCE TO STATION, TO FACILITATE MEETINGS WITH BKGB ON THIS MATTER. TO BE A BIT AHEAD OF THE CURVE, REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE AND AUTHORIZATION AS APPROPRIATE.

8. FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. DECL ON: X1. CL REASON: 1.5(C). CL BY: 0702653. DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5388761 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

/ / STAFF

CONF: EA/J INFO: C/ORMS, DC/EA, DCEA/CI, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, EA/XO (2/P)

96 5388761 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 131946Z SEP 96 DIRECTOR 941533

S E C R E T
STAFF 131953Z DIRECTOR 941533
TO: PRIORITY TOKYO.

FROM: LIMIT EA/J INFO DC/EA, DCEA/CI, D/PAS

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: NEW STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: TOKYO 30260 96 5367593

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SUGGEST COS HAVE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER REFER THE UPI CORRESPONDENT TO THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF.

2. IN DISCUSSING REF WITH THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF, PAS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO TREAT UPI CORRESPONDENT AS THEY WOULD ANY OTHER REPORTER WHO SEEKS A COMMENT ON A STORY OR FACT PERTAINING TO NWBOLTON. THEREFORE, PAS RECOMMENDS THAT COS TELL THE EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER TO SUGGEST THAT THE UPI CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS HIS QUESTIONS TO PAS AT (703) 482-7677 AND ASK TO SPEAK TO A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON. BASED ON THE UPI CORRESPONDENT'S QUESTIONS, PAS MAY THEN REFER THE REPORTER TO HISTORICAL RECORDS OR OTHER OUTSIDE OFFICE.

3. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2164121, CL REASON: 1.5 (C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.
CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 1.0.2.
RELNO: DORELS0100513880
ORIG: EA/J(BRYSNBS,35162); AUTH: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY); REL: DC/EA/J(CONNELLY).

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5367593 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: EA/J (223) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC, DC/EA, EADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, PAS, FILE, CIC/EA, EA/XO (3/W)

96 5367593 ASP PAGE 001 IN 5367593
TOR: 120802Z SEP 96 TOKY 30260

S E C R E T 120758Z SEP 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 30260

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT AC/EA/J INFO D/PAS, DC/EA, C/EA/CI

SLUGS: WNINTEL

*SUBJECT: NEWS STORY ON<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>AND CIA IN JAPAN

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PROVIDE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF *PROJECT OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION>PAPERS.

2. EMBASSY PRESS OFFICER ADVISED COS AT RECEPTION LAST NIGHT THAT LOCAL UPI REPORTER IS ABOUT TO FILE A STORY BASED ON LOCAL RESEARCH AND AN INTERVIEW WITH A RETIRED MARINE OFFICER WHO CLAIMED *TO BE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>COMMANDER IN JAPAN THAT OSWALD WAS RECRUITED BY CIA WHILE STATIONED WITH THE MARINES IN JAPAN IN THE 1950S. UPI CORRESPONDENT OFFERED PRESS OFFICER A CHANCE TO COMMENT. PRESS OFFICER DECLINED. COS SUGGESTED THAT MUCH, IF NOT ALL PAPERS ON OSWALD'S PERSONAL HISTORY HAVE BEEN DECLASSIFIED FOR USE BY MEDIA, *RESEARCHERS AND<ASSASSINATION>BUFFS AS PART OF OVERALL<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION>DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAM. COS ALSO RECALLED THAT THE UPI REPORTERS STORY, IN SOME FORM, ALSO HAS ALREADY BEEN WRITTEN. HENCE, AS A LONG SHOT AT KEEPING A CIA-RELATED STORY FROM SURFACING IN JAPAN, THEREBY PROMPTING JAPANESE JOURNALISTS TO PURSUE THE SAME INFORMATION, COS SUGGESTED TO PRESS OFFICER THAT SHE PASS NUMBER OF THE HISTORICAL OFFICE AT HEADQUARTERS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH PUBLIC QUERIES TO THE REPORTER, ADVISING THAT HIS SCOOP MAY, IN FACT, BE OLD NEWS.

3. WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE NAME AND/OR NUMBER THAT UPI REPORTER COULD CALL AT HEADQUARTERS HISTORICAL OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR *<JFK ASSASSINATION>INQUIRY DECLASSIFICATION. IF THERE IS ANOTHER OFFICE AT NATIONAL ARCHIVES OR ELSEWHERE THAT HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH INQUIRIES, THAT WOULD BE FINE AS WELL. THANKS FOR THE HELP.

4. CL REASON 1.5(C); DECL X1

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 96-5367593 SENSIND: PAGE: 2

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

104-10326-10055 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

MHFNO: 96-3123036 SENSIND: RYBAT

SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: C/EUR/NOR (729) INFO: EUDORECORD, EUR/LGL, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, DC/EURN, CIC/EUR (3/W)

96 3123036 ASO PAGE 001 IN 3123036
TOR: 081248Z FEB 96 COPE 94608

S E C R E T 081247Z FEB 96 STAFF

CITE COPENHAGEN 94608

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT EUR/NOR INFO DC/EURN, CIC/EUR, EUR/LGL

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

SUBJECT: RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

REF: DIRECTOR 633349 96 3117723

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: SEE PARA 2.

2. THE FAX STATION RECEIVED APPEARS TO BE INCOMPLETE. IT CONTAINED A COVER SHEET, A ONE-PAGE COPENHAGEN CABLE STATING "NO TRACES" AND THE FIRST PAGE OF A DIRECTOR CABLE REQUESTING TRACES ON *<LEE HARVEY ((OSWALD)).> UNLESS THE MISSING PORTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR CABLE HAVE SOME BEARING ON DENMARK, STATION CANNOT MAKE A CASE AGAINST RELEASE OF THIS MATERIAL. WE WOULD INSIST, HOWEVER, THAT CRYPTS BE DELETED - AS REF INDICATED WOULD BE THE CASE.

3. PLEASE KEEP US APPRISED OF DATE THESE DOCS WILL BE RELEASED SO THAT STATION MAY INFORM AMBASSADOR AND OUR LIAISON SERVICE CHIEFS.

4. CL BY: 0716497 CL REASON: 1.5(C) DECL ON: X1

4. FILE: 021-120-004/1. DECL DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1758303 SENSIND: PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: LA/MCGMXB INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGLA, CIC/LA, LA/MCG, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/P)

95 1758303 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 221413Z SEP 95 DIRECTOR 456844

S E C R E T
STAFF 221413Z DIRECTOR 456844
TO: IMMEDIATE MEXICO CITY.

FROM: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB INFO C/LA/MCG

SLUGS: WNINTEL KDSOMBRERO KDMARTINI

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE ON MEXICO CITY TELTAPS

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: STATION COMMENTS PER PARA 3.

2. IN 22 SEP 95 ISSUE, WASHINGTON POST PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "CIA BUGGED SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY." THE ARTICLE *IS BASED ON CIA DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED UNDER THE<JFK ASSASSINATION> RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992. MOST OF THE DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ARE EDITED STATION CABLES FROM THE EARLY 1960'S. HQS HAD ATTEMPTED TO BLOCK THE RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENTS; REGRET THAT WE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.

3. THE ARTICLE DISCUSSES SOME AGENCY ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO *CITY IN TIMEFRAME OF THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, FROM A DAMAGE STANDPOINT, THE ARTICLE STATES "...THE CIA HAS TRIED TO KEEP SECRET ITS WIRETAP OPERATION, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. THE AGENCY HAS ARGUED THAT DISCLOSING SUCH PAST ACTIVITIES MIGHT ENDANGER SIMILAR, ONGOING OPERATIONS, IN MEXICO CITY OR ELSEWHERE." WOULD APPRECIATE STATION'S INPUT ON ANY REACTION BY LIAISON (PARTICULARLY KDSOMBRERO) OR UNILATERAL ASSETS TO THIS FURTHER DISPLAY OF THE INABILITY OF THE USG TO KEEP CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE.

4. THE ARTICLE IS BEING FAXED TO STATION.

5.. FILE: 050-002-037/3, 050-002-033/3 . DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E245787

ORIG: LA/MCGMXB(LUCEMW,39342); REL: C/LA/MCGMXB (LUCE). CL BY 0712052

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

13-00000
104-10326-10074 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1374342 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , , ,

STAFF

ADV: CE/W/MB (1102Z)

ACTION: CE/W/MB (773) INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/W)

95 1374342 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1374342
TOR: 161102Z AUG 95 MNSK 14144

S E C R E T 161059Z AUG 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14144 (FALANTZ ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: DIRECTOR 404798 95 1366840

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI OR COMMENT

2. STATION IS FAXING TO HQS A COPY OF BRIEFING PAPER FOR CODEL SHELBY, REVISED IN ACCORD WITH SUGGESTIONS OF REFERENCE. UNLESS ADDITIONAL REVISIONS ARE REQUIRED, THIS IS THE COPY WHICH WE WILL PROVIDE TO CODEL TO READ, BUT NOT TO CARRY AWAY.

3. APPRECIATE SUMMARY INFORMATION REGARDING HISTORICAL CONVERSATION WITH LOCAL SERVICE ABOUT FILES ON *<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> ACOS BELIEVES HE DID SEE THE CABLE MENTIONED IN REF. AT TIME OF RECEIPT STATION WAS VERY BUSY AND IN ACCORD WITH "READ AND BURN" POLICY A COPY WAS NOT RETAINED. A RETRANSMISSION IS NOT NECESSARY. ALSO, IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY FOR HQS TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER, SINCE SUMMARY INFORMATION WILL PROBABLY SUFFICE. ADDITIONALLY, ACOS HAS LEARNED THAT YESTERDAY THE AMBASSADOR SUBMITTED A DIPLOMATIC NOTE TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI SANIKOV WHICH IS AN OFFICIAL REQUEST FOR THE FILES ON OSWALD. STATION JUDGES BY THIS THAT FBI HAS CARRIED THE ACTION TO STATE WITH THIS RESULT. STATION COMMENT: THERE IS BELIEF HERE THAT THE FILES WERE MADE *AVAILABLE TO THE AUTHOR OF A RECENT BOOK ON THE<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION.>

4. STATION WILL ADVISE HQS OF IMPRESSIONS OF CODEL SHELBY AT CONCLUSION OF VISIT. THANKS FOR PROMPT AND THOUGHTFUL SUPPORT IN PREPARATIONS FOR THIS VISIT.

5. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

104-10326-10075 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, COMPT, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, DDO (4/P)

95 1366774 ASO PAGE 001
TOT: 152211Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 404768

S E C R E T
STAFF 152211Z DIRECTOR 404768
TO: IMMEDIATE MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT CODEL

SUBJECT: DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER AND OSWALD FILES

REF: A. MINSK 14140 95 1360178
B. DIRECTOR 398108 95 1311426

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE CORRECT DRAFT BRIEFING PAPER TO REFLECT CHANGES REQUESTED IN PARA 3, BELOW.

2. RE PARA 2, REF A: THE BACKGROUND OF THE OFFER TO PROVIDE *THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>FILES WAS TRANSMITTED TO STATION ON 9 AUG VIA REF B. THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT THE MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO *THE FBI BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY CONNECTED WITH THE<KENNEDY> *<ASSASSINATION> WE ARE QUERYING THE FBI TO SEE WHERE THE MATTER STANDS. YOU ARE WELCOME TO PASS THIS ALONG TO THE AMBASSADOR. WE WILL ADVISE AS SOON AS THE FBI RESPONDS TO OUR REQUEST.

3. PAGES ONE AND TWO OF YOUR BRIEFING PAPER ARE RIGHT ON THE MARK. PAGE THREE HOWEVER CONTAINS SOME ISSUES THAT WE REQUEST YOU DELETE AND/OR SOFTEN.

A. FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4. DO NOT DISCUSS ANY UNILATERAL OPERATIONS WITH THE SENATOR. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH ANY DISCUSSION OF SOURCES; IN THIS INSTANCE THE CASE IS INACTIVE AND WOULD NOT ADD TO YOUR DISCUSSION.

B. PARAGRAPH 7. PLEASE REDRAFT TO READ AS FOLLOWS: REGARDING EMBASSY SECURITY, OUR CONCERN IS THAT WITHOUT A 24 HOUR PRESENCE WE DO NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY. ELECTRONIC SECURITY DEVICES WILL ONLY TELL US THAT AN ENTRY HAS BEEN MADE, IT WILL NOT STOP AN ENTRY. SECURITY AT EMBASSY MINSK WAS RECENTLY DISCUSSED BY CE OFFICERS WITH THE SSCI, WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN TO THE DEPARTMENT. THE FACT, OF COURSE, IS THAT STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO HAVE MARINE GUARDS AT ALL LOCK AND LEAVE EMBASSIES AND NWBOLTON APPRECIATES THAT. (FYI: THIS IS A PARTICULARLY CONTENTIOUS ISSUE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. WE SEE NO POINT IN ALIENATING HIM BY PUTTING

13-00000

HIM ON THE SPOT WITH THE SENATOR WHEN, IN FACT, THIS MATTER IS BEING SORTED OUT IN WASHINGTON.)

C. PARAGRAPH 8. PLEASE DELETE IT. HQS HAS NOT AGREED TO ALL OF THE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS YOU NOTED SO WE WOULD PREFER THAT THEY NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE SENATOR.

3. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU DID NOT RECEIVE REF B AND WE WILL RETRANSMIT. REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK!

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E224938

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB (DOWDON, 73516); AUTH: C/CE/W (WEBER); REL: C/CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1311426 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

CONF: CE/W/MB INFO: CE/TNI, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE,
CE/W, CE/W/IS (4/P)

95 1311426 ASP PAGE 001
TOT: 092204Z AUG 95 DIRECTOR 398108

S E C R E T
STAFF 092204Z DIRECTOR 398108
TO: PRIORITY MINSK.

FROM: LIMIT C/CE/W/MB INFO C/CE/W/IS, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: MINSK 14072 95 1207999

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: INFORMATION BELOW PROVIDED AS BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

2. WE RESEARCHED THE JYVAPOROUS PROMISE TO DELIVER FILES ON *<LEE HARVEY OSWALD.> WHILE NOT MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT IS REFLECTED IN THE FILES, WE DID COME UP WITH INFORMATION WHICH INDICATES THAT THAT MATTER WAS TURNED OVER TO THE FBI FOR ACTION. THE ORIGINAL OFFER WAS MADE BY JYVAPOROUS/1 (V/1) TO FORMER C/CE IN MAY 92. IN OCTOBER 1992, DC/CETF/W VISITED MINSK FOR FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS WITH V/1 RE THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS. THE FOLLOWING IS TAKEN DIRECTLY FROM THE TRIP REPORT:

* "WE OPENED THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TOPIC OF THE<LEE HARVEY> *<OSWALD>FILES, TELLING V/1 THE FBI IS PREPARING A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER KEBICH, ASKING PERMISSION TO SEE THE FILE. V/1 BECAME IRRITABLE AND DEFENSIVE, SAYING THAT SINCE THE USG DID NOT DEIGN TO MAKE PUBLIC ALL MATERIAL PERTAINING TO ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF *THE<KENNEDY ASSASSINATION>(THE WARREN REPORT), WHY SHOULD HE BE PRESSURED INTO SURRENDERING HIS FILE. WE SAID NO PRESSURE IS INVOLVED; WE ARE ONLY FOLLOWING UP ON HIS OFFER. STILL DEFENSIVE, HE STATED HE WOULD NOT ALLOW ACCESS TO THE RAW FILE, WHICH WOULD EXPOSE SOURCES AND METHODS USED TO SURVEIL AND INVESTIGATE OSWALD IN MINSK. HE OFFERED INSTEAD SUMMARIES CONTAINING THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE, WHICH OSTENSIBLY WERE PREPARED AT THE TIME OF OSWALD'S STAY IN MINSK. HE WOULD ALLOW OUR "EXPERTS" (PRESUMABLY USG) TO EXAMINE THE DOCUMENTS CLOSELY AND TO CONFIRM THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND COMPLETENESS. HE HINTED THAT WE (NWBOLTAN REPRESENTATIVES) MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO LOOK A BIT INTO THE RAW FILE. WE SAID WE WOULD RELAY THIS TO OUR SUPERIORS, BUT EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT, DUE TO THE SENSITIVITY AMONG SOME AMERICANS *STEMMING FROM THEIR DISTRUST OF NWBOLTAN VIS A VIS THE<KENNEDY>

SECRET

13-00000

*<ASSASSINATION,>WE COULD NOT UNILATERALLY HANDLE THE FILES -- THOUGH WE COULD HELP FACILITATE THEIR PASSAGE TO THE PROPER USG AUTHORITIES (THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT)."

3. V/1 THEN TOLD OUR C/O THAT THE FBI'S LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET VICE THE PRIME MINISTER AND WE AGREED TO SO INFORM THE FBI. THAT MEMO IS THE LAST INFORMATION WE HAVE ON THE MATTER. THERE IS NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT THE FBI DID INDEED SEND THE LETTER OR, IF IT WAS SENT, THAT THEY RECEIVED A REPLY TO IT. BECAUSE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED THAT THE FBI HAD PRIMACY IN THIS MATTER, IT IS OUR DETERMINATION THAT WE SHOULD NOT REQUERY JYVAPOROUS. WE HAVE ASKED OUR REP AT THE FBI TO CHECK (INFORMALLY) AS TO THE STATUS OF THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE JYVAPOROUS AND WILL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE THE ANSWER. PLEASE ASSURE THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE WOULD LIKE US TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE FBI THROUGH OUR CHANNELS, WE WILL BE GLAD TO DO SO. REGARDS.

FILE: NONE. INDEX: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>

RELNO: E221787

ORIG: C/CE/W/MB(DOWDON,73516); AUTH: CE/W (FREIMANN); REL: CE/W (WEBER). CL BY 520992.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

MHFNO: 95-1207999 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: CE/W/IS (513) INFO: CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, CE/W, CE/W/MB (4/W)

95 1207999 ASP PAGE 001 IN 1207999
TOR: 311003Z JUL 95 MNSK 14072

S E C R E T 311000Z JUL 95 STAFF

CITE MINSK 14072 (OLEAN ACTING)

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CE/W/IS INFO C/CE/W/MB, C/CE/W

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT GTDANCER

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE

REF: NONE

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE IF HQS WOULD LIKE PARA 2 QUESTION RAISED WITH JYVAPOROUS.

2. ON 29 JULY, AMBASSADOR SHOWED ACOS STATE CABLE GIVING HIM HEADS-UP ON OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE THAT JYVAPOROUS, UNCOOPERATIVE IN SHARING ITS FILES ON<LEE> <HARVEY OSWALD>WITH USG, MADE SOME OF THEM AVAILABLE TO NORMAN MAILER FOR HIS BOOK, AND SUGGESTING THAT IT MAY BE TIME TO ASK AGAIN. WHILE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A HEADS-UP, AND NO OFFICIAL GUIDANCE HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED, HE PROMISED TO KEEP ACOS INFORMED IF SUCH A REQUEST DOES COME IN. IF HQS BELIEVES SUCH A LINE OF QUESTIONING IS APPROPRIATE, OLEAN CAN FOLLOW UP WITH JYVAPOROUS/3 IN LINE WITH PRIOR DISCUSSIONS ON LACK OF RECIPROCITY IN LIAISON RELATIONSHIP.

3. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

SECRET

104-10326-10087 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

/ / SECRET FRP: , , , , , , ,

STAFF

ACTION: LA/MCGMXB (373) INFO: C/ORMS, CIC/LA, LA/TERR, LADORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/LA, DC/LA (3/W)

94 8695408 ASR PAGE 001 IN 8695408
TOR: 022121Z DEC 94 MEXI 53620

SECRET 022120Z DEC 94 STAFF

CITE MEXICO CITY 53620 (NOWOCIN ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT LA/MCGMXB

SLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT

*SUBJECT: <JFK ASSASSINATION>ISSUES

REF: DIRECTOR 932873 94 8655988

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: NONE.

2. AS HQS IS AWARE, STATION CONTINUES TO CONDUCT JOINT TELTAP OPERATIONS WITH MEXICAN LIAISON AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AND CUBAN EMBASSIES; HOWEVER, THE TAKE ON THE CUBANS IS VERY LIMITED. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF INITIATING A UNILATERAL TELTAP OP AGAINST THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND SEVERAL RESIDENCES. THUS, ANY OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF WHERE TELTAP TAPES ON OSWALD WERE DERIVED WOULD HAVE DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON CURRENT LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. THE MEXICAN LIAISON SERVICES AND SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE RE THE NWBOLTON RELATIONSHIP, AND THERE ARE THOSE WITHIN THESE RANKS WHO QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE MEXICANS SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING MORE THAN A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WITH NWBOLTON. STATION BELIEVES THAT ANY EXPOSURE (WHETHER OLD OR NEW) AT THIS STAGE OF THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP (A NEW REGIME IS COMING TO POWER) WOULD FORCE THE MEXICANS TO REASSESS THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US AS WELL AS QUESTION OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A DISCREET AND PROTECTED RELATIONSHIP. (IT WOULD ALSO GIVE OUR DETRACTORS THE EXCUSE TO FURTHER REDUCE OR COMPLETELY BREAK OFF THE RELATIONSHIP.) GIVEN THE HIGH INTEREST OF POLICYMAKERS IN NARCOTRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN MEXICO, THE PRESERVATION OF STATION LIAISON EQUITIES IS PARAMOUNT AT THIS TIME. STATION ENCOURAGES HQS TO CONTINUE TO DO WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE TO KEEP THE LID ON THE BOX RE PREVIOUS JOINT OPS WITH THE MEXICANS.

3. RE THE NOC INVOLVED IN THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE TAPES,

SECRET

MHFNO: 94-8695408 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 2

STATION PLANS TO DISCREETLY CHECK CONSULAR FILES TO DETERMINE IF HE IS STILL RESIDING IN MEXICO. IF NOC IS IN MEXICO WILL QUERY HIM RE HIS REACTION TO FULLER DISCLOSURE OF HIS ROLE WITH THE TAPES. INITIAL STATION REACTION RE DISCLOSURE OF NOC'S INVOLVEMENT WITH OSWALD TAPES AND IMPACT ON STATION OPERATIONS AND EQUITIES IS NEGATIVE SINCE BLOWBACK POTENTIAL COULD BE TWOFOLD: IT COULD DRAW LIAISON ATTENTION TO POSSIBLE STATION USE OF NOCS IN MEXICO, AND LIAISON WOULD PROBABLY SCREEN MUCH CLOSER U.S. BUSINESSMEN TRAVELLING AND OPERATING IN MEXICO.

4. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

104-10326-10092 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SECRET

/ / SECRET FRP: ,2, , , , , ,

ADV: CE/R/IO (1613Z) STAFF

ACTION: CE/R/IO (479) INFO: C/ORMS, CEDORECORD, LIMITO, MDSX, ODPD, FILE,
CE/R, DC/CE (4/W)

93 4593421 ASP PAGE 001 IN 4593421
TOR: 191613Z NOV 93 MCOW 62359

S E C R E T 191610Z NOV 93 STAFF

CITE MOSCOW 62359

TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO ST PETERSBURG.

FOR: LIMIT CE/R/IO INFO C/CE/R, DC/CE

SLUGS: WNINTEL GTDANCER NQHAYWIRE

SUBJECT: 11 NOVEMBER 1993 MEETING WITH THE SVRR

REF: A. MOSCOW 62226 93 4516923
B. MOSCOW 62260 93 4536763
C. MOSCOW 62261 93 4536806

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUESTED: SEE PARAS FOUR AND FIVE. SEPARATE CABLE TRAFFIC CONTAINING SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ACTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO APPROPRIATE HQS ELEMENTS.

2. ON THE MORNING OF 11 NOVEMBER 1993, LEONID ((RYABCHENYA)), DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN LIAISON DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SVRR) TELEPHONED TO ARRANGE AN "URGENT" MEETING WITH COS. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT 1600 HOURS AT KOLPACHNIY PEREULOK. REFS CONTAIN STATION'S TRANSLATIONS OF THE ITEMS RYABCHENYA PASSED DURING THE MEETING (TEXT OF A LETTER TO THE DCI FROM PRIMAKOV CONTAINING HIS THOUGHTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE CURRENT PEACE PROCESS; A PAPER ON AID TO THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS; AND A PAPER ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA, RESPECTIVELY.)

3. RYABCHENYA ALSO RAISED THE NAME OLEG ((NECHIPORENKO)), RETIRED SENIOR KGB OFFICIAL. AS WE KNOW FROM PRESS ACCOUNTS, NECHIPORENKO'S BOOK, "PASSPORT TO ASSASSINATION" WHICH PROVIDES *NECHIPORENKO'S ACCOUNT OF<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY IS SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN MID-NOVEMBER. RYABCHENYA SAID THAT NECHIPORENKO IS PLANNING TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. ON BOOK PROMOTION TOUR. RYABCHENYA STATED THAT HE WAS BRINGING THE SUBJECT UP IN ORDER TO PUT ON RECORD THAT THE SVRR HAS NO CONNECTION TO THE BOOK, ITS CONTENTS, OR NECHIPORENKO'S TRAVEL. RYABCHENYA WAS ADAMANT THAT THE ENDEAVOR WAS "100 PERCENT PERSONAL."

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4. NEXT RYABCHENYA INQUIRED WHETHER ANY DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE WITH REGARD TO THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE ON YUGOSLAVIA. HE RECALLED THE NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS WERE TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN DECEMBER 1993 IN WASHINGTON. REQUEST HQS ELEMENTS INVOLVED ADVISE INTENTIONS FOR THE SCHEDULING OF THE NEXT EXCHANGE.

5. RYABCHENYA ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER PRESENTING THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. SCIENTISTS INVOLVED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL TASK FORCE EFFORT SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER 1993. HE REMINDED COS OF OUR PROMISE TO PROVIDE A COPY (A PROMISE MADE FIRST DURING THE VISIT OF THE ETF TEAM IN JULY AND LATER REPEATED BY THE DCI DURING HIS 9 AUGUST MEETING WITH SVRR LEADERSHIP). RYABCHENYA EXPLAINED THAT THE SVRR HAS HELD SOME MEETINGS WITH RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS AND IS WORKING ON A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS ON THIS SUBJECT. AFTER THEY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PAPER, THE SVRR WANTS TO MOVE FORWARD AND SCHEDULE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN SCIENTISTS. (AN EVENT MOTIVATING THE SVRR'S DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THIS INITIATIVE IS, OF COURSE, THE GORE/CHERNOMYRDIN MEETINGS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT MONTH.) REQUEST HQS PROVIDE A COPY OF THE UNCLASSIFIED PAPER BY THE MOST EXPEDITIONS MEANS POSSIBLE. LENGTH PERMITTING, SUGGEST USE OF SECURE FAX TO THE STATION.

5. FILE: 74A-002-001. DECL OADR DRV LIA 1-87.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

MHFNO: 92-7827323 SENSIND:

SECRET ERP: / / / /

/ /

STAFF

CONF: CIC/CEX-3 INFO: C/ORMO, CICEDC, CIDORECORD, DOCHRONO, DOOPS, MDSX, ODPD, ORMS/CI, FILE, C/CIC, CE/RBI, CED/CIC, CETF/W-5, CETF/W/BAL, CIC/CEG, CIC/CEI, CIC/CLFL, CIC/EOB, CIC/ISB, CIC/OG-4, CIC/PRB, CIC/TA, DC/CE, DC/CIC, DDO-2 (28/P)

92 7827323 ASR PAGE 001 TOT: 041754Z APR 92 DIRECTOR 324829

S E C R E T

STAFF 041754Z DIRECTOR 324829

TO: VILNIUS.

FROM: CIC/CEX INFO CIC/PRB, CETF/W/BAL.

SLUGS: WNINTEL TAZZACEX LWOPUS

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE RE KGB OFFER TO HOLLYWOOD

REF: A. DIRECTOR 283424 (92 7575137)
B. VILNIUS 10599 (92 7801082)
C. VILNIUS 10578 (92 7735236)

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: FYI.

2. FOLLOWING ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE 27 MARCH EDITION OF THE "WASHINGTON TIMES:"

"THE KGB SPIES WHO CAME IN FOR THE GOLD

"MOSCOW: ON THE 'STREET OF TRUTH,' RETIRED KGB SECRET AGENTS CAME TO TELL ALL.

"WITH NO HINT OF SHAME, THE COLD WAR SPY MASTERS SAID THEIR MEMOIRS CAN BE HAD FOR CASH--ON EVERYTHING
* FROM<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>TO KIM PHILBY AND THE SPY RING THAT STOLE THE SECRETS OF THE ATOM BOMB FROM AMERICA.

"'THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE WHO ENGAGE IN ESPIONAGE ARE VERY RICH IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE,' SAID ANATOLY PRIVALOV, VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KGB VETERANS OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE, OR FIVA, AS THE RUSSIANS CALL IT.

"MR. PRIVALOV AND THREE COLLEAGUES FROM THE ELITE OF KGB ESPIONAGE CAME NOT OUT OF THE COLD BUT OUT OF THE RAIN WEDNESDAY TO THE OFFICES OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA ON ULITSA PRAVDA (TRUTH STREET).

"THEY TOLD REPORTS OF THEIR PLANS TO ENTER THE CAPITALIST WORLD THAT THEY TRIED TO VERY HARD TO

UNDERMINE DURING THEIR CLOAK-AND-DAGGER DAYS.

"FEAR OF POVERTY HAD SPURRED THE RETIRED SPIES TO SIGN UP WITH THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM ENTERTAINMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS ASSOCIATION TO PEDDLE THEIR INSIDE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR FOR FILMS, MINISERIES AND DOCUDRAMAS.

"'DUE TO THE PRESENT CONFUSION IN OUR COUNTRY, MANY OF THE VETERANS ARE IN A VERY DIFFICULT (FINANCIAL) SITUATION,' MR. PRIVALOV SAID.

"OLEG NECHIPERENKO, A 25-YEAR KGB VETERAN, SAID HIS FORTHCOMING BOOK WILL GIVE DETAILS OF HIS TWO MEETINGS
* WITH<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>IN MEXICO CITY TWO MONTHS BEFORE
* OSWALD SHOT<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.>

"THE OSWALD MEETINGS TOOK PLACE SEPT. 27-28, 1963, ON THE INITIATIVE OF OSWALD, SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO, THEN KGB STATION CHIEF IN MEXICO CITY.

"'HIS MOOD WAS BAD,' SAID MR. NECHIPERENKO.

"BUT, HE TEASED, 'THE OSWALD HE MET IN MEXICO CITY WAS THE SAME ONE WHO WAS IN DALLAS.

"ANOTHER NECHIPERENKO TIDBIT: TWO OTHER KGB MEN WERE PRESENT AT THE INTERVIEW AND AN OPERATIVE IN MOSCOW WAS KEPT ABREAST OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

"EXHIBITING FAMILIARITY WITH OLIVER STONE'S MOVIE
* <'JFK,'>MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID HE WOULD AGREE WITH 'SOME OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF JAMES GARRISON,' BUT ONLY BASED ON THE FORMER NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S BOOK, NOT ON ANY EVIDENCE.

"IF HE HAD THE DOCUMENTS, MR. NECHIPERENKO SAID, HE COULD GIVE A BETTER VERDICT. OF COURSE, NO TALK OF SUCH
* AN<ASSASSINATION>TOOK PLACE IN MEXICO CITY AND THERE WAS NO ENCOURAGEMENT OF SUCH A DEED, HE SAID.

"MR. NECHIPERENKO HAS BEEN TROTTED OUT BEFORE BY THE KGB ALONG WITH YURI MODIN, THE HANDLER OF KIM PHILBY, THE BRITISH MASTER SPY WHO WORKED FOR THE SOVIETS. PHILBY DIED IN MOSCOW IN 1988.

"THE NEW FACE SHOWN WEDNESDAY WAS ANATOLY YAZKOV, CODE-NAMED 'YAKOVLEV' IN HIS WORLD WAR II YEARS IN AMERICA WHEN HE HELPED RUN THE SPY RING THAT GAVE JOSEF STALIN THE ATOM BOMB. IT WAS ONE OF THE MOST SUCCESSFUL ESPIONAGE PENETRATIONS IN HISTORY.

"BUT MR. YAZKOV, BEYOND ADMITTING THAT HE WORKED OUT OF THE RUSSIAN CONSULATE AT 7 E. 61ST ST. IN NEW YORK CITY, ACROSS FROM THE HOTEL PIERRE, WAS SINGULARLY

RETICENT.

"ASKED IF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG, WHO WERE EXECUTED IN 1953 FOR PASSING ATOMIC SECRETS, WERE INDEED GUILTY, MR. YAZKOV SAID HE PREFERRED 'NOT TO TALK ABOUT PEOPLE WHO TOOK PART IN THIS OR MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PART IN THIS.

"IT WAS NOT THE BEST ADVERTISEMENT FOR HIS FORTHCOMING WORK.

"WHEN ASKED IF HE MISSED THE COLD WAR, MR. YAZKOV REPLIED, 'THANK GOD THAT IT IS OVER.'

"UNCONTRITE, HE INSISTED HE WAS 'NOT SPYING AGAINST AMERICA, BUT IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN ORDER TO BALANCE THE TWO POWERS.'

"ABOUT 5,000 FORMER KGB OPERATIVES ARE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION.

"'WHEN A PERSON LEAVES HIS POST, HE IS LEFT ALL ALONE,' SAID MR. PRIVALOV, A 42-YEAR KGB VETERAN. 'SO IN ORDER THAT PEOPLE WILL NOT FEEL THEMSELVES ABANDONED, WE DECIDED TO UNITE AND TO ORGANIZE A CLUB WHERE VETERANS COULD COME TO RELAX, TO DRINK A BEER OR A WHISKEY, AS THE ASSOCIATION OF THE CIA DOES.

"INSTEAD OF FEELING SORRY FOR THEMSELVES, THE FORMER CLOAK-AND-DAGGER MEN WILL WORK ON A FILM ABOUT THE ATOM BOMB SPY RING; A TV MINISERIES ABOUT U.S. NAVY EMPLOYEE GLENN MICHAEL SOUTHER, A SOVIET SPY WHO COMMITTED SUICIDE IN MOSCOW IN 1989; AND A DOCUMENTARY ON OSWALD'S BIZARRE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB.

* "DOCUDRAMAS ON THE<ASSASSINATION>OF LEON TROTSKY AND THE CASE OF NATO OFFICIAL ROBERT LEE JOHNSON, KNOWN AS 'THE AMERICAN KIM PHILBY,' ARE ALSO PLANNED."

3. FOR THE RECORD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT SOME SIMILAR THREADS RUN THROUGH BOTH THIS ARTICLE AND THE LWOPUS CASE.

A. THE TIMING OF THE OFFER BY THE FIVA GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, 25 MARCH, FALLS DIRECTLY INTO THE MIDDLE OF THE WINDOW ESTABLISHED BY LWOPUS (24-26 MARCH). ALSO, LWOPUS NOTED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT GETTING THE MANUSCRIPT ACROSS THE LITHUANIAN BORDER, HE WOULD RESORT TO A RESERVE VARIANT BUT WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER PARTIES, I.E., HE WOULD APPROACH SOMEONE ELSE.

B. LWOPUS SENT A SAMPLE OF HIS WORK TO US NOT FOR PUBLICATION BUT FOR A CRITICAL READING. HE STATED THAT IF A PUBLISHING HOUSE SHOWED INTEREST IN HIS MANUSCRIPT, AGREEMENT

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COULD BE REACHED REGARDING JOINT ACTIONS AND MUTUAL LEGAL COMMITMENTS. ALTHOUGH MONETARY COMPENSATION IS IMPLIED, LWOPUS DOES NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC SUM, RATHER HE SUGGESTS THAT HE IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO SOME SORT OF CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT. THIS IS COMPATIBLE WITH WHAT THE FIVA GROUP APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING. THE FIVA GROUP STATES IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THEY NEED MONEY.

C. IN EACH CASE THERE APPEARS TO BE A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL. LWOPUS STATED THAT UP TO NOW HE HAS PREPARED SEVEN FOLDERS ON FOURTEEN COUNTRIES AND FORESEES WRITING 22-25 SMALL BOOKS OR EPISODES ON DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THE FIVA GROUP ALSO IMPLIES THAT A LARGE VOLUME OF MATERIAL EXISTS. LWOPUS CLAIMS THAT HIS WRITINGS WERE BASED ONLY ON DOCUMENTARY SOURCES. THE FIVA GROUP MAKES NO SUCH CLAIM, BUT IMPLIES THAT THEIR MATERIAL IS FROM PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

D. BASED UPON THE GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY OF THE MATERIAL AND THE TIME SPAN IT ENCOMPASSES, WE SUSPECT THE LWOPUS MANUSCRIPT MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT. IF IT IS NOT A JOINT EFFORT, COLLECTION MUST HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG TIME BY SOMEONE WITH EXCELLENT ACCESS TO ARCHIVAL MATERIAL. THE FIVA GROUP IS A COMMON EFFORT OF AT LEAST FOUR (AND PROBABLY MORE) RETIRED KGB OFFICERS.

E. LWOPUS NOTED THAT HE IS CONCERNED FOR HIS SAFETY AND THAT OF HIS FAMILY. HIS FAILURE TO SHOW AT THE EMBASSY IN VILNIUS DURING THE WINDOW MIGHT BE THE RESULT OF HIS CONCERN. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON STATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY ALERTED THE EMBASSY, INCLUDING THE LITHUANIAN FSN IN HIS OFFICE, THAT THEY SHOULD BE ALERT FOR THE RETURN OF THE LWOPUS MESSENGER. IF LWOPUS BECAME AWARE THAT THE LITHUANIAN EMPLOYEE HAD BEEN TOLD TO WATCH FOR THE MESSENGER, HE MAY HAVE ELECTED NOT TO RETURN. IN SUCH CASE, ASSUMING THAT YURASOV IS CONNECTED WITH THE FIVA GROUP, THEIR OFFER TO THE HOLLYWOOD FIRM MAY BE AN ALTERNATE PLAN.

F. IN EACH CASE, THE MATERIAL PRESENTED WOULD HAVE APPEAL FOR THE GROUP TO WHICH IT IS OFFERED, I.E., THE OFFER TO US OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED SNIPPETS REGARDING IN-PLACE AGENTS VS THE OFFER TO THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY OF THE MORE SPECTACULAR CASES THAT WOULD APPEAL TO A MASS AUDIENCE.

G. THE NAME OF YAZKOV (TRUE NAME ANATOLIY YAKOVLEV) IS SIMILAR TO YURASOV. ALTHOUGH IT IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE IN EVERY CASE, THE FORMER SOVIETS FREQUENTLY USED COVER NAMES SIMILAR TO OR WHICH HAD THE SAME FIRST LETTER AS THEIR OWN NAME.

H. LWOPUS IS OBVIOUSLY HEDGING HIS BETS. HE ALSO MENTIONED THAT HE HAD MADE TWO PREVIOUS UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS

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TO CONTACT US. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM EITHER OF THESE ATTEMPTS, IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE MANUSCRIPT HE PROVIDED TO US WAS A CARBON. BASED ON THE QUALITY, WE BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NOT CARBON NUMBER ONE.

4. WE ARE CURRENTLY CHECKING THE FILES OF THE FOUR FIVA OFFICERS TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEIR BACKGROUNDS MIGHT OFFER THEM ACCESS TO THE SAME INFORMATION THAT LWOPUS PROVIDED. WE ALSO PLAN TO COMPARE THE MATERIAL WE RECEIVED FROM LWOPUS TO SEE IF THE FILES OF THESE FOUR OFFICERS INDICATE THAT THEY HAD CONTACTS SIMILAR TO ANY OF THOSE MENTIONED IN THE LWOPUS MATERIAL. WE WILL ADVISE YOU OF THE RESULTS OF OUR RESEARCH.

5. WELCOME VILNIUS COMMENTS.

6. FILE: 201-1478016. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.>
ORIG: C/CIC/CEX (BORGRINK); COORD: C/CIC/CEG (ROBINSON), C/CIC/PRB (BANNERMAN), CETF/W/BAL (MILLER) ; AUTH: C/CIC/CEX (SANDERS); REL: C/CETF/W (MORRIS). CL BY 0710601.
END OF MESSAGE SECRET

104-10332-10009 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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OGC 78-3595
5-31-78

Executive Registry
78-8432/11

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

OLC 78-1012/8
30 May 1978 JUN 5 10 04 AM '78

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.

I

3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

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4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period, during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

II

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

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8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn it against the Agency on a point irrelevant to the central purpose of the inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant to its charter, but the Agency should also assert a similar right to defend itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

III

10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is, therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the Report's being made available.

11. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides a working basis for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report will remain classified.

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have access to it, which is at least three times the number needed for bona fide research purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

SECRET

that if the paper is withheld, and a court test results, the Agency must expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report. Such access shall be conditioned on agreement to limit use of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the question of Nosenko's bona fides.

S. D. Breckinridge

Attachments

CONCURRENCE:

SIGNED	31 MAY 1978
General Counsel	Date
Chief, SE Division	Date
Chief, CI Staff	Date
[signature]	1 JUN 1978
Director of Security	Date

APPROVAL: /s/ Frank C. Carlucci
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

DISAPPROVAL: ______
Director of Central Intelligence — Date

13-00000

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - C/SE Div
1 - C/CI Staff
1 - SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono
OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

13-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

C/C

11 March 1993

NOTE FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

FROM: Peter Earnest
Chief, Media Relations

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy assassination.

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a $250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday, 3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko who said he was satisfied with how the interview was conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxed me a list of the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves to use in checking out Nosenko's information. They asked if there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the individuals named. I told them that developing information in response to their questions would probably take a good deal of research and that I doubted the Agency would be able to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I said I would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone would be willing to undertake research on their questions, I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would be grateful for making such a person available even if

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them would be seen as a gesture of good will.

Peter Earnest

Attachment:
As stated

______Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is available.

______No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the Nosenko information.

13-00000

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest:ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)

Distribution:

Original	Addressee
1	ADDO
1	SA/DDO
1	DO Registry
1	D/PAI
1	D/DO/CIC
1	C/DO/NROC
1	C/DO/CE
1	C/CSI
1	C/History Staff

Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the JFK assassination:

1. General Oleg M. Gribanov, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh Department. Nosenko described himself as sort of favored by Gribanov and he said Gribanov instructed him, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right away.

2. Anatoliy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at time of JFK assassination. Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were going over the all-important first volume--and finding KGB had nothing to do with Oswald--when a KGB officer from the First Department came in and picked it up on Gribanov's orders, to review it and write a summary of it.

3. The officer who picked it up was Col. Matveev, deputy chief(I think) of First(or American) Department, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.

4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseev and presumably he would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the "spravka" or summary.

5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were kicked out because of Nosenko's defection, according to Nosenko. That right? *What happened?*

6. Maj. Georgi Rastrusin. Was in 1959 a senior case officer in KGB responsible for Intourist matters. Nosenko says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in Soviet Union. Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald "doesn't present interest" to KGB and Nosenko checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

7. Rastrusin returned next day and said we got a problem. Oswald tried to kill self, etc. KGB washed hands of him, decided to let Intourist deal with him. Intourist then part of Ministry of Foreign Trade. Nosenko said he believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that ministry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald stay in Minsk. But not, Nosenko says, by KGB.

8. In the fall of 1963, a KGB colleague, M. I. Turalin, Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Mexico City station had just sent a cable about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?

Nosenko said he said, 'wait a second. How come he's back in America?' At that point, Nosenko said he hadn't know Oswald had gone back.

9. Nosenko said he said let's go to chief of department who he identified as a Col. Chelnekov or Chelnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may have been chief of Nosenko's department at the time). In any case, Nosenko quoted chief as saying, in effect, 'I remember this crazy nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don't have any interest.'

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his own country and apply for a visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc., etc.

10. Col. Gruzdev, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners there.

11. Oleg Nechiporenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly interrogated or dealt with Oswald on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.

Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: Valeriy Kostikov and Pavel Yatzkov.

f. 6

3 March 1994

Memo to: C/HRG

Subject: Mangold Litigation

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/[redacted]) that the JFK collections contains a significant number of documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling the litigation, however, she was not familiar with the documents involved. She will consult with [redacted], the lawyer on the case, and get back to me.

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold or other consideration to address, we can do so after the HRG review is complete.

Barry

13-00000

9 March 94

Re: NOSENKO

Having Reviewed Box 45 — We note several Reports, not completely identified as to author.

(1) "Conclusions & Comments in the Case of Yuriy I. Nosenko" (dtd Oct 68) (The Solie Report) — 264 pgs.
(This is in BOX 45, FOLDER 8)
(It has been released in JFK) — JFK 62-F9
(It concludes NOSENKO is GOOD)

(2) "Case of Yuriy I Nosenko" (835 page study) dated February 1967

(No indication that it has been released)
(Believe it was prepared in SB (perhaps by Bagley — or perhaps with CI/STAFF)
(It concludes NOSENKO is BAD

(3) "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" — TS # 197124
(447 pages) dated FEBRUARY 1968

(This is found in ORIS BOX 62 JFK — FLD 9)
(It was released except for ANNEX A which is found in BOX 45 F. 23.

(It concludes ~~[illegible]~~ NOSENKO WAS NOT Bona fide.)
(Don't know author).

Jm)

13-00000

INTERNAL USE ONLY

23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG

Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from Kathy Kelly, OGC, this morning concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination story and the files are part of the sequestered collection, HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

Kathy Kelly said that the Mangold litigation should not be a factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act. When the review is complete, a list of the documents released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has protected the information provided by Nosenko on other Soviet sources and leads for possible recruitment. This type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and there was a large amount of information including parts of the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard copy collection. We have deleted information provided on other sources and operations not related to the JFK story. We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies. Although they contain potentially embarrassing information for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots), there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK Act.

5/94

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in declassifying material files pertaining to the career and "bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft. Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the Russian services continue to target Americans, this information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR) remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities. Russian intelligence services since the Second World War have tried to track their defectors. There are indications that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO case.

* o At the time of his arrest, Rick Ames had some NOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) in his possession. The US Counterintelligence Community is unsure if this material was passed to the Russian service.

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the United States, both were questionned by the Russian service about NOSENKO's activity and place and residence.

Legal position
C.I.

Mr. Robert Pringle
2909 Rock Manor Court
Herndon, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,

It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.
I am writing to confirm our recent conversation about the CIA's release of documents about me to the National Archives. As I explained to you at our meeting, I am very displeased that this was done without my knowledge and especially since my photograph was officially released by the Agency for the first time in thirty years.

As you know, it has come to my attention that the CIA released these many hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling me that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of these reports totalling more than 700 pages. One is the October 1968 report supporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 report by the CI Staff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report contains a copy of my photo from the late 1960s. I consider this a breach of my personal security.)
I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive cases which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now been seriously damaged.
This release particularly troubles me because for the past thirty years I have remained very loyal to the Agency and considerate of its wishes. For instance, despite many requests, I have only spoken to a few journalists, and only when the Agency advised me to do so. I have never sought

on my own to publish my story in an article or book. But now, the CIA has not returned this courtesy. Instead, it has released sensitive information to the public without speaking to me first.
Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the following:

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Director James Woolsey, and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and Historical Review staff -- so that they are aware of what has happened.

2. I would like to receive, in writing, an explanation from those responsible of why this release was done.

3. I would like to receive a list of the major reports about me which have already been released. Aside from the two reports that I already have seen, I would like to receive copies of any other major studies that have been released. (For instance, if there are reports released by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff and John Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like to be given the Agency's written assurance that further releases will not occur without consulting me first.

Bob, you should know that before I wrote this letter I have spoken about this matter with my good friend George Kalaris. He too was troubled by what I told him, and he advised me that I should ask the Agency for an explanation.
Bob, I apologize for troubling you with this matter, but I have no one else to turn to for assistance.
Please let me know if there is any response as soon as possible.

Respectfully yours,

13-00000

Secret

Draft letter to Nosenko from the DDO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Dear ,

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter expressing concern that US Government declassification of material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have already been released, rest assured that I have directed officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care in reviewing information concerning you in light of your special circumstances. We will make full use of all possible ~~exceptions~~ exemptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in order to protect your privacy.

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required all US Government agencies to release any records related to the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern about the files on you that are related to the assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer in the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's ~~historical staff~~ Historical Review Group who are involved in the declassification program. This officer has had extensive discussions with members of the ~~staff~~ Group and has worked closely with them to identify those portions of the files that include personal and operational information.

As a result of this effort, we have ~~postponed release of any~~ taken special care to protect all sensitive information touching on your private life or on operational information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK law, a Presidential Review Board will make the final decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we will present the Board with the strongest possible case for protecting information that could affect your privacy and security.

Best wishes,

Secret

13-00000

17 April 1997

Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825, 2 soft files entitled:

1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"

2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by Al Bonner in the vault.

[signature] 17-APRIL-97

Received

GARY M. BRENNEMAN

13-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft (or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date from the Warren Commission period, or were created in 1975/76 (latest date of documents) in response to a request or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection (OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is not indexed document by document).

13-00000

30 April 1997

Note for the Record

Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised Sue Amiano, SA/CIC, that most of the documents in the two folders are duplicates of documents in the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald. These documents are probably duplicated in the Nosenko material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to Michelle Combs, ARRB staff, on her next visit.

Barry

SECRET

f.16

TO: Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY: 2034442
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. I am CIC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such information to the maximum extent possible. If I can be of help in that regard just let me know. Jim

From the Desk of Dennis D. Lamb

NOTE FOR: *Ron L. Seckinger*
FROM: *Dennis D. Lamb*
DATE: *07/31/97 10:44:28*
SUBJECT: *The Nosenko Papers*

CL BY: 0790429
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, I received a call from Eileen Wukitch of the Agency's External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) on 5 August. Wukitch said Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is taking. I said yes. Wukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns in explaining our position to the ARRB.

1. Is Nosenko married? (No one in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? (This is known, but I can't see why she or the ARRB needs to know.)

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4. Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

SECRET

According to Wukitch, Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair: the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible would be done to prevent further release of his papers. I don't see any problem with this since the papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the letters also.

Wukitch said she told Combs CIC would have Bob Pringle, former Chief of AG/FIOB currently serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. Wukitch noted that Combs alluded to the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

CC:

CC: John B. ENGBERT, Nancy T. BRUNONE, Edgar C. BAUML, Dennis D. Lamb, Curtis L. MACKIAN, Jacqueline Frankfort @ DCI, Ron L. Seckinger

13-00000

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

August 5, 1997

To: T. Jeremy Gunn

From: Michelle Combs

Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

I have prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as "NBR." These NBR records consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the extent this is correct, we should process them as "NBRs."

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His case became the single most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency's history to date. Nosenko's information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

13-00000

December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko's bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn's world view. Golitsyn argued that any CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko's first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley) who met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko's bona fides, plans were made in March 1964, to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then in a specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three years of severe treatment, Nosenko's original story remained unchanged, no "confession" was forthcoming, and no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko's information, to date, and concluded that he was what and who he had claimed to be all along. After a review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

13-00000

In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the Sunbelt.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

13-00000

6 October 1997

Note To: DO

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK sequestered collection as "not believed to be relevant" (NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a description of all NBRs to be made available to the public. Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions, call me on 31825. Thanks.

BH
Barry

Per phone call from Dennis Lamb 8 Oct 97 1:30+ p.m CIC has no problem with attached description of Nosenko files.

BH

13-00000

Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8A and B

Folder 8A contains the 263 page "Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" by Peter Bagley. It records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko's biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

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This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief, SR/CI on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper analyzing Nosenko's sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

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MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts, memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800 contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities, and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko's early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko's bona fides. The October 1968 Solie Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the JFK Act, establishes Nosenko's bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released, which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and identified for processing and review.

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Board Focal Point

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997

REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:

1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010, please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. State cover

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting. I recommend that you review the material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other components that should be consulted on this issue? Sue Burggraf was involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is a long standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

CC: John Pereira @ DCI
Eileen Wukitch @ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

FAX Rec'd TODAY 10/31/97 Re NOSENKO

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

SECRET

28 October 1997

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

NB

1. The Board intends to declassify and release for public consumption, approximately 2400 pages of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency, even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price, in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko's private life or on operational information pertaining to his debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would be made to protect information that could affect his privacy and security. The question has been asked before. Should we not show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high intelligence value has always been this Agency's top priority. Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the USG would cause any potential source to think twice before placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr. Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past, entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

CL BY 0489514
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV DEF 2-82

SECRET

13-00000

SUBJECT:

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously erodes this Agency's credibility and undermines our Resettlement Program.

13-00000

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 5-82

5 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: 17 November JFK Board Meeting-- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:

1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:

- (S) Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton, Va. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the Agency has been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

- Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR (Not Believed Relevant) material from the 2017 per the JFK Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with the Board on this issue and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency opposes the 2010 change in the date, I will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010 date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as 2017 to review and appeal the release of the records. I have ask OGC for a legal opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be Assassination Records (AR) will be re-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the coming year.

- (S) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under "integrated State cover".

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated with State and copy of MOA between CIA and State). According to the ARRB staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover as an "open secret" and are inclined to release. We have been offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

13-00000

- Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR. Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. If you have any comments or objections, please forward them to me by COB Wednesday.

- Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

(S) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Warrenton and/or State Cover. Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the material and prepare their presentations for the Board.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Becky Rant @ DA

13-00000

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
Linda Cipriani @ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results

REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of Warrenton as CIA Records Center:

The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.

2. CIA use of State Cover:

The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.

This determination affects 16 documents (3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsideration/appeal review.

3. Release date of Nosenko NBR records:

The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal at that time.

4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. *Ramparts* Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant

13-00000

organization be processed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA *Ramparts* Memorandum be declared NBR. The memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in *Ramparts* the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the *Ramparts* article. The relevant organization is the International Rescue Committee; the IRC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists:

The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain stations that are releasable.

7. Document # 104-10072-10232:

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (LINLUCK). The document has been sent to the DO for reconsideration/appeal review.

8. Other Documents:

The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents.

Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register on that date. As mandated by the White House, the Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

13-00000

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
OFFICE:
DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records

I have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While I see this as a success to have them support our position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. I think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy Act.

I trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and classification but I just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. I will not object to the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NBR information, I would like to see less detail in the description if at all possible.

CC: Eileen M. Wukitch @ DO, Lee E. Carle Y @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM

Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE

Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

****

CLASSIFIED FAX

SUBJECT: Nosenko

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson

SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060

DELIVER TO: Dennis Quinn

RECEIVING FAX NO. 893-4346

DATE TRANSMITTED: 10/10 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 7
(including cover sheet)

TRANSMITTED BY: [signature]

****

MESSAGE:

Classification of Material Transmitted

MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: Michelle Combs MC

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

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NBR Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko's bona fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions which cover Nosenko's family, background, early career, and Komsomol experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then current) incarceration by the CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko's military career, KGB buildings, personalities and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division (C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR's belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn's comments on inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko's testimony and his recommendations for further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" written by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin's conclusions on Nosenko's bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

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This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter Deryabin which covers Nosenko's career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the transcript is also included in this folder.

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Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4

13-00000

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 22, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director

cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs *Michelle Combs*
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not Believed Relevant to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages of material on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA sequestered collection microfilm unrelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on Nosenko produced as a result of the search for records related to the Kennedy assassination. This material either duplicates or is the original copy of the sequestered collection microfilm material previously declared NBR. For example, many of the original tapes from which transcripts were produced are found in the working files. The Board previously declared the transcripts, which are found in the sequestered collection microfilm, to be NBR. The files contain no new material which would add to the understanding of the Nosenko story.

I recommend that the Board declare the contents of the two boxes of working files on Nosenko to be NBR.

e:\combs\nbr\nosenko.wpd
File 2.4, 4.0.2, and 4.20.5

CI-277-94
31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) at the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current CIA independent contractor--Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The documents are being reviewed for declassification and release as required by the JFK law.

2. The Declassification Problem: CSI's declassification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations officer--is representing the DO in the review process. Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two parts:

- Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's information about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union and his relationship with the KGB.

- A body of counterintelligence staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain sensitive personal and operational material. For example:

  -- Information on how CIA conducted operations in Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
DRV HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases) and on Americans Moscow Station used as assets. One US citizen the KGB developed is now a senior professor of history in California.

3. **Nosenko's Sensitivities:** I discussed with Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release of information on his personal life. I informed her of Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the release of material related to his association with CIA, and of his concern that future releases would endanger his privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great detail on Nosenko's personal life, including his problems with venereal disease and his relationships with women. Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man who has served as a CIA employee for more than three decades.

4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended that CIA move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy--strongly suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He told me in closing that later this year the Agency would have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center and said I believed we could provide the justification.

Robert Pringle

13-00000

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

CONCUR:

/s/
John Pereira (AD/CSI) — 2 Sept 94 (Date)

/s/
Barry Harrelson (CSI) — 2 Sept 94 (Date)

/s/
Ellie Neiman — 6 Sept 94 (Date)

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94)

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG
1 - AD/CSI
1 - CSI (Harrelson)
1 - Neiman
1 - C/CIC Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Chrono
1 - CIC/AG Defector File

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V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS ON AUGUST 9, 1978

INTRODUCTION

Having heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who believed him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official who had overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko during the years 1964–67, when Nosenko was kept in solitary confinement. Among other things, he was asked about the reason Nosenko was placed in solitary confinement, about why he questioned Nosenko's credibility, and about Nosenko's charge that his statements to the Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the Agency. Portions of that transcript follow.

Excerpts of Deposition of David Murphy Before House Select Committee on Assassinations on August 9, 1978

Mr. Klein. When Nosenko defected in 1964, when he came to the United States, was he in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?

Mr. Murphy. I don't want to be cute by saying I believe so. I am not exactly sure of the legal—I mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts, he was in the custody of the IC.

Mr. Klein. What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. The Soviet Russian Division.

Mr. Klein. Of which you were the Chief?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And what year did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. Murphy. Beginning in 1968.

Mr. Klein. And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have primary responsibility for Nosenko?

Mr. Murphy. I don't recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the spring of 1967.

Mr. Klein. The investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet Russia Division to another division?

Mr. Murphy. My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which Solie was a member.

Mr. Klein. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Mr. Murphy. I was responsible for the case.

Mr. Klein. OK.

Mr. Murphy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the Division.

Mr. Klein. But they would report to you?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Klein. There came a time in 1964, April 4, I believe, when the treatment received by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. Murphy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.

Mr. Klein. Well, elaborate.

Mr. Murphy. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to decide when he would or would not want to respond.

Mr. Klein. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as conditions and how it was changed?

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Mr. MURPHY. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting Nosenko to call the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was not to sit still for a full day's briefing, to want to go out socially all the time, which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsistencies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr. KLEIN. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. MURPHY. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to depart.

Mr. KLEIN. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interrogation sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. MURPHY. I don't think so, not that early. I don't remember that.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko was interrogated by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

Mr. MURPHY. That is right.

Mr. KLEIN. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated chosen?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure. I don't know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that. In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this. And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to possession of information in the hands of the interrogators which then offered the best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other breakthroughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a factor of the tactics of the debriefing.

Mr. KLEIN. Would it be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. MURPHY. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, made no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his statements were not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as valid any data he might provide unless you could be sure that that data was in fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the motivation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the information was not considered acceptable.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February or March.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall now the substance of it?

Mr. MURPHY. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the affair. There is more detail, but I can't really pin it down.

Mr. KLEIN. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959 in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think, that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it seemed to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on or to have been added as though it didn't seem to be part of the real body of

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the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand that Nosenko was—much of what he said was true.

Mr. KLEIN. You are talking about other areas?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there and all that sort of thing. That is what I mean.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept in Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, that they just—this is part of the first one—no contact was ever made, that he went up to Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact. The Soviet Union with foreigners don't do that. I mean, he is the only person. Read the accounts of what happened to this poor gentleman, what happened to Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of the American Embassy. It didn't seem to be possible.

Now, again, that does not constitute proof, doesn't constitute any breakthrough. It seemed to me to be strange.

Mr. KLEIN. Would you distinguish between first the fact that nobody debriefed Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he knew as a marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they decided to allow him to stay, nobody debriefed him to find out if he was some kind of a Western security agent or working for CIA?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, they would be two different points. The first point clearly involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet what did the blips look like. I don't think they had many American radar operators handling operational traffic involving U-2's.

Mr. KLEIN. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him, and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he worked at the base from which the U-2's took off and landed?

Mr. MURPHY. I think it would be strange.

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector, there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the outfit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn't require that he be known to have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a—they would talk to him about his military affiliation just as we would.

I realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don't believe they are. I think they are very, very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Americans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a private in the East German Border Guards, period. The GRU would be interested in talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all. I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it.

Yuri may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to believe.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko's statements about Oswald?

Mr. MURPHY. And other things.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald was?

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Mr. MURPHY. I honestly couldn't find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this case, were handling it directly. I don't know of any former Soviet intelligence officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. KLEIN. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. MURPHY. Probaby not.

Mr. KLEIN. Why would that have been?

Mr. MURPHY. Because there were many other areas which posed equally interesting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously is not easy for us to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. KLEIN. Who in the Soviet Russia division made the decision as to who would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. MURPHY. [CIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you know of any criteria that he used to pick his interrogators?

Mr. MURPHY. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko's English was not good, the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the first place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is liable to go back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don't want to expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available and there were a variety of criteria.

Mr. KLEIN. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn't know anything about Oswald's background or really about Oswald at all. Is there any reason that such a person would be used that you can tell us?

Mr. MURPHY. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had, he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations. I wasn't sure of the point he didn't know about Oswald. I am not sure very many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. KLEIN. Two points——

Mr. MURPHY. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was levelheaded, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. KLEIN. But wouldn't——

Mr. MURPHY. I don't know that he didn't, that he wasn't what you are saying, he knew nothing at all about Oswald's case. I find that difficult to believe. But I don't know.

Mr. KLEIN. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that they would not, if they didn't have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn't do that?

Mr. MURPHY. I would certainly think so.

Mr. KLEIN. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that, it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would that be——

Mr. MURPHY. That wouldn't surprise me because there were very few people, relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debriefings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad,

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might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange. There just wasn't squads and squads of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI experienced interrogators.

Mr. KLEIN. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a number of tapes, and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English, there was no Russian.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major operation in the Bureau in 1964?

Mr. MURPHY. It was an important operation, an important case.

Mr. KLEIN. And yet there was nobody with interrogation experience who could be used to interrogate him?

Mr. MURPHY. I am sure some of the people had interrogation experience. I mean [CIA employee] himself had a lot of background in this field. I can't explain why the officer who debriefed him on Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald except what I mentioned to you the other day, because it was not a thing that we thought we were going to get through on, because we were weak in that area at that time.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

Mr. MURPHY. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. KLEIN. Were there ever any conversations in which you took part about whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?

Mr. MURPHY. There were many, many conversations all the time about various things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, to get him to talk, but as far as I know and in discussions with the medical officer who handled the case, there was never any decision made or any attempt made to use these, because none of them appeared to be likely to produce results and they all would be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results.

Mr. KLEIN. Between 1964 and 1967 when you lost control over the case, in those years, it is your statement that if any drugs were given to him, to get him to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr. MURPHY. That is correct.

* * * * * * *

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that Nosenko was given a lie detector test in 1964, in April?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. It indicated he was lying on several key points.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Mr. KLEIN. Are you aware that he was given a second lie detector test in 1966?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. Do you know the result of that test?

Mr. MURPHY. Same thing.

Mr. KLEIN. And do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the same operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. KLEIN. That is correct.

V. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In a further effort to clear up the facts surrounding Nosenko's claims that his statements to the CIA should not be used to impeach his present testimony, the committee took depositions from FBI and CIA agents who were present during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20, AND 21, 1978

VOLUME III

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I have read the foregoing pages one through sixty-six, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded. Signature is subject to corrections.

/S/Nicholas Katzenbach

rchigiani, Notary Public in and for the do hereby certify that I am notarizing re for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas th day of February 1979.

/S/Flora A. Marchigiani
Notary Public in and for the
County of Westchester
State of New York

On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504

September 25, 1978

The Honorable Louis Stokes
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While

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this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell
Hon. Richard C. Helms
Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.

13-00000

On September 25, 1975, Mr. Katzenb...
...h my recollection and therefore would not
...seem to me that in fairness to both the
...hould make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

Nicholas deB Katzenbach

...s, Esq.

Thursday, April 2, 1964

Harold Reis)		9:35 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum)	Civil	9:35 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan)	Rights	9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff)	briefing	9:35 a.m.	SAW
John Douglas)		9:35 a.m.	SAW
Jack Rosenthal)		9:35 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall)		9:35 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		11:55 a.m.	SAW
William Foley		12:27 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		1:50 p.m.	SAW
Marshal McShane		2:37 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		3:10 p.m.	SAW
William Geoghegan		3:25 p.m.	SAW
Edgar Cahn, O.L.C.		3:30 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		3:32 p.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall		4:07 p.m.	SAW
[Lawrence Houston, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[David Murphy, CIA		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div.		4:08 p.m.	SAW
[Defector Case]			
Addressed Brandeis Univ. Students (40) in AG's office		4:40 p.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum		6:45 p.m.	SAW
John Douglas		6:56 p.m.	SAW
William Orrick		7:06 p.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff		7:12 p.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan		7:15 p.m.	SAW

Friday, April 3, 1964

John Duffner (White Motor)		9:15 a.m.	SAW
Sol Lindenbaum)		9:30 a.m.	SAW
Harold Reis)	Civil	9:30 a.m.	SAW
David Filvaroff)	Rights	9:30 a.m.	SAW
Burke Marshall)	briefing	9:30 a.m	SAW
Jack Rosenthal)		9:30 a.m.	SAW
Joseph Dolan)		9:30 a m.	SAW
NdeBK to Puerto Rico		10:15 a.m.	

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INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 22, 25, AND 26, 1978

VOLUME IV

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have a say in what happens with respect
ertainly was involved with decisions on
to end, but I was not the controlling

re were three major agency reports that
the Nosenko case; specifically there was
by the Soviet Russia Division, another
l the Office of Security report, and then a
red to as the Hart report.
ether you are familiar with all three of

ll any longer whether I read the first two
riefed on their contents. The Hart report
the agency in early February 1973 and I
onnections with it since.
ing his defection in 1964 and upon his
tes was Yuri Nosenko in the custody of

I missed the question.
s asking precisely during his defection in
in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko

. That was an accepted procedure under
eragency Defector Committee that defec-
intry were handled by the CIA, through
esettling period, whatever had to be done

iat the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dulge me.
nly.
go, on September 20, 1978, I received a
before this committee in executive ses-
reviewing that transcript I noted that,
er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko's
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of
is an area of obvious interest to the
take this opportunity to describe my
t greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen-
entral Intelligence Agency was.
a lawyer nor a judge, so I was not
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko's tenure
e Agency. I'm sorry, I am not prepared.
Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko re-
ed to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko's
npanied by a claim that he could give a
ee Harvey Oswald's contacts in connec-
Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be-

e the significance that Yuri Nosenko's
ivestigation of President Kennedy's as-
turned out to be a bona fide defector, if

this information were to be believed, then we could conclude that the KGB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey Oswald in 1963 and therefore had nothing to do with President Kennedy's murder.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Nosenko had been programed in advance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information about Oswald's contacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November 1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy.

If it were shown that Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to the United States of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to this Government to determine the bona fides of Mr. Yuri Nosenko. Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end of March it was clear to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosenko's credibility would not be easy.

On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along with David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General of the United States; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department; Mr. William E. Foley, who was then Mr. Yeagley's First Assistant in the Internal Security Division; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department.

The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach's office in the Justice Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosenko's legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency's ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.

The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting on April 2, 1964, and a second memorandum which reflects the substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day, April 3, 1964. These documents were in part declassified by the Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part of the record of these proceedings.

During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice was fully informed of Mr. Nosenko's status with the Agency and the Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.

As Mr. Houston's memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko's technical status in the United States was one of "exclusion and parole," which means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had also temporarily "paroled him" to the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it was determined whether Mr. Nosenko should be deported or whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

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statement of some employee or something. He was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposed to be the most familiar with it since he had reviewed it for the CIA.

He stated in substance, Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material. The guards were instructed neither to talk to him or smile to him. He was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there under the equivalent of some 3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be specific, at which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go.

And then they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that. Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK, that this would be legal.

And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I don't imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you would not rather clearly remember the incident if it had occurred.

Mr. KATZENBACH. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, I would recollect it, I am certain; and I would hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed.

Mr. SAYWER. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Having heard Mr. Katzenbach's testimony of yesterday, can you reconcile his testimony to this committee with your statement just read to this committee?

Mr. HELMS. I can only say, Mr. Stokes, that it is very hard to reconcile. I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the meeting is something he was not responsible for as far as I am aware.

Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr. Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel of CIA, wrote on April 3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opinion of the Justice representatives on what we could do to control the situation. I pointed out that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more technically, deferment and parole.

Paragraph 2:

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representatives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr. Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley later confirmed this position by telephone.

I in turn, after the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an interpretation thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto. Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel.

The attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It is signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memorandum for the director of security. That would be the officer who was the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:

On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status of aliens whose inspection by INS—

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ABC NEWS

SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)

August 27, 1993

Transcript # 1337

TYPE: Show; Show

SECTION: News; Domestic

LENGTH: 8240 words

HEADLINE: Case Closed

GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attorney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr. PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent; ROBERT OSWALD, Brother

HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports on a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.

BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I'm Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end the controversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - 'Case Closed.'

And-

SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: [sp?] Who is equipped to think of dying in your 20's or 30's?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are, the harder it is to detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography can have an error rate of up to 40 percent in young women versus a rate of less than 15 percent in older women.

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ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Today, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

'ALEX,' Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30 years of my life, I feel alive.

ANNOUNCER: -but in the gay community, backlash.

GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they 'Born or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

[Commercial break]

Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this week when more than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event continues to haunt us all.

The fact is a majority of Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

[voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you'll want to see Lynn Sherr's report now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: [voice-over] No period in an American presidency has been as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's life.

1st NEWSCASTER: [?] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph, medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

MAN: [?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead. Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far too convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attorney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly [sp?], One bullet missed, struck the curb.

SHERR: [voice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission was wrong, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands of documents in the vaults of the CIA, the DI [?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see - the cover-up is continuing.

SHERR: [voice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him directly to the only person who could possibly have shot the President.

GERALD POSNER, Author, 'Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy, acting alone.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win over many conspiracy buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Most people who have written conspiracy books started with their conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they went around to prove that case.

SHERR: [voice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is overlooked by most experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the shot and

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turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had over eight seconds, not five, for the next two.

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last year.

SHERR: [voice-over] This is the so-called 'magic bullet' that seemed to zigzag through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no magic. Because of the way the two men were lined up, this bullet passed directly through them. It turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist - no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with no flaws on it, really, whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged so clean because that it went through Kennedy, it slowed up. When it went through Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist, which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of its speed - fast enough to crush the bone, but not fast enough to deform the bullet.

SHERR: [voice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many to believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it to move back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn't fall forward. I think you'd have to fall backwards or aside.

SHERR: Because?

Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

2nd NEWSCASTER: [?] At approximately one o'clock, the President is dead. The doctors were working too frantically to revive him to notice the exact moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy sometime standing next to him.

Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and she was just holding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car came to Parkland. Bad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential limousine and its passengers, Posner sought to show where in Dealey Plaza, the shots came from.

Mr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's sixth-floor window is right in the center of it.

Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going to hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-

Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there, and they testified, and two-thirds of them said they know shots came from the wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What about that reported fourth shot fired from the grassy knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles [sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't hear any.

[interviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle slowing down, see?

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select Committee's tape?

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Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot at all, even, to hear.

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings, that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.

3rd NEWSCASTER: [?] Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-organized crime connection? Clearly, there was a connection there.

Mr. POSNER: No question. As a matter of fact, I think the Warren Commission underplayed Jack Ruby's organized crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their behalf to wipe out Oswald?

Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would erase the stain and the stigma attached to the city that had been done by the President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself, a lone-gunman theory once again?

Mr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: [voice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy theories about the assassination.

ROBERT F. KENNEDY: Did you say, 'That S.O.B., I'll break his back'?

JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the 'who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or '63, sat at a

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table with some of its key henchman, and discussed killing President Kennedy. They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for him to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have some reason to knock off Kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved, and there is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it's a disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled on the American public. Here was a man who knew better. I think his behavior actually crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that I can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Oswald for day in and day out for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB? After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.

Mr. POSNER: A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA's possible list of targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: [sp?] I do not think that Oswald will be trusted by any intelligence.

SHERR: [voice-over] Uri Nosenko is someone who might know. Before defecting to the United States in 1963, Nosenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face.

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: [voice-over] But unlike Posner, Nosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald could have shot the President for a very simple reason.

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Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would you believe it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a long distance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds.

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald was like with a gun, his brother who used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run, okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.

SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald says his younger brother was always interested in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 16.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he usually got his game.

SHERR: [voice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald, a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something.

MAN: [?] Lee Harvey Oswald, O, S, W, A, L, D.

REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: [voice-over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why did he kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was to be almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three days before Kennedy arrives in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass in front of the Depository. It's not ideology, it's not because he's Communist, but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes so, but out experience is that people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.

SHERR: -which is where it took place-

WALTERS: Yeah.

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SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERR: -than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERR: Right.

WALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses who have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded that day.

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more to come. Is that going to settle anything?

SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree - unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even so, this is going to be argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer only attacks women over the age of 50.

[voice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are discovering they have a special battle to fight. What should you know? After this.

[Commercial break]

It Could Happen to You

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer in younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

[voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnson reports, if you are under 40, much of what you previous learned about the disease may not apply to you.

TERESA ROBERSON, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they turned out to be cysts. But I knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in my family, so I was very surprised.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to have breast cancer, and I thought they were right.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: [voice-over] A disease they thought they were too young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

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Chicago Tribune

October 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION

SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 1; ZONE: C

LENGTH: 1949 words

HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY;
GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:

The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a Turkish restaurant near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting him.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there to meet George and his wife, as he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 and now lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and Nosenko had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nosenko had suggested that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of two couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the KGB files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period of Oswald's life."

A chapter in Posner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nosenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald to be Kennedy's assassin, acting alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a sociopath and loser who had grandiose notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people. If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and what wasn't.

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Chicago Tribune, October 3, 1993

Poking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was garbage on the record. I didn't know how much."

After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation, perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bob Loomis, his editor at Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

"I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was overwhelming," he said.

Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

"Bob told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren Commission was right," Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest, best-informed, best-educated people in New York City, and no one raised a hand except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. "When people cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90 percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a conspiracy, I say I'm surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

'JFK' an 'abomination'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that 2,000 books, including those that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a handful present a variety of sometimes-elaborate scenarios about plotters, motives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make bestseller lists, while the others don't.

"Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy," Posner said. "A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment called 'The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' "

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie, "JFK," released in late 1991.

"Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1963. Stone's movie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, 'Well, Stone may have exaggerated, but there's got to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's not."

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What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty, and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was a "counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren Commission.

The no-longer magic bullet

Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK," Posner noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas Gov. John Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in midair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy and Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots. More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match ballistically with remnants of the other rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was a coincidence, so you're off and running with a conspiracy."

Posner's account of Ruby's life and his actions during the assassination week demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in its anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's list of Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes: "Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke, layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee Harvey Oswald." It quotes Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon: "The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up to conspiracy theories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is "utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of all that has transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes of his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of lawyers. He said, 'Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.' "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley, where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm, leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding in South America.

"It was a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German government," Posner said. "Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000 documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was published in 1986, prompting Posner to leave the law and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. "A weakness of mine is that I tend to underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go into detail in exposing these cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the 1978 investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

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"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radio traffic on Dallas police channels and said they were 95 percent certain there had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting, Posner said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulous examination of Oswald's entire life, culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two months before the assassination. "Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald. But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said. "It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a patsy.

"My technique was to go to original sources. Too many books quote secondary sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is disseminated again and again, becoming fact.

"Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC
PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles Cherney.

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE-MDC: December 7, 1993

ESG 95-02
14 July 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

1. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to maintain protection of this information.

2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record. These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets. We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.

3. We also agree to release of the following:

A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees, and file numbers.

CL BY 524343
DECL OADR
DRV COV 2-87

SUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination Records

B. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO).

C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym LIENVOY.
This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activity from different perspectives. Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect.

4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and informed that their name is being considered for release. This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations. We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

September 11, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

ARRB Attendees: Marwell, Gunn, Mary + one
CIA Attendees : Barry, Ellie

Issue: Inconsistency between Mexico City Chrono item #132 and ARRB document #31

Gunn proposed that the Agency release the information in document 31 that was released by mistake in the Mexico City Chrono. Otherwise, the staff would have to take the document back to the ARRB for reconsideration which they felt would undercut the credibility of the CIA and the staff. The Board will not uphold a postponement in a specific document if that information is released by mistake in another copy of the same document.

Ellie's response - because the information deals with Mex. liaison, she will have to take their proposal to a higher level. [response needed by 16 September]

They also requested a "new" highlighted version of the Mexico City Chrono which reflects all information released to NARA in the multiple copies of the Chrono and in the documents referenced in the Chrono.

Issue: The three documents of concern.

GIBSON - Ellie reviewed the Gibson issues--the fact that he had denied in court his affiliation with the CIA, etc. I noted that since the document would not be included in the determination list would the Board be willing to reconsider.

Marwell said that we could make an addition pitch to the Board to reconsider, but he did not think it would have any effect on their decision.

PROENZA - Ellie explained that out goal here was to protect the "asset" not the method and that the deletions could be reduced to those words that could result in the identification of the agent.

Marwell said that the Board may reconsider based on the need to protect a source.

Mary ask who was the asset? Was it LIRING?
Ellie said she did not know (it could have been some "AM" source.

Mary ask for more information on LIRING.

"PRIVATE LINE TAP" - According the Marwell, the Board considered the issue of the "private lines" but since the paragraph dealt with Oswald, voted to release. Mary said is was hard to defend the individual released since she did not have any information on the person.

We pointed out that the this release impacted on other documents which dealt with private line taps plus the Board had not limited its release to the paragraph that mentioned Oswald but released the name in other calls which had nothing to do with Oswald.

Marwell said the Board may re-look at the document as part of looking at similar documents.

The issue of the taps on other Bloc embassies came up. Mary said the Board was inclined to release given the end of the Cold War.

[Note: we will locate as many of the "private line tap" documents we can for special review]

Issue: Removing the Proenza and Private line tap documents form the formal notification list

Marwell clearly prefers not to do it at this time (said they would discuss). Has no problem with asking the Board to reconsider or giving us the opportunity to presence additional evidence since their next meeting was within the 30 days set by the law, but felt that the Board was not inclined to keep tabling documents that they had reached a decision on.

Marwell asked if the Agency plans to "appeal"; he would like a heads-up.

<u>Later, in private, Marwell said that he wanted to build into the process a loop that would handle these types of situations.</u>

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that **"STATIONS"** would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s,

references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try a avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship; when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories did not go over well and neither did Bill McNair. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law.

SECRET

September 12, 1995
WORKING PAPER

Notes from meeting w/ ARRB staff Sept. 11, 1995

Issue: Presentation to Board at Sept. 20/21 meeting

It was agreed that "**STATIONS**" would be the focus of the presentation -- 10:00 am, 20 Sept., one hour.

Marwell recommended providing evidence of bilateral agreements as well as identifying current harm. Said that the Board was leaning strongly toward releasing stations, particularly those in Europe.

Mary pointed out that there were still issues on the Mexico City station window. There are documents from the 50s, references in summaries to the founding of the station and, most important, the visit by the HSCA to Mexico City.

Ellie said there was the possibility of opening windows of stations when Oswald was present, however, this was a key issue for the Agency and a senior Directorate/Agency decision. She indicated that the DO would oppose expanding the Mexico City window into the 70s.

As for the older documents, we pointed out that we had already agreed to the release of those documents.

Marwell suggest that the 20 Sept. presentation would be a good opportunity to address the **Private Line and other Tel Taps** issue rather than requesting a separate meeting.

After the meeting Marwell elaborated on the presentation. He said to try to avoid going over old ground (US-Mexico relationship); when possible provide specific/hard evidence (bilateral agreements carry weight); war-stories do not go over well. He emphasized the importance of using the language of the law especially when citing harm. He specifically mentioned Sec. 6. (B){copy attached} which sets a standard of "interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities".

[Note: In a previous meeting with Gunn, he stressed similar themes including avoiding what he called "chicken little" arguments. He also raised the question on sensitivity of acknowledging we had a station in Moscow during the 60s? "It would have been logical to have one during the Cold War."]

SECRET

13-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

FEB 0 2 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Coordination, Intelligence and Research, Department of State

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) recently released documents revealing the existence of CIA stations in Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague, a joint tel-tap operation with Mexican liaison, and the identity of a unilateral penetration of a liaison service. It is the CIA's assessment that such releases could seriously damage intelligence operations as well as adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States. CIA is presently preparing an appeal of these rulings by the Board and requests the support of the Department of State should these appeals be brought before the President. (S)

Additionally, the Board has just released the existence of stations in Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Brussels, and Stockholm, and in March-April, it will be reviewing a document that reveals the location of every CIA station in 1965. It is anticipated that CIA will be preparing to appeal those releases and requests State Department's assessment as to the damage to foreign relations should the location of CIA stations be publicly acknowledged. (S)

It remains essential that the U.S. Government stand by assurances to persons and foreign governments that information they provide and activities they undertake based upon expected confidentiality remain protected for as long as necessary. These releases made by the Board seriously undermine the ability of CIA to uphold secrecy obligations it took on in the past and to make those assurances in the future. (C)

CL BY 2103140
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1; X5
DRV LOC 3-82
DRV LIS 3-82

13-00000

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

We have a critically short deadline in which to address issues concerning the release of Helsinki, Bern, Geneva, and The Hague stations, the identity of the asset, and Mexican liaison. The release of the identities of the remaining stations must be resolved over the next two weeks. We request your comments and expert opinions regarding the impact such releases would have on the foreign relations of the United States, and hope to cite State Department's support as we finalize our appeal. (S)

David N. Edger

David N. Edger
Acting Deputy Director for Operations

CIR-316/ 00293-96

13-00000

SUBJECT: Appeal of Unfavorable Determination by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (AIUO)

C/IMS/ESG/F.Wickham/tdn/x44448/2Feb96

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2 - ESG

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/18/96 06:24:14 PM
SUBJECT: JFK Meeting today

After speaking with you tonight about the results of the meeting today, Jeremy Gunn called me and relayed his concerns about the Board's understandings (or misunderstandings) of CIA's position. Bob Caudle and I discussed what happened at the JFK meeting and the following is our impression of what resulted. Basically, Edger did not commit himself on any specifics on these issues, but expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Board:

1. Jerusalem Station Edger was more willing to negotiate this one, but does not agree to its release. CIA wants to present more information. Edger was not under the impression that this station was to be discussed today so he did not come prepared to present new information on it. CIA should do this for the Board at the next possible opportunity.

2. Open Period for Stations Edger agreed that the staffs of the Board and HRG should work out the exact time period. He had no problem with the Sept 63-64 period and opening it up to '61 in the Oswald file. He did not make any firm commitment on the dates to the Board, saying that the staffs should come to an agreement on this.

3. Substitutions for Nordic stations - Although Edger suggested "Scandanavia Station" as a substitution, he clearly prefered something less revealing like "Northern European station 1, 2, etc.)". Using the former term has far less plausible deniability. The latter option basically gives up what we want to protect.

Once HRG hears from Edger as to what his understandings are, then someone needs to speak with Jeremy Gunn ASAP on Tuesday morning before the Board leaves. Jeremy said that unless we correct the Board on its mistaken impression about the above, they will leave assuming we have come to an agreement and will refuse to revisit this at a latter date.

Let me know if you need me to help out in any way on this. FYI, I will be in meetings at 10AM and 2pm (Win Scott settlement discussions!!!) tomorrow.

CC: John F. Pereira
Eleanor Neiman @ DO

13-00000

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: Fredrick Wickham @ DO
Johnny Goins @ DO
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/29/96 11:52:57 AM
SUBJECT: JFK release of Tokyo station(S)

I just spoke with EA legal and informed her about the latest release by the JFK Board of Tokyo station and the fact that we have a letter from the Ambassador objecting to the release. She indicated that Art Brown would be a good candidate to go down to speak with the Board at their next meeting (what are the dates?) to request that they reconsider. It might also be more persuasive if we could arrange for a State Department person (Japan desk) to come to the Board with us and present the Ambassador's letter. (S)

I would appreciate hearing your thoughts on this course of action. If we plan on doing this, we need to arrange it with Marwell and then brief the appropriate people in the DO and State Department as soon as possible. (S)

CL BY 2224130
CL REASON 1.5(c)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-83

CC: Robert D. Caudle
J. Barry Harrelson

13-00000

Barry H.

21 March 1997

JFK PROJECT WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance--"Atsugi" and "U-2"

1. References to "CIA base/Station/representatives at Atsugi, Japan" in the U-2 context is releasable.

2. Information relating to the station, other bases, and Agency representatives elsewhere in Japan will continue to be protected.

3. The issue was coordinated with the DS&T (Teresa Wilcox), DO (Lee Carle), the Air Force (Captain Thomas D. Rock)and the Department of State (Nina Noring); all of whom had no objection to the declassification and/or release of "CIA Base at Atsugi, Japan" and "U-2" project / effort / activities.

J. Barry Harrelson

File: G:\HRG\JAPOL.DOC

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DD/O 95-3057

- 7 NOV 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: David Cohen
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)

2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)

3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain individuals from the services. In the past, we have had close

CL BY 0695930
CL REASON: 1.5 (C)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM LOC 3-82

relationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program and will need to improve our relationship over the next several months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our station there would further hamper developmental relationships and eventual recruitments. (S)

4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:

Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)

Paris - No additional damage. (S)

Bonn - No specific damage. (S)

Berlin - No specific damage. (S)

Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)

The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

Oslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)

Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)

Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)

Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)

London - No specific damage. (S)

Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)

5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further

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SUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents

inquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)

6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at risk. (S)

7. We receive significant national collection systems support from Australia which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (S)

8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (S)

9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negatively

to a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and Islamic extremism. (S)

10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.S. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.S. Government would lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African stability and Islamic extremism. (S)

11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)

David Cohen

104-10332-10022 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ER 96-0455/8

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

November 27, 1996

VIA FACSIMILE

The Honorable John M. Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence
The Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Re: The Central Intelligence Agency's Compliance with the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Deutch:

Since 1994, the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has been working with a number of Federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, to locate and publicly release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. These actions have been taken pursuant to The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) ("JFK Act"). We have been working with Mr. John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group and Mr. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group of CIA and have appreciated the cooperation we have received.

The purpose of this letter is to request your agency's cooperation in assisting the Review Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American people that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest reasonable extent. We want to assure the American people that the United States Government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. Indeed, one of the paramount purposes of the JFK Act is to certify to the public that the United States Government is not withholding relevant materials related to the assassination. *See, e.g., Assassination Materials Disclosure Act*, H. R. Rep. No. 102-625, Part 1, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) ("The Federal Government's failure to release official materials has contributed to numerous conspiracy theories and fueled charges of government complicity in the assassination . . . a salutary purpose is served in opening these files [relating to the JFK assassination] to allay the suspicion of government cover-up.").

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell

The Review Board has recently considered how it, along with the relevant federal agencies, can best demonstrate to the American public that a thorough, good faith, and diligent effort has been made to locate and release all remaining assassination-related records within the control of the United States Government (and that the Government is not hiding any such materials from public disclosure). Pursuant to the Congressional mandate under the JFK Act to "create an enforceable, independent, and accountable process for the public disclosure of such records," 44 U.S.C. § 2107(2)(a)(3), the Review Board seeks to have the relevant federal agencies provide a complete and specific accounting of their efforts to locate and release assassination-related records, including a full explanation for any destruction of such records.

Accordingly, the Review Board requests that each relevant agency adhere to the formal compliance program (hereinafter "JFK Act Compliance Program") outlined below and devised by the Review Board pursuant to its powers under Section 7(j)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), and (F) of the JFK Act. We hereby request that you undertake the following measures by the dates provided (these dates were set in view of the fact that the Review Board's operations currently are scheduled to expire on September 30, 1997):

1. Designation of Agency Compliance Official (or officials) and statement of intent to comply with the JFK Act. We request that by December 9, 1996, your agency designate an Agency Compliance Official who ultimately will be responsible for ensuring that the agency has complied with its obligations under the JFK Act, including the identification, location, and organization of assassination records and the transmission of those records to the National Archives and Records Administration ("National Archives"). Although the Review Board assumes that Mr. John Pereira or Mr. Barry Harrelson will serve in this position, we nevertheless await your formal confirmation. If necessary, your agency may designate additional persons with knowledge of the measures that have been undertaken to locate assassination records.

   We also request that by December 9, 1996, the agency convey its agreement to adhere to the compliance procedures outlined in this letter. To the extent that any compliance procedure described below appears to be unreasonable or to present difficulties that we may not have anticipated, please explain why and make alternate suggestions to us.

2. Initial Statement of Compliance. We request that the Agency Compliance Official prepare, by January 6, 1997, an initial written statement of the

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agency's compliance with the JFK Act ("Statement of Compliance"), setting forth the steps that the agency has taken to locate and process assassination records. The Review Board recognizes that many of the relevant federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, have previously written letters to the Review Board apprising it of their progress at various stages of identifying and processing assassination records under the JFK Act. The Statement of Compliance, while it may include information previously reported to the Board, is to be the agency's comprehensive and final report to the American public of what it has done to locate records relating to the assassination. This Statement of Compliance shall include, to the fullest reasonable extent, the following information:

a. A complete description of all steps that your agency took to identify and locate assassination records including, but not limited to, an identification of the major record collections and files that were consulted in the agency's search, any departmental file indices consulted, the names and titles of the persons who were responsible for conducting the searches, the physical locations of the records that were searched, the off-site storage facilities (*e.g.*, Federal Records Centers) searched, the specific steps that were taken to locate and retrieve materials in archives, and any other criteria used by the agency to locate assassination records.

b. A description of the steps that the agency took in direct response to specific requests of the Review Board to locate certain additional records or information relating to the assassination. In particular, we ask that the CIA describe what specific steps it has taken to address the following requests: CIA-9, Publications and Analytical Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated March 6, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-11, Silvia Duran's Original Statement (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 3, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); CIA-12, JMWAVE Materials (*See* David G. Marwell letter dated May 22, 1996 to Mr. John Pereira); for HTLINGUAL records (*See* T. Jeremy Gunn Memorandum dated October 1, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson); and for Monthly Operational Reports on Cuban Exile Groups (*See* Manuel E. Legaspi Memorandum dated October 17, 1996 to Mr. Barry Harrelson).

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c. To the extent that any assassination-related records have been destroyed by the agency or any agency official, a full and specific explanation of the circumstances surrounding the destruction of such records.

d. The status of remaining work that you can now identify that needs to be completed by your agency in order to comply fully with the JFK Act, including an identification of the categories of records that must be processed and transmitted to the National Archives, a description of any additional searches for files that must be done, and the projected date(s) for completion of these tasks.

3. Review Board Interview With Agency Compliance Official (or Officials). Shortly after the submission of the agency's written Statement of Compliance, we ask that the Agency Compliance Official (as well as any persons who helped prepare the agency's initial Statement of Compliance) be made available to the Review Board for an interview regarding the location of agency assassination records. The interview will be used as an opportunity to resolve any outstanding questions regarding the agency's search, including any follow-up tasks to be completed by the agency. The Review Board anticipates that these interviews will be conducted in January 1997.

4. Submission of Final Agency Declaration of Compliance. By July 1, 1997, Federal agencies are expected to complete the process of identification, location, and declassification of its assassination records at which time they should submit to the Review Board a final declaration certifying, under oath, their compliance with the provisions of the JFK Act (the "Final Declaration of Compliance"). Because of the volume of CIA records, such a "final" statement may not be practicable at that time. However, we do expect that CIA will provide a complete status appraisal by July 1, 1997. This final declaration shall set forth all of the information initially set forth in the initial Statement of Compliance and shall also supplement the initial Statement of Compliance by detailing any further steps that were conducted by the agency in identifying and locating assassination records. The agencies' Final Declarations of Compliance will be included in our final report to Congress.

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5. Compliance Depositions. Starting on or about August 1, 1997, the Review Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, may conduct depositions, under oath, of the Agency Compliance Official along with any other agency officials with responsibility for complying with the JFK Act. The decision to take a compliance deposition of an agency will be made on a case by case basis, taking into account the importance of the agency to the work of the JFK Act and the sufficiency of the agency's efforts to account fully for its compliance with the JFK Act. In the event that the Review Board decides to commence a compliance deposition of an agency, the responsible agency designee(s) will be expected to testify under oath with respect to any and all issues relating to the agency's record search, including the scope of the search, the identity of files searched, the destruction of any relevant records, and any other matters set forth in the Final Declaration of Compliance. Any person obligated to appear for a deposition under oath shall be fully entitled to obtain legal representation.

We look forward to receiving your initial response, by December 9, that designates your Agency Compliance Official and includes your statement regarding your position with respect to the provisions outlined in this letter. To the extent that you have any questions or suggestions regarding the Compliance Program, please do not hesitate to contact our General Counsel, T. Jeremy Gunn, at (202) 724-0088.

Thank you for your cooperation with our work.

Sincerely,

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

cc: The Honorable Nora Slatkin, Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Michael O'Neil, General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency
John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency
Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer, Historical Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

9 December 1996

David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Marwell:

The Director of Central Intelligence has forwarded to me your 27 November 1996 letter for response. I commend the efforts of the Review Board and its staff in reviewing and releasing hundreds of thousands of United States Government documents for greater public understanding about the assassination of President Kennedy. I also confirm the Central Intelligence Agency's commitment to continue working closely with the Review Board in carrying out its statutory authorities.

With regard to the requests made in your letter, I understand the Review Board's desire to demonstrate to the public that it has carried out its duties thoroughly and diligently. You have requested that CIA appoint an Agency Compliance Official to be responsible for ensuring CIA's compliance with its obligations under the JFK Act. The DCI has full confidence in Mr. John Pereira as Chief of the Historical Review Group (HRG) and has determined that Mr. Pereira will continue to act as the CIA official responsible for ensuring full compliance with the JFK Act and will remain the Agency's focal point with the Review Board.

You have also requested that CIA provide an Initial Statement of Compliance. Mr. Pereira and Mr. Barry Harrelson, the senior review officer for HRG, as well as the rest of the HRG staff, have always been available to you without restriction. The Review Board and your staff have been provided access to any relevant documents or information you have requested. As you know, the Review Board was fully informed as to the steps CIA took to designate Agency records as part of the President Kennedy collection. HRG has also arranged for multiple briefings by senior CIA officials from a wide variety of CIA components so that the Review Board can better understand the information it is reviewing. Given the current effective relationship between HRG and your staff, should you require additional assurances of this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, I suggest that you contact Messrs. Pereira and

Harrelson directly. As usual, they will provide you with the specific information you need as quickly as possible to continue to record CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

As to your request for a complete description of the steps CIA has taken to respond to specific requests, I understand that there are several outstanding requests. HRG has assured me that these requests have been discussed with your staff and responses will be provided to you as quickly as possible. Given the number and breadth of the requests that are being made by the Review Board and the limited staff resources available to CIA to process such requests, I ask that the Review Board continue to prioritize all its requests for information or documents. With the Review Board's priorities established in this way, the Agency can immediately work on those requests that are most important to the Review Board. Of course, as CIA responds to these requests, HRG will provide any information the Review Board needs as to how the searches were conducted. I believe that this method will best meet the needs of the Review Board and will allocate CIA's limited resources in the most efficient manner possible.

Finally, as to your requests to interview CIA officials responsible for this Agency's compliance with the JFK Act, Mr. Pereira has always been available to the Review Board for informal discussions as well as for giving sworn testimony including depositions. CIA has never objected to the Review Board deposing or interviewing informally any of its current or former employees and has, in fact, facilitated such interviews. You will also recall that, on 6 August 1996, Messrs. Pereira and Harrelson gave sworn testimony at an open hearing of the Review Board.

I trust that this responds to the concerns raised in your letter. Of course, if you should have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact Linda C. Cipriani, an attorney in the Office of General Counsel, at (703) 874-3124.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

Michael J. O'Neil

David G. Marwell

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani/76124 (2 Dec 96)

OGC-96-53203

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - DC/LD/OGC
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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

April 16, 1997

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Compliance Program and Requests for Additional Information and Records

Dear Barry:

I am writing to memorialize the Review Board's understanding of the status of CIA's responses to our formal and informal requests for additional information and records that have been requested pursuant to the Review Board's authority under Section 7(j)(1)(C)(ii)of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994) (JFK Act).

It is important that everyone at the Agency who is responsible for providing answers to our requests for additional information and records understand that the answers will need to be incorporated by reference into the Agency's Final Compliance Statement. Essentially, CIA will need to attest, under oath, that it has made all reasonable and diligent searches and that its answers are true and correct to the extent of the best, reasonably available information. In this regard, is important to note that when the Review Board requests, for example, a 201 file, it is ***not*** asking that you identify relevant records within the Sequestered Collection. ***Rather***, it is asking to review the original 201 file in its current and most complete version.[1]

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[1]The Review Board has no basis for assuming that a 201 file as it appears in the Sequestered Collection today is necessarily complete. It is fully possible that a relevant document was not identified by CIA or the HSCA in 1978-79 and therefore is not included in the Sequestered Collection, or that a relevant document that was initially placed in the Sequestered Collection in 1978-79 may have been misplaced at some point during the subsequent twenty years. Therefore, in response to requests for files, ***it is not sufficient merely to point to places where responsive records appear in the Collection.*** On a case-by-case basis, we are very willing to hear your explanations for the possible burdensomeness of any particular search or your analysis of why a search

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

As we have written in our formal requests and as we have said to you orally, you should interpret our requests in the broadest reasonable sense. However, to the extent that you believe that a request poses an unreasonable burden that we may not have anticipated, or to the extent that you have suggestions to modify or to amend our requests in such a way as to better reach our goals, you should not hesitate to make suggestions or seek clarification. However, unless we specifically hear from you to the contrary, it is our presumption that CIA will respond fully to the requests as posed.

In response to your request, the ARRB staff has now identified six of our outstanding requests as high priority issues. We would appreciate your forwarding to us as much responsive material as you are reasonably able to assemble during the upcoming two weeks with regard to these six issues. We wish to obtain a reasonably complete response to these requests within one month. These six issues are identified in the text by double asterisks (**).[2]

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts involving first, the formal requests for information and records, and second, the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.[3]

I. Formal Requests.

CIA-1 Organizational Material.

CIA has collected information responsive to this request for Review Board action. The ARRB staff has identified records that it believes will enhance the

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will not be fruitful.

[2]As identified more fully below, the six issues are: CIA-7 (Histories); CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-assassination files); personnel assigned to a designated post; QKENCHANT; the electronic take from the Mexico City Station; and files on George Stanley Brown.

[3]This memorialization follows-up, in large part, on your conversations of March 19 and 20, 1997 with Michelle Combs and on the DO and DS&T briefings to the ARRB staff on April 1, 1997.

historical understanding of the assassination by providing some background on CIA records.

CIA should now review the DO and DS&T organizational material and re-examine some of the proposed redactions. Several documents have been cleared by the directorate IRO's for either release in full or release with minor redactions.[4] The ARRB staff will consult with CIA to determine whether these records should be designated "assassination records" or whether they could be made available publicly in a manner similar to the material from the 1996 Boston trip. HRG would like to discuss this issue before the materials are formally put before the Review Board.

CIA-2 through CIA-5.

These requests have been satisfied and no further action is needed by CIA.

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[4]These are:

DCI
- –Organization of the Office of the Director 1963
- –Mission Statements for 1959, 1962, 1965 and 1966
- –some Office of the Director notices
- –OGC and IG Mission Statements for 1964, 1966, 1969, 1975, and 1976
- –OLC Mission Statement for 1975 and 1976

DI
- –Organization and Functions of the DI pre-1961
- –Organizational Charts for 1961, 1964, and 1969
- –Mission Statements for 1961, 1963, 1964, 1966, and 1970

DA
- –Mission Statements 1957, 1958, 1960, 1963, and 1974
- –Organizational Chart 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, and 1966
- –Office of Security Organizational Charts for 1956, 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1975
- –Office of Security Mission Statements for 1958, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1969, and 1975.

CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches.

The Review Board first made this request on September 11, 1995. On September 11, 1995, CIA agreed to make these materials available by December, 1995. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to make these materials available by November, 1996.

We are aware that many of the cables requested are already in the JFK files, but not all are included. Those that we have not been able to locate in the collection include: Mexico City Station to Headquarters (September 26-30, 1963); Headquarters to Mexico City Station (September 26-30, 1963); JMWAVE to Headquarters (September 26-November 21, 1963); Headquarters to JMWAVE (September 26-November 21, 1963); and all traffic between the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE for the periods September 26-October 20, 1963 and November 22-December 30, 1963.

**CIA-7 Histories.

The Review Board first requested access to several internal CIA histories and to indices of histories on November 8, 1995. On August 8, 1996, after reviewing a list of histories that you provided, the ARRB staff designated approximately sixty histories for which further review was sought. To date, the ARRB staff has reviewed the seven histories that CIA has made available and has made suggestions with respect to further processing of those seven histories. CIA should make the remaining sixty-plus histories available.

CIA-8 Intelligence Community Staff records.

The Review Board first requested information on the Intelligence Community Staff on March 1, 1996. On October 1, 1996, CIA agreed to report on the status of this request within two weeks. The Review Board has not yet received any substantive response to this request.

CIA-9 Intelligence Community publications on Cuba or USSR (November 20-30, 1963).

The LBJ Library has already identified several publications for mandatory

review.[5] Michelle Combs reviewed the materials and identified some that should probably become available to the public. The DI has been tasked to locate the additional publications that have been requested.

CIA-10 Interagency Source Register.

CIA has provided a full description of the ISR, which should now be submitted as a formal response to the Review Board's request. Once the formal statement is provided, this request will be complete. (Under separate cover, the Review Board is sending to you an additional request for information and records, CIA-17, which provides a list of names that we request you check against the Interagency Source Register.)

CIA-11 Sylvia Duran materials.

CIA reports that it has exhausted its reasonable leads for pursuing additional information. CIA has agreed to provide a formal letter for the record detailing what searches were done and confirming that the responsive document currently in the JFK collection is a true copy of the original letter. Once this formal statement is provided, this request will be complete.

CIA-12 JMWAVE and David Sanchez Morales.

On May 22, 1996, the Review Board requested access to "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files" relating to five persons allegedly connected to JMWAVE. It is our understanding that, in response to this request, several months ago CIA located and made available for our review many records responsive to this request. However, it is also our understanding

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[5]They include:

Intelligence Report (11/22/63; 11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 12/11/63; 12/13/63; 12/18/63; and 12/20/63).

Intelligence Memorandum (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/25/63; 4/20/64; and 10/16/64).

President's Intelligence Checklist (11/23/63; 11/24/63; 11/25/63; 11/26/63; 11/27/63; 11/28/63; and 11/30/63).

that all of the records provided were located in the Sequestered Collection.

As stated in the second paragraph at the beginning of this letter, we seek to review the original files that we have requested. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-13 Mexico City Backchannel Communications.

This request, dated November 1, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-14 Mexico City Station Annual Reports.

This request, dated December 23, 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO provided no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-15 Win Scott files identified in Russ Holmes Files.

CIA has completed its response and no further action is needed.

**CIA-16 Oswald Pre-Assassination Files.

The HRG reportedly received a lengthy answer from the Office of Security on the LHO files and a formal response to the Review Board's request is in process. Oswald's Office of Security file has been located and will be delivered to HRG for review in April. Access to other files will require a special request from HRG to the Office of Security and should be requested by HRG for ARRB staff review.

II. Informal Requests.

All of the following informal requests have previously been made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.

**CIA-IR-01 Personnel assigned to post from 1959-64 (*see* RIF 104-10065-10199).

This request, originally made in November 1996, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. It is our understanding that the DO believes that it is not able to answer this request. The ARRB staff does not find DO's response to be credible. We believe that with all of the resources at the Agency's disposal -- including ready contact with individuals who should be able to answer this question from memory -- this question can be answered.[6] The ARRB staff has provided suggestions as to how this information could be obtained, including suggesting the types of files and cables that could be searched.

CIA-IR-02 Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.

The cable was delivered to the Review Board on March 20, 1997. No further action by CIA is needed.

CIA-IR-03 Full computer search for list of documents in HTLINGUAL file.

CIA should undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.

CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's files.

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for *Mangold v. CIA*. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.

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[6]The ARRB staff has spoken with a retired CIA official who claims to be able to answer this question from memory, but who refused to do so.

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CIA-IR-05 Possible foreign source for records on Oswald.

CIA was informally requested, more than two years ago, to use its contacts to pursue certain records related to Oswald that were orally described to CIA. The Review Board believed that, for reasons of security classification of information, it would be appropriate for CIA to make the initial inquiries rather than the Review Board. Under separate cover, we are providing documentation of the action the Review Board has taken to further this request.

**CIA-IR-06 QKENCHANT.

The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of QKENCHANT and its connection with Clay Shaw, Howard Hunt, and Monroe Sullivan.

The Review Board was initially provided some information in regard to this request that now appears to be incorrect. CIA is now seeking additional information to correct or to clarify its previous answers. The Review Board seeks an immediate, full, and accurate response to this request.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart.

The ARRB staff has reviewed all records that CIA has been able to locate to date. During the course of this review, additional questions were raised that you agreed to pursue. You also agreed to conduct additional searches to determine whether there may be additional retrievable records on Mr. Capehart.

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memoranda.

HRG will locate this item.

CIA-IR-09 George Bush computer search.

The Review Board provided CIA with a copy of an FBI document, dated November 29, 1963, prepared under the name of John Edgar Hoover, which states: "The substance of the foregoing information [on the assassination of President Kennedy] was orally furnished to Mr. George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency . . . ." We have been informed that the DO has no record of a "George Bush" being in the employ of CIA in 1963 with the exception of Mr. George William Bush who has already given a sworn affidavit that he is not the

"George Bush" in question. CIA is now checking whether the search query included George Herbert Walker Bush prior to 1970. CIA should determine whether George Herbert Walker Bush is the person to whom the memorandum refers and should provide a definitive statement regarding the scope of its search and the basis of its conclusion.

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports.

CIA will determine whether the IG's office maintains an index or inventory of its reports and determine whether the IG's office prepared a report on the handling of Oswald.

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission critics.

We are asking that CIA determine whether it possesses any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher. The Review Board is not requesting information *per se* regarding any FOIA requests by these individuals or any Public Affairs news clippings.[7]

CIA-IR-12 Contacts with journalists or publishing houses.

The Review Board seeks to determine to what extent, if any, CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. This request, originally discussed in March 1997, was raised at the DO follow-up briefing on April 1, 1997. The DO had no response and no time frame for a response.

CIA-IR-13 Office or person dealing with organized crime and Cuba.

The Review Board requested that CIA make a particular personnel file available. The file was made available by CIA for review. The Review Board will discuss with you whether any further steps need to be taken.

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[7]To the extent that CIA possesses FOIA files or records on any of these individuals, and to the extent that those records contain information that was not filed with the courts, such records ***are being requested for review by the Review Board.***

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge files.

CIA (OGC) will determine the disposition of the files of Scott D. Breckinridge.

**CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City Station.

The Review Board has for some time been attempting to determine whether it has had access to all of CIA's surveillance "take" from the Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination. On numerous occasions, the Review Board has asked whether there was any surveillance take in addition to what is currently in the collection.

On March 18, 1997, the Review Board provided additional leads to CIA to assist it in answering these questions. The DO has agreed to check Headquarters records for the file referenced in HMMW 12454, to search for the crypts cited in this document, and to search for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. The DS&T will query its offices for possible records on Mexico City and Cuba and for the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods.

CIA-IR-16 U-2 files.

DS&T will provide a folder title print out of U-2 materials for Review Board examination, check for records filed under Richard Bissell's name, and search for OSP files. DS&T has also contacted Lockheed for assistance.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro assassination plots.

HRG will furnish the 1967 IG Report to provide possible search query suggestions for DS&T follow-up.

CIA-IR-18 DO Office.

The Review Board has requested orally information about a particular DO office. We understand that you are collecting the relevant information.

CIA-IR-19 Computer searches.

The Review Board has requested that full computer searches be conducted on all of the following people and organizations. The results of the searches should be documented.

Name	Results/Comments
1. Spas Raikin	ARRB awaits documentation.
2. Leo Cherne	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file starts in 1988. HRG is checking on a 201. No OMS file.
3. Hunter Leake	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG is checking for a DCD file.
4. Marilyn Dutz Murret	ARRB awaits documentation.
5. John McVickar	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file. DO is checking.
6. Andy Anderson	ARRB awaits documentation.
7. Byron B. Morton, Jr.	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
8. Marie Cheatham	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file. No OMS file.
9. Paul Garbler	ARRB awaits documentation. OP file. OMS file. HRG has requested personnel file.
10. Verna Deane Brown	ARRB awaits documentation. No OP file.
** 11. George Stanley Brown	ARRB awaits documentation.
12. Howard Guebler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
13. Gordon Duane Novel	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
14. Ed Butler	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
15. INCA (Information Council of the Americas)	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.
16. Permindex	ARRB awaits documentation. HRG will check for files.

Conclusion

Please let me know if you have any supplements or corrections. We would very much like to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously. As always, we appreciate your cooperation and assistance.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
General Counsel and
Associate Director for Research and Analysis

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

13-00000

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

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DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 3-82

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(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for <u>information which is clearly related</u> to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, <u>there is no time frame limitation.</u> Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are <u>central</u> to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) <u>A. JFK Assassination Investigations:</u>

- -- Warren Commission, 1963-64
- -- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
- -- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
- -- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
- -- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

<u>B. Key subjects</u>

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

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(AIUO) -- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) if they involve JFK figures (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO) C. Key figures
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

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(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

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DRAFT

October 16, 1997

HAND-DELIVERED

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Barry:

In connection with the work of the CIA to locate and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination pursuant to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("JFK Act"), please submit to the Review Board the CIA's initial formal report regarding its work.

As you know, the procedures for documenting the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act were set forth in the Review Board's November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA Director. These procedures entailed the submission of an intial report by the CIA, which we referred to as an Initial Statement of Compliance. This past Spring, we informally agreed to extend the time for submission of the Initial Compliance Statement pending ongoing work of the CIA under the JFK Act.

To facilitate the completion of the CIA's work by September 1998, including the submission to Congress of a final report detailing the work accomplished by the CIA and other Federal agencies under the JFK Act, please submit the CIA's Initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board no later than November 6, 1997.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
and General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

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DRAFT

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

October 17, 1997

Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Completion of Review of Assassination Records

Dear John:

The Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") has less than one year to complete its statutory responsibility of ensuring that all Federal records related to the assassination of President Kennedy are made publicly available at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"). Because of the importance to the Review Board of completing the review and release of Central Intelligence Agency records, I am taking this opportunity to raise with you some of our concerns and to describe our goals.

Let me first reiterate our deep appreciation for the cooperation that we have received thus far from the Agency. We are very mindful of the enormous amount of work that has been accomplished thus far. We very much hope to be able to report, at the completion of our work, that the Agency has fully complied with the letter and spirit of the JFK Act and that the Review Board is confident that all CIA assassination records have been fully processed and transferred to the National Archives. Unfortunately, it is clear at this point that the pace of review of CIA records will need to increase significantly during this final year so that the Review Board and the CIA will be able to complete our responsibilities and that the Review Board can issue the type of report that we all ideally envision.

It is our goal to have all CIA assassination records reviewed and transferred to NARA by September 1, 1998. By "all" assassination records, I include the unredacted originals as well as copies containing Board-approved postponements. (I am excluding, therefore, duplicates of those records that have been transferred to NARA.) The Review Board is prepared to take all necessary steps within its statutory authority to ensure that this work is accomplished.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

The Review Board has promised Congress that this work will be completed by September 1998. The Review Board also is obligated to keep Congress informed, on a monthly basis, of the steps it has taken to ensure completion of this goal. We now need to keep Congress informed of any difficulties that we are facing in the course of completing this work.

As you know, the JFK Act in many ways imposed difficult obligations. For example, it required the CIA (and other agencies) to complete its review and transfer of records to NARA within 300 days of the time the statute was enacted in 1993. Although this statutory deadline was not met, we would like to make it as clear as we possibly can that we intend to ensure that the goal to review and transfer all assassination records to NARA is accomplished during the lifetime of the Review Board.

We have raised with you previously our concerns about whether the Agency has allocated sufficient resources to complete its work on its assassination records by September 1, 1998. In a meeting at CIA headquarters on October 16, 1996, CIA Executive Director Nora Slatkin promised members of the Review Board that the CIA would devote whatever resources are necessary to complete the task.

In order to ensure that this work is completed, the Review Board has developed a timetable for review of remaining CIA records. The CIA's Historical Review Group suggests that refinement of the timetable is necessary, but has of yet offered no specific changes.

In order to fulfill our responsibilities under the JFK Act and in order to honor our pledge to Congress, we believe that the following steps are necessary:

> *First*, we need to establish a reasonable but strict schedule for the CIA's review and release of records. The CIA must devote all of the resources necessary to review the records under this schedule. We believe that the only way to ensure that the CIA's work is completed is to adhere to such a schedule.
>
> *Second*, if the CIA has not completed its scheduled review by the proposed deadline, the Review Board will require that all CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act be transferred forthwith to the National Archives regardless of whether they have been reviewed or processed by the CIA pursuant to the Board's authority at 44 U.S.C. § 2107.7(j)(B).

Third, the Board will presumptively vote to open in full all records that have not been reviewed in conformity with the schedule.

We can assure you that we have no desire whatsoever to take steps two and three. However, at this point, we see no other method for satisfying our obligation to ensure that the CIA's assassination-related records are released by September 1998, unless the CIA agrees to schedule the review in a timely, consistent, methodical, and enforceable manner. Although you should not hesitate to contact us regarding any ideas you have for streamlining or improving the accomplishment of this task, there should be no misunderstanding by the Agency regarding what we believe our goal to be and the steps that we are prepared to take to ensure the fulfillment of our statutory obligations and our promises to Congress. It is our perception that if the Agency allocates additional resources to the accomplishment of this project, we all will be able to accomplish the goals of the JFK Act.

We therefore strongly urge the Agency to allocate now whatever resources are necessary to complete its review records in an orderly and systematic manner. To the extent that the Agency is able to meet the necessary deadlines, there will be no need for us to resort to the extreme -- but potentially necessary -- measures to complete our obligations to Congress and the American people.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

October 30, 1997

VIA FACSIMILE

J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: Submission of CIA's Initial Statement of Compliance Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

I have been asked by Jeremy Gunn to take responsibility, along with Robert Skwirot and Michelle Combs, for handling the Review Board's JFK Act Compliance Program with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Gunn has informed me that you have agreed to provide us with the CIA's initial compliance statement (as it is described in our November 27, 1996 letter to the CIA) by the end of November 1997. Thereafter, we can establish a reasonable time for the CIA to prepare and submit its Final Declaration of Compliance. The CIA's Final Declaration will be submitted to Congress and the President.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.

Board Members: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
Executive Director: *David G. Marwell*

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

February 11, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Review Officer
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505

Re: CIA Initial Compliance Statement To Be Submitted Under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107

Dear Mr. Harrelson:

Thank you for submitting to the Review Board the CIA's December 11, 1997 DRAFT of its initial Statement of Compliance under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act ("JFK Act"). You submitted the draft to obtain the Review Board's initial comments. We have made a preliminary review of the draft and offer the following comments.

The Statement is helpful in providing general background history regarding the measures undertaken by the CIA to assemble files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Statement also gives a good overview description of those files. At this time, we do not propose that you make any major changes that would delay the formal submission of the initial Compliance Statement to the Review Board.[1]

[1] We note that the initial draft statement generally describes the records identified in response to specific Review Board requests. For the initial Compliance Statement, this will be sufficient. To the extent that additional records are later identified or requests completed, these can be included in the Final Declaration of Compliance. We also note that "[t]he status, results and documentation of specific [Review Board] requests" are more specifically being addressed in separate memoranda being submitted to the Review Board, and this process is ongoing. These responses are extremely helpful in articulating what the CIA has done to search for records on the JFK assassination. Therefore, the Review Board will request that these detailed responses ultimately be incorporated by reference into the Final Declaration of Compliance.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **DEPUTY DIRECTOR:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

Therefore, please submit the CIA's official initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board as soon as possible, but no later than March 16, 1998.

After formal submission of the CIA's initial Statement of Compliance, we would schedule an informal interview with you (and perhaps other members of the Historical Review Group) to ask questions regarding the Compliance Statement and regarding the sufficiency of the CIA's record searches. After addressing any outstanding issues, the CIA would thereafter submit its Final Declaration of Compliance.

I recognize that you are extremely busy processing CIA records for inclusion in the JFK Collection. However, it is essential that the CIA devote sufficient time and attention to its Final Declaration of Compliance because, as we have stated before, the Final Declaration will constitute the CIA's representation to the American public, under oath, that the CIA has diligently searched for records relating to the JFK assassination and that the CIA is not withholding any materials regarding the assassination.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
Associate General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.
(By facsimile)

13-00000

2/13/98

BEFORE
THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DECLARATION OF BRIAN LATELL

I, Brian Latell, do hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (``CSI'') for the United States Central Intelligence Agency (``CIA or ``Agency'') and have held this position since September 1994. I also hold the position of Chairman of the Editorial Board (``Board'') for *Studies in Intelligence* (*Studies*), a publication of CSI. I have served as a foreign intelligence officer for the United States Government for over 36 years and, at CIA, I have held a variety of senior positions of management and analytical responsibility including serving as a member of the National Intelligence Council for 14 years and National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Latin America for four of those years. I hold a doctorate, masters and undergraduate degree from Georgetown University, have served as a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and presently hold an appointment to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service as an Adjunct Professor.

2. The purpose of this declaration is to provide the Assassination Records Review Board with my view of the status of *Studies* as a classified publication available within the Intelligence Community and as an unclassified publication available to the public. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

3. *Studies* is an independent, scholastic endeavor with the mission to promote scholarship in intelligence literature. Articles submitted to *Studies* are intended for educational purposes only and present solely the personal, academic views of the individual authors. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Board. Its criterion for publication is whether the article makes a contribution to the literature of intelligence. Articles submitted to *Studies* are not required to be coordinated through channels and, indeed, are not vetted through management by either the Board or the author. In addition to senior Agency officers, the Board also has membership representing other agencies of the Intelligence Community.

4. In the beginning of *Studies*, articles were primarily written by CIA authors. In the past decade, however, *Studies* has been enriched by an increasing number of contributions from authors from other components of the Intelligence Community, from members of the academic world in the United States and abroad, and from a few private citizens, most of whom have had some past intelligence connection. The Board welcomes this trend and looks forward to increasing contributions from non-Agency authors.

5. Once an article is submitted for consideration in *Studies* it is circulated to the members of the Board for their review. The Board then decides whether an article meets the criteria for publication and, if it does, begins the publication process. All unclassified submissions are reviewed by the Publications Review Board (PRB)[1] to ensure the unclassified nature of the article. The articles are edited, approved by the Chief of CSI, and published in the classified version of *Studies*. Most of the unclassified articles published in this version are then picked up by the unclassified version of *Studies* and with further slight editing are published. If an article has been deemed to contain classified information by its author, and it is subsequently requested to be released, it will be reviewed

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[1] PRB is the same body that reviews private writings proposed for publication by current and former Agency employees as required under Agency regulation.

by either the History Staff, the Historical Review Program, or more recently by the Publications Review Board -- pursuant to the personal manuscript standards -- to allow declassification or the creation of an unclassified version. By deeming or marking a given article as classified, we represent only that this personal writing contains some information of a proprietary (hence classified) nature to the US Government; that fact does not alter the nature of this private work or convert it into an official federal record containing official government information.

6. The independence and integrity of the Board, and its historical commitment to academic traditions, has never been questioned by Agency management. I, as well as several of my predecessors, can recall no cases of interference by Agency management with the publication decisions of the Board, no matter how sensitive the subject matter or critical of the Agency. Indeed, it is the antithesis of official information and the embodiment of personal, academic scholarship and work. The very intent is academic in the context of educational mentoring from one individual to those in succeeding generations. The Agency teaches through its institutional and official course materials; individual intelligence officers teach personally through *Studies*.

7. For the foregoing reasons, I believe that, while ``*Studies in Intelligence*'' is published under the auspices of the United States Government, it is neither an expression of official information nor an official release of official Executive Branch information, but rather a forum for the private academic expressions of the authors.

8. Executed this 13th day of February 1998 at Fairfax County, Virginia.

BRIAN LATELL

13-00000

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12 february 1998

draft by marty; revisions by lss

13-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT

19 March 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Gunn:

Re: STATEMENT CONCERNING ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992

The following is a listing of the principal measures taken to date by the Agency to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (the Act). Note: it does not include the numerous informal meetings, conversations, and exchanges between ARRB and HRP staff members, many of which covered all of the measures.

INITIAL SEARCHES

a. In early 1992, even before the Act was passed, the Chief of the CIA History Staff reported to the Director that the staff had located all of the so-called "sequestered collection" (those records compiled by the Agency for the House Select Committee On Assassinations investigation) and had surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination both at Headquarters and at the Agency records center. The sequestered collection contained sixty-four record center-size boxes. In addition, the staff had located sixteen boxes of Lee Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders mainly from Mexico Station records that were collected for the Warren Commission.

b. Before the ARRB was appointed by the President, John Pereira, Chief, Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence, sent a memorandum dated 25 October 1993 to the Agency directorates requesting a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, the JFK assassination, and any documents related to the assassination. This effort and discussions with various Agency components and Agency Information Release Officers over the past four years resulted in more

than 31 additional boxes of materials being sent for review. Included within this material were 19 boxes of JFK working files based on the sequestered collection, two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of LA Division documents and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs period. Not all of this material is related to the JFK story; and in some boxes only a few folders had anything to do with the assassination or events surrounding it. To date, the ARRB staff has designated approximately 22 boxes of this material as assassination records. In addition, about 400 pages of material from an FOIA request for minutes of the DCI's morning meetings which related to JFK were added to the collection. The search for documents is a continuing effort. Guidelines for this effort have been sent to Agency individuals and components which review documents and materials in the course of their work.

REVIEWS

c. Historical Review Group, now the Historical Review Program, reviewed boxes 1 through 63 of the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file and released most of the documents therein either in full or in sanitized form to the National Archives in August 1993. The total number of pages released by CIA prior to or during August 1993 was approximately 123,000. An additional release of approximately 30,000 pages of HSCA material from the sequestered collection was made in 1995.

d. Box 64 of the sequestered collection contained 72 reels of microfilm primarily dealing with Directorate of Operations materials and Office of Security files. In addition there were 22 reels of 201 files on 151 individuals. Following release of the main collection in August 1993, HRG staff members reviewed the microfilm files and released approximately 74,000 pages of material to the National Archives either in full or in sanitized form.

e. The status of HRP's review of additional records and re-review of the sequestered collection will be addressed in regular progress reports to the ARRB staff.

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND INFORMATION

f. The Agency maintains a rather unique and non-integrated files system which precludes a single query on a particular subject and the expected response from the files

13-00000

Mr. T. Jeremy Gunn

of all directorates. Following coordination with the ARRB staff, the Agency arranged for the staff to be briefed by a representative of each directorate concerning the nature of the files within the directorate -- how they are organized, maintained, searched, and how they have been searched previously for assassination-related materials. Following this effort, the ARRB staff asked for a number of additional searches by the Agency and they are in various stages of completion.

g. In addition, pursuant to requests both formal and informal from the ARRB staff, HRP has tasked various elements of the Agency to conduct special searches for other materials thought to be relevant to the assassination story. Included in this category was the Oswald security file which was found and has been examined by the ARRB staff. Although a number of the requests are still outstanding, considerable material has been provided for review by the ARRB staff some of which has been found to be relevant. These materials include the History Staff's histories on various CIA operations and Agency components; files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or HSCA investigations; and the product of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Those parts of these materials which are determined by the ARRB staff to have relevancy to the assassination story will be reviewed by HRP and released as completed.

The status, results, and documentation of specific requests are to be addressed in a separate memorandum.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

July 7, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

HAND DELIVERY

Mr. J. Barry Harrelson
Chief, JFK Project
Historical Review Program
Office of Information Management
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Final Search for all Original CIA Records Related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

Dear Barry:

This letter is in follow-up to our meeting of June 26, 1998, where we discussed the comprehensiveness of CIA's search for assassination records. As we expressed in the meeting, the Assassination Records Review Board is extremely concerned as to whether all original records held by the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly those controlled by the Directorate of Operations, have been identified in previous searches for records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The Review Board is aware that the former Chief of the Historical Review Group, John Pereira, ordered a search of all CIA records in 1993. Since that date, however, we have identified at least three examples of records clearly relevant to the assassination that have been identified through the efforts of the Review Board staff and that were subsequently located by CIA. These records were not identified through the 1993 CIA search.

In order to comply with the strictures of the JFK Act and to ensure that all original CIA records relevant to the assassination are identified, the Review Board requests the following:

1. CIA conduct a new search of all Office of Security and Directorate of Operations (including all counterintelligence components), for any documents relevant to the assassination. Particular care should be taken to examine possibly relevant documents dated shortly before and any time after the 1993 search.

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: *Thomas E. Samoluk*

2. CIA Director George Tenet send a directive to all CIA personnel that explictly requires all offices to search their files and notify the Historical Review Program immediately if they have any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created after 1992.

3. CIA arrange for a meeting between the Review Board staff and appropriate CIA officials to discuss CIC and other counterintelligence records.

4. CIA conduct a search for updated or continued records on individuals, from a list of names to be provided by the Review Board, of subjects who were of interest to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We are particularly interested in any records that CIA acquired on these subjects since the original files were sequestered in 1978. A list will be provided to you shortly.

The Review Board appreciates your cooperation and assistance in resolving these issues. As time is growing short, we would like very much to ensure that these matters are handled expeditiously.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

cc: Assassination Records Review Board
Mr. James Oliver
Lee Strickland, Esq.

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

July 15, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

I am writing to address the completion of CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"), including submission by CIA of a Final Declaration of Compliance certifying, under the Act, its work to identify and release records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. As we have advised CIA previously, the Final Declaration will constitute CIA's representations, under penalty of perjury, regarding disclosure of its records relating to the Kennedy assassination.

Accordingly, set forth below is our understanding of (1) the status for completion of CIA's work under the JFK Act and (2) the form and content of CIA's Final Declaration.

A. Completion of CIA's Work Under the JFK Act

1. Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998

We confirmed with CIA that it intends to place into the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA"), by September 1998, all identified assassination records except certain documents confirmed by the Review Board staff as being duplicates, which may be processed later.[1] Thus, CIA commits to placing the following assassination records into the JFK Collection by September 30, 1998:

[1] In addition, some peripheral documents may be processed after September 1998, but only if identified beforehand to, and approved by, the Review Board.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk

- Non-duplicate documents within the hardcopy set of the CIA-House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") Sequestered Collection (*i.e*, CIA files that were reviewed by the HSCA for its investigation of the JFK assassination and which were sequestered pursuant to agreement of the CIA and HSCA).[2]

- Non-duplicate documents within the microfilm version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (the microfilm version is a more expansive set of records than the hardcopy set of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection in that it contains complete underlying files, not just the specific records reviewed by the HSCA).[3]

- Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.[4] As for the microfilm copy of the Oswald 201 file (which we assume duplicates the original Oswald 201 file processed by the CIA), we request that it be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998 (after Review Board examination). Certain recently discovered documents relating to Oswald also must be added to the JFK Collection.

- Lee Harvey Oswald's Office of Security File. CIA has placed this file into the JFK Collection.

- Marina Oswald's 201 File. While Marina Oswald's 201 file has been processed for the JFK Collection (as part of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection), we request that the original file be transferred to the protected portion of the JFK

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[2] As CIA has reported, the hard copy and microfilm versions of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection were first placed into the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994. *See* CIA Initial Statement of Compliance (dated March 19, 1998), at 2. Documents from those collections are being re-processed, however, to the extent that the Review Board has mandated that such documents be opened up to a greater extent.

[3] NARA reports that it does not have the computerized version of the record identification forms ("RIFs") for documents in the microfilm Sequestered Collection. CIA explained that it must first complete the processing of non-duplicates and update the computer data before that data is transferred to NARA. CIA anticipates that this will be done sometime after October 1998.

[4] However, NARA reports that many documents do not have the proper RIFs attached. CIA will coordinate with NARA to correct this.

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Collection by September 1998.

- Non-duplicate documents within Kennedy assassination working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes (19 boxes).
- Non-duplicate documents selected from 7 boxes of Latin American Division working files.
- CIA organizational materials, including the JMWAVE organizational chart specifically designated as an assassination record by the Review Board [CIA-1].[5]
- Excerpts of certain CIA histories designated by the Review Board [CIA-7].
- Excerpts of CIA's "Family Jewels" memorandum [CIA-IR-08].[6]
- Excerpts of a CIA personnel file that relate to organized crime/Cuba [CIA-IR-13].
- Excerpts of the personnel file of Mr. George E. Joannides, the case officer responsible for the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) during a period in the early 1960's [CIA-IR-21].
- CIA "A" files for Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison [CIA-IR-22].
- Designated Watch Committee Reports [CIA-IR-23].
- Oswald-related documents from the a general defector file maintained by the CIA's Office of Security [CIA-IR-24].
- Certain records from the files of former CIA Director John McCone as designated by the Review Board [CIA-IR-28].

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[5] "CIA-1" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to a formal, written request (numbered 1) from the Review Board.

[6] "CIA-IR-08" reflects that these assassination-related materials were identified by the Review Board from among materials that CIA provided in response to an informal request (numbered 8) from the Review Board.

- Designated records from security files of Jack Ruby, Walter Sheridan, Harold Weisberg, Richard Case Nagel, and Gordon Novel [CIA-IR-27].

- Excerpts from the calendar of former CIA Director Allen Dulles [CIA-IR-31].

In addition to the assassination records identified above, the Review Board currently is inspecting additional files CIA has made available in response to Review Board requests. We may designate additional assassination records from these files. They are: intelligence community reports on Cuba/Soviet Union [CIA-9]; files relating to CIA officials stationed at JMWAVE [CIA-12]; and files of various high-level CIA officials (former Deputy CIA Directors Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter, former Deputy Directors for Plans Richard Bissell and Richard Helms, former General Counsel Lawrence Houston, C. Tracy Barnes, and William Harvey) [CIA-IR-34]. Additional assassination records may be identified from other requests for additional information.

2. <u>Mexico City Tapes [CIA-IR-15]</u>

We also have discussed with CIA the potential processing of recordings maintained by CIA and apparently reflecting audio surveillance of certain "Soviet bloc" and Cuban facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 through early January 1964, including possible surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Because CIA has not yet listened to the full tapes, it could not yet confirm the targets or substance of this "electronic take." CIA has committed to listening first to the tapes for the period November 22-23, 1963 (approximately 18 tapes), and thereafter will discuss with the Review Board potential placement of these and later audio recordings into the JFK Collection. CIA said it will complete its review of the November 22-23 tapes in July.

3. <u>Processing of Duplicate Documents under the JFK Act</u>

a. <u>The CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection</u>. Although a version of the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both microfilm and hardcopy) were placed in the JFK Collection in 1993 and 1994, the CIA has since been forwarding more open versions of certain documents in light of Review Board decisions. All such "re-processed" documents will be placed in the JFK Collection by September 1998 except that, to the extent that there are other duplicate copies of these re-processed documents in the Sequestered Collection, such duplicates will be re-processed and placed into the JFK Collection within one year after the Review Board terminates (*i.e.*, by September 1999).

b. <u>Russ Holmes Collection</u>. The CIA currently has not placed the Russ Holmes

Collection (consisting of CIA officer Russ Holmes' working files relating to the Kennedy assassination) into the JFK Collection. The Review Board recognizes that many documents within the Holmes files may be duplicates of CIA documents found in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection or Oswald 201 file. Nonetheless, the Review Board considers placement of the Holmes files into the JFK Collection to be of paramount importance in view of the selection and organization of documents that was made by a CIA officer. Accordingly, the CIA has committed to placing into the JFK Collection, by September 1998, all documents from the Holmes files not found elsewhere in the CIA materials at NARA. Duplicates of documents found elsewhere in the open JFK Collection can be processed after September 1998.

Given the unique organization of the Russ Holmes files, however, the Review Board requests that CIA make every effort to process those files, in their entirety, as soon as possible. Our understanding is that CIA will attempt to place the complete set of Holmes files, including duplicates, into the JFK Collection by December 1998 but absolutely no later than September 1999.

4. Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017

We have discussed with CIA its concerns regarding physical custody of certain records whose release has been postponed, under the JFK Act, until 2017. CIA has indicated that it may want to retain physical custody of certain postponed records pending disclosure in 2017.

The Review Board believes that original, postponed records should presumptively be held by NARA in accordance with the JFK Act. *See* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(5)(e)(2) ("Each Government office shall . . . transmit to the Archivist . . . all assassination records the public disclosure of which has been postponed . . . to become part of [NARA's] protected Collection.") Accordingly, all postponed assassination records of the CIA should presumptively be transferred to the legal and physical custody of NARA by September 30, 1998. The Review Board requests that the originals of any postponed records from the Oswald 201 file, the Oswald Office of Security file, and the Marina Oswald 201 file be placed in the protected portion of the JFK Collection by September 1998. The Review Board understands that originals of postponed records from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and the Holmes Collection would be transferred in September 1999 after duplicates have been processed.

To the extent CIA believes that certain other records, particularly those designated as NBR, must remain in CIA's physical custody until 2017, we suggest further discussions

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to resolve definitively how those record groups will be handled.

5. Completion of CIA Responses to Review Board Requests

We have identified certain Review Board requests for additional information (both formal and informal) for which responses are still due from CIA. We understand that some outstanding responses are in draft form or otherwise nearing completion. CIA's completion of all outstanding responses is an essential aspect of its compliance with the JFK Act. We identified the following responses due from CIA (certain priority items are listed first):

Priority Responses Due

Accounting of Pre-Assassination Files on Oswald (partial response received) [CIA-16]

Accounting of James Angleton Files [CIA-IR-04]

Accounting of Electronic "Take" from Mexico City [CIA-IR-15]

Possible Foreign Source for Oswald Records [CIA-IR-05]

Possible IG reports re Oswald [CIA-IR-10]

Files on Warren Commission Critics [CIA-IR-11]

S. Breckenridge Files [CIA-IR-14]

Other Responses Due

Intelligence Community Staff Records [CIA-8]

Interagency Source Register [CIA-10]

Computer Search for HTLINGUAL Documents [CIA-IR--03]

QKENCHANT [CIA-IR-06]

Contacts with Journalists [CIA-IR-12]

DO Office Information [CIA-IR-18]

Computer Name searches [CIA-IR-19]

Zapruder Film [CIA-IR-25]

AMWORLD [CIA-IR-32]

Search for document mentioned in RIF No. 104-10151-10206 [CIA-IR-35]

William Pawley Files [CIA-IR-37]

6. CIA Review and Declassification of Other Records

Besides CIA records, CIA is continuing to review its equities in other records, including Church Committee records and records from the Presidential libraries. In addition, the Review Board's interviews with former CIA official Ann Goodpasture must be reviewed and declassified by CIA so that the interviews can be sent to Ms. Goodpasture for her corrections and then included with the Review Board's open records.

Finally, the Library of Congress has a set of closed Rockefeller Commission records in its Manuscript Division that may require CIA review and declassification. It is our understanding that these records are closed until 2001 and can be inspected only by permission of the CIA Director. To assess what should be done regarding release of these records, the Review Board first seeks to inspect them. Accordingly, please authorize the Library's Manuscript Division to permit our inspection and let us know when this authorization has been granted.

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance will constitute its public statement, under penalty of perjury, that (1) CIA has located and disclosed all records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that it could identify through a diligent records search and (2) CIA is aware of no other assassination-related records being withheld from the public. We request that CIA submit its Final Declaration to the Review Board absolutely no later than September 1.

To demonstrate that CIA has disclosed all relevant materials, we make the following recommendations for CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance:

1. CIA Should Describe More Specifically its Searches for Assassination Records

We consider it essential that CIA describe with more specificity the searches that it conducted for records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and to the JFK assassination, including searches done by CIA in the early 1990's. *See* CIA Initial Compl. Stmt., at 1. This is important particularly in light of the fact that CIA record keeping is apparently decentralized among various components of CIA. Therefore, we ask that the Final Declaration confirm that the relevant components of CIA -- the DCI and its offices, the CIA Directorates (Operations, Intelligence, Science & Technology, and Administration), and the CIA office responsible for maintaining CIA's archives -- in some manner inventoried their holdings for the relevant time period for records relating to Oswald or the assassination. To the extent that computer database searches were run by different components of CIA, please confirm that fact and, if possible, identify the names or topics searched.[7]

For its early 1990's searches, the CIA should attach the 1993 search request issued by the Historical Review Group ("HRG") and unclassified versions of memoranda from components of CIA that describe their searches or search results. In addition, we recently requested CIA to re-undertake its searches based on the discovery of certain assassination records that were not identified by CIA's earlier searches.[8] We specifically requested that CIA Director George Tenet issue a directive to all CIA offices requiring them to search their files for assassination records. *See* July 7, 1998 J. Gunn Letter to B. Harrelson. As part of its Final Declaration, we request that CIA document the steps it took in response to our recent request, including attaching the requested search directive from CIA Director Tenet.

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[7] We understand that most CIA records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were collected and identified in 1978 for the House Select Committee on Assassinations and, therefore, currently reside within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection being processed under the JFK Act. It is not our intention to have the CIA re-do exhaustive searches done in 1978. However, we want CIA to demonstrate, in the Final Declaration, that it has searched its various components and that the searches were sufficient to identify major records on the assassination not included within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (it is our understanding that the Sequestered Collection does not encompass post-1978 records).

[8] For example, Oswald's Office of Security file was not identified through CIA's early searches. Similarly, we have identified recent documents related to Oswald.

In addition, the Final Declaration should confirm whether or not CIA has saved any 1963-64 files of the Mexico City Station (and certain files from another station). If those files have not been retained, please confirm that fact in the Final Declaration. To the extent those files have been archived, however, then please confirm that they have been examined for the purpose of determining whether they contain assassination records.

2. CIA Should Identify More Specifically the Records It Has Released Relating to Oswald and the Assassination of President Kennedy

We recommend that CIA identify more specifically the CIA files that have been, or will be, placed in the JFK Collection at NARA. Although we leave this to CIA's discretion, we recommend that, to the extent practicable, CIA attach a non-classified listing of the files encompassed within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. We believe that an identification of the files within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection will demonstrate the breadth and variety of assassination records being made public by the CIA.

3. CIA Should Specifically Account for Certain Important Record Groups, Including Any Destruction of Assassination Records

We request that CIA, in its Final Declaration, account for any important records regarding the assassination that may have been destroyed or that otherwise cannot be located.

For example, CIA has reported that the original surveillance tapes that recorded the Oswald telephone conversations with the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were destroyed, and that CIA has no copies of these audio recordings. However, CIA apparently has preserved certain recordings from Mexico City that post-date the assassination (*see* ¶ A.2 of this letter). We assume that CIA will provide a complete accounting for these records in its response to Review Board request CIA-IR-15, which relates to CIA's "electronic take" from Mexico City for the relevant time period. That response should be attached to the Final Declaration (CIA may also want to attach any formal explanation of this issue that it previously provided to the HSCA). We want to ensure that CIA explains the circumstances for the destruction of the audio recordings of the Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City, confirms that no copies of this audio surveillance has been retained by CIA, and gives a full accounting of the post-assassination Mexico City tapes.

We also request an accounting of certain records of former CIA Director John McCone. In reviewing his files, we noted that certain documents on the assassination (or dated

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around the time of the assassination) are identified on an index as missing or destroyed. In the Final Declaration, please explain, as best as possible, the circumstances for this.

We previously requested an accounting for the files of former Counter-Intelligence Chief James Angleton [CIA-IR-04] in view of the fact that no discrete files of Mr. Angleton had been identified under the JFK Act. Since Mr. Angleton was involved in the CIA's assistance to the Warren Commission, we request that CIA's statement regarding Mr. Angleton's files (*i.e.*, CIA's response to CIA-IR-04) be attached to the Final Declaration.

We also ask that CIA verify that all assassination-related materials from the files of Win Scott, former Chief of Station for Mexico City, are in fact in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection. CIA should describe what was done to inventory the Scott files to make certain that no other assassination-related materials exist in addition to those in the Sequestered Collection.

The Final Declaration should identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files.

4. The CIA Should Identify, and Incorporate by Reference, Each of Its Written Responses to Review Board Requests for Additional Information

CIA has been cooperative in providing written responses to formal and informal requests submitted by the Review Board regarding CIA records. These responses will collectively demonstrate much of the work that CIA has done under the JFK Act. We request that CIA attach to its Final Declaration a list of CIA's written responses and identify each by subject, date of response, and the Review Board request number. The Final Declaration should state that each response is being incorporated therein by reference.

5. CIA Should State That It Is Aware of No Records on Oswald or the Assassination of President Kennedy Being Withheld from the Public

After describing its records search under the JFK Act, identifying the assassination records that it has located, and accounting for records that were destroyed, CIA should include a representation that it is aware of no other undisclosed files or records relating to Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy, including records post-dating the 1978 HSCA investigation. We want the CIA to explicitly confirm, for example, that it is not aware of any undisclosed 1980's or 1990's intelligence or records

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relating to Oswald or the assassination.

As part of its overall representation, we request that CIA attach to the Final Declaration its complete formal response to the Review Board's request for an accounting of all pre-assassination files that CIA had on Lee Harvey Oswald [CIA-16]. We believe that CIA's response to CIA-16 has been very valuable and therefore should be included as part of CIA's Final Declaration.

Also as part of its certification that no assassination records are being withheld, we request that CIA represent that any remaining assassination records being processed after September 1998 are, in fact, duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection (or are peripheral documents that have been identified to the Review Board for processing after September 1998). CIA should explain, in a general way, its methodology for identifying duplicates so that there is a reasonable level of assurance that unique documents are not being withheld.

6. CIA Should State Its Future Commitments With Respect to <u>the Disclosure of Assassination Records</u>

As we discussed with CIA, CIA will undertake certain actions, after September 1998, to continue release of duplicate records and to release postponed records in 2017. We request that CIA, in the Final Declaration, memorialize its commitment to undertake these tasks and describe what will be done (as contemplated in ¶¶ A.3 and A.4 of this letter). In addition, we ask that CIA confirm in the Final Declaration that it will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK Collection.

7. <u>CIA Should Execute the Final Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury</u>

CIA's Final Declaration should be made under penalty of perjury.[9] We have made this request of all agencies that have searched for records under the JFK Act. The Review Board considers it essential that CIA's representations regarding its search for, and release of, assassination records be made under penalty of perjury.

Because of the decentralized nature of CIA records, we ask that the responsible

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[9] The Final Declaration(s) would be executed under oath in the form prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Thus, the appropriate CIA official(s) would state at the conclusion of the Final Declaration(s) that "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in _______, Virginia on this __ day of ___ 1998."

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individual for certain important components of CIA execute an affidavit on behalf of that component certifying, under penalty of perjury, that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. Accordingly, we seek a separate certification from: (1) the DCI area; (2) the Directorate of Operations, including its counterintelligence components; (3) the Directorate of Intelligence; (4) the Directorate of Science & Technology; (4) the Directorate of Administration; and (5) the Office of Information and Management, which we understand to be the office responsible for maintaining CIA's archive records.

Thank you for your continued cooperation in meeting the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act, responding to specific inquiries of the Review Board, and adhering to our compliance program. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief, JFK Assassination Records Collection
NARA

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

In a 15 July 1998 memo to CIA General Counsel, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board outlined what it expects will be contained in CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance, due to be submitted to the Board no later than 1 September 1998. The following is a summary of all points in section B which covers the Declaration:

B. CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance

1. Specific Description of Searches

a.) Confirmation that relevant components inventoried their holdings for the relevant time periods for records on Oswald or the assassination. These relevant components are: DCI area, Directorates (DO, DA, DI, DST), and the AARC

[Input details to be provided by the IROs]

b.) Attach 1993 search request from HRG and "unclassified versions of memos from components that describe searches and results."

[Note: search request is easy; 1993 responses, however, were thin to non-existent]

Attach recent DCI directive, unclassified version of followup memo to CI, LA, CE and results of the searches. If possible, search terms and databases searched should be included.

[Input details to be provided by the above offices]

c.) 1963-64 files of Mexico City Station. If retained, confirm that they have been searched for assassination records. If not, state so.

[DO to provide information]

2. Provide an unclassified index identifying what files are in the JFK Collection at NARA. To the extent possible, attach an unclassified listing of what files are in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection.

[To be done after October 98]

3. Account for Certain Important Record Groups, include. any destruction of Ass. Records

b.) E.g. is from Mexico City tapes. Attach comment on the time and manner of destruction of any records, including information to the effect that destroyed records were first made available to the HSCA (if that is the case)

[DO/IRO to provide input]

c.) Explain missing McCone files relating to the time of the assassination.

[DCI/IRO to provide input]

d.) Attach CIA's statement on James Angleton's files, especially the fact that Angleton was involved in assisting the Warren Commission but no files have been found on this activity.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

e.) Verify that all relevant materials from Win Scott's files are in the HSCA Sequestered Collection. Describe how the Scott files were inventoried to ascertain that all assassination records were included.

[DO/IRO to provide input]

f.) Identify any other records relating to Oswald/assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA holdings.

<u>4. Include CIA's Written Responses for ARRB Requests for Additional Information, with Cross References for each.</u>

[HRP files]

<u>5. Statement that CIA is Aware of No Records on Oswald/Assassination Being Withheld from the Public.</u>

b.) Include CIA response to CIA-16

c.) State that all assassination records being processed after Sept 98 are duplicates of records already in the JFK Collection or have been identified by the ARRB as peripheral.

Explain our methodology for identifying duplicates.

[HRP will handle all answers to No 5]

<u>6. CIA's Future Commitments to Disclosure of Newly Discovered Assassination Records</u>

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FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: Barry Harrelson
Fax #: 703-613-3063
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: Search Terms

Date: July 22, 1998
Pages: 2, including this cover sheet.

COMMENTS:

Search Terms

Lee Harvey Oswald
Harvey Lee Oswald
Marina Oswald
Jack Ruby
Exaction
Ex Action
Executive Action
Assassination
President Kennedy
John F. Kennedy
Kennedy Assassination
JFK
JFK Assassination
Presidential Threats
Threats to U.S. President
GPFLOOR
GPIDEAL
Assassination Attempts
Warren Commission
HSCA
House Select Committee on Assassinations

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cherne, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III

file

HSCA NAMES

Alferov, Ivan Gavilovich
Alpizar Perez, Evelio
Alvardo, Gilberto
Alvarez, Ramon Joseph
Alvarez Fernandez, Santiago
Alvarez Rodriguez, Santiago
Amron, Irving
Araujo Bernal, Lepoldo
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Artime Buesa, Manuel
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Bagley, Tennent H. (Pete)
Bakulin, Valentin Vasilyev
Balbuena, Luis
Barker, Bernard
Barnes, Winifred C.
Bartes Clarins, Francisco Antonio
Bartes, Frank
Bartine, Dominick E.
Batista Falla, laureano
Bentin, Sam
Blanco Fernandez, Juan Francisco
Bloc(k), Morris
Bosch Avila, Orlando
Browder, Edward, Jr.
Buetos-Videla, C.Z. (aka Charlotte L. Zehrung)
Bustamente O'Leary, Jose Angel
Cabell, Earle
Cain, Richard S.
Carballido, Emilio
Cavillo, Manuel
Cellini, Dino Vincent
Charles, Clemard Joseph
Chayes, Abram
Cherne, Leo
Christ, David L.
Cisneros Diaz, Rogelio
Citrynell, Harold

Cobb, June Viola
Coe, Virginius Frank
Conein, Lucien E.
Conte Aguero, Luis
Croizer, Ross L.
Cubela, Rolando
Cuesta Del Valle, Antonio
Dalzell, William
Davidson, Irving
Davis, Rudolph Richard, Jr.
Davis, Thomas E.
Davis, Bruce F.
De Varona, Manuel Antonio
De Torres, Bernardo
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diaz, Lanz Marcos
Diaz-Lanz, Pedro Julio
Diosdado, Cesar
Donovan, John
Du Bois, David (aka Mc Canns, David Graham)
Duque Miyar, Evelio
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Dutkaniez, Joseph
Echevarria Valdivia, Homer Samuel
Espinosa-Hernandez, Victor
Fernandez, Alberto
Ferre, Luis Albert
Ferrie, David W.
Flick Charles, E
Flores, Jose Jesus Clarck
Frank, Susan Heligman
Galan Ric, Victor
Garanin, Fedor Alexeevich
Garrison, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gibson, Richard T.
Godoy y Solis, Joaquin
Golitsyn, Anatoliy
Golub, Grigoriy Y.
Gonzales, Reinol

Guitart Camizano, Agustin
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Halperin, Maurice Hyman
Hem(m)ing, Gerald Patrick
Hernandez Sanchez, Carlos Eduardo
Hernandez Hechevarria, Alberto
Hoke, John Lindsay
Hunt, Everette Howard, Jr.
Isaacs, Harold
Itkin, Herbert
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Jones, Louis Henry
Kail, Samuel G.
Kantor, Marvin
Kara-Patnitsky, Waldemar boris
Karty, Floryan R.
Keenan, Thoman J.
Koch, Gene John
Korengold, Robert J. (Bud)
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Kutner, Louis
Laborde, Lawrencw J.
Lawson, John Howard
Leonov, Nickolay Sergeyev
Lesnick, Max
Loganov, Valentin Sergeyevich
Lopez, Gilbert Polocarpo
Lorenz, Marita
Luce, Clare Booth
Lynch, Grayson
Maheu, Robert A.
Martin, Willian Hamilton
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
Mastrocola, Bruce G. (aka Leo Cherne)
Matlak, Dorthe K. (Mrs.)
McCord, James W.
McDonald, Hugh
McLaney, Michael

McLendon, Gordon
McMillan, Prisilla Johnson
McVicker, John A
Merloa, Joseph R.
Meyer, Karl
Miller, Newton
Mirabal-Diaz, Alfredo M.
Mitchell, Bernon
Moore, J. Walton
Morales, David S.
Morales Navarette, Ricardo
Morgan, Eilliam
Morgan, William Alexander
Morua, Martin
Moss, Edward K.
Nagell, Richard Case
Newton, William J.
Nobregas, George
Nunez Portuondo Emilio
Obyedkov, Ivan Dimitriyrvich
Odio, Eunice
Otero, Rolando
O'Sullivan, Fredrick Stephen
Paneque Batista, Victor Manuel
Pawley, William D.
Pedroso Amores, Acelo
Perez Alamo, Duney
Petrulli, Nicholas
Phillips, David Atlee
Pico Ramon, Reinaldo
Pino Machado, Quintin
Pittman, John Orion
Posada, Luis Clemente
Posey, Buford Wallace
Prio Socarras, Carols
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ramirez Ortiz, Antillio
Randall, Fredrick C.
Rasco, Jose Ignacio

Ray, Manuel
Reggab, Mohammed
Ricciardelli, Libero
Rodriguez, Emilio Americo
Rodriguez y Gonzales, Armesto Napolean
Rodriguez, Tamayo, Francisco
Rodriguez Lopez, Rogelio
Rorke, Alexander
Rothman, Norman
Ruby, Jack
Ruiz, Pedro
Ruiz Perez, Ortestes G.
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Seymour, William Houston
Shaw, Clay
Shaw, Robert Taylor
Sierra, Martinee Paulino
Sloboda, Vladimir
Snyder, Richard E.
Soto Vazquez, Antonio
Stoner, Jessie B.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Ulman, Vlastimil
Uzolv, Sergy
Veciana Blanch, Antonio Carlos
Veqa Rerez, Manuel
Wasserman, Jack
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III
Whitehouse Insua, Eduardo Julius
Wichtrich, Alfonso Rudolph
Wickes, Alastar
Wilson Hudson, Carlos Juan
Winston, Henry
Zambernardi, Robert M.
Zarraga Martinez, Carlos

13-00000

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY
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RELEASE IN FULL
2000

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant

to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

13-00000

ltr file

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

General Counsel

29 July 1998

Ronald Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Haron:

Congratulations on your recent appointment as General Counsel to the President John F. Kennedy Records Review Board ("Review Board"). You have my assurances that, as the Review Board enters its final stages of the review and release of records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination, you will continue to have CIA's full cooperation.

I am in receipt of the 15 July 1998 letter from former General Counsel Jeremy Gunn in which he outlines CIA's outstanding obligations under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). While I recognize that much work needs to be done over the next few months, I am confident that J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer for CIA's Historical Review Program ("HRP"), together with the rest of the Agency team dedicated to document review under the JFK Act, will complete the outstanding obligations set forth in that letter.

With respect to the Review Board's request that CIA submit a Final Declaration of Compliance under penalty of perjury, we are in the process of identifying the appropriate CIA official to sign such a Declaration. Both HRP and my office will work closely with you to ensure the Declaration contains the recommendations made in Mr. Gunn's letter.

With respect to the suggestion that CIA execute a separate affidavit by an officer from each of the CIA's four Directorates as well as from the DCI area, the Office of Information Management, and the counterintelligence components of the Directorate of Operations, I believe that this is an unnecessarily cumbersome and confusing means by which to attest to Agency-wide record searches. Rather, I propose that the Executive Director of the CIA appoint one senior official as a Records Validation Officer ("RVO"). An RVO has the authority to locate, identify, and preserve records created or maintained by any Agency Directorate or component which are actually or

Ronald Haron, Esq.

potentially relevant to the subject matter of the search. An RVO also has authority to execute affidavits or to testify under oath with respect to all the record searches done by every Directorate or component of the CIA. For your information, this is the usual method by which CIA attests under oath to record searches done by more than one Directorate in criminal and civil litigation before the federal courts.

I appreciate this opportunity to assure you of CIA's continued cooperation with the Review Board. Should you have any further questions or concerns regarding this matter, you may contact Linda Cipriani of my office at (703) 874-3124.

Sincerely,

Dawn R Eilenberger
for Robert M. McNamara, Jr.

Ronald Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani:nl 76124 (27 Jul 98)

OGC-98-51950

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - GC
1 - LCC
1 - Lit File - LDG00021
1 - RDC FYI
1 - OGC Registry

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

August 10, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. McNamara:

Thank you for your July 29 letter regarding CIA's submission of its Final Declaration of Compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). I am writing to address CIA's desire that one official certify, under oath and on behalf of the entire agency, that CIA has conducted a thorough search for records relating to President Kennedy's assassination. Your letter and concerns were brought directly to the attention of Review Board members for their consideration. We understand that CIA would prefer that each CIA Directorate not be required to certify separately that it has done an adequate search for records on the assassination, as the Review Board had requested.

The Review Board specifically considered your proposal that the certifying official be a records validation officer appointed by the CIA's Executive Director. The Review Board requests, however, that the CIA's certification be made at the highest levels of the CIA. The Review Board believes that certification by a records validation officer would be insufficient to assure, to the fullest extent possible, public confidence in the CIA's representations that it has searched for and released all relevant materials relating to President Kennedy's assassination. In view of the importance of the CIA's formal representations regarding its holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald and President Kennedy's assassination, the Review Board requests that CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance be certified, under oath, both by CIA's Executive Director and its General Counsel.

I ask that CIA confirm that it will agree to this manner of certification.

BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: T. Jeremy Gunn • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Samoluk

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
August 10, 1998
Page 2

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: Linda Cipriani, Esq.,
CIA

J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

13-00000

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

13-00000

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

DA/OIM/EdCohen:bkh/31352 (11 Aug 98)
share/oim/ed/oim/irg/pjt/jfk/dd draft 980812.doc

Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DCI IRO
1 - DA IRO
1 - DI IRO
1 - DO IRO
1 - DS&T IRO
1 - D/OIM
1 - C/IRG
1 - C/HRP
1 - OIM/HRP/HRO (Barry Harrelson)
1 - DA Registry
1 - OIM/Subj
1 - OIM/Chrono

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25 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

(AIUO) I was requested to send the EB 02-98 (Final Document Search - JFK). The request was distributed to all of the Directorate via Lotus notes on Monday 17 August 1998, the notice was placed in the system on the 18th and received by the Directorate personnel on the 19th. Additionally, we placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

~~ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

SUBJECT: (U) Electronic Dissemination of Employee Bulletin

IMS/ESG/HCS Fwickham x44448:mjk (21 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG Chrono File

13-00000

27 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
Chief, Information Management Staff,
External Support Group

SUBJECT: DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

1. This memorandum is in response to the request from the staff of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). The staff requested that the CIA issue an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination Records. OIM-98-0081 dated 30 July 1998 was issued.

2. DO/Information Management Staff ran a corporate search of COMET, the DO's electronic message repository. That search generated some 128 hits. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff reviewed the search results and selected three records for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

3. The three selected documents have been sanitized with Ms. Combs' concurrence. The sanitization is more extensive than JFK guidelines because of the documents' proximity to the present and to current sources and methods.

4. The documents are not herewith attached. They are being provided separately by DO/IMS/ESG/HCS.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

SUBJECT: (U) DO Results of New Search for JFK Assassination Records

IMS/ESG/HCS FWickham x44448:mjk (28 August 1998)

Distribution:
Original - C/HRP/OIM
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG Chrono File

13-00000

D/01/m SEP 4 1998

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Office of General Counsel

31 August 1998

Ronald G. Haron, Esq.
General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Haron:

This letter responds to your 19 August 1998 request that the Central Intelligence Agency confirm, in writing, who will certify its compliance statement. This is to confirm that Edmund Cohen, the CIA's Director of Information Management, will sign.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. He is also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. He oversees classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. He manages the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serves as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. He coordinates the conduct of all special searches within the Agency and the release of any information uncovered in such searches. Finally, as Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is responsible to conduct, on behalf of the Agency, liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, and with the Information Security Oversight Office; and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

We believe that Mr. Cohen is clearly the most knowledgeable individual within the Agency, by position and experience, to execute such a certification. Based upon our short telephone discussion, I understand that he is, in addition, at least as senior as the anticipated signatories from other agencies or departments from which the Board has requested certifications. From a practical standpoint, we at CIA make a concerted effort to assure that the most knowledgeable individuals speak on behalf of

13-00000

the Agency on important matters such as this. It is for this reason that we have chosen Mr. Cohen.

If you wish to discuss this matter further, please call me on (703) 874-3123.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Associate General Counsel

Mr. Ronald G. Haron, Esq.

DCI/OGC/LD/RJEatinger, Jr. 76123 (31 Aug 1998)

OGC-98-52328

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - SA/ExDir (Dunn) (C)
1 - PDGC
1 - D/OIM
1 - ADGC (Burke)
1 - CSI/HRG (Harrelson)
1 - C/LD
1 - RJE Signer
1 - Lit File (LDG00021)
1 - OGC Registry

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D6 SEP 18 1998

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

		ACTION	INFO			ACTION	INFO
1	DCI		X	11	OPA		
2	DDCI		X	12	DDA		
3	DDCI/CM			13	DDI		
4	ADCI/MS			14	DDO		X
5	EXDIR/CIA	X		15	DDS&T		
6	CHMN/NIC			16	D/OIM		X
7	IG			17	HRP		X
8	GC	X		18			
9	COMPT			19			
10	OCA		X	20			

SUSPENSE DATE: 21 September 1998

DOCUMENT NO: ER 98-4210

Contact Betsy Quint-Moran (x37929) regarding suspense items.

COORDINATION/ROUTING:

EXDIR office to take lead in preparing and coordinating response with OGC.

SUMMARY:

The JFK Assassination Records Review Board has received the Agency's Final Declaration of Compliance. The Board is requesting certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or alternatively that the EXDIR and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. Absent the requested certifications, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials necessary and requests the DDO be made available ASAP, but no later than 21 September, for examination.

Date: 14 September 1998
Received in ER: 14 September 1998
Action Officer: Tracie Matecka x37932

DCI EXEC REG

13-00000

FAX TRANSMISSION

ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD
600 E STREET, N.W. SECOND FLOOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
202-724-0088
FAX: 202-724-0457

To: George Tenet, DCI **Date:** 9/14/98

Fax #: 703-482-3064 **Pages:** 3, including this cover sheet.

From: John R. Tunheim, Chair

Subject: CIA Compliance with the JFK Act

COMMENTS:

13-00000

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

September 14, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

The Honorable George Tenet
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tenet:

We have received the CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance (dated September 2, 1998) regarding the completion of CIA's work under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act"). On behalf of the Board, I am writing to express the Board's disappointment that CIA has been unwilling to have the most senior officials of your agency attest to CIA's compliance with the JFK Act.

The Board had first asked CIA to submit separate certifications from each directorate, as well as the office of the DCI, attesting to their searches for assassination-related records. We stressed these measures to obtain assurance that all components of the CIA had complied with the JFK Act, as well as to assure the American people that the U.S. Government had left no stone unturned in releasing records on the assassination of President Kennedy. The CIA refused to submit separate certifications, insisting it was their practice for one official to speak on behalf of the entire Agency. The Board then requested that CIA's most senior officials, the Executive Director and General Counsel, certify CIA's Final Declaration of Compliance under the JFK Act. CIA refused.

In 1992, CIA Director Gates testified to Congress that he was "determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession" that related to the Kennedy assassination. *See The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 282 Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1992). The Board has merely asked that CIA's highest officials confirm that they are fully confident that this commitment has been fulfilled. While we recognize the substantial documentation provided by CIA to demonstrate its work under the JFK Act, we are disappointed that CIA has been uncooperative in responding

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • **DEPUTY DIRECTOR:** *Thomas E. Samoluk*

to this most simple of requests. For me personally and for other members of the Board, this raises significant concerns as to whether CIA's highest officials actually have confidence in the reliability of the results for which the Review Board and CIA have expended considerable effort, energy and resources over the past five years. Such concerns may be noted in our Final Report.

Therefore, the Review Board specifically requests that CIA submit certifications by the individual directorates, as well as the office of the DCI, or, in the alternative, that the Executive Director and the General Counsel certify that CIA has met its obligations under the JFK Act and certify that no records on the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald have been knowingly withheld. We continue to believe that these more stringent certifications are needed, in part because of CIA's belated discovery of core records relating to the assassination.

Absent certification by the highest levels of CIA, as sought by the Board, the Board considers depositions of senior Agency officials to be absolutely necessary. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under the JFK Act, the Board requests that CIA make the Deputy Director for Operations immediately available for deposition. The Directorate of Operations has been the primary repository for records directly relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination. In fact, the Directorate of Operations only recently uncovered additional records relating to a KGB source with information relating to Lee and Marina Oswald. We ask that the Deputy Director of Operations be made available for examination as soon as possible, but no later than September 21. He will be expected to testify on behalf of the Directorate of Operations regarding its record systems, and its searches for assassination records, including searches conducted by the Counter-intelligence staff.

Thank you for your cooperation, and please inform us as soon as possible regarding CIA's compliance with this Review Board request.

Sincerely,

John R. Tunheim

John R. Tunheim
Chair

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

September 16, 1998

VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL

Robert M. McNamara, Jr., Esq.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Gary M. Stern
General Counsel
National Archives and Records Administration
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, Maryland 20740-6001

Re: CIA Compliance With the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Messrs. McNamara and Stern:

The Review Board considers it essential that certain remaining obligations of the CIA under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act") be identified and memorialized before the Board ceases operations on September 30, 1998.

I therefore am enclosing, for your agencies' consideration, a draft Memorandum of Understanding setting forth the outstanding obligations of CIA under the JFK Act. We believe that it is in the interest of the CIA, the National Archives, the Review Board, and ultimately the public to put in writing our collective understanding of the additional work that CIA must undertake and the reasonable time frames within which it should be completed. It is our intent to reduce any future ambiguity or disagreements that may potentially arise as CIA completes its work. We also believe that this MOU will facilitate the ability of the Archivist of the United States to carry out his statutory obligation to certify to the President that all assassination-related records have been released in accordance with the Act (*see* 44 U.S.C. § 2107(12)).

The terms of a Memorandum of Understanding have been discussed among the staffs of the Review Board, the National Archives, and CIA. We believe that the enclosed draft proposal is a fair accommodation of competing interests. Please review the

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: *Thomas E. Samoluk*

enclosed draft MOU so that we can resolve any outstanding issues and ultimately reach an agreement on an MOU before September 30, 1998.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Ronald G. Haron

Ronald G. Haron
General Counsel

cc: J. Barry Harrelson, Senior Review Officer,
CIA

Steven D. Tilley, Chief,
JFK Collection, NARA

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING
CONTINUING OBLIGATIONS OF THE CIA UNDER THE JFK ACT

WHEREAS the operations of the Assassination Records Review Board ("Review Board") cease on September 30, 1998 in accordance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 ("JFK Act");

WHEREAS the JFK Act provides that "the provisions of this Act [as applied to Federal agencies] shall continue in effect until such time as the Archivist certifies to the President and the Congress that all assassination records have been made available to the public in accordance with [the] Act" (JFK Act § 12); and

WHEREAS the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), the Review Board, and the National Archives and Records Administration ("NARA") seek to ensure that the CIA completes its continuing obligations under the JFK Act in a timely fashion;

IT IS HEREBY AGREED by the CIA (including any successor intelligence agency), the Review Board, and NARA that:

1. All CIA records identified as assassination records under the JFK Act will be placed in the JFK Assassination Records Collection ("JFK Collection") at NARA in College Park, Maryland by September 30, 1998 unless otherwise noted in this Memorandum of Understanding;

2. CIA may transmit the following assassination records to the JFK Collection after September 30, 1998:

   a. Duplicate documents within the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets).[1] The CIA will ensure that, by September 30, 1999, duplicate copies of documents from the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection (both hardcopy and microfilm sets) will be placed in the JFK Collection.

   b. Duplicate documents within the working files of CIA officer Russ Holmes. The CIA will ensure that, by December 31, 1998, duplicate copies of documents from the Russ Holmes working files will be placed in the JFK Collection.

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[1] "Duplicate documents" are exact copies of documents that are already publicly available in the JFK Collection as part of other CIA files or records.

13-00000

c. The audio tapes, and any transcriptions or summaries made by the CIA, from surveillance of certain Soviet and Cuban diplomatic facilities in Mexico City for the period November 22, 1963 to January 1964. These tapes (approximately 185), and any transcriptions or summaries, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by September 30, 1999. The CIA will submit these tapes to the JFK Collection on a rolling basis, as CIA completes review of individual tapes. Any postponements shall be identified to NARA and postponed information forwarded to the "Protected Collection" (*i.e.*, the classified, postponed records within the JFK Collection) in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act.

d. Working files from the DCI area, mostly from DCI's Executive Registry, that had been compiled in anticipation of passage of the JFK Act. These working materials, which consist mostly of duplicate documents, shall be placed in the JFK Collection by Decmber 31, 1998.

e. A document containing a list of names and cryptonyms created by the HSCA staff. Given the detailed nature of information in this document (RIF No. 104-10061-10115), the Board agrees that this can be processed by December 31, 1998.

f. Any other non-duplicate assassination-related records created or discovered by the CIA after September 30, 1998.

3. The CIA will review its equities in records that have been referred to it, and the CIA will cooperate with NARA and other Federal agencies to ensure that such records are released under the standards of the JFK Act and placed into the JFK Collection. The CIA will review the following major categories of records:

a. Church Committee records identified by the Review Board in August 1998 as being assassination-related.

b. Records from the files of Robert F. Kennedy, maintained at the JFK Library, that the Library and/or Review Board has identified as either assassination records or as records that would enhance the historical unnderstanding of the assassination.

c. Records of the Rockefeller Commission, maintained by the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress, to the extent that the Library of Congress identifies assassination records that are not available as part of the Ford Library set of Rockefeller Commision documents in the JFK Collection.

d. The Army's Investigative Records Repository file on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz.

The CIA will complete its review and and recommendations for release of the major record categories listed above no later than April 30, 1999. To the extent there may be other agency documents requiring CIA review under JFK Act, the CIA will continue to undertake such review.

4. The CIA shall handle the certain original or postponed records in the following manner:

a. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection," in accordance with Section 5(e) of the JFK Act, the originals of all postponed records from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file, Office of Security file, and "A" file.

b. By September 30, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the hardcopy original of Marina Oswald's 201.

c. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all of the original microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection.

d. By September 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" all records with postponed information to the extent that such records are not available on the CIA-HSCA microfilm rolls transmitted to NARA.

e. By October 30, 1998, the CIA will transmit to the "Protected Collection" the entire Oswald 201 file that was printed from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection microfilm (this will provide the CIA with time to make its own reference copy).

f. By December 31, 1998, CIA shall transmit to the "Protected Collection" the originals of all postponed records from the Russ Holmes working files (this will permit the CIA to process duplicate records in the Holmes Collection by that date).

5. The Review Board and the CIA have determined that certain materials reviewed under the JFK Act are not believed to be relevant to the Kennedy assassination (designated "NBR"), but nonetheless should ultimately be placed in the JFK

Collection. These NBR materials are: certain files contained within the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection; certain CIA work files relating to Yuri Nosenko (but not related to the assassination);[2] certain materials within the Russ Holmes Collection; and the complete version of certain records, portions of which were designated as assassination-related by the Review Board in connection with its requests for additional records and information. These hard copy materials will be physically retained by the CIA and then forwarded to the JFK Collection for public release by October 26, 2017. Within two months of the execution of this agreement, the CIA shall provide to NARA, in writing, a list of the hardcopy files being retained until 2017 and confirm the arrangements for securing this material. NARA shall have the right to inspect and inventory this material for archival and administrative purposes before 2017, and these materials shall be made available for inspection by NARA upon its request.

6. The CIA shall cooperate and coordinate with NARA in carrying out the provisions of the JFK Act, including Section 5(g) of the JFK Act, which provides for the "periodic review" of postponed assassination records. Such review "shall address the public disclosure of additional assassination records in the Collection under the standards of the Act" (§ 5(g)(2) (A)) and "shall serve to downgrade and declassifiy security classified information" (§ 5(g)(2)(C)).

7. The CIA recognizes that, in the year 2017, "[e]ach assassination record shall be publicly disclosed in full . . . ." JFK Act § 5 (g). To the extent that records are postponed but are to be released on a date prior to 2017, NARA shall release the records on the date the Review Board set for release. If the CIA seeks continued postponement of any record in the year 2017 (or an earlier scheduled release date), it will be incumbent upon the CIA to obtain from the President "certification" that continued postponement is necessary. *See* JFK Act § 5(g)(2)(D). Within six months of the scheduled release date, the CIA shall be responsible for notifying NARA of any specifc records, including any records within the microfilm rolls for the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, for which it will seek Presidential certification of continued postponement.

With respect to the NBR material identified in paragraph 5, these NBR materials shall be physically transferred to NARA by October 26, 2017 for release. In the event CIA seeks further postponement of any NBR material, it shall identify that material to NARA and seek Presidential certification that the material needs to be postponed.

---

[2] The Nosenko materials related to the assassination have been placed in the JFK Collection.

8. With respect to the review of other agency documents referred to CIA, the review of any new assassination records, or the periodic review of postponed assassination records, the CIA shall, in good faith, continue to apply the postponement criteria of the JFK Act as previously interpreted by decisions of the Review Board.

9. This Memorandum of Understanding is intended to clarify the CIA's obligations under the JFK Act in view of the expiration of the Review Board's term on September 30, 1998. This Memorandum of Understanding shall not be interpreted to limit CIA's obligations under the JFK Act.

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

David W. Carey
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

Laura A. Denk
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Date:____________________ Signed:________________________

John W. Carlin
Archivist of the United States

13-00000

SEP 21 1998

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

This will respond to your 14 September 1998 letter regarding Central Intelligence Agency compliance with the "JFK Act."

I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September 1998 Declaration of Compliance—signed, as you note, by CIA's Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen—confirms my judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

As Director of Information Management, Mr. Cohen is directly responsible for CIA's records systems and for ensuring the adequacy of CIA's search, review, and release of documents under the JFK Act. Mr. Cohen signed the Agency's Declaration of Compliance because he was the most senior Agency official with direct personal knowledge that its statements were accurate and complete. There was no more appropriate signatory.

In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

13-00000

REFERENCE

14-00000
104-10332-10023 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

FILE COPY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 September 1998

Mr. John R. Tunheim
Chair, Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E Street, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Re: JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dear Mr. Tunheim:

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I have no doubt whatsoever that the CIA has fully met its obligations to locate, review, and release "assassination records" as defined in the JFK Act. The Agency's 2 September 1998 Declaration of Compliance—signed, as you note, by CIA's Director of Information Management, Edmund Cohen—confirms my judgment. I have full confidence in the scope of the Agency's searches as described in Mr. Cohen's recent declaration.

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In sum, I understand that the appropriate CIA staff officers have worked diligently to locate and disclose to the JFK Board all relevant records in the Agency's possession and that they do not believe any other relevant records are being withheld from the Board. Mr. Cohen's declaration confirms my understanding.

I trust that this will meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

George J. Tenet

14-00000

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Special Assistant/EXDIR

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

18 September 1998

Mr. Cohen,

Jim Oliver called and wanted me to pass on the following message:

Talked Judge Tunheim and he is willing to release the two letters (Cohen & Tenet) and refrain from other derogatory comments if the Carey declaration is substantially like the ones Ed signed.

Michelle

He still would like you to give him a call on 31805.

14-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Washington, D.C. 20505

DECLARATION OF DAVID W. CAREY

I, DAVID W. CAREY, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Executive Director of the of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held the position of Executive Director since July of 1997 and have served with the CIA for over 29 years in a variety of operational, staff, and management positions.

2. As the Executive Director I am responsible, on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI), for the overall daily management of the Central Intelligence Agency, for strategic planning and coordination, and for the development and execution of the Agency's annual program. In order to carry out these responsibilities, I have been delegated all authorities vested in the DCI and DDCI except as prohibited by law or Agency regulation or policy.

3. The purpose of this declaration is to provide an assurance that the Central Intelligence Agency: (1) has made a diligent records search to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (2) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board. I make these and the following statements (including those in the attachments by reference) based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations ("DO"), Science and Technology ("DS&T"), and Administration ("DA") and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107) and other statutes,

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assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

5. There are six attachments to this declaration, which are incorporated by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released (separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration). Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in our records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. And Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

6. Based upon the foregoing and the attachments (Attachments I through VI, which are incorporated by reference) I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107).

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE) ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 23rd day of September 1998.

David W. Carey
DAVID W. CAREY

UNCLASSIFIED

From the Desk of James R. Oliver
Chief, Historical Review Program

NOTE FOR: James R. Oliver@DA
FROM: James R. Oliver
OFFICE: OIM
DATE: 09/24/98 11:12:17 AM
SUBJECT: EXDIR Declaration Signature, 23 September 1998

Memorandum for the Record:

This is to confirm that I replaced the first page of the ExDir's signed JFK Declaration, dated 23 September, with letterhead stationery to assure that the statement was comparable to that signed by Mr. Cohen, as earlier requested by the Board Chairman. The wording of the declaration was unchanged; only the letterhead stationery was changed. I called Michelle in the EXDIR's Officer to confirm that the Executive Director would have no problem with such a change (simply replacing the first page). She called back, saying that she had asked Mr. Carey, and he had no problem with this change.

Mr. Harrelson of this office will be hand carrying the EXDIR's declaration to the Board today. At the same time, and in accordance with my agreement with Chairman Tunheim of yesterday, Mr. Harrelson will be retrieving the earlier declaration signed by Mr. Cohen, the DCI letter of 16 September, both of which are being withdrawn. The Judge Tunheim also agreed yesterday that since the EXDIR had agreed to sign the declaration that there will no longer be a need for the critical language in their report on this issue.

James R. Oliver

CC: Edmund Cohen@DA
R. Bruce Burke@DCI
Sent on 24 September 1998 at 11:12:17 AM

UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

I, Edmund Cohen, hereby declare and say:

1. I presently serve as the Director of Information Management for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I have held this position since February 1994; I have also held the position of Director of the Office of Information Management since October 1997. I have served with the CIA for over 30 years in a variety of intelligence, legal, staff, and management positions.

2. As Director of Information Management, I am responsible for providing oversight and direction to the Agency's records and classification management activities, and information declassification and release programs. I am also responsible for the development and maintenance of automated tools to support these activities. I oversee classification and declassification policies, procedures, and practices. I manage the Agency Archives and Records Center, and serve as the CIA Archivist and the Agency Information Review Officer. I coordinate the conduct of special searches within the Agency and the release of information uncovered in such searches. I am also the Agency's official liaison with the National Archives and Records Administration and its Office of the Federal Register, with the Information Security Oversight Office, and with any other entities on any matters within the responsibility or authority of the Director of Information Management.

3. I make the following statements based upon my personal knowledge, information made available to me in my official capacity, the advice of CIA's Office of General Counsel, and the conclusions I reached in accordance therewith.

4. The Central Intelligence Agency: (a) has made diligent records searches to locate and disclose to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (the Board) all records in its possession relating to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy; and (b) is aware of no other assassination-related records in its possession being withheld from the Board.

5. With respect to the overall issues of search and review, and as explained in the attachments or otherwise included by reference, the CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI), Operations (DO), Science and Technology (DS&T), and Administration (DA) and the DCI Area Information Review Officer have certified to me that their respective offices or directorates have properly and fully responded to requests from the Board. In addition to these certifications, I have had briefings on the principal searches conducted and have had all of my questions answered to my satisfaction. Accordingly, I believe that the Central Intelligence Agency has worked diligently with the Board to locate and declassify, consistent with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, as amended, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. 2107 note, and other statutes, assassination-related records in its possession, in order to make such records available to the public.

6. There are six attachments, numbered I through VI, to this declaration, which I incorporate herein by reference. Attachment I addresses the universe and scope of documents that have been the subject of CIA's review. Attachment II describes the methodology and types of the searches conducted. Attachment III describes, in general, the records declassified and released. Separate detailed indices will be provided when documents are released to the National Archives and Records Administration. Attachment IV addresses questions raised by the Board regarding perceived gaps in CIA's records, including possible loss or destruction of records. Attachment V discusses specific requests from the Board and incorporates specific CIA responses by reference. Attachment VI addresses commitments which this Agency makes with regard to provision to the National Archives and Records Administration of assassination-related documents, including any documents which may be newly discovered or created subsequent to the tenure of the Board.

Declaration of EDMUND COHEN

7. Based upon the foregoing and Attachments I through VI, I believe that the CIA is in full compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING, INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS I THROUGH VI, ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed this 2 day of September 1998.

Edmund Cohen

14-00000

Attachment I

Attachment I

Universe and Scope of CIA Documents

Addressed Related to the JFK Assassination

Summary. This Attachment discusses CIA material examined in order to fulfill the requirements of the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act). It addresses the types of CIA documents found in the records of earlier investigations, including that of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and materials and files recovered in response to searches conducted in 1992 and thereafter. It discusses the process by which documents became "assassination-related records."

Discussion. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided large numbers of documents and materials over the years in support of successive reviews and investigations related to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We estimate that the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages comprise the "CIA collection" of documents associated with prior assassination reviews, including duplicates. In addition, we estimate that in responses to the JFK Act, CIA has reviewed over 100,000 pages of documents from the National Archives, the Ford, Johnson, and Kennedy Presidential Libraries and miscellaneous papers from the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, and the Senate Select (Church) Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

The documentation exists in many forms, from original contemporaneous material, such as field reporting from overseas or analytic reports, to material generated specifically as an Agency response to investigation questions. The largest "CIA collection," as such, is associated with the records of the House Select Committee on

Assassinations (HSCA).[1] The HSCA brought together in one place in 1978 the principal documents retrieved over the course of years from earlier investigations, including the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, and the Church Committee.

The Warren Commission in 1963 and 1964 was the first major review of the JFK Assassination. Existing records suggest that CIA provided roughly 4,000 pages of documentation to the Warren Commission review, plus testimony by Richard Helms and John McCone. The Warren Commission pursued matters related primarily to events and actions directly associated with the assassination event, including materials from CIA's Mexico City Station, which were considered relevant because of a visit to Mexico City by Lee Harvey Oswald shortly before the assassination.

The Rockefeller Commission in 1975 and Church Committee investigation in 1975 and 1976 were focused on allegations of wrongdoing by the CIA. Nonetheless, as a part of these investigations they yielded information which, to many, appeared to relate in some way to the assassination, such as an operational capability or willingness to consider assassination as an intelligence method.

From 1976 through 1979 the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) pursued additional leads, generating still further documentation. The HSCA ultimately brought together within its broad scope of investigation many of the documents from the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission and the Church Committee. This collection ultimately became the "HSCA sequestered collection," which altogether contains an equivalent of over 300,000 pages, in paper, photographs, tapes, and microfilm media, including duplicates. Because the myriad conspiracy theories included possible Soviet, Cuban, Mafia or right-wing American involvement, the scope of the HSCA investigation included anything or anyone that might appear to support those theories, including historical institutional behavior patterns. Further, although this sequestered collection was considered to be CIA's, it contains documents from other agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and over 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material.

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[1] The HSCA sequestered collection reflects the major corpus of CIA material or information reviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations (or to which they had access) during the 1976-1979 time frame. The pulling together of this collection was coordinated by the Committee and they defined what it was to include. This Collection has been physically held by CIA since 1979, although CIA was not authorized access until 1992, when permission was given by Congress to review the material in preparation for responding to the JFK Act.

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The HSCA sequestered collection is contained in 64 boxes of multimedia material, including paper, photographs, and microfilm which have been loosely organized into major categories of information. Boxes 1 through 34 are mostly material collected by the CIA's Directorate of Operations, the FBI, and other Government agencies, including field reporting and handwritten notes. They also include newspaper articles, name traces performed in response to requests by the HSCA staff, and copies of other documents such as the CIA Inspector General's 1967 report on CIA plots against Castro and Richard Helms' executive session testimony before the HSCA.

Boxes 35 through 63 of this collection are largely records of CIA's Legislative Counsel, Inspector General, General Counsel, Office of Security, and Directorate of Science and Technology, as well as internal records of the HSCA staff. They consist of reports, memoranda, transcripts, cables, letters, newspaper clippings, photographs, and charts. Box 64 contains 72 reels of microfilm—the equivalent of roughly 72 more boxes of paper documents. This material includes the file which the Directorate of Operations maintained on Lee Harvey Oswald (the 201 file) as well as similar files on additional individuals. Many of the microfilm documents duplicate other documents in the other boxes.

While not a part of the sequestered collection, a separate "Oswald 201 File" has served as a CIA repository for JFK assassination-related material over the years and to a large extent material in this file is duplicative of material in the sequestered collection. Only a few documents were in the file at the time of the assassination. The bulk of the approximately 26,000 pages currently in this file consists of documents collected immediately after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation. Included are a large number of third agency documents, primarily from the FBI. Other major additions to the Oswald 201 file include relevant Mexico City Station files and material generated by various FOIA requests and investigations, such as that of New Orleans District Attorney, James Garrison.

Assassination-related materials beyond the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file which have been located since 1992 generally fall into three categories. First, there are new documents which have been generated since 1978, such as defector reports that mention rumors or perceptions of conspiracies or newspaper or other open

source materials related to an individual associated with the assassination. Second, in a number of cases targeted areas of inquiry or more precise definitions of areas of interest by the JFK Board have yielded more information and added documents to the collection. And third, improved search techniques have provided better access to those files which are searchable electronically. Nonetheless, the material located since 1992 is quite small when compared to the material in the sequestered collection and the overall set of material from CIA which has been designated as "assassination records" by the JFK Board.

In accordance with the law, the Board has the authority to designate records which it considers relevant to the assassination as "Assassination Records." These documents are then subject to review for declassification or, as deemed appropriate by the Board, held for declassification in the year 2017. The Board has designated the entire sequestered collection as Assassination Records as well as selected material generated in the course of searches subsequent to 1992. The entire set of these documents is the equivalent of roughly 320,000 pages, including duplicates.

Attachment II

ATTACHMENT II.

Search Methodology and Types of Searches Conducted

Summary. This Attachment discusses the methodologies used in conducting the searches, including what we know of the searches which were conducted on behalf of the earlier assassination investigations. It includes, in referenced tabs, documentation of selected taskings. It discusses the distributed nature of CIA's paper recordkeeping systems and electronic databases and the custom keyword searches that are used with electronic databases which CIA maintains.

Discussion. The collection of CIA materials contained in the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) "sequestered collection" has existed as a discrete body of records since 1978. This material resulted from highly labor intensive and systematic searches by individuals familiar with the Agency's paper files and records systems in use in the 1960s and 1970s. Today, the sequestered collection comprises the great bulk of CIA-originated documents which can be associated with the JFK Assassination and related investigations.

For most of its history, the Agency has had a system of records which has been shaped by the divergent requirements of the directorates in accordance with the wide variance of focus in their missions. These basic differences in the missions of the directorates, as well as the compartmentalization-of-information procedures (the "need-to-know" concept), have resulted in each directorate keeping its own set of records in accordance with directorate-specific guidelines. This applies equally to paper records as well as to electronic databases.[2]

Since the late 1970s, the Agency has been in the process of converting to electronic databases, which allow for electronic searches for documents using keyword and

[2] Even within a single database, information may--in accordance with information compartmentalization requirements based on the need-to-know principle--be stored in separate files by several offices or divisions, each with its distinct recordkeeping criteria and access requirements. In order for a search to be thorough, a search for one term or a combination of terms must be conducted across all such files.

other indexing tools which provide much more expedited and efficient searches. Because the most significant portion of JFK assassination-related material was generated prior to this conversion to electronic databases, searches of the sequestered collection or other contemporaneous CIA records have had to rely primarily upon labor intensive hand searches.

Since 1992 and the passage of the JFK Act, CIA has, in responding to the requests of the Board, had to devise search methodologies and techniques to address both the hard copy and electronic versions of our databases. With respect to the hard copy material, Agency efforts have concentrated on those component records most likely to yield assassination-related documents. Short of a complete manual review of all documents in the Agency, the techniques used for searching hard copy materials include expert reviews of file series and folder names, including associations with known related topics, retrieving boxes of files from the Agency's Archives and Records Center, and manually reviewing those files identified as likely to contain the sought after materials.

Electronic files searches can actually be more complex than manual searches, in major part because of the number of different electronic systems in use. The Directorate of Operations' electronic databases, for instance, include most cables since 1978 and they can be searched using single or multiple search terms against the full text of these cables. The Directorate of Intelligence's automated systems include original source material used for analytic assessments as well as the products themselves and can be searched through a variety of electronic techniques. The DCI Area (considered, for this purpose a directorate) maintains the Executive Registry files which are not normally retrievable through full text search, but by index searches. The Directorate of Administration maintains a large and diverse system of databases and files on employees and contractors that includes data on security issues, medical records, training, etc. The Directorate of Science and Technology and its subordinate components maintain other electronic databases unique to individual missions. Each of these systems requires a unique set of access criteria and search commands and must be searched by information management experts of the respective directorates.

Where possible, automated systems were searched using key words such as JFK, Kennedy, assassination, executive action, Oswald, place names, and a large number of names, crypts, or pseudonyms identifying individuals known to have

been associated with countries, key installations, organizations, or operations that fell within the period deemed relevant to the history of the assassination.

The following categories are examples of the guidelines for relevancy with which both manual and computerized searches were conducted. They include, but are not limited to, individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects which are considered central to the Oswald/JFK assassination history and the ensuing investigations.

A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

- Warren Commission, 1963-64
- James Garrison, New Orleans District Attorney, 1966-68
- Rockefeller Commission, 1975 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- Church Committee (Senate), 1975-76 (JFK assassination & CIA anti-Cuban plots aspects only)
- House Select Committee On Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

B. Key Subjects:

- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, and JMWAVE Station, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.
- KGB interest in Oswald.
- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 if they involve JFK figures or subjects; most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.
- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders, and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures or subjects.
- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts) without limit on time frame.
- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames.

C. Key Figures: Material with the following terms was considered JFK assassination-relevant unless the context is clearly not related or the information is outside the appropriate time period:

- AMLASH
- AMMUG
- Maurice Bishop (any reference)
- Silvia Duran

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- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee
- Howard Hunt
- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson
- Valeriy Kostikov
- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt
- Yuri Nosenko
- Michael & Ruth Paine
- David A. Phillips
- Richard Snyder
- Win Scott

Prior to enactment of the JFK Act, in early 1992, the Chief of the CIA History Staff, through various manual searches of shelf lists, located the "sequestered collection" of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (sixty-four record center size boxes). After obtaining the permission of the Congress, his staff surveyed these and other related holdings on the assassination. In addition, the History Staff located sixteen boxes of Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file and a number of loose folders, mainly from Mexico City Station records that had been collected for the Warren Commission.

In October 1993, following enactment of the JFK Act but prior to the President's appointment of the Board, CIA's Historical Review Group (HRG) requested the directorates to conduct a name search on Lee Harvey Oswald, JFK assassination, and any related documents (Tab 1). This request resulted in a series of meetings and discussions with various Agency components and Information Release Officers. More than thirty-one additional boxes of materials were sent to HRG for review. Included in this material were nineteen boxes of JFK working files of Mr. Russ Holmes, a CIA employee who for many years was the Agency's focal point officer with responsibility for responding to questions related to our assassinated-related records. Also included were two boxes on Nosenko, seven boxes of Latin America Division documents, and three boxes from the Bay of Pigs project. Out of these thirty-one additional boxes provided to the Board staff, approximately twenty-two boxes of material were designated by the Board as assassination records. The preponderant volume of these records is duplicative of documents in the sequestered collection.

In April 1995, after the Agency received the Board's first formal request, and in anticipation of "what are

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likely to be many requests from the Board for information..." the Agency Executive Director asked each directorate and the DCI Administrative Officer to appoint a focal point officer for the JFK Assassination review. (Tab 2)

In the spring and summer of 1997, the Agency arranged for the Board staff to receive a series of briefings by representatives of each directorate on the files kept within the records systems of each directorate. These briefings covered aspects of the records systems, such as how the records are organized, maintained, searched and retrieved, as well as how they had been previously searched for assassination-related materials.

The Board staff requested a number of additional searches, which have now been completed. These requests were both formal and informal and resulted in responses to the Board staff which included a wide range of additional material, some of which was judged relevant to the history of the assassination. This material includes the histories of various CIA operations and Agency components, files on specific individuals involved in either the Warren Commission or in HSCA investigations, and the results of CIA internal reviews of programs and operations. Although many requests from the Board and responses from the Agency were handled informally, the significant initial requests are listed in the table in Attachment V.

Prompted in part by the surfacing of a small number of new relevant documents, the Board staff requested CIA in the summer of 1998 to: (a) perform an additional set of searches on certain specific topics; and (b) issue an Agency-wide notice reminding CIA employees of the requirements of the JFK Act.

Specially tailored tasking was sent to the three Directorate of Operations components deemed most likely to possess records relevant to the JFK assassination of the kind of concern to the Board (See Tab 3). Among other considerations, this special tasking included a list of new or revised search terms, a request for clarification on the disposition of the James Angleton files, and the requirement to focus on potential new information from the debriefing of defectors in which any reference to Oswald or to the Kennedy assassination occurs.

DCI Tenet issued an Agency-wide Employees Bulletin on 22 July 1998 directing all CIA personnel to "consider documents in their possession or with which they are

familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review..." (EB OIM 98-02—See Tab 4).

Finally, and in a separate tasking, all directorates were asked to assure that searches undertaken were sufficient to enable a directorate representative to provide a certification of compliance with the JFK Act, and that the DCI's Bulletin had been forwarded to all directorate employees. (See Tab 5).

CSI-0331/93
25 October 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/IRO
DI/IRO
DA/IRO
DS&T/IRO

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group/CSI

SUBJECT: Request to Conduct Search for
JFK Assassination Records

1. In recent testimony before the HPSCI the Director indicated that a continuing search for JFK assassination-related documents was in progress. In order to assure that there are no oversights in this regard, we are requesting the following, by directorate:

DO & DI: A name search on Lee Harvey Oswald for the period 1980 through 1993; a subject search on JFK assassination (Kennedy assassination, etc.), same period; all appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier.

DA & DS&T: All appropriate components be asked to forward to us any documents related to the assassination that were not provided earlier; a file search when an obvious need is recognized.

2. Information responsive to this request should be forwarded to the Historical Review Group, 404 Ames Building. Questions may be directed to Frank Most, 30146.

John Pereira

John F. Pereira

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

DO/IMS 95-0691

ER 95-8097
6 April 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI

FROM: Executive Director

SUBJECT: Appointment of Directorate Focal Points for JFK Assassination Board Requests

1. I would like each of you to appoint a focal point officer for your Directorate who would be responsible for responding to requests for information from the (President Kennedy) Assassination Records Review Board. (AIUO)

2. The Agency has received the first (attached) of what are likely to be many requests from the Board for information related to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the investigations into the assassination. Up to now, the Board has focused on the "sequestered" records CIA had collected for the House Assassination Committee's investigation and documents that had been part of the Oswald 201 file. It is expected that the new requests will require records searches to be done for additional information. ~~(AIUO)~~

3. The Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), which has been the Agency's principal liaison with the JFK Board, will continue in that role. HRG will receive requests from the Board, and then forward them to the Directorate focal points for action. Responses from the Directorates will be coordinated by HRG, which will make the responses available to the Board. ~~(AIUO)~~

4. Please provide the name of your focal point officer to John Pereira, Chief, HRG [x30373-secure] by 13 April. ~~(AIUO)~~

Leo Hazlewood

Leo Hazlewood

Attachment

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

3

SECRET

OIM 98-0081
30 July 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Center, DO
Chief, Latin America Division, DO
Chief, CE Division, DO

FROM: Lee Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Office of Information Management

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

REFERENCE: (AIUO) Bulletin OIM-EB No. 02-98, dated 22 July 1998

1. (U) The JFK Board has made a number of recent specific directed requests to assure that the Agency has complied fully with the requirements of the JFK Act. Among these was a request for issuance of the Reference Employee Bulletin, in which the DCI directed that employees leave "no stone unturned" in assuring that relevant documents are provided to the Commission.

2. (U) In part because relevant new documents have surfaced within the past few months, the Board has also requested specific focus on renewed searches of the Agency's "counterintelligence files." The new documents have surfaced due to a variety of reasons, including references to assassination related personalities in recent defector reports, records made available because of the break up of the Soviet Union, and advances in search capabilities due to digitization of older paper files.

CL BY: 644243
CL REASON: 1.5C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

3. (C) In discussions with the Board staff we have attempted to focus any new tasking on those areas in which they have expressed their greatest concern. It is imperative, however, that we satisfy the Board on these issues or the Agency will be subject to a determination by the Board that we are not in compliance with the JFK Act. Because of the impending statutory termination of the Board and their need to issue their report, there is some urgency associated with the conduct and completion of these searches. The searches must be completed by 6 August, 1998.

4. (S) Databases to be Searched. The addressees to this memorandum are requested to perform new searches—using the search terms in paragraph 5--on ANY of your files which may contain information relating in any way to the JFK assassination, including, in particular, all records systems or files containing information on:

- James J. Angleton and his files
- Debriefings of defectors in which ANY reference to Oswald or the JFK assassination occurs (Example, [IJDECANTER])

5. (U) Search Terms and Time Periods. These new searches should focus on documents that might be retrievable with the following search terms over the referenced periods:

- The period 1959—1965 using the search terms Executive Action, Exaction, Ex Action.

- Post-1978 information combining the term "assassination" with President Kennedy, John F. Kennedy, Kennedy, JFK, presidential threats, threats to U.S. President, attempt (or attempted), or the crypt GPIDEAL.

- Post-1978 information related to the following terms: Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations, HSCA, Oswald, Lee Harvey Oswald, Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby, or GPFLOOR.

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SUBJECT: (U) New Search of CI Files for JFK Assassination Records

6. (S) Information is also sought on:

- The identity and current location of personnel (either the current assignment of employees or any knowledge of current location of retirees) who participated in debriefings or the preparation of reports on debriefings of [IJDECANTER.]
- The destruction of James J. Angleton's files.

Such information should be brought immediately to the attention of the Historical Review Program, OIM (Barry Harrelson, [31825, Secure]).

James R. Olsen (for)
Lee S. Strickland

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

OIM

OIM EB No. 02-98
22 July 1998

FINAL DOCUMENT SEARCH TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH "PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT OF 1992" (JFK ACT)

FROM: George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence

1. (U) As you know, the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (Board) is completing its task of overseeing the search and declassification of all Federal government records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy by 30 September 1998. The Board and we want to do everything possible to place before the American people the full story as reflected in government and other records.

2. (U) The Agency has been working on this effort since 1992 and has searched all of the obvious databases. We want to make certain that we have left no stone unturned and that no employee has any records that might possibly be considered relevant to the assassination—including any records created [or received] after 1992. The reference to 1992 is largely intended to encompass documents which may have come into our hands since the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.

3. (AIUO) In accordance with the provisions of the JFK Act, I hereby direct all CIA personnel to consider documents in their possession or with which they are familiar that might have relevance to the Board's review and that might not have been found in the course of electronic or manual searches over the past six years. Representatives of the Historical Review Program believe that if such documents do exist they would, most likely, be found in files that would not be generally related to the assassination or that would not be "logical" areas for systematic searches. These include working paper files or smaller databases related to countries not normally associated with the assassination. Relevant documents can be in the form of papers, photographs, recordings, tapes, or other media, and can include documents "related to the assassination," such as later investigations, key topics/events within the Oswald/JFK Story, or material related to key figures—such as Nosenko.

4. (AIUO) CIA personnel who believe they have information regarding documents relevant to the JFK review that may not have been found in previous searches should contact their component or directorate IRO or the JFK Project Coordinator. Directorate IROs and the Agency's JFK Project Coordinator are as follows:

		Secure Phone
DO / IRO	William McNair	44448
DI / IRO	Barbara Blufer	54644
DS&T / IRO	Teresa Wilcox	50104
DA / IRO	Becky Rant	31204
DCI Area / IRO	Mary Lou Cummings	39058
JFK Project Coordinator	Barry Harrelson	31825

/s/
Director of Central Intelligence

5

OIM 98-0088
12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Administrative Officer, DCI Area

FROM: Edmund Cohen
Director of Information Management

SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

REFERENCE: Memo, "CIA compliance with the JFK Assassinations Records Collection Act of 1992," dtd 15 Jul 98, fr the Assassination Records Review Board.

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a requirement to provide to the JFK Assassination Records Review Board a "Final Declaration of Compliance" with the JFK Act. The declaration must include: a description of component searches undertaken in response to Board taskings since 1993; information on any possible destruction of assassination records; and a representation that a diligent search for assassination records was undertaken. We are in need of assistance of your staff in preparing the description of these items for inclusion in the compliance response.

2. The referenced memorandum describes the Board's requirements for the "Final Declaration" in greater detail. Jim Oliver, Chief, Historical Review Program and Barry Harrelson, the Agency's JFK Review Focal Point, are meeting with the Directorate Information Review Officer and, as appropriate, other members of your staff to review the information needed to support the certifications which the Agency will need to make.

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SUBJECT: Documentation of Searches Conducted in Support of JFK Act

3. In order to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline prescribed by the Board, we request that the information described in paragraph 1 be sent to Mr. Harrelson by close of business, 21 August 1998.

Edmund Cohen

Attachment III

14-00000

Attachment III

Records Declassified and Released.

Summary. This Attachment discusses the process used by CIA to declassify JFK assassination-related documents, including interaction with the Board and subsequent re-reviews of materials, as well as the personnel resources engaged in this effort. It discusses the volumes of records reviewed, the volumes of records declassified, and the manner in which the material has or will be made available to the public.

Discussion. In response to the enactment of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 and in anticipation of the appointment of the Review Board, CIA, during 1992 and 1993, reviewed for declassification material which had been sequestered following the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) in 1978. As a result of this effort, CIA released as declassified to the National Archives in August 1993 some 127,000 pages of material from this collection. Since that time, additional releases have been made; approximately 74,000 pages from the microfilm part of the collection were declassified and released in August 1994 and 30,000 pages of HSCA originated material were declassified and released in 1995. We estimate that, since 1992, CIA has devoted over 100 work years to its effort to respond to the JFK Act (including experienced annuitants working as independent contractors).

The development of the declassification review methodology was, from the beginning in 1992, an iterative process that took into account both the requirements of the JFK Act to release to the public information relevant to an understanding of the assassination and the DCI's statutory mandate to protect intelligence sources and methods under the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949.

In the years since 1992, considerable effort has been expended to balancing these two objectives. Interaction with the Board's staff was a significant factor in reaching this proper balance. The net result is that practices over this period evolved to the extent that types of material that had been redacted at the beginning of the process were, by the end, no longer considered necessary to withhold. This has, of course, required a further re-review of the material released during the earlier period to assure that

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consistent standards were being used for the entire collection.

Each document in the collection was read by an Historical Review Program (HRP) Reviewer -- in every case a retired officer with at least two decades of Agency experience -- who examined every word in the document with an eye toward releasing documents unless such release could be expected to cause damage to:

- Human intelligence assets or their families;
- Intelligence methodology clearly requiring continued protection;
- Intelligence operations or activities warranting continued protection, including relationships with foreign governments.

The reviewed documents were then passed to teams of officers from the components that generated the documents (in most cases the Directorate of Operations), who were responsible for determining current sensitivity. The senior HRP reviewers validated the component groups' actions prior to forwarding the materials to the Board.

Names of CIA employees who served all or most of their careers under cover posed particular problems and, while many names have been redacted, with Board concurrence for release at a later date, the current sensitivity, or lack thereof, of retired individuals' employment by CIA had to be checked in each case. Names of key players in the post-assassination scenario, as stipulated by the Board, were released as true names or with temporary and traceable substitute names. Identification by the Board of those who were considered key players was a complicated and time-consuming task. Significant review and analysis went into the decision to release true names of many Cubans connected with the Bay of Pigs.

Material from the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations, presidential libraries and PFIAB files which addressed the entire scope of CIA activities raised issues with respect to relevance to the JFK assassination. For example, Project MONGOOSE, a clandestine portion of the publicly acknowledged U.S. anti-Castro policy, was released.

Another major issue was consistency in reviewing duplicate copies of documents. In one case 47 copies of a cable were found by different reviewers in separate files

over the six years of our review process. The National Archives ground rules called for release of every copy for inclusion in the NARA collection; therefore, each of these 47 copies is included as part of the total collection. As duplicate copies were found, comparison with the 1993 released version revealed not only inconsistencies but textual phrasing which, in a mosaic of related documents, made likely the identification of a protected individual or action. As a result, much re-review of the files was required and did occur.

Another time-consumer was the question of the identification of overseas station locations, traditionally not revealed--both to protect Agency individuals, activities and sources and to avoid foreign relations difficulties with foreign governments. In these cases, a window of time for acknowledgment of such facilities was negotiated, directly relevant to such actions as Oswald's travels and post-assassination requests for foreign government assistance in the U.S. investigation.

Except for redaction of names of CIA employees, true names of clandestine agents (otherwise identified with traceable cryptonyms), and currently-sensitive cooperation with specific foreign intelligence services, the final collection in the National Archives will contain very limited redactions and, in our opinion, none that would affect an historian's understanding of the Agency's information on, and relevance to, the event.

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Attachment IV

ATTACHMENT IV.

Perceived Gaps in CIA Records

Summary. This Attachment addresses the Board's requested explanation for the apparent absence of files which are known to have existed (or for which there is some evidence that they existed at one time) but cannot now be located. Specifically, the Board asked for such information on the following: Oswald files; certain files of James Angleton; DCI McCone files; William Pawley; and Win Scott. This Attachment also addresses the Board's request that the Agency's Declaration "...identify any other records relating to Oswald or the assassination that CIA knows to have been destroyed or removed from CIA files."

Discussion.

Files on Lee Harvey Oswald

(a) The Office of Security (OS) maintained a pre-assassination subject file on Oswald. This file contained newspaper articles and reports from other government agencies. As would be expected, the number of volumes of the subject file grew following the assassination. The pre-assassination material remained in volume one and subsequent material was filed in volumes numbered II through VI. However, during a February 1997 search, no volume V was found. A second thorough search of the OS file system failed to produce any record of Volume V. A careful page-by-page review of the contents of the existing volumes revealed there is no time gap in the material. Therefore, it is believed the label on Volume VI is simply incorrect; it should have been labeled Volume V.

The OS Oswald subject file was reviewed by the HSCA in 1978; however, it was not stored with the rest of the sequestered material. There is no documentation on why this file was not incorporated into the sequestered collection held by the DO; eight boxes of non-Oswald OS files were in the collection. The Oswald Security File has been reviewed, declassified, and released to NARA.

(b) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their

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professional opinion is that most likely such tapes were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

James J. Angleton (Chief, CounterIntelligence Staff, 1954-1974)

As noted in a 24 August 1998 memo to the Board, the files of Mr. Angleton were incorporated within the files of the CI Staff and the Directorate of Operations. Three memoranda, dated 23 November 1976, 5 August 1977, and 29 November 1979, detail the review and incorporation into the DO Central Records System of the Angleton files as well as all the files found in CI Staff following Mr. Angleton's departure. As a result of this review and incorporation of files, there is no identifiable collection of Angleton files. The three memoranda mentioned above have been included in the Agency's JFK collection for processing and release to NARA.

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965)

Within the McCone papers are several file folders with notations that indicate documents are missing. However, each folder has an index of the documents that were originally within it. Of all the missing documents only two refer to the Kennedy assassination. One document is described as "Date of Meeting - 26 Nov; Participants - DCI &

Bundy; Subjects Covered - Msg concerning Pres. Kennedy's assassination." The second document is described as "Date of Meeting - 19 May '64; Participants - DCI, J.J. McCloy; Dinner at Residence - Re: Oswald. [The latter is annotated: "Destroyed 1-28-72."]

Both documents were noted as missing when the files were reviewed by the CIA History Staff in November 1986.

William Pawley (Industrialist; friend of DCI Dulles and supporter of Anti-Castro activities)

The JFK collection contains a 201 file on Mr. Pawley that ends in 1962. The Directorate of Operations determined that material through 1965 that should have been in the 201 file was filed in an operational file. Most of the material was already within the JFK collection. The Board staff reviewed all the documents within the operational file and selected additional documents for inclusion in the JFK collection. This material will be processed for release to NARA.

Win Scott (Chief of Station, Mexico City, 1956-1969)

The Agency's Retired Record Table (RRT) shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the DO Records Control Schedule in effect at that time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy upon completion of a specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987, based upon reference to Item Number 40-76 of the Records Control Schedule.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

Certain Station Files

Within the Board's guidance for CIA's compliance declaration, the Board asked that the Agency specifically address the existence, non-existence or destruction of files

from two stations in its Final Compliance Statement. The two stations in question are Mexico City for the period 1963-1964, and Moscow for the period 1959-1962.

It has been long-standing practice and policy that materials that the DO keeps in the field are for immediate operational needs, and that record materials are to be returned to Headquarters for safekeeping. Limited storage space overseas as well as the risk of physical loss in the event of civil unrest or the need for evacuation are contributing factors to this policy. Once at Headquarters, these materials are normally organized by topic or subject rather than by station because this is the way that work is performed. Particularly with paper records and the passage of significant time, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to reconstruct with any confidence, a full set of documents for any particular station.

We do know that files from Mexico City Station are listed in the documents found in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file materials. This divergence from normal practice with respect to these files can be explained by the obvious high interest of the Warren Commission in the events in Mexico City surrounding the time of the assassination (as shown by the fact that they are contained in the Warren Commission materials). It would not have been normal practice at the time for the Agency to keep these records in this form. Thus, other than the materials in the sequestered collection and the Oswald 201 file, we have been unable to identify collections of records which would represent files for the two stations for the periods requested.

HTLINGUAL

The Church and Pike Committees both expressed concern about HTLINGUAL, a mail opening project which held information on American citizens. As a result of these investigations, CIA was directed by court order to destroy all HTLINGUAL material. It is reasonable to believe that an HTLINGUAL file existed on Lee Harvey Oswald; however, along with all other files designated as HTLINGUAL files, it would have been destroyed in accordance with the court order. Within the JFK sequestered collection, there are HTLINGUAL materials on Oswald -- materials which were apparently copied from the HTLINGUAL files before they were destroyed in accordance with the court order. It is not possible, however, to say that everything on Oswald that was held in the HTLINGUAL file wound up in the JFK collection. (See Tab 2 of Attachment V for more details.)

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Records Relating to Oswald or the Assassination known to have been destroyed or removed.

In November 1997, the Information Management Officer of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) advised that he had discovered a record which indicated a file that referred to the Kennedy assassination had been destroyed on "5/1/95". A search for information on this document revealed that the document had been created in 1977 and was described as "allegations regarding the Lee Harvey Oswald file." It was included with other documents grouped under the description:

> "Individual Case Files - Consists of documents accumulated in investigating complaints, suggestions, or problems of individuals which are brought to the attention of the IG. Filed numerically by case number. Potential cases filed alphabetically."

It has been confirmed that copies of the documents were made available to the HSCA and are in the sequestered collection. The OIG has reconstructed the file and will maintain it as a permanent record. Documentation is provided at Tab 1.

14-00000

06 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

TO: Barry Harrelson
OIM/HRG

FROM: Jerry Owens(C)
OIG/IMO

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

REF: (U) Telecon dated 06 January 1998

1. (U) Per your request, attached is a memorandum written to the Office of the Inspector Generals (OIG), Deputy and Associate Deputy IG for Investigations. The attached memorandum was also reviewed by OIG/Counsel. It explains in some detail the events we discussed in referenced telephone conversation.

2. (AIUO) It is understood by me, the undersigned, that no further action from the Inspector Generals office is required, and that this matter may be considered closed. The Office of Information Management/Historical Review Group (OIM/HRG) will notify the Assassination Review Board (ARB) and file a copy of this memorandum in HRG files to refer to when writing the compliance letter to the ARB.

3. (AIUO) It is also understood that original documents are not required when material is requested for or being added to the sequestered collection, and that copies of the material which were inadvertently destroyed were previously provided to the HSAC and ARB (or special task force) before their destruction in 1995.

4. (AIUO) With the assistance of HRG, the OIG/IMO has been able to reconstruct the file and will maintain it as a permanent record, also adding a copy of the attached to that file.

CL BY 0680987
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X-1
DRV fm COV 1-82

SUBJECT: (AIUO) Inadvertent Destruction of Records

5. (AIUO) Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please call me on secure X77081. Thank you.

Jerry N. Owens (C)

cc: D/IG/INV w/o att
AD/IG/INV w/o att
IG/Counsel w/o att
OIG/IMO w/att
DCI/IMO w/o att

14-00000

Names thru 1988
Name: LONNQUIST Gary H.
Component: DA OC
Type: 37/77
Complaint: Allegations regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD file.
Referred to IG by:
Date Opened: 29 March 1977
Date Opened mm/dd/yy: / /
Date Closed: 31 May 1977
Date Closed mm/dd/yy: / /
Inspectors: Cox
Category:
Spec Cons:
Action:
Was lower resolution possible?:
Was grievant satisfied?:
Case Referred to:
Report Sent to:
Did OGC refer case to DOJ?:

Did DOJ decide to prosecute?:
Record Center Job Number: 80-01770R
Box: 2
Comments:

Attachment V

14-00000

Attachment V

Specific Requests From the Board

Summary. The JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 mandates a number of specific actions on behalf of all government departments and agencies. One of these is to:

> "...make available to the Review Board any additional information and records that the Review Board has reason to believe it requires for conducting a review under this Act." (Sec. 5(c)2 H.)

In the exercise of this authority under the Act, the Board made fifty-three specific requests for additional records and information in the form of sixteen (16) requests designated as "formal" and thirty-seven (37) designated as "informal." On each request, the CIA worked closely with the Board and Board staff to provide the information and/or documents requested and a written response which records such actions.

Discussion. As a part of this Final Declaration, the CIA has attached at Tab 1 a list of the fifty-three requests by number and a short description of the subject of each. At the Board's request this attachment includes at Tab 2 the specific response to the request numbered CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination File)

Beyond the fifty-three requests, the Board raised two additional matters which tend to fall within the category of special requests:

1) A request that the Agency review and declassify the Board's interviews of former CIA officer and Mexico City station employee, Anne Goodpasture; the Agency's response to that request is complete.

2) A request for Board staff access to sealed Rockefeller Commission records held by the Library of Congress; these records were given to the Library by Rockefeller via a deed of gift which requires a letter from the DCI before access can be granted. This letter will be completed by 9 September 1998.

Attachment V. Tab 1

JFK Assassinations Records Review Board Requests for Additional Information and Records As of 1 September 1998

FORMAL REQUESTS	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT	STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES
CIA - 1	Information on the organization of CIA	All directorates, the Office of the Director and HRP	COMPLETE
CIA - 2	*CIA 2 through 5 were background questions on the JFK collection; these types of questions were handled informally; no written responses prepared*	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 3		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 4		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 5		HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 6	Cables and dispatches	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 7	Review of 60 CIA histories	HRP, DO, DS&T	**CONTINUING 1 History pending access approval.**
CIA - 8	Intelligence Community Staff Records	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA - 9	Intelligence Community Publications on Cuba or USSR, Nov. 20-30, 1963	DI	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff**
CIA - 10	Interagency Source Register	DO	COMPLETE;
CIA - 11	Sylvia Duran Materials	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 12	Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA - 13	Mexico City Back-channel Communications	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 14	Mexico City Station annual Reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 15	Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files	HRP, DO	COMPLETE
CIA - 16	Oswald Pre-Assassination Files	DO, DA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	**DESCRIPTION**	**RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT**	**STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES**
CIA-IR-01	Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959 to 1964	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-02	Location of Certain Cable	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-03	Full Computer Search for HTLINGUAL files	DO	**Documents/files available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-04	Disposition of Angleton Files	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-05	Possible foreign source for records on Oswald	HRP, DO	**Board chairman has requested a DO Briefing on this matter. To be resolved by 15 September.**
CIA-IR-06	QKENCHANT - Information on purpose and connection with certain individuals	DO	COMPLETE; Classified Response Provided.
CIA-IR-07	Claude Barnes Capehart	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-08	Unredacted copy of the "Family Jewels" memorandum	HRP, DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-09	George Bush computer search	DA, DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-10	Determination if CIA IG maintains an index of reports and determine if one was done on handling of Oswald maters.	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-11	Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics -other than press clippings?)	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-12	Contacts with journalists or publishing houses	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-13	Office/person dealing with organized crime & Cuba	HRP	**Documents available; being reviewed by Board Staff.**
CIA-IR-14	Breckinridge files (focal point for HSCA investigations)	ODCI/ OCA	COMPLETE

INFORMAL REQUESTS	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT	STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES
CIA-IR-15	Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes	DO	COMPLETE. The tapes from 22-23 Nov. '63 have been processed and are available to NARA. Processing the remaining 168 tapes will be done by September '99.
CIA-IR-16	U-2 Files Shelflist	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-17	DS&T records on Castro assassination plots	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-18	Information on one DO Office	DO	COMPLETE.
CIA-IR-19	Computer search on specific individuals and organizations	HRP, DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-20	"Monster Plot"	HRP	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-21	DRE monthly operational reports	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-22	"A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-23	Watch Committee files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-24	Defector file	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-25	Zapruder film	DS&T, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-26	Jordan James Pfuntner	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-27	Security files on five individuals	DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-28	McCone files	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-29	Oswald Le Winter	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-30	Cherepanov papers	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-31	Dulles calendar	DCI/IRO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-32	AMWORLD—Information on purpose and relation to Cuban exile group	DO	COMPLETE. Classified Response

INFORMAL REQUESTS	DESCRIPTION	RESPONSIBLE COMPONENT	STATUS/ REMAINING ISSUES
CIA-IR-33	FBIS-USR-92-112	DS&T	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-34	Files of CIA officials/offices	DO, ODCI	**DCI Area complete; DO files being reviewed by Board staff.**
CIA-IR-35	Oswald related information provided by Source identified in RIF No 104-10151-10206	DO	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-36	Handling of cables in 1963	DO, DA	COMPLETE
CIA-IR-37	William Pawley	DO	COMPLETE

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

24 December 1997

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Dr. Gunn:

Re: Request for Additional Information and Records
No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and
No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)

This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.

1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.

2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.

3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.

4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.

If you have any questions about this response, please advise.

Sincerely,

J. Barry Harrelson

14-00000

22 December 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16,the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

<u>**Question 1:**</u> Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

<u>**Response:**</u> At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.

4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.

6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.

7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

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c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months

Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of

documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

11. A representataive of the Office of Personnel Security /Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

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27 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
AIN: 0351164

1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence(HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.

2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB)research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.

3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.

4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.

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DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.

Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection

In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

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Attachment VI

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Attachment VI

Disposition of CIA/HSCA Sequestered Collection and other Assassination Records.

Summary. This attachment discusses proposed agreements and understandings between the CIA, the Review Board and National Archives and Records Administration regarding the disposition of JFK Assassination-related records held by CIA which are not already at the National Archives, and the terms under which those records to be declassified will be dealt with.

Discussion.

1. "Processing of CIA Assassination Records by September 1998". Per agreement with the Review Board, the declassification review of all records, unless specifically designated for post-September 1998 processing by the Review Board, in the following categories will be completed and the releasable version of the records ready for transfer to the National Archives by September 30, 1998:

- Non-duplicate documents from the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection, the Russ Holmes files and the LA Division working files;
- Documents designated as assassination records as a result of Review Board specific requests for additional information and records (CIA 1-16, CIA-IR 1-37);
- All documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's "A" file and post-1978 201 file; Oswald's 201 file and security file and Marina Oswald's 201 (microfilm version) have already been transferred to NARA;
- Any non-duplicate documents discovered in the recent searches undertaken to ensure full compliance with the JFK Act; any new documents on Oswald will be added to the post-1978 part of his 201 file.

2. "Processing of Duplicate Documents and Commitments for the Future Treatment of Assassination Records".

- CIA/HSCA sequestered collection duplicates to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999.

- Russ Holmes Working Files to be completed and a declassified version transferred to NARA by December 1998.

- Mexico City tapes (186) to be completed and transferred to NARA by September 1999. [CIA-IR-15]

- Post-September 1998 Discovery of Assassination Records.

Diligent searches have been made and we are aware of no assassination records being withheld from the Board. However, given the Agency's decentralized records systems, it is possible that assassination-related documents will be discovered in the future. A guide has been prepared for those officers whose work requires them to review Agency documents and material (Executive Order Review, FOIA, etc.) that may be subject to the JFK Act. Any assassination records that are discovered will be processed according to JFK release standards and forwarded to NARA. A copy of the guide is attached. (TAB 1)

- Referrals not complete by 30 September 1998. The CIA <u>proposes</u> that it complete its review and return to originating agency by April 1999 all unreviewed third agency referral documents which were received prior to 30 September 1998. To date the following referral have been identified for possible post-September 1998 review:

a. Army's Investigative Records Repository (from Review Board):

File on Alfredo Mirabal Diaz -- 151 pages

b. SSCI -- Church Committee Records -- TBD pages
(to be identified by Review Board staff)

c. JFK Presidential Library:

Records from Robert Kennedy files -- 1484 pages

These documents have not been formally designated as Assassination Records. The CIA <u>proposes</u> that these be handled in a manner similar to the John F. Kennedy National Security Files on Cuba that were reviewed in 1996 by a joint CIA-State-DOD-Review Board task force.

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3. <u>"Custody of CIA Assassination Records to be Released in 2017."</u>

The CIA <u>proposes</u> that the classified versions of Lee Harvey Oswald's Security File and "A" File along with Marina Oswald's original 201 be transferred to the protected (secure) portion of the JFK Collection At NARA by 30 September 1998. The CIA will need to retain custody of the classified version of the original Oswald 201 and the CIA-HSCA sequestered collection to complete the review of duplicate documents by September 1999.

In September 1999, the classified versions of the Oswald 201 (original and microfilm from the sequestered collection) will be transferred to NARA. Due to the sensitive nature of the information in the remaining sequestered collection, particularly the NBR material, CIA proposes that the Agency and National Archives work out a joint custody arrangement that would allow these record to remain in CIA physical custody until 2017.

8 October 1997

JFK Records Review Project

(U) The following is intended as a guide for those people whose work requires them to review Agency documents and materials that may be subject to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Some of the records within the Agency's JFK collection are assassination specific, others are ancillary. They deal with individuals and events not directly linked with Oswald or the assassination; but they are thought to have had a relationship to the assassination or investigation into the assassination.

I. The Agency's JFK Collection.

(U) The Agency's JFK records collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). There were eighty-one (81) Records Center-sized boxes in the original collection. Of these, the first seventeen (17) made up the Oswald 201 file. The next sixty-four (64) are referred to as the "JFK files" or sequestered collection and break down as follows: thirty-four (34) boxes of DO materials; nine (9) boxes of Office of Security files; fifteen (15) boxes of OLC materials; two (2) boxes each of OGC and IG materials; and one (1) box of DDS&T documents. HSCA originated material, including notes by HSCA staff members, are found throughout the collection. Box 64 contains seventy two (72) reels of microfilm.

(U) The microfilm contains copies of complete files to which the HSCA had access during its investigation. In addition to the Oswald 201 file (12 reels), the microfilm includes: 201 files on Cubans, Americans, and Soviets linked to Oswald, the JFK assassination or the various investigations (approximately 26 reels)and the Cuban Revolutionary Council and other exile group activities (approximately 13 reels); the personnel files of CIA staff employees (approximately 5 reels); and operational files on organizations, projects, and other subjects of interest to the HSCA investigation (approximately 16 reels).

CL BY: 611637
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: LOC 3-82

(U) We continue to identify other collections of documents that properly belong within the JFK collection. These include: The Oswald Security File; Agency working files generated by JFK assassination investigations and requests; and CIA documents found by other agencies and Presidential Libraries and referred to CIA for review under the JFK Act.

II. The Time Frame of JFK Assassination Records.

(U) In general, the time frame of JFK records commences when Oswald arrived at the US air base (the U-2) at Atsugi, Japan, in December 1957 and continues through the end of the Garrison investigation in 1968. Note, however, for information which is clearly related to the story of the JFK assassination or its investigations, there is no time frame limitation. Any document or request that deals with the assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, or the various conspiracy theories should be referred to the HRG/JFK review project.

III. Key Topics, Etc.

(U) Certain individuals, organizations, places, projects, and subjects are central to the Oswald/JFK story and the ensuing investigations, which causes a number of documents with no mention of Oswald or the assassination to fall within the purview of the JFK Act. Clearly, it is not possible to list every category of document which may have been reviewed and released under the JFK Assassination Records Act. The following categories contain examples of information that are considered to be within the JFK review.

(U) A. JFK Assassination Investigations:

-- Warren Commission, 1963-64
-- James Garrison, New Orleans DA, 1966-68
-- Rockefeller Commission,* 1975;
-- Church Committee (Senate),* 1975-76
-- House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), 1976-79

* JFK Assassination, anti-Castro plots and CIA anti-Cuban operations only.

B. Key subjects

(S) -- Moscow Station, Mexico City Station, JMWAVE Station, and CIA stations in those cities through which Oswald passed on his way to and from the Soviet Union, as they related to Oswald's activities or to possible conspiracies.

(AIUO)-- CIA anti-Cuban operations 1960-64 (Mongoose, etc.) <u>if they involve JFK figures</u> (see comment on Meagher's "index" below); most US anti-Castro activities in 1963 are considered relevant.

(U) -- Cuban exile anti-Castro activities, leaders and organizations, 1960-64, if they involve JFK figures.
-- Castro assassination activities (plans and attempts); no limit on time frame.
-- Mafia, if related to Castro, JFK, or New Orleans during Oswald time frames (see attached chronology).

(AIUO) <u>C. Key figures</u>
(the following individuals are considered JFK assassination-related, unless the context is clearly unrelated or outside the appropriate time period)

-- AMMUG, Cuban defector;
-- Maurice Bishop, alleged to exist (any reference);
-- Silvia Duran, employee in Cuban Embassy, Mexico City;
-- Richard Gibson and the Free Cuba Committee;
-- Howard Hunt, CIA employee;
-- Priscilla MacMillan Johnson, journalist;
-- Valeriy Kostikov, KGB officer in Mexico city;
-- Mr. & Mrs. George de Mohrenschildt (all documents)
-- Yuri Nosenko and the dispute over his bona fides;
-- Michael and Ruth Paine, Dallas friends of Oswalds;
-- David Phillips, CIA employee;
-- Richard Snyder, State Department Officer.
-- Winston Scott, COS Mexico City

For a more comprehensive list of subjects and individuals related to the JFK assassination, reviewers should consult Sylvia Meagher's <u>Master Index to the JFK Assassination Investigations</u>, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.

(U) Action Officer: Barry Harrelson (31825)

Attachment: Oswald Chronology

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(U) Attachment:

Oswald Chronology, 1956-1963

--Joins Marines	10/26/56
--Arrives Atsugi (U2 Base) Japan	09/12/57
--Returns to US	11/02/58
--Hardship discharge	09/11/59
--Departs New Orleans for Moscow via LeHavre, London, Helsinki	09/20/59
--Arrives Moscow	10/16/59
--Resides in Minsk	01/07/60 - 05/22/62
--Departs Moscow via train	06/02/62
--Departs Rotterdam via ship	06/04/62
--Arrives New York	06/13/62
--Fort Worth/Dallas, Texas	06/14/62 - 04/63
--New Orleans	04/63 - 09/63
--Mexico City	09/25/63 - 10/03/63
--Dallas	10/3/63 - 11/24/63

23 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert M. McNamara@DCI
Robert D. Caudle@DCI
Stephen W. DeVine@DCI

FROM: Edmund Cohen

OFFICE: OIM

SUBJECT: Re: blurb from JFK Board

REFERENCE:

Original Text of Edmund Cohen
Original Text of Edmund Cohen

TO: James R. Oliver@DA

TO: *James R. Oliver@DA*
FROM: *Edmund Cohen*
OFFICE: *OIM*
DATE: *09/23/98 08:04:16 PM*
SUBJECT: *Re: blurb from JFK Board*

After reading the note below, I spoke with the GC, who working with Bob Caudle, was seeking to have included in the Board statement the fact that the DCI had sent a letter endorsing my declaration. I suggested to the GC that even with this addition, the JFK Board comment would be most unfortunate. The whole six year effort was designed to put to rest all of the conspiracy theories and this comment would undercut the effort. In addition, it likely would result in significant additional questions, additional work for OIM, OCA, OGC and PAS, and put the Agency in a bad light. I suggested that I should ask the EXDIR to sign the declaration. The GC interposed no objection. I then spoke with the EXDIR who agreed to sign a declaration if this would satisfy the situation. I informed the GC that the EXDIR was willing to sign and the GC asked me to inform Bob Caudle, which I did. After you spoke with Judge Tunheim and got his agreement to: 1) return the Cohen declaration and the DCI letter and substitute the EXDIR declaration, and 2) eliminate the "blurb," I had the EXDIR sign the declaration.

I subsequently briefed the DDA, ADDA, and ADDA/IS. of the above.

Original Text of Robert D. Caudle
Original Text of Robert D. Caudle

This is what they are going to include in their report, according to fax I just received from Ron Haron:

"The Board has considered release of all CIA assassination records to be critical to successful implementation of the JFK Act. Accordingly, the Board requested each of CIA's directorates to certify,

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under penalty of perjury, that they had conducted thorough searches and identified all relevant records. The CIA refused. The Board then, as an alternative, asked the highest officials of the Agency - - the Executive Director and General Counsel - - to certify that CIA had met its obligations under the JFK Act and that no records on Oswald or assassination were withheld. The CIA refused. Instead, the CIA designated its Director of Information Management to sign CIA's Declaration of Compliance. In the Board's view, CIA's highest officials should have been willing to certify, under oath, that the Agency has complied with all the requirements of the JFK Act. The CIA's failure to do so raises serious concerns for the Board that the CIA has in fact fully complied with the JFK Act."

CC: *Lanie P. D'Alessandro@DA, R. Bruce Burke@DCI, Lee S. Strickland@DA, Walter I. Hazlett@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI*

Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:04:16 PM

CC:

Sent on 23 September 1998 at 08:09:39 PM

14-00000

I, Barbara Blufer, declare and state based on my personal knowledge and the information made available to me in my official capacity that:

1. I am the Information Review Officer for (IRO) for the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 6 October 1997 and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since (1980). I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DI that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. Since assuming my present position, I have had limited contact with the ARRB. With respect to matters prior to 6 October 1997, this statement has been prepared with inputs from my predecessor, Richard J. Flynn, who occupied my current position during the DI's principal contact with the Board.

3. Mr. Flynn has reported that, to ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DI records system and search capabilities, the DI/IRO and the DI Information Management Officer, Ms. Diana Hastings, briefed the staff on 13 May 1997. Other DI participants at the meeting were Joyce Jump, Marie Menafee, and Ilse Hartman. These officers were at that time assigned to the DI Office of Information Resources. Ms. Hastings focused on the current DI records keeping system, and, as best we could, the system that existed in the 1960s. DI participants stressed that the DI records keeping system has evolved over time and that the DI is continuously striving to achieve greater consistency in our procedures. DI participants candidly informed the ARRB staff that none of them at the meeting had first hand knowledge of DI records keeping in the 1960s; and b) the system in place at that time was entirely paper-based and therefore could not be considered as accurate as the present system. Members of the ARRB said they understood this limitation.

4. Mr. Flynn further reported that based on his recollection, Mr. Flynn is aware of a limited number of records searches the DI conducted in direct response to ARRB requests. On 11 June 1997, DI personnel met with members of the ARRB. Mr. Flynn had arranged this meeting earlier to give ARRB staffers, Michelle Combs and Bob Skwirot, an even more detailed briefing of DI's document search capabilities. The topics they asked the DI to search are noted in an attached memorandum to Barry Harrelson dated 17 June 1997. The result of further searches (CIA -9) are summarized a 19 June 1997 memorandum a member of the DI/IRO's staff prepared for Mr. Barry Harrelson, CIA's point of contact on the JFK assassination issue. This memorandum is also attached.

5. On 21 August, Mr. Harrelson contacted me for a further search of DI records, asking specifically that the DI follow up on a previously search by extending the timeframe covered in that original search. According to Mr. Harrelson, the ARRB requested a search for all documents concerning Mexico, Cuba, or the USSR for the period from 20 November 1963 to 6 December 1963. On the basis of this request, a search was conducted 32 documents not belonging to the DI were located. The materials were turned over to Mr. Harrelson.

6. All employees of the Directorate of Intelligence have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

7. I declare under penalty of perjury that foregoing is true and correct.

14-00000

Executed this 28th day of August 1998.

Barbara Blufer
IRO for the Directorate of Intelligence

14-00000

October 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Divisions, Staffs, and Groups

SUBJECT : President Kennedy Assassination File Search.

1. We are requested to search our files for any classified material relating to the assassination of President Kennedy, ~~specifically~~ information on Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, Yury Ivanovich Nosenko, and the Warren Commission. Report ~~any~~ documents, etc. on the three individuals regardless of whether the information is related to the assassination or not.

2. The search must be completed as soon as possible. A report (even if only a progress report) must be made to John Michaels, Room 7F36, ext. 7654, no later than 1300, Tuesday, 28 October.

DOUGLAS P. MULHOLLAND
Acting Director
Current Intelligence

28 Nov '75

File Searach on President Kennedy's Assassination - OCI Front Office

1. Office of D/OCI has a file labeled: "Material regarding President Kennedy's Assassination." It contains:

a. Memo entitled: Rumours About Lee Harvey Oswald, which discusses the rumor-mongering in the world public regarding the presumed assassin. Memo is Secret and dated 23 March 1964.

b. Listing of government leaders expectdd to attend Kennedy funeral

c. Memo entitled: Fidel Castro's Speech, which contained an "objective analysis" of implications of Kennedy's assassination. Memo is Confidential and dated 25 Nov. 1963

d. FBIS study, never disseminated, entitled: The Past Soviet Propaganda Assessment of President Johnson. Study is Confidential and dated 25 November 1963

e. FIBS Daily Report - World Reaction Series - on foreign radio and press reaction of death of Kennedy and accession of Johnson. Official Use Only and dated 26 November 1963

f. Memo entitled: Castro's speech of 27 November on the President's Assassination. Speech says Oswald the innocent dupe of a complex plot. Memo is confidential and dated 29 November 1963.

g. Unclassified copy of Wash. Post article on Castro reaction to Kennedy death - November 29, 1963

h. Three copies of Memo entitled: World Reaction to the Assassination of President Kennedy. Deals with idea of possible coverup in killing of Oswald - to seal his lips and protect the extreme right, whose tool he was. Memos ~~is~~ are TOP SECRET DINAR and dated 23, 24, + 25 November 1963

Carla Scopeletis

Copy passed to Michael
28 Oct 75

14-00000

DECLARATION OF MARY LOU CUMMINGS

I, MARY LOU CUMMINGS, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer ("IRO") for the offices of the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA). I was appointed to this position on 5 January 1998, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1981. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DCI area (Offices of the Director and Deputy Director(DCI&DDCI), Community Management Staff(CMS), National Intelligence Council(NIC), Office of the Comptroller(COMPT), Office of the General Counsel(OGC), Office of Congressional Affairs(OCA), Office of the Inspector General(OIG), Office of Public Affairs(OPA), Arms Control Intelligence Staff(ACIS), and Center for the Study of Intelligence(CSI)) that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to ARRB requests.

2. By memo date 6 April 1995, the Executive Director (CIA) requested that focal points for each Directorate be appointed to be responsible for responding to requests for information from the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). Until that time the Historical Review Group (HRG) of the Center for the Studies of Intelligence (CSI) had been the principal liaison with the JFK Board. As of that date, DCI area/IRO was appointed to be the DCI area focal point. HRG would continue to receive requests from the Board forwarding them to the Directorate focal point for action. Responses from the Directorate were coordinated by HRG, which then made the responses available to the Board.

3. In an effort to understand the DCI area records systems and to ensure the conduct of thorough searches and responses, the ARRB staff requested a meeting with the DCI area/IRO and key DCI records management officers. Detailed questions were presented in advance to CIA personnel who then provided complete responses to the ARRB staff during the summer of 1997. At that time HRG instructed my predecessor to wait for formal taskings from ARRB before proceeding with additional searches.

See Attachment 1

4. Based on personal knowledge and information reflected in the records of the DCI area/IRO, I am aware that the following searches and reviews were conducted in response to Board requests for DCI area records.

CIA - 1 ORGANIZATIONAL MATERIAL

The DCI area/IRO made available to the Board the following records:

Organization of the Office of the Director, 1963;

Mission Statements for 1959,1962,1965, and 1966;

Relevant Office of Director Notices;

OGC and OIG Mission Statements for 1964,1966,1969,1975, and 1976;

OLC Mission Statements for 1975 and 1976;

Names of Personnel Responsible for Liaison with the Warren and Rockefeller Commissions, Pike and Church Committees and the HSCA.

See Attachment 2

CIA - 7 HISTORIES

Sixty-one histories were provided to the Board by CSI/HRG. The ARRB staff is continuing to review the histories to determine their relevancy to the JFK assassination.

See Attachment 3

CIA - 8 Intelligence Community Staff Records

Following the Board's request of 1 March 1996, the records systems of CMS were searched for JFK assassination related information with negative results. The Board then asked to examine CMS shelf listings for the relevant time period. A redacted copy of the shelf list was delivered to HRG in April 1998. On 12 August the Board identified 14 CMS records that they believe may be relevant. On 21 August, ARRB Staff examined the responsive folders.

See Attachment 4

CIA-IR-08 Unredacted Copy of "Family Jewels" Memoranda

The Board has identified pages of the Memoranda to be included in the JFK Collection. The Board agreed to the necessary redactions and the request was completed.

See Attachment 5

CIA-IR-09 George Bush Computer Search

The DCI area provided a response of "no record found" of any contact with Bush in the 1960-1967 time frame.

See Attachment 6

CIA-IR-10 IG Reports

On 3 August 1998, the DCI area/IRO informed HRG that OIG does not maintain an index or inventory of IG cases. All reports and material prepared by the IG on the JFK assassination were turned over to the Office of External Affairs (OEXA). There is no indication that a report on the handling of Oswald was ever prepared.

See Attachment 7

CIA-IR-14 Breckinridge Files

The OIG located six documents that may be relevant to the JFK assassination. They have provided a list to HRG. OGC located five documents that they made available to the Board.

See Attachment 8

CIA-IR-23 Watch Committee Files

Following a thorough search and review of CMS files, 12 documents were turned over to the Board.

See Attachment 9

CIA-IR-28 McCone Files

The ARRB staff provided a list of McCone records that they wished to review: The DCI area/IRO, in turn, gave the ARRB staff complete access to the McCone files in March 1998. The records selected by the Board's staff are being processed for release. On 30 April 1998, the DCI area/IRO was notified that the request was complete. The DCI area was then notified on 3 August the there were missing McCone files that remained of interest to the Board. As soon as we receive a list of the missing files, we will begin an in-depth review of Executive Registry records in an effort to locate the missing file

See Attachment 10

CIA-IR-31 Dulles Calendars

The ARRB staff has completed their review of the Dulles calendars and has requested that some pages be processed for release.

See Attachment 11

CIA-IR-34 File of CIA Officials and/or Offices

On 5 March 1998, the Board requested records concerning DDCIs Charles Cabell and Marshall Carter and former General Counsel Lawrence Houston. The DCI area/IRO recalled seven boxes of relevant material from Records Center. The boxes were review by ARRB staff during July 1998 and several records were selected for

further processing. OGC is currently reviewing files for pertinent Houston records.

See Attachment 12

5. In addition to the formal requests, the DCI area/IRO completed the declassification review of three NIEs, documents from the Ford and Kennedy libraries, and an IG Report.

See Attachment 13

6. As this declaration demonstrates, the DCI area/IRO including predecessors, to the best of his/her ability has caused thorough searches of the DCI area systems of records for records related to the JFK assassination not included in the CIA-HSCA Sequestered Collection and will place any newly discovered or created assassination records into the JFK collection.

7. I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING AND THE ATTACHMENTS (ATTACHMENTS 1 THROUGH 13, WHICH ARE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE)ARE TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in McLean, Virginia on this 28 day of August 1998.

Mary Lou Cummings

Mary Lou Cummings

SECRET

DECLARATION OF BECKY L. RANT

I, Becky L. Rant, declare and say as follows:

1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Administration (DA) of the Central Intelligence Agency (Agency). I was appointed to this position on 3 February 1997, and have held various administrative and professional positions within the Agency since 1965. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DA, Office of the Deputy Director of Administration (ODDA), Center for CIA Security (CCS-formerly the Office of Security ((OS)), Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), Office of Medical Services (OMS), Office of Finance and Logistics (OFL), Office of Communications (OC), Office of Training and Education (OTE), Office of Facilities and Security Services (OFSS), Agency Technology Services (ATS), Center for Security Evaluation (CSE), that may contain JFK Assassination records and may be responsive to Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) requests.

2. To ensure that the ARRB staff understood the DA records systems and search capabilities, the DA/IRO and DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO) briefed the staff on 17 March 1997. The briefing focused on the DA records systems that existed in the 1960s and the current records systems. Questions that were provided by the staff prior to the briefing were discussed and an individual from the Office of Communications (OC) attended to answer questions related to cable processing in the 1960s. In addition to OC participation, the Offices of Finance & Logistics (OFL), Human Resource Management (HRM), and Security (OS) provided written responses to the list of questions submitted by the staff. It was agreed that the additional questions raised by the staff during the briefing would be tasked to the directorate formally by the Agency JFK Focal Point/Historical Review Program (HRP). An outline of the records briefing and a copy of the advance questions and the answers provided appear as **Attachment 1.**

3. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in the records of the DA/IRO, I am aware of the following searches that were conducted in response to specific AARB requests for DA records:

CIA 1 - Information on Organization of CIA

The DA provided from the records of the Regulatory Services Group/ODDA copies of Agency regulations and notices pertaining to the organizational structure of the Agency during the time periods specified by the ARRB staff. DA/IRO gave approval for the cleared staff members to review the material. Subsequently the DA/IRO approved release of the following items:

31 mission statements and organization charts for the DDA (DDS) and Office of Security (full release)

2 organization charts and mission statement of the Office of Communications (OC) (sanitized)

16 Agency mission, function and organization charts (full release with concurrence of the other directorates) (**Attachment 2**)

CIA-7-Histories

The DA JFK Focal Point reviewed the index of histories produced by the CIA History Program for release to the ARRB and approved access with certain restrictions. There is no record in the DA/IRO's office that the staff requested access to the DA histories on the list. (**Attachment 3**)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN REMOVED
FROM SECRET ATTACHMENT

SECRET

SECRET

CIA-12-JMWAVE—5 Files

The DA conducted file searches in OS and HRM for records on Theodore Shackley, Ronald Cross, Bart Henry, Doug Gupton, David Morales. We were subsequently advised by HRP that the David Morales OS file was part of the collection so the OS searched for records on the first four names only. OS identified files on Shackley, Cross and Gupton which were reviewed by the ARRB staff. HRM identified files on Morales and Shackley which were provided to HRP. Neither office surfaced records on Bart Henry. **(Attachment 4)**

CIA-16-Oswald Pre-assassination Files

The Office of Security identified a multi-volume file and provided answers to questions posed by the ARRB staff. **(Attachment 5).** The OS file was reviewed and in April 1998 was released to the National Archives. **NOTE:** The attached 17 February 1997 OS memorandum describes records holding related to HTLINGUAL and states that the files were destroyed in April 1994.

CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL File

See CIA-16 above and **Attachment 5**

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart

Capehart's Office of Security file is in the sequestered collection. The DA JFK Focal Point provided input on the question of protecting Capehart's relationship with global marine. **(Attachment 6).** In coordination with the DS&T, HRP responded to the ARRB staff.

CIA-09 George Bush Computer Search

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management reviewed the files of George Herbert Walker Bush and found no documentation indicating that Mr. Bush had an affiliation with CIA during the 1963 time period. **Attachment 7**

CIA-IR-11 Warren Commission Critics

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Information Management were tasked with records searches on Edward Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg and Sylvia Meagher. No records were found on Lane and Thompson. Weisburg and Epstein security files were made available for ARRB staff review. An OS impersonal file was identified but had been destroyed in 1994. HRM found only an OSS service card on Weisberg which has been supplied to HRP. OIM identified a file on Epstein. Several FOIA and PA files also were identified. **Attachment 8.** Contains the DA response and the final HRP response letter coordinated with the DA/IRO.

CIA-IR-13 - Office/Person Dealing with Organized Crime & Cuba

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management and Finance & Logistics provided responses to this request. The Official Personnel File of Charles Ford was given to HRP, OS provided a description of the OS file contents and OFL provided travel and financial records. **Attachment 9**

SECRET

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CIA-IR-19 Computer Search on Specific Individuals and Organizations

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Medical Services, Training & Education conducted searches on the following individuals with described results:

Cherne, OPF provided to HRP; OS file made available for staff review
Leake, OPF provided to HRP, OS and OMS files made available for staff review
Garbler, OPF provided to HRP, OS, OTE, OMS files made available for staff review
Verna Deane Brown, OPF provided to HRP
John A. McVickar, OPF provided to HRP
Byron Morton, No records
Marie Cheatham, No Records

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management conducted searches on the following individuals with results noted:

Spas T. Raikin, OS File described in attachment, No HRM record
Marilyn Murret, Index card only, No HRM record
Andrew Anderson, OS File(may or may no be correct file) made available, No HRM Record
Howard Geubler, No OS or HRM records
Gordon Novel, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, No HRM Record
Edward S. Butler, OS found cross reference to GARRISON file, NO HRM Record

The Office of Security found no records on INCA (Information Council of the Americas) or Permindex. **Attachment 10**

CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports

HRP requested and was provided the Official Personnel File of George Joannides

CIA-24 Defector File

The Office of Security provided a description of "Defector Files" maintained by OS in a 17 February 1997 memo **(See attachment 5)**

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder File

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Finance & Logistics searched for records on William Green of Kodak Labs. All reported negative results. HRM confirmed that Homer McMahon was an NPIC employee and provided bio information. **Attachment 11**

CIA-IR-26 Jordan James Pfuntner

The Office of Security conducted a search and reported that the OS file had been destroyed in 1980-81. **Attachment 12**

CIA-IR-27 Security Files on 5 Individuals

The Office of Security conducted a records search for files on the following individuals:

Richard C. Nagell
Gordon D. Novel
Jack L. Ruby
Walter J. Sheridan
Harold Weisberg

The Nagell, Novel and Ruby files were designated assassination records and copies were provided to HRP. The Sheridan and Weisberg files were made available and were reviewed by the ARRB Staff. **(Attachment 13)**

CIA-IR-29 Oswald LeWinter

The Offices of Security, Human Resource Management, Facilities Security & Services conducted searches for information on Oswald Winter. HRM and OFSS reported negative results. OS found information in an impersonation/crank file. The DA/IRO coordinated with the DO on a statement that was provided to the ARRB staff. **Attachment 14**

CIA-IR-36 Handling of Cables in 1963

The DA/IRO provided coordination approval on a memorandum prepared by HRP describing cable handling procedures **Attachment 15**

List of 38 Names of Interest to the ARRB-Provided by HRP 8/5/98

The Offices of Security and Human Resource Management searched records for information on 38 individuals listed in the attachment. The OS and HRM responses are attached. **Attachment 16**

4. As this declaration demonstrates, I and my predecessors to the best of our ability have caused thorough searches of all relevant DA records systems for records responsive to the JFK ARRB requests for information. In addition, the offices of the Directorate of Administration have certified to me that all employees have been furnished with a copy of DCI Tenet's 22 July 1998 directive to all employees requiring them to search records in their possession for information related to the JFK Assassination that might not have been found in the course of the searches conducted over the past 6 years.

5. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 21 day of August 1998.

Becky L. Rant
Information Review Officer
Directorate of Administration

1

14-00000

Directorate of Administration

Briefing for the JFK Assassination Records Review Board Staff on Records Management in the DA

17 March 1997

Carol M. Johnson
DA Information Management Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1205 Secure 31205

Becky Rant
DA Information Review Officer
2B17 IP Bldg.
703-613-1204 Secure 31204

Directorate of Administration

TOPICS

- CIA Information Services Strategic Plan
- Information Management Program Segments
- Information Management Goals
- Organization of Records Management In the Agency
- DA Information Management Officer (IMO)
- DA Information Review Officer (IRO)
- Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965
- Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997
- DA Records

CIA Information Services Strategic Plan

- "Information and Records Management, including Classification Management, is a fundamental and essential business requirement for the Agency."

- "The CIA's Information Services shall...ensure that each official record is appropriate, accurate, secure and retrievable throughout its life cycle regardless of physical form or media."

14-00000

Directorate of Administration

Information Management Program Segments

- Records Management
- Classification Management
- Information Disclosure
- Information Automation

14-00000

Information Management Goals

An effective and efficient information management ensures that records are available:

- to meet day-to-day business needs
- to ensure the continuity and consistency of records
- to provide corporate memory and history
- to protect the rights and interests of the organization, the employees and the public
- to meet legal requirements

Associate Deputy Director for Administration

Information Services

Organization of Records Management in the Agency

This slide is Administrative Internal Use Only

D/Info Mgt *

OIT

Recruitment & Training*

Policy Research & Audit*

Archive & Preservation*

System Development*

Agency Information & Records Management Panel

* = member

DCI/IMO*
component/imos

DA/IMO*
component/imos

DI/IMO*
component/imos

DO/IMO*
component/imos

DS&T/IMO*
component/imos

Directorate of Administration

DA Information Management Officer (DA/IMO)

- The DA/IMO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for issues relating to records and classification management.
- The DA/IMO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statues, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the creation, maintenance and use, and disposition of information.

Directorate of Administration

DA Information Review Officer (DA/IRO)

- The DA/IRO is the Deputy Director for Administration's representative for reviewing all DA relevant information for release to the public under FOIA, PA, EO, and other information release programs.
- The DA/IRO is responsible for protecting equities consistent with existing statutes, EO guidance and internal rules and regulations governing the review and release of classified information, specifically, in response to:
  - FOIA/PA/EO Requests
  - Congressional Inquiries
  - DOJ Inquiries/Litigations
  - IG Investigations
  - Special Searches & Other Release Programs

14-00000

Directorate of Administration

Deputy Director for Support (DDS) - 1965

- Office of the DDS (ODDS)
- Office of Security (OS)
- Office of Personnel (OP)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Logistics (OL)
- Office of Finance (OF)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Training (OTR)

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Deputy Director for Administration (DDA) - 1997

- Office of the DDA (ODDA)
- Office of Personnel Security (OPS)
- Office of Facilities & Security Services (OFSS)
- Office of Finance & Logistics (OFL)
- Human Resources Management (HRM)
- Office of Medical Services (OMS)
- Office of Communications (OC)
- Office of Information Technology (OIT)
- Office of Training & Education (OTE)
- Center for Security Evaluation (CSE)

14-00000

DA Records



- Information Management Officers
- Core functions
  - 1960s
  - 1990s
- Records Life Cycle
  - Creation
  - Maintenance & Use
  - Disposition
- File organization

DA Records



- Records Control Schedules
  - Temporary
  - Permanent
- Records Storage
  - Short term
  - Long term
- Accountability
  - Personal
  - Organization
- Search & Retrieval

DA Records



- Access
- Safeguarding
- Preservation
  - Hardcopy
  - Electronic
- OGC Retention List
- Automation

DRAFT

Types of Questions for DA Records Briefing
March 17, 1997

Budget and Finance

1. In Cold Warrior, (p. 52) Mangold refers to a CI secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and never audited by the usual procedures. According to Mangold, it was this fund which allowed Angleton to run his own operations without supervision. Did the fund exist? Was this fund ever audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

2. Mangold also refers (p. 53) to an unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-1964 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI Staff from 1959-63. Do their records still exist?

3. We have seen Directorate of Operations monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960's still be retrieved?

4. What records are kept on disbursements to sources in the field? If, hypothetically, LHO had received money from the Agency, what records would exist?

Personnel

1. What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Security

1. For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

2. How are Office of Security records indexed?

3. What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

These pgs were released in full in 104-10333-10002 JFK-M-18, F3

DRAFT

4. In the OS/SRS memo of Oct. 31, 1960; written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed: "Robert Edward Webster, EE-18854; Lee Harvey Oswald, MS-11165; Libero Ricciardelli, MS-8295; Vladimir Sloboda, MS-10565; and Joseph Dutkanicz, MS-10724." What do the "MS" and "EE" file prefixes designate? How are these designations assigned?

5. Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kinds of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained. For example, Clay Shaw was given a security clearance and had access to classified information based on his "responsibilities" as a source for the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD).

6. Where are records that would describe liaison (etc.) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

7. Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located. For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?] more info

8. How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

OC

nuts & bolts

Do we have anyone who can brief on cable process in 60-64 time period. How came in, decrypted. What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived on a desk at HQS, how disseminated.

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Budget and Finance

Question 1 - In Cold Warrior Mangold refers to a CIA secret slush fund which was tightly controlled by Angleton and not audited by usual procedures. Did the fund exist? Was the fund audited? Are there any records of CI operational expenses for the period 1959-63?

According to C/Financial Service Division (FSD/OFL) who contacted a former finance officer who was a secretary in CI in 1957-60, to the best of their recollection CI did not have their own finance officer. C/FSD also talked to another officer during that era who did not recall that CI was one of the early offices to do their own certification of expenses. It was his feeling that there very well may have been a CI fund that was not handled in the usual way however it is very unlikely to impossible that any fund was not audited/certified in some fashion (i.e. reviewed and certified decentrally and only reported on the books in some aggregate amount). He commented that he has never in discussion with finance officers heard of an account managed by staff officers that wasn't certified by someone in finance.

Question 2 - Mangold also refers to unnamed CI/B&F officer who says he worked for Angleton from 1958-64 and never dealt with him directly on a single matter. Is there a list of B&F officers assigned to the CI staff from 1959-63? Do their records still exist?

OFL - The Career Management Officer stated that we would need the name of the B&F officer in order to identify if he/she was assigned to the CI/Staff. CMO also stated that he does have some old records during that time period pertaining to assignments but the list he has is alphabetical by name. The current procedure is that the soft file maintained in OFL contains the assignment of each officer in the biographical profile.

HRM - Has microfilm staffing complements for the 1959-63 timeframe. These staffing complements were created on a quarterly basis and are broken down by the office (location) level. With the correct directorate/office name we can visually search these microfilm records, find the correct office and produce hardcopy reports listing the employees on the rolls for a given quarter. The hardcopy report could be reviewed to break down the office listing by occupation and create a list of names associated with the occupation (i.e. B&F officers assigned to CI from 1959-63. The employee name could then be used to located current or archived HRM files. CAUTION: 1) If an individual came

and left an office during the same quarter they might not appear on the staffing complement, 2) If an individual was TDY to an office they would not appear on the staffing complement of that office. 3) If an individual was being paid by their home office they would not appear on the staffing complement of the outside office they were supporting.

Question 3 - We have seen DO monthly operational reports which contain information on the allocation/distribution of operational funds. Are there other DO or DA records which reflect how a certain project utilized its funding? Can this type of information from the early 1960s still be retrieved?

The DO operational fund records would contain expenditures against a certain project or operation. However, according to C/FSD the system that preceded the General Accounting System (GAS) was RCA 501 (not sure what this contained) but in all probability has been destroyed, would have this type of information also. More information may have been recorded in 201 files similar to today's automated systems.

Question 4 - What records are kept on disbursements in the field? If hypothetically LHO had received money from the Agency what records would exist?

According to the OFL Records Control Schedule station accounting containing indigenous personnel are kept for 56 years, station accounting not containing indigenous personnel are kept 20 years.

<u>**Personnel**</u>

Question 1 - What records are maintained on contract personnel?

Responsibility for records maintained on independent contract personnel was transferred to OFL o/a 1 October 1996. Staff contract personnel files continue to be maintained by HRM.

Office Contract Personnel Files contain many of the same items found in the staff Official Personnel File (OPF)--application info, actions (Staff contracts only) clearance info, secrecy agreement, etc., and also contract info (agreements, amendments, terminations, etc.) A separate payroll file was also maintained.

IC's - fee for task
Staff Contracts - hired for job--not to exceed 5 years.

Contract files can be opened/maintained/retired in true name, pseudo, alias or crypt depending upon the sensitivity of the contract.

14-00000

Security

Question 1 - For the period between 1955-65, what was the universe of files that OS had on individuals or groups?

OPS located information which describes the categories of files created during this time frame but it is impossible to state this is all inclusive:

General - Usually unsolicited correspondence of crank variety and junk.

Security Research Staff - possibly material of counterintelligence interest.

DCD contacts - persons who travel abroad and/or have specific information.

Contractor Employees - industrial contractors with collateral and/or SCI accesses

Miscellaneous - Includes publications, organizations, intelligence services, etc.

Alien - Foreign nationals who were of interest

New Building - Persons involved with construction of original Headquarters Building

Regular - Files which included staff employees, contractors, GSA/GSI, etc.

Question 2 - How are Office of Security records indexed?

Prior to 1964 all index records were maintained on 3x5 inch index cards. When the information was known, these cards included names (primary, alias, telecodes), file numbers, kin/relatives, location/residence, DPOB, citizenship, occupation, polygraph number, reference source data, information codes, remarks, SSN, sex, employer, and file retirement data. To locate a file record, the subject of interest was searched in this card system.

During mid-1964 these index cards with the exception of impersonal entities, were under conversion to a keypunch system. The impersonals (companies, publications, intelligence services, organizations, etc.) were maintained on cards until much later, possibly mid-1970s. Aside form the subject name indices, the Office of Security also indexed information of interest within a file record. This information could include associates, companies, publications, other government agency reports information, etc.

TODAY'S INDEXING PARAMETERS ARE VERY LIMITED.

14-00000

Question 3 - What was the function of the Office of Security/Security Research Staff (OS/SRS)? Why were defector records kept in this component?

The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counter intelligence effort throughout OS. SRS reported directly to the Director of Security.

Question 4 - In the OS/SRS memo of Oct 31, 1960 written by Marguerite D. Stevens, the file numbers of several defectors are listed. What do the MS and EE file prefixed designate? How are these designations assigned.

As noted in question 1, records were categorized according to the type and the older file numbers reflected the file category. "M" designated a miscellaneous record; "S" designated a Security Research Staff record. Therefore "MS" most likely referred to a miscellaneous record of interest to the Security Research Staff. "E" or "EE" designations covered subjects of interest to the Domestic Contacts Division for information/intelligence purposes. It appears that at least some of these alpha designations were converted to numerical values circa 1964.

Question 5 - Does OS process security clearances for non-employees (e.g. sources) to receive access to classified information? What kind of files are created by this process? How long are these files maintained.

Security clearances per se are not processed for non-employees (sources/contacts). The Office of Security conducts appropriate national agency checks to try to determine the reliability of those individuals who are of interest for contact purposes because of their foreign travels, specific scientific information, etc. In a few instances an ad hoc clearance/validation may be requested in the event some classified information would be revealed in the course of acquiring intelligence from these sources. The validation period is normally five years, and any files created are maintained in the individual's name for a period of ten years after the validation period has expired. The DO would most likely have further information on a particular source.

Question 6 - Where are records that would describe liaison (etc) cooperation or operations between OS and CI located? How are these records organized?

With the short turnaround time imposed on responding to this request no information could be readily located to provide an answer to this question. It is believed that if information of this nature does exist, it may be located in archived policy or administrative files of the Office of Security and/or Security Research Staff. Retrieval and review of this information would require an extensive research effort. Officers who may possess knowledge of this type of record were queried and it was suggested that info responsive to this question may possibly be located in DO records.

Question 7 - Where are records regarding operations that OS participated in or ran located? For example, where are the OS records on the Castro assassination attempts?

Records on operations and/or projects in which the Office of Security was involved in the past have most likely been destroyed, unless they are maintained because of congressional directives or the records control schedules. The Office of Personnel Security has the capability of retrieving a listing of any current records with the prefix or "project" or "operation". If the title does not include these words, retrieveal would be more difficult unless an exact name or acronym is known for a particular operation or project.

Question 8 - How many files did OS have on Oswald? Which OS components maintained files on Oswald? Why did OS have any files on Oswald?

OPS answered in CIA-16. Copy attached.

John:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in briefing the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) to be held on Monday, 17 March, at 2:00 p.m., in 2C06 IP Bldg. I regret the short notice. As we discussed, the ARRB has asked for information relating to the creation, transmission, and dissemination of cables and your name instantly came to mind. Their specific questions are:

1- Can you describe the cable process in place in the Agency during the
1960-1964 time period?

Prior to 1962 messages were delivered to the DPD (Development Products Division) at 1717 H Street or to the Communications Center at "L" Street. In addition there also was a Q building that received special traffic. After 1962 messages came into the CIA Headquarters and were processed in different areas depending on the types of traffic.

Imagery traffic would be sent to to a specific floor for the imagery personnel. Intercept and Special Programs would either be passed to a Special Sections Area of the Communications Center or to the Cable Secretariat.

2- How did cables come in?

Messages came in from the field via the Brandy Station State Channels or military channels.

3- How were they decrypted?

Messages were deciphered using a OTT (One Time Tape) or a OTP (One Time Pad) process.

4- What happened from the time a cable was sent from a field site until it arrived
on a desk at Headquarters?

Messages sent from a field site would be passed to a communicator, encrypted and transmitted via High Frequency Radio. The message received from Brandy and relayed to headquarters and then it was decrypted. The analyst of the Cable Secretariat would then read the message and match what they read against customer requirements. They then would have a typist type the dissemination on the message. The message then would be picked up from the message center by the various staffs and or divisions.

5- How were cables disseminated?
See item four.

Please let me or Becky Rant, DA/IRO, know if you have any other questions or concerns prior to the briefing.

CC: Becky L. Rant
Andrea E. Boyce
Sent on 13 March 1997 at 03:17:34 PM

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(4) JFK-34

SECRET

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

included in 104-10335-10014
JFK-M-19, F16
part of 52 pg. doc.

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Secret Attachment

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and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

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(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

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(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#C351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

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w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

14-00000

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

2

14-00000

SECRET

DOCS TO ME
MARLENE
30492
GLORIA HAS ORIGS

1 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gloria Boyd, HRG/CSI

FROM: Marlene H. Rives
RSG CSC DA

THROUGH: Don Hatch, DDA/IRC
Jack Wright DA Focal Point for JFK

SUBJECT: ARRB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. Attached per your request is a copy of Regulatory Service Group documents responsive to the subject request for items explaining the organizational structure and division of responsibilities within CIA for the years 1958-68 and 1975-79. Some of the documents are dated outside the time frame specified but were determined to be effective during the years 1958-68 and 1975-79.

2. The Directorate of Operations and the History Staff may have additional documents. See the attached notice dated 13 March 1964.

3. If you have any questions, please call Marlene Rives on 30492 (secure).

Marlene H. Rives

ATTACHMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM DOCUMENTS

SECRET

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

13 June 1995

CR DA #5

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jack Wright @ DA

FROM: Eldon I. Hatch
Information Review Officer, ODDA

SUBJECT: Review of Organizational Structure for the year 1958-68 and 1975-79

REFERENCE: ARRB Additional Information Request CIA-1

1. The attached documents relating to subject have been reviewed for release to the Assassination Records Review Board and are to be handled in accordance with the level of classification security indicated on the documents. The documents have not been reviewed for release to other than properly cleared personnel.

2. If you have any questions, please call me on 30683.

Eldon I. Hatch

Attachments: a/s

Handcarried to Jack Wright

CC:

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL~~ USE ONLY

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2 6 FEB 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
DA Focal Point for JFK Board Requests

SUBJECT: ARRB Request for Access to Indices to CIA Histories

REFERENCE: A. JFK Board Request No. CIA-7, dtd 9 Nov 1995, Item # 6

B. CSI-0307/05, dtd 20 Feb 1996, same subject

1. Per your request, I have reviewed the list provided to me of all histories produced under the CIA History Program for release to the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). Regarding equities that concern the Office of the DA, I reviewed pages 38 through 48 and pages 51-54 and have no problem granting access to the list except for those noted on page 40, 42, 46, and 48. If this list is to be provided unclassified, then the station names as marked would need to be redacted. If this list is to be provided classified, the DA pages may be passed without sanitization.

2. Is the ARRB allowed to request access to any Agency document if unrelated to the JFK Assassination? We could be setting a precedent if we grant the ARRB access to see this entire list. Potentially, the ARRB could request access to any number of Agency documents totally unrelated to the JFK Assassination (i.e. 201 files).

3. If you have questions, I may be reached on extension 30554 secure.

Lee S. Strickland

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27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bonnie K. Hunter-Y- @ DCI

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: CIA-12 (Shackley et al)

REFERENCE: Shackley, Cross, Henry, Gupton (CIA-IR-12) DA/IRO No. 12

Bonnie:

This is with respect to your 26 February 1998 note wherein you asked that we check HRM for personnel files on Ron Cross, Bart Henry and William Morris Kent. In an effort to bring the status of this particular tasking (CIA-IR-12) up-to-date, I provide the following:

My records show that on 18 July 1997 Barry requested that we conduct file searches on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross, Bart Henry and Doug Gupton. We were advised by Barry, and as outlined in a 22 May 1996 letter from ARRB to John Pereira, that Cross, Henry and Gupton are pseudonyms used by CIA personnel who testified to the HSCA.

Notwithstanding, we tasked OPS and HRM to conduct searches on these individuals in an effort to locate files. On 22 December 1996, I advised Barry that HRM had located files on Ted Shackley and would provide them to Barry via this office once they arrived from RC. It is my understanding that Becky gave you the OPF yesterday. HRM advsied further that they had attempted to locate files on Cross, Henry and Gupton but failed to locate any files on these individuals in light of the fact that only the pseudos had been provided. We further advised that if in the future you have access to the true names, we will glady search again.

On 23 December 1997, I advised Barry that OPS had located files on Ted Shackley, Ron Cross and Doug Gupton and that the files were in OPS for review. They were unable to locate a record on Bart Henry. It is my understanding that you have not reviewed these files to date but are in the process of making arrangements to do so. Sue-Ann Pierson conducted the search back in July and I am certain that — she will be glad to you in this matter (40000).

And lastly, I have no record of ever having received a request to search on William Morris Kent. Accordingly, I will request OPS and HRM to do so.

Please let me know if I have misinterpreted the status of this request. Thank you. Frieda

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

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(4) CR JFK-24

27 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board

REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997

1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.

<u>Question 1:</u> (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, *each* file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.

<u>Response:</u> (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,

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CL Reason: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
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and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.

(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.

(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.

> <u>Question 2:</u> (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.

<u>Response:</u> (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:

#0077826	Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079	Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466	Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144	Opened approximately May 1955

14-00000

(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.

(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:

a. _Washington Star_ press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960

c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors

e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961

f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.

14-00000

(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.

(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.

(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).

(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.

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(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:

a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959

b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"

c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959

d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959

e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959

f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"

g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"

h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960

i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961

j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter

14-00000

k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas

l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961

m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961

n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure

o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961

p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962

q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure

r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"

s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.

(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.

t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald

u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)

14-00000

w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963

x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963

y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).

Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.

Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.

(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.

(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to

detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.

(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.

3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.

4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

Janet A. Ecklund

Attachment

14-00000

6

(35)

6

27 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-7 For Information On Claude B. Capehart

1. The following is responsive to subject request.

2. The Agency has made a thorough search of its records for information on Claude B. Capehart and can state:

a. Mr. Capehart was never an employee of the Agency;

b. Mr. Capehart was however, an employee of a company with which the Agency had contracts;

c. The Agency has files on Mr. Capehart because of its contractual relationship with his employer.

d. All such files have been made available to and were reviewed by ARRB staff members.

3. If you require anything further in this regard, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

14-00000

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14-00000

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9 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI - JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-09 - George Bush/ARRB Request

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (attached) and our telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) review "any and all personnel files of George Herbert Walker Bush to determine whether he had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period."

2. The Office of Personnel Security and the Office of Human Resource Management have reviewed its files and have been unable to find any documentation to show that George H.W. Bush had any affiliation with CIA during the 1963 period.

3. This concludes DA action on this request.

Attachments

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~~ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

11 February 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Cmasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-11 - ARRB Request for Search on Warren Commission Critics (DA/IRO No. 21)

1. This is with reference to your 2 February 1998 memorandum (Tab A) and our subsequent telephone conversation on 6 February wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) search for files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher.

2. Based upon the limited biographic information provided on Subjects, the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM) and the office of the Publication Review Board conducted thorough searches. No records were located on Josiah Thompson or Mark Lane. As you know, OPS located a file on Harold Weisberg as a result of its search in response to CIA-IR-27 (DA/IRO No. 14). At your request, on 6 February 1998 (Tab B) we requested that OPS make arrangements to have this file reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents are Assassination Records. Accordingly, OPS did not address the Weisberg file in this CIA-IR-11 response.

3. As a result of DA's searches (Tab C) we located the following files and/or information:

Edward J. Epstein - AIN 0 488 768 (found in OPS; File found in PRB

Harold Weisberg - computer printout (attached, found in HRM

Sylvia Meagher - OPS advised that there was an impersonal folder regarding Subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article which were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule on 1 Janaury 1994.

ADMINISTRATIVE - ~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Please let me know when you want me to request the [illegible]es on Edward Epstein from OPS and PRB. Meanwhile, this concludes DA action on CIA-IR-11. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

(35)

UNCLASSIFIED

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E 0 - IR-11
21

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/Information Review Office

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 08/14/98 09:10:11 AM
SUBJECT: Response to CIA-IR-11

Barry & Gary:

I have reviewed the draft response to CIA-IR-11 dated 13 August 1998 and following are my comments and requested changes:

Paragraphs 1 and 2 - OK

Para 2a: **EPSTEIN,** Edward J. --The DO found no files identifiable with subject; a file was found on an individual with the same name but; with research, it was determined that the individual was not the Edward J. Epstein who is the subject of this request. DA searches found a Center for CIA Security, formerly the Office of Personnel Security, file and a Publications Review Board file on subject, as well as three "hits" to records destroyed pursuant to normal records destruction schedules. The destroyed records involved three Freedom of Information requests that mention Epstein's name in the subject line. None of the requests were for information on Epstein.

Para 2b: **LANE,** Mark
4th line - Please change Public Affairs to Privacy Act request

Para 2c: **MEAGHER, Sylvia** -- A reference to the fact subject made a Privacy Act request was found. In addition, the Center for CIA Security found that it had, at one time, a folder on subject and a 1968 Ramparts Magazine article. Both subject's Privacy Act request file and the impersonal folder have been destroyed pursuant to normal record control schedules.

Para 2d: defer to DO

Para 2e: **WEISBERG,** Harold

11th line - Please change Office of Security to Center for CIA Security.

In so far as DA equities are concerned, I concur with draft letter once the above changes have been incorporated.

Becky

CC: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:10:11 AM

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From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
OPS/CD/IMB (40552) THIS IS A VOICE ACTIVATED COMPUTER. UPPERCASE IS FOR EFFICIENCY & IS NOT MEANT AS A BREACH OF CYBERSPACE ETIQUETTE.

NOTE FOR: Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Janet A. Ecklund
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: OPS/CD/IMB
DATE: 06/09/97 04:22:02 PM
SUBJECT: RECORD SEARCH, CHARLES D. FORD, AIN 0038497

DEAR BECKY, I CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF SUBJECT'S SECURITY FILE TO INCLUDE MICROFICHE & HARDCOPY. BELOW ARE MR. FORD'S ACTIVITIES FROM 1959 THROUGH 1964, PER YOUR REQUEST.

MICROFICHE-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

16 JAN 59-CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

AUGUST 1959-VACATION IN CANADA FOR 2 DAYS

15 MAR 61-ESTABLISHMENT OF P.O BOX LETTER ADDRESS FOR SUBJECT

30 MAR 62-MFR, SUBJECT WAS PROVIDED AN ALIAS (FISCALINI) FOR TASK FORCE " W" TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK ON 31 MAR 62 TO CONTACT AN ATTORNEY IN THAT CITY. ATTORNEY GENERAL, ROBERT KENNEDY OFFERED HIS SERVICES TO HELP SOME OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS SCHEDULED FOR TRIAL IN CUBA. SUBJECT RECEIVED VERBAL APPROVAL FOR HIS ALIAS.

05 JUN 62-SUBJECT WAS UNAWARE OF REINVESTIGATION & WAS NOTIFIED BY SECURITY.

28 JUN 62-ANOTHER NAME WAS ADDED TO SUBJECT'S LETTER ADDRESS

03 DEC 62-SUBJECT WAS BRIEFED TO A SENSITIVE OPERATION CONDUCTED JOINTLY BY THE CI STAFF & DDS/IOS

20 FEB 63-REQUEST FOR CIA IDENTIFICATION CARD IN ALIAS

06 MAR 63-MFR REGARDING AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT

10 MAY 63-REVOCATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC CLEARANCE

02 JUL 63-REASSIGNMENT PROCESSING FORM, APPROVED FOR DOMESTIC ASSIGNMENT

08 JUN 63-SUBJECT GRANTED A "Q" CLEARANCE

31 JUL 63-MFR REGARDING AN INDIVIDUAL WHO BROKE INTO SUBJECT'S HOUSE & ATTEMPTED TO ASSAULT HIS 14 YEAR OLD DAUGHTER. THE ASSAILANT WAS ARRESTED, NO HARM TO DAUGHTER

HARDCOPY-CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER

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02 & 10 MAY 62-MEMOS REGARDING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION FROM U.S. ARMY

27 JUN 62-CIA BRING-UP- TO-DATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION TWX. FAVORABLE

22 MAY 63-"Q" CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT INFORMATION & 1962 FAVORABLE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

26 FEB 64 & 25 MAR 63-POLYGRAPH SCHEDULING MEMOS

BECKY, IF WE CAN BE OF FURTHER ASSISTANCE, PLEASE LET US KNOW. THANKS, CURT.

CC:

Sent on 9 June 1997 at 04:22:02 PM

FOR ~~OFFICIAL USE~~ ONLY

CL BY: 462125
CL REASON: Section 1 5
DECL ON:
DRV FRM:

From the Desk of Becky L. Rant
DA/IRO

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson
FROM: Becky L. Rant
OFFICE: DA/IRO
DATE: 09/17/97 10:57:20 AM
SUBJECT: Travel Records

Barry: I am forwarding to you today copies of the microfilmed accounting ledgers re Charles Ford's travel. The OFL IMO worked with RCF and the copies are somewhat better than those you saw previously. This reflects the search after our visit to OFL to define search terms. I am also forwarding for your information the paperwork that approved the destruction of financial accountings after 6 years 3 months. Please call if you have any questions. Becky

CC:

14-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: 0663879
CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X 1
DRV FRM: COV 1-82

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 03/26/97 03:14:55 PM
SUBJECT: Re: CSI access to OPFs in Helms Research

Becky - thanks for your note. I'll be sure you and Frieda are kept advised of all file requests that come to me.

I have received the file on Charles D. Ford from Record Center that Barry H. (JFK) requested and I am forwarding the file thru you for your info - I would appreciate it if Pat could handcarry the file to John Pereira as Barry instructed since he (Barry) is off all week.

Have a wonderful Easter - I will be off on Thurs and Fri (my flex). Take care.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta

Sent on 26 March 1997 at 03:14:55 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

14-00000

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14-00000

10

6 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATTN: JFK Project Officer

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO No. 32)

1. This is in response to your 5 August 1998 memorandum (attached) wherein you requested that the Directorate of Administration (DA) conduct searches on the following names identified in CIA-IR-19 of the 27 July 1998 ARRB memorandum (attached). Specifically, upon the DA's review of the 27 July memorandum, we advised your office that we had no record of ever having been tasked to conduct searches on these names.

   Andrew "Andy" Anderson
   Howard Guebler
   Gordon Duane Novel
   Edward Scannel Butler III, Director, Information Council of the Americas (INCA)

2. The Center for CIA Security (CCS) conducted a search (memorandum attached) in the Personnel Security Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and, based upon the information provided, was able to identify that the names of Gordon Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER are cross-referenced in Volume II of the following security file:

   "GARRISON CASE" AIN 0 601 153, Vols I-III

   No records were located in CCS on Howard Guebler or Andrew (Andy) Anderson.

3. Please let us know if you need the volume referred to above. Meanwhile, unless you advise us to the contrary, this concludes DA action on CIA IR-19

4. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments

14-00000

28 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

FROM: Frieda Omasta
Associate Information Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: Priority Request from JFK Board

1. This is in response to your 3 February 1997 memorandum (copy attached) wherein you requested, on behalf of the ARRB Staff, a comprehensive file search on the individuals listed below. Specifically, the request is for access to records of possible pertinence to the JFK assassination.

A. Leo Cherne
B. Hunter Leake
C. Paul Garbler
D. Byron B. Morton, Jr.
E. Marie Cheatham
F. Verna Deane Brown
G. John A. MMcVickar

2. In response to your 3 February memorandum, the Office of Human Resource Management (HRM), the Office of Medical Services (OMS), the Office of Personnel Security (OPS), and the Office of Training (OTE) conducted thorough searches and attached are copies of their response memoranda.

3. In discussions with Jeanne of HRM, it is my understanding that you still have the files that HRM located on Cherne, Leake, Garbler, Brown and McVickar. HRM was unable to locate records on Morton and Cheatham.

4. As noted in OMS' 10 February memorandum, OMS located medical charts on Leake, Garbler and George Brown which you can review if you make arrangements with OMS as noted in OMS' memorandum. Also note that if a file exists on Verna Brown, it will be included with her husband's chart. OMS was unable to locate records on Cherne, Morton, Cheatham or McVickar.

14-00000

5. As noted in OPS' memorandum, OPS was only able to locate files on Cherne, Leake and Garbler. However, after a careful review, they determined that there is no information contained in the files that links the individuals to or pertains to JFK or to the JFK assassination. They also found reference in Verna Dean Brown husband's file that she was employed by the Department of State.

6. OTE was only able to locate a record on Paul Garbler. However, the record does not pertain to the JFK assassination.

7. This concludes DA action on this request. If you have questions, please feel free to call me on 31201.

Attachments: As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS

From the Desk of Jeanne Kardaras
Human Resource Management/Information Coordinator

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
DATE: 12/23/96 12:25:48 PM
SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board dated 17 December 1996

I have completed my search of all Human Resource Management records and have not found any information on the following two individuals listed in your request:

a. Spas T. Raikin - SSN: 085-30-7690, DOB: Oct 26, 1922

b. Marilyn Dorothy Murret - DOB: July 14, 1928

The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive records.
Please advise if I can be of further assistance.

Jeanne

cl by: 0663879, cl reason: 1.5(c), decl on: X1, drv from: cov 1-82.

CC: Gary L. Moore
Frieda P. Omasta
Lee S. Strickland
Mary V. Amoia-Y- @ DCI

20 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Priority Requests from JFK Board

REFERENCE: Request dated 17 December 1996

1. (C) In response to referenced request for "additional files" searches on Spas T. Raikin and Marilyn Dorothy Murret, the Office of Personnel Security conducted appropriate searches of the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). MDP/PS is the automated database of security records used by the Office of Personnel Security. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records.

2. (C) The Office of Personnel Security has a file on Spas T. Raikin (#0134669). This file reflects that in August 1957 Foreign Documents Division/OO requested a clearance on Spas T. Raikin for unclassified contract employment with Project U.S. Joint Publications Research Service in New York City on an unwitting basis. The Office of Security responded there was no information which would preclude use of Mr. Raikin. On 31 January 1967 the Office of Security again granted approval for Mr. Raikin to be used as an unwitting independent contractor with the U.S. Joint Publications Research Service.

3. (C) The Office of Personnel Security does not maintain a security file on Marilyn Dorothy Murret, but there is an index record to an media article dated 1971 from *Computers and Automation*. This article contains the statement that Marylyn Murrett is Lee Harvey Oswald's cousin and that evidence indicates she was involved in espionage activities in Russia and Asia.

4. (U) This review was prepared by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.

CL BY: 0605636
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: SEC 5-82

14-00000

12 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB

REFERENCE: INCA & Permindex

Gary,
As I mentioned in my note of a few minutes ago, noted below is CCS's search response re INCA & Permindex. My records show that all DA action is now complete regarding CIA IR-19 DA/IRO 32a, 32b and 32c). As you were advised in my memoranda dated 6 and 7 August 1998, the Garrison (Volume II refers to Gorder Duane NOVEL and Edward Scannel BUTLER) and the Andrew Clarence Anderson files are available for your review in CCS. Please contact Curt if you wish to see those files. Frieda
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: *Frieda P. Omasta@DA*
FROM: *W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE: *CCS/PS/CD/IMB*
DATE: *08/12/98 12:46:19 PM*
SUBJECT: *Re: PRIORITY - CIA IR-19 (DA/IRO 32c) JFK/ARRB*

Frieda, per our telephone conversation CCS has no record for the organizations listed below. Thanks, Curt.
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt:
Thank you very much for your status report w/respect to your search on the 38 names and your search re INCA and Permindex.
Pursuant to a call that I received moments ago from Gary Breneman, would it be possible for you to advise as to whether you have located any information on INCA and/or Permindex. Gary is frantically trying to close out IR-19 and your response will assist him greatly. Thanks in advance for addressing these two items separately. Frieda
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

32b

11 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson, Gary Breneman

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name Traces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

REFERENCE: CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32b

Barry:

Below is the HRM response w/respect to its search for files on Anderson, Guebler, Novel and Butler.

CCS is still working on CIA IR-19/DA/IRO 32c w/respect to its search for records on INCA and Permindex.

Frieda

Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-

Original Text of Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: Daniel J. Mulqueen-Y-
OFFICE: HRM
DATE: 08/07/98 01:25:05 PM
SUBJECT: Re: PRIORITY - Name TRaces for JFK/ARRB - Andrew (Andy) Anderson

Frieda,

I have completed searches for Andrew Anderson as Anderson for maximum hits, on Howard Guebler under Guebler, on Gordon Novel under Novel and Edward Butler under Butler, all last names for maximum possible hits. My searchs on these four individuals produced no hits, no records, and no indexed data on one and all.

I note the presumption "Evidently, he (Anderson) was a former employee" because he had a AIN number of 0 800211. An AIN number is an Agency Identification Number, not necessarily suggesting an "employee" relationship. An "EIN" is an Employee Identification Number, but what categories of employment fall under it, I'm not prepared to say.

Dan

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Dan,

Barry Harrelson, the JFK Project Officer, is requesting that you search once again under the name of Andrew (Andy) Anderson in light of the fact that CCS has located a file on one Andrew Clarence Anderson (AIN 0 800211). Evidently, he was a former employee. I regret that we did not have this information prior to tasking you the first time.

14-00000

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14-00000

CIA-IR-25

6 May 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI

FROM: Becky L. Rant

OFFICE: DA/IRO

SUBJECT: ARRB Special Request - Zapruder Film

REFERENCE:

Barry: HRM's response follows to your request for the address of "Holmer McMann". This sounds like the individual you described--spelling different. As stated, McMahon resigned in 1970 and the Agency has no current address or record of whether or not he is still alive. If you want us to pull the file to determine his address while he was an employee, let me now. That info, of course, is 28 years old. Becky

TO: Becky L. Rant
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 05/05/97 04:41:06 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request

Becky -

I have located information on a former employee named Homer Albert McMahon, DOB: 6 Jan 1928, who (first) EOD'd 22 Sept 1952 and resigned on 20 March 1953 (GS-03) - his title was photographer. He reEOD'd on 30 Oct 1960 and resigned on 11 Sept 1970 - (GS-11) - his title was photographer and he was assigned to NPIC. HRM would have no address listing for this individual. Mr. McMahon's retired official personnel file is at Record Center.

Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 5 May 1997 at 04:41:06 PM

CC: Frieda P. Omasta
Teresa Wilcox @ DST

14-00000

NOTE FOR: Barry Harrolson @ DCI
FROM: Thomas C. Benza
OFFICE: OFL
DATE: 12/24/97 08:37:39 AM
SUBJECT: Search Results - Bill Green and Claude Barnes Capehart

Office of Finance and Logistics has search its files for any information on Mr. William Green at Eastman Kodak. There were no responsive records. We also ran a check on Mr. Claude Barnes Capehart also with negative results.

Any question please call me on extension 58032..

CC: Frieda P. Omasta, Becky L. Rant
Sent on 24 December 1997 at 08:37:39 AM

14-00000

TO: Frieda P. Omasta
FROM: Jeanne Kardaras
OFFICE: HRM/MS/INFO COORDINATOR
DATE: 07/23/97 12:55:29 PM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB Request - Green & Capehart

Frieda -

Based on information provided, I have found no information on the following individual:

Bill (William) Green at the Eastman Kodak lab

The search undertaken was reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive records. Please advise if I may be of further assistance.

Jeanne

CC: Becky L. Rant, J. Barry Harrelson @ OCI, Thomas C. Benza, W. Curtis Chaloner
Sent on 23 July 1997 at 12:55:29 PM

14-00000

24 July 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Name Trace Request on William Green

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 23 July 1967

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched as requested.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, no security records were located.

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

14-00000

12

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL~~Y

TO: J. Barry Harrelson@DCI
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/13/98 12:54:16 PM
SUBJECT: Re: JFK/ARRB Request (PRIORITY) CIA-IR-26 (DA/IRO 34)

Barry, the Center for CIA Security had a file for a PFUNTER, Jordan J., DPOB (?) 07 May 1902, Akron, Ohio. This file was destroyed circa 1980-1981 following the Records Control Schedule. Thanks, Curt.
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,
On behalf of ARRB, please conduct a search for records on Jordan James Pfunter. Please respond directly to J. Barry Harrelson with a copy to Becky and me. Thank you. Frieda

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, Frieda P. Omasta@DA, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
Sent on 13 August 1998 at 12:54:16 PM

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4,

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

13

From the Desk of Frieda P. Omasta

NOTE FOR: W. Curtis Chaloner @ DA
FROM: Frieda P. Omasta
OFFICE: ADA/IRO
DATE: 02/06/98 05:26:24 AM
SUBJECT: PRIORITY - CIA-IR-27 - ARRB Request for Security Files on 5 Individuals (DA/IRO No. 14)

Curt:

In response to CIA-IR-27, on 26 September 1997 OPS advised Barry Harrelson (JFK Project Officer) that security records are available for review by his office on the following individuals:

NAGELL, Richard C.
NOVEL, Gordon D.
RUBY, Jack L.
SHERIDAN, Walter J.
WEISBERG, Harold

Barry has just advised that the files on Nagell, Novel and Ruby have been identified as Assassination Records. Accordingly, they have requested that OPS transfer these files to DCI/CSI/HRG (J. Barry Harrelson) for inclusion in these records. Barry has further advised that a copy of the documents from each file would be acceptable if OPS prefers.

This is with respect to the files on Walter J. SHERIDAN and Harold WEISBERG. Barry has asked that arrangements be made for these files to be reviewed by the ARRB to determine which documents in each of these files are Assassination Records. In light of a short deadline, it is requested that the arrangements be made early in February. Once documents have been selected, Barry will need copies of those documents as well.

Please keep Becky and me posted with respect to these requests. Thanks in advance for your assistance. Frieda

CC: Becky L. Rant @ DA
J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI
Katie Nakai

Sent on 6 February 1998 at 05:26:24 AM

ADMINISTRATIVE ~~INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

26 September 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG

VIA: Becky Rant
DDA/IRO

FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request for the Assassination Records Review Board

REFERENCE: Lotus Note dated 26 September 1997

1. In response to the referenced request, the Office of Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database was searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the following security records were located. These security records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

NAGELL, Richard C.	AIN 0 264 170
NOVEL, Gordon D.	AIN 0 526 113
RUBY, Jack L.	AIN 0 261 219
SHERIDAN, Walter J.	AIN 0 101 572
WEISBERG, Harold	AIN 0 018 281

3. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
Janet A. Ecklund

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

14

14

New Memo\Standard

26 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: Frieda P. Omasta

OFFICE: ADA/IRO

SUBJECT: Assassination Records Review Board Request

REFERENCE: Lewinter aka Lewirter

Barry:

With Curt's response referred to below, this concludes DA action on this request. HRM and OFSS were negative. As you know, OFSS led OPS to the files as summarized by Curt. Frieda
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner
Original Text of W. Curtis Chaloner

From the Desk of

From the Desk of W. Curtis Chaloner
Information Review (40552)

NOTE FOR:	*J. Barry Harrelson @ DCI*
FROM:	*W. Curtis Chaloner*
OFFICE:	*OPS/CD/IMB/INFORMATION REVIEW*
DATE:	*11/26/97 12:24:59 PM*
SUBJECT:	*Assassination Records Review Board Request*

Barry, attached is the official OPS response. Thanks, Curt.

DOC1.DOC

CC: *Janet A. Ecklund*
Becky L. Rant
Frieda P. Omasta
Sent on 26 November 1997 at 12:24:59 PM

CC: Becky L. Rant

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

26 November 1997

Memorandum For The Record

Subject: LeWinter, Oswald

Oswald LeWinter came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. CIA/Public Affairs advised LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six part television series being produced by the BBC based upon the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh.

LeWinter is a known fabricator and has used the following aliases; Oscar LeWinter, Ibrahimir Razin, Razin LeWinter. LeWinter is indexed to the OS crank file.

LeWinter is also known as a fabricator to the DDC.

W. Curtis Chaloner
DDA/OPS/CD IMB
Information Review

14-00000

December 1997

NOTE TO: ARRB Staff

SUBJECT: Further Clarification

REFERENCE: ARRB Request Regarding Oswald LeWinter

Clarification:

Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA*, the CIA has never had any **official** affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)

CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1991, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice." (S)

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14-00000

LeWinter also came to the attention of the Office of Security in December 1991. The CIA's Public Affairs advised that LeWinter apparently approached the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) claiming to be a former CIA officer. LeWinter volunteered to provide information about Agency operations overseas. His offer was in conjunction with a six-part television series being produced by the BBC based on the book "The Agency" by John Ranelagh. (U)

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(26)

5

10 March 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Jeremy Gunn, Esq.
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Senior Reviewer, HRP

SUBJECT: ARRB Request No. CIA-IR-36, For Information On Processing of Incoming Cables

1. The following and the attachment are responsive to subject request. The attachment is an extract of the pertinent text from a memorandum provided by the Directorate of Operations.

2. If you have any questions concerning this response, please advise.

J. Barry Harrelson

Att.

FOR YOUR COORDINATION:

Becky Rant *

Becky Rant, DA/IRO

16 March 1998

Date

*Re Para 3 - The Cable Secretariat was part of the Office of the Director until 1972 when it was placed in the Office of Communications. See attached [illegible]

ATTACHMENT TO 10 MARCH 1998 MEMORANDUM RE: CIA-IR-36

1. Per the Review Board staff's request the following is a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations (DO) processed cables in the 1963/1964 time-frame. As we are unable to locate any definitive records on the subject, and in all probability none ever existed, the information provided is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time.

2. Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos"; collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

3. To the specific question regarding processing of cables, on a daily basis, usually six day per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariate, within the ~~Office of Communications~~. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to pre-defined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days and then destroyed.

4. Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariate for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and then destroyed.

5. It is important to note that the cable scenario outlined here is general in nature and that throughout their existence registries and their procedures were frequently altered until the registry system as described above was eliminated in the mid-1980's.

14-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

(This notice is NOT to be filed in Agency manuals. Please destroy after reading.)

ORGANIZATION

HN 1-80
1 February 1972

TRANSFER OF THE CABLE SECRETARIAT

Effective 1 February 1972, the Cable Secretariat is transferred from the Office of the Director to the Office of Communications, Directorate for Support.

W. E. Colby
Executive Director-Comptroller

DISTRIBUTION: AB

S-E-C-R-E-T

CABLE SEC

14-00000

16

14-00000

ARRB request re 7 July memo — Advance copy 8/4/98 (16)

HSCA Names

Alvarado, Gilberto
Arcacha-Smith, Sergio
Azcue Lopez, Esuebio
Cabell, Earle
Calderon, Luisa
Cheme, Leo
Cobb, June Viola
Conein, Lucien E.
de Mohrenschildt, George
Diosdado, Cesar
Duran, Silvia Tirado de
Ferrie, David W.
Garrision, James
Garro de Paz, Elena
Gutierrez Menoyo, Eloy
Hall, Loren Eugene
Heming, Gerald Patrick
Johnson, Priscilla Mary Post
Kantor, Marvin
Kostikov, Valeriy Vladimirovich
Martin, Jack
Masferrer y Rojas, Rolando
McMillan, Priscilla Johnson
McVickar, John Anthony
Nagell, Richard Case
Odio, Sylvia
Pawley, William D.
Proenza, Maria Teresa
Raikin, Spas
Ray, Manuel
Ruby, Jack
Salvat Roque, Juan Manuel
Shaw, Clay
Snyder, Richard E.
Sturgis, Frank Anthony (aka Fioriri)
Veciana, Antonio Carlos Blanch
Webster, Robert Edward
Werbell, Mitchell Livingston III

TO: Frieda P. Omasta@DA
FROM: W. Curtis Chaloner
OFFICE: CCS/PS/CD/IMB
DATE: 08/14/98 09:07:44 AM
SUBJECT: Re: ARRB - 38 names DA/IRO 33

Frieda, thank you for the kind words, however, I do not deserve them as I was not completely thorough. The oversight was not intentional. Please see attached. Thanks, Curt.

OGCRECD.DOC

Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta
Original Text of Frieda P. Omasta

Curt,
Thanks so very much for your most thorough and prompt response this request. However, would you please let us know what, if any, records you may have found on four other names that are identified on the original list? Thanks Frieda

Elena Garro de Paz
Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Jack Ruby
Clay Shaw

CC: John K. Reilly@DA, Becky L. Rant@DA, J. Barry Harrelson@DCI, Gary M. Breneman-Y-@DCI
Sent on 14 August 1998 at 09:07:44 AM

14 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 13 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request. These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. RUBY, Jack and SHAW, Clay are cross-referenced to AIN 7 191 689, the Garrison File. IMB has possession of the Garrison File.

4. The Center for CIA Security has no record of a GARRO DE PAZ, Elena or GUTIERREZ MENOYO, Eloy.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

13 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

FROM: John K. Reilly
Chief, Information Management Branch
Center for CIA Security

SUBJECT: Records Search Request
HSCA Names from ARRB

REFERENCE: ADA/IRO MFR dated 07 August 1998

1. In response to the referenced request, Personnel Security's Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS) database and the predecessor to MDP, the Security Automated Name Check Activity (SANCA) were searched.

2. The searches undertaken were reasonably calculated to retrieve all responsive documents. Based upon the information provided, the Center for CIA Security has located Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific to and/or referenced to, with your request (attachment A). These records are available for review by your office after prior written notification.

3. Attachment B reflects Security Records which may or may not be identifiable, specific, and/or referenced to your request which were destroyed under the Records Control Schedule.

4. Attachment C reflects those individuals whom the Center for CIA Security has no record.

5. This memorandum is provided for your information and appropriate disposition. Please direct any further inquiries regarding this matter to W. Curtis Chaloner at 40552 (secure).

W. Curtis Chaloner
for
John K. Reilly

ATTACHMENT A

The following Security Records are in the possession of Information Management Branch or enroute and are available for your office's review here at CCS/IMB. The Center for CIA Security defers to the Assassinations Records Review

Board regarding documents which could be considered relevant.

		Post 1978 Memoranda
CHERNE, Leo	AIN 0 053 082	UNKNOWN
CONEIN, Lucien E.	AIN 0 005 025	YES
DEMOHRENSCHILDT, George	AIN 0 000 775	NO
DIOSDADO, Cesar	AIN 0 432 469	NO

DURAN, Silvia Tirado de AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File
CCS record reflects listing as Duran, Silvia.

FERRIE, David W. AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File
Ferrie is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 546 933 (Whelan, John Edward) which was destroyed, according to the Records Control Schedule, on 30 April 1997.

FIORINI, Frank AIN 0 353 459 = Sturgis File

HALL, Loren Eugene AIN 0 348 627 YES
AIN 7 191 869 = Garrison File
CCS record reflects listing and Security File (hardcopy) as Loran not Loren.

JOHNSON, Priscilla Mary Post YES
AIN 0 071 589
CCS record reflects listing under McMillan, Priscilla J..

KANTOR, Marvin AIN 0 539 326 YES
CCS record reflects listing also as Kantor, Melvin.

KOSTIKOV, Valeriy V. AIN 0 261 091 NO

MCMILLAN, Priscilla Johnson YES
AIN 0 071 589
CCS record reflects McMillan also cross-referenced to Alliluyeva, Svetlana. The Security File (hardcopy) reflects

ATTACHMENT A CONTINUED

Stalina, Svetlana I.. The McMillan Security File (hardcopy) reflects Macmillan not McMillan.

MARTIN, Jack. CCS records reflect the three following individuals who may or may not be identifiable with your request.

MARTIN, Jack M. AIN 1 254 357 YES

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MARTIN, Jack S.   AIN 0 651 268   YES

MARTIN, Lawrence J.   AIN 0 634 475   YES

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando   NO
AIN 0 036 859
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer, Rolando Rojas.
Masferrer is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 780 397
(Montreuil, Raymond A.).   NO

MCVICKAR, John Anthony   AIN 0 269 351   YES
CCS record reflects listing as McVickar, John **A.**

NAGELL, Richard Case   AIN 0 264 170   YES

ODIO, Sylvia   AIN 0 351 164 = Oswald File
AIN 0 351 164-6 =-Oswald File

PAWLEY, William D.   AIN 0 078 435   NO

RAIKIN, Spas   AIN 0 134 669   YES

SNYDER, Richard E.   AIN 0 038 984   YES

STURGIS, Frank Anthony   AIN 0 353 459   YES

WEBSTER, Robert Edward   AIN 1 258 236   YES
CCS record reflects listing as Webster, Robert.
Webster is also cross-referenced to AIN 0 387 123
(Whittaker, Frederick).   YES

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III   YES
AIN 0 027 686
CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell L.

ATTACHMENT B

The following Security Records were destroyed in accordance with the Records Control Schedule.

		DESTRUCTION DATE
ARCACHA-SMITH, Sergio	AIN 0 523 948	1994
AZCUE LOPEZ, Esuebio	AIN 0 352 838	25 October 1994
CABELL, Earle	AIN 0 033 554	circa 1980-1981
COBB, June	AIN 0 216 264	1994

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GARRISON, James AIN 0 535 449 1994
HSCA list reflects Garrision, James. CCS has no record.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 592 464 circa 1980-1981
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

HEMMING, Gerald Patrick AIN 0 429 229 04 August 1995
HSCA list reflects Heming or Henning, CCS has no record of either.

MASFERRER Y ROJAS, Rolando
AIN 0 352 772 25 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Masferrer Rojas, Rolando Arcadio.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 350 653 24 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 346 416 20 October 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Pawley, William.

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 121 104 circa 1980-1981

PAWLEY, William D. AIN 0 357 552 circa 1980-1981

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 342 000-A circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

PROENZA, Maria Teresa AIN 0 317 003 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Proenza, Teresa.

ATTACHMENT B CONTINUED

SALVAT ROQUE, Juan Manuel
AIN 0 219 999 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Salvat, Juan Manuel.

SNYDER, Richard E. AIN 0 389 179 03 June 1995

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 348 309 circa 1980-1981
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

STURGIS, Frank Anthony AIN 0 349 691 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Sturgis, Frank.

VECIANA, Antonio Carlos Blanch
AIN 0 256 167 1994

WERBELL, Mitchell Livingston III

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AIN 0 256 167 1994
CCS record reflects listing as Werbell, Mitchell Livingston.

ATTACHMENT C

The Center for CIA Security has no record of the following individuals.

ALVARADO, Gilberto

CALDERON, Luisa

RAY, Manuel

14-00000

Declaration of Teresa F. Wilcox

I, Teresa F. Wilcox, hereby declare and say as follows:

1. (AIUO) I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). I was appointed to this position in February 1996, and have held various professional positions within the Central Intelligence Agency since 1985. I am responsible for the review of records maintained by offices in the DS&T, to include the Offices of the Deputy Director for Science and Technology and the Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology; the Office of Technical Service (OTS); the Office of Technical Collection (OTC); the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO); the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); the Office of Development and Engineering (OD&E); the Office of Advanced Analytic Tools (AAT); the Office of Advanced Projects (OAP); and the Office of Research and Development (ORD). In addition, I am responsible for searching and reviewing certain records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

2. (AIUO) I am aware that the DS&T has searched appropriate records systems for information responsive to all requests the DS&T has received. I have obtained this knowledge through my personal experience, as well my conversations with, and my review of the records of, the former DS&T IRO Anthony R. Frasketi, and the DS&T Information Management Officer, Marsha A. Hubbs.

3. (AIUO) The following is a description of DS&T searches and review of documents undertaken in response to Board taskings the DS&T has received.

CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart. The DS&T made deletions to security records located by the Directorate of Administration. The DS&T Searched ODDS&T records for Capehart's medical file. The DS&T forwarded the medical file to the Board for its review.

CIA-IR-08 Family Jewels Memorandum. The DS&T reviewed a package of documents forwarded by Barry Harrelson. The DS&T advised the Board it had no objection to ARRB access.

CIA-IR-15 Electronic 'take' from Mexico City Station. This memorandum addresses the portion of the action, "In addition, the Board is still awaiting a response on the present location of Staff D records. Regardless of the outcome of these particular searches, the Review Board continues to seek a full accounting for all surveillance conducted during the relevant time periods."

14-00000

In conducting a search for the above information, the DS&T located in OTS records a file with the folder title, "Mexico City, Mexico." We forwarded the entire contents of that folder for the period 24 May 1961 to 10 June 1965, with one exception. Three Operational Monthly Reports were forwarded to the Board. The dates covered were 1-30 September 1963; 1-31 October 1963; and 1-30 November 1963. The attachment to Dispatch HMMA 20307 dated 4 December 1962 was not included. It was a poor-quality audio tape in Spanish, between two individuals talking about office procedures. No substantive information was exchanged during this conversation.

The DS&T also conducted a search of OTC records. This office would have inherited the Division D records of the Directorate of Operations (DO). We reviewed old DO Records Retirement Requests; there are no shelflists (folder-inventory) associated with these Records Retirement Requests since the Division D records were recorded initially in the DO system. We forwarded for the Board's review the six Records Retirement Request whose job numbers reflected the years 1959 to 1962. We advised the Board that Records Center records indicated the records' disposition as follows:

1. 59-S-477: Destroyed September 1977.
2. 60-S-182R: Destroyed May 1980.
3. 60-S-402: Transferred to FI/D(DDO), December 1977.
4. 61-S-157R: Four boxes transferred to FI/D (DDO), March 1972; three boxes destroyed, May 1980.
5. 62-S-885: Destroyed (no date given).
6. 62S000986R: Transferred to the Office of SIGINT Operations (DS&T).

These were the only Records Retirement Requests in the possession of OTC that are in the time frame relevant to the JFK assassination. As their descriptions indicate, they do not appear relevant to the request.

The DS&T also conducted a search of CITO records. This DS&T office inherited some files from OTC when CITO was established. We searched its records in the event some Division D records were held by CITO. These searches identified no responsive records.

Searches of OTS, OTC, and CITO records used the following keywords:

surveil*
Russian
USSR
Cuba*
audio*
electron*
embassy
Mexico*

14-00000

CIA-IR-16 U-2 Files. The DS&T provided the Board a copy of the U-2 shelflist. We also searched for records filed under Richard Bissell's name. We received no follow-on request from the Board.

CIA-IR-16 FBIS-USR-92-112. The DS&T provided to the Board a translation of articles about a KGB file on Oswald.

CIA-IR-17 DS&T Records on Castro Assassination Plots. Records of the ODDS&T, OTC, and OTS were searched for the following keywords: Castro, Oswalt, Oswald, assas*, and KDBADGER. In addition, we searched OTS records on the following: Project ZRRIFLE, Mollusca, Cubela, Black Leaf, ballpoint pen, hypodermic syringe, Artime, silencer, gambling, aerosol, cigar, depilatory, wiretapping, Phyllis McGuire, skin diving suit, sea shell, and project AMLASH. As a result of these searches, we provided to the Board a document titled, "Handwriting Analysis - AMLASH-1," dated 7 April 1965.

CIA-IR-25 Zapruder Film. A search was conducted on records of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (records of the former National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) and Office of Imagery Analysis) using the terms Zapruder, JFK, Commission, and 1963. Hits on year 1963 did not reveal any pertinent information. We located no record of a "William Green" at NPIC in November 1963. We located no log books or indexes regarding the processing or handling of any assassination films. We also reviewed an audiotaped interview with a former NPIC employee, and made minimal deletions to the tape.

CIA-IR-33 Search of FBIS records for any files on Oswald, and request for information on how FBIS-USR92-112 was filed. No past or present files were found. An explanation on how FBIS-USR-92-112 was filed was provided.

Review of three Ford Library Documents (178-10003-10453, 178-10004-10087, 178-10002-10394. Made deletions and deferred to the DO on 178-10002-10394. Made deletions to Summary Report on CIA Investigation of MKNAOMI.

Review of two terms. The DS&T advised that the terms should not be released because of ongoing CIA activity at the location.

Review of Alias Documentation issue (104-10220-10179, -10181, and -10188). Requested that Board postpone release of specific information. A search of OTS records indicated OTS had no records on particular documents in the 1960s and 1970s.

Review of a slug in current use. Requested that the Board postpone its release because the slug is in current use.

Review of Organizational Charts of all Agency directorates for the years 1958-1968 (CIA-1). Requested deletions.

Review of the proposed release of an Agency facility. Provided information about DS&T activities at risk if this facility were acknowledged.

Review of records regarding the release of the name of Jose Marie Mankel. Provided information about the potential chilling effect on current operations.

Review of documents concerning a certain entity in the CIA Sequestered Collection which are Not Believed Relevant (NBR)to the JFK assassination. Four documents had been previously released (one was released in full, and three were sanitized); eight documents had been denied in full. The Board determined that four documents were NBR.

Review of the Board's request to review an index resulting from the CIA's History Staff's review of 61 histories for any connection to the JFK assassination. The DS&T concurred in the Board's review of the index.

4. (U) Based on this information, I have concluded that the DS&T has diligently searched and reviewed all requests for information from the Board that the DS&T has received.

5. (U) I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 21st day of August 1998.

T. F. Wilcox

Teresa F. Wilcox

14-00000

JFK Declaration of FREDRICK C. WICKHAM, JR.

I, Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr. declare and say as follows:

1. (U) I am the JFK Focal point Officer ("FPO") for the Directorate of Operations ("DO") of the United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). I have held technical positions associated with the design and implementation of computer systems, information management positions including the DO IMO, and currently manage the DO information review and release programs. I have been with the CIA since 1967 and have been associated with the JFK records review activity since 1992 and the JFK FPO since 1995.

2. (U) I have obtained the information contained in this declaration based upon my personal knowledge and experience, as well as conversations with the DO Information Review Officer, the DO Information Management Officer and individuals taking action on the specific requests.

3. (U) DO records were predominately paper with a hard copy card index in the 1960's and an electronic index in the 1970's. The indices were based upon names that meet specific collection requirements or projects that were undertaken in the performance of our mission. Searches that exceeded the capability of the indices required manual paper file searches. I am aware that the DO searched the central record system, which includes retired records, and hand searched the convenience files and specialized files located within various offices. Specialized collections are often extremely sensitive and therefore only reside within the components. During our newer searches we have not found any significant documents in the DO files dated 1978 or prior that appear to have been missed by the searches through 1978. We did locate one set of tapes which we know was made available to the Warren Commission but was not included in the HSCA sequestered collection. We also found one file that was only partially included in the HSCA sequestered collection.

CL BY 0524343
REASON 1.5C
DECL X1
DRV MIS 5-82

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

4. (S) Many of the searches performed today are not significantly different than the ones done during the period of the various commissions and committees. The searches performed since 1995 still use the index to the central record system the same as in 1978 but we have a couple of new databases that were not available in 1978. We now capture all cable traffic electronically and are able to perform text searches of that repository. That repository post-dates the HSCA so it is not useful in locating older records. Additionally, we have converted a small amount of very sensitive paper files into computer searchable form. While these specific collections are part of the DO's record system, they were not electronically searchable nor were they included within the indices to the DO's central records system. We have searched all of these records systems for information responsive to requests the DO has received. Some of the specific requests could not be satisfied by the electronic searches and we resorted to manual paper searches in an effort to locate the information.

5. (U) The DO provided several briefings to the Assassination Records Review Board and their staff, starting in 1995, to describe the records created by the DO and the record system that manages that information. We also described what is meant by the need to continue protection of sources and methods, and the impacts the revelation of information would have on the lives of individuals and current operations. The presenters included the Agency's General Counsel, Deputy Director for Operations, Chief of the Information Management Staff, and several other DO managers associated with the conduct of operations and protection of sources and methods. We also provided detailed descriptions of current operations. We provided information about specific individuals whose lives or livelihood would be threatened as examples of harm that would occur if certain information was released. Additionally, we presented a description of the operational environment that existed and the intensity under which searches were performed in the wake of the assassination.

6. (U) The CIA issued an Agency-wide employee bulletin for a new search for JFK Assassination records (OIM 98-0081, dated 30 July 1998). As requested by the ARRB, the DO distributed the employee bulletin via Lotus Notes on 17

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

August and placed it on the morning message that people receive when they first log onto the system.

7. (U) We have received numerous specific requests for additional information. Based on personal knowledge and on information reflected in our records, I am aware of the following efforts that were conducted in responding to specific ARRB requests for DO records. I have abbreviated the questions to save space:

CIA-1 - Information on the organization of CIA

(U) The March 1995 ARRB request called for the availability of "comprehensive organizational charts (or the best available substitutes)." The request contained about three pages of various requirements, including:

A. organizational charts of the Directorate of Plans (DDP); "CIA Stations . . . in Mexico City (1960-68 only), Miami, other stations that we will discuss orally;" any other offices . . . any pro-Castro groups, . . . or anti-Castro groups;

B. names and affiliations of all CIA personnel responsible for liaison with the Warren Commission, the House Select Committee on Assassinations, . . .;

C. all manuals, handbooks, . . . guides explaining: . . . organizational structure, . . . filing systems, . . . for drafting memoranda;

D. copies of the instructions, guidelines, and other materials used by your reviewers;

(U) Over a thousand pages of material were provided in responding to this request.

(U) In May 1997 the ARRB further requested that 35 pages from CSN 5-50, 2 pages of the JMWAVE chart, and

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13 pages from Regulation No. 1-130 and HR #1 be reviewed for release.

(U) Although the AARB staff had access to all of the requested material, in January 1998 the Agency answered that the various CSN 5-50 pages contained basic information regarding the mission and functions of the Office of Operations (now the Directorate of Operations (DO)) and could not be released. However, in April 1998, we agreed to provide structure charts for the DDP in 1961 and 1963, with Division and Staff titles and a JMWAVE Chart.

CIA-2 - Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) The ARRB request was dated May 1995 and was six pages of file code numbers, crypts, names, dispatch designators, and cable location designators and requested identification thereof. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June and July 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing (returned to CIA) microfilm file summary sheets, and descriptive sheets.

CIA-3 - Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated June 1995 and was three more pages of queries similar to CIA-2. A variety of methods of responses was utilized, (some dated June 1995 and some undated) to answer, including a paired listing marked (returned to CIA), microfilm file summary sheets, and handwritten notes.

CIA-4 -- Confirmation of/Queries About Some Information

(U) This four-page ARRB request dated June 1995 was for "descriptions of each crypt, a brief identification of each individual . . . , and indications of whether these crypts, operations, and

individuals are presently active or inactive." This request was answered orally and by informal notes.

CIA-5 -- Queries About Some Information

(U) This ARRB request was dated July 1995 and was for identification of some twelve crypts, names, file codes, or acronyms. This was answered by a paired listing dated July 1995 (Returned to CIA).

CIA-6 -- Request for Systematic Review of Traffic

(U) This request was dated September 1995 and was for "the CIA to assemble all of the cable traffic and dispatches for . . . September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between" . . . Mexico City and Headquarters and Mexico City and JMWAVE.

(C) The DO provided a classified response in January 1998. All cable traffic and dispatches for the period September 26, 1963 through October 20, 1963 and November 22, 1963 through December 30, 1963 between: (a) the Mexico city Station and Headquarters, and (B) the Mexico City Station and JMWAVE are <u>not</u> available as a chronological collection. The Office of Communications (OC) only held cables long enough to ensure that they were successfully transmitted to the recipient. Because processes and resources to perform cleanup activity varies, cables were sometimes held for longer periods but not with the intention of becoming a long-term reference collection. The offices of record for the origination of cable traffic and dispatches did not create files in this manner. The desks maintained a temporary paper cable chrono. These were not usually retained for more than 90 days. There is no electronic repository for cables and dispatches from the stations. Cables were printed out and went into specific files dealing with subjects or operations. Accordingly, it is not possible to recreate as a collection all of the requested cables and dispatches.

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CIA - 7 - Review of CIA Histories

(S) ARRB staffers Jeremy Gunn and Michelle Combs have reviewed all of the requested histories except one still under pre-review by the component because of sensitive information -- we expect this to be resolved in the near future. They were granted access to identify any relevance to the assassination of President Kennedy. They selected a number of pages to be included within the materials to be declassified and released to the National Archives. The histories reviewed were as follows:

- *Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba,* written by Colonel J. Hawkins, USMC, on 5 May 1961, and controlled by WH division.

- *Domestic Operations Base,* written by Perry E. Crookham, in May 1967, and controlled by SO Division. We are also aware that relevant parts of pp. 29-31 have been released in the Bay of Pigs declassification project.

- The TS history entitled *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D 1948-1965,* written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter, in April 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff.

- *The Stockholm Station, Volume I, II, and III, 1942-1967,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in November 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Oslo Station, 1943-January 1968.* This history was written by William D. O'Ryan and Elizabeth Hart, in 1967-1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *Covert Action Project Funds, FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective December 1947 - January 1964),* written by CA Staff, in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

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- *The Helsinki Station, February 1951-February 1964, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Melvin W. Jokinen and Hank Jarvinen in 1967, and controlled by EUR.

- *Domestic and Areawide Operations (WH/6) August 1963 - 30 June 1967,* written by Maurice Currie, in June 1968, and controlled by WH Division.

- *Soviet Russia Division -- Reports and Requirements 1945 - 1966, Volumes I, II, and III,* written by Mrs. Elizabeth Sanford Peyton and Anthony Arnold, in June 1973, and controlled by SB.

- *Madrid Station -- Spain, Volume I and II, 1942-1966,* written by David Wright and Gardner MacPherson, in April 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Ottawa Station, 1953- 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan, in April 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *CIA Participation in Police Assistance Programs for Developing Countries, 1955 - October 1965,* written by Robert Bowling, Geraldine L. Jelsch, and Lyle T. Shannon, in October 1965, and controlled by CI Staff.

- *History of Lisbon Station, April 1942 - October 1965,* written by Robert Ruth and John C. Bishop, in October 1965, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Maritime Branch (MB) at Headquarters, April 1951 - 1966,* written by S. H. Chapman, in June 1968, and controlled by SO Division.

- *History of The Hague Station 1942 - 1966,* written by Marion Linde and William D. O'Ryan in 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *The Alaska Station (Plans for Operations Aimed at Soviet Siberia From Alaska) 1949 - 1964,* written by

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George N. Belic and John Bogart in January 1971, and controlled by SB.

- *Western Europe Operations Directed at Cuba 1962 - 1964,* written by WE Division Officers in July 1967, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 - 1966,* written by Alfred T. Cox in August 1968, and controlled by SO Division.

- *Iceland - The History of the Reykjavik Station, 1950 - 1966,* written by Rolfe A. Haatvedt in February 1967 and published in February 1968, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *History of Station Port of Spain, August 1949 - November 1967,* written by Stannard K. Short in March 1969 and published in May 1969, and controlled by WH Division.

- *Monrovia Station -- Liberia, December 1958 - August 1969,* written by C. Frank Stone II, Lester C. Houck, and Louis B. Spaeth in October 1969 and published in January 1970, and controlled by AF Division.

- *The Algiers Station, 1947 - 1965,* written by M. S Caver in December 1972, and controlled by AF.

- *History of the Copenhagen Station, 1943 - 1968,* written by William D. O'Ryan in early 1969 and published in October 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.

- The *History of Tunis Station, March 1956 - October 1968,* written by Louis B. Spaeth in October 1968 and published in December 1969, and controlled by AF Division.

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- *History of the Cyprus Station, 1950 - 1968,* written by Dean L. Dodge in June 1968 and published in July 1969, and controlled by NE Division.

- *History of the Brussels Station, 1942 - 1968, Volumes I and II,* written by William D. O'Ryan in Autumn 1968 and published in May 1969, and controlled by EUR Division.

- *History of the Rangoon Station, 1947 - July 1968, Volume II,* written by Carleson C. Ames in September 1968 and published in January 1969, and controlled by FE Division.

- *The Africa Division, 1959 - 1967,* written by W. H. Dunbar in December 1971 and published in June 1972, and controlled by AF.

- *Operations in Angola, 1942 - 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck in May 1970, and controlled by AF.

- *The Conakry Station, February 1959 - June 1968,* written by M. S. Caver in September 1971, and controlled by AF.

- *Operations in Mozambique, 1942 - 1969,* written by Lester C. Houck in September 1971, and controlled by AF.

- *The Bangkok Station, 1945 - 1965, Volume III,* written by Gerard Campagna in May 1971, and controlled by FE.

- *The Phnom Penh Station, 1953 - 1965, Volume II,* written by Allen W. Ginder. in February 1974, and controlled by CIA History Staff and DDO.

- *History of the Bukavu Base, September 1963 - June 1967,* written by Lester C. Houck and Roscoe N. Sandlin, Jr. in August 1969, and controlled by Africa Division.

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- *Lagos Station, 1950 - 1967,* written by William H. Dunbar in March 1971, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Khartoum Station, November 1955 - July 1969,* written by Lawrence R. Devlin in November 1972, and controlled by DDP.
- *The Melbourne Station and Canberra Base, 1954 - 1966,* written by Ruth Hyde in June 1970, and controlled by DDP.
- *Covert Action Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1950-1968,* written by Donald M. Jameson in December 1972, and controlled by CE.
- *History of Guatemala Station, December 1960-March 1965,* written in March 1965 by Paul L. Loeb and controlled by WH.
- *History, Japan - FI/D Operations, 1950-1955*, written in June 1970 by Vyrl E. Leichliter and controlled by the successor component to FI/D.
- *The Illegal Border-Crossing Program, 1946-1959,* written by Anthony Arnold, George N. Belic, Boris Ilyin and John Basarab in July 1971 and controlled by CE.
- *Air Support of Cuban Operations 1960-1962,* written by Andrew Russo in January 1973, and controlled by History Staff.
- *Counterintelligence Operations Soviet Russia Division, 1946 - 1965, Volumes I and II,* written by Frederick Walters in August 1972, and controlled by SB.
- Memorandum for the Record on *HS-Misc 13 (file of CA material)* dated 11 April 1978, written by Eulalie Hammond.

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- *The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime Aspects, 1961,* written by Savilion H. Chapman in November 1966, and controlled by Special Operations Division.

- *The Covert Actions Project Funds FY 1964 and FY 1965 (With Historical Perspective), December 1947 - January 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA Staff in January 1964, and controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Funding Covert Operations, 1960 - 1964.* This TOP SECRET history was written by CA and Cover Staff Officers in September 1964, and is controlled by CA/PEG.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D, 1948-1965* This TOP SECRET history was written by Fred Griffin, Frank B. Rowlett, and Vyrl E. Leichliter in April 1974, and is controlled by CIA History Staff.

- *History of the Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1-2 November 1963, Saigon Station Log and Analysis.* This history's access is controlled by FE/VNC or its successor.

The following were very sensitive and we discussed the collections with ARRB staffers. An agreement was reached to provide access to specific sections that may contain relevant information:

- *Covert Action Project Funds:* pages preceding Tab 1, and pages 1 through 6 under Tab 1.

- *Foreign Intelligence Staff/Division D:* Sections III (1952-1965) (pages 39 through 50) and IV (Division D Contributions to US National Policy) (pages 51 through 57).

CIA-10 -- Interagency Source Register

(U) This request was dated June 1996. The DO provided a classified response to the ARRB together

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with a copy of DOI 50-46, "The Interagency Source Register," and advised that an unclassified response was not possible.

CIA-11 -- Sylvia Duran Materials

(U) This request was dated May 1996 and was "in particular . . . [for] a 'ten-page statement' she may have given to the Mexican police." IMS/ESG "searched its main index system, its 'names' data base, and hard copy files." The Agency response, dated October 1997, indicated to the ARRB that "no such 'statement' has ever been found and we cannot confirm that it ever existed."

CIA-12 -- Files on five persons allegedly connected with JMWAVE

(U) This ARRB request was dated May 1996 for "all 201 files, personnel files, Office of Security files, P-files, or any other files related to … David Sanchez Morales … Ted Shackley … Ron Cross … Bart Henry and Doug Gupton.

(U) The DO maintains no files on former employees, such as Morales, Shackley, or Gupton (P).

(U) In a response dated August 1998, the DO responded to DA/OIM/HRP/JFK that we were unable to identify Ron Cross and Bart Henry as true names, registered aliases, or pseudonyms and, therefore, could not provide any files.

CIA - 13 - Mexico City Back-channel Communications

(U) The DO provided a classified response explaining that these types of communications are usually administrative matters, e.g., they contain sensitive personnel information and they are not placed in operational files or saved, collectively, in other

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databases. Unfortunately, there is no way of retrieving these cables through a reasonable search using any generic or specific term, since cables were not captured by any organized filing process.

CIA - 14 - Mexico City Station Annual Reports

(U) The DO was asked for specific annual reports from Mexico City.

(S) We informed the ARRB that we were successful in locating an official DO file which contained station "annual reports" for the years 1957 through 1973. The file included two dispatches which forwarded the RMDs from Mexico Station for the years 1960 and 1961. However, the RMDs, which were sent as separate attachments (sent in a different pouch from the covering dispatch memorandum) were not present in the file. (NOTE: Attachments which contained true names of CIA officers or assets or information that would identify operational sources with CIA were customarily sent in separate transmissions as a security measure if a pouch(es) were compromised). We also note that in a speed letter, dated 1978, written by DDO/LA/STB to OLC, that the RMDs for Mexico City Station, for the years, 1962, 1963, or 1964 could not be located.

(S) Based upon further review, we are providing an updated response to the ARRB as follow: The only report that was annually required of a station was that relating to its ability to meet its mission directives, now called "operational directives". These annual reports called the Station's "Relative Mission Directives" (RMD) were used to compose an overall annual division or staff submission to the Deputy Director for Operations, as an evaluative tool. The RMDs, themselves are a summary of station activities reported to Headquarters in other correspondence during the course of the year, were used to compile a division level evaluation--in a sense, an annual report card--on how it was doing against operational requirements. The station reporting was extracted into the larger

division summary, much as it is today. The RMDs from year-to-year could and often did change with the operational requirements the Agency was expected to fulfill. As such, the RMDs for each station had value only as data to the larger examination of how the Agency performed its intelligence mission in a given year and what trends or changes this review would suggest for the ensuing year.

(U) Station reporting of the type described above would be treated as transitory information and as such meet the definition of a temporary record. It is entirely possible and quite probable that these facilitative reports were systematically destroyed. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) authorized the Agency to destroy facilitative reports in 1954 (NARA Reference: II-NNA-1057); the destruction of intelligence collection requirement files in 1962 (NARA Reference: NN-163-1), and operational management objective files at the subcomponent level (which would include reports from Stations and base) in 1977 (NARA Reference: NC1-263-77-10). The 1977 authorization remains in force today.

CIA - 15 - Win Scott files from Russ Holmes files

(U) The Retired Record Table RRT shows Mr. Scott's Mexico City files were retired as Job 78-00594R on 11 August 1972. These records were retired to the Agency's Archives and Records Center under Item Number 40-76 in the Records Control Schedule in effect at the time. Files under Item Number 40-76 were described as:

"Temporary. Destroy on completion of specific job or as they serve their purpose. Return folders and documents on loan and destroy remaining papers."

The RRT shows Job 78-00594R was destroyed on 12 January 1987.

The RRT page showing the disposition of Mr. Scott's files and the page of the Records Control Schedule which describes Item Number 40-76 have been

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incorporated in the Agency's JFK collection and will be processed for release to NARA.

CIA - 16 - Oswald Pre-Assassination Files

(S) The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.

(S) Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational interest file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedure that upon opening a 201, the documents from an operational interest file would be transferred to the 201.

(S) Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(S) In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.

CIA-IR-01 - Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-1964

(S) The request for a listing of personnel assigned to Moscow 1959-1964 was discussed with Board

Staff. Instead of a listing, the files on individuals who were assigned to Moscow and a history of the Moscow Station were made available. In addition, the staff interviewed a former COS Moscow. The Board staff is satisfied with the response and will prepare its own documentation.

CIA-IR-03 - Full Computer Search for List of HTLINGUAL Files

(C) First, as an outcome of the Pike and Church Committees investigations, all HTLINGUAL files which were identifiable, as such, were destroyed under court order. Copies of materials from these files that may have been made prior to the destruction order and put into other files have, however, surfaced as files are reviewed. This includes material in the HSCA sequestered collection.

(C) The DO ran a search on the term "HTLINGUAL." Some records were identified as destroyed. Some were not so marked but are not locatable under the job number identified; however, given that there is no requirement to record destroyed records under the Federal statutes for disposition programs and given limited resources for noting files destroyed, this is not uncommon. The HTLINGUAL search further identified files because they had been the subject of Freedom of Information Act queries; however, these were not HTLINGUAL files per se, but files which contained the FOIA requester queries for HTLINGUAL information.

(U) ARRB staff member Michelle Combs has reviewed the HTLINGUAL file run and has selected some folders for review. OIM has identified that they have only redacted records for the large FOIA case that is listed. IMS/ESG/HCS is retrieving its records for unredacted copies of the records and will make them available.

CIA-IR-04 - Disposition of Angleton Files

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(U) The DO provided the following unclassified response about the Angleton Files: The files that Kalaris mentioned in Mangold's book were incorporated with the files of the CI staff. Per memorandum dated 1976-1979, the CI files were reviewed and incorporated into the DO record system. Items that were duplicates or not worthy of retention were destroyed. The memos describe the file collection and the process that was followed. Because the files that were once known as Angleton's have been dispersed within the DO records, they are no longer identifiable as a collection.

CIA-IR-06 -- QKENCHANT

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS initially provided a classified response to DA/OIM/JFK for this request in February 1998. In a follow-up response for declassification of the response, IMS/ESG/HCS worked with the providing office and then approved DA/OIM/JFK's unclassified response.

CIA-IR-07 - Claude Barnes Capehart

(U) The DO provided a classified response, which stated that we found no record when conducting a name trace for records on Capehart. Subsequently, we were advised by the CIA's Project Manager, Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, that this request was primarily being researched by the Directorate for Science & Technology.

CIA-IR-09 -- George Bush

(S) The ARRB requested information about George Bush because of a reference to "George Bush of the Central Intelligence Agency" in a certain FBI document dated November 1963.

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(S) IMS/FAB provided a main index search response to IMS/ESG/HCS. A 201 (that dated back only to 1977) and a DCD file were located.

(U) DA/OIM/JFK responded to the ARRB in February 1998 that the "search determined the Agency has no record of any association with George Herbert Walker Bush during the 1963 time period."

CIA-IR-11 - Warren Commission critics (Does CIA maintain files or records on specified critics - other than press clippings?)

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response for "any files or records on Warren Commission critics Edward J. Epstein, Josiah Thompson, Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg, or Sylvia Meagher below. In addition to these records, our research did surface a reference to a file titled "Garrison Investigation of Kennedy Assassination" which was opened in 1969 and closed in 1996. At the direction of the ARRB staff, no material in response to FOIA requests or news clippings in Public Affairs was included.

A. Edward J. EPSTEIN - The DO has no identifiable information on subject. Our search did surface the name Edward Epstein; however, by using additional biographic data known about subject, we were able to dismiss this name as a false "hit."

B. Josiah THOMPSON - Subject was of operational interest to the DO circa 1962; therefore, a 201 file does exist on this individual. ARRB staff member Combs reviewed this file in August 1998.

C. Mark LANE - Our search produced references to two documents: (1) An Agency dispatch from Germany dated 23 January 1970, and (2) An OGC letter dated 29 March 1977. Both of these documents are available for review. The OGC letter concerns a 1976 FOIA request -- Mark Lane was one of the individuals requesting the FOIA action -- which involves two dispatches dated 1967

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and 1968. Because these two documents are the subject of a FOIA request, they are not included in this response.

D. Harold Weisberg - There is a 201 file on subject which contains very limited information. This file can be made available for review by an ARRB staff member. The DO retired records system, CARD, has a reference to an Agency dispatch (EGBA-87605, 1969) which indicates subject was in correspondence with Julius Mader. This document was in the files when it was reviewed by staff member Combs in August 1998.

E. Sylvia Meagher - We found no DO information.

CIA - IR-12 - Contacts with journalists or publishing houses

(U) The DO provided both an unclassified and classified response about contacts with journalists or publishing houses, regarding whether CIA might have attempted to influence any journalists or publishers regarding public discussion of the assassination. Searches with generic terms such as "journalists," "publishers," "publishing houses," and "media" would not produce meaningful responses. This question required the research of crypts mentioned in various documents in the JFK "assassination records." These crypts referred to projects managed under the overall guidance of a staff in the DO and in all instances were projects concerning press and propaganda programs designed to promote anti-communism and to counter Soviet press and propaganda initiatives worldwide. Specifically, the various projects were developed for the following reasons (Corresponding cryptonyms to these projects were provided in a classified document, and are not included below):

A. to counter Soviet activities in international intellectual organizations, in order to unite and promote anti-Communist intellectuals.

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B. to be involved in book publishing matters and the international distribution of anti-Communist books.

C. to purchase and distribute books.

D. to cover the international mailing of American books translated into Spanish and French languages.

E. to purchase and mail books to selected addressees in Latin America and Africa.

F. to cover a worldwide news and feature story service.

G. as a Press and Propaganda Developmental and Target of Opportunity project involving Latin America.

CIA-IR-13 -- Organized Crime

(S) As part of DA/OIM/JFK's research, IMS/ESG/HCS was requested to do a trace on "Charles Ford." The trace resulted in no hits.

(S) Later, to answer CIA-IR-03 on HTLINGUAL material, a computer run was made. The list contained a citation to testimony to Congress by Charles Ford in September of 1975. A copy of Ford's testimony to a Senate Committee regarding a Mafia connection to assassination plots against Castro was provided to DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998.

(U) At the request of HRP JFK, several project Crypts were searched and results provided in connection with this request.

CIA - IR-15 - Mexico City Station electronic surveillance and surveillance tapes

(S) The Directorate of Operations has checked Headquarters records for files referenced in HMMW 12454

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and for files on the crypts cited in this document and searched for HMMA 20307 and other cables or dispatches cited in this document. As previously explained, the crypts in HMMW 12454 have been researched. The dispatch was apparently written in haste and in truncated language without correct knowledge of the operational crypts for the specific operations in Mexico City. The crypts in the dispatch are the more generic crypts for teltap operations, not for the then-current operations in Mexico City, which are in question.

(U) There has been considerable interest over the years in locating any electronic surveillance tapes that would have been made during the period that Oswald visited Mexico (26 September - 2 October 1963). A thorough search has been conducted of the DO's record system as well as the index to retired records in an attempt to locate any tapes and/or find documentation to resolve their disposition. We have discussed this issue with operational experts and their professional opinion is that most likely tapes such as these were never returned to Headquarters for retention. It was normal practice to recycle audio tapes after they had been listened to by transcribers and their transcripts made.

(U) Messages between field stations and headquarters used operational jargon and shortened sentence structures that can sometimes allow for misinterpretations. Thus, possible confusion was created when references to what was being sent to headquarters referred to "tapes" but really intend "information" from tapes.

(U) In our search efforts we did locate approximately 185 audio surveillance tapes of the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City that were recorded during the immediate time following the assassination (22 November 1963 to January 1964). The fact that these tapes were retained and returned to Headquarters could account for the fact that some people recall that some tapes existed which were sent to Headquarters.

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(U) Based upon the search efforts that were undertaken and the opinions of operational experts consulted, CIA has concluded that the tapes in question do not exist and were almost certainly recycled in the normal course of business before their potential value was identified.

CIA-IR-18 - Information on one DO Office

(S) The DO provided an unclassified response on the "Defector Staff" listed in CSN 5-50 revised in October 1959 and the "CIA Defector Coordinator, DDP/CDC," revised in October 1963. The "Defector and Contract Personnel Branch" had the symbol SR/OS/D. Only Soviet Bloc (formerly Warsaw Pact countries) defector cases were handled by this branch. Staffs and branches identified, among other duties, were responsible for identifying, debriefing, and resettling foreign defectors of intelligence interest.

CIA - IR-19 - Computer search on specific individuals and organizations

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB Staffs' request to review Agency files on some 38 names who were the subjects of the HSCA. All files and traces were reviewed by the ARRB staffers on 19 and 20 August.

A. Leo Cherne, (Leopold Chernetsky), a US citizen, was born in 1912, has Office of Security file #53082, has 201 file #07662 (two volumes), has an A-file #048058, and subject does have a pseudo.

B. Hunter Leake has an A-file (#105075) DCD file number, pseudo not found.

C. John McVickar. Trace results only.

D. Andy Anderson. No identifiable traces running variations of "Andy."

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E. Byron B. Morton Jr. -- Trace resulted one document.

F. Marie Cheatham. -- Trace resulted in one document.

G. Paul A. Garbler. Our records reveal that Garbler had three pseudos assigned to him. Also, Garbler had four aliases on record.

H. Verna Deane Brown. The trace resulted in one document.

I. George Stanley Brown. Results of trace search was an A-File.

J. Howard Guebler. There was one trace result, who may or may not be iden to Subject which is an index card.

K. Gordon Duane Novel. Trace resulted in three index cards. He is the subject of 201-0834822 and has an A file (#A185210); however, the A file has been incorporated into his 201 file. No record of a pseudo on this name.

L. Ed Butler -- Trace resulted in an A file (#121440) on Edward Scannell Butler, III, the Director of INCA.

M. INCA (Information Council of the Americas). AllStar trace search on "INCA" provided the following index card(s) information that may or may not be iden to the "Information Council of the Americas, Inc."

N. Permindex. One trace result was found.

CIA-IR-20 -- Monster Plot NBR

(U) This is a large number of files from the microfilm part of the collection that Michelle Combs reviewed and then crafted a "SECRET" classified memo identifying the reels and folders of the files that were then declared "Not Believed Relevant."

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CIA-IR-21 -- DRE Monthly operational reports

(U) This request involved "Howard" and some extensive research for the name as a true name, pseudo, or alias for anyone out of JMWAVE and/or connected to the DRE operation.

(U) We also did extensive research for DRE monthly reports. In the JFK collection, there was a gap in the reporting between December 1962 and April 1964.

(U) This also covered the question of George Joannides' Performance Appraisal Reports and their inclusion in the collection with some redactions.

CIA-IR-22 - "A" file on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison

(U) The DO provided this unclassified response:

"It was the DO's understanding that there were illegible markings on pages of the copy of the "A" file on Clay Shaw. Legible copies were promised and have recently been delivered.

The DO has recently provided a copy of the "A" file on Jim Garrison."

CIA-IR-26 -- Jordan James Pfunter

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS did a records search on subject name. The information is contained in a 201 file and an A file. This information was provided to the ARRB by DA/OIM/JFK in February 1998, and they were advised that other information was available from a Third Agency.

CIA-IR-29 -- Oswald LeWinter

(U) The ARRB provided the name to be traced. Apparently he is/was claiming to be an Agency employee and the Acting Assistant Director of Counter Espionage.

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SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(S) A name trace was run. The resultant information was included in an IMS/ESG/HCS "clarification memo" for the ARRB. The text, which was classified "Secret," reads as follows:

"Oswald LeWinter is a naturalized US citizen and a man of at least four other names -- George Mearah, Oscar LeWinter, Razin LeWinter, and Ibrahimin Razin. Although he appeared in the East German *Who's Who in CIA,* the CIA has never had any official affiliation with LeWinter. LeWinter was the subject of an Agency "burn notice" in 1990; a burn notice alerts the intelligence community. In this case, the alert advised that LeWinter was an intelligence swindler, peddler, and fabricator. (C)

CIA has a report of an episode involving an intelligence fabricator and convicted drug dealer Oswald LeWinter, AKA George Mearah, born 2 April 1931, in Vienna, Austria. In July 1990, a CIA representative overseas reported that LeWinter, using the name of George Mearah, contacted him and offered to put high-level GDR officials wishing to defect in touch with our representative and in turn the CIA. This contact would be in exchange for help and a presidential pardon that would wipe the slate clean and leave LeWinter (Mearah) without a record as a convicted felon. LeWinter (Mearah) claimed this was important [because] he was married (for the third time) and starting a new life; he was reportedly considering quietly acquiring Israeli citizenship. This contact was not followed up because of the "burn notice."

CIA-IR-30 -- Cherepanov Papers

(U) This undated and undocumented request from the ARRB was derived from a passage in the book Molehunter (pp. 121-123) regarding the Cherepanov papers.

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SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

IMS/ESG/HCS located a workbook copy in English and provided access to ARRB staffer Michelle Combs. She was further offered access to the original Russian copies. Combs then wrote a memorandum dated April 1997 that identified the collection as papers that "primarily examine the habits, potential vulnerabilities, and KGB approaches made to various members of the American Embassy staff." Combs went on to say that "no information of believed relevance to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was found in these papers. No pages were designated as assassination records."

CIA-IR-32 -- AMWORLD

(C) The confidential draft of the IMS/ESG/HCS response was shown to ARRB staffer Combs in February 1998. That text follows:

> "(C) <u>**CIA-IR-32 AMWORLD. The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of AMWORLD and its connection with the Cuban exile groups.</u> After a thorough search of the DO records system, to include telephonic communications with various DO Latin American Division officers, we formulated the following as a definition of the purpose of the AMWORLD operation. The AMWORLD operation was a covert Agency effort to provide support to several Cuban exile groups. This was an "autonomous" operation designed to bring the exile groups under the direct control of Manuel Artime Buesa. AMWORLD's mission was to cause a popular uprising in Cuba through the use of propaganda and paramilitary forces to ultimately overthrow Fidel Castro.
>
> (C) The Agency provided direct and indirect financial aid and technical advisory support to these groups but did not participate directly in the day-to-day operations. ARTIME was responsible for recruitment of AMWORLD

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

personnel; he obtained sites for training and deployment, and he had primary responsible for day-to-day operations. AMWORLD was based in three locations. The AMWORLD propaganda efforts were based in Costa Rico. The paramilitary efforts were run out of the Nicaragua base. The third base was located in Miami to service AMWORLD requirements including the collection of operational leads, servicing of dead drops and assisting in the vetting of AMWORLD personnel."

(C) Combs asked two follow up questions: Was part of the program to put in place a government in exile? Was there ever a government in exile? IMS/ESG/HCS put these questions to LA and DO/IRO. The DO/IRO has provided the following additional write up, classified confidential:

``(C) Based on file reviews and recollections from officers involved in the Cuban program, there was never a Cuban Government in Exile. During the planning for the Bay of Pigs operation it was envisioned that after the invasion site had been secured, Miro Cardona and the Cuban Revolutionary Council would be flown to the area to establish a new Cuban Government. The invasion site was never secured.

(C) The AMWORLD Project, begun well after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion and after the release of Manuel Artime Buesa and other Bay of Pigs veterans from Cuban prisons, was designed to support and unite several Cuban exile groups under the control of Artime in an effort to enhance the cohesion of the exiles and augment Artime's capability to launch propaganda and paramilitary attacks against the Cuban mainland. The overall mission of AMWORLD was to foment a popular uprising in Cuba which could lead to the ultimate overthrow of Fidel Castro. There is no evidence that AMWORLD's mission even remotely came close to fruition and no evidence that a projected government in exile was ever considered as a viable option.''

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CIA-IR-34 -- Files of CIA officials/offices

(U) IMS/ESG/HCS ran a computer search for 'OPI 40" files. This computer run was then made available to ARRB staff member Michelle Combs for review. Her review encompasses some 42 boxes from a variety of retired DDP files. The identified folders were gathered in an aggregate of seven boxes (including one that is exclusively microfilm and microfiche of so-called Registry logs).

(U) The ARRB staff member's review is about half completed. She has so far selected some 44 records totaling 123 pages to be included in the JFK collection. When the ARRB staff member's review is completed, the selected records will be copied and subjected first to a duplicate check by DA/OIM/JFK reviewers, then reviewed by those reviewers, then reviewed by HCS reviewers.

(U) We have been unable to locate any "operational diaries" by William Harvey.

CIA-IR-35 - Oswald related Information

(S) The surfacing of a report in the continuing Oswald 201 file attributed to IJDECANTER prompted the ARRB to request a review of that defector's 201 file. Certain such reporting records will be included in the JFK collection as records in Oswald's 201. A Board request for an updated search of records for Oswald related material generated some 128 hits, which were reviewed by Ms. Michelle Combs of the ARRB staff. Three records, selected by Ms. Combs and sanitized with her concurrence, were selected for inclusion in the JFK assassination records collection.

CIR-IR-36 - Handling of Cables in 1963

14-00000

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB staff's request for a brief explanation of how the Directorate of Operations processed cables in the 1963/1964 timeframe. We are unable to locate any Agency-wide definitive records on the subject for this time frame, and the information provided below is based solely on the memory of DO officers familiar with procedures in place at the time and in the specific offices in which they served.

(U) Each area division in the DO maintained and staffed its own registry. Although each registry was configured to meet each division's unique requirements, there were common functions performed by all the registries to include: collecting, sorting, and delivering of incoming cables; maintenance of incoming and outgoing cable "chronos;" collecting and delivering of incoming and outgoing pouch material; and the issuance and maintenance of "pseudo and alias" card files.

(U) On a daily basis, usually six days per week, each registry collected its incoming cable traffic from a central processing point, then called the Cable Secretariat, within the Office of Communications. The incoming cables were then sorted by registry personnel according to predefined guidelines. These guidelines were unique to each division and were frequently altered to meet changing operational requirements. Sorted cables were then delivered to specific operational/area desks. A "chrono" copy of each incoming cable was maintained, on a temporary basis, usually for 90 days, and the receiving office placed a copy into an operational file based upon subject or activity.

(U) Outgoing cables were created and coordinated by appropriate operational/area desks and usually released by the chief of the division or a designated releasing officer. "Released" cables were then hand delivered or sent by pneumatic tube system (a system long ago dismantled from the original Headquarters building) to Cable Secretariat for processing into the Agency's communication network. "Chrono" copies of

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outgoing cables were forwarded to the registry for a 90 day hold and the sending office placed a copy in the appropriate operational file.

(U) There was a centralized processing section for the directorate that received copies of the cables to review them and update the central index cards.

CIA-IR-37 - William Pawley

(U) The DO provided an unclassified response to the ARRB's request to review all files on William Pawley and any files on his possible connection with Cuban exile groups in the 1962-1963 time frame. The Agency's 201 file on Pawley consists of three volumes, the same as in the JFK sequestered collection, and November 1962 is the date of the last record indexed to his 201. However, the Agency holds operational files for the period 1963 to 1965 which related to Pawley. Those files were made available for review by the ARRB staff and they selected a number of documents for inclusion in the materials being processed for release to NARA.

Unnumbered Request -- Worldwide Query

(U) In March 1998 the ARRB asked "whether a worldwide query was sent out the day after the assassination for all case officers to query their sources for any information on the assassination and Oswald. Are or would all the answers be in the collection?"

(S) The following information has been identified:

A. A "book message," that is a message to all stations and bases, DIR 84608, dated 22 November 1963 (date/time group 222054Z) was sent. This message advised all stations and bases about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The message advised all to be "on alert." This cable is found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 3.

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SUBJECT: JFK Declaration of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

B. A "book cable," DIR 85133, dated 26 Nov. 1963 (date/time group 262319Z) was sent. This message was sent "routine" but with ten addressees on a "prior-ity basis." The ten "priority" addressees were: Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, The Hague, London, and Ottawa. This cable advised all stations and bases of the identity of the alleged assassin by name of Lee Harvey Oswald. This cable can be found in Oswald's 201 file, Box 1, Volume 4.

C. Neither of these two cables indicates that a "routing" coding was to be used to ensure that all responses, if any, would be classified to Oswald's 201 file.

8. (U) I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT.

Executed in Langley, Virginia on this 2nd day of September 1998.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
JFK FPO, Directorate of Operations

SUBJECT: JFK Declaration for the Directorate of Operations

DISTRIBUTION:
Original - JFK Official File
1 - D/OIM/DA
1 - C/JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA
1 - C/IMS/ESG
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - ESG/ Chrono

104-10337-10001 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

April 1992

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)
(OCA 1123-92/1)
(OCA 1123-92/2)

Original - Addressee (w/enclos)
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - ER
1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)
1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)
1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)
1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)
1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)

13-00000

OCA 1123-92

1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories, the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking, involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?

about 30

We believe that between 40 percent ~~and 50 percent~~ of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI.

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4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act(FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved.

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APR 21 '92 11:20

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DCI History Staff
316 Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Phone (703) 351-2621

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92 PAGES TRANSMITTED 8
(cover sheet included)

TRANSMITTED TO:

NAME: JOHN PEREIRA

ORGANIZATION: OGC

BLDG, ROOM

TELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 874 3208)

SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENCL) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT.) & CIA HS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE

TRANSMITTED FROM:

NAME: KEN McDONALD

BLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES

TELE/EXT: 30147 (FAX 522 9280)

MESSAGE:

John - The OCA letter (which David Pearline sent us yesterday) has my suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with State, to which the Wilcox memo refers.
Ken

UNCLASSIFIED

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.

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2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines of the kinds of records sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so, approximately how many?

We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA's JFK assassination records, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

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APR 22 '92 08:48

P. 4

20 APR 1992

ER 92-2346

JOHN GLENN, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

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JIM SASSER, TENNESSEE
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LEONARD WEISS, STAFF DIRECTOR
FRANKLIN C. POLK, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR AND CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6250

April 14, 1992

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Dear Director Gates:

I am please to learn that you will be testifying before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12, 1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation proposes to create an independent review board to govern and coordinate the release of government information relevant to the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100 copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee and to the Congress as it considers this important legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the records and resources of your agency, the Committee would appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:

> What are the reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency has records related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What have the methods been to date for the identification and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as material related to the assassination of President Kennedy?
>
> What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to assess the scope of relevant documents outside of materials requested by earlier investigative or other official committees or commissions, or through the Freedom of Information Act?
>
> What is the volume of material which you might recommend be released to the public without concern for further postponement?

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Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies, whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may released without agency objection?

What recommendations can you make with regard to the need for interagency working groups to identify third-agency records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the public?

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns that you have with regard to the review and release of assassination material?

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at 202-224-4751.

Sincerely,

John Glenn

John Glenn
Chairman

JHG/sk

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

W I T N E S S L I S T

* * * *

RELEASE OF [illegible] INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Panel 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R-PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

Panel 3:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

HEARING
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THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

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W I T N E S S L I S T

* * * *

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United States Senator (D-OK)

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* * * *

Panel 2:

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

* * * *

Panel 3:

James Lesar
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

* * * *

4/22/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION

A. Agreement with Principles of Legislation.

1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as is consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods.

2. Established own declassification program. Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable mechanism to declassify documents.

B. Describe Nature and Amount of Records.

1. Reasons for having records.

2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs to.

3. How we have identified material related to JFK assassination.

C. How Much Material Can be Released?

1. Give estimate of amount of material to be released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Describe material that could not be disclosed.

   a. Example of Intelligence Sources and Methods that would require withholding.

   b. Example of material the release of which would invade privacy.

3. Describe resources--manpower and funds-- to achieve results.

D. Concerns with Resolutions.

1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns. Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.

2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents should conduct initial review of material to determine whether it can be released. Material withheld from public release could then be made available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be allowed to review it for release even if that information is contained in a document prepared by another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency working group to handle coordination issues likely to arise with disclosure of third agency documents.

4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board for additional material that has a reasonable relationship to the assassination.

5. Would hope that the Board will consult with DCI before using subpoena power to compel production of material that involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to ensure that deliberative process information and identities of covert employees are protected.

E. **Conclusion:** Pledge to cooperate with whatever mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK assassination.

13-00000

OCA 2034-92
1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Majority Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.

2. The hearing was well attended by the public and attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie "JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris, Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea, American National Government Specialist at the Congressional Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that "after much negotiation," the Director of Central Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

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received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work together to release the documents to the American people.

4. The general tone of the session was strongly in favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might be some materials that required postponement of disclosure, but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years, conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone thought 98 percent of the material could be released. Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church Committee counsel, suggested that most national security information should be released under the resolution, but that privacy interests posed greater concerns. Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up the bill," which is why he said that review by an independent board was so important.

5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today." Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone, describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government as part of his research process? However, there was no aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's "research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

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He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence, and also said that a closer look should be taken at an operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact, spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change embarking upon several courses that disturbed that "Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In response to a later question about various theories, Stone called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible deniability" and that it was important to look behind the Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism to "vindicate t public's right to know." (On 18 March Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite the need to make the documents publicly available, the Administration would not support the resolution and it could be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such an action would be problematic for the Administration, because much Executive branch information is contained in House records, and the House also probably considers documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to avoid a constitutional confrontation with the Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the Advisory Committee established in connection with the State Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent on general propositions like the fact that the documents ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core issues raised by H.R. 454.

Victoria L. Pepper
Assistant General Counsel
Office of Congressional Affairs

13-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

SECRET

4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

NOT A PART / ADDED LATER

Pages	Date	Description.
1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
1	"	Redacted copy of same.
1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
2	"	Redacted copy of same
1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
1	"	Redacted copy of same
14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

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1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

COMPILED & ADDED LATER

SECRET

13-00000

OCA 2050-92
6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: JFK Testimony

1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The Committee has requested that an advance copy of your statement be provided to them by 8 May.

Stanley M. Moskowitz

Attachment:
as stated

13-00000

Draft 5/6/92

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

13-00000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger ~~even~~ over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that ~~the~~ CIA had anything to do with ~~participated in~~ the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

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methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. As we speak this Group has already begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, which includes all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which have a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to do so.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of ~~information provided to the~~ (copies and originals of Warren Commission and the) House Select Committee on Assassinations ~~between 1977 and 1979~~, and ~~over~~ 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald, accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.

~~At first blush, you might think that this is an enormous amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is important to recognize, however, that~~ Virtually all of these are ~~essentially "secondary"~~ documents ~~collected~~ were originated or came to CIA from other agencies after the assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. ~~There were~~ some documents relevant to the investigations ~~that did~~ exist before the assassination, but they were only brought together in response to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this very point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of ~~37~~ 33 documents (~~less than 150~~ approximately 160 pages), ~~of which 28 documents consisted of material originated by the State Department, the Navy, the FBI, and newspaper clippings.~~ I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have

rewrite

not clear

What's this mean? Spell out

how + where? What kind of documents

add part

Where's the chart?

The documents Only 11 of were CIA documents

11 - CIA (?) pages

13-00000

What's that mean? Sounds like a dodge.

already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file ~~and provided them~~ to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities ~~in the U.S.~~ after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA ~~collected all~~ accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages in total.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. ~~I should emphasize that~~ much of the material held by CIA originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. ~~My~~ Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in the 63 boxes. ~~[However]~~ we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately ~~10~~ 27 % originated from the ~~FBI, and a smaller number of records, [less than 1] %, originated from the State Department or elsewhere.~~ ... 24 % originated from a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review. A preliminary ~~review~~ survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet

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Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation, and Cuban exile activities. ~~copies of FBI reports about Oswald, and even information about Watergate.~~

The CIA cannot ~~simply act to declassify or~~ release ~~some~~ a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to ~~proceed to review for declassification~~ these documents it has sequestered.

The House will let us declassify and release these sequestered documents?

Release the results of the declassification on the sequestered documents?

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested ~~on~~ a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

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Although largely irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose ~~this information~~ their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will ~~be willing to~~ make redactions, ~~substitute generic information~~ or summarize ~~the~~ that information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of ~~15~~ stet full-time positions to expand the History Staff, and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the review of the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

Meaning? Meaning? 15 is correct

If legislation is not passed regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence that CIA has not held back any information, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans to examine documents we have kept classified or redacted. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our

While we are in complete agreement on the need to declassify documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, I do have certain technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

My primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial determination as to whether materials related to the assassination held by all Executive Branch agencies, including CIA, can be released to the public. Vesting this review authority in an outside body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. In addition, I am concerned that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a Review Board that has no particular expertise in making classification determinations and is unfamiliar with the assassination material is bound to result in delays in releasing the material. It will also result in a duplication of effort since originating agencies will have to review the decision of the Executive Director to release particular documents.

I share your belief that the review of documents be done in an expeditious and efficient manner. To that end, I propose that the initial review of assassination materials be made by the

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originating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process. Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the public or redactions would then be reviewed by members of the Review Board, who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an agency and the Review Board over the release of a document could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents while at the same time providing an independent review of all decisions made to withhold information. It presumably would expedite the process because the amount of material still classified to be reviewed would be only a fraction of the whole.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. [As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I could not make classified information available to the Board until it took the necessary steps to safeguard that information.]

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

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Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Once again, this provision conflicts with my statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated information found in another's document should have the opportunity to review the information and raise necessary objections prior to its release to the public. An interagency working group should be established to coordinate the review and release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion.

Fourth, the joint resolution defines "assassination material" broadly to include any records that relate "in any manner or degree to the assassination." I believe we have already identified these documents as a result of previous inquiries from investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations. These investigations were thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material should be reviewed.

Fourth ~~Fifth,~~ the joint resolution provision for ~~provides only~~ a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information. ~~This~~ may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large

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volumes of material at one time. If the initial review of documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution should be amended to provide that an agency may request a reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents may be released.

Fifth and Finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, ~~may not be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects. For example, there is~~ makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. I also believe that "intelligence agent" under section 6(1)(A) of the joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired undercover from an intelligence agency.

* These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. We will cooperate further with any mechanism established by the Congress and the

While I believe that the joint resolution can be improved, I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the CIA will cooperate with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify the assassination material. As Director of Central Intelligence and as ~~Robert Gates~~ a private citizen, I am committed to making this process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this

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6 May 1992

1) A number of questions
2) check my file with Gries, McDonell, OGC & OCA
3) go ahead + circulate to OMB, DOJ & FBI.

NOTE FOR: DCI

FROM: Neal Wolin, SA/DCI

Re: JFK Testimony

Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by OCA. The draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.

Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality) that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectives relating to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of material consistent with your statutory obligations.

In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your "statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the definition of "assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical" criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make (especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material declassification to death.

Neal

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OCA 2149-92
19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC

FROM: David M. Pearline
Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA

SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony

1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's 15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.

2. The following specific questions require follow-up action:

a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? (p. 5)
b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection? (p. 5)
c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)
d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that you can shed some light on? (p. 5)
e. [W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald file] that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? (p. 14)
f. [W]ould the establishment of such a panel of outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)

3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate components, will take the lead on all questions except for the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the record.

David M. Pearline

Attachment

13-00000

Draft: 14 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 1992

13-00000

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on **House Joint Resolution 454,** "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter, **just as I did before your Senate counterparts last Tuesday.**

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible

consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

First priority - JFK documents

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

— were released

declassified

change to over the coming weeks

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. **In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.**

In connection with these historical review guidelines, I have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the **JFK papers** for declassification, it is important to

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place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

Chart

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (**amounting to 124** pages), some of which

originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. **(Although I reported slightly smaller numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed these exact numbers.)** Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this is but the first installment--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

The committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be

minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum

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amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I

intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

13-00000

Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law
Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. House of Representatives
20 May 1992

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide our views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

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Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have,

but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, the Director ~~recently approved new~~ CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. The Director believes that we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

In connection with these historical review guidelines, the Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the

FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material that we will review--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

We have been asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

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Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92

22 May 1992

The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

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DRV FM LIA 3-87

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SECRET

The Honorable John Glenn

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement:

> In response to a request from the US embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective."

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority Member Roth.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

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SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92/1
22 May 1992

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Roth:

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I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations.

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CL BY 2196777
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SECRET

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

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Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

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SECRET

The Honorable John Glenn
The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs

OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92

Distribution:
Original - Addressees
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
1 - DDO
1 - D/OCA
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/DCI History Staff
1 - ER
1 - OCA Records
1 - Leg Subj File
1 - SMD Signer File
1 - SMD Soft File

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Se:lator John Glenn

News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks (202) 224-5635
May 12, 1992 Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

Statement of Senator John Glenn
Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on
S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"
May 12, 1992

The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.

The legislation would require the government to release records to the American public which are "relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would establish an independent review board within 90 days of enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to release the records to the public through the National Archives and the Government Printing Office.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.

It is also important to stress that the legislation does not authorize any official investigation of the assassination. Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American public may be given the most complete access to review relevant records, and make their own observations and assessments. The Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to this purpose.

This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs, and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the

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assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly improved by the release of these records.

Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive Branch national security information. Declassification schedules remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same practice. It is likely that more government documents related to the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past 12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions, have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by the FBI.

The public interest in the history of the assassination of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films, or television programs were produced on the subject between the years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250 holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports, allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas police officers who were not previously interviewed by government investigators.

The speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made available will answer many questions and provide many history lessons.

I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the process for review and release of the records is fair and appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of assassination related records that will be efficient and effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.

The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for working quickly to propose an independent and accountable mechanism to release records related to the assassination. However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.

I believe that the major issues include:

First, how will agencies and others who hold records define the universe of "relevant" Kennedy assassination materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees, but the question must be asked: Where will the search for documents end?

Second, the definition and search for "relevant assassination material" also raises important questions of human resources and costs to organize and make material available to the Review Board. How much will this cost?

Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review and release of records in an independent, accountable, and credible manner. The tension between management and public confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff. Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers necessary?

Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?

Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages of material will be released, the bill contains national security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and administrative records relating to past official inquiries.

I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress, which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and congressional officials are to release their records. If even some of the material can go out the door without further adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly thereafter.

Today we are fortunate to have several experts and authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

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Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work represents the track record on public access to Kennedy assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He will speak to the nature and limitations of current access arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We welcome all of you to the Committee.

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CIHRG #
IS you have any oral comments, Vicki Pepper is the one to call.
Dave

DRAFT

6/5/92

SUGGESTED AREAS TO BE ADDRESSED IN REPORT LANGUAGE
(IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)

1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which requires that records not provided to the Archivist for public disclosure be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as much information available as possible before the Review Board conducts its review of assassination materials. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to review and release assassination materials. Section 5(a)(2), which requires that all records of an official investigation for which an agency is custodian be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives for public release wherever possible. In, fact the Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch as they can provide for more expeditious release of assassination materials to the public.

2. "Third agency rule" adhered to in review of documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily provide that the agency or department that originated the information will have any input into a decision to disclose the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The Committee understands that existing regulations within the Executive Branch require that classified information originated in one agency may not be disseminated outside another agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. The Committee expects that agencies that are custodians of records will follow this practice before providing information to the Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release pursuant to section 4.
>
> Section 5(a)(2) requires agencies that are custodians of records of official investigations to make such records available to the Review Board. The Board will then make a determination of whether the material qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth

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in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records and the originating body of the record of its determination. The Committee expects that the Review Board also will consult with the agency or department that originated the information in reaching its determination as to whether public disclosure of the material must be postponed to ensure that it is apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that information. For example, the Review Board should consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that provided information incorporated into a Congressional document before making a decision to release that document and shall inform the originating agency of a decision to release that information.

3. Identities of covert employees qualify for postponement. "Intelligence agent" is something of a term of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to protect information that would reveal the identity of covert employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested clarifying report language:

> The term "intelligence agent" as used in section 7(a)(1)(A) is intended to permit postponement of release of information that would reveal the identity of a domestic or foreign intelligence or counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States intelligence organization, where the identity of any of these currently requires protection.

4. Board access to "any record" of an Executive agency. In addition to adding language to section 10(1)(1) to clarify that requests for additional records must be made by the Review Board itself, report language should make clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report language:

> Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may request "any record" from an Executive agency. The Committee intends to give the Review Board wide latitude to determine what additional records may be held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee attempting to define what records should be requested, the Committee believes that this judgment is best left to the Board, which will develop expertise in assassination-related issues and documents as its work

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proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to request any and all records of agencies without regard to their relationship to the assassination. The Committee expects that the Board will request only documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods is to be avoided.

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HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996

1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered

   - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files

   - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries

2. Pages released (227,000)

   - Percentage of pages redacted; 70 %

3. Process of declassification

   - Former senior officers in HRG review

   - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)

4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992

   - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination

   - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records

     -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board

        E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection

        - Source or method currently utilized

        - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection

5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement

   - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees

   - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days

- Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station"

    - Also, summary of a record

- Board has access to every document in full

6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:

    - Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with <u>damage</u> to current intelligence operations

    - Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki

    - Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover

        - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US

    - Liaison, joint operations in Mexico

    - Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others

    - Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination

    - President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information

        --President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination

            -- This is published in the Federal Register

8. Current appeal (now resolved)

Barry + Linda

    - Issues: identification of Agency asset
      liaison relationship
      identification of station

    - Potential appeal: Tokyo station

9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY~~ Barry's file

CSI 1997-552
10 December 1997

NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence
Deputy Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from Congressman Burton to EXDIR

Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the JFK Board.

Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton's staff last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the review of documents by 1 September 1998. Gunn showed the staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers, Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the impression that Burton's strong interest will prompt him to write to the Agency.

During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him the Agency's clear commitment to declassifying all assassination records. We also explained that we have shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing down or stopping other declassification efforts.

John Pereira
John Pereira

1- Eileen
1- Fav'd Dickham
12/10
1 circulated JFK

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL~~ USE ONLY

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ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT

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BERNARD SANDERS, VERMONT
INDEPENDENT

December 16, 1997

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable George J. Tenet
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Tenet:

As Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I have a great interest in ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee, completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this year I introduced H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the Review Board for one additional year, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Review Board was included in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.

During consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of authorization for the Review Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all federal agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order that documents may be processed and transferred to the National Archives, in compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).

The Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board nevertheless believes that the CIA is not transferring records to the Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to use its legal powers to order a transfer of records to the Board which would then vote to open the records without benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it does not wish to take this step, but that it is fully prepared to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination date.

I urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfills its obligations under the law by expeditiously reviewing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board.

Sincerely,

Dan Burton

Dan Burton
Chairman

DB:jts

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OCA 97-1969
8 January 1998

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) processing of records related to President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board's concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure you, as I did to the Review Board's Executive Director in the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the Agency's assassination-related materials. As the Review Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board and its staff in this effort.

We share the Review Board's goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive information that might warrant continued protection can be identified to the Board. For the past several years a team of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National Archives.

The Honorable Dan Burton

I understand the importance that the Congress and the President have placed on disclosing to the American people all available information about the assassination. To this end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material and are working diligently to complete our review of the remaining records.

If you or your staff require any further information or would like a briefing on our declassification program, please have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

David W. Carey

Enclosure

The Honorable Dan Burton

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 **INTERIM**)
OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)
Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)

Distribution:
Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC
1 - EXDIR/CIA **(Follow-up to SCI 97-536)**
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER **(ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851)**
1 - DCI/OGC
1 - DCI/CSI
1 - DDO
1 - DO/IMS
1 - DA/OIM
1 - DA/OIM/IRG
1 - DA/MS
1 - D/OCA
1 - AO/OCA
1 - OCA Records **(ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)**
1 - JPMeehan Chrono

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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2000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.

Make public today the guidelines

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.

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These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 (73) reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing

resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of <u>CIA information</u> contained in <u>documents</u> originated by

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Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.

Added comment on personal reaction at the time.
Determined personally to make available every scrap of paper

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
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4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OSWALD PRE-ASSASSINATION FILE:

NOT A PART

ADDED LATER

Pages	Date	Description
1	6 Mar 64	Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA
4	30 Jan 76	CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s.
1	6 Mar 64	DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.
4	6 Mar 64	Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
5	6 Mar 64	Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
1	31 Oct 59	State Cable from Moscow to SecState.
1	"	Redacted copy of same.
1	1 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	2 & 4 Nov	Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
3	2 Nov 59	Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Moscow to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	9 Nov 59	State Cable, Tokyo to SecState
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	16 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	26 Nov 59	Press clipping
1	25 May 60	Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
7	12 May 60	Attachment to above
2	12 May 60	FBI report, fr Dallas
2	25 Oct 60	State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
2	"	Redacted copy of same
1	3 Nov 60	DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
1	"	Redacted copy of same
1	18 Nov 60	Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming
1	undated	Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
2	21 Nov 60	Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors
1	"	Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
7	"	List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
1	18 Nov 60	Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
9	21 Nov 60	Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above
2	9 Dec 60	2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201
3	11 Jul 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
4	26 May 61	2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept
1	13 Apr 61	DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk)
1	26 Jan 61	State MemCon re Oswald
1	"	Redacted copy of same
14	13 Jul 61	Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible
1	28 Sep 61	Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201
4	13 Oct 61	Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow
1	7 Dec 61	Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald

SECRET

1	3 Mar 62	Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
5	26 Apr 62	Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items
9	7 Sep 62	Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
2	"	Redacted pages from above
7	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas
3	24 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
3	10 Sep 63	FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above)
2	8 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report
20	7 Nov 63	Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff
20	25 Oct 63	FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above
14	31 Jan 64	Report, not really contemprary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..," 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
14	"	Redacted copy of same

COMPILED & ADDED LATER

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Wick
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

June 14, 1966

MR. TOLSON:

Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, 6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss matters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e., the Jenkins case, [redacted] boyfriend, and other items which Mr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.

(b)(6)

The Black case was then brought up and he was told that although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this matter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time. He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.

Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat of the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of correspondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He was told specifically of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kennedy. I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed.

Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent, had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if facts, as possessed by the FBI, concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely destroy Kennedy.

CDD:amr
(2)

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had ineptly and inadequately presented the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting. At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed around" regardless of the politics involved.

Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memoranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court.

After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.

He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that

CONTINUED.....OVER

he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.

He stated the next problem would be to find this particular man. He said he had in mind somebody like Ken Royall, former Secretary of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone like Ross Malone, former President of the American Bar Association, would be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was an immediate past President of the American Bar Association from the State of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak. Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.

Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however, he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated he thought this could be done.

Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with the Hoffa case. I replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances

CONTINUED.....OVER

13-00000

he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the other Justices.

Justice Fortas next inquired if I had known a former Bureau employee by the name of Courtney Evans. I told him that I did know Evans. He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his "ace in the hole." I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated, "Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard. The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone coverage.

Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background. I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical of Kennedy.

Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraignment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.

Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father. I told the Justice that the Director had received information pointing out that despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr. The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.

CONTINUED.....OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

OK. Certainly Royall would be impossible. I had enough of him when he was atty for the saboteurs & later when as Secretary of War he was instrumental in throwing us out of SIS [Special Intelligence Service] & setting up C.I.A. [illegible] the practicability of "arbitrator" I have some doubts. It can be another "Warren Commission" & end in a fiasco. H [Hoover]

13-00000

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

4-750 (Rev. 12-14-88)

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

28 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

☐ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you.

Section 552		Section 552a
☐ (b)(1)	☐ (b)(7)(A)	☐ (d)(5)
☐ (b)(2)	☐ (b)(7)(B)	☐ (j)(2)
☐ (b)(3)	☐ (b)(7)(C)	☐ (k)(1)
______	☐ (b)(7)(D)	☐ (k)(2)
______	☐ (b)(7)(E)	☐ (k)(3)
______	☐ (b)(7)(F)	☐ (k)(4)
☐ (b)(4)	☐ (b)(8)	☐ (k)(5)
☐ (b)(5)	☐ (b)(9)	☐ (k)(6)
☐ (b)(6)		☐ (k)(7)

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☒ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

______ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies).

______ Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): ______

☐ For your information: ______

☒ The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:
65-6165-25, 26

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X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
X FOR THIS PAGE X
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FBI/DOJ

Theoharis -- Appendix C

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

March 16, 1953

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
ON [illegible]

In connection with a possible unauthorized leak of official Government information, it is believed desirable to institute a technical surveillance of Henry William Grunewald, a prominent figure in Washington, D. C.

I therefore recommend that you grant authority to place a technical surveillance on the residence of Grunewald, Apartment 625B, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone: Woodley 7-5700, or any other residence or office space which he might occupy in the future.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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MAR 18 1953
24
RECEIVED [illegible] MAR 16 5 03 PM '53

The Attorney General on February 13, 1953, requested that we cover the activities of Grunewald and asked that a technical surveillance be instituted on his residence. This memorandum is being submitted in accordance with the Attorney General's suggestion. (FHW/rh)

10:00 am 3/17/53

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

56 APR 1 1953

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: April 28, 1953

FROM : L. B. Nichols

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [illegible] BY [illegible]

SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD KEAN COMMITTEE

I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session, [redacted] Tobin then outlined the following particulars:

1. [redacted] Tobin stated he had ascertained this was probably [redacted] b7C

2. [redacted] This was the point which Tobin stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at New York on July 20, 1951, in the investigation on [redacted] b7C

3. [redacted] Tobin outlined this was [redacted] b7C

4. Tobin stated that Grunewald had the habit of passing out ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hottel. I told Tobin if he was inferring that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have furnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director has not appreciated the manner in which Grunewald has thrown the Director's

cc: Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen

RECORDED - 58
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65-6165-147

Executive Session testimony

13-00000

name around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on [redacted] With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly, all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned; that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District Committee.

Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from the Bureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on [redacted] Grunewald was a fairly good investigator and it would have been a simple matter for him to find out [redacted] that with reference to the information on [redacted] told him it was my understanding [redacted] that this itself was a matter of public record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investigation of a lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and with the Grievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this. Further, I inquired whether he had any information to the effect that [redacted] assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated Grunewald stated [redacted] assisted him. I told him [redacted] undoubtedly knew [redacted] personally; that [redacted] was in the Department for many years himself and no doubt had friends in the Department. I asked whether he had any information indicating [redacted] was close to McInerney.

b7c

The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily concerned about [redacted] I told him the investigative reports on [redacted] went to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951; Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was furnished the AG under date of February 29th on [redacted] and [redacted] He then inquired as to why G-2 would want the information. I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the answer.

I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in November or December, 1951.

I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired regarding [redacted] and [redacted] stating he had heard there were a couple of Communists on the staff and that the evidence was supposed to be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case and it would appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we furnished no information; that there was some indication from the source that [redacted] had been helping Grunewald and [redacted] might be in contact with McInerney.

[redacted] I told him he was at liberty to do so.

I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted the information and let him know, which is being done.

b7C

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In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was information over in the Senate similar to that furnished by Grunewald. I asked him where in the Senate and he said it came out of Senator McCarran's Office. Inasmuch as [redacted] told me that a member of the King Committee had told the Senator about [redacted] and [redacted] I think it might be well the next time I see [redacted] to confidentially inquire as to whether she recalled what member of the Committee furnished them this information.

I, of course, see no point in talking to [redacted] any further about this matter.

b7C b7D

13-00000

cc Mr. Ladd
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Malley
Mr. Pennington

b7C

The Attorney General — May 13, 1953

orig nt to file
file 65-6165-192
Conv 11/22/57 TIK

Director, FBI — PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

JUNE

HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD
INFORMATION CONCERNING

DECLASSIFIED BY ______
ON 12-27-89

The following information concerning Henry William Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known reliability on May 11, 1953.

MAILED 11
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INDEXED - 75

MAY 18 1953

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The Attorney General

b7C

Complete details concerning the information developed in connection with the request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers will, of course, be furnished to him upon the completion of the investigation of these matters.

NOTE:

This is a condensed version of information received from the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable form as possible for the information of the Attorney General. It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish the Attorney General with only pertinent information which appears would be of interest to him.

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(5) Bureau file 67-322 also reflects that, in April 1929, the Bureau conducted an investigation entitled, "William H. Vander Poel, Henry W. Grunewald, Application for Commission in Officer's Reserve Corps." It is noted that Vander Poel had served as an Agent of the Bureau of Investigation during World War I. At the time of the investigation, both were seeking to obtain a commission in the United States Army. The Bureau's investigation reflected that Grunewald was not trustworthy, possessed a bad reputation and had been indicted for violation of the National Prohibition Act, although he was not convicted of this offense. This information was furnished to the Military Intelligence Service by memoranda to the Department dated May 6, 1929, and September 10, 1929.

(6) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that at the request of Mr. Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in June and July, 1940, entitled, "Harry H. Woodring; Henry William Grunewald, also known as Henry Gruenwald, Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, and Henri Grunewald; Misconduct in Office, Espionage." Mr. Early's request was based on allegations received from [redacted] to the effect that Grunewald was believed to be "in cahoots" with Senator Gerald P. Nye and that [redacted] had told [redacted] that Grunewald, on two occasions, had given the secretary a check in the sum of $4000 for Senator Nye. It was alleged that Grunewald had intimated this money came from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in connection with War Department negotiations. On June 25, 1940, the Bureau received a memorandum from the Military Intelligence Service reflecting that Mr. Smith W. Brookhart had informed that Service that he had learned through [redacted] an alleged employee of the French-English Intelligence Service in 1917-1918 that the head of Nazi espionage in Washington, D. C., was Frederich Wilhelm Grunewald, also known as Henry William Grunewald, Westchester Apartments, Washington, D. C. It is noted that McDonald at that time was also residing in the Westchester Apartments and during 1937 and a portion of 1938, Grunewald shared offices with McDonald and former Senator Arthur R. Robinson, in the Munsey Building, Washington, D. C. (1)

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(1) 65-6165-3

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Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters.

ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator."

RESPECTFULLY,

C. D. DE LOACH

OK. Certainly Royall would be impossible. I had enough of him when he was counsel for the saboteurs & later when as Secretary of War he was instrumental in throwing us out of SIS [Special Intelligence Service] & setting up the C.I.A. The practicability of an "arbitrator" I have some doubts. It can be another "Warren Commission" & end in a fiasco. H [Hoover]

13-00000

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

May 23, 1941

[redacted] b7c - 51018

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

With further reference to Henry William Grunewald, in whom we are presently interested, I am attaching a memorandum for Mr. Carson from [redacted]

b3 b7C per IRS

[redacted]

b3 per IRS

[redacted]

For your approval there is attached hereto a letter for the Attorney General's signature, to the Secretary of the Treasury [redacted]

Respectfully,

P. E. Foxworth

T-4 SNIT
9-11-40

65-6165-25

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The investigation in this matter, which was closed July 8, 1940, revealed that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and suspicion and not on any definite knowledge of the complainants. Neither the conditions alleged nor any irregularity on the part of Grunewald or former Secretary of War Woodring were discovered. There was no evidence developed that Grunewald was engaged in any activity for the German government. The result of the investigation in memorandum form were furnished to Mr. Early on July 9, 1940. (1)

(7) Bureau file 65-6165 also reflects that in May, 1941, the Military Intelligence Service advised the Bureau that information had been received by one of its informants that Grunewald was the pay-off man for German agents in the United States and was also contact man for various American peace and subversive organizations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant of the Military Intelligence Service was [redacted] and it was felt that the Military Intelligence Service was merely resurrecting old information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same allegations made by [redacted] However, on May 13, 1941, a technical surveillance of Grunewald was authorized and from June 4, 1941 through August 1, 1941, such surveillance was maintained on his apartment in the Westchester Apartments. No definite information was developed, indicating that Grunewald had violated any specific Federal Statute. (2)

b7D per Army

(8) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that on September 15, 1942, the Omaha Office of the Bureau received a complaint from the Military Intelligence Service that Henry William Grunewald had, on the previous evening, given $110.00 in currency to two Army Privates attached to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, while Grunewald, [redacted] were drinking at a bar in the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying intelligence work, and becoming suspicious of Grunewald's apparent generosity with his money, reported the matter to the Omaha Office. They indicated that [redacted] had approximately $16,000 in her purse. This money was observed when she opened her purse in order to furnish currency to Grunewald to pass out to the crowd.

b7C b7D

Grunewald was interviewed by two Agents of the Omaha Office on September 15, 1942, regarding the matter and he identified himself as being connected with the Alien Property Custodian's office in Washington, D. C., by exhibiting travel authority 55G, signed by James E. Markham, of the Alien Property Custodians Office in Washington, D. C. Grunewald claimed to receive $8000 per year as salary from the Alien Property Custodian's Office. He admitted passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that he did not wish the matter reported to his superiors in Washington although he was willing to furnish information about the incident confidentially to the Bureau. He stated

(1) 65-6165-8
(2) 65-6165-22; 65-6165 Sub 1, Serial 1 to 122

Serial Removal Charge Out-
4-874 (Rev. 7-18-73)

b7E

Subject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD

This serial, the original memorandum from the FBI to the Attorney General dated 3/16/53, which was returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has been permanently removed for retention in the [redacted] per memorandum [redacted] to [redacted] dated 7-13-73. See 62-115687-1 for details and where maintained.

b7E

b7C

Removed By 343 Date 1/21/74

Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/82 BY [illegible]
12-27-89 5PS [illegible]

13-00000

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

WPR:MJH:co

TO: J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: April 13, 1953

FROM: William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

SUBJECT: Request of Kean Committee for Henry W. Grunewald Files

Mr. Tolson, Mr. Ladd, Mr. Nichols, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Clegg, Mr. Glavin, Mr. Harbo, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Tracy, Mr. Gearty, Mr. Mohr, Mr. Winterrowd, Tele. Room, Mr. Holloman, Mr. Sizoo, Miss Gandy

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 7, 1953, from the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, requesting permission to inspect the Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the personnel files relating to Henry W. Grunewald including his service with the Office of Alien Property and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the Alien Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any FBI reports, in accordance with policy.

Advice would be appreciated whether the Bureau has a personnel file on Grunewald, and, if so, whether the Bureau would have any objection to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for examination by a Subcommittee representative. If the Bureau has such a file and no objection to its examination, please advise whether the Bureau would prefer to make it available for examination in one of the Bureau's offices or in this office.

cc Grunwald to Mr. Nichols

1 Enc.

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EXPEDITE PROCESSING

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268 AUG 27 1970

65-6165-141

APR 23 1953

50 MAY 4 1953

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14 May 1992

Note For: David Pearline, OCA

Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination Documents

(Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following lines)

Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the Archives previously . Is this correct ?

Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies had previously released.

Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the Oswald file that was released. Is this true ?

Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith commitment to release as many documents related to the assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible

John Pereira
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154
Time: 10 a.m.
May 15, 1992
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The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-8355; outside D.C., call 1-800-537-9755.
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ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454, the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.

I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy.

Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his murder.

I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to accelerate the declassification of historical materials, creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified, or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old, and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.

I've asked them to take as their first priority the review for declassification a review of the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.

And I've indicated earlier this week, we've declassified the first set of these records, the pre-assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred to the National Archives for release.

It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to declassify these documents and to get them before the public as quickly as possible.

I've also made publicly available this week the agency's new guidelines for historical review and declassification.

In connection with these guidelines I have recently commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I've described for historical declassification.

Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents and those that are often requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and the release of government or CIA records.

The chart that I've brought along with me describes the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. And I don't need I think to go into any further detail on that.

As I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show how thin it was before that time.

It was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on Oswald alone.

There has been some comment on the pre-assassination Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material we will review; merely an earnest of our intentions.

All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the archives as they are completed without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination materials that may be held by other intelligence community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.

The National Security Agency and the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.

I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and

the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.

However, we've already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification.

As I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of ~~Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release~~ the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

I also have indicated in my statement for the record that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns, or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

And let me again take a moment to give an example of this type of material.

During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended ~~up~~ in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping it confidential.

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals, where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach of such a promise.

Where we cannot disclosure such information to the public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent, or the privacy of an individual.

As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week, if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified.

And they would then issue an unclassified report on their findings.

I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these documents declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental review.

It is against this background that I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result.

First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body the determination whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff.

Third, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission.

Under the joint resolution documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board, without any review by the president or the executive branch.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest, and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly relating to the assassination, they would be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.

These are technical problems, and I believe they can be solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the president to declassify this material.

That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman.

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(First Add)
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x x x Mr. Chairman.

REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a couple of observations.

Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? Why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the ~~CIA 14 mon~~ths after his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that that you can shed some light on?

Q's

GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those questions. But I will take them for the record and respond quickly to the committee.

A

REP. CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.

We're here against the background of history and the fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the United States, sitting president. And I thought it was exemplary of the CIA--I never thought I'd be saying this this morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think tanks around the city, one of which was included was the Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.

And I was told that there was a very candid exchange about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting. Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with them.

And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd say what I am saying today. But one of the parts of that discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has been parading around the country saying that you will not meet with him.

And as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he

has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on this subject?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I think that the agency has in many ways set a standard in terms of its willingness to release these documents, and our determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.

Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government, and to a number of people who were in office at that time from the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on down.

It is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.

REP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and understanding that you may have for the American people's confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?

GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the assassination; I have not read the many books that have been written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea of a single individual, a single irrational individual, committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value.

And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and so on in that respect.

And by the same token, and with all due respect to his memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy about the assassination of President McKinley.

And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept it at face value but rather than particularly young people who may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may not read what historians have to say that is critical about the movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must have been some sort of conspiracy.

And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see the movie, and they came back and the reaction was not that they accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the

suspicions that had been created.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. Mr. Schiff.

REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy schedule, and I'm sure all the members of the committee do appreciate that.

I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.

I do know this, though. I do know that it's because of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the CIA. And I'm quite positive that his movie has caused all of that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for that.

Second of all, I note your observation that there is not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the government, your agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or information which for any reason are not being released with respect to the assassination of President McKinley?

GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's the central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever resolve all the questions about the assassination of President Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave reasons for that.

But the difference between the assassination of President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our country's history is, this is the one situation where the government, for whatever reason, and for whatever circumstances, still holds information which it considers to be confidential.

And that's the root of this controversy now, and that's the root of this hearing, I think.

And I made a note of items that you as director of the CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality today. And I made notes of three. If there were more, I apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the procedures, which you made observations about, and which I think you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive branch.

But three classifications of records. The first is personnel records involving, I gather, government agents, perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of all.

Second of all, the privacy issue because government

files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular informant.

Before I ask you about those three, can I just ask, are there any other areas of documents that you as director of the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic category like these?

GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I think you've captured it.

REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these briefly.

On protection of personnel records, why would those have gotten--I understand what you're talking about. I think we all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would those records have gotten into the assassination records on President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?

GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this part of it: These files contain everything from the most mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified, or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.

And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through these documents is that they are not indexed; they are not catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.

So when I started asking some months ago what was in the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what kinds of records were in there.

But I assume that these kinds of things were just swept up with a lot of other material.

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Assassinations/hearing (first add)
May 15, 1992
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Second Add)
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x x x other material.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other categories, and that is, where the government has given a promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that. Can't the information be released without revealing the informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired here, not necessarily the identity of who provided it.

GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should be the case in almost every instance.

REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence methods, I understand that there's a national security point there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago, approximately.

Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in 30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and collect and evaluation information would present a national security risk today if revealed?

GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to protect it.

I think here again, though, that the focus should be on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.

The only reason I would seek to protect them is in those instances in which those techniques are still being used, or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.

With respect to sources, I think that we have a much longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence business review any of that material that we had held back to see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.

REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director

Gates, is that everything that can be released should be released?

GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.

REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff.
The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.

REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming and positive testimony before this committee. I think that it is important to emphasize that we share an interest in disclosing all of the information related to the substance of this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct its business.

And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says that disclosure to the general public of assassination material or particular information in assassination material may be postponed if its release would--and there's a whole list--but among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the United States government is involved.

And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us, and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods would be revealed or compromise by the information which is released?

GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for the protection of sources and methods and that allow us ultimately the president to have the final say would provide adequate safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for intelligence-related information then are sufficient?

GATES: Yes, sir. I've indicated in my testimony we would ask the Congress to consider I think two additional categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.

Again, we think that there would be very little information that would be withheld under those circumstances, but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.

The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.

REP. THORNTON: I appreciate those suggestions. But in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the general outline contained in this resolution would not damage any current CIA operations; is that correct?

GATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in the late '50s and early '60s?

GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the documents that will be reviewed in the--

REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question as to whether those files would be included in the material.

GATES: Yes, sir.

REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make sure that all of the information that is in government possession relating to this assassination be released. Because in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy, that there were allusions to the possibility of an external conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of that time.

Would you agree with that, sir?

GATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton.

REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton.
The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.

REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to release important documents that will contribute to the better understanding of the public at large as to what exactly happened.

I also agree with my colleagues that while the conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day.

And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to the content of that movie, because what we need now is an informed basis upon which to look at it.

I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to

evaluate it, as most of the people in the country. And therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely important.

Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that you indicate that some of the documents which are relevant to this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in fact documents which belong to other agencies.

Would you comment on that and clarify that particular statement in your testimony?

GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post assassination investigations, a great deal of information was shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made available for information to CIA.

About 20 percent originated with the State Department or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.

Under the third-agency rule, it is our obligation to leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same practice with us.

REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are considering now make it possible for your agency, as the custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies, be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?

GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that, Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of reviewing for declassification the documents that they originated.

We don't hold the record copies of those documents. We simply have copies of them.

REP. MINK Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they were documents that your agency had been provided by other governmental agencies?

GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file, of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies had all already been declassified. That's correct.

REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with reference to Oswald now in the public domain?

GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.

REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now available public documents?

GATES: I don't know whether that's the case or not. Only the documents that we had from them have been released as part of the file we released. They may have other documents pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.

REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald everything that you had in your possession, regardless of whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to be declassified, have all been released?

GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.

REP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you released to the archives?

GATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no student of this material. I do not know the answer to that question.

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Assassinations/hearing (second add)
May 15, 1992
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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(Third Add)
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x x x that question.

REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your agency have an answer to that question?

GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been released, so would have represented new information.

REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new items that had not been released previously?

GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the director of our center for the study of intelligence.

DAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been previously released. About half of those that are--originated at the CIA.

Among the documents of other agencies that were in our files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been previously released.

REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? } Q.

GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you precisely which documents were new. } A.

I do know that the new ones are not of much consequence. They do not contain any information that is particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the hearing what those are.

REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October 31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did not open a file until 14 months alter?

GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.

Mink.

REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the Soviet Union?

GATES: I just don't know.

REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the agency to determine that 14-month lapse?

GATES: I don't believe so.

GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in addition, we gained no information. We don't know.

REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals, as the article says, that the materials turned over had been altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were released to the archives. Is that a true statement?

GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we had. That file contained copies of original documents. Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we had.

What might be characterized as alterations by some by us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I can assure you, nothing of any consequence.

These are Privacy Act considerations and things of that nature.

REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree to that would be inconsistent with your statutory responsibility.

I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?

GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions that provide that the president can have the final say, normally I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part of the bill that we could find a way to work around.

REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside the government to do the exact same function for your agency?

GATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to examine all of the documents that we decided could not be declassified, and then provide a report to the American people on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld documents had a bearing on the assassination.

They would not make the decision to declassify.

REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition violate the Privacy Act? } Q.

GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.] A.

REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've touched on some very important areas.

There are just two related considerations that I'd like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I bring it to your attention for your future consideration.

And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter to your attention as well.] HRG Note

GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us today.

GATES: Thank you, sir.

END GATES TESTIMONY
*****
*****
The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (third and final add)
May 15, 1992
REUTER

LLLEnglish

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

January 30, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
2185 Rayburn House Office Building
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report, as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R. 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until September 30, 1998.

At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately 3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly 5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in the coming months.

The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased

BOARD MEMBERS: *John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. Nelson*
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: *T. Jeremy Gunn* • DEPUTY DIRECTOR: *Thomas E. Samoluk*

willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner.

Since our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000 pages of records from the FBI's HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is completed in a timely manner.

As I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.

I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board's federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.

Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.

Sincerely,

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

f.l.

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Statement for
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on S. 712

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee -- I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim, Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassification will be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.

I applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to reduce government secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of government secrecy has been the widely held belief that the government has known much more about the assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help alleviate the suspicion of government -- some of it being justifiable suspicion -- that has festered since the assassination of President Kennedy.

Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, I will focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial classification.

I. Background

Although the word "unique" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) ("JFK Act"), the Review Board

has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments, including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and the National Security Council.

Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board deliberates and makes "formal determinations" as to whether the records should be opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately involved approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable lessons that may be of use to you as you consider S. 712.

II. The "Four Noble Truths" of Declassification

In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the "Four Noble Truths" of declassification:

first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final decision maker on declassification;

second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed, and skeptical;

third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal institutional incentives to declassify information; and

fourth, the key to successful declassification is *not* the articulation of the

List of Exhibits
Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn

Exhibit A.
Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.

This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.

Exhibit B.
Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security.

This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained foreign government information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of the information. In December 1995, the document was released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.

Exhibit C.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.

The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Exhibit D.
(a) *Vietnam January-August 1963*, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3. pp. 265-270.

(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii .

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In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign Relations of the United States)* and part (b) includes the title pages of the full 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRB declassification session in July 1997.

Exhibit E.
Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.

The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. This document is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. The attached form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety. It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote.

Exhibit F.
NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.

The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was released with sanitizations by Board vote.

Exhibit G.
Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject: Assassination of Castro.

This document from the files of the National Security Council was originally classified "Secret" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.

categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release.

Because these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony.

During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets.

In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would "certi[fy] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States . . . ." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny.

Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that

covered other topics. Finally, an official said: "I don't see why it can't be released. This is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.] Someone ask COMMO whether it cares." COMMO was subsequently asked -- and it had no objection to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.

Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service, the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently voted to open the record.

Illustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J. Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.

Illustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily redacted but provocative document pertaining to an FBI "Internal Security" inquiry into Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the information, arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign government and that the government had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and the record is now open in full.

Illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been "excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification." The Review Board staff arranged for a group of declassifiers from several military and other national-security entities to meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being completely closed to completely open.

Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in *Foreign*

Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page *Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference* from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997.

Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety.

Illustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released.

Illustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally classified "Secret" and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board.

I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK Act, agencies have little internal or external incentive to take an energetic approach to declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: *once agencies come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith with the requirements established by Congress.*

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III. The Mechanics of Declassification

Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification.

First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.

The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.

The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically *assumed* that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed.

Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to "direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . ." JFK Act, § 7(j)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,

and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work.

Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.

Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons learned by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.

When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it.

IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective

With regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:

First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.

Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that

is essential for completing its work.

Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (*e.g.*, between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.

Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere "detailed justifications" (*see, e.g.*, S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be *more than* "justifications," they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing.

Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.

Finally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the "sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.

* * * *

I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

March 25, 1998

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.

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*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978, ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance from the National Security Council.

Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions; (5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and (8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.

On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.

Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:

- In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.

- Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.

- Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.

- The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more

than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency decisions to keep those same documents classified.

- Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have decreased to historic lows.

- Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased threat to our national security.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner, timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after conversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with foreign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws, and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.

These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy.

I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.

However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712.

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Statement
of
Steven Aftergood
Director, Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists

before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Hearing on
S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act

March 25, 1998

National Council Members
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13-00000

<u>**Introduction**</u>

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy.

I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.

At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.

A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate **balance** between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy.

Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets.

My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest.

In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act.

BACKGROUND

I would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.

1. **Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.**

One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.

Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government

protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET."[1]

In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest."

Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues-- the JFK assassination, POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.

2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.

Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection.

This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned-- within the executive branch itself-- by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives:

> We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, *in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....*[2]

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[1]Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of secrecy" for technology with military applications. *"Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996"* by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>.

[2]Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>.

The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can.

The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, "The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible."[3] If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.

Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.

Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area.

3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.

The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has *exclusive* authority to do so.[4]

The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.

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[3]Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy ("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.

[4]"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997.

There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:

> Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.[5]

The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that:

> Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures-- subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.[6]

And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring

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[5]Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff.

[6]410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret."

disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.[7]

Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"[8]; S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg[9]; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act."[10] Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills-- as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself-- would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.

In short, while the executive branch is entitled to *advise* Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.

4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.

A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.

In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results.

Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.[11]

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[7] See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.

[8] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>.

[9] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>.

[10] <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.

[11] 1996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html>.

So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm." Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy-- and then building on it.

THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997

The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations-- a "balancing test" and a National Declassification Center-- are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.

1. The balancing test and judicial review.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information, it shall not be classified.

From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision.

In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)

This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement *per se*, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.

This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been "properly" classified.[12] Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.

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[12]See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.

To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not *sufficiently* diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.[13]

The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are *in need of* the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:

> the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied *not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.*[14]

Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification.

Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test.

I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge "barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and *pro bono* assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.

The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most

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[13]"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement," Boston College Law Review **25**: 611-643 (1984).

[14]Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, emphasis added.

appropriate solution.[15]

2. A National Declassification Center

The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link."[16]

As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:

- The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.

- The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process.

Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously."

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[15]The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in *Security Classification of Information*, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process-- such as "beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the evidence"-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).

[16]Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.

The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,

> When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP's staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.[17]

Therefore, one straightforward "fix" that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the "missing link" of executive branch oversight.

But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:

> Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.[18]

3. What About the "Other" Classification System?

If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system-- we would have <u>two</u> statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.

The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system.

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[17]Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.

[18]Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.

Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer,

> information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, *there appears to be no system in place to get this information declassified*, even though the Departments involved-- Energy, Defense, and State-- acknowledge that it is innocuous.[19]

The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act's goal of "a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures."

Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one.

CONCLUSION

Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.

It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of "checks and balances."

By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information.

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[19]Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.

H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

[Page: E876]

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HON. DAN BURTON

in the House of Representatives

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997

- Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992--Public Law 102-526--to provide 1 additional year for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. This legislation would extend the **Review Board** 's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable **Henry Waxman,** the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable **Louis Stokes,** who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553.

- The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release **records** relating to the Kennedy **assassination** at the earliest possible date. The **Assassination Records Review Board** was set up to **review** and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on **Assassinations** have all held **assassination records** , and **records** have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of **records** compiled by official investigations of the **assassination** had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy **assassination** , and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the **Review Board** to presume that documents relating to the **assassination** should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.

- As a result of the **Review Board** 's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and **Records** Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that

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collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The **Review Board** was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy **assassination** .

- The President John F. Kennedy **Assassination Records** Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the **Assassination Records Review Board** to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of **Board** members, and as a consequence the **Review Board** was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The **Review Board** subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the **review** process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the **Review Board** 's authorization.

- I support the **Assassination Records Review Board** 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The **Review Board** has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998.

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TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

on

S.J. Res. 282

"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAY 12, 1992

13-00000

STATEMENT OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.S. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records?

There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records.

As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion about the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FOIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.

There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branch. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the

recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing program, CIA officials advised that the relevant program file had been destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which provided additional information about the scope of this program. During the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times, distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official Oliver North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting and authorizing "black bag jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative" matters in which case was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from "sources illegal in nature" or from "most secretive" sources such as "Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters for reporting "facts and information " which could "cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distributed." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos were to be maintained in "office files" of senior FBI officials (and were to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FBI headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any agency outside the Bureau."

S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all relevant Kennedy assassination records and how and where they might have been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review Board "all assassination materials" even if "uncertain if a record is assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to "inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that the Review Board "subpoena such records in the event of denial." Properly placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency's records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading of cross references in the "available" documents.

Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure, the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold categories of information when releasing FOIA-requested documents. Particularly

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during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to individuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination. Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984 totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but, at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure."

My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover, is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.

In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately 6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right to appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately 2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this time I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that much of the withheld information was already in the public domain and further that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory information on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent personalities the question of what use had been made of this information required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in 1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including information formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.

The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985. When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release would reveal FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach in 1966 and the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this

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decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's "clear and convincing" standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World Report which devoted its "1984" issue of December 1983 to summarizing the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989, if not 1985, FBI officials were no longer willing to risk FOIA litigation challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.

My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders, notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a "contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in 1963 and then from the Warren Commission in 1964? The answers to these questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well as other FBI memos recording how the FBI dealt with these transcripts. My experience involving how the FBI has processed my requests for other FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be so redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which distinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff, and lawyers.

This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington, D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas Corcoran, and Washington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested in Grunewald's activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration, became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941 wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix B): either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departments' failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the

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wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.

The heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were heavily redacted--the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)

I have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the "culture" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountability. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.

While I doubt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy," I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret

Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities" information.

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN

BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

May 12, 1992

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.

The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation.

We have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA

Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.

Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject.

Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.

The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not.

But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions.

As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.

This is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling.

What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board.

It may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution.

I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive,

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and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files.

Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the

year 2029.

To date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century.

The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure.

In addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a

page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present.

In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest.

Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.

The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its

first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.

We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations.

The Justice Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in <u>Morrison v. Olson</u>, 487 U.S. 654

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(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct.

If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations.

Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to

submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review Board to obtain any additional records.

The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the Government, would undertake the initial screening of these records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this manner, many records could be promptly released without formal Review Board deliberations.

If the Executive Director determined that a particular record was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she would automatically be required to refer that decision to the Review Board.

The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further investigation, to the Review Board.

In deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct

hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.

The Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress.

Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.

Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying.

Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of

the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.

Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change.

With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information.

The whole point of this legislation was to create new criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence of the American people.

It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man" defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with solving the problem.

I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If Congress wants to release information it has developed, the President should not be able to stand in the way.

Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and

telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.

Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee.

1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy...." But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.

The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of

inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early 1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full review is probably appropriate.

I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the Review Board to do so promptly after it is established. Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the various records agencies and committees as to what documents should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.

2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or committee control over release of a record it originated even if that record contained information obtained from another agency or committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give agencies authority over release of their own information. However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a lengthy congressional report, may contain both information

developed by the body that created the record and information originated by a- ·xecutive agency. Instead of letting either of these two "oric :ing bodies" have veto power over the release of an entire document, we should work out language that give an agency or committee control over release of that portion of a document for which it was responsible even if other information in the document was originated elsewhere.

3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased government openness should not itself establish an exception from general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe, however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.

5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are released instead of actual records or information: "Any such

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summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public."

6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution.

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure.

Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,

May 12, 1992

Ernest R. May

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

It is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill. I am a professor of history at Harvard University, where I teach both in the history department and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. While I have done research on the history of intelligence agencies and have served in Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak as an expert on the matter before the committee. My comments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation designed to unearth historical source material.

The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts about President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission had the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the public. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost within months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists.

Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this particular set of theories has found new life. Two books of this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992, and Oliver Stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit.

The bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of the people in their government."

To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.)

The bill says that members of the Board are to be "distinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder.

The Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance.

The Board's decisions are to be final unless the President himself intervenes to insist that some piece of information not be released. The bill giving the Board its powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial decision ..., or common law doctrine" that might be in conflict.

My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I question whether any legislation can achieve all that this bill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected, with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.

The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a story that all Americans will accept. Why should it? Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven. One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!

Despite more than a century of research, new theories still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be true for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so,

however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large.

The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret.

In fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?

Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to

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leave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of "smoking guns"?

The Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind.

Some material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?

The Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson!

I forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing.

I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow.

If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a "whitewash." The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed.

There may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released.

An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de-

gree" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill — agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc.

Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office.

This alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release — their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for nondisclosure, and plans for eventual release.

A Review Board could be created with a limited — and more workable — mandate.

Its first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of

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communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.

The Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used.

The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.

In a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.

Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the

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American Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate.

Unless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.

I believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs.

This alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of <u>criteria</u> for disclosure and non-disclosure.

Since the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification

policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be applied much more widely. A statute could declare that all government records more than thirty years old would become public unless the originating agency showed specific cause for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could have authority to review all such materials and to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates practice in the United Kingdom.

In conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting <u>any</u> legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to the trust of the people in their government." Inventors of conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than assemblers of evidence. The immediate result of releasing records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the theorists' mills. Even if <u>everything</u> were released tomorrow, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evidence that suited them. In the long run, release of documents will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed, that long run probably stretches beyond any of our lifetimes.

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR

PRESIDENT

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER

ON

S.J. RES. 282

"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"

BEFORE

THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

May 12, 1992

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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you on the legislation to require the government to release its records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center ("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation, and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.

I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have also read the letter which you received from the Department of Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records

on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically altering the standards for classifying information in the interests of national security.

The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive order on national security classification. If you support release of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.

A few illustrations from my practice will show the inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay, costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government. Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of information, with little significant information being released.

Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the results of the spectrographic tests which had been conducted on

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bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court, relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not in the national interest to release the results of these scientific tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA "forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.

In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately,

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Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests, including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request, the legal battles lasted fourteen years.

Case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release all of the records it had made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request. I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.

By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents. Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus, he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold

virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that previously had been released, or documents that were heavily redacted.

Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969 investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed, Hoch received such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-year period. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed, evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a hundred documents that month.

A few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court, the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a considerable volume of materials, mostly on grounds of national

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security or because disclosure allegedly would identify intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.

Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg submitted a new request for King assassination records. He specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.

During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an

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FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When finally located, most of the file had been gutted.

Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted 15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

These stories that I have related are unusual only because the requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their FOIA requests against these agencies. You might be tempted to conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.

Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions

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which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the National Security Agency.

I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any "smoking gun," which will "solve the case." Rather, this legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The American people want to know the details of their history, however painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.

The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses. I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes. To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release of information. The standards for postponement are critical

because they determine the amount of material which may be withheld.

Before discussing the limitations on the term "assassination material" as related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy. Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a movie has been made about them, there is no justification for excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.

The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in "willful and corrupt misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence,

engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's assassination should also be included in this legislation.

The term "assassination material" is broadly defined, but it falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the documents which they need in order to properly study the subject. It should include policy documents which provide the context of decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all documents obtained or created by any previous official investigation. It should include materials on those persons who have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its investigations. Finally, it should also include information records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant to the study of the assassination.

The current provision defining assassination materials contains an exemption for "personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren Commission records on this subject have been publicly available

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through the National Archives for many years and should not now be made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath, others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or executive branch commission or committee.

This provision would also be used to prohibit release of information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis T. Blahut, surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally. According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph

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examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too. Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully available to the public.

A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official" investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent materials if the panel does not include experienced and knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.

A third and critically important area that needs refinement is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term "intelligence source" and the term "intelligence method." Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official acknowledgement, and sources who are willing to have their identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are

disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term "confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known to other hostile intelligence services.

New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air, it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to increase.

I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.

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ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

on S. J. Res. 282

Sec. 3. Definitions

(2) "Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material" includes any material which any member of the Assassination Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOIA"), can plausibly contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its investigations.

The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of the Government. . . ." This

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language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.

The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created right of legal action by family members rather than denial or public access.

Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board

(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to serve as members of the Review Board."

Query: Is this language designed to exclude private citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only those persons who participated in official investigations or inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to

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the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not likely to inspire trust.

Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."

This must be qualified. It should only apply to living, covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government. . . ."

This provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such "intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement

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agencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them. Research in a public library is an "intelligence method," and it, too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency thereof, it should be released.

"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it applies only to methods that are unknown to the public or to foreign intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its release would (C) reveal "any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States; and the threat to the military defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure.

The chief problem with this provision is that there is no standard for what constitutes a "public interest" of sufficient

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moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the substantive content of the material at issue be shown?

Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure."

This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies "whether the person is identified in the material or not." This phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption 6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely to have profound adverse impact on an individual.

Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent and a witness or a foreign government. . . ."

This provision needs to be amended to include only those promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign government--made in writing. Among the reasons for this are the

fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own desire for secrecy.

This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a requirement that the foreign government officially object to each such disclosure in writing.

Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or in the legislative history, that it is not a "substantial and unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness can be concealed.

Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board

Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than litigation under the FOIA.

Subsection (h)(2) provides that the President may certify that material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to

section 6, in which case release of the material shall be postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial review."

There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion of the President's term which remains.

Section 11. Rules of Construction

Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.

One problem here is that transferring all agency records to the Review Board may mean that they are no longer "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA."

A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.

A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA.

Additional Notes

It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller Commission as subject to the Act.

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

Judge John R. Tunheim
Chairman
Assassination Records Review Board

Prepared Testimony In Support of H.R. 1553, To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board until September 30, 1998.

Before the
National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee

June 4, 1997

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history, and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.

Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff, Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr. William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in

Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee and answer any of your questions.

I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local governments that were not previously available to the American public. I believe that we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.

II. <u>Accomplishments to Date</u>

As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States.

By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30 different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the

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important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted information will have been made public by the Review Board.

III. <u>Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination</u>

Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has made public. They include:

* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's investigative activities following the assassination;

* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, including the controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City;

* Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and

* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most graphically demonstrated by showing you the "before" and "after" versions of one of the pre-assassination FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document (JFK Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, "October 12, 1960," that it was to the "Director, FBI," from "Legat, Paris" (the FBI representative in Paris), that the subject was "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security," and that it had to do with a "Paris letter 9/27/60." The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the provocative subject title.

The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss

government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state, the document could have meant anything that a researcher's imagination and speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.

IV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records

One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline, much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this responsibility.

I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional assassination records. Some examples:

* Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence. As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.

* Identification and Location of Additional FBI Records and Information. The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested information.

* Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information. The Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.

* <u>Identification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and Information</u>. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than 1,500 pages of material.

* <u>Identification and Location of Additional Military Records and Information</u>. The Department of Defense (including its many components and the military services) (collectively "DOD"), identified few assassination records on its own initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located, DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.

  Additional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFK Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage for accomplishing this task.

V. <u>Release of Private and Local Records</u>

In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files, and consistent with the Board's mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local governments, including:

* The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;

* Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the assassination;

* The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969 against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

* Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, including records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;

* Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and

* Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney Frank Ragano, as well as others.

I am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this particular chapter of the assassination story.

All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the National Archives, they will be available for research.

VI. The Need For Additional Time

Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:

* First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we have taken in fulfilling our mandate.

* Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact, many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking their compliance.

* Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board

could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.

We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job we began, and with one additional year we can.

VII. The Job Ahead

The additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year on the following:

* CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the Oswald "201 file," the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the agency's "Sequestered Collection," the large collection of files that was assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's. These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others cannot be identified.

* FBI Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two general categories. The first is the "Core and Related Files," consisting of nearly 600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its "HSCA records," is a large collection of records that were identified as being of interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the

CIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately 280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.

* The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees. Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies, including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee.

* Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.

* Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American public that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully documented in the final report.

It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an additional year.

VIII. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records

It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task. However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.

Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-consuming early phase.

At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed postponements can be released through a "consent" process. In this consent process, the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the release of the information.

In our review of the FBI's "Core and Related Files" and the CIA's "Oswald 201 File," the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?

In considering our review of the CIA and FBI "Sequestered Collections," the Board recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board's attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996 Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or "NBR"). Applying these new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant remaining records in order of priority.

These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word. These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true

assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.

The fruits of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our task can be completed.

IX. Conclusion

In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that our recommendation is motivated strictly by our desire to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.

I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our final report.

Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the assassination.

I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:

"In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect

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upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination."

These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.

The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for a confident conclusion of this important task. sion of this important task.

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional information that may be required. Thank you.

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HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION
CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)
2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today, also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October 26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September 30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the statute to continue operating for one additional year.

The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than

anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total accountability to the people of this country.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to welcome
my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this area.

Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the government about that assassination.

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The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access to government information. That legislation was necessary because administration after administration had failed to release documents. That should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting with our government to allow public access to government documents. Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more. I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished. It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in that process, but there is much more work to be done.

Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement? If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976 to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.

And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.

REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr. Turner, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20 years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our

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investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two days of public policy hearings.

Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released, would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

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A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these sealed files.

As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in keeping with the memory of this great president.

Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL 102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every agency, every court record, anywhere they existed -- that those records be released to the American people.

Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus an additional year, at the board's discretion.

We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by the Congress -- a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff, Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding executive director, David Marwell.

Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret government documents.

They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive amount of work in which they have been involved.

They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people, that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about

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the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the original co-sponsors.

I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman – or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually, three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly now?

REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one additional year that they will complete the work.

REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals of your original legislation in 1992?

REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

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REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.
REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that -- in projecting the fact that they can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.
REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.
REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you, Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.
REP. STOKES: Thank you.
REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?
REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort. And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the assassination of our president.
However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things. For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before we went out of existence.
And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.

REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.
The gentleman from Ohio.
REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on 1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman, and also to Congressman Stokes.
The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have, and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland, here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and this country.
Just as an example, the other day I found out -- and I don't know if you're a

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lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes -- well, you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.
I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that, and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his expertise with the country.
Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony, and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public polls. And you still run into people -- as I'm sure -- I still run into people that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in Dallas.
And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait 34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some of those rumors?
REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks. But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not -- when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that one also.
But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought things to the head.
REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the Assassination Records Collection Act -- obviously, now we collect records differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy -- God forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should

another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?

REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons. Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and that will help us, I think, tremendously.

But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in their testimony -- for instance, there's a very interesting document that they will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and the name of a country -- everything was redacted. And under their work, that whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.

What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind of rumors and myths that grow up around it.

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And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future --
which all of us hope would never occur -- that our agencies will realize that this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct this type of thing.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise --

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. LATOURETTE: -- and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you.

And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of service and your contributions to this body.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other issues to which you've contributed.

And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.

Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives. We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.

And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time. So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and -- (witnesses are sworn in). Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.

JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and

just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.
I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy.
The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing this hearing today and assisting in this effort.
One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct

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historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.
The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995, pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material.
I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version, the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60. And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly, a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The speculation that individuals had about this was great.
Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president. Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.
And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was, indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information that has long been redacted from the public.
The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have

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been released.
The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens and local governments. Just a couple of examples:
The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission, have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released. And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st, 1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.

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Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and at the FBI -- records sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you and the members have.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the testimony.

MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?

STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf -- for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.

I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be brief in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives. Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.

When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.

The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review board.

NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's authorization.

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The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the assassination of President Kennedy.
I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately 3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.
For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI records.
Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance

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of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by private entities are also available in the collection.
This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their own personal computer through the Internet.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30 percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.
Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size, quality or public demand witnessed today.
However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this important work can be completed.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any questions.
REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Holland?
MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.
Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was Lincoln Murdered?" Eisenschiml claimed one of the most important events in American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.
When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.

Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least, they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.
I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made; in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board

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had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ever created by the federal government.

These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries, compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance, simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and manage to do the right thing.

Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources. The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources and methods.

With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.

The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here

before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods. While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during the Cold War.

Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board, serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.
And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this afternoon.
You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to your testimony.
BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the record and I will briefly summarize.
REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the record.
MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.
My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education. My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history, American government, and international relations.

And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only as a citizen, but as an educator.
In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional research.
From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from

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believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work, it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged. What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists, in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the government.

In his recent book, "The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception of events that is crucial."

Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be assembled?

It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in some small way -- or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK assassination means.

We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56 students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.

The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the public and students can relate. It touches people.

As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project. Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering 500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call

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from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.

The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination. I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not

Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and truly educational opportunity.

I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for students.

In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively involved in learning.

Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still

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and could not be fully appreciated.
An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?
After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford to miss.
In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said, we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.
Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year -- they could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.
REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the record.
MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.
REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any information in here that you find particularly interesting?
MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our

staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he played in the trial.
We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted him.
REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was so difficult to get this information?
MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where

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records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be. Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take from people, so we have to find where they are.
Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw, and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was developed.

REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose now and which just have to wait?
MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the material.
The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly. Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there personal privacy considerations that are involved.
I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board made on earlier records.
REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination.
Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record. The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some continuing national security concern.

So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how many more records need to be reviewed?

MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located

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some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.
Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up the records they've located.
So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the collection before this process is finished.
REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?
MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and years ahead.
REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?
MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board. He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially, encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.
REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin reviewing the CIA and FBI records?
MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a million pages of records.
What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are

highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.
In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next year, if we get the extension.
REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?
MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next year.
We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long

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time. We need to get the information to the American public.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that folks like yourself can have the availability for students?
MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for the government.
I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk, nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.
It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university, students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American citizens.
I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.
REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that your learned demeanor was that of a --
REP. HASTERT: Not at all.

REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm glad you brought that up.
Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part of a conspiracy.

When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall semester of 1960 and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all.
The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI originally appealed the decision to not--or to withdraw the redaction of this particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.
Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be appropriately publicly released?
MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer -- the question is, no, we're not receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process going for one additional year.
The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite well.
The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no. Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important materials.
REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should another review board setting be required in the future to review another situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the release of documents in the future?
MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency, to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process

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at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed. There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time simply to trust the American people with access to important information about their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this process. It's a process that, while time- consuming, has worked very well for this set of records.

REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left behind for future such endeavors?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have -- virtually all of our work has been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas if the Congress so wishes.

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REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. : Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland; were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before this commission existed, before these documents came out?
MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know, credible is in the eye of the beholder.
But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you have to -- it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did. Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about -- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been missing all this time.
REP. : So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than any questions they had remaining about the assassination.
MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being an investigation of three crimes -- the murder of President Kennedy, the assault on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding mandate.
But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with

entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great -- and the FBI had not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time. And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.
REP. : One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point. In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think, can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's still some -- can we accelerate the process?
What have we learned from this as to -- obviously this is one that particularly anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do

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you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so, presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.
MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to release any of that information.
I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen approach of the past.
REP. : We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank. And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations. That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this will have silenced most critics?
MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps provoke others.

We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I think that will be a very significant development.
Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing. We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found.
REP. : I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the

status of that?
MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this collection.
Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So, therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to the American public.

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We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for --
REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one more question, if I may.
Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be, it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by this legislation?
MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time. It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to completing the review of the records on a timely basis.
REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.
REP. : I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing -- the hearing is adjourned -- and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.
If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in favor say "Aye."
MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full

committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work.
~END~

104-10337-10014 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

RELEASE IN FULL
2000

24 November, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned

The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong.

I. The JFK Act

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today.

Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example:

a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication.

For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection.

b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100).

Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required docmentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story.

Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99.

II. The Process

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be

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released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

III The Requests

(being drafted)

Attachment I. [incomplete draft attached]

Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

DRAFT

12 December, 1998

Memo for the Record

Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned

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I. Background (1992-1995)

The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation:

* testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA`s new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file).

* six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992.

The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992:

* it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals;

* established "a presumption of immediate disclosure" for records relating to the assassination.

For first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records:

* there were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994)of approximately 227,000 pages;

* joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefellow Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.).

Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents:

* approximately 80% of the 227, 000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions

* resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines.

II. The JFK Act and the ARRB

Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed un-realistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program.

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III. The Process and Lessons Learned

There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects:

* We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive.

* We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project.

* Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on <u>relevant</u> information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information.

* On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project.

* Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion.

* Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project.

* In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above).

* Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing.

* If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index.

IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

(see attached draft)

Attachment I. Description of the JFK Collection

Attachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.]

[statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANs, DIFs, NBR, etc.)]

9: lrg - hrp "reg. doc"

DRAFT: Section ~~III~~ IV, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records

1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically:

> ...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, including authority to --
>
> * * *
>
> (C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities;
>
> * * *
>
> (F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents.

This substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37.

2. <u>Categories of Requests</u>:

Although each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows:

a. Requests for **access** to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over ___ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports.

b. Requests about **methodologies** which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc.

c. Requests for **subject specific** matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film.

d. Requests for **project specific** information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes.

e. Requests for **individual specific** information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular "George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley.

3. <u>How a Request was Worked</u> Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s).

4 ~~3~~. The Agency's written responses to each request - either a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project.

5 ~~4~~. <u>Lessons learned</u>: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution.

a. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project.

b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons -- a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external

authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer, who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity.

c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/redaction/denial of materials.

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ATTACHMENT #1

CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION

Oswald Files

Pre-assassination "201" file --approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions.

DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA).

The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB . Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998.

Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998.

DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release.

Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999.

The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

The Sequestered Collection

At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff.

JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include

approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997.

JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file.

DCI Morning Meeting Minutes

This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection.

Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes)

Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection . He continued in this role until 1992.

As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999.

LA Division JFK Task Force Files

The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ##### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force

documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998.

New assassination Records -- "M" [Miscellaneous] Series

The ARRB submitted 53 numbered "Requests for Additional Information and Records" (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999,.

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE IN FULL
2000

JFK Assassination Records Collection Act

- Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended
- Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ "non Precedent Setting Releases"
- Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.
- Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.
- Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board's requests.
- Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.
- "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

6

During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which:

Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates)

Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action.

Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection.

Prepared CIA's Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests.

Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review.

The Board's report of 30 September 1998 states that "The Review Board considered the CIA's compliance with the JFK Act....to be one of [the Board's] highest priorities." It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency's Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency's activities in response to the Board.

JFK Act -- Process

- Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board.
- Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper.
- Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times).
- Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments.
- Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up.
- Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations.

7

Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA.

The scope/deadlines and decisons were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose.

When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board.

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JFK Lessons Learned

- Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient
  - Requirements to declassify All drives out focus on important
  - Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different
  - Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned
- Structure and Planning
  - Good Communications with Oversight Body
  - Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management
  - Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood:
    - Guidelines (flexible),
    - Deadlines (reasonable),
    - Responsibilities
  - Understanding of Final Product Desired:
    - Media, Databases, indexes, etc.
- Support of Senior Management

8

- Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to :
  - Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant.
  - Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents.
  - Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow
  - Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs.
  - Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs ~~for which we had no~~ that did not have the benefit of a legal mandate.
- Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that:
  - We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts.
  - We have found that annuitants "who know the territory" can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the senstitivity of material.
  - We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there.
  - We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants.
- We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

SECRET

OIM 99-0281
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assignments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management.

2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management - unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy.

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

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SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of "official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation.

4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached.

Charles A. Briggs

13-00000

SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
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OIM 99-0282
29 October 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM

FROM: Charles A. Briggs
JFK Declassification Project, OIM

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK declassification law on Agency resources and information release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the "openness philosophy" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey through a series of "Cold War Declassification" projects. He noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification of the JFK collection; however, he said, "with the end of the JFK activity in sight," resources could be applied to the other projects. Six years later (actually seven since the project got underway), we are almost finished.

2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative, trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act, the DCI's authorities, as well as Executive Orders and Regulations.[1] The Act presumed release. It did allow for appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed "postponements" but only if clear and convincing evidence was presented for each requested postponement and that release would demonstrably impair the national security. The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos, methods, station locations (within specified dates), file identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had

[1] See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B)

AIUO When Separated
from Attachments

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FRM: LIA 2-82

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learned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) "Standards For Review" and "Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act," with examples).

3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made.

4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA's JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.

SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION

5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the "Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents made available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called "The Holmes Collection" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called "Miscellaneous," including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

"Dailies." Box 64 of the "Segregated Collection" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on.

6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.

7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable.

THE REVIEW PROCESS

8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.

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SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn't have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald's trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain.

10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teltaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald's trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald's presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station's unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teltap and photo operations.

11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the "postponements") occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn't. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998:

SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

> "A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions."

12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to the approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board.

THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE

13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie "JFK," reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant - hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning.

14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban

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exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JMWAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released.

15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded "truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination" were designated "not believed relevant" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR.

INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS

16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.

17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be

released in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name.

IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS

18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods.

19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below.

20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:

- Don't cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents.

- Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team.

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- Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents

- Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations.

- Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees.

- Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.

- Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity.

21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures.

22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing "the need to rationalize the classification process." A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make "significant historical information available without

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damage to national security." Subsequently, a central management focal point was established in the Office of Information Management and a system that addresses part of the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification "metrics" (millions of pages of released documents), modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA is reneging on "openness."

23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for information, we were able to make case law in the courts and protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the "no comment" of the 1950s and the "answer the question only as asked" of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the government declassification arena is a very clear signal.

24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly, in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the Executive Director with "corporate" Agency focused guidance to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the credibility and resource impact levels, they should be supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.

25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer, Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO team, without whom this exercise could not have been completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an individual or group is between a rock and a hard place, as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO, and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having

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been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as "the enemy." That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing.

26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling.

27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breech. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law.

28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.

Charles A. Briggs

Attachments:
- A. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards)
- B. OGC Memorandum
- C. Foreign Government Information

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SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience

DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)
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closure-oriented than President Reagan's order. The current Executive Order applies to all Executive branch records and, unlike the JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives agencies five years—until April 2000—to declassify all *classified* information that is (1) more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the "agency head" determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated harms. The Executive Order provides for continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, *inter alia*, information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans that are still in effect, and protection of the President.[8]

We need to separate sources from methods. This could be the most lasting effect of the Board.
—Steven Garfinkle,
April 14, 1998

The JFK Act guidelines that governed the disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were detailed in section 6 of the JFK Act.[9] The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone the release of assassination records only where the agencies provided clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated harms would occur if the Review Board released the record *and* that the harm outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The statute allowed protection of intelligence agents and intelligence sources and methods if the agency could show that the agent, source, or method currently required protection. The statute further allowed the Board to protect the identity of living persons who provided confidential information to the government if the agency could show that disclosure of the person's identity would pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone release of information if release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or if release would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK Act allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of government officials.

2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act

In considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the House and the Senate concluded that the FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to guarantee adequate public disclosure of assassination records.

At the time that the JFK Act became law, the largest collections of records concerning the assassination were under the control of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of these entities, and thus could not serve as the mechanism for maximum disclosure of assassination records. *First,* the FOIA exempts CIA operational files from disclosure.[10] *Second,* the FOIA provides broad-based protection for law enforcement files and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.[11] *Third,* the FOIA does not apply to unpublished Congressional records.[12] Congress found that the FOIA did not require adequate disclosure in those records that it *did* cover. Thus, Congress believed that the FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for guaranteeing disclosure of assassination records.[13]

President Clinton did not sign Executive Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two years after Congress passed the JFK Act. Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order applied to most assassination records since they were of permanent historical value *and* were over 25 years old. Even if President Clinton's Executive Order had been in effect prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the maximum disclosure accomplished by the JFK Act. The problem with the Executive Order is that it allowed "agency heads" to make the decision to exempt records from automatic declassification provided that the "agency head" expected that disclosure of the records would result in one of the nine enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review

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Board found that "agency heads" tended to be quite reluctant to release their agencies' secrets. The Executive Order, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of "agency heads'" decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order's standards for declassification appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads accountable for their decisionmaking.

The JFK Act did require agencies to account for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: *first,* the JFK Act presumed that assassination records may be released; *second,* the JFK Act stated that an agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, *with clear and convincing evidence,* that disclosure would result in harm and that the expected harm would outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; *third,* the JFK Act created an *independent* agency—the Review Board—whose mandate was to ensure that agencies respected the presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the need to protect information; and *fourth,* the JFK Act required agencies to provide the Review Board with *access* to government records, even when those records would not become part of the JFK Collection. Without these accountability provisions, the JFK Act would not have accomplished its objective of maximum release of assassination records to the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act ensured that the goal would be met. The two accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—the presumption of release and the standard of proof—are discussed in detail below. The third provision discussed below is the Review Board's obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release.

a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records.

The most pertinent language of the JFK Act was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, "all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a *presumption of immediate disclosure.*"[14] The statute further declared that *"only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records."*[15]

b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence.

If agencies wished to withhold information in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the narrow postponement criteria.[16]

> *The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.*
> *—Senator John Glenn, May 12, 1992*

Congress selected the clear and convincing evidence standard because "less exacting standards, such as substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, were not consistent with the legislation's stated goal" of prompt and full release.[17] The legislative history of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence.

> There is no justification for perpetual secrecy for any class of records. ***Nor can the withholding of any individual record be justified on the basis of general confidentiality concerns applicable to an entire class.*** Every record must be judged on its own merits, and every record will ultimately be made available for public disclosure.[18]

When agencies did present to the Review Board evidence of harm that would result from disclosure, it had to consist of more than speculation.

> The [Review] Board cannot postpone release because it might cause some *conceivable or speculative harm* to national security. Rather in a democracy the *demonstrable harm* from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of release of the information to the public.[19]

The Review Board's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is covered in more detail in Section B of this chapter.

Section B includes a discussion of the "Rule of Reason" that the Review Board ultimately adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies.

c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release.

Assuming that agencies did provide clear and convincing evidence that information should be protected from disclosure, the terms of section 6 required that information not be postponed unless the threat of harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, "public interest" means "the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy."[20] The Review Board interpreted the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence of the threat of harm that would result from disclosure. However, to the extent that the JFK Act left room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review Board—not the agency that originated the document—that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review Board as a panel of independent citizens with expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in such determinations.[21]

d. Segregability and substitute language.

When the Review Board determined that the risk of harm *did* outweigh the public interest in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency redacted the least amount of information possible to avoid the stated harm, or "segregate" the postponed information, and (2) provide substitute language to take the place of the redaction.

3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them.

The JFK Act defines "assassination records" to include records related to the assassination of President Kennedy that were "created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of" the following groups: the Warren Commission, the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the federal government, and any state or local law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination.[22]

When it passed the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Collection to include the record groups that it identified in section 3(2), but it also intended for the Review Board to consider carefully the scope of the term "assassination record" and to issue an interpretive regulation defining this crucial term.[23] The Act requires government agencies to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of this report explains how the Review Board interpreted its responsibility to define and seek out "additional records and information." Set forth below is a description of some of the core government holdings on the assassination which were released under the standards of the Review Board.

a. The FBI's "core and related" files.

The FBI's "core and related" files consist of those records that the FBI gathered in response to FOIA requests that it received in the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The "core" files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI's Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination investigation file. The "related" files include FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald's wife Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald's friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the Oswalds' Dallas friends Ruth and Michael Paine. The FBI began its processing of the core and related files in 1993. The Review Board applied strict standards to its review of postponements in the core and related files.

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b. CIA's Lee Harvey Oswald "201" file.

CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it has an "operational interest" in that person. The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald in December 1960 when it received a request from the Department of State on defectors. After President Kennedy's assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created during CIA's wide-ranging investigation of the assassination. Thus, the file provides the most complete record of the CIA's inquiry in the months and years immediately following the assassination.

c. The FBI's "House Select Committee on Assassinations"(HSCA) Subject Files.

During the HSCA's tenure, the Committee made a number of requests to the FBI for records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA's requests, the FBI made available to the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of the "HSCA Subject" files in 1993. The Review Board applied its "Segregated Collection" guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA subject files.

d. The CIA's "Segregated Collection" files.

HSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA's work, the CIA kept separate the files that it had made available to the HSCA and retained them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper records available to the HSCA staff. The paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various files. The 64th box of the CIA's segregated collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, cover an agent's entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assassination story.

e. FBI records on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination.

The JFK Act defined "assassination record" to include records relating to the Kennedy assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events surrounding the assassination.[24]

Before President Clinton appointed the Review Board, the FBI collected and began to process its administrative files relating to its involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the Bureau's administrative files related to topics other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records in these files that concerned topics other than the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or "NBR" as that acronym is defined *infra*) and removed them from further consideration.

f. Requests for Additional Information.

Congress included in the JFK Act a provision that allowed the Review Board to obtain additional information and records beyond those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains the requests that the Review Board made and the assassination records designated as a result of those requests.

B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS

The Review Board's primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to determine whether an agency's request for postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an introductory clause, which established the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, and five subsections that set forth the criteria under which the Review Board could agree to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information.

1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence

Text of Section 6

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records

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to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] clear and convincing evidence that [the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest in release.]

a. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires an agency to submit "clear and convincing evidence" that one of the specified grounds for postponement exists.[25] The Review Board required agencies to submit specific facts in support of each postponement, according to the Review Board's guidelines for each postponement type.

b. Commentary. Although the agencies argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be satisfied by a general explanation of those agencies' positions in support of postponements, the Review Board determined that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was a document-specific one. Thus, the Board required agencies to present evidence that was tailored to individual postponements within individual documents.

I think today a great gulf exists between people and their elected officials. Doubts about this particular matter are a symptom of that, and so I think the purpose of this hearing is to ask some questions. Why does information need to be withheld? At this moment in time, what compelling interests are there for the holding back of information? Are there legitimate needs in this respect? Who and what is being protected? Which individuals, which agencies, which institutions are in the need of protection, and what national security interests still remain?
—Senator William S. Cohen, May 12, 1992

The JFK Act clearly required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of their postponements, but it did not establish a mechanism for when and how such evidence should be presented. The legislative history provides a clue as to Congress' intent: "[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates an understanding on each side as to the basis and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations."[26] The Review Board did consult with government offices to determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence.

The Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre- assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the Board asked the staff to present the records on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which it intended to vote on the records. The Review Board invited the FBI to present its evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be allowed to brief the members of the Review Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its position to the Board—both in an oral presentation and in a "position paper." The FBI's "position papers" summarized the FBI's general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. Third, the Review Board staff researched existing law on each of the FBI's "positions" and determined that the arguments that the FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Act standards—and not the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected the FBI's general policy preferences on the basis that the arguments did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to support a request for a postponement under section 6. The FBI did appeal the Review Board's decisions to the President, but the Review Board's document-specific interpretation of the clear and convincing evidence standard ultimately prevailed when the vote was withdrawn.

i. "Rule of Reason." Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than others. With regard to records that had a close nexus to the assassination, the Review Board strictly applied the law. For example, the Review Board voted to release in full nearly all of the information in the FBI's pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the bulk of the information in the HSCA's report on CIA activities in Mexico City—the "Lopez" report—because of the high public interest in that material. With regard to the FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review Board's decisions on the pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the Review Board, the White House Counsel's

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Office, and ultimately the Department of State spent a substantial amount of time resolving the issues that arose in the appeal process, and for those important records that were at issue, the Review Board considered its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent as much time as was necessary to deliberate and decide upon those records.

The postponement-by-postponement review at each early Review Board meeting proved to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved to be a necessary educational process for the Board members. The Board members were a group of five citizens who were selected not for their familiarity with the subject of the assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through reviewing individual documents at its early meetings, the Board essentially educated itself about the assassination.

While the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the Board's pace eventually increased. In an effort to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA and FBI to work out an approach for review of records that would allow the Review Board to make informed decisions, but not require agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating evidence for and providing briefings on each postponement within an assassination record.

The first step to developing a reasonable approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and denying postponements. The Review Board's "guidance" to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules—a Review Board "common law." Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular type of postponement, the agency learned to present only those facts that the Review Board would need to make a decision. For example, with regard to FBI informants, the Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the Bureau what it considered to be "clear and convincing" evidence. Then, the Review Board worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an "Informant Postponement Evidence Form" that the FBI could use to provide evidence on an informant. (See illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in a particular document. This approach had the added benefit of providing consistency to the Review Board's decisionmaking.

A large number of records that the JFK Act defined as "assassination records" proved to be of very low public interest. The JFK Act required the Review Board to process all records that were "made available" to the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by the Commission or the committees. Many of these records, while interesting from a historian's perspective, are not closely related to the assassination. For those documents that were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways described below.

A. "NBR" Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were "not believed relevant" to the assassination. For those records that truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination, the Review Board designated the records "not believed relevant" (NBR). The "NBR" Guidelines allowed the Review Board to remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board designated "NBR" were virtually the only groups of records that the Review Board agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records "NBR" and rarely did so.

B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those records that were not immediately relevant, but shed at least some light on issues that the congressional committees that investigated the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board created the "Segregated Collection Guidelines." The segregated collections records, although marginally relevant, were not appropriate for "NBR" designation, as the "NBR" Guidelines would have resulted in withholding records in full. Instead, the Board passed the "Segregated Collection" Guidelines, which ensured that the Review Board staff would review every page of the

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marginally relevant records, but would not require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. The regulations that the Review Board adopted on November 13, 1996, define "Segregated Collections" to include the following: (1) FBI records that were requested by the HSCA in conjunction with its investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA records including the CIA's segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes of CIA staff "working files." The Review Board adopted revised guidelines on April 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state, "...even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review." Where the Review Board's standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth below note the distinction.

Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review Board sought to be vigorous in applying the law, but, in order to complete its work, found it necessary to employ a "rule of reason."

2. Intelligence Agents

Text of Section 6(1)(A)

...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection...

a. CIA officers.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board usually protected the names of CIA officers who are still active or who retired under cover and are now living in potentially risky circumstances. The Review Board usually released names of deceased CIA officers and the names of CIA officers whose connection to the CIA was public knowledge. When the Review Board postponed names, it usually substituted the phrase, "CIA Employee."

ii. Commentary. Names of numerous CIA officers appeared in the CIA's assassination records. The Review Board and the CIA had to confront the challenge presented by the statute, which requires name-specific evidence, but gathering such evidence proved to be time-consuming and burdensome for the CIA and the names of CIA officers in the records were not always relevant to the assassination. The statute, of course, states that the only way that the Review Board could protect names of intelligence agents was if the CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the CIA officer's identity "currently" required protection.

The CIA initially believed that the solution to the above-referenced challenge was for the Review Board to agree with CIA that the names of all CIA officers within the JFK Collection should be postponed until the year 2017. The CIA supported its request for blanket postponements with two arguments: *first,* since many CIA employees are "under cover," CIA argued that its intelligence gathering capability depended on employees maintaining cover, and, *second,* even though the majority of CIA officer names in the Collection are names of retired CIA employees, CIA is bound by a confidentiality agreement to protect the relationship. Many of these former employees objected to release of their former Agency affiliation, complaining that it violates this agreement and suggesting that such release might jeopardize business relationships or threaten personal safety.

Mindful of the JFK Act's requirement that agencies provide name-specific evidence, the Review Board would not agree to CIA's request for blanket postponements of CIA names. Instead, the Review Board requested CIA to provide evidence for each name.

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The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce name-specific evidence and, on occasion, CIA failed to furnish evidence when it promised to do so. CIA's initial refusal to supply evidence on individual names was met, not with the wholesale release of names by the Board, but with a firm insistence that the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the process, but gave the Agency a number of additional opportunities to provide specific evidence on other names.

For example, in December 1995, the Review Board designated one day of their meeting "name day," and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had encountered in CIA records during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain the postponement of all CIA names. The Review Board did not want to jeopardize the personal safety of individuals and gave CIA more time to provide evidence. The Board set other "name days" in May 1996 and May 1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA agreed to release some names, but in most cases, continued to offer less than satisfactory evidence on those they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA did begin to provide supporting evidence of the postponement of individual names.

By May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired under cover or abroad, or evidence that the individual objected to the release of his or her name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer's name. Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with CIA, the Review Board would protect the name. Because the JFK Act required the Review Board to balance the potential harm from disclosure against the public interest in release, there were cases in which the Review Board determined that, even though the CIA had provided the required evidence, the Review Board believed that the individual was of sufficiently high public interest that it would require the CIA to provide additional evidence before it would consider protecting the name. In these cases, the Review Board asked CIA to provide information on the employee's current status, his or her location, and the nature of the work he or she did for the CIA.

The Review Board determined that names were of high public interest when the CIA officer at issue had a substantive connection to the assassination story or where the CIA officer's name appeared in CIA's Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had determined that where CIA officer names did not fit within one of the "high public interest" categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of its requests for postponement. Given the large number of CIA officer names in the CIA records, the Review Board determined that it had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources available to complete its own review of CIA records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high level of scrutiny that it used to review names of high public interest. Nevertheless, the Board's approach compelled the CIA to release many more names than it would have desired.

b. "John Scelso" (pseudonym).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso until May 1, 2001 or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever comes first.

ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who was head of CIA's division "Western Hemisphere 3" during the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy testified before the HSCA and the Church Committee under the "throw-away" alias John Scelso. His true name appears on hundreds of documents in the JFK collection, many of which were the product of the Agency's extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing this particular name, the Review Board's desire to satisfy the public's interest in release

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clashed with the CIA's strong evidence in support of postponement. Initially, the Board was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but the Agency argued convincingly against release. CIA provided evidence on the current status of the individual, shared correspondence sent by him, and even arranged an interview between him and a Review Board staff member. As an interim step, the Review Board inserted his prior alias "Scelso" as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release "Scelso's" true name in five years or upon his death.


CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: BIRCH O'NEAL
UNIT: C/CI/SIG
EXT: 5367
DATE: 23 NOV 63

SECRET

TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: CI/SI
INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C1, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, FI, SR 7, WH 7, OS 2, VR

IMMEDIATE

TO IMMEDIATE MEXI INFO

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED 1995

84886

REF: MEXI 6453 (IN 36017)*

1. IMPORTANT YOU REVIEW ALL [LIENVOY TAPES AND TRANSCRIPTS] SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER TO LOCATE ALL MATERIAL POSSIBLY PERTINENT TO SUBJECT REF.

2. DISPATCH SOONEST BY SPECIAL COURIER, STAFFER IF NECESSARY, [FULL TRANSCRIPTS AND ORIGINAL TAPES IF AVAILABLE] ALL PERTINENT MATERIAL.

3. [ARE ORIGINAL TAPES AVAILABLE?]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 16 APR 1976

END OF MESSAGE

CS Comment: *Reported that on 1 October 63, an American male who said his name was Lee Oswald was at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Document Number 40-541 for FOIA Review on APR 1976

201-289248
~~200-5-41~~
23 Nov 63

D:200-5-41

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER C/WH

COORDINATING OFFICERS

[SCELSO WH/3] AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

c. *Information that identifies CIA officers.*

i. Review Board guidelines. For specific information that, if released, would reveal the identity of an individual CIA officer that the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information.

ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review Board voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination records, it had to be realistic enough to realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information would reveal the individual's identity. Examples of specific identifying information include home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names of family members, and other less obvious, but equally revealing pieces of information.

d. *Names of National Security Agency employees.*

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encountered. The Review Board would have considered releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names appeared in NSA's assassination records. Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confront. NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names required protection. NSA argued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and officers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA officers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA information, the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested protection, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names.

3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States

Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C)

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...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal—

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

a. CIA sources.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information under standards similar to the Board's decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review Board believed names held a high level of public interest, either because the name was central to the story or because assassination researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close scrutiny. The Board generally protected the identity of foreign nationals unless they were of high public interest and then the Review Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the two above-referenced harms, the Review Board released the name at issue. In addition, where the public already knew the names of individuals who were connected to the CIA, especially if the government had previously released the information, the Review Board released the information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board addressed the issue of whether to postpone or release source names at the same time that it considered CIA employee names, and encountered the same problems as it had in the review of CIA employee names. As with CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to provide name-specific evidence to the Review Board, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA's request that the Review Board redact all names.

The Review Board should consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well known by the public (e.g. that the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was bugged during the alleged visit of Lee Harvey Oswald), and whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether was the information it collected which was secret.
—Senate Report on JFK Act, July 22, 1992

The Review Board ultimately decided to protect the names of sources, assets, and informants in cases where the identity of the source is of reduced public interest because CIA sources live in countries other than the U.S. and were more likely to face harm if the Board disclosed their relationship with CIA. In those records where the source's identity was of possible public interest in relation to the assassination story or was important to understanding information related to the assassination, the Review Board required the CIA to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source's identity.

When the Review Board postponed release of source names, it did so for ten years except in cases where a foreign government might accuse the source of committing treason for assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review Board protected the source's name and identifying information until 2017.

b. CIA pseudonyms.

i. Review Board guidelines. With only a few exceptions, the Review Board released the pseudonyms of individuals. In some instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual's true name.

ii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, since pseudonyms were a sort of "throw away" identity for individuals who were under cover, the Review Board could release

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the pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review Board's policy to release pseudonyms. The CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it believed to be particularly sensitive, and demonstrated to the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence that release of those pseudonyms would do irreparable harm.

c. CIA crypts.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released some CIA "crypts"—code words for operations and individuals. The Review Board also generally released CIA "digraphs"—the first two letters of a crypt that link a particular crypt to a particular location. CIA often created crypts to refer to other U.S. government agencies; for example, the FBI was "ODENVY." The Review Board made a blanket decision to release all U.S. government crypts. The Review Board nearly always released CIA crypts where those crypts denoted operations or individuals relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The digraph for Mexico City was "LI," and for Cuba, it was "AM.") For all other crypts, the Review Board protected the digraph and released the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established a few exceptions, and where exceptions applied, the Board required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board had to determine whether it believed that release of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board required the CIA to provide crypt-specific clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and that CIA had not previously released the crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review Board to sustain postponements, the Board required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIA still used the individual or the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board.

As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA crypts—even "ODENVY"—the CIA's old crypt for the FBI that CIA had already released in other CIA records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was an operational method that should remain secret, even though CIA had replaced most of the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed that if the Review Board released the crypts, researchers would be able to piece together the records and determine the identity of operations and individuals. CIA further argued that the burden of locating evidence on each crypt was too heavy.

The Review Board, conversely, believed that CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the identity of an operation or an individual, and so the Review Board could release the crypts and not compromise the operation or the individual. As with CIA agent names, the Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the Review Board released a group of CIA crypts from Mexico City with the "LI" digraph. CIA eventually agreed to release its crypts and digraphs in assassination records, and the Review Board eventually agreed to protect certain sensitive crypts.

The Review Board recognized that it could not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for every CIA record that it encountered. CIA records contain hundreds of thousands of crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the Review Board decided that, for all crypts *except* the "LI," "AM," and "OD" series crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most crypts in the collection and the most relevant digraphs. The Review Board did make three exceptions to its general rule: it protected the digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt appeared next to a true name that had been released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to specific identifying information, and (c) when CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph.

d. CIA sluglines.

i. Review Board guidelines. "Sluglines" are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or more crypts, that appear above the text in CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review Board released CIA sluglines according to the same criteria it applied to crypts and digraphs.

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ii. Commentary. The Review Board released CIA sluglines because the Agency never offered the Review Board any evidence to explain why the Board should not release them. An example of a CIA slugline is "RYBAT GPFLOOR." "RYBAT" is a CIA crypt that meant "secret," and GPFLOOR was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in the case of "RYBAT GPFLOOR," the CIA agreed to release the crypt "RYBAT" in two places elsewhere in the document at issue, and the CIA agreed to release the crypt GPFLOOR when it appeared in the text. CIA told the Review Board that it could not, however, release the slugline "RYBAT GPFLOOR." CIA offered no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute's demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines.

e. CIA surveillance methods.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIA surveillance methods where CIA provided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA's requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language "surveillance method," "operational details," or "sensitive operation."

ii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The Review Board, on the other hand, believed that it was not a secret that CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, the Review Board did not believe that its votes to release CIA surveillance methods in Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the Review Board recognized that certain CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 were already well-known to the public because the U.S. government had disclosed details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo operations, was a major element in the story of Oswald's 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See illustration.)

The Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any risk to national security and directed release of the information. However, in records that CIA proved did contain information about current operations, the Review Board voted to postpone the information.


CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE: 29 NOV 63

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DEFERRED | PRIORITY | ROUTINE | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE | 2900227 | 6796

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL 1995

IMMEDIATE MEXI MANA

Slugline

RYBAT GPFLOOR

REF MANA 4617

Cable Prefix

Crypt

DUP OF 230-650

1. FEEL ERTKYROID 3 SHOULD GO MEXI EVEN THOUGH ALVARADO MAY BE IN MEXICAN HANDS. ASSUME HE CAN BE USED AS CONSULTANT AT LEAST, THAT HE WILL KNOW WHETHER HE CAN AND SHOULD CONTACT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES, AND THAT MEXI WILL CLEAR ANY ACTIVE USE WE MAKE OF HIM WITH THE ODENVY REP. ODENVY HERE KNOWS HE IS COMING TO MEXI TO HELP.

2. AT 1830 WASHINGTON TIME, WHICH IS ABOUT 1630 YOUR TIME, WE HAVE NO FURTHER NEWS OR REQUESTS. WE ARE GOING HOME BUT CAN BE BACK ON THE WIRE ON SHORT NOTICE.

29/01052

f. CIA installations.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board used date "windows" within which it released the locations of CIA installations where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board released the location of CIA installations relating to Mexico City during the time period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review

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Record reviewed unilaterally by CIA in 1992. | Same record after Review Board action in 1995.



Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that were relevant to the assassination during the time period between the date of the assassination—November 22, 1963—and the date that the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of *all* CIA installations that appeared in Oswald's 201 file during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board protected all information that identified CIA installation locations.

The Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this, the Review Board divided the world into five regions: Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/ Pacific, and Africa/ Near East/ South Asia. Then the Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, "CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1" serves as a place holder for a particular installation in all CIA assassination records.

ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review Board released CIA installation locations in CIA documents relevant to Oswald's visit to Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant objections to the Review Board's release of its installations in these records.

When the Review Board began to vote to release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did not offer evidence of the harm to national security that it believed would result from disclosure of the information. The CIA

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threatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board's votes, but the Review Board's position was that the JFK Act required release of information where CIA did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to gather and present its evidence to support its requests for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal to the President.

Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would trust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board required to postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an effort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to protect certain installations, the Review Board decided to establish date "windows" within which it would release CIA installation locations.

The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote to the President.

g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report).

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report "prefixes" are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes where it voted to protect the location of the CIA installation.

The Review Board replaced the prefixes that it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: "Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1."

ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA did not disagree that the Board should release cable, dispatch and field report prefixes.

h. CIA job titles.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board voted to release CIA employees' job titles except when the Board's disclosure of the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection.

ii. Commentary. Although the Review Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed other information that the Review Board had voted to protect.

i. CIA file numbers.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes many of its files by country and assigns "country identifiers" within particular file numbers. The Review Board released nearly all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the "country identifiers" in CIA file numbers for all other countries with the exception of country identifiers "15" and "19." The Review Board generally released all CIA "201" or "personality" file numbers where the files related to the assassination.

ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected to the Review Board's release of its file numbers.

j. CIA domestic facilities.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released references to domestic CIA facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility. The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evidence that the facility was still in use.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely encountered the issue of whether to release the location of CIA domestic facilities in assassination records, as CIA officially acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. When the Review Board did vote to postpone the location of CIA domestic facilities, it required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIA had to keep the location of those facilities secret.

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k. CIA official cover.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA "official cover" is a means by which a CIA officer can operate overseas in the guise of an employee of another government agency. In *congressional documents*, the Review Board released general information about official cover but protected specific details. With regard to *executive branch documents*, the CIA convinced the Review Board that, while Congress might reveal information about official cover, the executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA's postponements regarding official cover in executive branch documents unless the U.S. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue.

The Review Board inserted the phrase "official cover" as substitute language when it postponed such information.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to be an "open secret" that was well-known to the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold such obvious information. The CIA, however, supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the harm in releasing information about official cover outweighed any additional information that assassination researchers might gain from knowing details about official cover.

l. Alias documentation.

i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board released information that revealed that CIA employees and agents used aliases. The Board protected specific details about how CIA documents particular aliases.

ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it currently uses alias documentation and that aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its intelligence operations. The CIA also argued that the Review Board's release of specific information about alias documentation would not be useful to assassination researchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because they agreed that the public interest in the specific details about alias documentation was low. The Review Board determined that it did not want the CIA to spend a large amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the CIA to provide evidence in support of every postponement relating to alias documentation.

m. Foreign intelligence cooperation.

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA.

ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA and demanded extensive evidence and multiple briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members judged that the information might add to the historical understanding of the assassination, the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the information outweighed this potential value.

n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets).

i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board evaluated the need to postpone the identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case basis. Where the human source was a *foreign national*, the Review Board generally agreed to protect the individual's identity *unless* the individual's connection with the FBI was already known to the foreign government at issue. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials*, the Review Board sometimes released the identity of the individual if the public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens*, the Review Board tended to evaluate the release of the source's name more like other domestic informants.

ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the FBI defined "intelligence source" as "any

individual who has provided or is currently providing information pertaining to national security matters, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI's intelligence and counter-intelligence-gathering capabilities."

The FBI offered the following arguments in support of its request to keep intelligence sources' identities secret: (1) Review Board disclosure of intelligence sources would harm the FBI's ability to develop and maintain new and existing sources, because sources would reasonably believe that the government would reveal their identities, and (2) disclosure of intelligence sources may subject the sources, their friends, and their families to physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism.

The Review Board's interpretation of the "clear and convincing" evidence standard required it to reject the FBI's general policy arguments, and instead required the FBI to present asset-specific evidence that explained the particular harm that the FBI expected the asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the Review Board usually protected the identities of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board considered whether the individual was in a position of trust with the foreign government and whether he or she might be in danger if the Review Board disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the source who was a *United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens* was generally evaluated according to the Board's domestic informant standards.

o. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities.

i. Review Board guidelines. As a general rule, the Review Board believed that most aspects of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act.

ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. The FBI's assassination records contain information that reveal many of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period. Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board considered how it could release as much information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require protection.

In all cases where the Review Board is considering postponement, it should keep the withheld information to an absolute minimum, and ensure that the postponement is narrowly drawn for the shortest possible duration. In so doing, the Review Board should release as much information from the records as is possible.
—Senate Report on JFK Act, July 22, 1992

In spring 1996, the Review Board considered and voted on a group of FBI records relating to the FBI's foreign counterintelligence activities. In response to the Review Board's requests for evidence on the foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI had provided its "position paper" on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its paper, the FBI defined "intelligence activities" as "intelligence gathering action or techniques utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined to be of national security interest." The FBI's primary argument in support of its request for continued secrecy of intelligence activities was that disclosure of specific information describing intelligence activities would reveal to hostile entities the FBI's targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to develop countermeasures.

Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In addition, the JFK Act's legislative history instructed the Review Board to consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well-known by the public, whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether the information collected was secret.[27]

The Review Board considered the FBI's evidence and weighed it against public interest in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some foreign counterintelligence information. The Board's primary reason for releasing such

records was its belief that the FBI's evidence did not enumerate specific harms that would result from disclosure.

A. The FBI's May 1996 Appeals to the President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI appealed to the President to overturn the Board's vote on 17 records relating to the FBI's surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries—the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI's overarching arguments were that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods that would compromise the national security of the United States, and that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance—the four Communist countries—would harm the foreign relations of the United States.

The FBI sought to postpone five types of source and method capabilities: tracing of funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The Review Board's response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of each issue are discussed below.

In response to the FBI's overarching argument that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods and compromise the *national security*, the Review Board responded that if the national security would be harmed by release of this information, the harm would have already occurred, since the FBI had already released both the identities of the target countries *and* the sources and methods that the FBI used in its operations.

In response to the FBI's arguments that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance would harm the *foreign relations* of the United States, the Review Board responded in three parts. *First*, the information that the FBI sought to protect is widely available in the public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of the information, then the harm has already occurred. *Second*, the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated international law or "diplomatic standards" by employing the sources or methods at issue since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that were in effect at the time that the records were created. *Third*, despite the FBI's assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had evidence that other governments *do* acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against other countries.

The Review Board believed that the FBI had not provided evidence of a "significant, demonstrable harm" to current foreign relations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board asked the President to deny the FBI's requests for postponement. The White House did not expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after several meetings involving representatives from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White House, the White House directed the FBI to provide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The White House requested the Review Board to reconsider the Bureau's specific evidence. The FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its pending appeals, including some records in which the Review Board voted to release information obtained from a technical source.

B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the FBI agreed to release most information regarding its foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries as "consent releases." In those few cases where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist Bloc countries still required protection, the Bureau submitted for the Board's determination postponement-specific evidence.

To the extent that the information in the FBI's proposed redaction did not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI to postpone direct discussions of foreign counterintelligence activities against *non*-Communist Bloc countries. With regard to the FBI's "segregated collections," the Review Board stated in its segreated collection guidelines,

> It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal stan-

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OGC-92-53256

14 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

VIA: W. George Jameson
Associate General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has created declassification guidelines that are to some extent different from the Historical Review Program guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the continuing review of material related to the assassination of President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be used.

2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it creates on agencies to justify continued classification of information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act, information must be declassified unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security.

3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in its Section 6 and are as follows:

Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS.

Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that--

(1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that

it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) Any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States;

(2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk to that person;

(3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest;

(4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or

(5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest.

4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as follows.

a. The most basic change is that <u>you must apply a balancing test before maintaining the classification of any information</u>. You must balance continued classification against the public interest in the information. Therefore, the greater light disclosure of the information would shed on the assassination of the President, or on the

government's investigation into that assassination, the more serious must be the need to continue to withhold the information for classification to be maintained.

b. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information advocating continued classification of information will bear the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security. The Act defines that burden as one of "clear and convincing evidence." Further, the Act changes "reasonably could be expected to cause" to "demonstrably." Therefore, unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security, the information must be declassified.

c. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for maintaining the classification of foreign government information, the identity of a foreign source, and intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified. Under the Act, with respect to these categories of classified information found with records related to the assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they--

(1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; <u>and</u>

(2) that they not have been officially disclosed; <u>and</u>

(3) that their disclosure would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities.

All of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.

d. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and organizational information. The Act only permits the continued withholding of the identity of an "intelligence agent" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act does not permit the withholding of organizational information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would demonstrably impair the national security.

e. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine whether information warrants continued protection pursuant to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes <u>all</u> other statutory authority for withholding information except

for a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence over 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and § 403g, as well as the Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act also makes no provision for protecting information on the basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process and attorney-client communications.

5. Certain categories of information may fall into more than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining whether to release or withhold specific information. For example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1)(A) ("intelligence agent"), (1)(B) ("intelligence source"), (2) ("living person who provided confidential information to the United States"), and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual"). At this point, we do not know how the Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for that withholding.

[handwritten margin note: cf NARA software – [illegible]: won't accept [>1?] author. for each redaction]

6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such information may be withheld only with the personal authorization of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a statement that included the following:

> My authority to protect [executive branch deliberations, law enforcement information of the executive branch, and national security information] comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by statute. Although only the most extraordinary circumstances would require postponement of the disclosure of documents for reasons other than those recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my constitutional responsibility to take such action when necessary.

7. The Act provides individuals the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect, then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of our determinations that certain information meets the criteria for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board,

subsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA cases.

8. If you have any questions concerning the application of the Act to your review of the assassination records, please call me on secure extension 76105.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

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DCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992

OGC-92-53256

Distribution:

1 - Addressee
1 - DO/IRO
1 - DI/IRO
1 - DS&T/IRO
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1 - PCS/PGG
1 - ERR
1 - DPH
1 - Lit file
1 - EC
1 - WGJ
1 - RJE Soft file
1 - OGC Chrono
1 - RJE Signer

OGC-94-52916
19 September 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes
Deputy General Counsel

FROM: Robert J. Eatinger. Jr.
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division, OGC

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA.

3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be "postponed." The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA § 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if:

> "(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal--

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

(A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection;

(B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or

(C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States."

ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.)

4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records." ARCA § 7(i)(1). Specifically, the "Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i)(2)(B).

5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it "shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made." ARCA § 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is "obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6." ARCA § 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA § 9(d)(2).

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SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records

6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members.

Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.

Attachment

SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect to JFK Assassination Records

OGC-94-52916

DCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76105 (19 Sept 94)

Original - Addressee (w/attach) (hand delivered)
1 - OGC Registry (~~w/attach~~)
1 - Lit File ________
1 - RBB (OGC/ILD)
1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames)
1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach)
1 - RJE - Signer
1 - PDP
1 - KK -fyi
1 - PAS-fyi

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C

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Attachment C

Friday, October 29, 1999

Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection

CIA's JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms:

First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and the Board agreed that substantive information could be released.

Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA's "sequestered collection" and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as "Assassination Records," subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no documentation regarding coordination with liaison.

Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act.

The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are reflected in OIM records:

Australian

1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in which reference is made to the 'Australian security service.' [The Warren Commission document (CD #97) was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the 'Australian security service.'] The Board did not accept the Agency's initial action to "deny in full" Sir Spry's letter and the Board's acceptance of substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted and retyped version of Sir Spry's letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated "this . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in releasing ASIO documents." The Board postponed release of the original until 2017.

2. (S) Helms' response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017.

3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in Item 1 were declared assassination records, but release of the cables was postponed until 2017.

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1.5d

British

1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service's (BSS) interview of the spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of *privacy rights in the UK.* The BOARD agreed that the document was "not intrinsic to assassination story" and that the document could be postponed until 2017.

2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982 "KOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there." (The author EPSTEIN in *Legend* claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald's KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information.

3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the BOARD's examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign government that specifically requested not to be identified.

Canadian

(S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017.

Dutch

(S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the information from intercepted conversations on the topics of "Mr. Lee (sic)" and Richard Gibson, but redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.

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104-10338-10018 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.

2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished "many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."

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3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.

4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertheless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."

6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred [redacted] who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to [redacted], trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge [redacted].

7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. [illegible]. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

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labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "solidarity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

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ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists [illegible] have been in close liaison with Cuban agents [illegible], and elsewhere. [illegible] appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported [illegible].

Last January, [illegible] traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origen.

[illegible]

2. Bolivia

Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. [redacted] Cuban Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.

[redacted] gave him two boxes of arms to be distrubuted among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. [redacted] that the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countires. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

police to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.

Some 300 Bolivians have received or were receiving guerrilla warfare training or political indoctrination as of mid-March 1964. About 70 Bolivians traveled to Cuba in 1963; 14 traveled to Cuba through April 1964.

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.

In late February, a usually reliable source reported that Brizola agreed to accept offers of Cuban financial assistance to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his Popular Mobilization Front. The same source reported that Brizola received his first subsidy from Havana of [illegible] in Bolivian, Venezuelan, and Uruguayan currencies to buy arms. In addition, a usually reliable Mexican source with contacts in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil via Mexico City.

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.

At least 219 Brazilians traveled to Cuba in 1963.

4. <u>British Guiana</u>

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment [redacted] of GIMPEX [redacted], ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown [redacted] officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior [redacted] official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.

[redacted]

5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp."

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A clandestine source [redacted] reported in February that [redacted] said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba.

6. Colombia

Cuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported [redacted] to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity.

Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends.

7. Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-government action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose.

In 1963 some 47 Costa Ricans traveled to Cuba; 14 traveled to Cuba in the first 4 months of 1964.

8. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.

Seventy-one Dominicans traveled to Cuba in 1963.

9. Ecuador

Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorean government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban efforts there. When the junta began to exile Communists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. An Ecuadorean exile residing in Bolivia told a clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorean Communist Party (PCE), is reportedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former president Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being offered to followers of former president Arosemena.

Some 121 Ecuadoreans traveled to Havana during 1963; 14 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

10. El Salvador

There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications.

Havana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer.

Twenty-six Salvadorans traveled to Cuba in 1963; 4 traveled to Cuba through April 1964.

11. Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestine sources reported last September that extremist guerrilla leader Yon Sosa and some of his followers traveled to Cuba the previous year and returned with large sums of money to finance their activities. In addition, another source reports one of the persons killed in October by the premature explosion of a homemade bomb was acknowledged by the Guatemalan Communist Party as a Cuban-trained expert in explosives. Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.

12. Haiti

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire.

~~Twenty-three Haitians traveled to Cuba in 1963.~~

13. <u>Honduras</u>

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government.

~~[illegible] 50 Hondurans traveled to Cuba in 1963.~~

14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source [illegible] reported [illegible] small sums of money to the Communist-led Independent Peasants' Central (CCI)--which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months.

At least [illegible] Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; [illegible] to Cuba from January through April of this year.

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.

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Twelve Nicaraguans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963.

16. Panama

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR).

Seven Panamanian extremists returned to Panama in late March after having spent varying periods of time training in Cuba. Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future.

Sixty-one Panamanians traveled to Cuba in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

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attention, which is given through the Cuban embassy in Montevideo. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there.

Thirty-three Peruvians are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963; 16 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

19. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.

At least 153 Uruguayans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963; 22 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase.

The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence

as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll.

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities.

[illegible] least 139 Venezuelans traveled to Cuba in 1968; [illegible] traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963

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NATIONALITY	January		February		March		April		May		June		July		August		September		October		November		December		1963	
	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From	To	From
ARGENTINA	18	27	47	34	12	21	13	14	57	12	4	5	6	0	4	0	37	0	4	9	5	3	15	1	222	126
BOLIVIA	1	7	4	3	3	5	6	0	2	5	3	2	14	0	5	3	21	5	1	17	2	1	7	0	69	48
BRAZIL	11	19	22	13	9	6	18	7	10	5	1	6	25	0	0	24	121	0	2	162	0	0	0	0	219	242
BR. GUIANA	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	1	0	0	7	10	0	0	1	0	0	10	0	26	25	51
CHILE	31	44	26	20	13	42	20	8	9	14	3	8	20	1	22	47	175	1	9	70	9	54	18	7	355	316
COLOMBIA	54	39	7	12	13	9	23	5	7	15	3	7	29	1	6	14	17	1	8	14	5	1	10	4	182	122
COSTA RICA	9	0	0	29	1	0	11	1	0	8	0	3	12	0	0	8	0	5	0	1	4	1	10	0	47	56
DOM. REPUBLIC	0	2	0	0	0	6	2	1	1	2	0	2	37	0	1	8	19	0	11	0	0	0	3	3	74	24
ECUADOR	20	0	20	5	10	1	31	1	24	1	4	6	2	0	0	2	7	0	3	4	4	0	1	0	121	20
EL SALVADOR	7	2	0	0	0	0	5	4	0	0	0	4	4	1	1	0	3	0	6	0	0	1	0	0	26	12
GUATEMALA	30	18	0	5	15	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	3	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	64	23
HAITI	0	0	4	4	0	0	18	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	23	22
HONDURAS	11	12	20	0	0	0	11	0	1	8	0	11	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	50	39
JAMAICA	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	33	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	38	6
MEXICO	100	81	22	0	26	38	37	18	34	54	14	42	65	28	34	63	84	36	24	71	23	27	49	72	512	530
NICARAGUA	4	7	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	12	9
PANAMA	4	1	20	0	2	1	2	3	2	0	3	0	15	0	6	0	6	13	1	3	0	0	0	3	61	24
PARAGUAY	2	3	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9
PERU	6	2	2	4	3	1	5	8	5	3	3	5	4	0	2	9	1	2	0	0	1	2	1	2	33	38
URUGUAY	19	19	16	14	8	8	8	0	5	12	9	0	17	15	10	16	56	6	3	27	1	0	6	13	158	130
VENEZUELA	26	9	2	3	9	9	8	0	4	4	8	0	22	0	3	0	37	0	11	10	6	0	3	0	139	35
MONTHLY TOTALS	354	296	212	150	124	149	223	88	163	144	73	103	319	47	104	214	587	64	76	380	69	99	126	132	2430	1863

The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October.

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY TO	FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

NATIONALITY	JANUARY TO	JANUARY FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	9	3	1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA	3	1	1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	1	0	29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown.
CHILE	14	15	Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution.
COLOMBIA	4	0	An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations.
COSTA RICA	11	13	3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration.
DOM. REP.	0	1	1 attended Architects Congress
ECUADOR	8	0	5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico.
EL SALVADOR	0	0	
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	1	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	87	45	
NICARAGUA	0	1	
PANAMA	1	1	
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	5	3	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	0	7	
VENEZUELA	5	0	
TOTALS	148	91	

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

NATIONALITY	MARCH-APRIL TO	MARCH-APRIL FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	11	10	1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry.
BOLIVIA	8	2	3- Attending May Day Celebration.
BRAZIL	0	0	
BR. GUIANA	2	2	
CHILE	14	37	4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile.
COLOMBIA	7	0	
COSTA RICA	3	3	1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
DOM. REP.	1	7	4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
ECUADOR	5	2	
EL SALVADOR	3	8	2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba.
GUATEMALA	0	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	0	0	
MEXICO	32	24	3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	2	1	
PANAMA	2	14	3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	9	0	
SURINAM	0	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	14	11	
VENEZUELA	17	0	
T O T A L S	130	121	

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SECRET

3. DEFINITIONS

Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.

a. *Operational Use*
Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate.

b. *DDO Element*
Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms.

c. *Operational Contact*
Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.

4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE

a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:

(1) *Operational Use is Prohibited* (see paragraph 5):

(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;

(b) Fulbright grantees;

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(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom;
(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations;
(e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigative agencies.

(2) *Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence* (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF SA/ADDO.
(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;
(b) DDO agents or assets in the United States;
(c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies;
(d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories) and New Zealand;
(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;
(f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.

(3) *Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO* (see paragraph 7):
(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media;
(b) CARE employees;
(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;
(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States;
(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned;
(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies;
(g) Officials of the Vatican State;
(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;
(i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;
(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;
(k) Volunteers to America.

(4) *Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division* (see paragraph 8):
(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;
(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations organizations not assigned in the U.S.;
(c) Members of the academic community.

b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case.

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DDO INSTRUCTION
NO. 50-10

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4 September 1973

5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED

a. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*

(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.)

(2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:

(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

(c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.

(3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.

(4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION.

(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following:

(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.

(b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION.

. If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division.

b. *Fulbright Grantees*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships or grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants at international trade fairs or expositions who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 7.j., below).

c. *Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments.

d. *Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations*

DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals.

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e. *Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies*
DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations.

6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED

a. *Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies*
Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5.

b. *DDO Agents or Assets in the United States*
In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff.

(1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions.

(2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI.

(3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI.

(4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be

provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes.

c. *Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence Registered by Other U.S. Agencies*

The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter.

d. *Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand*

(1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens).

(2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above.

(3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director.

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e. *Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands*
The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division.

f. *Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries*
The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned.

7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED

Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations

Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.)

a. *Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media* (see DOI 240-6)

(1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States.

(2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control.

b. *CARE Employees*

It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases.

c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18)

Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States.

d. *Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States* (see DOI 60-11)
Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.

e. *Delegates or Employees of the United ~~States~~* NATIONS
It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular (UN) individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.

f. *Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies*
The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.

g. *Officials of the Vatican State*
Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.

h. *U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees*
U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other

exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.

i. *Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations*

(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.

(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.

j. *Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute*

Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.

k. *Volunteers to America*

Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a

counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country.

8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION

Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use.

a. *Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas* (see DOI 50-19)

The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

b. *Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.*

The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.

c. *Members of the Academic Community*

(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community.

(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is

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operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:

(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;

(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.

DDO Approval

If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.

(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:

(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.

(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.

(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.

(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the

academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.

(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7.

9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY

When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.

10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations.

William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations

104-10406-10139 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

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SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B

15 November 1974

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0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON      POB GERM, BERLIN          201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26           OCC PHARMACIST            TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                      OCC CODE CHEM             OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53                               RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                          30 NOV 70           00833555
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Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

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4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

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Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM:			EXTENSION	NO. / DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of ____ volume(s) of 201-__________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ________ desk.
15.				

CL BY: 0U7522

FORM 5-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

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NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

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(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
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TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______________ Date: ______________

FORM 2-73 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: CC7522 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

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8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL & CHINA
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6775/1108/0038		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU_MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		18MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP28	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130615			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/655		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091833			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-GAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2895/5930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG TS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2895/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2895/2797	A	C1PC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAO /7115/2895/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/76		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0054759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2895/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2895/9133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2895/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0567/039		C1AC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0221162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2551/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2873/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858643			CHIN	[illegible]	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0095967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2895/0599/		15APR30	CHIN,SHANGHAI	CMND	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAI /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0095119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0131749			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0753916			CHIN	RUSS	
CHEN, SHU TEH /8795/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0313731			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TING /7115/0667/6639		C1PC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153129			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2895/2737/		19MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0667/0037/	A	02FEB05				0131129			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2895/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0173136			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0137135			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN05	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179129			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		07DEC13	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	[illegible]			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB39	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313512			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	[illegible]			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3962/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	014475			CHIN	TAIW	

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E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

PAGE [illegible]

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

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Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rescinded by Annex B to Chapter III to CSHB 70-1-1 dated 1 Aug 62

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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

104-10408-10078 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

78-0070/15

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4624

FEB 21 1978

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Office of the Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Carpentier:

In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed:

1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information;

2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees;

3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries;

4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries;

5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries;

6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures;

7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist or unfriendly intelligence organizations or instrumentalities thereof;

8. Individuals who have received money or other items of value from communist or unfriendly governments or instrumentalities thereof; and

9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents or employees.

Please address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would you please specify in your response under which criteria, or combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file was considered to be mandatory during this period.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:mgj

13-00000

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OLC #78-0070/[illegible]

DO/ISS 78-098

28 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O
Attention: Mr. Shepanek

FROM: William F. Donnelly
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S)

REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978

1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff.

2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions.

William F. Donnelly
William F. Donnelly

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ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

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```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                              201-0032671*
     SEX M DOB 12 APR 26      POB GERM, BERLIN             TYPE NAME T
     CIT GERM                 OCC PHARMACIST               OI CODES AA XX
     REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53 OCC CODE CHEM               RCD DATE 53
     SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
     CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
     AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
     29 OCTOBER.

                        30 NOV 70          00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

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e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

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4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

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a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: | EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files GC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ______ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ______ (date)
14.				retained at ________ desk.
15.				

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ______ BADGE ______ COMPONENT ______ EXT. ______

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REQ. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

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(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021):

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE HT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______________________ (name)
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______________________ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______________________ Date: ______________________

FORM 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — CONFIDENTIAL — E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (13)

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

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8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL A CHINA — SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/9030/		17JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0239859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0179653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0086		90	CHIN,AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, PANCHUPIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		19MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1907		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/485		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091803			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040288			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2995/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHUAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN,HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2995/2		NOV30	HK	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2985/2797	A	CIRC22	CHIN,PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0988577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAN /7115/2985/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN,FUKIEN		CHIN?	0044799			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2985/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0073195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2855/8133		05MAY18	CHIN,FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179422			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2985/9030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0239156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2895/2710		27NOV23	CHIN,FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0647/009		CIRC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN,FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAO-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2985/0589/		15APR30	CHIN,CHENGHAI	CRMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN,KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0083119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103249			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2495/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /975/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013951			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		CIRC75	CHIN,HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2995/2737/		19MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0767442			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0317/	A	02FEB06				0191329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAO /7115/2695/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN,PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN,FANG CHEN KW		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/4992/		07OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0343628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB35	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313610			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0454010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

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Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

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AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Resc by Annex B to CSHB 70-1-1 to CSHB 70-1-1c

of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No. 201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

104-10408-10316 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2003

ANNEX B

THE 201 SYSTEM

Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966

1. INTRODUCTION

The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.

2. THE 201 SYSTEM

The principal features of the 201 system are:

a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual.

b. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.

c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings.

d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated.

13-00000


```
0002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETON                                201-0032671*
SEX M DOB 12 APR 26          POB GERM, BERLIN                TYPE NAME T
CIT GERM                     OCC PHARMACIST                  OI CODES AA XX
REF AACD-12345, 20 JUN 53    OCC CODE CHEM                   RCD DATE 53
SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISTS
AND PHARMACISTS HELD IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH
29 OCTOBER.

                             30 NOV 70          00833555
```

Information About Subject

1. Sequence Number and Name
2. Sex and Date of Birth
3. Citizenship
4. Place of Birth
5. Occupation
6. Occupation Code
7. Text

Document Reference Data Group

8. 201 Number
9. Name Type Indicator
10. OI Codes
11. Record Date (year only)
12. Reference

ISC Control Information

13. Date of latest update of the record
14. STAR Index Record Number

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e. *OI Code:* a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes (Attachment 4)

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations.

A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer.

A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment.

The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service.

f. *201 Machine Lists:* produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist.

3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER

a. *General*

The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on

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persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records systêm and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories:

(1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only.

(2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening.

(3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel.

(4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I.

(5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20).

(6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS).

b. *Requesting a 201 File Opening*

Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record.

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4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER

Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures.

Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to:

a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831).

b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples.

c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II.

d. Operational and other security approvals.

e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals.

f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym.

g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations.

h. Copy of contract and termination papers.

i. Secrecy agreement.

j. Agent Duty Status Report.

k. Training and evaluation.

l. SGSWIRL report.

m. Newspaper clippings.

n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting.

5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS

The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers.

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a. *Purging*

Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following:

(1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document.

(2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening.

(3) All abstract slips.

(4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884).

(5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report.

(6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments.

(7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer.

(8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document.

(9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)).

b. *Maintenance Procedures*

(1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201

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dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document.

(2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201.

(3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201.

(4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it.

(5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name.

(6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN).

(7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201.

(8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file.

(9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201.

(10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10).

Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers.

(11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS

FROM: | EXTENSION | NO. | DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IP/Files CC-52				(For guidance see CSHB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.)
2.				
3.				Volume(s) #____ of____ volume(s) of 201-____________.
4.				
5.				
6.				☐ Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2021 to Dossier)
7.				
8.				☐ Non-Restricted Dossier
9.				
10.				For Split Charge Dossiers:
11.				All documents prior to ________ (date)
12.				forwarded to IP/Files. All
13.				documents after ________ (date)
14.				retained at __________ desk.
15.				

FORM 3-74 610E ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES

A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY

TO: NAME	BADGE	COMPONENT	ROOM	TUBE	EXT.

This is to notify you that accountability for the document(s) and/or file(s) cited below has been transferred to you by:

NAME ________ BADGE ________ COMPONENT ________ EXT. ________

Accordingly, IP's records now reflect you as the custodian. Please contact IP/Files, Ext. 4362, if you have any questions regarding this transfer.

SUBJECT OF REQUEST	FILE NO.	DOC. SYMBOL & NUMBER	DOC. DATE	DATE OF TRANSFER	CHARGE PERM OR TEMP	REG. NO.

FORM 1-73 2977 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS   CONFIDENTIAL   CL BY: 007622

The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component.

7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.)

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

TO	DATE	INITIALS	
IP/FI GC-52 TUBE DT-6			FILE RESTRICTION NOTICE
IP/DCU GC-40 TUBE RT-4			

ACTION DESK: 1. To restrict a file, complete Section A (signature of R.O. not necessary).
2. To remove a restriction, complete Section B (R.O. signature necessary).

FILE NUMBER

SECTION A
RESTRICT TO: (Use country or non-country code number. See CSI 70-28) ______
RESTRICTED BY: ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

SECTION B
REMOVE RESTRICTION (AUTHORIZED BY) ______ R.O. No. ______
COMPONENT: ______ Date: ______

FORM 2021 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS — CONFIDENTIAL — E2 IMPDET CL BY: 007622

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES

The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.

IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.

Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.

9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION

A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.

10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS

Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.

a. *Standard Listings*

Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest

Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are:

(1) Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number;

(2) Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number;

(3) Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number;

(4) Numerical, leading to a surname;

(5) Numerical, leading to a cryptonym.

FUL & CHINA　　SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY
201 SURNAME ALPHA LIST
03 OCT 1973

NAME	TYPE NAME	DOB DA/MO/YR	BIRTHPLACE CTRY CITY	OCC.	CIT.	201	OI-1	OI-2	ACT. CTRY	LOC. CTRY	INT. CTRY
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/5030/		37JUL14	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0165401			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU I /7115/1343/0001/				DIPT		0230859			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU I. /7115/1343/0001/	A	24JAN11				0178653			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-JEN /6774/1108/0038		90	CHIN, AMOY	BUSP	CCOM?	0043751			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU MEI		04JAN19	CHIN, FUKIEN, PROV.		CHIN?	0234629			CHIN	CUBA	
CHEN, SHOU-MING /7109/1343/690		21OCT08	CHIN, MANCHURIA, PORT ARTH		CHAT	0179620			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHOU SHIH /7115/1109/001	A	12NOV22	CHIN, HUNAN		CHAT	0069786			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-TAO		12MAR45	CHIN	DIPT	CCOM	0905390			CHIN	MALT	
CHEN, SHOU-TSENG /7115/1109/1		C41	CHIN, CANTON	ENGR	CHAT	0832855			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHOU TZE /0701/1343/1807		02SEP26	CHIN, LIAONING PRO		CHIN?	0130415			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHOU-WEI /7115/1109/499		12JAN18	CHIN, FUKIEN		CCOM?	0091A03			CHIN		
CHEN, SHOU-YI		09JUN99	CHIN, CANTON	PROF	CHIN?	0040289			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU-SAN	A	19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-CHIN /7115/2585/6930		02JUL30	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.	ARMY	CHAT	0328328			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU CHIAN /7115/3219/122		19	CHIN, HUAN TANG IS		CHIN?	0124438			CHIN	IR	
CHEN, SHU-CHUAN /7115/2535/2		NOV30	IR	TSEA	CHAT	0797335			CHIN	HK	
CHEN, SHU CHUN /7115/2585/2797	A	C1AC22	CHIN, PEILIU		CHIN?	0200223			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU FEN	R					0488577			CHIN	ETHI	
CHEN, SHU HAN /7115/2845/3185/		08JUL14	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0179621			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU HSIANG /7115/2579/74		10	CHIN, FUKIEN		CHIN?	0054759			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-HSIUNG /7115/2585/7		23FEB07	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093195			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU HSUN /7115/2855/8133		05MAY18	CHIN, FOOCHOW		CHIN?	0179A22			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-HUA		30MAR26		DIPT	CCOM.	0223161			CHIN	CEY	
CHEN, SHU-I /7115/2585/5030/	A	06FEB16	CHIN, HOPEI	DIPT	CHAT	0839156			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU KUEI /7115/2885/2710		27NOV23	CHIN, FANG CHENG	PROF	CHIN?	0179623			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LAN	R		CHIN		CCOM	0221972			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIANG /7115/0547/009		C1AC21	CHIN	DIPT	CHIN?	0223162			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU LIN /7115/2579/2651/		25NOV20	CHIN, FENGSHUN		CHIN?	0179624			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-LING /7109/2973/010		01JUL29	CHIN, KIANGSU	MILA	CCOM	0858440			CHIN	LAOS	
CHEN, SHU-MIN	A	20SEP20	CHIN, HSIAN-HSIEN, KIANGSU		CHAT	0096967			CHIN	USA	
CHEN, SHU NAN /7115/2885/0589/		15APR30	CHIN, CHENGHAI	CHMO	CHIN?	0179625			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-PAO /7115/2579/0202/		19DEC19	CHIN, KWANGTUNG PROV.		CHAT?	0052638			CHIN	HWAI	
CHEN, SHU-SEN /7115/2895/2773/	A	10DEC26	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CHIN?	0085119			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-SHAN /7115/2579/091		27JAN25	CHIN, FUKIEN PROV		CHIN?	0103249			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-TE /7115/2485/1795/		21DEC37	CHIN, SHANGHAI	GEOL	CHIN?	0763816			CHIN	BURM	
CHEN, SHU TEH /4795/	V	27MAR20	CHIN, CHANG SHU			0013951			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU TUNG /7115/0647/6639		C1PC75	CHIN, HANG CHOW		CHIN?	0153929			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/2485/2737/	-	18MAR17	CHIN	FIN	CCOM	0747462			CHIN	UK	
CHEN, SHU TZU /7115/0647/0337/	A	02FEB06				0151329			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YAU /7115/2655/1031		11NOV06	CHIN, KWANGTUNG		CCOM?	0093196			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU-YIN	V	05APR17	CHIN, PEIPING		CHIN?	0107306			CHIN	CHIN	UK
CHEN, SHU YIN /7115/2895/5391/		15JUN06	CHIN, FANG CHEN KU		CHIN?	0179626			CHIN	CHIN	
CHEN, SHU-YIN /7115/2579/6992/		09OCT30	CHIN, HENG YANG HSIEN, HUN	ARMY	CHAT	0340628			CHIN	TAIW	
CHEN, SHU-YU		17FEB38	CHIN, CHEKIANG	INT	CCOM	0313A10			CHIN	DENK	
CHEN, SHU-YU		21APR21	CHIN, SHANGHAI		CHIN?	0154010			CHIN		
CHEN, SHU YU /7115/2579/3842/	V	04SEP28	CHIN, SZECHWAN		CHIN?	0144758			CHIN	TAIW	

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SECRET

All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions *must be* destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.

b. *Non-Standard Listings*

Based on one or more of the following selection criteria:

(1) Country of location

(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)

(3) Citizenship

(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)

(5) Occupation.

These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:

(a) Surname

(b) Given name

(c) Date of birth

(d) Country of birth

(e) Citizenship

(f) OI code

(g) Location

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Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.

c. *Scheduled Listings*

Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.

d. *Special Listings*

Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.

e. *Request for Listings*

All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.

SECRET

DOHB 70-1-1
CHAPTER III, ANNEX B
Attachment 2

15 November 1974

AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS

Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people.

1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*

   a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above.

   b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.

   c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).

   (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)

2. *British Commonwealth*

   a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.

   b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).

   c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.

   d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).

3. *Cuba*

   Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).

4. *Israel*

   a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest.

   b. Military attaches.

   c. Assistant military attaches.

   d. Identified intelligence officers.

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5. *North Vietnam*

All diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.

6. *USSR*

a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.

b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.

c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.

d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.

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CSHB ~~43-1-1~~ 70-1-1
CHAPTER III

CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

ANNEX B

PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS

1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.

2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.

3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control

Rscs by Annex B to Chp III to CSHB 70-1-1 dat 1 ...

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of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself.

4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series:

IDN-123457

These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.

5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows:

Dispatch Symbol and No.
XYZA-12345
Headquarters File No.
201-

6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service.

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CLANDESTINE SERVICES
HANDBOOK NO. ~~43-1-1~~

15 February 1960

7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.

104-10408-10329 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING
1 4
2 5
3 6

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorized: DE SENSITIZE
Signed: [signature]
R.O. #1 - Unit C/R+A
Note: If destruction, cite reasons and coordinate if appropriate.

DIRECTOR
MELBOURNE
C/WH 4
DCI, D/DCI, DDP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR

S E C R E T 020422Z   CS COPY
DIR INFO CNBR CITE MELB 2517 (ROLLOFIER ACTING)
GPFLOOR
REF DIR 85690

2 DEC 63 IN 71187

1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL:

A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY.

B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL N.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, ERWAN SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCO 122, 1960 OLDEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 28 HEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE EROG ON ABOVE.

C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (IN 68838)

D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS.

E INDON FIRST SECY POSSIBLY IDU R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS MOUSTACHE; RUSSIAN CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY CLOSE TO SOVS CNBR.

D: 200-5-41

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976
E IMPDET CL BY 012208

201-289248

Document Number 270-676 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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13-00000

2. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PMG LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG
SE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE
CNBR.

3. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

CRET

/S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with e Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.

Document Number 352 for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR	DATE-TIME GROUP	CITE	MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
DEFERRED TELEPOUCH	170106Z	WASHINGTON	914708

CONF: IPDP5 INFO: FILE

INDEX DISSEM BY:
NO INDEX
RETURN TO PER
IP FILES #

TO: (BRUSSELS).Y

FROM: SE/BIO INFO SE/CI/X, SE/X/EU, E/BNL/BY

SUBJECT: WNINTEL CKTOP (PD)GRAVE (NIGALE) - TRACE ON VLADIMIR K U Z N E T S O V {ASSIGNED 201-0943610}Y

REFERENCE: (BRUSSELS) 41919 |IN 025302| |*|Y

ACTION: FOR (LIAISON) LESS 201 AND FYIY

1. VLADIMIR K U Z N E T S O V {ASSIGNED 201-0943610} IS POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV, A GRU STAFF OFFICER {FYI: (PD)SATISFY, DOI: 67}.Y

2. FYI: ACCORDING TO (PD)STORAGE, AS OF OCT 67, VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV HELD THE RANK OF ENGINEER-MAJOR AND WAS ASSIGNED TO THE THIRD {ANGLO-AMERICAN} DIRECTORATE AT THE GRU HEAD-QUARTERS IN MOSCOW. SOMETIME EARLIER IN 1967, KUZNETSOV ATTENDED THE MILITARY DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY. END FYI.Y

3. FYI: SUBJECT OF (PD)STORAGE AND (PD)SATISFY INFORMATION IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH VLADIMIR SERGEYEVICH KUZNETSOV {201-0900259} WHO SERVED AS COUNSELOR AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN JAKARTA FROM 72 TO 75. END FYI.Y

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

B 201-900259

RECORD COPY

17 Sept 76

201-943610

RELEASING OFFICER | COORDINATING OFFICERS | AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY:

IP/EDI ABSTRACT; IP/CRV; IP/MB; IP/CRU — TRAVEL PROGRAM, INDEX, PREPARE FOR FILMING, FOR FILING

0/W

13-00000

OUTGOING MESSAGE

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CLASSIFICATION

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MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

914708

CONF: INFO: FILE

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0 NO INDEX
0 RETURN TO PER
0 IP FILES #

4. AS KUZNETSOV IS A COMMON SOVIET SURNAME, HEADQUARTERS WILL RETRACE SUBJECT REF UPON RECEIPT OF PATRONYMIC AND ADDITIONAL PERTINENT BIO DATA.

5. FILE: 201-0943610 AND 201-0900259. E-2 IMPDET.

*REQUESTED TRACES ON PCS SOV

MD 40617

DATE: 13 SEPT 76
ORIG: SE/BIO
UNIT: DOREEN PETERSON/KN
EXT: X1551

SE/CI/X P.W. JONSSON/L. SULLIVAN (IN DRAFT)
SE/X/EU M. NOSTER (IN DRAFT)

DC/E/BNL — RELEASING OFFICER
E/BNL/B — COORDINATING OFFICERS
DC/SE/BIS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY: 058071

SECRET

7/1/N

S E C R E T

6 June 1960

PROJECT LINOG COVERS HIM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF DAVID M. WILSTED (ps)

1. On 1 June 1960 Mr. John G. Heyn and Mr. John Kennedy of WHD, Mr. Robert Brown of CI/OPS, Mr. Robert Bryant of FI/OPS and Mr. Charles Bray of FI/D met with David M. WILSTED (ps).

2. WILSTED emphasized that the whole telephone system in Mexico City is undergoing a reformation. The company Telefonos de Mexico, S.A., has sub-contracted this work of cleaning up and reorganizing the phone system to the independent firm, Intel. They are cleaning up unused and old lines, putting in new and spare lines, redefining exchange areas, laying underground cables, etc. Eventually we should be better off because there should be more surplus lines. The renovation work has hampered much of the LIFEAT work, principally because many of the lines now are underground and we cannot get access to them before they enter the central. This is particularly true with respect to the Czech Embassy, to whose telephone lines we cannot obtain access from the vantage point we now occupy.

3. WILSTED said that we try to keep track of the activities of "Intel" but since they seem to attack "Colonias" at random, we have no prior warning of their presence in a certain area.

4. In the recent past, Mexico has been using houses for listing posts for security reasons. We have more control over the access of phone company inspectors or repairman to houses. However, under new regulations, all new apartment buildings must have telephone lines installed in the building by the phone company during the construction phase. This means that the lines and their destination are concealed. WILSTED proposed that this will mean we can again use apartments since we can siphon off a line destined for use by another tenant in such a way that the phone company cannot trace its destination without tearing the building apart and we can then install a separate line to the building and hook up the subscriber to this line which, if checked, will belong to a legitimate subscriber.

5. One system which has been used effectively is to take one-half of two separate pairs which have one faulty line each. These two half pairs then form one good pair which we can use.

6. WILSTED explained that it cost about 3000 pesos to get a regular telephone. This entails the purchase of a telephone company bond, which later can be sold.

S E C R E T

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7. Personnel involved in the tapping of the lines are:

06
(Rene)- who has access to the [centrals]. He contacts the following men:
Two brothers
(Jose)- does exchange connections.
06

8. The take from each basehouse is collected early in the morning before office hours by RAFANELLI. He only enters one basehouse which is occupied by an elderly couple. All other contacts are in automobiles made at different spots each day of the week. RAFANELLI then takes the material to a meeting between him, WILSTED and SECHEN where RAFANELLI turns the material over to SECHEN and they all discuss the problems and plans for the day.

9. According to WILSTED there is no live monitoring done by any of the basehouse keepers.

10. There follows <u>a list of the basehouses and the lines covered at each base:</u>

DOI JUNE '61

a) (Calero 39) [24] - formerly covered American commies, now no lines. Being held for future use.

CHANGED BY '63 ? YES!

b) (Juanacatlan 179) [24] - Cuban residence
Russian Commercial
E. T. (Nicaraguan)

c) (Atlixco 47) [24] - 2 Polish
Seborer
Tropete
Bekier

d) (Tenanzingo) [24] - Cuban military office
Cuban Ambassador's office
Campos (travel agency)
1 spare

e) (Aristoteles 80) [24] - UAR
Ejercito Nacional 540 (name of person unknown)

f) (Suderman & Horacio) [24] - facilities for three lines. Formerly processed the Czech lines. Now nothing but being held open.

g) (Cuautla 131) [24] - 3 Soviet Embassy (tapped in the [Central])
1 Soviet propaganda office (tap in box)

9/17/

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Page count wrong. 86 pages

14-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Chief, Latin America Division	1431	DATE 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. Russell Holmes O/EXO/CI				
2.				
3.				
4. Mr. Scott Breckinridge Principal Coordinator/HSCA				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

1 3 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA

VIA : Mr. Russell Holmes
O/EXO/CI

FROM : Raymond A. Warren
Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

1. Attached is a file folder titled "Yuri" which contains informal and preliminary research based on a theory that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" observed entering and departing the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico, in October 1963. Ms. Christine Hopkins undertook to research the theory that MOSKALEV might be the unidentified man as a result of the indepth study she conducted as the Task Force Leader of this Division's efforts to determine if there could have been Cuban complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

2. Although the material contained in the attached folder is entirely theoretical and does not constitute an official file or position of this Division or Agency it may be of interest to Mr. Blakey and Mr. Cornwell of the HSCA.

3. It is requested that you review the material contained in the file folder and, if you consider it appropriate, make the material available for Messrs. Blakey and Cornwell to review with the understanding that it is a theoretical unofficial research undertaking.

Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Chief, Latin America Division	1431	DATE 13 July 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. O/EXO/CI				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET

JUL 1978

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Principal Coordinator/HSCA

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O/EXO/CI

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Raymond A. Warren

1 Attachment as stated
DDO/C/LA/STB/WSturbitts:esm (X9127) (13 Jul 78)
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee w/att
1 - O/EXO/CI w/o att
1 - C/LA w/o att
1 - C/LA/STB w/o att
1 - LA/CO/CIOS w/o att

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 12180

SECRET

SECRET

April 1977

SUBJECT: Theory re MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich and Unidentified Man

That Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV might be identifiable with the "unidentified man" going into and coming out of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in October 1963. The "unidentified man" was recently identified by SLIPSTREAM as a KGB type by name of "Yuri" whom he knew in Moscow in 1964.

- According to travel records MOSKALEV was in the USSR in 1964.; in the U.S. in October 1963 .
- MOSKALEV functions officially as a Soviet scientist and often attends international conferences. He has been in contact with known GRU Soviet diplomat in the U.S.

MOSKALEV bears a striking resemblance to composite of "Saul" in book Appointment in Dallas who claims he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. "Saul" claims:

- he crossed border into U.S. illegally and was in Dallas on 20 November.
- That he had been to Mexico City, had a contact in Soviet Embassy there, in 1963, and that he knew the identity of OSWALD because he (OSWALD) had been fingered to him in Mexico City.

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- that OSWALD was involved in the Kennedy assassination plot, but that he, "Saul", fired shots that killed Kennedy.

- that two hours after the assassination he, "Saul", was out of the U.S. That he used limp as a disguise.

QUESTIONS

1. Could MOSKALEV be "Saul"?
2. Could MOSKALEV, therefore, be mystery man who boarded plane in Mexico City for Havana on 22 November 1963?
3. Was assassination a Soviet comspiracy without Cuban knowledge?

RECOMMENDATION

1. Can we obtain voice tape of MOSKALEV, since he has delivered speeches at scientific conferences in U.S. and abroad?
2. If so, could we arrange to have McDonald (unwittingly) hear it, to see if he recognizes it as that of "Saul"?

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

14-00000

1. Can we find photo that PENKOVSKY identified of MOSKALEVSKIY.

2. May I see PENKOVSKIY's 201 file for period 61-63?

3. Get photos and check out MOISEEV and BABKOV.

4. Via CI Staff, find out if we can show photo to DERYABIN and ROSTVOROFF?

5. Could MOSKALEV be Dept 13? Could OSWALD have met with him in Mexico City clandestinely in 1963?

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26 March 1977

SUBJECT: Juriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

DOB: 23 July 1920

POB: Iguamnovo, USSR

HGT: 172 Centimeters

Hair: Brown (medium light)

Eyes: Gray

Wife: Married to Vera Nikolayevna STRELTSOVA

Children:

Education: Unknown

Misc: Became a Communist Party member in 1951

Was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings.

Occ: As of May 1973 was with Institute of Biophysics of the Soviet Ministry of Health. (Dr. of Medical Sciences.) Prof.

1922 - Family moved to Leningrad.

48-70- Lived in Moscow

1958 - Became head of Division of Institute of Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health

1951-53 Head of Patho physiology Lab, Inst. of Biophysics.

1952 - Last half of year, had a month's TDY at Biophysical Lab. in Moscow.

1953 - When source (Dr. Wilhelm MENKE)STIB, left as Chief of Pathphysiological Lab. at Sungol in Oct. 53, MOSKALEV took that position. He reportedly was not well qualified.

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Personal Misc.

1. Very adept diplomat - finds it easy to adopt conversation to group he is with.

2. Excellent chess player, patient with both adults and children.

3. Has dasha near Moscow.

4. Reads, writes, and conprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency. Reportedly speaks it much better after few drinks. (He is careful about drinking, if he drinks at all, in relation to attending conferences.)

14-00000

26 Dec 62 - CIA=A-3.246.539

Re International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, Aust. 15-18 Oct 62. "Most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof. MOSKALEV of USSR Academy of Sciences. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When he spoke he changed the title to "Problems of Kenetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." His paper presented nothing new and can be described as elementary. He apparently spoke no English.

19 Jan 63 - OOB 3,248,156.

Information from another source on the above conference. Dr. D. J. SEMENOV and Dr. I.T. TRUGUBENKO ? were invited to attend. The Soviets sent instead, Prof. MOSKALEV. He was bright, but not individual who should have been sent representing the USSR at this meeting. Was said to be his first time out of the USSR. /CDH comment - not so.7

9 July 63 - DF-440

(PENKOVSKY)
Source: AEDAZZLE-1 (doi 1961) identified photo(not by name, nor was name supplied) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY Air Force Col. and GRU officer in Information Directorate of GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.

21 Aug 63 - OOB 3,271,609

MOSKALEV participated at meeting of IAEA panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, Austria 4-8 June 63.

18 Oct 63 - OOB 3,278,069

Re Symposium in Vienna, Austria from 26-31 August 63. The Soviets sent a small three or four member delegation headed by MOSKALEV "a very personable and diplomatic gentleman." At the end of the conference MOSKALEV voiced his dismay that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

3 Dec 63 - OOB 3,283,411

Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining & Milling, Vienna, Austria late Aug 63. "Due to misunderstanding in USSR, topics covered by symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology." All papers were given by Dr. L. N. BURYKINA in the absence of MOSKALEV et al.

10 Dec 63 -

FR

30 Dec 63 - OOB 3,286,351

MOSKALEV attended Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63.

23 Jan 64 - OOB 3,288,475

IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, N.Y. Oct 63. MOSKALEV, one of the Soviet delegates, was frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.
Sources (3 U.S. scientists) were asked if they thought MOSKALEV's objectives were motivated from anything more than genuine scientific position. They responded - "Who can say?" MOSKALEV, both from papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated he was very sharp. The paper he gave presented no new data. His paper said nothing specific.

24 Oct 66 - OOB 321,15482-66

About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third Int'l Congress of Radiation Research put in appearance. The papers were disappointing. A paper written by MOSKALEV and V.A. STRELTSOVA was not impressive.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,30340-67

MOSKALEV attended the Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67. He presented an interesting paper. He was not expected at the meeting and came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise tohear his paper. He understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual. He became very interestdd in visiting a certain U.S. facility and pursued arrangements to visit it. U.S. Gov't

clearance and permission to visit were obtained, but he "backed-out" (after all had been arranged) saying it was too much trouble for U.S. persons and authorities concerned.

16 Oct 67 - OOB 321,27474-67

MOSKALEV participated in Second Int'l Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He had travelled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to Chairman of conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known MOSKALEV from previous meet-

N.B. ings said MOSKALEV's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, he did not drink at all during this conference. He did mention that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself. A respected U.S. scientist with more experience than MOSKALEV said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. (Said this in private.) MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a report by a West German. MOSKALEV left the conference a

N.B. little upset. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions he asked in private, it was obvious he understood English quite well. Considerable time was spent in arranging visit to a U.S. lab. in route to his home. He took a different route, without telling anyone of plans, and did not visit the lab.

1 Feb 70 -

BE

1 Jul 70 - OOB 321/17309-70

Fnu MOSKALEV and P.V. RAMZAYEV were scheduled to attend the Biology & Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conf. Sutton, U.K. 30 Apr to 1 May 70, but apparently were not permitted by the USSR to attend.

24 Aug 70 - OOB 321/20573-70

MOSKALEV was among Soviet delegation to Second Int'l Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70. MOSKALEV personally attended virtually every session and was very busy asking many questions. He asked all questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given, in English, he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter.

13 Nov 70 - OOA(S) 322/33488-70

Sept 70 MOSKALEV visited a U.S. facility devoted to research in field of nuclear medicine. "It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker." Visited Brookhaven in Oct 63; Sun Valley in 67; and Hanford Biology Symposium 69.

24 Aug 71 - U.S. Embassy Moscow Airgram

26 Sept 71 - Science Berkeley Lab. 600254

Four Soviet scientists, MOSKALEV, MOISEEV, NENOT and MASSE, participated at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during week of Sept 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day. They did not travel to the conference together. It all seemed to be coincidental. Drs. MOSKALEV and MASSE reportedly understood more English than they could speak. Dr. MOSKALEV was the USSR's rep. on ICRP internal dose committee.

23 Dec 71 - <u>OOE 324/37776-71</u>

Dr. Yuriy I. MOSKALEV, Inst. of Biophysics, Min. of Public Health, visited several U.S. biological and biophysical research facilities. During that time it was learned that he was chairman of the USSR equivalent to the U.S. National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position Dr. Aleksey A. MOISEEV (Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow) was MOSKALEV's secretary.

25 Oct 71 - Letter to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from

BATTELLE Pacific Northwest Laboratories

12 May 73 - <u>U.S. Embassy Moscow files</u>

Y'

Chris Hopkins

14-00000

SUBJECT: Passports Used by MOSKALEV, Yuriy
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich

	PP#
1957	Unknown
1962	S-012960
1963	S-022766 S-012960
1964	S-022766
1965	S-022766
1967	O-113459
1968	T-286915
1970	O-286915 S-201222
1971	S-201222
1972	O-068765 S-201222
1974	Unknown

MOSKALEV has following birthdates:

23 July 1920

17 January 1920

21 July 1920

1930

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TRAVEL

NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO	
MOSKALEV, Juriy Ivanovich	-	Chem	-	[Sept 57]	USSR	France
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-012960	[Oct 62	Aust.	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	-	Oct 62	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Biol.	S-012960	Oct 62]	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Phys.	S-022766	[May 63	USSR	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	30/6/63	Poland	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	-	S-022766	8/6/63	Aust	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USSR	USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Scie	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSLAKEV , YuriyIvanovich	23/7/20	Scie.	S---------	Oct 63	USSR	USA
[MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63	USA	Denmark
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Mikhailovich]	23/7/20	--	S-012960	Oct 63]	Denmark	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	23/7/20	Medl.	S-022766	[9/11/64	--	Aust.
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	14/11/64]	USSR	Aust.

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NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM-TO
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	15/4/65	Aust USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	S-022766	10/5/65	Czech Aust
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	USSR Can
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	Cam USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy	1920	--	O-113459	8/9/67	Can USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof.	--	8/9/67	USSR USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Stu	O-113459	8/9/67	Can USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	4/4/68	- UK
MOSKAEEE, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Chem.	T-286915	11/4/68	UK -
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	-	-	-	1/2/70	-- UNNY
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	O-286915	2/5/70	-- UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	O-286915	16/5/70	UK -
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	- -	S-201222	11/70	USA Suis
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	15/4/71	USSR UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR XXXX USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR XXXXX USA
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	-	S-201222	17/10/71	USA USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol.	S-201222	25/4/71	UK USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	1930	--	--	26/9/71	USSR USA
MOSKALVE, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	10/71	USSR USA

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NAME	DPOB	OCC	PP#	DATE	FROM	TO
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	S-201222	17/10/71	USA	USSR
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Prof	O-068765	11/11/72	-	UK
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	Biol	S-201222	15/11/72	UK	==
MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich	23/7/20	--	--	9/ 3/74	-	Suis

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USSR CONFIDENTIAL CIA-P-312403
MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH. 1971.
INSTITUTE OF BIOPHYSICS,
MOSCOW.

CRS PHOTO

14-00000

April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Possible Identity of the "Unidentified Man" Photographed in Mexico City in October 1963

REFERENCES: A. Photos Taken in Mexico City by Mexico City Station

B. Paperback Book "Appointment in Dallas"

C. Soft File, Headquarters Information on Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, Possible "Unidentified Man"

1. Photographs of the unidentified man were taken by our Mexico City Station on 2,3,4, and 15 October 1963, going into or coming out of both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City. Copies were provided to the FBI in Dallas, Texas on 22 November 1963. Although cropped copies have appeared in various works, including Volume XX, page 691, of the Warren Commission Report, and the book "Appointment in Dallas", to our knowledge the individual has never beeni identified.

2. On 17 March 1977, a former member of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) recognized photographs of the unidentifid man as Yuri LNU, a KGB officer, whom he met in Moscow in 1964 while attending an intelligence course there. He said that Yuri, a fluent English and Spanish speaker, was acting as a trouble shooter for the Cuban group, about 15, attending the course. Yuri lived with

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the Cuban and Bulgarian groups quartered in the same building in Moscow. Any time the Cubans had a problem, Yuri would solve it for them. Yuri was a good friend of Juan (pseudo) a KGB officer who taught the Cubans about the Agency (CIA) and the West German intelligence apparatus. Juan told the DGI member that he had served in Mexico for about 20 years and in the U.S. clandestinely for about 10 years (specific dates unknown). Yuri was entrusted with their welfare only, and did not attend classes with the Cuban group.

3. SE/X travel records were reviewed in search of an individual by the name of Yuri who possibly fit the description of the unidentified man. This lead to an individual by the name of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV, a Soviet, reportedly a Doctor of Medical Sciences, who has participated in international scientific conferences for the USSR since 1962 or earlier. Although there is no official 201 file on MOSKALEV, there is a sizable dossier on him in the Central Reference Service. Many of the documents in his dossier are OO reports from U.S. scientists concerning MOSKALEV's attendance and behavior at scientific meetings. It is obvious that he has a much greater knowledge of the English language than he admits. His capability is said to improve greatly after a few drinks; however, it is noted that he rarely, if ever, drank at the scientific meetings. It is also noted that on occasions he reportedly was not qualified to represent the Soviets at a particular conference. His papers rarely, if ever, were specific, or presented new data.

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Following are items of interest from selected documents in MOSKALEV's CRS dossier:

a. In 1961 PENKOVSKY identified a photo (with no name provided) as that of Col. Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, Air Force Col. and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU.

b. [In December 1963 the FBI reported

FBI

c. In October 1963 MOSKALEV was a delegate to the IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiation, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York. Described by U.S. scientists as very sharp, MOSKALEV was a frequent commentator on other people's work and made a practice of denigrating their reports with respect to radiation lethality.

d. In October 1967 MOSKALEV participated in the Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, arriving two days early. He

travelled al[illegible] to Sun Valley and appar[illegible] was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. Although he complained about not knowing much English, he admitted writing the English version of the paper he presented. MOSKALEV attempted to make propaganda of a paper by a West German scientist. A respected U.S. scientist said he frankly did not believe MOSKALEV's findings. MOSKALEV took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he understood what was going on. He also took many pictures with a 35 mm camera. From questions MOSKALEV asked, it was obvious that he knew English quite well. Although considerable time was spent arranging for MOSKALEV to visit a U.S. laboratory en route to his home, he took a different route, without telling anyone of his plans, and did not visit the lab.

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4. On 23 March 1977 several identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section of OTS/GAD compared photos of the unidentified man with photos of XXXX Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV from the FBI, British Liaison, and CRS. It was their opinion that MOSKALEV could very likely be identifiable with the unidentified man.

5. Page 59 of the book "Appointment in Dallas," shows an Identi-Kit Model composite of an individual who told the author in London in 1972 that he was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. The composite of that individual (code name "Saul"), whose real name is unknown to the author, bears a striking resemblance to the photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. According to the author "Saul"identified the picture shown in the Warren Commission Exhibit #237 as having been taken at the Russian Embassy in Mexico City, either in the foyer or just outside.

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6. The author of the aforementioned book, Hugh C. McDonald, is the inventor of the Identi-Kit and at one time was under contract to CIA in regard to the Identi-Kit. McDonald claims in his book that he met "Saul" at an office in CIA Headquarters sometime after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and that a colleague of McDonald told him that "Saul" was an assassin.

7. There are striking parallels between the backgrounds of "Saul" as given in McDonald's book, and MOSKALEV. For example:

"Saul"	MOSKALEV (AGENCY INFO.)
Pg. 7 - CIA allegedly knew of Saul. McDonald said he first met Saul in CIA Hqs. CIA took picture of Saul that started McDonald's investigation.	According to Office of Security, McDonald has been in touch with CIA in relation to his Identi-Kit. His [redacted] (FILE) states he was a cleared source of LAFO/DCS - doi September 1969. (contract agent) It is true that Mexico City Station took photos of "Saul" that McDonald claimed started his investigation.
Pg. 59 - See Identi-Kit composite of "Saul".	CDH comment: See photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV. He bears striking resemblance to "Saul."
Pg. 60/61 - McDonald states it was obvious that FBI and CIA were compromised at the very top since both Agencies denied knowledge of "Saul". Noone wanted to hear anymore about him.	Helms, the DDP testified under oath that he didn't know "Saul."

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Pg. 69 - McDonald began his search of "Saul" in 1970. It began, he said, with a call from an unidentified woman who arranged a meeting in London and told him she believed the Russians had a germ warfare installation in Vozrozdenya, in the Aral Sea. McDonald obtained CIA approval to make contact.

Note MOSKALEV's scientific background and travel. He was in the U.K. in 68,70, 71 and 72. Background is biophysics. MOSKALEV's (GRU) contact BUBNOV/"specialized in chemical warfare".

Pg. 70 - In Germany in 1945 McDonald knew of 12 people (Poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Germans, Scandinavians, 2 Russians) who feared and hated Russia. They formed org. to observe, analyze, and report all future activities within Russia and Russia sphere of control. Most had legitimate jobs.

MOSKALEV was allegedly imprisoned during war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Could he be a double agent?

Pg. 71 - 24 Sept 70 McDonald left for London with "Saul's" picture. McDonald said both he and Saul were contract men for CIA. Saul did dangerous jobs for private interests.

McDonald met Saul in London July 72. MOSKALEV travel shows him in London Nov 72.

Pg. 73 - McDonald learned that on Island of Vozrozdenya, Aral Sea, germ warfare was being planned against U.S. (Russians transmit germs in jet streams).

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Pg. 75 - McDonald showed photo of Saul to man. Man asked if McDonald's interest had to do with murder of Pres. in 1963. McDonald said no, he wanted to talk to him (Saul) on business.

Pg. 76 - By now McDonald was sure that "Saul" was reasonably well-known in highly specialized circles on the European continent.

MOSKALEV is known in international circles as scientist.

Pg. 81 - McDonald says that co-relation between activity on Vozrozdenya and new types of influenza in U.S. is disturbingly exact.

Pg. 92. - Man told McDonald in summer of 1970 on outskirts of Gormisch, that he was dying from radiation sickness. He was flown to Vozrozdenya where he was lead to believe there was hospital that specialized in cases of radiation sickness and he would be looked after by famous doctors. Was interviewed by 3 Russian specialists: Emile KROPTATE
Peter GORSACH
Marion LENTZEN

MOSKALEV was delegate to 2nd International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, U.K. 3-8 May 70.

Pg. 95 - At hospital ~~he~~ was orderly by name of Ivan. There were other young interns, orderlies, etc., there.	MOSKALEV's middle name is Ivanovich; so is BUBNOV's .
Pg. 99 - Some momths before Kennedy was killed, an inquiry was being circulated, about this man (Saul). Someone wanted to contact him. Word went out that someone needed his services.	
Pg. 109 - An alleged former Agency employee (McDonald called Kimsey) said the scheme which "Saul" described /to kill the president/ could not possibly have been activated without help from very high places in this country. (U.S.)	
Pg. 117 - Saul did not know he was being called Saul.	
Pg. 119 - Saul told Kimsey that he often used limp as part of his disguises.	
Pg. 120 - In Zurick in 1972 McDonald saw four men. Three Arabic and one who had a blunt, Slavic fact with a broad-typed nose, about 40.	Could this have been MOSKALEV?

Pg. 121 - Kimsey felt that Saul was a middle-European, so probably grew up with German as second language. "Saul" spoke English like an American.

MOSKALEV has much greater knowledge of English than he pretends or admits.

Pg. 143 - "Saul" said he came back to the U.S. for a short period one time, lived in Southern Calif. for about a month, or six weeks, then moved to Mexico. Said business was good in Mexico, and that made it easy, or easier, to try to make contact with whoever was trying to make contact with him.

Pg. 164 - "Saul" said a contact he knew/ named Troit would have OSWALD in Mexico City 26 Sept to 3 Oct. [ ] and that OSWALD would call on both the Cuban Consul and Soviet Consul.

According to our records, OSWALD was in Mexico City between those dates, and was in contact with the Cuban and Soviet Consuls.

"Saul" said he did not have a photo of OSWALD but had a contact in the Soviet Embassy would do the job (identify OSWALD) for him. Saul said OSWALD did show up in Mexico City and was fingered to him. He sat close to him in restauratns and cafeterias.

Page 167: "Saul" said he left for the U.S. in Nov 1963 but would not say how or where he crossed the border. On evening of the 20th of Nov he was in Dallas.	McDonald said that as a professional assassin with international clientel, "Saul" had to master the art of crossing borders illegally, so that no record is kept. False passports are easiest methods.
Page 177: "Saul" desccibed how he shot President Kennedy from 2nd story window of County Records Bldg.,	
Page 178: "Saul" said that he used "limp" disguise" out of bldg., and in 2 hours was out of the U.S.	Could "Saul" be mystery man who boarded plane for Havana? See DIRECTOR 36054. Flight from Mexico City reportedly delayed from 1700 to 2200 hours for passenger who arrived at 2130.
Page 182: McDonald remembers "Saul's" statement that long before the Warren Commission even existed he had been told that there was a possibility that such a bullet would be planted to tie in OSWALD's rifle positively to the shooting. It therefore appears that the mere existence of CE No. 399 tends to prove the accuracy of "Saul"s statement and the presence of a conspiracy.	

Page 185: McDonald ... he believes "Saul" was telling true story.	CDH - I do too.
Page 94: McDonald finds buck passing so pervasive that he cannot escape suspicion of a continued and officially backed cover-up.	
Page 199: McDonald said he thinks Herman KIMSEY (what was true name?) was the mentor or contact for "Saul" wherever Saul worked with the Agency.	Can we identify KIMSEY? Was he really working for Agency?
Page 203: "Saul" moves from country to country, avoiding the U.S. except in extremis but keeping in touch with his contacts in Guatemala and Mexico. He calls THEM. Spends much time in Europe. Has no wife, children, or friends. Is voracious reader.	
Page 204: "Saul" went into Westbury Hotel without a tie.	
Page 205: "Saul" had recently given up smoking (1972?) but still had nicotine stains on fingers.	Does MOSKALEV smoke?

Chris Hopkins
LAD/JFK Task Force

14-00000

27 September 63: OSWALD went to Cuban Embassy, Mexico City and made appoint for visa to Cuba on way to USSR. OSWALD to Soviet Embassy to get letter of recommendation. They wouldn't give it to him because they didn't know who he was.

OSWALD went to Soviet Embassy on 27 Sept.

" then went back to Cuban Emb. on 27 Sept.

Valery KOSTIKOV talked with Sylvia Duran and said Soviet had never heard of OSWALD.

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SUBJECT: Unidentified Man Seen Going into Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City in Oct 1963. Photos Taken by Mexico City Station

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Subject: Unidentified Man

1. A photograph of this unidentified man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The subject visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963.

2. As of October 1963, he was described as:

Apparent age: 35

Athletic build

About 6 feet tall

Blond, receding hairline with balding top

Wore khakis and sport shirt.

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☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Case 53034

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
DCD/OSG/Alien Branch [redacted] 203 Key Building	2775	DATE: 6 Apr 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. LA/COG/NY Attn: [redacted] 3D 5325				REF: LA/COG-068-77, dated 3 Mar 77 Attached copy of memo SF-137-77, dated 29 March is in response to reference. Attached also are related photographs. [redacted]ltg
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SF-137-77

TO : Chief, Domestic Collection Division

DATE: 29 March 1977

ATTN : OSG/Alien [redacted]

FROM : Chief, San Francisco Office

SUBJECT: Case 53,034 - Resettlement Case

REF : ALN-71-77

1. Subject examined the photographs of the unidentified man very carefully but was unable to provide any information. We did not mention the fact that a photograph of the man had been published in the Warren Commission report until Subject said that he was unable to identify the man. Subject still could not make any comment about the identity of the man.

2. We are returning the photographs of the man as requested. We regret that Subject was unable to be of greater assistance on this matter.

for CHARLES R. CARLSEN

EBAmes:mm

Enc: Photographs

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 031686

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
OTS/GAD/A/OPS 2Z7 Central Bldg	2444	AB MEMO NO. 194
		DATE 29 MARCH 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DC/OTS/GAB/A	29 Mar	77	✓	
2.				
3. C/OTS/GAD	/	/	/	
4.				
5. Deputy Chief, Latin America Div 3C2019 HQS			CH	
6.				
7. LAD/TASK FORCE				
8. C Hopkins				For filing MOSKALEV
9.				
10.				
11.				2 photos - 1 from FBI (State) 1 " Bur. liaison
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

SECRET

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

14-00000

SECRET

AB MEMO NO. 194
29 MARCH 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

ATTN : Chris Hopkins

FROM : Graphics and Authentication Division/Senior Operations Officer

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

REFERENCE : DDO/LA Division Memo, dated 25 March 1977

1. On 23 March, Chris Hopkins of Latin America Division handcarried photographs to OTS/GAD for identification comparison. These photos were examined by the undersigned and two identification experts of the Disguise and Identification Section.

2. The results of the comparison is as follows:

A. Facial Shape - Close similarities, although there are slight differences which are probably due to subject's age differences.

B. Chin - Fair similarities-the loss of muscletone due to ageing is most apparent here.

C. Hair Line - Again good similarity with the natural ravages of time factored in.

D. Set and Proportion of Eyes and Eyebrows - Close similarities. (Comparison of eye detail is not possible due to poor photo quality)

E. Nose and Caliper Lines - Close similarities in the nose but the younger man has no sign of the distinctive caliper lines which extend from the nose to either side of the mouth on the known Soviet. This could be explained by loss of muscletone and/or differences in lighting.

F. Mouth - The shape, proportion and expression of the mouth and the whole area from the tip of the nose to the tip of the chin is perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of both subjects. Here the similarities are very close.

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14-00000

SUBJECT: Photo Comaprison
PAGE -2-

G. The proportions of the head, check bones and the body style of the younger man tend to indicate he is of slavic origin.

3. The results of this type comparison are rarely absolute and are usually limited by poor photo quality or differences in viewing angle. With that understood it is our opinion the two subjects of the forementioned photo comparison could very likely be the same person. If additional photographs of the subjects, particularly if they are of better quality, are obtained, we would be happy to examine those as well.

Antonio J. Mendez
Senior Operations Officer,
OTS/Graphics and Authentication Division

14-00000

NSMITTAL SLIP | DATE

TO: Chris Hopkins, LAD/Task Force

ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

FROM:

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

SECRET

25 MAR 77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, OTS/GAB

ATTENTION : Acting Chief, OTS/GAB/DIS

FROM : George V. Lauder
Deputy Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Photo Comparison

This is the official follow-up, requested by you, of the visit to your office by Chris Hopkins on 23 March 1977 for the purpose of photo comparison. Although a preliminary analysis was given Ms. Hopkins at that time, it was understood that you would provide a written analysis for the record. Your assistance is much appreciated.

/s/ George V. Lauder

George V. Lauder

DDO/LAD Task Force/CHopkins:rp(25 Mar 77) 1839

Based on: Photos of unknown man taken in front of Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City in October 1963; Photos of Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV.

Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addee
1 - LAD/Task Force Chrono
1 - Chris Hopkins
1 - DC/LA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 056852

SECRET

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3C 2019

Source - Ramiro Perez Rodriguez

14-00000

SECRET

ALN-72-77
11 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field Office

FROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division, Operations Services Group, Alien Branch

SUBJECT : Case 57845

1. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.

2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.

3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.

JACKSON R. HORTON

Attachments:
As stated

FJNiemiec/ltg

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875

SECRET

14-00000

C O N F I D E N T I A L 181600Z MAR 77 STAFF

CITE DCD/MIAMI 13919

TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.

WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLY

MIAMI OIR-06870-77

SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER

REF : DCD CASE 57845
CPLA-006877

1. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT CITY. HE SAID THAT YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER, WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15, ATTENDING THE COURSE.

2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.
E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668
C O N F I D E N T I A L

14-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE: 2 March
TO: Chris Hopkins	
ROOM NO. 3D57	BUILDING

REMARKS:

BU-4 Amber

FROM: Mailey LY/INFO

ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
1E41		1479

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

14-00000

National Library of Medicine

PROG:

1
AU - Moskalev YI
AU - Levdik TI
AU - Lyubchanskii ER
AU - Nifatov AP
AU - Erokhin RA
AU - Buldakov LA
AU - Lemberg VK
AU - Koshurnikova NA
AU - Filippova LG
AU - Ternovskii IA
TI - Metabolism and biological effects in rodents of plutonium and other actinide elements. pp. 1214-32.
SO - In: Nygaard OF, et al., ed. Radiation research: biomedical, chemical, and physical perspectives. New York, Academic Press, 1975. W3 IN558 197r. :

SS 2 /C?
USER:
NOS

14-00000

T[illegible]SMITTAL SLIP | DATE 25 Mar 7[illegible]

TO: Chris Hopkins

ROOM NO. 3D57 | BUILDING

REMARKS:

BU-4

amber

FROM: Mailly [illegible]/INFO

ROOM NO. 1E41 | BUILDING | EXTENSION 1479

FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

Soviet Personalities in Biomedicine 2 (new publication) 1974

NAME: MOSKALENKO N P

SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE

CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF CARDIOLOGY IM A L MYASNIKOV, AMS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "CHANGES OF THE TOTAL AND RENAL HEMODYNAMICS IN ORTHOSTATICS IN HEALTHY PERSONS AND IN ORTHOSTATIC HYPOTENSION" (CO-AU)
"COMPENSATORY CHANGES IN THE KIDNEYS IN UNILATERAL AFFECTIONS AND NEPHRECTOMY" (CO-AU)
"THE DIURETIC AND HYPOTENSIVE EFFECT OF UREGIT (ETHACRINIC ACID)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO YU D

SPECIALIZATION: CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY

CAREER POSITIONS: DIV OF VASCULAR SURGERY, INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY IM A N BAKULEV, AMS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "THE CLINICAL PICTURE, DIAGNOSIS AND SURGICAL TREATMENT OF CONGENITAL ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS OF PERIPHERAL VESSELS" (CO-AU)
"HEMODYNAMICS WITH ARTERIOVENOUS FISTULAS (ON DATA OF CARDIOGRAPHY AND SCANNING OF THE HEART CAVITIES)" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALENKO, YURIY YEVGEN'YEVICH

SPECIALIZATION: PHYSIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, LAB OF REGULATION OF BLOOD CIRCULATION IN THE BRAIN, INST OF EVOLUTIONARY PHYSIOLOGY AND BIOCHEMISTRY IM I M SECHENOV, AS USSR, M

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: INTRACRANIAL BLOOD CIRCULATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF STRESS AND WEIGHTLESSNESS, M, 1971 (CO-AU)
DYNAMICS OF BLOOD FILLING OF THE BRAIN UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS AND DURING GRAVITATIONAL LOADS, L, 1967

NAME: MOSKALEV, YURIY IVANOVICH

SPECIALIZATION: ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: INST OF BIOPHYSICS, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "CHANGES IN LENS OF RATS AFTER TOTAL EXTERNAL BETA-IRRADIATION" (CO-AU)
"THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF EUROPIUM-152 AND CURIUM-244" (CO-AU)
"THE DISTRIBUTION AND BIOLOGICAL EFFECT OF CALIFORNIUM-252" (CO-AU)
"THE EFFECT OF SUB-ACUTE 241AM DOSES ON RABBITS" (CO-AU)
"EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS ON RADIOBIOLOGY IN THE USA"
"WAYS AND PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN APPLYING ANIMAL EXPERIMENTAL DATA TO MAN"

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: THE RADIOBIOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT AND MAN, M, 1969
PROBLEMS OF THE DISTRIBUTION AND EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION OF PERMISSIBLE LEVELS, M, 1968 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKALIK K G

SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; ROENTGENOLOGY AND MEDICAL RADIOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM N N PETROV, L

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "EFFECT OF ENERGY MAGNITUDE OF IMPULSE AND RHYTHM OF IRRADIATION ON THE ANTITUMOR EFFECT OF LASER RADIATION" (CO-AU)
"QUESTIONS ON THE USE OF LASERS IN ONCOLOGY" (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVICH E G

SPECIALIZATION: INTERNAL MEDICINE

CAREER POSITIONS: CLINICAL HOSPITAL IM S P BOTKIN, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "DEVELOPMENT OF A GRAVE FORM OF DIABETES MELLITUS AND OF HYPERGLYCEMIA IN TWO PATIENTS AFTER TAKING HYPOTHIAZIDE" (CO-AU)
"TWO CASES OF HYPEROSMOLLARY COMA DURING DIABETUS MELLITUS" (CO-AU)

PUBLICATIONS, BOOKS: DIABETES MELLITUS AND DISEASES OF THE EYES, M, 1966 (CO-AU)

NAME: MOSKOVKINA O YA

SPECIALIZATION: ONCOLOGY; VIROLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: EXPERIMENTAL TUMOR THERAPY LAB, RESEARCH INST OF ONCOLOGY IM P A GERTSEN, M

PUBLICATIONS, ARTICLES: "THE EFFECT OF A COMBINED THERAPY OF VIRAL LEUKEMIA OF MICE WITH CYCLOPHOSPHANE AND COMPLETE FREUND ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF CC57BR-BV VIRAL RETICULOSARCOMATOSIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT IN MICE" (CO-AU)
"STIMULATION OF RAUSCHER-VIRUS-INDUCED LEUKEMOGENESIS BY COMPLETE FREUND'S ADJUVANT" (CO-AU)

EDUCATION: DR MED SCI (1967)

SPECIALIZATION: PEDIATRICS; ORTHOPEDICS AND TRAUMATOLOGY

CAREER POSITIONS: HEAD, CHAIR OF PEDIATRIC SURGERY AND ORTHOPEDICS, STATE MEDICAL INST, TOMSK, RSFSR

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for Chris M.

Intelligence Informat. ı Report

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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Dupe.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. OO-E-324/37776-71

SUBJECT Visit to US by Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev/Current Positions/Moskalev's Research Program/Personality Data

DATE DISTR. 23 DEC 71

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. October 1971

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE US/October 1971

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US biophysicist who had conversations with Yu I Moskalev and Alex Moiseev during the visit of the two Soviets to the US in October 1971.

1. In October 1971 Dr Yu I Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Moscow and Dr Alex Moiseev, Central Advanced Institute for Training of Physicians, Moscow, visited several US biological and biophysical research facilities. During one of these visits it was learned from Moskalev that he is the Chairman of the USSR equivalent to the US National Council on Radiation Protection. In this position, Moiseev is Moskalev's secretary.

2. Moiseev was a difficult individual to figure out. He stated that his training is in health physics and that his job in the USSR is to be informed at all times of the status of US health physics and radiation protection programs. He said that he reads the US journal "Health Physics" regularly as well as other Western radiation research journals. Although in discussions with Moiseev he appeared to be technically competent, he kept very close to Moskalev and rarely let him out of his sight. If Moiseev is Moskalev's "guardian" (as he appeared to be) he let his own guard down during a cocktail party hosted by Dr David M Taylor, Department of Biophysics, Institute of Cancer Research, Belmont, UK. During the course of the evening Moiseev consumed countless gin and tonics until he could barely articulate. Moskalev, on the other hand, sipped one or two drinks all evening.

3. Moskalev was a very adept diplomat. He finds it easy and convenient to adopt his conversation to whatever kind of group he is with. He talked at considerable length about the role of women in the Soviet economy and mentioned that his own wife is a pathologist. He was always much freer in his conversation when Moiseev was out of hearing.

4. In terms of his professional work, Moskalev stated that he has a program in the USSR of exposing dogs to various doses of radiation to learn the biomedical effects of radiation. It is a program quite similar to that at the Lovelace Foundation in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The major difference being that whereas the Lovelace inhilation experiments involve only the beagle dog, the Soviets do not use a controlled breed, but rather use mongrels. Moskalev's budget, which

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U YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S YES

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he implied was sufficient, comes from the Soviet Ministry of Health. The actual Soviet work with the dogs is virtually parallel that in the US. It involves studying the low level effects of radiation from inhaled or injected materials.

5. Moskalev's work appears to be very good as far as it has gone. But he has only worked with nitrates and chlorides of plutonium, not with plutonium oxide. Oxides (solid components) should be of interest to anyone working in this field because the chemical forms of plutonium are quite useful to know about when doing accident type studies — to understand plutonium metals it is essential to know about plutonium oxide. Whether the Soviets are working only with solutions rather than oxides is not known. It is always possible, of course, that Soviet work with plutonium oxides is classified.

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Battelle
Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Battelle Boulevard
Richland, Washington 99352
Telephone (509) 946-2121
or 942-1111
Telex 36921

October 25, 1971

Mr. D. G. Williams
Manager
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Richland, Washington 99352

Dear Mr. Williams:

Report on Visit of USSR Citizens to
Pacific Northwest Laboratories

Visitors

Professor Yuriy I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Zhivopisnaya 46, Moscow D-182, USSR.

Professor Aleksey A. Moiseev, Central Institute for Advanced Medical Studies, 2 Botkinsky proezd 7, Moscow A-284, USSR.

Date

Visitors arrived in Richland at 12:35 p.m., September 27, 1971 and departed early on October 2, 1971. They stayed at the Rivershore Motor Inn.

Schedule of Visit

September 27, 1971 - 2:30 p.m. Attended Dedication ceremonies for new Life Sciences Laboratory in 300 Area.

6:30 p.m. Symposium banquet at Rivershore Motor Inn.

September 28, 29, 1971 - Attended Biology Symposium on The Biological Implications of the Transuranium Elements at the Rivershore Motor Inn. The symposium was sponsored by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Battelle-Northwest.

September 30, 1971 - Attended meeting on Transplutonium Registry organized by the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine and Hanford Environmental Health Foundation.

October 1, 1971 - Visited Biology Department staff in Life Sciences Laboratory, 331 Building, 300 Area.

Participation in Symposium and Transuranium Registry Meeting

Five contributed papers and one invited paper by USSR scientists were included on the symposium program and were presented by Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev. These included:

1. Yu. I. Moskalov. Plutonium-239: Problems of Its Biological Effect (Invited).

2. L. A. Buldakov, Z. I. Kalmykova, A. P. Nifatov, V. N. Doshchenko, I. A. Tseveleva, G. S. Mushkacheva, N. P. Kudasheva, V. M. Pesternikov, V. I. Matveev, A. G. Surina, and V. N. Karpova. Metabolism and Biological Effects of Inhaled ^{241}Am and ^{239}Pu in Dogs.

3. N. A. Koshurnikova, V. P. Aristov, V. K. Lemberg, G. S. Mushkacheva, M. G. Poplyko, and I. A. Tseveleva. As to Mechanism of Development of Plutonium Pneumosclerosis.

4. T. I. Levdik, V. K. Lemberg, L. A. Buldakov, E. R. Lyubchanskii, and V. M. Pesternikov. As to Biological Effectiveness of Neptunium-237.

5. A. P. Nifatov, L. A. Buldakov, and V. I. Matveev. Some Late Effects After a Single Inhalation of ^{239}Pu and ^{241}Am in Dogs.

6. E. P. Ovcharenko. An Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of Transuranic Elements on Reproductive Ability.

The two visitors presented the Soviet papers in English (Dr. Moiseev speaks English quite well) and participated in the discussions of other papers. The visitors were already acquainted with many attending the Symposium so informal discussions were very common and apparently productive. Representatives from all major U. S. laboratories working on the transuranium elements and from the Atomic Energy Commission were able to meet with the Soviet visitors. The visitors related current status of their studies on biological effects of plutonium in their formal presentations and in their discussions. Their manuscripts have been received and will be published in the Symposium proceedings. During the week, they met with Dr. R. C. Thompson, Symposium Co-chairman to discuss editing of their manuscripts.

Visit to Life Sciences Laboratory

On October 1, Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev were escorted to the 331 Building by W. J. Bair. Discussions with the staff occurred during the day in the conference room with visits to various laboratory facilities occurring as necessary.

Dr. J. F. Park - Past, present, and future experiments on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in laboratory animals; therapeutic removal of inhaled plutonium, and USSR recommendations to the ICRP to lower plutonium MPC's were discussed. These Soviet scientists have completed more work on the biological effects of inhaled plutonium in animals than any other research group except our own laboratory. The interchange of experimental methods, results, and concepts was valuable for planning our future research and evaluating the results of past and present research. Since they have reported biological effects of inhaled plutonium in experimental animals at extremely low exposure levels and recommended to the ICRP that limits of exposure should be lowered, the opportunity to understand and evaluate their experimental results, interpretation, and logic in making their recommendations was very useful.

Dr. V. H. Smith - Drs. Moiseev and Moskalev were reasonably well acquainted with the field of therapy for plutonium poisoning but not intimately in terms of details or recent Soviet literature; the former because his field was more on the ecological side, and the latter because he has concentrated on radiation effects and ceased active work on removal about ten years ago. Dr. Moskalev was interested in our plans to test phosphorothioic acids as removal agents and mentioned his own work on the removal of ^{144}Ce with DTPA as an example of the timing of treatment. He stated DTPA was given i.v. to humans in the USSR, not by inhalation, and that Zn-DTPA was not used or being experimented with. The latter is difficult to believe due to his former close relationship with Dr. Catsch. He was not satisfied with the lack of side effects of multiple DTPA treatments and said that some problems with bone in long-term experiments could be due to DTPA but he wasn't aware of the details. Answers to questions about other treatments than DTPA, experience in treating humans, or future plans were not obtained because presumably this was not a primary research concern of Dr. Moskalev, although he did state there was considerable research effort in this field.

Dr. C. L. Sanders discussed our low-level inhaled $^{238}PuO_2$ studies (life-span), metabolism of plutonium and cellular interaction with PuO_2 particles. The Russians were particularly informative in describing their low-level life span studies with ^{239}Pu. It was learned that Dr. Moiseev is primarily a radioecologist who worked in Siberia and is familiar with oil pipe lines and associated ecological problems such as arctic and lake pollution problems.

Dr. J. E. Ballou discussed their studies with soluble plutonium compounds, comparative metabolism and effects of DTPA, and our americium, plutonium, and cerium work. Dr. Moskalev had tried inhaled EDTA therapy many years ago to no avail. He was interested in our work with age effects on gut absorption and wanted to know why the very young absorb more plutonium. He agreed there is prolonged gut transit time and different intestinal morphology in

17. Sikov, M. R., D. D. Mahlum, T. D. Mahony, and M. F. Sullivan. 1966. Particle Size and Animal Age as Factors in Evaluating Hazards from Ingested Radionuclides. In: Gastrointestinal Radiation Injury, M. F. Sullivan, Ed., pp. 524-535.

18. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1969. Physicochemical State as a Determinant of Plutonium-238 Toxicity in the Rat. Health Physics 17, 346-347.

19. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Effect of Environmental Temperature and Potassium Consumption on Cesium-137 Metabolism in the Rat. Health Physics 15, 541-543.

20. Mahlum, D. D. and M. R. Sikov. 1968. Distribution of Cerium-144 in the Fetal and Newborn Rat. Health Physics 14, 127-129.

21. Mahlum, D. D. 1971. Modification of the Hepatotoxic Action of Neptunium-237 in the Rat. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology 18, 696-702.

Other Activities

During the week, in addition to participating in the Symposium social functions, they were guests in the homes of Dr. W. E. Lotz, Director, Health and Safety Division, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Richland, Drs. W. J. Bair and C. L. Sanders. These occasions were enjoyable for the hosts and, apparently, for the visitors. Dr. Moskalev is an excellent chess player and very patiently played chess with both adults and children. Dr. Moiseev was interested in current fashions and consumer products. Mrs. Bair gave him the current Sears and Roebuck Christmas catalog as an example of consumer products. He was familiar with the mail order concept but we could not determine for certain that it is common in the USSR. Both Drs. Moskalev and Moiseev have dachas near Moscow which indicate they are well up the status ladder in USSR science, but it was also obvious that Dr. Moskalev's dacha is a level above Dr. Moiseev's.

The visitors also expressed interest in our standard of living. The visits to our homes seemed to dispel some doubts they might have had about our standard of living. They seemed particularly to enjoy the opportunity to meet our children.

Comment

All those having an opportunity to meet with our Soviet guests were impressed by their congeniality, willingness to discuss their research, interest in our family life, and the spirit of good will

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·ORENCE BERKELEY ...

REPORT ON VISIT OF FOREIGN SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 4, 1971 331...

There were four guests in the group:

Dr.(Prof) Yuri I. Moskalev; Inst. of Biophysics, Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. 6002547

Dr. Alexei A. Moiseev; Central Inst. for Advanced Medical Studies, Moscow

Dr. Jean-Claude Nénot; CEA, Centre D'Etudes Nuclaires, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France.

Dr. R. Masse,; CEA as above.

The four visitors were not traveling together, but by coincidence were participants at the same Transuranium Biology Symposium at Hanford during the week of Sept. 26. They were in San Francisco by chance at the same time and desired to visit Berkeley on the same day.

Mrs. Anne Low-Beer picked up the four guests in San Francisco and brought them to the Donner Laboratory where they were greeted by Dr. John Lawrence. Drs. Donald Van Dyke, James McRae, and Howard Parker took them on a short tour of the Anger camera facility and whole-body counting and scanning equipment. The current uses and potential in medical diagnosis were discussed. Major questions concerned the use of these instruments in monitoring and assessing the extent of persons contaminated with radionuclides in industrial accidents.

Lunch was attended by Dr. Hardin Jones, the four guests, Drs. Van Dyke and Parker, and Dr. Patricia Durbin, who acted as hostess and guide through the day. Topics discussed at lunch were centered about the Transuranium symposium. The efficacy of two new techniques to remove lung contamination by alpha-emitting isotopes was considered. The two techniques are lung lavage and aerosolized chelating agents, particularly DTPA.

A tour of Bldg. 74 followed lunch. Three of the visitors are biologists--Drs. Moskalev and Nénot are physicians, and Dr. Masse is a veterinarian --and all deal with animal experiments or the interpretation of the results of animal experiments. They were much interested in how one achieved and managed a "biologically clean" rodent colony, in the minimum maintenance rabbit rooms, and the cage-washing facilities. There was some discussion about the 90-Sr-injected monkeys, their exposure levels, years of follow-up, and the essential absence of biological effects at the dose levels in the study.

A two-hour general discussion between and among the four guests and Dr. Durbin followed the building tour. The chief topics discussed were how to explain the observed differences in the metabolism of the transuranic elements among species. The usefulness and verifiability of models of human Pu metabolism were considered at great length. New areas of research in internal emitters problems were considered including the influence of age on local dose and ultimate biological end-points; the usefulness of common experiments with various species particularly those with known variations in iron metabolism, bone formation rates and liver function.

Dr. Durbin proposed a collaborative effort with two of Dr. Moskalev's colleagues. They have collected data on human skeleton weights, but now do not have the time or interest to write up their material. Dr. Durbin has collected all of the 19th century and early 20th century human bone weight data and would like to add the modern Russian material to the set. Dr. Moskalev agreed to propose a joint article with his colleagues looking towards publication in an international journal. He suggested that the original data would be forwarded in any case as soon as it could be copied.

In the late afternoon the visitors toured (briefly) the Bevatron guided by Ralph Thomas; the californium separation facility guided by Francis McCarty; and the Hi-lac guided by Al Ghiorso. Dr. Moiseev, who is a physicist, was very much intrigued by the proposal to make an advanced scientific instrument by joining the Bevatron and the Hi-lac. Dr. Moskalev was not interested in how the machines worked,"physics was not his field"he said, but asked what he as a biologist might do in the nature of radiobiology experiments with such machines.

Dr. Moskalev regretted that it had not been possible to visit with Dr. Tobias. (We could probably have fit in a few minutes or made arrangements for the following day, but I had run them ragged with sight-seeing the day before, Monday was very full, and frankly they were exhausted and needed rest. pwd). They would also have liked to visit the Medical Services group. Mrs. Low-Beer tried to fill them in on the duties and routine of that group.

Comments on money, budgets, problems of communication, demands on time, such as committees, etc. ran thoough all of the conversations. Dr. Nénot and Dr. Moiseev spoke English and understood it well. Dr. Moskalev and Dr. Masse understood more English than they could speak. All four are chiefly occupied with radiation protection and especially with problems raised by internal emitters. Dr. Moskalev is his country's representative on the ICRP internal dose committee. They all forsee the development of nuclear power in their countries at a fast pace. This obviously includes, as they were careful to point out, Pu fast breeders, hence the overriding interest in Pu and its transplutonium contaminants.

The Russian visitors will be guests of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine in Washington. (I feel certain we will receive good marks as hosts and as scientists. pwd).

One further point needs to be added. Although nuclear medicine is not a cuurent specialty in either country, and the use of nuclear medical techniques, especially as diagnostic tools, is very limited, the two physicians indicated thay they personally were much interested, and there was a definite trend in both countries towards more and more use of such tools. "It is coming", they said.

Patricia W. Durbin

14-00000

FROM DCS/LSD/SBD 25 Nov 70

COUNTRY: USSR

DCHI 00-A(S) 322/33488-70

SUBJECT: Dr. Y. I. Moskalev, Institute of Biophysics, Moscow/Professional Interests/Personal Characteristics/Foreign Travel

13 Nov 70

1. In September 1970, Dr. Yuri Ivanovich Moskalev visited a US facility devoted to research in the field of nuclear medicine. Dr. Moskalev was born on 23 July 1920 in Igumnobo, USSR, which is near Kalinin. In 1922 his family moved to Leningrad. He has lived in Moscow since 1948. In 1958 he became the head of a division comprised of approximately 30 people at the Institute of Biophysics, Soviet Ministry of Public Health, Moscow. He is the best known investigator of the metabolism and toxicity of radioelements in the Soviet Union and has published a number of papers and reviews on this subject. During his visit, he outlined his as yet unpublished experiment on skin carcinogenesis in rats (dosage administered to the body surface by Sr^{90} -Y^{90} plaques on the sides of the cage) and reported two percent tumors of the skin and some mammary tumors after a 245 rad exposure. It is obvious that he is a careful and trustworthy worker.

2. Moskalev is conversant with English but not fluent and has some difficulty in finding the correct English words; however, with a little patience, scientific communication is very satisfactory. He is genial, frank, and possesses a good sense of humor. He prefers Leningrad to Moscow, considering the former to be a more traditional and cultured city. His chief recreational diversion is his dacha, near Moscow, to which he sometimes travels by skis in winter (a distance of approximately 20 kilometers).

3. Dr. Moskalev has visited the United States on two previous occasions; once attending the Sun Valley Symposium in 1967 and again for the Annual Hanford Biology Symposium in 1969. He has traveled to other places outside the Soviet Union and was present at a meeting sponsored by the IAEA in Vienna in 1964.

- end -

Also in Oct. 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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USSR — Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV

CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE

CURRENT POSITION:	Institute Biophysics, Moscow since 1953.
BIRTHDATE AND BIRTHPLACE:	23 July 1920; Igumnovo, RSFSR.
EDUCATION:	Doctor Medical Sciences.
PARTY MEMBERSHIP:	Member CPSU since 1951.
CAREER:	Member, Radiobiology Department, Nuclear Research Institute, Sungul 1951-53 (Head, Pathophysiology Laboratory 1953).
SCIENTIFIC SPECIALTIES:	Biological effect of fast neutrons and protons of high energy; blastomogenic effect of ionizing radiation; distribution of yttrium-91, zirconium-95, and niobium-95 in rats after inhalation; distribution of radium isotope thorium-X, antimony-124, tellurium-127, tin-113, cerium-144, and strontium-89, 90; distribution of lead (thorium B) after intra-arterial and intravenous injection; dynamics of white blood cell reaction to irradiation; kinetics of excretion of Nb^{95} from organism; blastomogenic effect of 120-Mev protons; primary blood relations induced by ionizing radiation; behavior of cesium-137 in mammals; distribution and biological effect of americium-241; (1963-68).
TRAVEL:	International Conference on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning, Vienna, October 1962; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Panel on Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, June 1963; Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, August 1963; visit, Poland, June 1963; Symposium on Biological Effects of Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, New York, October 1963; visit, Austria, November 1964; visit, Czechoslovakia, May 1965; Third International Conference on Radiation Research, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Italy, June-July 1966;

GROUP 1
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14-00000

Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEV (cont.)

TRAVEL : Second International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone-Seeking Radionuclides, Sun Valley, Idaho, September 1967; visit, Salt Lake City, Utah, September 1967; visit, Montreal, September 1967; visit, UK, April 1968.

PERSONAL : About five feet, eight inches tall; graying, dark blond hair, with receding hairline; gregarious; reads, writes, and comprehends English well, but speaks it with less proficiency; wife, Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova, also works at Institute Biophysics.

HONORS : Order Lenin.

mr 21 January 1968

REMARKS : No major changes in Moskalev's career since publication of above report; a recent document refers to him as head of a laboratory at Institute Biophysics; applied for visa June 1970 for four month's stay in US for meetings of United Nations Working Group on Effects of Atomic Radiation. During 1969 published several papers (with coauthors Yu. M. Shtukkenberg, V. F. Zhuravlev, V. N. Strel'tsova, L. A. Buldakov, L. A. Kalmykova, L. A. Yerokhin, V. K. Lemberg): "Recommendations as to the Maximum Permissible Concentrations of Tritium Oxide in Industrial Environment," "Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage," "Role of the Time Factor in Separate and Combined Injury by Cerium-144 and Plutonium-239", "Accumulation-Removal Patterns of Cesium-137 in Adult Dogs; Long-Range Experiment", "Remote After-Effects of Radiation Injury".

ees 9 September 1970

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Information Report

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR/Franco/Italy

REPORT NO. OO- B-321/20573-70

SUBJECT Second International Congress on Radiation Protection/Unimpressive Soviet Contribution/Lafuma's Work With DTPA at Fontenay-aux-Roses/ General Interest in Plutonium Protection

DATE DISTR. 24 Aug 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54123
NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70
USAFAC/OTSG

DATE OF INFO. May 1970

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Brighton/Fontenay-aux-Roses - May 1970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, radiation physicist who attended the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 70.

1. The Soviet delegation to the Second International Congress on Radiation Protection arrived several days late. As a consequence, the only presentation from the USSR personally attended was a paper entitled, "Disorders in Embryonal Development of Rats after Injection of 131_I," by A M Lyaginskaya, Y D Parev and S N Sinitsyana. Since this same experiment has been conducted on the human embryo, there was really nothing new or even interesting in Lyaginskaya's presentation.

2. A Soviet delegate who was very busy asking many questions at virtually every session personally attended, was Yuriy I Moskalev. Moskalev is a well known scientist in the fields of radiobiology and radiotoxicity. He asked all of his questions through an interpreter, but when answers were given in English he always seemed to understand without benefit of his interpreter. Moskalev indicated to a US attendee that the USSR was finally planning to request membership in the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA).

3. The most interesting work presented at the meeting from a personal point of view was that of Professor J Lafuma, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France. He is charged with the responsibility of setting the plutonium protection standards and removal techniques after exposure to plutonium for all of France. Lafuma's most impressive work involves the success he has had in removing copious amounts of plutonium and other transuranium products from humans using DTPA.

4. Lafuma explained that from his point of view he was concerned with only two primary aspects of human contact with plutonium, inhalation and wounds. His studies have shown, of course, that the earlier treatment is begun the better the results; but also he has found it easier to decontaminate an area of the body exposed to plutonium through contact or a wound than to remove it from the lungs. Lafuma has used intravenous injection exclusively for the treatment of wounds and finds that a very significant amount of the transuranium particles are discharged from the body in urine. For the treatment of inhaled particles, Lafuma has used both DTPA aerosols and injection. He find his results from injection are better than the use of aerosols, even in lung decontamination.

5 4 3 2 1

U YES | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | S YES

CONTROLLED DISSEM | NO DISSEM ABRC

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Intelligence Information Report 600297

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY International/USSR

SUBJECT Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970/Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970/Current Research and Findings

REPORT NO. OO-B-321/17309-70

DATE DISTR. 1 Jul 70

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 54,123 NAVINTCOM NIP-10-70

DATE OF INFO. May 70

PLACE & DATE ACQ. BY SOURCE Sutton/Brighton: May 70

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; a professor and researcher in radiation biology at a US university.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with DCID 2/3.]

1. A US radiation biology researcher attended both the Biology and Ecology of Polonium and Radiolead Conference, Sutton, UK, 30 April - 1 May 1970, and the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association, Brighton, UK, 3-8 May 1970.

2. The nature of the Sutton meeting was such that few significant scientific positions were taken: however, in general, the quality of the papers was very high. The scheduled Soviet participants, P V Ramzayev and FNU Moskalev, were presumably not permitted by the USSR to attend; D Panov (Yugoslavia) was in the US, and D Djuric (Yugoslavia) did not attend for unknown reasons. The countries represented were UK (26), Italy (5), France (1), Sweden (2), Poland (1), South Africa (1), and the US (7).

3. To the extent that the proper "half-life for lead in man" was discussed, the consensus appeared to be that (a) the loss rate can not be represented as a single exponential; (b) the presently available data on baboons and beagle dogs does not extend for a sufficient period of time to provide a measure of the "last slow rate loss constant"; (c) it is likely that lead and radium loss rates will differ because of the selective reutilization of Pb in bone. D Barltrop (UK) and US researchers have been performing experiments which indicate that lead is not bound by red cell membranes, but at sites in the cell interior.

4. C R Hill (UK) provided a useful summary of the contribution of polonium to human radiation dose. He stipulated that the distribution of polonium will depend on whether it is administered as polonium per se or is allowed to grow in an animal as the daughter of an ingested parent. This is a significant consideration to biological researchers engaged in dose calculation work.

5. Twenty-nine countries and five international bodies were represented at the Second Congress of the International Radiation Protection Association. W G Marley (UK) was the congress president and H J Dunster (UK) was the secretary of the scientific program committee. The congress shared the common problems and advantages of similar large meetings. Concurrent sessions inevitably brought about some conflicts in important papers, discussion was generally absent or quite limited, and there was the usual number of papers given in "broken" English by foreign scientists.

U	NO	C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L	GROUP 1	S	YES

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FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 11-8-28

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14-00000

TO: Chief, SB

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FROM: Chief of Station, London

SUBJECT: REDTOP/AEUPWARD
Transmittal of Immigration Cards

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Nelson C. CHIRUCK

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	OELA - 49339	7 June 1968
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
	SECRET	74-120-158

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COUNTRY USSR/West Germany/France/Poland

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/27474-67

SUBJECT Y I Moskalev's Paper on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides Disappointing/Personality Notes/Attempt to Propagandize at West German Scientist's Expense/France and Poland Fail to Participate

DATE DISTR. 16 OCT 67

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES

DCS Case 49,991

DATE OF INFO. Sep 67 and earlier

PLACE & DATE ACQ. -- Sep 67 and earlier

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, an active researcher in the field of long-range effects of radio nuclides.

1. I was quite surprised when I arrived in Sun Valley, Idaho, to participate in the International Symposium on Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radio Nuclides to find that Dr Yuriy I Moskalev of the Institute of Physics, Moscow, had arrived two days earlier. Moskalev had traveled alone to Sun Valley and apparently was able to use his knowledge of the English language to get along on his own. However, he complained to the chairman of the conference that he did not know enough English to read his paper which also required condensation because it was too long for the time allowed. A colleague who had known Moskalev from earlier meetings said Moskalev's knowledge of English improved greatly after a few drinks. However, during this conference, he did not drink at all. He did mention, however, that he had written the English version of the paper he presented himself and said he could read and write English quite well but was deficient in the spoken language.

2. Moskalev's paper concerned the results of a series of experiments utilizing an unusually large number of rats and mice. The numbers he used were far in excess of those that would be used in a western laboratory. These figures were undoubtedly meant to impress his western associates. The data he presented was primarily on Strontium 90. His findings indicated that Strontium 90 was much more toxic than had been reported anywhere in western literature and that it was more carcinogenic than has been previously reported. His technique was almost exclusively injections of radio nuclides. The control he had on his animals was not explained, but very likely was very poor. He claims to have been able to induce cancer in laboratory animals at permissible exposure levels for atomic workers in the US. The animals were not examined for radioactivity, only for the existence of cancer. A respected US scientist with much more experience than Moskalev flatly stated, in private, that he did not believe Moskalev's findings. Moskalev did not ask questions during the question periods. However, he did talk privately to several scientific reporters after their presentations.

3. Dr Heinz Spiess West Germany reported on the results of injections of Radium 224 made during World War II in a wide section of the population in Germany. At that time, there was a mistaken belief that Radium 224 had a very beneficial effect on a person's health. He reported on 242 cases in which all types of cancer were appearing. The results of his observations in human population exposures were very similar to experiments

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U YES · C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L · GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification · S YES

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on dog populations in this country. Moskalev made an attempt to make some propaganda of this report by asking in a small group, "Why did you do this?" almost accusing Spiez of doing it himself.

4. Moskalev left the conference a little upset. It was suggested that he might visit a US laboratory en route home, and considerable time was expended to arrange this visit. However, he apparently took a different route and made no effort to tell anyone of his plans, and he did not visit the laboratory. He took copious notes on all papers, which indicated he was understanding what was going on. He took many pictures with a 35mm camera. From the questions he did ask in private, it was obvious that he understood English well.

5. I understand a Polish scientist had been invited to the conference. However, when his paper was submitted, the reviewer criticized it quite severely and suggested changes. As a result, the Polish scientist apparently decided not to attend the conference.

6. Three French scientists asked to be invited when the symposium was first announced. They even gave titles to their papers and the papers were put on the program. However, they later withdrew and no French scientists attended the meeting.

[Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis in report 00-B-321/30340-67]

-end-

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CE[illegible]RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO. 00-B-321/30340-67

SUBJECT Second International Symposium, "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho/ Interesting Paper Presented by Soviet Yu I Moskalev, an Unscheduled Participant

DATE DISTR. 16 OCT 67

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES DCS Case 49,991
(351)

DATE OF INFO. Sept 67

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ---; Sept 67

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen; research scientist.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I attended the Second International Symposium on "Delayed Effects of Bone Seeking Radionuclides", Sun Valley, Idaho, 12-14 Sept 67.

2. An interesting paper was presented by Yuri I Moskalev, USSR on "Some Late Effects of Radionuclide Damage". Dr. Moskalev was not expected at the meeting and he came alone, arriving two days early. He had furnished no brief and it was a surprise to hear his paper.

3. I was unaware that research such as he presented was being done in the USSR. His demonstration was a good piece of scientific work, that is, his procedures and results in pathological consequences of radioisotopes fit reasonably well with our procedures and results in the US. He did not present anything new in his paper, and it must certainly reveal that they are a few years behind the US in biology and radioisotope studies and applications. They are apparently still testing the toxicity of radio elements, which we have already established and accept, knowing the effects and using them accordingly. In other words, we are through with his reported work, feeling that it is completed; apparently they are not. Else, they don't yet know the toxicity boundaries, are still experimenting along these lines, or are experimenting to see how much more they can learn. But his paper reveals remarkable research.

4. Dr. Moskalev understands English reasonably well, but speaks it less well. Therefore, his appearance alone at the conference was even more unusual.

5. I understand that Dr. Moskalev became very interested in visiting a certain US facility researching in his field of interest and pursued arrangements to visit there. His time schedule permitted the visit and permission to visit the facility was obtained for him from the facility and the US governmental clearances were also obtained. However, after all this was done, he "backed out", going to great extent to give the

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U Yes | C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L | GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification | S Yes

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reason that the itinerary change was too much trouble for the US persons and authorities concerned, notwithstanding the fact that all change arrangements had already been completed, which facts he well knew. From the USSR viewpoint, he stated that no objections would exist, but I doubt that this was true. He was in Sun Valley four days; immediately after the conference he went to Salt Lake City, and then on to Montreal, Canada. His schedule allowed for several days in Canada, but he stated that he was leaving Montreal immediately for Moscow.

[Headquarters Comment: The analysis of Moskalev's paper in this report conflicts with the analysis reported in 00-B-321/27474-67]

-end-

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COUNTRY	USSR/Yugoslavia/Poland	REPORT NO.	OO-B-321/15482-66
SUBJECT	Soviets at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research/Emphasis on Study of Radiation Effects on Large Animals/David Shugar of Poland/Planning for 1967 International Symposium on Photobiology in Yugoslavia.	DATE DISTR.	24 OCT 66
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	DCS Case 47146
DATE OF INFO.	Up to 3 Jul 66	Responsive to:	C-SI6-52537
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Cortina d' Ampezzo, Italy 26 June - 3 Jul 66	Related to:	FTD-5901-N

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: SOURCE A. US citizen, radiologist at US university.

SOURCE B. US citizen, biologist at US university.

SOURCE A.

1. About one third of the Soviets expected at the Third International Congress of Radiation Research put in an appearance. The papers I heard were disappointing. In my opinion the Soviets are confining themselves to a narrow range of interests in their radiation research. In Session 32, which was concerned with ingested or injected radioisotopes, a paper written by Yu I Moskalev and V N Streltsova of the Institute of Biophysics of the Ministry of Public Health, USSR, did not impress me. A very poor reading marked the presentation of the paper prepared by A Tumanyan of the Gamaleya Institute for Epidemiology and Microbiology, Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR. The paper was given in a hurried and garbled fashion by a person who obviously was not a scientist. After the session ended, I talked to Tumanyan regarding her radiation experiments with monkeys. A woman about 45 years of age, Tumanyan had no English but spoke excellent French. She was quite enthusiastic about her work which I in turn considered commonplace.

2. It appears to me that the Soviets have a strong tendency toward experiments that enable them to study radiation effects on large animals. They do not seem interested in radiation response — the effect on tissue; on the other hand, they concern themselves with metabolic effects, which are important because they are related to the ability to suppress immunity mechanisms. They stress immunology and transplants.

SOURCE B.

3. Session 8, which was devoted to the discussion of radiation effects on cells, had but one Soviet paper. This was presented by J J Kerkis of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Novosibirsk. It was a poor paper.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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4. The meeting gave me an opportunity to renew my acquaintance with David Shugar of the Warsaw Institute of Biochemistry and Biophysics, Academy of Sciences of Poland. Though a highly competent scientist and a dedicated Communist, Shugar seems to be short of funds. The organizing committee of the Congress sent him money to insure his presence at Cortina d'Ampezzo. He and his wife drove by automobile from Poland to Italy. Shugar introduced me to one of his students - K L Wierzchowski. In performing the introduction Shugar declared the young man was highly capable and had a brilliant future.

5. The International Committee of Photobiology had an executive committee meeting at Cortina d'Ampezzo. It was decided to hold a photobiology symposium in the late summer of 1967 on the Island of Hvar, Yugoslavia. The symposium will emphasize photosynthesis. The general plan calls for participation by about 100 scientists, with emphasis being placed on invitations to the younger scientists in the Sov Bloc. The chief organizer of the forthcoming symposium is Maria Drakulic, Laboratory of Cellular Biochemistry, Institute "Rudjer Boskovic", Belgrade.

- end -

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U. R. S. S.

The following contains photos and bio information about the delegates to the XI International Congress of Radiology, held in Rome Italy 22-28 Sep 65.

SO: OO-B-324/18689-65 Case 46424, UNCL.

GORISONTOV, Petr D.; Prof. M.D.
Member of the Academy of Medical Science of the USSR;
Two Orders of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labour;
National Delegate;
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Science,
14 Solyanka, Moscow.



IVANITSKAYA

IWANITSKAYA, Maria A.; M.D.Sc.
Head of the Roentgenological Department,
Institute of Cardio-Vascular Surgery;
National Delegate;
8 Leninskij prospect, Moscow.

KOROGODIN, Vladimir I.; Ph. D.
Institute of Medical Radiology, Obninsk;
National Delegate
Kaluga Region.



KOZLOVA, Anna; M.D.
Professor;
National Delegate;
7 Solanka, Moscow.



LAGUNOVA, Irina G.; Prof. M.D.
National Delegate;
7 Solianka, Moscow.



MOSKALEV, Yuri I.; Prof. M.D.
Order of Lenin;
Institute of Biophysics Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, 14 Solyanka, Moscow.



REINBERG, Sam A.; M.D.Sc.
Professor, Director of the First Chair of Medical Radiology;
Postgraduate Institute (Central) in Moscow;
Honorary President and Member of 22 Societies of Radiology;
President of the Moscow Society of Radiologists;
National Delegate;
Moscow A-55, Novoslobodskaja 57/65, K U 37.



Candidate of M dical Sciences; Chief of Division of Med. Radiology, Deputy Chief of General Department for Medical and Prophylactic Service, Ministry of Health;
National Delegate;
3 Rachmanovski pereulok, Moscow.
SEMENOV, VIKENTY A

6002547



UGRYUMOV V M
UGRJUMOV, Benjamin; Prof. M.D.
Director of Neurosurgical Institute;
National Delegate;
12 Majakovskaja Stard, Leningrad.

Min Health RSFSR



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

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

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Moskalev Yu. I.

6UU2011

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR/International	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,288,475
SUBJECT	IAEA Symposium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, NY, Oct 63: Neutron Irradiations Compared to X- and Gamma Radiations in Large Animals; the Problem of Neutron Depth-Dose Relationships in Large Animals; Problems with the term "Relative Biological Effectiveness"; Soviet Proposal for Supplanting "Rad" with Some Other Radiation Unit	DATE DISTR.	23 Jan 64
		NO. PAGES	10
		REFERENCES	CD/OO Case 41357 FTD-5462-N
DATE OF INFO.	Oct 63		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--- Oct 63		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Three US citizens. Radiobiologists at a major US radiobiological research center.

Sources participated in IAEA Sympsoium on Neutron Irradiations, Brookhaven, Long Island, New York.

Source 1

1. Q. Did Symposium contributions include significant advancements in research on controlled thermonuclear reactions that may be useful in determining the feasibility of initiating uncontrolled thermonuclear reactions solely without the use of fissionable materials which would produce large amounts of energy, on the order of one kiloton or greater?

A. To the best of my knowledge there was no formal discussion of any nuclear reactions, as such. The great majority of the material presented had to do with biological effects, and the physicists at the Symposium were using high energy machines largely to produce the radiation that would be comparable to solar flare radiation.

2. Q. Was anything presented on effects of space radiation on the human body?

A. I can recall no Soviet references to the Vostok flights. The two Soviet speakers confined their references to purely laboratory observations. There was a number of US papers, and as I recall one from France, oriented to space flight conditions, however.

3. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I do not recall anyone's discussing drugs--Soviet or other. And I think that although research in drugs is continuing many radiobiologists are not very optimistic about their value. This is something many of us have reservations about.

4. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information.

A. I do not recall any discussion of this by anybody. Practically everyone was talking about physical measurements

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S-YES U-YES

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Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. This is something on which I can speak somewhat as an expert. Although other people may claim to have this, I do not think anyone has it, including the Soviets. One can find biological criteria at low doses, but whether they have meaning beyond the limited experiment is the big question, you see.

Q. Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. Nothing.

Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Again, I can speak with some certitude. There is no conclusion about the relative biological effect of this factor. People will argue about it, but there is no conclusion. The Soviets had some things to say about it, but I was thoroughly confused about their position. There are two ways of thinking about the RBE factor. One is from the viewpoint of theoretical biology which is interested in the why of differences of biological effectiveness, and this becomes one of the parameters of experiment. The other is the question of an empirical number that one can use in handling questions of judgment about radiation exposure in man. With regard to the questions of judgment, I think that most biologists would agree that we do not have any reliable and valuable RBE factors. We have numbers that represent what we might be afraid of, more than anything else.

Q. Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. One of the Soviet delegates, [Yu.I] Moskalev, was a frequent commentator on other people's work and he made a practice of denigrating the reports of these people with respect to radiation lethality. His comment was to the effect that the studies of radiation lethality done usually in small animals were not to the point, were not germane to problems in the human case, and that to be useful these studies should be done in animals closer to man.

Q. What is your critique of his argument?

A. Well, a mass of work has been done with the smaller animals in variuos laboratories and we are beginning to get certain generalities about the nature of radiation injury, or at least certain kinds of radiation injury, and therefore I think it is worthwhile to pursue it. As you might imagine, I presented a paper on radiation lethality and was among those to whose work Moskalev objected.

Q. Do you think Moskalev's objections were motivated from anything more than a genuine scientific position?

A. Who can say? In their published work the Soviets show a lot of attention to effects in the central nervous system--they are very interested in this and US people have tended to ignore this area. So conceivably Moskalev is oriented to CNS work and physiological functions, I do not know. But quite a lot of the Soviet work has a different orientation from western work--at least their published stuff.

24. Moskalev, both from the papers he gave and his questions and comments in discussion, indicated that he was very sharp, very advanced in his knowledge of the biological effects of radiation, particularly with respect to distinguishing among the effects of various energies of neutrons and the techniques for measuring these energies. I think it may be safely assumed that the Russians are using very advanced methods for detecting and measuring the various energies of neutrons--the dosimetry of neutrons. In the biological effect, I think they are way behind us. But they are much involved in the potentials of neutron irradiation and their objectives are, I am sure, the effects of space radiation on human beings.

25. Actually, [V P] Afanas'yev, who is a physicist, was even more sophisticated than Moskalev. Afanas'yev's paper was entitled "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy". His paper showed that both their production of high energy protons in the laboratory and the measurements of these protons with respect to animal work is sophisticated. They are advanced in this. I think this is the distinction to be made: they are more advanced in the technology of producing high energy radiations and the measurement of these than they are in biological effects of radiation.

26. Q. Was anything reported on effects of radiation on non-regenerative tissues such as the brain?

A. The Russians are very much involved in CNS effects of radiation, but they presented no data at the Symposium. The paper that Moskalev gave was a survey of Russian research work on biological action of neutrons and isotopes. It covered maybe twenty different pieces of work with only a few sentences for each. It presented no new data and nothing on the CNS as I recall. Afanas'yev's paper, on the other hand, presented new data on the production of dose fields with high energy protons.

27. One gets the impression that whereas Russians physics is mechanistic and quite indistinguishable from ours in that respect, Russian biology is impregnated with philosophy. Moskalev, for example, spoke of how the body "adapts" to radiation in the sense that a single animal adapts. Most biologists will reserve this word to changes in a species over a very long period. I suppose you could consider wound healing as adaptation in a sense. But western biology sees certain events occuring in an organism as the consequence of a wound which can be described without resort to notions of teleological adaptation. This philosophical tendency has been a damaging element in Russian biology, I believe.

28. Q. Were there results in the use of drugs in radiation protection?

A. I can recall nothing on protective drugs from anybody. There was here and there a reporting of drugs used to enhance the effect of radiation with respect to tumor treatment.

29. Q. Was anything presented on the characteristics of a bio-element used for space radiation detection including the number required for an extended space probe and the method of transmitting information?

A. I am afraid I do not understand the question.

30. Q. Was there anything on biological indicators at low ranges of radiation doses?

A. There is a tremendous amount of interest in such indicators everywhere. Moskalev's presentations did not say anything specific except that the Russians are working on long-term effects of small doses of radiation

mostly as regards tumors. So they are interested in carcinogenesis and in fact Moskalev asked me a question following my paper on carcinogenesis. He said nothing on acute, short-term effects of low doses of radiation, so presumably they are not concerned with these.

31. People from other countries, and particularly the US, reported work having to do with low dose effects and reliable biological indicators for low ranges of dose using the chromosome aberration methods in human cells. But the Russians had nothing to say about this particular thing and seem not to be working on it as yet.

32. Q. In your opinion, what is the level of accomplishment, worldwide, in this matter of getting reliable indicators of biological damage?

A. Insofar as I know, the most sensitive and reliable biological index for damage at low dose rates involves the study of chromosome abnormalities. The approach was developed in the US and is being used extensively here and in England, and other countries are taking it up. Moreover, I think that in radiobiology in general, in almost any question you could ask, the west and particularly the US and England are very much in the forefront. From what I know of Russian radiobiology from translations and hearsay, the Russians are years behind us, but I exclude their related physical work from this judgment.

33. Q. Was there reporting from the Soviets on types of radiation detection equipment used in the Vostok flights? Did they report findings on the relative biological effectiveness factor values for neutrons, protons and cosmic ray attenuations?

A. Well, again, there was no specific mention of this, but the interest in the relative biological effectiveness factor for neutrons and cosmic radiation was a major concern of the whole Symposium: the attempt to elucidate the RBE factor and particularly the problem with respect to large animals, like humans, where in the case of neutrons you have a change in the type of radiation in the interior of the animal. You do not have this change with x- gamma rays, but you do have it with fast neutrons.

34. Q. How is this neutron change manifested in large animals?

A. The neutrons become moderated. As they proceed through the tissue, the hydrogen in the tissue reacts with the neutrons and there is a change in the energies taken up. At some point you have gammas. So, the first few layers of hydrogenous material on the outside of the animal tend to change the dose, and in the interior, where the important effects occur, you do not know what the dose is. We talk about mid-line doses, average doses, but the actual dose in the cells of the bone marrow or the gut, we do not know yet. This is one of the problems of the RBE and a very big one.

35. [A G] Searle of Harwell reported genetic effects of low dose rate neutrons in mice finding that there were as many if not more mutations with low dose rate neutrons than with high dose rate neutrons. His work is the first direct evidence of the cumulative effect of a prolonged, or fractionated, low dose of neutrons. You do not have such an effect with x- or gamma rays. If you prolong the dose with these, the effect will be very much less than it would be if you gave the same total dose in a single fast pulse.

36. Q. The neutron dose given gradually might have an even more damaging effect than if given all at once, is that it?

A. Yes. At least. But the matter is still delicate, for Searle's experiment was with mice and the question remains whether neutrons, as such, will

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get into cells in the interior of a large animal, such as a human being, or will be moderated and changed into gamma rays. The neutron RBE for mortality in dogs, as reported from my laboratory and Brookhaven, is around 1. For small animals like mice it is more like three or four. So there is this discrepancy, and it may be promising for large animal research. Harwell, my laboratory, and the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago are now setting up to apply low dose rate neutrons in sheep. This will be new work and should have important results.

37. Q. Were results presented on cosmic and Van Allen belt radiation effects on test organisms in such areas as lethal, metabolic, developmental and genetic?

A. There was nothing on this as far as I know, except for a paper from the Donner Laboratory people at the University of California, Berkeley entitled "Some Biological Effects of 730 Mev Protons". This may simulate the kind of radiation that occurs in space and this is why they are playing around with it, you see.

38. Q. Were conclusions presented on determining the relative biologic effectiveness factor of biologic material when exposed to radiation from nuclear testing?

A. Well, this kind of interest is implied in work with neutrons. With neutrons there is this question of RBE and it was one of the major points of discussion at the Symposium.

39. Q. Did the Soviets say anything bearing on physical measurements of radiation in space in terms of relative biological effectiveness factor and implications for future manned space flights?

A. All I can say is that it is logical to suppose that this is what they are after: good physical measurements of radiation of a type that might be anticipated in space.

40. Q. Was there anything said on mapping and profiles for space radiation?

A. There was nothing on this.

41. Q. What interest have the Soviets shown in development and testing of nuclear power sources for thermionic power generators? Are the Soviets now applying such generators?

A. There was nothing on this.

42. Q. Did the Soviets report progress in radiation resistant materials and components for application to long space flight electronic equipment?

A. This Symposium was all biological, so there was nothing on this.

43. Q. Was there anything from the Soviets on methods of radiation shielding?

A. It was there by implication. The fact that they were talking about the investigation of dose fields, the radiation of experimental animals with protons of high energy, implies that they would be using some kind of shielding to get the animal exposed.

44. Q. This contribution would have been in Afanas'yev's paper "Production and Investigation of Dose Fields for Irradiation of Experimental Animals with Protons of High Energy"?

A. Yes.

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,286,351
SUBJECT	Assessment of Attendees and Research at Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	30 Dec 63
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	Case--40178 Guide-316 C-SI3-81,081 CSI/ABCD MIIA FSTC/CCIA
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna, August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, professor of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Source, a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was his first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[This report was prepared for submission to the US Atomic Energy Commission and is disseminated in accordance with paragraph [illegible] of DCI/D 2/3.]

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63, brought together the professional multi-discipline groups concerned with the health and safety of people exposed to nuclear materials in mining and milling and the potential problem of public health from the waste materials in these industries. To me, it pointed up the necessity of understanding the work within each of these disciplines in order to better define the exposures, dosimetry, metabolism and biological reactions in people exposed to the nuclear and chemical materials encountered in these industries.

2. Except for the historical review of the pulmonary malignancies found in the workers of the Schneeberg and St Joachimsthal mines and the epidemiological review of the Colorado Plateau with the suggestion of possible increase in pulmonary emphysema, fibrosis and cor pulmonale as well as malignancies and some dyscrasia of hair roots in these people, the meeting was devoid of any specific information with regard to health effects on humans.

3. We did not make detailed notes of the meeting and are not prepared to summarize the papers, however, there were a few points of interest to us that we will mention in the following paragraphs.

4. V A [illegible] of the USSR stated that uranium tetrafluoride was less toxic than uranyl nitrate in the same dose in animals. A P Novikova [illegible] of the USSR reported a decrease in blood cellular elements and an

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observation of an unstable non-protein [illegible] with albumin and glycosuria as the result of moderately [illegible] dietary doses of mixtures of the oxides of Uranium 23[illegible] and 235. [illegible] also reported from such exposures what appeared to be a [illegible] exponential or power type of urinary uranium excretion function and high retention of the uranium oxides in the lungs and concomitant lymph areas. These exposures also allegedly caused a deterioration of conditioned reflexes in their dogs but no pathological changes were found in the nervous system at autopsy. They did find sclerotic damage in the pulmonary perivascular, peribronchial and mediastinal lymph areas. This damage was more prominent in the dogs inhaling mixtures of oxides containing the highest per cent of Uranium [illegible]. One dog [illegible] so studied [illegible] with a carcinoma of the lung and another had atypical hyperplastic changes in the lung. V S Kuznova of the USSR reported that silica dust plus radon exposures in animals caused more clinical and pathological pulmonary damage than either silica or radon alone. Yu I [illegible] of the USSR reported on the body distribution and biological effects of numerous inhaled radioisotopes with acute, subacute and chronic pathological changes in the lungs, bone marrow and liver. We personally know so little about the effects of the radioisotopes of which he spoke that we don't know whether this was new knowledge or not.

5. J Lafuma from France reported finding no radon daughters in a slave dog attached by a cross blood circulation experiment with a master dog inhaling radon. Radon daughters were found in the lung of the master dog. The Yugoslavians reported confirmatory information on finding the immediate radon daughter attached to dust particles and they stressed the importance of determining radon daughters in the environment in order to calculate alpha lung doses. The Austrian, F Pohl, reported studies of people and animals exposed to radon in their spas and found a high lung retention of radon daughters and that the bismuth daughters of radon were more readily excreted by the kidneys than the lead daughters. Dr [illegible] of the [illegible] gave a fine paper on the function of mass mean diameter and chemical composition of Uranium dust with relation to lung retention. [illegible] of France gave an interesting theoretical discussion on the effects of the thickness and physiologic activity of the bronchial mucous [illegible] on alpha lung doses. [illegible] of the US gave a theoretical discussion of the expected neighborhood alpha dose from a point source. [illegible] of Poland unfortunately was not present to give or discuss his paper on the finding of radiolead in the hair and nails of uranium miners and his hypothetical evaluation of Lead 210 body burden therefrom.

6. J C Gilliland of the US [illegible] on the secular disequilibrium of uranium daughters in uranium mill [illegible] and methods for determining a man's time-weighted exposure [illegible] in mills [illegible] a frequency of sampling for 95% confidence exceeding or not a maximum allowable concentration. We detected no new ideas in most of the papers on environmental exposure and internal and external contamination from Japan, France and Canada.

7. E C Hyatt of the US, in a paper describing the techniques for measuring and sizing radioactive dusts, reiterated again that the particle size and density of radioactive dusts are extremely important in evaluating biological effects. It was generally agreed in the section on "Radiological Protection" that ventilation is most important in controlling radon and radon-daughter products in mining atmospheres and that masks have only a special limited use in temporarily uncontrolled areas of exposure. The USSR scientists, however, paid unusual attention to Mr Hyatt's paper on respirators and seemed quite concerned about the acceptability by workmen of the described respirators. The Russians apparently are using disposable masks.

8. Management of wastes appears to be a unique problem for the areas in which wastes occur. No general management of wastes was promoted.

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COUNTRY: Austria/USSR/International/Belgium/Sweden

REPORT NO.: OO-B-3,283,411

SUBJECT: Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling Held in Vienna 26-31 Aug 63 Under Auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization, and the World Health Organization (IAEA-ILO-WHO)/USSR Research and Practice in These Subjects As Disclosed at the Symposium/Visits to Related Laboratories in Belgium and Sweden: (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie De L'Energie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden

DATE DISTR.: 3 Dec 63

NO. PAGES: 7

REFERENCES: Case 40170 C-SI3-[illegible]

DATE OF INFO.:

PLACE & DATE ACQ.: ~~Vienna, Mol, Stockholm, Aug-Sep 63 DATE OF INFO: Aug-Sep 63~~

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US nuclear biologist.

He is head of the pharmacology operation of a major US atomic laboratory.

1. In late August 1963 I attended the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling held in Vienna, Austria. The symposium was under auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Office, and the World Health Organization. In early September 1963 I visited related laboratories as follows: (1) Laboratories Du Centre D'Etudie Nucleaire, Mol, Belgium; (2) Division of Radiobiology, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden, and (3) Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, Research Institute of National Defense, Stockholm, Sweden.

2. Due to a misunderstanding in the USSR, the topics covered by the symposium were not known sufficiently in advance for Soviet scientists to contribute papers on other than nuclear toxicology. Therefore, Soviet Delegate N Tschesnokow briefly discussed USSR uranium mine health practices which included three areas of activity: (1) Maximum efforts are taken to suppress dust at the source, and mines are well ventilated; (2) Personnel protective devices, such as respiratory masks and filters, are used, and (3) Preventive health or prophylactic procedures include assignment of mine workers to a sanitarium for one month each year. No kidney damage or other pathology apparently has been seen as a result of uranium mining activities in the USSR. There was no mention of cancer due to this activity. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters. Most Soviet studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes -- although it was brought out that the importance of inhalation as a route of entry is being recognized. The symposium brought together a world cross section of scientific disciplines for discussion of uranium mining and milling hazards. Details of all of this are given in my trip report which follows:

3. IAEA, ILO, and WHO Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, August 26-31, 1963. Visits were also made to the following laboratories:

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This is apparently due to the high acceptance of data published by the University of Rochester. It was pointed out that the possible contribution of radioactive dust composed of other than radon daughters was not actually evaluated in the case of the Schneeburg lung cancers because dust samples were not collected. Although radon is released by crushing of ores, radon and radon daughters were not considered to be a problem in uranium mills of France because of large work areas and high ventilation rates.

e. Four papers from the USSR dealt with laboratory studies on the toxicology of internal emitters in general, particularly Cs^{137}, Sr^{89}, Sr^{90}, Y^{91}, Ce^{144}, Zr^{95}, Ni^{95}, Ru^{106}, and uranium and radon. Most studies involved intratracheal administration of the isotopes, although a few inhalation studies were described. These papers were all given by Dr L N Burykina in the absence of Drs Moskalev, Sanotsky, Novikova and Kushneva. They report that 10 to 18 per cent of the inhaled radioactivity was found in the lungs of rats and dogs after exposure, and that five per cent was cleared by ciliary activity. These data are difficult to evaluate since the particle sizes of the aerosols were broadly described as being between 1 and 4 μ. Translocation of the inhaled radioisotopes was similar to that reported by others.

f. Biological effects were reported only for intratracheal administration of Ce^{144} and Ru^{106}. They report degenerative inflammation of the lung and aplastic changes in the bone marrow accompanied by leukopenia in acute stages. In longer term studies they find chronic pneumonia and degenerative and proliferative changes of the bronchial epithelium and connective tissue. They also reported reduction of bone marrow hematopoiesis and degenerative changes in the liver, kidney, etc. These occurred after deposition of 1 to 19 μc Ce^{144} in rats, 0.6 to 2.6μc Ce^{144}/gram of dog, and 0.4 μc Ru^{106}/gram of rat. No cardiovascular changes were noted, but were not specifically studied. The results of studies with uranium were similar to those reported many times, with the exception of central nervous system injury which consisted of changes in conditioned reflexes and in hibitory and excitatory processes. Due to this and relatively high burdens found in skeleton (3 to 4 per cent) they conclude that uranium toxicity is not necessarily confined to kidney damage. Kushneva's paper on synergistic effects of silica and radon reported previously published data. Silicotic rats were exposed to 8 μc radon. The radon treated silicotic rats showed more serious clinical symptoms, drop in circulating blood cells, and more extensive lung pathology than rats treated with radon or silica alone.

g. An excellent paper describing experimental work on the inhalation of Rn^{222} and its decay products was presented by Dr E Pohl from the University of Innsbruck, Austria. When Rn was inhaled in equilibrium with RaA, RaB, and RaC the concentration of daughters in lungs and other tissues were higher than when the concentrations of RaA, RaB, and RaC in the inhaled air were less than the equilibrium values. However, in the latter case the concentrations of daughter products in the lungs and other tissues were higher than would be predicted from the concentrations in the inhaled air. Further experiments are in progress to confirm and explain these results. Similar, but less extensive, studies were reported in a paper co-authored by Dr LaFuma of France and Medjidovic of Yugoslavia.

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COUNTRY	International	REPORT NO.	OO- B-3,278,069
SUBJECT	Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling, Vienna, Austria, 26-31 Aug 63	DATE DISTR.	18 Oct 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	August 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna—August 1963		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizens; professors of industrial medicine at a large western medical school.

Sources, one of whom is a medical doctor, attended the conference under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was their first experience at a conference of this kind and first meeting with foreign colleagues in this field.

[Sources are generally available for reinterview, should any further questions be generated by this report.]

[On file in CIA Library is the official program of the Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling under the sponsorship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization, held in Vienna on 26-31 Aug 63. Also on file is the Provisional List of Participants as of 19 Aug 63 and the Provisional Volume of Abstracts in the language submitted by the author.] [FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY].

1. The Symposium on Radiological Health and Safety in Nuclear Materials Mining and Milling in Vienna, 26-31 Aug 63, did not provide much new information mainly because the US is so far ahead of the other countries represented at the symposium in its studies of these subjects. The US was actually the only country which presented original material at the conference. The Soviets sent a small three or four-member delegation headed by Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalev, a very personable and diplomatic gentleman. At the end of the conference, he voiced his dismay in all apparent sincerity, that the Soviets had misunderstood the exact point of the meeting and had presented very minor papers.

2. All the Soviet papers were read by V S Kusneva, a woman physician who delivered them very dramatically. The most interesting Soviet claims, which we do not believe directly applicable to the causes claimed and which were not fully documented were:

   a. that uranium effects the central nervous system, i e, causes certain changes in the Pavlovian reflexes;

5 4 3 2 1

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

c002547

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	USSR/International	REPORT NO.	00- B-3,271,609
SUBJECT	Meeting of IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4-8 Jun 63	DATE DISTR.	21 Aug 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Jun 63		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna; Jun 63		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen. Medical doctor.

Source, who does cancer research at a large US institute devoted to nuclear studies, attended subject meeting.

1. I attended the meeting of the IAEA Panel on the Toxicity of Incorporated Radionuclides, Vienna, 4 - 8 Jun 63. The purpose of the panel was to advise the IAEA on research programs in this field. The meeting was organized by Evgeniy I. Komarov (USSR) of the IAEA Division of Isotopes.

2. The following named scientists participated in the panel:

Dr. M. H. Faes, Chief
Medical Service
Nuclear Energy Center
Mol-Donk, Belgium

Dr. A. R. Gopal-Ayengar
Atomic Energy Establishment
Richardson-Cruddas Building
Byculla, Bombay, India

Dr. Arne G. A. Nelson
Research Institute of
National Defence, Dept. 1
Sudbyberg, Sweden

Professor G. [illegible]
Academy of Medical Sciences
Moscow, USSR

Dr. Krista Kostial
Institute of Medical Research
Yugoslav Academy of Science
Zagreb, Yugoslavia

Dr. Julian Liniecki
Institute of Occupational Medicine
Narutowicza 96
Lodz, Poland

Dr. P. Brinkman
Radiopathology Laboratory
University of Groningen
Groningen, Netherlands

Dr. Jan Muller
Radiation Safety Division
Institute of Labor Hygiene
and Occupational Disease
Prague, Czechoslovakia

Dr. Pierre Wenger
Institute of Radium
Geneva, Switzerland

Dr. Otto Hug
University of Munich
Munich, Germany

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DF - 440

9 July 1963

INFORMATION REPORT

SUBJECT : Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY

SOURCE : AEDAZZLE-1

DOI : 1961

1. Source identified a photograph of MOSKALEVSKIY /not by name, nor was the name supplied/ as that of an Air Force Colonel and GRU officer in the Information Directorate of the GRU who attended a meeting in London in May or June 1961.

Comment:

2. No SR/6/Bio traces.

3. Informal [illegible] traces report that Yuriy Ivanovich MOSKALEVSKIY, born 17 January 1920, a radio engineer, attended a Conference on Electronics in London from 12 to 17 June 1961.

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INDEX

9 July 1963

N.B. Birthdate also recorded as 23 July 1920.

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Moscalev — C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L — 6002547

COUNTRY	USSR/Czechoslovakia/West Germany/India/France	REPORT NO.	OO- [illegible] 248
SUBJECT	WHO/IAEA Scientific Meeting on the Diagnosis and Treatment of Radio-Active Poisoning--Assessment of Participants and Their Presentations/ Biographical Information	DATE DISTR.	15 Jan 63
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	[illegible]
DATE OF INFO.	15-18 Oct 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Vienna 15-18 Oct 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US citizen, doctor of medicine.

Source conducts research in the treatment of radioactive metal poisoning and is also a clinician when such cases arise at the medical center. Source speaks German and keeps abreast of all literature on the subject of radio-active poisoning. [This report was prepared by an ARMY representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

1. I participated in the World Health Organization's International Atomic Energy Agency's scientific meeting on the diagnosis and treatment of radioactive poisoning, held at Vienna, Austria, 15-18 Oct 62. There were only 20 participants at this meeting; therefore each individual is considered highly qualified in this particular field otherwise he would not have been invited as a participant.

2. The two USSR doctors who were invited were Dr D J Semenov and Dr I T [illegible], a female doctor. They are both from Sverdlovsk Center. When the secretary had not heard from them, he contacted the permanent USSR representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who called Moscow to find out whether or not these two representatives would attend. He was informed that they could not come due to unforeseen circumstances. They sent instead, Prof Moscalev. He speaks only Russian. He is bright but not current on the effects of radiation, that is, the effects of radioactive metals. He was therefore not the individual that should have been representing the USSR at this meeting. This was his first time out of the USSR. He is about 5'-8" tall, weighs about 175 pounds, is around 45 years of age and has graying hair. He is generally an outgoing individual. He became very warm and friendly during the meeting and toasted my son saying that he hoped that his son and my son could climb mountains together. He was rather gay at parties but only a social drinker. He smoked an average amount. He has a family, the size of which I do not know, and is a professor in the Institute of Medicine.

3. Professor V Volf, Department Ionizing Radiation, Institute of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, Sribitvani 24, Prague 7, Czechoslovakia, is a well-known scientist. He is tall, slender, and athletic, in his late 30's, about 6 feet tall, speaks perfect English. He has one boy aged 5 and a girl aged 9. He lives in Prague. He publishes an annual report on the proceedings at his institute, which I receive. He is a top-notch scientist. He is an MD and sees patients in addition to conducting research. He stated

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14-00000

Moskalev

6002547

Int'ntl Conf on Diagnosis and Treatment of Radioactive Poisoning
Vienna 15-18 Oct 62

Source US national; physicist on staff of US institution of higher learning.

The most interesting aspect of meeting was conduct and contributions of Prof Yu I Moskalev of USSR Acad Sci. His subject was listed as "Uptake and Retention of Plutonium in Man"; no abstract was presented. When Prof Moskalev spoke, however, he changed the title to "Problems of Kinetics of Uptake and Retention of Radioisotopes." During his presentation, it was suggested that the retention of multiple dosis of Sr90 in the rat could not be predicted on the basis of single injection studies. After continual questioning via translation service (he apparently spoke no English), we concluded he meant by this that the rat is a continually changing animal. In any event, his paper presented nothing new and could be described as being rather elementary.

In contrast, Prof Moskalev's questions throughout the four day meeting covered a wide range of topics, and left one with the impression that he was a competent individual. In response to questions, however, his answers were far from satisfactory. He have no specific answers to questions regarding Soviet experience with radioisotopes in man.

SO: CIA-A-3.246.539 CONFIDENTIAL Controlled/NDA/NFD
26 Dec 62

14-00000

SECRET

1. NAME MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich

CASE NO. 5656719

2. VARIANTS

3. POSITION Sci Worker, Radiobiological Installation, Nuc Res Inst, Sungul, Chelyabinsk Oblast, c 53; I/w Inst. of Biophysics, AS USSR, Moscow, 51

4. LOCATION @ Sungul, Chelyabinsk Obl, C 53; Msocw, 51

5. OCCUPATION Nuclear Research-Radiobiology

6. FIELDS Distribution of Isotopes in Various Animal Species.

7. BIRTHDATE c1921

8. BIRTHPLACE

9. NATIONALITY USSR

10. EDUCATION

585 2760

11. HONORS

6002547

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12. POL. AFFIL. CP Mbr., 51

13. CTRY. WORK. FOR

9.	SOUNDEX	TO 1	LOCATION	4.	ORGANIZATION	7.	5.	6.	13.
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FORM NO. 214B 1 OCT. 54 REPLACES FORM 60-58B WHICH MAY BE USED

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION CARD

SECRET

14-00000

In 19⁵3 tests were begun by MOSCALEV concerning the distribution of isotopes in various animal species. Work of the radiobiological installation at Sungul

SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-14 64, 25 Oct. 55, Secret. jab

MOSKALEV -- assistant to Timofeyev, Head of Biological Dept, Sungul Institute. Moskalev, a nerve physiologist and party man, worked with Catsch (and subsequently succeeded him) on research on curing or preventing radiation damage. (Source is Dr Wilhelm Menke (STIB), a returned German scientist who gave information on Soviet personalities at the Nuclear Research Institutes at Sukhumi, between 1945 and 1955.) SOURCE: CIA, CS-G-82811, 1 Mar 56, SECRET/NOFORN RELEASABLE TO U.K./CONTINUED CONTROL

MOSKALEV, Yuriy Ivanovich - worked as a sci. asst. in source's lab. at Sungul. Took the position of chief of the pathophysiological lab. when source left in Oct. 53. Not well qualified. Was supposedly imprisoned during the war because of his German descent or for black market dealings. Became a Party member in 1951. Had one month's TDY at the Biophysical Inst., Moscow during the last half of 52. Upon his return, he informed source that the inst. was doing intensive work on the hematological effects on dogs of radiation exposure. The inst. was also working on radiation effects on the nervous systems of dogs, similar to the conditioned reflex experiments of Pavlov. He also stated that the inst. was doing parallel work to Sungul on increasing the excretion of incorporated radioactive isotopes, using diuretic substances & hormones, particularly the parathyreotrope hormone. No special results were achieved. He was married to Vera Nikolayevna Streltsova. Age 35. Medium height. Dark blond.
SO: CIA, CS-G-EG-1550, 24 Apr. 56, Secret joe

SRI, Consol, Biblio, lme, Ju 1956

15-10

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A 76A01 M   TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N   SUIS                (BERN)                CA SEP 76       OPEN
A 76A01 U   PCS REPORTS  20-10  (BERN) 7821                           09 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   NO TRACE            WASH-914630           TELEPOUCH       14 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404617                201-0943610
  00A00 B  KUZNETSOV            VLADIMIR                              T
  00A00 C   USSR                MOSCOW                20 SEP 26       M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 B  KUZNETSOV            VLADIMIR                              T
A 76A01 C   USSR                MOSCOW                20 SEP 26       M
A 76A01 D   USSR
A 76A01 E  WIFE GALINA B 25 MAY 41 MOSCOW NEE GULIYUTKINA
A 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE                  15-5
A 76A01 M   TRADE REPRESENTATION
A 76A01 N   BELG                (BRUSSELS)            CA SEP 76       OPEN
A 76A01 U   PCS REPORTS   20-5  (BRUS)-41919                          31 AUG 76
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  00A00 C   USSR                                      CA 30           M
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  00A00 E  WIFE OLGA
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B 76A01 C   USSR                                      CA 30           M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE OLGA
B 76A01 G  STUDENT                   15-5
B 76A01 M   UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSEL
B 76A01 N   BELG                (BRUSSEL)             CA SEP 76       OPEN
B 76A01 Q   FOR 1976-1977 ACADEMIC YEAR
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS 20-5 (BRUS) 41938                        02 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   TRACE REPLY         WASH-914699           TELEPOUCH       14 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404619
  00A00 B  TRUBETSKY            ANDREY                GERASIMOVICH    T
  00A00 C   USSR                KRASHINO              04 MAR 48       M
  00A00 D   USSR
  00A00 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA
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B 76A01 B  TRUBETSKY            ANDREY                GERASIMOVICH    T
B 76A01 C   USSR                KRASHINO              04 MAR 48       M
B 76A01 D   USSR
B 76A01 E  WIFE FAINA GRIGORYEVNA B 27 FEB 49 LARINOVKA
B 76A01 G  ELECTRICAL ASSEMBLER
B 76A01 M   ORSHANSKY TOOLS-BUILDING PLANT
B 76A01 M   STANKO-CANADA LTD        16-43
B 76A01 N   CAN                 (TORONTO)             30 SEP 76       OPEN
B 76A01 U   PRESENCE REPORTS 21-6 (OTTA) 27783                        09 SEP 76
F 76A02 U   NO TRACE            WASH-915518           TELEPOUCH       15 SEP 76
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  00A00 A 404621
  00A00 B  KASSINOV             ERIK                                  T
  00A00 C   USSR                                                      M
  00A00 D   USSR
F 76A01 B  KASSINOV             ERIK                                  T
F 76A01 C   USSR                                                      M
F 76A01 D   USSR
F 76A01 G  EMPLOYEE
F 76A01 M   SORICE INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
F 76A01 M   STANKO-FRANCE                 15-4
F 76A01 N   FRAN                (PARIS)               PR JUL 76
F 76A01 U                       SX-29811                              03 JUL 76
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  00A00 A 404622                201-0943860
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9/14/0

Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

IDENTIFICATION: NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, a Soviet KGB officer who defected in 1964 and was subsequently involuntarily confined in the U.S. by the Agency for a period of approximately three years.

BACKGROUND : NOSENKO first contacted Agency personnel in Switzerland in June 1962 and subsequently defected in January 1964. NOSENKO was brought to the U.S. and after a period of relative freedom he was involuntarily confined in April 1964. From April 1964 to August 1965, he was confined at an Agency controlled site in Clinton, Maryland. From August 1965 to October 1967, NOSENKO was confined at Camp Peary, Virginia. In October 1967, he was returned to the Washington area, given increasing amounts of freedom until he was given total freedom in April 1969. NOSENKO became a U.S. citizen in April 1974. NOSENKO was employed by the Agency as a consultant in March 1969 and continues under contract to date. His present salary is $23,500 per year.

APPROVAL : (1) The legal basis to confine NOSENKO against his will was discussed by Mr. Richard Helms, DD/P, and others with the Deputy Attorney General on 2 April 1964 (Tab 1). On 3 April 1964, the Agency General Counsel, Mr. Lawrence Houston, advised the Director of Security by memorandum that such confinement was proper (Tab 2).

(2) There are a series of letters from the DDCI, DCI and others to various agencies, including the Department of Justice and the White House, covering the period 1964 to 1969, evidencing awareness of these agencies of the NOSENKO affair (Tab 3).

(3) The conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were established by the Office of Security (Tabs 4 & 5).

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RESULTS : By memorandum dated 2 October 1968, the Director of Security forwarded two reports to the DDCI summarizing the results of the NOSENKO case to that date. The reports are voluminous. One was prepared by the Office of Security and the other by the FBI. Both reports conclude that NOSENKO was a bona fide defector. A draft memorandum attached to this file, dated 21 October 1968 and prepared by the CI Staff, raises question regarding NOSENKO's bona fides and challenges the above two reports.

TERMINATION : NOSENKO continues under contract to the Agency. He is brought to Washington periodically to consult on matters germane to his background and experience. Various reports are available in the files of the Office of Security which detail financial aspects of this case. No final accounting has been made since the project continues.

COMMENTS : (1) While the Office of Security files do document the rationale for the original confinement of NOSENKO, they do not document the rationale for his continued confinement over so long a period of time. A memorandum dated 5 August 1969 states that various congressional staff officers were briefed on NOSENKO and states that concern for his safety, as well as concern regarding his bona fides, prompted the prolonged confinement. (See Tab 6)

(2) Office of Security files document a period in 1969 during which a mail cover was placed on NOSENKO.

(3) During the above period, NOSENKO was allowed a pleasure trip to Florida. During this trip, Agency personnel, with apparent Headquarters approval, obtained the services of prostitutes. This apparently occurred on at least two occasions.

FILES : Office of Security files on NOSENKO are maintained in the following locations:

OS/SSD (Contact - Mr. Charles Phalen)

OS/SAG (Contact - Mr. Bruce Solie)

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Files 29 January 1964

M. D. Stevens

THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, née: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. [The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.]

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project RJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

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104-10423-10337 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TAL Commission File

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TO: Chiefs of all Stations

INFO.

FROM: Chief, KUDOVE

SUBJECT: Warren Commission Testimony - Selected Excerpts

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

FYI

1. The Warren Commission's Report on the assassination of President Kennedy focused attention on the magnitude of the problem involved in the protection of the Chief Executive. As you know, it is our responsibility, overseas and in headquarters, to render every support possible to the Secret Service in the conduct of its statutory responsibilities in the United States, and especially when the President travels abroad.

2. The circumstances confronting the Warren Commission produced discussion and testimony on various aspects of the problem of Presidential protection and on interagency operational cooperation, which normally do not find their way into the public domain. These include the acquisition and dissemination of information, consultation, coordination, and operational interchanges. I believe you will be interested in the attached extracts of testimony given before the Warren Commission by U.S. intelligence and security officials. Pertinent portions have been side lined. I commend these materials for reading by all officers in positions of senior responsibility in headquarters and overseas.

FLETCHER M. KNIGHT

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Originated by: Chief, CI/R&A, Ext. 7468/23 December 1964
and Mr. A.E. Dooley, Ext. 6748

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ALAN H. BELMONT, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR, FBI
MAY 6, 1964

Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. DULLES. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

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We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.

Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. STERN. Turning to——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.

in view of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again.

Mr. McCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy?

Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at——

Mr. McCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it.

Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably.

Mr. McCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. STERN. What is the subject?

Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI.

Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense?

Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or without payment.

Mr. STERN. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal

matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about?

Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.

Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us tLat the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?

Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves.

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I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. STERN. Are they complete?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.)

Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. BELMONT. I did.

Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.

Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. BELMONT. Well——

Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Yes.

Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?

Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. STERN. Have you broadened——

Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir——

Mr. STERN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to furnish this information.

Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in?

Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——

Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.

Mr. STERN. This liaison function.

Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of Instructions Section 83."

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.

Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date?

Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.

Mr. BELMONT. Very good.

Mr. DULLES. Thank you.

Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (*c*) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (*d*) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.

Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?

Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.

Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (*d*) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.

Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (*d*) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these——

Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought.

Mr. STERN. That is right.

Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (*d*) to an "or".

Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.

The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?

Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. BELMONT. Correct.

Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty.

Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?

The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field.

We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having.

Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel——

Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.

Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.

Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them.

Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made.

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This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.

Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.

Mr. McCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you——

Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instructions.

Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.

Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a special category other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

Mr. McCLOY. All Communists, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that correct?

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.

Mr. McCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. McCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (*a*) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (*b*) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials

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Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. McCLOY. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative FORD. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. BELMONT. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge.

Representative FORD. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139 agents that we have made available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative FORD. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses their services while the President is there.

Representative FORD. I gather that prior to the assassination such requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the Bureau.

Mr. BELMONT. No. There were never any such requests before.

Mr. STERN. At the level at which the requests have been made so far, have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have, and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which can be handled in due time, and whenever

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our agents are putting in an average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men will be felt.

Representative FORD. 169.

Mr. BELMONT. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.

Mr. STERN. 139 on 16 separate occasions.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not complaining. We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure and we are not complaining.

Mr. DULLES. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr. Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to——

Mr. BELMONT. At the time of the assassination?

Mr. DULLES. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the functions of the Secret Service.

Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is a basic responsibility.

Mr. DULLES. And you have no auxiliary function to that——

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.

Mr. DULLES. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.

Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.

Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that we have done religiously.

After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this particular case was concerned.

Mr. DULLES. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. And there was a period there, there was a period though, after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of office—did this order come to you during that period or after he had taken the oath of office?

Mr. BELMONT. It was very rapid, probably within a day.

Mr. DULLES. I see. It wasn't immediately after.

Mr. BELMONT. No.

Mr. DULLES. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.

Mr. BELMONT. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder and was within the province of the local police who immediately took hold of it and started the investigation.

Mr. DULLES. I realize that.

Mr. BELMONT. And started the investigation and it was theirs.

Mr. DULLES. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by courtesy of the local authorities.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."

Mr. DULLES. I understand.

Mr. BELMONT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any legisla-

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tion in recent years that might have been introduced in the Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?

Mr. BELMONT. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the assassination?

Mr. BELMONT. Since the assassination.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were there any recent legislation to that effect?

Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done research on it, and I just don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.

Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being made on a foreign dignitary.

At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular point.

Mr. BELMONT. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection is that it was called to our attention—I cannot pinpoint it for you—but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.

Mr. McCLOY. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the wastebasket.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true.

Mr. McCLOY. In respect of other incidents.

The CHAIRMAN. When the emotion died down.

Mr. McCLOY. When the emotion died down, that is true.

I have some further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?

Mr. STERN. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday. Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a check to be made on that?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not have a specific record of when that information was recorded.

Mr. STERN. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some contemporaneous communication?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.

Mr. STERN. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64 and 67, just so the record is straight.

Mr. BELMONT. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the headquarters dateo October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.

On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4, but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELs.

Mr. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.

I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy.

Mr. McCLOY. I have one or two questions.

Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an agent or an informant of the FBI?

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Mr. BELMONT. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr. McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.

Mr. McCLOY. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent of any other country.

Mr. McCLOY. Or any other agency of the United States?

Mr. BELMONT. Or any other agency of the United States.

Mr. McCLOY. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr. Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.

Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at the present time require or justify further investigation other than routine check-ups that have not already been undertaken?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have had a long exposure to investigation in this case.

As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy or anything other than the act of a single individual?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.

Mr. McCLOY. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that he was the President's assassin?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever—you or the agency—have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker, case?

Mr. BELMONT No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered——

Mr. McCLOY. Bullets.

Mr. BELMONT. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to the assassination itself.

Mr. McCLOY. Until recently.

Mr. BELMONT. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.

Mr. McCLOY. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.

Mr. McCLOY. Have we got all your reports on that?

Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCLOY. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?

Mr. BELMONT. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that would stand up to show there was an association between them.

Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this is in the record, but do you—by reason of your very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this question—do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find—was there any evidence in

Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?

Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the hearing room.)

Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.

As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the assassination.

I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.

I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly, whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your particular competence.

Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.

Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.

Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we received them.

Mr. DULLES. That is correct.

Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions, misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.

We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.

Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.

Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and give you a——

Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have, Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?

The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our attention.

Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book. That is your idea, is it?

Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to have it.

Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything about Buchanan's background?

Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.

Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.

Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.

Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School and Yale.

Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have, that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.

Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in off the street.

Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.

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J. EDGAR HOOVER
MAY 14, 1964

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HOOVER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will carry on the examination, Mr. Director.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, do you want to tell him briefly what our purpose is?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes; it is our practice to make a brief statement before the testimony of each witness, and I will do it now.

Mr. Hoover will be asked to testify in regard to whether Lee H. Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence of any conspiracy, either domestic or foreign, involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

What he has to say about an article in the National Enquirer, Commission Exhibit No. 837, and concerning the failure to include the name and information concerning special agent Hosty in the initial report of the Oswald address book and any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States. Now, Mr. Rankin, you may proceed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, will you state for the record your name and position?

Mr. HOOVER. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. Hoover?

Mr. HOOVER. I live at 4936 30th Place, Northwest, Washington, D.C.

Mr. RANKIN. And you have been Director of the Bureau for some 40 years according to the newspapers?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct; since 1924.

Mr. RANKIN. You have furnished us a considerable amount of information, Mr. Hoover, about whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent or acting for the Bureau in any capacity as informer or otherwise at any time. Are those statements correct?

Mr. HOOVER. They are correct. I can most emphatically say that at no time was he ever an employee of the Bureau in any capacity, either as an agent or as a special employee, or as an informant.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your particular attention to Exhibit 835, and suggest that you will find that that is your letter, together with your affidavit about this subject matter, and other matters that you furnished to us concerning this particular subject.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you wish to add anything?

Mr. HOOVER. No; there is nothing that I desire to add to what appears in this letter and my affidavit which accompanied it to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. You have provided many things to us in assisting the Commission in connection with this investigation and I assume, at least in a general way, you are familiar with the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, is that correct?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. When President Johnson returned to Washington he communicated with me within the first 24 hours, and asked the Bureau to pick up the investigation of the assassination because as you are aware, there is no Federal jurisdiction for such an investigation. It is not a Federal crime to kill or attack the President or the Vice President or any of the continuity of officers who would succeed to the Presidency.

However, the President has a right to request the Bureau to make special investigations, and in this instance he asked that this investigation be made. I immediately assigned a special force headed by the special agent in charge at Dallas, Tex., to initiate the investigation, and to get all details and facts concerning it, which we obtained, and then prepared a report which we submitted to the Attorney General for transmission to the President.

Mr. RANKIN. From your study of this entire matter of the assassination and work in connection with it, do you know of any credible evidence that has ever come to your attention that there was a conspiracy either foreign or domestic involved in the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. I know of no substantial evidence of any type that would support any contention of that character. I have read all of the requests that have come to the Bureau from this Commission, and I have read and signed all the replies that have come to the Commission.

In addition, I have read many of the reports that our agents have made and I have been unable to find any scintilla of evidence showing any foreign conspiracy or any domestic conspiracy that culminated in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Representative FORD. May I ask this, Mr. Hoover. As I understand your testimony, it is based on the evidence that has been accumulated thus far?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct, sir.

Representative FORD. Is the Federal Bureau of Investigation continuing its investigation of all possible ramifications of this assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. We are receiving and we, I expect, will continue to receive for days or weeks to come, letters from individuals that normally would probably be in the category of what we would call crank letters in which various weird allegations are made or in which people have reported psychic vibrations. We are still running out letters of that character and in turn making a report to this Commission upon it, notwithstanding the fact that on the face of it the allegation is without any foundation. Individuals who could not have known any of the facts have made some very strange statements. There have been publications and books written, the contents of which have been absurd and without a scintilla of foundation of fact. I feel, from my experience in the Bureau, where we are in constant receipt over the years of these so-called crank letters, that such allegations will be going on possibly for some years to come.

I, personally, feel that any finding of the Commission will not be accepted by everybody, because there are bound to be some extremists who have very pronounced views, without any foundation for them, who will disagree violently with whatever findings the Commission makes. But I think it is essential that the FBI investigate the allegations that are received in the future so it can't be said that we had ignored them or that the case is closed and forgotten.

Representative FORD. Could you give us some idea of how many agents are currently working to one degree or another on any aspects of this case?

Mr. HOOVER. I would estimate, Congressman Ford, that there are at the present time at least 50 or 60 men giving their entire time to various aspects of the investigation, because while Dallas is the office of origin, investigation is required in auxiliary offices such as Los Angeles or San Francisco, and even in some foreign countries like Mexico. We have representatives in Mexico City.

At the outset of the investigation, following the assassination, it was the desire of the President to have this report completed by the Bureau just as quickly as possible, and as thoroughly as possible, and I would say we had about 150 men at that time working on the report in the field, and at Washington, D.C.

Now, all the reports that come in from the field are, of course, reviewed at Washington by the supervisor in charge of the case, and then in turn by the assistant director of the division, and then in turn by Mr. Belmont, who is the assistant to the Director.

Reports in which there is a controversial issue or where statements have been made of the existence of some particular thing that we have never heard of before, I myself, go over these to see that we haven't missed anything or haven't had any gap in the investigation so it can be tied down.

Recently the National Enquirer had a fantastic article in it as to the existence of a letter that had been written or a request that had been made by the Department of Justice to Chief Curry of the Dallas Police Department, to withhold arresting Rubinstein, or Ruby, and Oswald after the Oswald attempt on General Walker's life.

First, I had the agent in charge at Dallas interview Chief Curry and I have sent to the Commission a letter as to what Chief Curry had to say. He branded it as an entire lie—that he had never received any request of that kind. I had our files searched to be certain we had not written any such letter as that and found we had not. I requested the Department of Justice to advise me whether they had written any such letter and Mr. Katzenbach advises there is no ref-

erence in the Department files to the alleged letter from any Department of Justice official to Chief Curry nor any reference that an FBI official was asked to request the Dallas police not to arrest Oswald or Ruby. A letter is being sent to the Commission today setting forth this information.

Representative FORD. The point that I think ought to be made is that despite the magnitude of the effort that has been made by the FBI and by other agencies, and despite the tremendous effort that has been made, I believe, by the Commission to help and assist and to consolidate all of the evidence that we possibly could, that there is always the possibility at some future date that some evidence might come to the surface.

Mr. HOOVER. That is, of course, possible; yes.

Representative FORD. I want just to be sure that no leads, no evidence regardless of its credibility will be ignored, that it will be pursued by the Bureau or any other agency to make certain that it is good, bad or of no value.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned, the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to either prove or disprove the allegation. We found in the course of our investigations that individuals have made statements. Yet, when we investigate they will frankly admit that the statement is an entire falsehood, or that they don't know why they wrote the letter or why they made the statement. But, nevertheless, we have the record and generally in those instances we try to get a signed statement from that individual so it can be made a part of the record.

Representative FORD. Under your authority from the President, the authority which gave you the FBI, the responsibility to conduct this investigation it is not an authority with a terminal point. It is an authority that goes on indefinitely?

Mr. HOOVER. Very definitely so. The President wanted a full and thorough investigation made of this matter, and we have tried to do so. As I have stated, I think we will continue to receive allegations. I think this will be a matter of controversy for years to come, just like the Lincoln assassination. There will be questions raised by individuals, either for publicity purposes or otherwise, that will raise some new angle or new aspect of it. I think we must, and certainly we intend in the FBI to continue to run down any such allegations or reports of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Congressman Boggs.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Hoover, I don't want any cover—to cover any ground which has been covered but I just have one or two questions. First, let me say that you and the Bureau have been very cooperative with this Commission.

Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Representative BOGGS. And tremendously helpful. I have been concerned about some of these wild press reports and concerned about what impact it may have ultimately on the history of this thing. For instance there is a man named Buchanan who has written a series of articles.

Mr. DULLES. A book now. A book is out; yes.

Representative BOGGS. A book now. I understand they have been widely circulated in the European press, and this man came here and was, as I got it from some other sources, he took in some people here, some American journalists, and I am told that this man has a Communist background, and in addition to that is a most unreliable person. He has made these allegations that the Dallas police force was involved in the assassination and so on.

Would you have any suggestions on how this Commission should deal with this sort of thing?

Mr. HOOVER. We have received a request from the Commission to review that book and to make a report upon any portions of it that can be contradicted or substantiated by actual facts or documents. I know Buchanan's background. He worked on the Washington Star and he was dismissed from the Washington Star because he was a member of the Communist Party. He spent much of his time in recent years in France writing for French newspapers. I have fol-

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lowed the articles that he has written about this matter and they are what I would call "journalistic garbage." There is not a scintilla of truth to most of the things he has written in these articles and in his book which I have had a chance to scan but haven't actually reviewed yet. It is being reviewed by my research section. Some of the allegations are utterly fantastic. I often wonder where some of these individuals get such ideas and why they make such statements without foundation.

Now, he makes many wild charges there, and to read it, a person not knowing him, or his views, or his background, would be inclined to wonder. I think you are going to have that problem, as I say, for years to come. I don't know how you can handle individuals like him other than to have the record clear upon the facts of the case, and either substantiate or disprove his statements. I don't think too much time should be given to these individuals who have such unsavory backgrounds as Buchanan has and who makes statements that have been proved to be untrue. But, at the same time I think when a book like that comes out or an article of that type comes out that deals with the assassination of the late President, I think it should be gone into from an investigative point of view. We should then submit to this Commission, even after it has concluded its hearings, for record purposes, what we have found in each particular instance.

Representative BOGGS. Now, on the other side of the fence——

Mr. DULLES. May I add one other thing just to interrupt. I wish you would add to your list a book called "The Red Roses of Dallas" by a man named Gun. He is a more reliable correspondent.

Mr. HOOVER. He is a Philadelphia correspondent.

Mr. DULLES. He has been living in this country since 1946. I have met him over here. Let's see, he was at Dallas at the time. He was then reporting, I think, for the Italian newspaper Epoca.

Mr. HOOVER. That is not the same one.

Mr. DULLES. He might have been lying. This book is full of lies. But I think it is a book that ought to be added, too, and I will see that a copy is sent to the Bureau.

Mr. HOOVER. I would appreciate that.

Representative BOGGS. On the other side of the spectrum some professor out at the University of Illinois wrote a piece in which he alleged the President was a Communist agent, President Kennedy, and Buchanan's allegations are that the extreme right assassinated the President and this fellow's allegations are that the Communists assassinated the President. Would you care to comment? Have you read that piece?

Mr. HOOVER. I have read that piece. My comment on it is this in general: I think the extreme right is just as much a danger to the freedom of this country as the extreme left. There are groups, organizations, and individuals on the extreme right who make these very violent statements, allegations that General Eisenhower was a Communist, disparaging references to the Chief Justice and at the other end of the spectrum you have these leftists who make wild statements charging almost anybody with being a Fascist or belonging to some of these so-called extreme right societies. Now, I have felt, and I have said publicly in speeches, that they are just as much a danger, at either end of the spectrum. They don't deal with facts. Anybody who will allege that General Eisenhower was a Communist agent, has something wrong with him.

A lot of people read such allegations because I get some of the weirdest letters wanting to know whether we have inquired to find out whether that is true. I have known General Eisenhower quite well myself and I have found him to be a sound, level-headed man.

In New York City there is a woman by the name of Kraus who must be mentally deranged as she stands on a Broadway corner there handing out leaflets in which she charges me with being in the conspiracy with the Communists to overthrow this Government and so forth.

Well now, if any person has fought communism, I certainly have fought it. We have tried to fight it and expose it in democratic ways I think that is the thing we have to very definitely keep in mind in this whole problem in the

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security of the President and the successor to office. Just how far you are going to go for his protection and his security. I don't think you can get absolute security without almost establishing a police state, and we don't want that. You can't put security in a black groove or a white groove. It is in a gray groove, and certain chances have to be taken. You are dealing with a human being when you are dealing with the President of the United States. President Johnson is a very down to earth human being, and it makes the security problem all the more difficult, but you can't bar him from the people.

There are certain things that can be done, and I submitted a memorandum to the Secret Service, and to the White House on certain security steps that might be taken and tightened up. But you are dealing with the general public and that is what has given me great concern in the recent expansion, of the criteria for dissemination that we adopted after the assassination.

Prior to that time we reported to the Secret Service all information that dealt with individuals who were potential killers or by whom acts of violence might be anticipated. The Secret Service would take that information and would do with it as they saw fit. I gave great consideration to it because I am not very happy with the criteria expansion, but I felt we had to include subversives of various character, and extremists. We have, in turn, furnished their names to the Secret Service. I think 5,000 names up to the present time already have been submitted and there are at least three or four thousand more that will be submitted within the next few months.

Then you come to the problem of what you are going to do when the Secret Service gets those names. They have to call upon the local authorities. Just recently, in the city of Chicago, when the President was there, the local authorities were asked to give assistance as they usually do to the Secret Service and they went to the homes of some of these people, and it resulted really almost in a house arrest.

Now, I don't think there is any place in this country for that kind of thing, but these people who belonged to extreme subversive organizations or organizations that advocated the overthrow of government by force and violence were told that they couldn't leave their house or if they did they would be accompanied by a police officer. That gives me great concern because in New York City alone, you run into maybe three or four thousand such individuals who would be members of subversive organizations, and then you get into the twilight zone of subversive fronts.

Now, there again, merely because a man belongs to a subversive front organization, in my estimation doesn't mean that he is blacklisted and is a menace to the country for life. If he belongs to 20 of them, it certainly shows either one of two things, he is either very gullible and dumb or he is a menace. That has been my attitude in regard to Government service where you find a Government employee who belonged to one or two, maybe in his early days. I don't believe this necessarily makes him a security risk. Rather, this would be dependent on the degree of his activity in the front group and his purpose and intent in associating himself with it. But where he has belonged to 15, 18, 20 of them, I don't think he has enough good judgment to be in the Government.

Some ministers get drawn into organizations, some of which are under the domination of the Communist Party. Now, those ministers don't know that. They are just as loyal and patriotic as you and I are, but they happen to belong. Now, that is where the question of human judgment has to be used. We try to use it in selecting these names. But I was startled when I learned of the incident in Chicago because there you come pretty close to a house arrest and we don't want that. We don't want a gestapo. We have to, I think, maintain an even balance.

I think it was very well expressed—

Mr. DULLES. May I ask you, Mr. Hoover, was this house arrest based on names you had furnished the Secret Service and they furnished the local authorities?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That brings me back to the question I think I heard

Congressman Ford ask you as I came into the room, because I think this is the crux of our investigation.

I read the FBI report very carefully and the whole implication of the report is that, number one, Oswald shot the President; number two, that he was not connected with any conspiracy of any kind, nature or description.

Mr. HOOVER. Correct.

Representative BOGGS. Do you still subscribe to that?

Mr. HOOVER. I subscribe to it even more strongly today than I did at the time that the report was written. You see, the original idea was that there would be an investigation by the FBI and a report would be prepared in such form that it could be released to the public.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Then a few days later, after further consideration, the President decided to form a commission, which I think was very wise, because I feel that the report of any agency of Government investigating what might be some shortcomings on the part of other agencies of Government ought to be reviewed by an impartial group such as this Commission. And the more I have read these reports, the more I am convinced that Oswald was the man who fired the gun; and he fired three times, killed the President, and wounded Governor Connally.

And I also am further convinced that there is absolutely no association between Oswald or Ruby. There was no such evidence ever established.

Mr. DULLES. Or Oswald and anybody else? Would you go that far?

Mr. HOOVER. Anybody else who might be——

Mr. DULLES. In connection with the assassination?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I would certainly go that far. There was suspicion at first this might be a Castro act.

Representative BOGGS. Right.

Mr. HOOVER. We had information that had been obtained in Mexico City by another intelligence agency indicating there was a man who had seen a certain amount of money passed to Oswald at the Cuban Consulate. I think it was $6,000 that was passed. We went into that very thoroughly. The man later retracted his statement and stated it was not true. He was asked whether he would take a lie detector test, and he did. The lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.

As to the lie detector, I do want to make this comment on it. I have always held to the opinion that it is not a perfect piece of machinery. It is an interpretation made by human beings of what the machine, the polygraph, shows. I would never want to convict or to send to the penitentiary any person solely on the evidence of the lie detector. It is a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological contribution.

But I have seen individuals who have failed the lie detector test and who were just as innocent as they could be. That particular lead in Mexico City was completely disproved; there was no foundation for it.

We found no associations between Oswald and Ruby. There has been a story printed that Ruby and Oswald worked together and were close friends.

There was no evidence, there was never any indication that we could find that Oswald had ever been in Ruby's nightclub or had had any association with him.

Ruby comes from Chicago, he was on the fringe of what you might call the elements of the underworld there. He came to Dallas, opened up the nightclub and it was a place where, certainly not the better class of people went, but it wasn't any so-called "joint," to use the vernacular. It was just another nightclub. So far as we have been able to establish there was no relationship or contact between Oswald and Ruby or anyone else allegedly involved in this assassination.

Representative BOGGS. The FBI interviewed practically everybody who ever associated with Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. It did.

Representative BOGGS. You didn't find any indication of why anyone should even suspect that Oswald would do this, did you?

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slowly. It wasn't going at a high rate of speed, so that he had perfect opportunity to do it.

Now, some people have raised the question: Why didn't he shoot the President as the car came toward the storehouse where he was working?

The reason for that is, I think, the fact there were some trees between his window on the sixth floor and the cars as they turned and went through the park. So he waited until the car got out from under the trees, and the limbs, and then he had a perfectly clear view of the occupants of the car, and I think he took aim, either on the President or Connally, and I personally believe it was the President in view of the twisted mentality the man had.

But he had given no indication of that—we had interviewed him, I think, three times. Of course, our interviews were predicated to find out whether he had been recruited by the Russian intelligence service, because they frequently do that.

Representative BOGGS. And had he been?

Mr. HOOVER. He had not been, so he said, and we have no proof that he was. He had been over there long enough but they never gave him citizenship in Russia at all. I think they probably looked upon him more as a kind of a queer sort of individual and they didn't trust him too strongly.

But just the day before yesterday information came to me indicating that there is an espionage training school outside of Minsk—I don't know whether it is true—and that he was trained at that school to come back to this country to become what they call a "sleeper," that is a man who will remain dormant for 3 or 4 years and in case of international hostilities rise up and be used.

I don't know of any espionage school at Minsk or near Minsk, and I don't know how you could find out if there ever was one because the Russians won't tell you if you asked them.

They do have espionage and sabotage schools in Russia and they do have an assassination squad that is used by them but there is no indication he had any association with anything of that kind.

Representative BOGGS. Now we have some people, including this man's mother, talk about Oswald having been an agent of the Government of the United States. I think his mother mentioned the CIA; she has made these statements publicly for money, apparently.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; she has.

Representative BOGGS. Just for the purpose of the record, I think it would be well if you would comment on that, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. Of course, we have interviewed his mother and his wife, and all his relatives, and everybody that he is known to have associated with. His mother I would put in a category of being emotionally unstable. She has been around the country making speeches, and the first indication of her emotional instability was the retaining of a lawyer that anyone would not have retained if they really were serious in trying to get down to the facts. But she has been in New York City; she has been in Chicago; I think other parts of the country, always speaking for money.

Now, that kind of an individual is the type we have seen over the years, who will say almost anything to draw a crowd. Just to be able to say something sensational. Many times we have gone out to such people and asked them specifically, "Now, what is your basis for this?" And they will say, "Well, I just had a feeling that that was true, so I said it."

She has never made that statement to us, but we have many other instances where that kind of statement is made. They don't have the legal evidence that you must have if you are going to take any positive action. I would put very little credence in anything that his mother said.

I think his wife was a far more reliable person in statements that she made, so far as we were able to ascertain, than his mother. I think the mother had in mind, naturally, the fact she wanted to clear her son's name, which was a natural instinct, but more importantly she was going to see how much money she could make, and I believe she has made a substantial sum.

Representative BOGGS. And the allegations she has made about this man being an agent either of the CIA or the FBI are false?

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I can certainly speak for the FBI that it is false, and I

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have discussed the matter, naturally, with Mr. McCone, the Director of CIA, and he, of course, will no doubt appear himself, but there is no indication at all that he was employed by them. We frequently get that kind of a story from individuals who, when they get into some kind of difficulty, will claim they were working for the CIA or they were working for the FBI.

Representative BOGGS. Surely.

Mr. HOOVER. Now, no one can work for the FBI without the approval being given at Washington and a record kept of it, even of the confidential informants. That is very tightly controlled. We have no so-called lump sum that we can use to hire people. So there has to be a voucher and specific details of payment. And I know at no time was he an informant or agent or a special employee or working in any capacity for the FBI.

As to the interviews we had with him in which he gave us some information, some of it was not the truth, but this was not particularly significant. The interviews we had with him I would not term as talking with an informant. He was interviewed while under arrest by the New Orleans police, and then after he had committed this act of assassination we interviewed him in police headquarters in Dallas. But they were the only contacts we had, I think four contacts altogether, and he received no money of any kind, no promise of any kind, and there was no indication that he was rendering assistance to the U.S. Government. We looked upon him as a criminal after the assassination, of course, and prior to that time we looked upon him as an individual who we suspected might become an agent of the Soviet government. There was no proof of that, and we checked him carefully.

We knew of his contact with the Soviet Embassy here at Washington, his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New York, and his contact with the Worker publication in New York. And none of those contacts gave any indication of any tendency to commit violence.

There are many people who read the Daily Worker, or what is now the Worker, and you certainly can't brand them as hazards to the security of the country or as potential assassins. It is in that area that I am particularly concerned that we don't become hysterical and go too far in restricting the citizens of our country from exercising their civil and constitutional rights. The mere fact a person disagrees with you in a matter on communism doesn't mean he should be arrested. Many Communists make very violent speeches, and we know them, but I don't feel that the time has come that they should be arrested. If they have violated the laws of the United States, we will, then, proceed with prosecution, and the cases can then go through the courts. Such cases last for years before they get to the Supreme Court, and even then such cases often start over on some legal angle. But, all in all, I think that the enforcement of security and the enforcement of laws dealing with subversion ought to be handled in the American manner.

I am criticized by the extreme right for that. They put me in the category, I guess, along with General Eisenhower. But the extreme left criticizes me, saying I believe that any person who has on a red necktie may be addicted to communism, and, therefore, is a great danger. That is why I say the extremists at both ends are bad, and I have repeated that several times publicly.

Representative BOGGS. No doubt about the problem being a difficult one. I remember some years back when these fanatics started shooting up the House of Representatives.

Mr. HOOVER. I recall that.

Representative BOGGS. I happened to be there on the occasion and there were many suggestions that we build a bulletproof glass enclosure around the Members of Congress and so on. Of course, all of us rejected those ideas because it would be totally incompatible with our democratic institutions and this, obviously, becomes a problem in the security of the President; that is what you are telling us, isn't it?

Mr. HOOVER. That is the great problem. We have participated in the protection of the President since the assassination. The Secret Service indicates how many agents it needs when the President is traveling somewhere or going somewhere in Washington, and then I assign that number of agents to the Secret Service. They are not under my direction. They are under the direction

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of the Secret Service because under law they are charged with the protection of the President. We have never done that before, but I felt that it was something we must do if the Secret Service desired it. Sometimes, such as at the funeral of the late President Kennedy, the procession walked up Connecticut Avenue, which created a very, very grave security problem because they were walking with these tall building on either side. As I recall, we had the responsibility for the Cathedral, and we had 43 agents in the Cathedral during the services. I was more concerned about these tall buildings, because all the small buildings have been torn down along Connecticut Avenue, and there were about six or seven blocks to walk. Not only the high officials of this Government, including the President, but the Queen of Greece, General de Gaulle, Emperor Haile Selassie, and many Prime Ministers were present. They were a perfect target for someone in some window.

Now, you can't empty these buildings. It is impossible to do that, because you can't go to the Mayflower Hotel and say all front rooms must be vacated. Other office buildings are there, even taller than the Mayflower, and you can't make them keep everybody out of the front offices because then you get into a police state.

The Secret Service does try to check to find out who have these various offices. We also check so if there is anything in our files on those individuals the Secret Service is at once advised. When the President goes to a banquet or a social occasion, all of the employees in the hotel, the cooks, waiters, and busboys, and so forth, are all checked by Secret Service to be certain there is no one with a background that would indicate a hazard to the President. But that is as far as I think you can go. You can't put in a whole new staff of waiters and you can't make people move out. People going to a Presidential function are generally invited by card or by list and that is very carefully checked at the entrance by the Secret Service.

We suggested a few more things that possibly could be done, and some of which I have doubts about. You speak about this matter of glass around the galleries in the House. One of the suggestions that we made was that there be bulletproof glass in front of the President's lectern. In my own mind, I question whether that is wise. Knowing this President as this President is, he wants to get close to the audience; he wants to reach over and shake hands with people. That concerns me because you never know when an emotionally unstable person may be in that crowd. As you noted, he has frequently brought groups into the White House gardens and walked around with people he didn't know. I know the Secret Service people are concerned about it. I am concerned about it.

President Truman last week expressed his concern that the President was taking unnecessary chances.

But the governmental agency having the responsibility for guarding him, the Secret Service, has a natural hesitancy to say, "You can't do this."

Representative Boggs. Of course, for the record, President Kennedy had the same difficulty.

Mr. Hoover. That is right. It was best expressed at Parkland Hospital. One of President Kennedy's staff made the statement that the whole fault in this matter was that, in the choice between politics and security, politics was chosen. That is exactly what happened. It was an open car. I am thoroughly opposed to the President riding in an open car.

They did not have any armored car in the Secret Service at that time. I have now sent one of our armored cars over for the President, but it is a closed limousine. But on occasion, such as at Gettysburg and Atlanta the other day, the President got out of the armored car which had been flown there for his use, and commandeered the car of the Secret Service which is wide open, so he could wave and see the people. Now, that is a great hazard. I think he should always be in an armored car that is closed, that can't have the top put down. But as you recall, President Kennedy had the bubble top off of the car that he was in. It was not armored and the bubble top was made of plastic so a bullet could have gone through it very easily.

Representative Ford. Mr. Hoover, you have categorically testified that the

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FBI never at any time had Oswald as an agent, as an informant, or in any other way.

Mr. HOOVER. That is correct. I couldn't make it more emphatic.

Representative FORD. And Mr. Belmont testified to the same last week when he was before us.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Representative FORD. Both you and he would be fully familiar with all of the records of the FBI in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. We would, and we would not only be fully familiar with it because while Mr. Belmont is in charge of the Investigative Branch of the Bureau—we have two assistants to the Director, one in charge of administrative work and the other in charge of investigative work—we have also checked the administrative records where vouchers or payments would have been made and there is no indication that any money was ever paid to Oswald. We have obtained, and they are on file with the Commission, the affidavits of the agents, who at various times were in contact with Oswald, to the effect that he was not an informant; that they had never paid him anything; that he was being questioned as to possible recruitment by the Soviet intelligence; so there was no evidence at any time indicating employment by the FBI.

Representative FORD. And you were not under any limitation or restriction from any other authority in this regard?

Mr. HOOVER. Absolutely not. I have the entire control of whether a man shall be an informant or shall not be an informant. That comes under my chain of command from the local office which has the matter at hand. They can't just put on an informant without our approval. The recommendation on security informants comes to the Bureau; it goes through the Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division, and, in significant cases, goes to Mr. Belmont, and then to my desk for my specific approval. So I, or my seat-of-government staff, have to approve every one of those who are used as informants in all classes of cases, not only in intelligence cases but in white-slave cases, automobile thefts, and all of these cases.

Representative FORD. There is no limitation on what you can tell us about this situation?

Mr. HOOVER. None whatsoever.

Representative FORD. No limitation; no restrictions?

Mr. HOOVER. No restriction. So far as the record of vouchers in the Bureau are concerned, they are open to the inspection of this Commission at any time going back as far as you may want to go.

Senator COOPER. May I ask just one question there? I think you have answered it, but in your examination of this aspect as to whether or not Oswald was an informer or employee or held any relationship to the FBI, you, yourself, have looked into all of the means you have of determining that fact when you make the statement to us?

Mr. HOOVER. I have personally looked into that for two reasons: Because the President asked me personally to take charge of this investigation and to direct it, and I knew that the report ultimately would be made to him. For that reason I became familiar with every step and every action that was taken. Then when the allegation was made by someone—I think it was the mother of Oswald first, if I recall correctly—that he was employed by some Government agency, the CIA, or FBI, and maybe both, I insisted upon a check being made and any record showing any indication of that being brought to me. When they could find none, I then asked for affidavits from the field force that had dealt with Oswald as to whether they had hired him or paid him anything or given him anything, and the affidavits are on file here that they had not.

Senator COOPER. I think you have said there is no sum available to the FBI which would enable these men, these agents, to employ him out of any funds that are made available to them.

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, no; it must be done by voucher, and those vouchers are examined by the General Accounting Office every year or so. We have no lump sum in the field offices for employment of informants as such which is not supported by vouchers.

Senator COOPER. I have just about two questions, I may have to go in a few

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minutes to the Senate. I would like to direct your attention to that period of time when Oswald was a defector, beginning when he left the United States and when he returned.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. During that period, did the FBI have any jurisdiction over intelligence regarding him, or any capacity to know?

Mr. HOOVER. While he was in Russia?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. No; we did not. We were interested in knowing what he might say in Russia that appeared in the press. That was our first intimation that this man had defected, when we read it in a newspaper article. We were, of course, interested in knowing when he would return or if he would return. We had no jurisdiction as to what he was doing in Russia after he had gone there.

Senator COOPER. As I understand it, you had no capacity at that time to follow his activities?

Mr. HOOVER. That is true. We have no agents in Russia. Foreign intelligence is handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, and our responsibility is domestic. We work very closely together.

Senator COOPER. Have you had the jurisdiction since the assassination or the occasion to examine persons connected with the State Department concerning the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. HOOVER. Well——

Senator COOPER. Would that be a matter for some other agency?

Mr. HOOVER. That could be a matter for CIA or for us after Oswald had returned here.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. HOOVER. Then he becomes a civilian in the country here. Now, there is what we call a delimitation agreement among the Government intelligence agencies. For instance, the military branches of the Government have their own intelligence services and they handle all military deviations in regard to espionage or things of that kind. If they want our assistance and ask for it we, of course, will always cooperate. In regard to CIA, there are many cases which CIA and the FBI work jointly on, of individuals that may have been recruited over in Europe by the CIA, not by us, because we don't have authority to do that abroad, but when that man comes to this country, the best ends of intelligence are served by having the two agencies work very closely together, conduct joint interviews, and exchange information very, very freely. That has been going on ever since I can recall CIA being existence.

Mr. DULLES. I would like to testify to the fact that that cooperation existed during the whole period I was Director, and I am sure it has continued now with great cooperation on both sides.

Mr. HOOVER. It is a very necessary thing, because the intelligence agency of many of these foreign countries will cover the whole world and the country itself. Whereas in this country you have separate agencies covering espionage activities. CIA covers the foreign activity, and the FBI the domestic activities, and they must be interlocking. An espionage agent of the Soviet Government can arrive in New York today by plane from Paris and he can be in Mexico City tomorrow. Then, CIA would pick him up there. We would not pick him up there. We would watch him while in this country, but as soon as he takes that plane and leaves the United States CIA moves in on him. If he comes back to the United States, we move in on him. Therefore, we have a very close liaison.

As a matter of fact, what we have done in government agencies is to have a liaison agent in our Bureau assigned to contact CIA, the Pentagon, State Department, and various other agencies to cut out the red tape of writing letters back and forth. In order to orally relay information which has come to his attention, our representative can immediately phone it over to the FBI, and if there is need, for instance, to meet a plane coming in to New York or a boat that is docking at New York, it is all accomplished within a matter of 45 minutes or an hour.

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If you went through this letter-writing process and the paper war that goes on so often in the Government it might take a week or 10 days.

The FBI does have 10 legal attaches attached to 10 embassies abroad. Their purpose is not operational. They don't investigate in those countries any matters that have to be investigated. That, if it is to be done, is handled by CIA. Our purpose in being there is to maintain liaison with our opposite number such as the Surete Nationale in France and with the national police in the Philippines, to exchange information that is vital to our internal security, and also vital to the internal security of the other country.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one other question?

Is there any, considering the number of defectors in the United States to Communist countries, which cannot be large, I would assume——

Mr. HOOVER. I think there are about 36.

Senator COOPER. Which would indicate, I would think either a lack of reliability on their part and stability or beyond that a dedicated purpose to become Communists, then upon their return, wouldn't it seem to you they should be given some special attention?

Mr. HOOVER. We have now———

Senator COOPER. To determine whether they are a risk to become Soviet or Communist espionage agents or in fact become dangerous?

Mr. HOOVER. We have taken steps to plug that gap.

Prior to the assassination of the President, a defector, before he came back was always cleared for return by a representative of the State Department or the military abroad. When he came back we immediately interviewed him if he was a civilian. It had to be done promptly to determine whether he could be a potential intelligence agent.

Now, in December of last year, following the assassination, we expanded the criteria of what should be furnished to the Secret Service, and all defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service.

There are 36 defectors that we know of in this country who have been under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.

Mr. DULLES. That includes military defectors, does it not?

Mr. HOOVER. Military defectors and defectors from any private agency, after they return to the U.S. and become civilians. Some have defected to China, to the satellite nations and to Russia.

Senator COOPER. Just one other question, because I have to go.

In the course of this investigation, as you know so well, there have been a number identified who were very close, at least to Mrs. Oswald, and a few, I can't say that were close to Oswald yet they had association with him, such as the man who drove him back and forth, Mrs. Paine, with whom Mrs. Oswald lived, and others, has there been any credible, I won't say credible because if you had you would have presented it to us in your report, has there been any claims by persons that these people are in any way related to the Communist Party?

Mr. HOOVER. We have had no credible evidence that they have been related to the Communist Party in this country.

Now, as to Mrs. Oswald, the wife of Oswald, there is no way of knowing whether she belonged to the Russian Communist Party in Russia. She is a rather intelligent woman, and notwithstanding that you have to talk with her through an interpreter, we have had no indication of her association with Communists in this country, nor have any of her close friends or relatives.

As to his mother, we found no indication she is associated or closely associated with the Communists. She is the only one of the group that we have come in contact with that I would say is somewhat emotionally unstable. Our agents have interviewed her. She sometimes gets very angry and she won't answer questions. As to the rest of the group who had been friends of his, or worked with him in the Texas School Book Depository, none of them have indicated any Communist associations of any kind.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

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Mr. HOOVER. Thank you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, I hand you Exhibit 863 and ask you to examine that and state whether or not that is the letter that you referred to in which you answered questions of the Commission concerning the National Enquirer magazine or newspaper?

Mr. HOOVER. This letter of May 8 addressed to the Commission is the letter that dealt with our interview with Chief Curry and was predicated upon the article which appeared in the National Enquirer of May 17, 1964.

Mr. RANKIN. I ask you if you would care to add anything to that letter except what you have already testified to?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to that. Chief Curry was very specific, I am told by my agent in charge at Dallas, that this article is an absolute lie; that none of these things set forth in the article occurred; that he received no phone call or any request of any kind oral or by phone or in writing from the Department of Justice or from the FBI. As I stated earlier, the report from the Department of Justice indicated that they made no request.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Exhibit 863, being the letter just referred to.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 863 for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, is Exhibit 837 the article that you referred to in the National Enquirer?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; that is the one.

Mr. RANKIN. I call your attention to Exhibit 836 and ask you if that is the letter that you referred to which describes the criteria in the handling of the security of the President that you have described in your testimony.

Mr. HOOVER. This is the letter. It sets forth the criteria which were adopted, originally about 1942 and later incorporated in the manual of instructions in 1954. It also includes the amended instructions to our field offices, prepared in December of 1963, which extended the criteria.

Mr. RANKIN. Does that Exhibit correctly set forth the information you had in regard to those matters?

Mr. HOOVER. It does.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you care to add anything to it?

Mr. HOOVER. No; I have nothing to add to it at all.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, in light of what happened. Mr. Hoover, I think the Commission would desire to have your comments or whatever you care to tell them, concerning the reasons why you did not furnish the information you had concerning Lee Harvey Oswald to the Secret Service prior to the time of the President's assassination.

Mr. HOOVER. Well, I have gone into that very thoroughly because that was obviously one of the questions that I had in my mind when the tragedy occurred in Dallas.

In going back over the record, and I have read each one of the reports dealing with that and the reports of Mr. Hosty who had dealt with the Oswald situation largely in Dallas, we had the matter that I have previously referred to, the report of the State Department that indicated this man was a thoroughly safe risk, he had changed his views, he was a loyal man now and had seen the light of day, so to speak.

How intensive or how extensive that interview in Moscow was, I don't know. But, nevertheless, it was in a State Department document that was furnished to us.

Now, we interviewed Oswald a few days after he arrived. We did not interview him on arrival at the port of entry because that is always undesirable by reason of the fact it is heavily covered by press, and any relatives generally are there, so we prefer to do it after the man has settled down for two or three days and become composed. We do it in the privacy of our office or wherever he may be, or in his own home or apartment. We interviewed him twice in regard to that angle that we were looking for. We had no indication at this time of anything other than his so-called Marxist leanings, Marxist beliefs.

We wanted to know whether he had been recruited by the Soviet government as an intelligence agent, which is a frequent and constant practice. There is not a year goes by but that individuals and groups of individuals, sometimes on these cultural exchanges, go through Russia and recruits are enlisted by the Russian intelligence, usually through blackmail. The individual is threatened that if he doesn't come back to this country and work for them they will expose the fact that he is a homosexual or a degenerate or has been indiscrete.

Pictures are usually taken of individuals who become implicated in that sort of thing, so the individual is really desperate. Such blackmail has occurred year after year for some time.

In Oswald's case we had no suspicion that any pressure like that had been brought to bear on him because he had gone voluntarily and had obviously wanted to live in Russia and had married a Russian woman.

After those interviews had been completed, the next incident was the difficulty he had at New Orleans. We were concerned there as to whether he was functioning officially for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee which was financed and supported by Castro and Castro's government, and if he was, where he obtained money and with whom he had dealt.

He apparently had the leaflets printed himself on plain ordinary paper. There was no reason for us, then, to have any suspicion that he had any element of danger in him.

However, we did not ignore or forget the fact that he was still in the country. We kept track of him when he went from New Orleans to Dallas, and that was one of the reasons why Hosty went to the home of Mrs. Paine. She told us where Oswald was working, at the Texas book house. Hosty gave her his telephone number and his name so that if there was any information or any contact she wanted to make she could phone him at the Dallas office.

Mrs. Oswald, the wife, took down the license number of Hosty's car which was incorrect only in one digit. The name, the telephone number, and the automobile license were later found in Oswald's memorandum book.

However, that in itself was not significant because many times we will go to see a person and tell him now, "If you think of anything you want to tell us or you have any information you want to give us, here are my name and address, telephone number, and call me," and that is what was done with Mrs. Paine because Hosty wasn't there at the time. He was at work.

Incidentally, those items in Oswald's notebook requiring investigative attention were first set out in an investigative report of our Dallas Office dated December 23, 1963. This report was not prepared for this Commission but rather for investigative purposes of the FBI and, therefore, the information concerning Hosty's name, telephone number and license number was not included in the report as the circumstances under which Hosty's name, et cetera, appeared in Oswald's notebook were fully known to the FBI.

After our investigative report of December 23, 1963, was furnished to the Commission, we noted that Agent Hosty's name did not appear in the report. In order that there would be a complete reporting of all items in Oswald's notebook, this information was incorporated in another investigative report of our Dallas Office, dated February 11, 1964. Both of the above-mentioned reports were furnished to the Commission prior to any inquiry concerning this matter by the President's Commission.

There was nothing up to the time of the assassination that gave any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might do harm to the President or to the Vice President. Up to that time, as has been indicated.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, may I interrupt, you said Hosty was not there at the time, he was at work—did you mean Mr. Oswald?

Mr. HOOVER. That was my mistake. I meant Mr. Oswald. Hosty talked with Mrs. Paine and Mrs. Oswald. Mrs. Paine speaks Russian and she could interpret for her.

Oswald was at the Texas Book Co., and then, as I say, Hosty left his telephone number and name, and Mrs. Oswald for some reason took down the license number. I don't know whether she was convinced this was an agent of the FBI, or why she did it.

But, anyway, that was in the book that was later found, and which contained many other things that Oswald had entered in the book.

Now, as I say, up to that time, there had been no information that would have warranted our reporting him as a potential danger or hazard to the security or the safety of the President or the Vice President, so his name was not furnished at the time to Secret Service.

Under the new criteria which we have now put into force and effect, it would have been furnished because we now include all defectors. As to the original criteria, which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to S.S. to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened the President or Vice President.

At my office during the course of a week there are sometimes three or four callers who have to be taken to a Hospital because of their mental condition. They claim they are being persecuted by radio beams and they want to see me or the President to have those beams stopped. Now you never know what tangent they are going to take. If such a person is living in some part of the country where the President may be going his name would be furnished to the Secret Service.

One car last year, I think, crashed through the gates of the White House; the person driving wanted to see the President. The guard wouldn't let him in and so the car crashed through and got within 20 feet of the first door. The guards, by that time, had their revolvers out and took him into custody.

Last year a gentleman drove all the way from Arizona to see me. He drove up the marble steps of the Department of Justice, and by that time the guards had come out and took him into custody. I think he was incarcerated in Arizona.

People of this type are among those we would have furnished to the Secret Service. They have the potential to harm somebody.

We get names from members of Congress, of people who come to the Capitol and try to threaten them or harass them. They let us know about it, and we make the investigation or advise the police. If we can get the family to have the person put into an institution, we try to do so. If they don't, we may take steps to have him incarcerated through other legal means.

Mr. DULLES. How many names, Mr. Director, in general, could the Secret Service process? Aren't their facilities limited as to dealing with vast numbers of names because of their limited personnel?

Mr. HOOVER. I think they are extremely limited. The Secret Service is a very small organization and that is why we are fortifying them, so to speak, or supplementing them by assigning agents of our Bureau which is, of course, quite a burden on us. Our agents are assigned about 24 to 25 cases per agent and cover such involved matters as bankruptcy and antitrust cases.

Now, the Secret Service has a very small group and I would estimate that the names we have sent over number some 5,000. I would guess there are about another 4,000 that will go over in the next month to them. Frankly, I don't see how they can go out and recheck those names. We keep the records up to date; if additional information comes in on these names we furnish it to the Secret Service. They will have to call upon the local authorities, unless the Secret Service force is enlarged considerably so that they can handle it entirely on their own. I think the Secret Service is entirely too small a force today to handle the duties that they are handling. The great crowds that are at the White House all the time, around the gates, that go to church where the President goes, all of those things, of course, have to be checked over by them. They always check in advance and just recently, a few Sundays ago, they found some individuals in the basement of St. Mark's church in Washington, where he was going to attend on Sunday morning. His arrival was held up until they could ascertain who they were. They were deaf mutes whose identity had not been cleared with the Secret Service.

Now, the Presidential party was delayed about 5 or 10 minutes in reaching the church by reason of the radio call to the White House to hold it up.

We are giving to Secret Service more and more names. The total, in addition to the names they already had, will reach 10,000. I don't see how they are

going to be able to handle the situation as they would want to handle it. They have to depend upon local police organizations. Many local police departments are capable and efficient; some are not. Many have good judgment and some have not. Wherever you have a police department of 10,000, 15,000, 20,000 men you are bound to find a few who will just barge in and do something which better judgment would dictate should not be done, as in the incident which occurred in the Midwest where they placed people practically under house arrest. I think it was very bad judgment and should not have been done but the Secret Service, of course, turned the names over to the local authorities, and the local authorities do what they think is right.

Now, I guess their attitude with all justice to them is, "Well, we will resolve the risk in our favor. If we keep these people under surveillance and keep them in the house until the President gets out of town nothing can happen from them." That is what you would call totalitarian security. I don't think you can have that kind of security in this country without having a great wave of criticism against it. There is a great tendency for people to expect the intelligence forces and the law enforcement agencies to be able to go out and arrest people and bring them in and hold them endlessly and talk to them. We can't arrest a person, without probable cause, or unless he commits a crime in our presence. We have to arraign him promptly and if not done promptly, the confession that he may have made generally cannot be used against him.

Just as a collateral matter we faced that problem in California in the case of the kidnapping of Frank Sinatra, Jr. One of the kidnappers we arrested near San Diego confessed but we didn't arraign him because the other kidnappers would have left California and it would have been difficult to find them. However, the next day after arraignment he made changes in the confession and signed it so the court held that it was admissible.

The Secret Service, of course, is faced with the same problem. They just can't arrest people because they may not like their looks. They have to have facts justifying detention but the public conception is that you have a full right to go out and do these things. We have stressed in the FBI that there must be full compliance with the laws of this country and with the decisions of the Supreme Court. That is the law of the country. Now, whether a person likes it or not and there are some groups that are very violent against the decisions of the court while others are very much in favor of them, it is not for the FBI to take sides. We have a job to do and we do it under the rulings of the courts and we have been able to do it effectively.

I know when the ruling came down on the prompt arraignment, there was great shouting and some strong editorials claiming that it was going to wreck law enforcement. It hasn't wrecked us. It has made it more difficult but I think we have to face up to the fact that law enforcement in a free country must abide by the laws of that country irrespective of how difficult it is. Some persons talk about putting handcuffs on the law enforcement officers and taking them off the criminals. That is a nice catch phrase to use in a speech or article but operating within the law has not interfered with our work.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Hoover, I ask you about Exhibit 825 which is first a letter and then encloses certain affidavits of your agents.

Mr. Hoover. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. You are familiar with that?

Mr. Hoover. I am familiar with that. I read all of that and signed it.

Mr. Rankin. You know those are the affidavits in regard to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was an agent or connected in anyway with the Bureau that you have just testified to?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; and the affidavits of all agents, who had any contact with him.

Mr. Rankin. I call your attention to Exhibits 864 and 865, and ask you if you have seen those before or, you have seen the original of 864 and 865 is a photostatic copy of your letter to us in answer to 864, is that correct?

Mr. Hoover. That is correct; yes. I recall very distinctly.

Mr. Rankin. Do you recall those letters involved an inquiry as to any connections of Lee Harvey Oswald with Communists or any criminal groups or others that might be conspiratorial?

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refrained from further comment but of course by that time the identification of the gun was known, the caliber of the gun, where it had come from, where it had been bought and the information we had run down in Chicago and had furnished to the Dallas Police Department.

If the case had been in the hands of the FBI none of that information would have been given out: Because of the publicity you had to face the charge that the prejudice of the community would require a change of venue. With the publicity, I don't know where you could have changed the venue to, since newspapers all over the State covered it. I think a Houston reporter was the first one who wrote that Oswald was an informant of the FBI. We went to the newspaper reporter. He refused to tell us his source. He said he had also heard it from other persons. We asked him the names of these persons and we interviewed them but none of them would provide the source. In other words, I was trying to nail down where this lie started. That, of course, is always the result where you are daily giving out press interviews because the press wants stories desperately. We have always adopted the policy in the Bureau of no comment until we have the warrant and make the arrest. Then a release is prepared briefly stating what the facts are, what the written complaint says, the fact. The complaint was filed with the Commissioner, and that ends it. We don't try to run it out for a week or 10 days, It is up to the U.S. attorney thereafter and the court to try the case.

I was concerned about the demand for change of venue, because all the evidence was being given out. At that time, of course, we didn't know that Oswald was going to be killed, and there was a possibility that he might be confronted with some of this evidence. If it had been kept secret and used in the interrogation of him, just confronting him with what was found, such as his picture with the gun might have been helpful.

A small thing can often make a man break and come forward with a full confession. If he knows in advance that you have certain evidence he will be on guard against answering questions. Of course, he is always advised of his rights and that he can have an attorney. We always make a point of this. We generally have a reputable physician of the community present in our office while the prisoner is there, to administer to him and be able to testify that he has not been subjected to third degree methods. He is examined when he comes in and he is examined before we take him to the commissioner. Taking him before the commissioner in a case like Oswald's would probably have been done within 4 or 5 hours. Generally we try to arraign a prisoner within an hour.

That makes it more difficult; you have to work faster. But again I say I am in favor of having the procedures of law enforcement officers as tightly bound down as we can, with due respect for the interests of society.

Of course, there must be an equal balance. For years we have had a rule against third degree methods, but years ago many police departments used the third degree. I think very few of them use it now because if they use it they violate the civil rights statutes and we investigate them for having brutally handled a prisoner. Many allegations are made unfairly against police officers that they have used third degree methods and we are able to prove they haven't in our investigations. That is particularly true where civil rights matters are involved. We have such cases in many areas where civil rights agitation is going on.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Hoover, to remind you of my question, any suggestions that you may have concerning the protection of the President, and the information that the Commission has that you have a special appropriation in that connection for the Bureau?

Mr. HOOVER. We do not have a special appropriation for the protection of the President. The Secret Service, of course, has that responsibility. On December 2, I prepared this memorandum for the President, and for the chief of the Secret Service at the request of the President, outlining suggestions that I felt should be considered to tighten up on the security of the President. If the Commission desires I will be glad to leave this or I will be glad to read it to the Commission.

Representative BOGGS. Why don't you ask the Director just to summarize it.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you summarize it?

Mr. DULLES. Can we have a copy of it?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Representative FORD. Could the copy be put in the record as an exhibit?

Mr. HOOVER. Yes, sir; that is all right with me. I have no objection to it. Regarding travel, first, advise the Secret Service as far in advance as possible of the President's travel plans and proposed itinerary. The reason for that is there have been Presidents who suddenly decide they are going somewhere and the Secret Service does not have the chance always to cover the area and check the neighborhood and check the hotel or place where it may be.

Representative BOGGS. You have one like that right now, Mr. Director.

Mr. HOOVER. I know from experience.

Second, avoid publicizing exact routes of travel as long as possible. Again, it has been the practice in the past to announce the President is going along a certain route and, therefore, great crowds will gather along that route. And, therefore, I thought that was something that should not be given out and the President should be taken along some routes which are not announced. At the present time, he goes to cities and he wants to see people and the crowd wants to see him. In Dallas, the route was publicized at least 24 hours before so everybody knew where he would be driving.

Third, use a specially armored car with bulletproof glass and have such cars readily available in locations frequently visited. The President, as I observed earlier in my testimony, had no armored car. He has one now which I supplied to Secret Service and they will have one made no doubt in due time for the President's use. But if it had been armored, I believe President Kennedy would be alive today.

Fourth, avoid setting a specific pattern of travel or other activity such as visiting the same church at the same time each Sunday.

Regarding public appearances. First, use maximum feasible screening of persons in attendance including use of detection devices sensitive to the amount of metal required in a firearm or grenade.

Second, use a bulletproof shield in front of the entire rostrum in public appearances such as the swearing in ceremony at the Capitol on inauguration day, the presidential reviewing stand in front of the White House on the same day and on the rear of trains.

Third, keep to a minimum the President's movements within crowds, remain on the rostrum after the public addresses rather than mingling with the audience. Again, there is great difficulty in that field.

Fourth, in appearances at public sporting events such as football games, remain in one place rather than changing sides during half-time ceremonies.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DULLES. About the armored car you said if Kennedy had an armored car that might have saved him. Would the back of the armored car have some protection to protect his head?

Mr. HOOVER. Oh, yes.

Mr. DULLES. Because if the armored car had been open——

Mr. HOOVER. He must never ride in an open car; that has been my recommendation.

Mr. DULLES. The back never comes down?

Mr. HOOVER. The back never comes down, and it is bulletproof. The top, sides, and underpart are all of bulletproof construction. So that except by opening a window and waving through the window the occupant is safe. A person can shoot through the window if the glass window is lowered.

Fifth, limit public appearances by use of television whenever possible.

Sixth, avoid walking in public except when absolutely necessary.

Now, on legislation. First, I recommended that the President and the Vice President be added to the list of Federal officers set out in section 1114, title 18 of the U.S. Code which deals with assaults which are punishable under Federal law.

Mr. RANKIN. You would add to that I understood from your prior remarks, the Speaker and the President Pro Tempore?

Mr. HOOVER. In view of the situation which prevails at the present time the

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Speaker and President pro tempore, in other words, the line of succession under the Constitution but not below that.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. HOOVER. Second, furnish the Secret Service authority to request assistance and cooperation from other U.S. agencies including the military, particularly in connection with foreign travel.

Now, my reason for that is that sometimes requests for assistance have to clear through red-tape channels here at Washington through some high official of Government. If an emergency arises abroad, or even in this country, it may be of such character that you do not have time to telephone back to Washington or to telephone back to the Pentagon. Aid ought to be immediately available by calling on the local authorities and the nearest military authority.

Third, improve control of the sale of firearms requiring as a minimum registration of every firearm sold together with adequate identification of the purchaser. The problem of firearms control is under extensive debate, in both the House and Senate at the present time.

The gun that Oswald used was bought by mail order from a mail-order house in Chicago, no license for it, no permit for it, no checkup on it. The only way we were able to trace it was to find out where in this country that Italian-made gun was sold. We found the company in Chicago and later the mail-order slip that had been sent by Oswald to Chicago to get the gun. Now, there are arguments, of course——

Mr. DULLES. In a false name.

Mr. HOOVER. In a false name.

There is argument, of course, that by passing firearms legislation you are going to take the privilege of hunting away from the sportsmen of the country. I don't share that view with any great degree of sympathy because you have to get a license to drive an automobile and you have to get a license to have a dog, and I see no reason why a man shouldn't be willing, if he is a law-abiding citizen, to have a license to get a firearm whether it be a rifle or revolver or other firearm.

It is not going to curtail his exercise of shooting for sport because the police make a check of his background. If he is a man who is entitled to a gun, a law-abiding citizen, a permit will be granted.

Of course, today firearms control is practically negligible, and I think some steps should be taken along that line.

Fourth, a ban on picketing within the vicinity of the White House as is now done at the U.S. Capitol and Supreme Court. Some of these pickets are well-meaning and law-abiding individuals, some are for peace and some are more or less dedicated Communists.

Representative BOGGS. It is illegal to picket a Federal court now, Mr. Director, I happen to be the author of that law.

Mr. HOOVER. Yes; I am glad you had that law passed. Of course, they picket public buildings, they march around the Department of Justice Building, now and then, but the principal places they prefer to go are the Supreme Court Building, the Capitol and its grounds and the White House.

I think such picketing at the White House, of large or small groups, should be forbidden. I think at the White House they tried to get the pickets to walk across the street along Lafayette Park. That at least takes them away from being close to the gates at the White House. I think there ought to be some control. Picketing, of course, is legitimate if it is orderly. Many times it doesn't continue to be orderly, and sometimes pickets, as in this city, have thrown themselves on the pavement and the police have to come and pick them up or drag them away. Then, of course, the charge is made of brutality right away.

Delegations of colored groups have visited me and asked why I don't arrest a police officer for hitting some Negro whom he is arresting in a sit-in strike, lay-in strike or demonstration in some southern cities.

We have no authority to make an arrest of that kind. Under the authority the Bureau has we have to submit those complaints to the Department of Justice and if they authorize us to make an arrest we will do it.

have the number 866 assigned to the memo that Mr. Hoover is going to send about protection of the President, and have it admitted to this record under that number.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it may be.

Representative FORD. Also a number for this letter Mr. Hoover is going to submit.

Mr. RANKIN. May I assign 867?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Commission Exhibit Nos. 866 and 867 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. McCONE AND RICHARD M. HELMS

MAY 14, 1964

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be in order.

Director McCone, it is customary for the Chairman to make a short statement to the witness as to the testimony that is expected to be given. I will read it at this time.

Mr. McCone will be asked to testify on whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever an agent, directly or indirectly, or an informer or acting on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency in any capacity at any time, and whether he knows of any credible evidence or of any conspiracy either domestic or foreign involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, also with regard to any suggestions and recommendations he may have concerning improvements or changes in provisions for the protection of the President of the United States.

Would you please rise and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCONE. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please? Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, will you state your name?

Mr. McCONE. My name is John Alex McCone.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official position with the U.S. Government?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, sir; I am Director of Central Intelligence.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you been Director for some time?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; a little over 2½ years.

Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live, Mr. McCone?

Mr. McCONE. I live at 3025 Whitehaven Street in Washington.

Mr. RANKIN. Are you familiar with the records and how they are kept by the Central Intelligence Agency as to whether a man is acting as an informer, agent, employee, or in any other capacity for that Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; I am generally familiar with the procedures and the records that are maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Quite naturally, I am not familiar with all of the records because they are very extensive.

Mr. RANKIN. Have you determined whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald, the suspect in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, had any connection with the Central Intelligence Agency, informer or indirectly as an employee, or any other capacity?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; I have determined to my satisfaction that he had no such connection, and I would like to read for the record——

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us briefly the extent of your inquiry?

Mr. McCONE. In a form of affidavit, I have gone into the matter in considerable detail personally, in my inquiry with the appropriate people within the Agency, examined all records in our files relating to Lee Harvey Oswald. We had knowledge of him, of course, because of his having gone to the Soviet Union, as he did, putting him in a situation where his name would appear in our name file. However, my examination has resulted in the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him directly or in any other manner. The Agency never fur-

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nished him with any funds or money or compensated him directly or indirectly in any fashion, and Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected directly or indirectly in any way whatsoever with the Agency. When I use the term "Agency," I mean the Central Intelligence Agency, of course.

Representative FORD. Does that include whether or not he was in the United States, in the Soviet Union, or anyplace?

Mr. MCCONE. Anyplace; the United States, Soviet Union, or anyplace.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, is that the affidavit you are going to supply the Commission in connection with our request for it?

Mr. MCCONE. Yes; this is the substance of the affidavit which I will supply to you.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I ask leave to mark that Exhibit 870 and have it introduced in evidence as soon as we receive it from Mr. McCone as a part of this record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(Commission Exhibit No. 870 was marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Would you tell us about your procedures in regard to having an agent or informer or any person acting in that type of capacity? Does that have to pass through your hands or come to your attention in the Agency?

Mr. MCCONE. No; it does not have to come through my personal hands.

Mr. RANKIN. Without disclosing something that might be a security matter, could you tell us how that is handled in a general way in the Agency?

Mr. MCCONE. Mr. Helms, who is directly responsible for that division of the Agency's activities as a Deputy Director, might explain. Would that be permissible?

Mr. RANKIN. Could we have him sworn then?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HELMS. I do.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, you heard the inquiry just directed to Mr. McCone. Could you answer the question directly?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; we have a specific procedure which we follow in all cases where the Agency is in contact, for the purposes of acquiring intelligence or whatever the case may be, with an individual. We not only have a record of the individual's name, but we also usually get information of a biographical nature. We then check this individual's name against our record. At that point we make a determination as to whether we desire to use this man or not to use him. It varies from case to case as to how many officers may be involved in approving a specific recruitment. May I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, did you have anything to do on behalf of your Agency with determining whether or not Lee Harvey Oswald was acting in any of the capacities I have described in my questions to Mr. McCone?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I did.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you tell us what you did in that regard?

Mr. HELMS. On Mr. McCone's behalf, I had all of our records searched to see if there had been any contacts at any time prior to President Kennedy's assassination by anyone in the Central Intelligence Agency with Lee Harvey Oswald. We checked our card files and our personnel files and all our records.

Now, this check turned out to be negative. In addition I got in touch with those officers who were in positions of responsibility at the times in question to see if anybody had any recollection of any contact having even been suggested with this man. This also turned out to be negative, so there is no material in the Central Intelligence Agency, either in the records or in the mind of any of the individuals, that there was any contact had or even contemplated with him.

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Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Do you recall or do you know at what time the name of Lee Harvey Oswald was carded, first came to your attention so it became a matter of record, in the Agency?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, I would want to consult the record to be absolutely accurate, but it is my impression that the first time that his name showed up on any Agency records was when he went to the Soviet Union.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, in connection with your work you have supplied information to the Commission and we have requested many things from your Agency. Can you tell the Commission as to whether or not you have supplied us all the information the Agency has, at least in substance, in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. We have; all.

Representative FORD. Has a member of the Commission staff had full access to your files on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. HELMS. He has, sir.

Representative FORD. They have had the opportunity to personally look at the entire file?

Mr. HELMS. We invited them to come out to our building in Langley and actually put the file on the table so that they could examine it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was personally out there, too, and was offered the same opportunity. I did not avail myself of it because of the time element, but I was offered the same opportunity.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, can you explain, according to the limitations of security, the reasons why we examined materials but did not always take them, in a general way?

Mr. HELMS. Yes; I can.

In our communications between individuals working overseas and in Washington, we for security reasons have a method of hiding the identities of individuals in telegrams and dispatches by the use of pseudonyms and cryptonyms. For this reason, we never allow the original documents to leave our premises. However, on the occasion when the representatives of the Commission staff looked at these files, we sat there and identified these pseudonyms and cryptonyms and related them to the proper names of the individuals concerned, so that they would know exactly what the correspondence said.

Mr. RANKIN. By that you mean the representatives of the Commission were able to satisfy themselves that they had all of the information for the benefit of the Commission without disclosing matters that would be a threat to security; is that right?

Mr. HELMS. It is my understanding that they were satisfied.

Representative FORD. Mr. McCone, do you have full authority from higher authority to make full disclosure to this Commission of any information in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. MCCONE. That is right. It is my understanding that it is the desire of higher authority that this Commission shall have access to all information of every nature in our files or in the minds of employees of Central Intelligence Agency.

Representative FORD. On the basis of that authority, you or the Agency have made a full disclosure?

Mr. MCCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Helms, I have handed you Exhibits 868 and 869 directed to you acting for the Agency, the first one being from the Commission to you and the second one, 869, being your answer in regard to your full and complete disclosure in regard to your records; isn't that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct. May I say, Mr. Rankin, that any information, though, subsequent to this correspondence which we may obtain we will certainly continue to forward to the Commission.

Mr. RANKIN. Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask leave to have those two exhibits, 868 and 869, received in evidence at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be admitted under those numbers.

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(Commission Exhibits Nos. 868 and 869 were marked for identification and received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, if I may return to you, I will now ask you if you have any credible information that you know of or evidence causing you to believe that there is any or was any conspiracy either domestic or foreign in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. McCONE. No; I have no information, Mr. Rankin, that would lead me to believe or conclude that a conspiracy existed.

Representative FORD. Did the CIA make an investigation of this aspect of the assassination?

Mr. McCONE. We made an investigation of all developments after the assassination which came to our attention which might possibly have indicated a conspiracy, and we determined after these investigations, which were made promptly and immediately, that we had no evidence to support such an assumption.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any contact with Oswald during the period of his life in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCONE. No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any record we have.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency have any personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States?

Mr. McCONE. No.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, your Agency made a particular investigation in connection with any allegations about a conspiracy involving the Soviet Union or people connected with Cuba, did you not?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, we did. We made a thorough, a very thorough, investigation of information that came to us concerning an alleged trip that Oswald made to Mexico City during which time he made contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to gain transit privileges from Mexico City to the Soviet Union via Havana. We investigated that thoroughly.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you also include in your statement that you found no evidence of conspiracy in all of that investigation?

Mr. McCONE. That is correct.

Mr. RANKIN. And also the investigation you made of the period that Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone——

Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question there? Does your answer, Mr. McCone, include a negation of any belief that Oswald was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time when you were in contact with him or knew about his activities?

Mr. McCONE. As I have already stated, we were never in contact with Oswald. We have no evidence that he was working for or on behalf of the Soviet Union at any time. According to his diary, Oswald did receive a subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross which we assume had the approval of the authorities. Such a payment does not indicate to us that he even worked for the Soviet intelligence services. Furthermore, we have no other evidence that he ever worked for Soviet intelligence.

Representative FORD. Is the Central Intelligence Agency continuing any investigation into this area?

Mr. McCONE. No, because, at the present time, we have no information in our files that we have not exhaustively investigated and disposed of to our satisfaction. Naturally, any new information that might come into our hands would be investigated promptly.

Mr. HELMS. I simply wanted to add that we obviously are interested in anything we can pick up applying to this case, and anything we get will be immediately sent to the Commission, so that we haven't stopped our inquiries or the picking up of any information we can from people who might have it. This is on a continuing basis.

Representative FORD. In other words, the case isn't closed.

Mr. HELMS. It is not closed as far as we are concerned.

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Mr. RANKIN. Would that be true, Mr. Helms, even after the Commission completed its report, you would keep the matter open if there was anything new that developed in the future that could be properly presented to the authorities?

Mr. HELMS. Yes. I would assume the case will never be closed.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, do you have any ideas about improving the security provisions for the President that you would like to relate to the Commission?

Mr. McCONE. Well, this is, in my opinion, a very important question which I am sure this Commission will—has and will—devote a considerable amount of thought to, and undoubtedly have some recommendations as part of its report.

Mr. RANKIN. Your Agency does have an important function in some aspects.

Mr. McCONE. We have a very important function in connection with the foreign travels of the President, and I would like to inform the Commission as to how we discharge that responsibility by quickly reviewing the chronology of the Central Intelligence Agency's support of President Kennedy's visit to Mexico City from the 29th of June to the 2d of July 1962.

Mr. RANKIN. Will you please do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Director, is that a security matter?

Mr. McCONE. No. I think I can handle this for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. McCONE. If I have to make a remark or two off the record I will ask that privilege.

That visit, as I said, started on the 29th of June. On the 28th of April, in anticipation of the visit, instructions were transmitted to Mexico for the Ambassador to coordinate planning and informational guidance for the advance party of the Secret Service.

We asked that the Secret Service be given information on local groups and persons who would cause disturbances, embarrassments or physical harm, an estimate of the determination and ability of the Mexican government to prevent incidents, and preparation for special briefings to the Embassy officials and the Secret Service, and such additional support and communications personnel that might be required.

These instructions were given two months before the trip.

On the 15th of May, we received confirmed information that the President would visit Mexico on the specific dates. On the 1st of June the Secret Service was supplied by the Agency with the detailed survey of Mexican security forces that would be called upon to protect the President.

Friendly and allied governments were informed of the visit and their cooperation and pertinent informational support was solicited. From this date through the 2d of July daily information reports were furnished to the State Department, the Secret Service, the FBI and the military services.

That is from the 1st of June to the 2d of July, a period of 31, 32 days. On the 8th of June the Secret Service advance party was briefed in detail by a group of officers of the Agency on the Mexican government's plans for the protection of the President, including current information on the size, strength and capabilities of potential troublemakers.

Hazardous locations and times in the planned itinerary were identified, political and economic issues that might be invoked by hostile elements for demonstrations were specified.

On the 11th of June, the Secret Service advance party left for Mexico supported by additional security personnel to assist in coordinating an informational report and the followup activity required.

Especially prepared national intelligence estimates on the current security conditions in Mexico was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on the 13th of June.

On the 15th of June arrangements were completed to reenforce communications facilities. On the 24th of June a conference at the State Department was held at the request of the President for reviewing security measures, and this meeting I attended personally, and reported to the State Department on the essence of all that had gone before.

Emergency contingency plans were discussed and a consensus was reached that the President should make the visit as scheduled.

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On the 27th of June, a final updated special national intelligence estimate was prepared, and this indicated no basic changes in the security assessment that Mexican government was prepared to cope with foreseeable security contingencies.

On the 28th of June, a final briefing report was prepared for the Director's use which indicated the security precautions of the Mexican government had effectively forestalled major organized incidents, and our informed estimate was that the President would receive a great welcome.

The report was presented to the President personally by the Director at noon in a final meeting prior to departure on this trip.

From the 29th of June to the 2d of July in Washington headquarters, headquarters components remained on a 24-hour alert for close support of the embassy and the Secret Service.

So, not only was the Central Intelligence Agency and its various components involved in this for a period of 2 months in close collaboration with the Secret Service, but by bringing in the United States Intelligence Board we brought in all of the intelligence assets of the United States Government in connection with this particular trip. I thought this procedure which is followed regularly on all trips that the President makes out of the country would be of interest to the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the normal format of your procedures?

Mr. McCONE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When the President goes abroad?

Mr. McCONE. Yes, I selected this one. The same was true of his trip to Caracas or Paris or elsewhere.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, in your investigation of the Oswald matter did you use the same approach or a comparable approach to a liaison with the other intelligence agencies of government to try to discover anything that might involve your jurisdiction.

Mr. McCONE. Yes. We were in very close touch with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and with the Secret Service on a 24-hour basis at all points, both domestic and foreign, where information had been received which might have a bearing on this problem.

Mr. RANKIN. Assassination?

Mr. McCONE. Assassination.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an opinion, Mr. McCone, as to whether or not the liaison between the intelligence agencies of the United States Government might be improved if they had better mechanical, computer or other facilities of that type, and also some other ideas or methods of dealing with each other?

Mr. McCONE. There is a great deal of improvement of information that might be of importance in a matter of this kind through the use of computers and mechanical means of handling files, and you, Mr. Chief Justice, saw some of our installations and that was only a beginning of what really can be done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I did.

Mr. McCONE. I would certainly urge that all departments of government that are involved in this area adopt the most modern methods of automatic data processing with respect to the personnel files and other files relating to individuals. This would be helpful.

But I emphasize that a computer will not replace the man, and therefore, we must have at all levels a complete exchange of information and cooperation between agencies where they share this responsibility, and in going through this chronology, it points out the type of exchange and cooperation that the Central Intelligence Agency tries to afford both the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in matters where we have a common responsibility.

I would like to emphasize the very great importance of this exchange, which is not always easily accomplished because it is cumbersome.

Sometimes it becomes involved in distracting people from other duties, and so on and so forth.

I have given a good deal of thought to the matter of some incentives to bring out informers, thinking about the old informer statutes in which some of them are still on the books, in which people were rewarded for informing when others conducted themselves in a damaging way.

Mr. DULLES. Smuggling cases?

Mr. McCONE. Smuggling cases. But I believe that something could be done. I call to the attention of this Commission one of the laws relating to atomic energy, namely the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 wherein a substantial reward is offered for the apprehension of persons responsible for the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the United States of such nuclear material or atomic weapons. It is suggested that the Commission may wish to recommend that original but similar legislation be enacted which would induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. Substantial reward could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad who are charged with assassination and sabotage. We have information that such personnel and police state apparatuses have expressed and, in certain cases, acted upon their repugnance for such work and for the political system which requires such duties to be performed.

Mr. RANKIN. Is it your belief, Mr. McCone, that the methods for exchange of information between intelligence agencies of the Government could be materially improved.

Mr. McCONE. I think the exchange between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Secret Service is quite adequate. I am not informed as to whether the exchanges between the Secret Service and the FBI are equally adequate. I have not gone into that. I would have no means to know. Certainly it is most important that it be done.

Mr. DULLES. Looking back now that you have the full record, do you feel that you received from the State Department adequate information at the time that they were aware of Oswald's defection and later activities in the Soviet Union, did you get at the time full information from the State Department on those particular subjects?

Mr. McCONE. Well, I am not sure that we got full information, Mr. Dulles. The fact is we had very little information in our files.

Mr. HELMS. It was probably minimal.

Representative FORD. Why did that happen?

Mr. HELMS. I am not sure, Mr. Ford. I can only assume that the State Department had a limited amount. Interestingly enough, it is far enough back now so that it's very hard to find people who were in the Moscow Embassy at the time familiar with the case, so in trying to run this down one comes to a lot of dead ends and I, therefore, would not like to hazard any guess.

Representative FORD. Whose responsibility is it; is it CIA's responsibility to obtain the information, or State Department's responsibility to supply it to Central Intelligence and to others.

Mr. McCONE. With respect to a U.S. citizen who goes abroad, it is the responsibility of the State Department through its various echelons, consular service and embassies and so forth.

For a foreigner coming into the United States, who might be of suspicious character, coming here for espionage, subversion, assassination and other acts of violence, we would, and we do exchange this information immediately with the FBI.

Representative FORD. But in this particular case, Oswald in the Soviet Union, whose responsibility was it to transmit the information, whatever it was, to the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. McCONE. Well, it would be the State Department's responsibility to do that. Whether there really exists an order or orders that information on an American citizen returning from a foreign country be transmitted to CIA, I don't believe there are such regulations which exist.

Mr. HELMS. I don't believe they do, either.

Mr. McCONE. I am not sure they should.

Representative FORD. It wouldn't be your recommendation that you, the head of Central Intelligence Agency, should have that information?

Mr. DULLES. In a case of an American defecting to a Communist country, shouldn't you have it?

Mr. McCONE. Certainly certain types of information. What we ought to be

careful of here, would be to rather clearly define the type of information which should be transmitted, because after all, there are hundreds of thousands or millions of Americans going back and forth every year, and those records are the records of the Immigration Service, the Passport Division.

Mr. DULLES. I was thinking of a person who having defected might, of course, have become an agent and then reinserted into the United States and if you were informed of the first steps to that you might help to prevent the second step.

Mr. McCONE. Well, certainly information on defectors or possible recruitments should be, and I have no question is being, transmitted.

Representative FORD. What I was getting at was whether the procedures were adequate or inadequate, whether the administration was proper or improper in this particular case, and if some files you have that started when he attempted to defect are inadequate why we ought to know, and we ought to know whether the basic regulations were right or wrong, whether the administration was proper or improper, that is what I am trying to find out.

I would like your comment on it.

Mr. McCONE. Well, I think the basic regulations should be examined very carefully to be sure that they are copper-riveted down and absolutely tight. What I am saying, however, is because of the vast number of Americans who go abroad and stay in foreign countries for indefinite periods of time, it would be an impossible task to transmit all information available in the State Department and Immigration Service as files to the Central Intelligence Agency. It would not be a productive exercise. What must be transmitted and is being transmitted, while I cannot recite the exact regulations is information that is, becomes, known to the various embassies of suspicious Americans that might have been recruited and defected, and then returned so that they would be agents in place.

Representative FORD. In this case, Oswald attempted to defect, he did not, he subsequently sought the right to return to the United States, he had contact with the Embassy. Was the Central Intelligence Agency informed of these steps, step by step, by the Department of State?

Mr. McCONE. You might answer that.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Ford, in order to answer this question precisely I would have to have the file in front of me. I have not looked at it in some time so I don't have it all that clearly in mind. But it is my impression that we were not informed step by step. When I say that there is no requirement that I am aware of that the State Department should inform us and when I said a moment ago that we had minimal information from them, this was not in any sense a critical comment but a statement of fact.

But an American going to the American Embassy would be handled by the Embassy officials, either consular or otherwise. This would be a matter well within the purview of the State Department to keep all the way through, because we do not have responsibility in the Central Intelligence Agency for the conduct or behavior or anything else of American citizens when they are abroad unless there is some special consideration applying to an individual, or someone in higher authority requests assistance from us. So that the State Department, I think, quite properly would regard this matter as well within their purview to handle themselves within the Embassy or from the Embassy back to the Department of State without involving the Agency in it while these events were occurring.

Representative FORD. I think it could be argued, however, that the uniqueness of this individual case was such that the Department of State might well have contacted the Central Intelligence Agency to keep them abreast of the developments as they transpired. This is not—and when I say this, I mean the Oswald case—is not an ordinary run-of-the-mill-type of case. It is far from it. Even back in the time, well, from the time he went, and particularly as time progressed, and he made application to return, there is nothing ordinary about the whole situation.

Mr. McCONE. That is quite correct; there is no question about that.

Representative FORD. And I am only suggesting that if the regulations were not adequate at the time and are not now, maybe something ought to be done about it.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. McCone, when you said that supplying all of the information about U.S. citizens who went abroad and came back to the country would not be a profitable exercise, did that comment include the thought that such an intrusion upon all citizens would be questionable?

Mr. McCONE. Such an intrusion?

Mr. RANKIN. Upon their right to travel.

Mr. McCONE. Well, I think this would have a bearing on it. I did not have that particular matter in mind when I made that statement, however. I was just thinking of the——

Mr. RANKIN. Burden?

Mr. McCONE. Of the burden of vast numbers involved.

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any thought in regard to whether it would be an intrusion upon their rights?

Mr. McCONE. Well, that would be a matter of how it was handled. Certainly, if it was handled in a way that the counterpart of providing the information was to impose restrictions on them, then it would be an intrusion on their rights.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Senator COOPER. May I inquire?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. I missed the first part of Mr. McCone's testimony; I went to answer a quorum call. Perhaps the question has been asked.

It has been brought into evidence that a number of people in the Embassy talked to Oswald when he first defected, and the various communications with the Embassy and, of course, when he left to come back to the United States. Have we been able to ascertain the names of officials in the Embassy or employees with whom Oswald talked on these various occasions?

Mr. McCONE. I am not familiar with them; no.

Mr. HELMS. Neither am I, sir.

Mr. McCONE. I presume that the Department's inquiries have covered it.

Senator COOPER. Is it possible to ascertain the names of those employees?

Mr. RANKIN. Senator Cooper, I can answer that. We have inquired of the State Department for that information, and are in the process of obtaining it all.

Senator COOPER. Taking into consideration your answers to the previous question, would it have been possible in your judgment to have secured more comprehensive information about the activities of Oswald in Russia?

Mr. McCONE. It would not have been possible for the Central Intelligence Agency to have secured such information because we do not have the resources to gain such information.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more? Congressman Ford?

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency investigate any aspects of Oswald's trip to Mexico?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we did.

Representative FORD. Can you give us any information on that?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we were aware that Oswald did make a trip to Mexico City and it was our judgment that he was there in the interest of insuring transit privileges and that he made contact with the Cuban Embassy while he was there.

We do not know the precise results of his effort, but we assumed, because he returned to the United States, he was unsuccessful. We have examined to every extent we can, and using all resources available to us every aspect of his activity and we could not verify that he was there for any other purpose or that his trip to Mexico was in any way related to his later action in assassinating President Kennedy.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency make any investigation of any alleged connection between Oswald and the Castro government?

Mr. McCONE. Yes; we investigated that in considerable detail, because information came to us through a third party that he had carried on a rather odd discussion with Cuban officials in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. The allegation was that he had received under rather odd circumstances a substantial amount of money in the Cuban Embassy, and the statement was made by one who claimed to have seen this transaction take place. After a very thorough

13-00000

and detailed examination of the informer, it finally turned out by the informer's own admission that the information was entirely erroneous, and was made for the purpose of advancing the informer's own standing with the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Government and it was subsequently retracted by the informer in its entirety.

Representative FORD. Was there any other evidence or alleged evidence——

Mr. McCONE. Parenthetically, I might add a word for the record that the date that the informer gave as to the date in time of this alleged transaction was impossible because through other, from other, information we determined that Oswald was in the United States at that particular time.

Representative FORD. Did the Central Intelligence Agency ever make an investigation or did it ever check on Mr. Ruby's trip to Cuba or any connections he might have had with the Castro government?

Mr. McCONE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. HELMS. We had no information.

Mr. McCONE. We had no information.

Representative FORD. Central Intelligence Agency has no information of any connections of Ruby to the Castro government?

Mr. McCONE. That is right.

Representative FORD. Did you ever make a check of that?

Mr. HELMS. We checked our records to see if we had information and found we did not.

Representative FORD. What would that indicate, the fact that you checked your records?

Mr. HELMS. That would indicate that if we had received information from our own resources, that the Cubans were involved with Mr. Ruby in something which would be regarded as subversive, we would then have it in our files. But we received no such information, and I don't, by saying this, mean that he did not. I simply say we don't have any record of this.

Representative FORD. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Director, thank you very much, sir, for coming and being with us and we appreciate the help your department has given to us.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)

Thursday, June 4, 1964

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY, LEO J. GAUTHIER, LYNDAL L. SHANEYFELT, AND ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The President's Commission met at 2:10 p.m., on June 4, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Senator John Sherman Cooper, Representative Gerald R. Ford, Allen W. Dulles, and John J. McCloy, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, general counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; and Charles Murray, observer.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS J. KELLEY

(Members present at this point: The Chairman, Representative Ford, Mr. Dulles, and Mr. McCloy.)

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, we have witnesses today who are Thomas J. Kelley of the Secret Service; Leo J. Gauthier, Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, and Robert A. Frazier of the FBI. They are going to testify concerning certain

13-00000

JAMES J. ROWLEY, CHIEF, SECRET SERVICE
JUNE 18, 1964

Mr. ROWLEY. I think there are certain things that you have to allow the man who is operating as a politician, and not as head of state. I mean this makes a difference in your operation.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report of the activities in protecting the President at and around Parkland Hospital?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. And is that Commission Exhibit No. 1026?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1026 for identification.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1026.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1026, was received in evidence.)

Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any additions or corrections you care to make in that exhibit?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, did you give us a report about protective activity subsequent to Dallas on behalf of the Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. I will hand you Commission Exhibit No. 1027 and ask you if that is the report that you have just referred to.

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 1027 for identification.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, I ask you, are there any problems with regard to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 concerning security, and whether that should be—that document should be made public? You just take your time if you want to glance over it.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; as I read it, it is general enough, sir, that it can be included.

(At this point, Mr. Dulles entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer in evidence Commission Exhibit No. 1027.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted.

(The document heretofore marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 1027, was received in evidence.)

(At this point, Representative Boggs entered the hearing room.)

Mr. RANKIN. Are there any of the various answers that you give in the answers to the questions attached to Commission Exhibit No. 1027 that you care to elaborate on at this time?

I am not asking you or urging you to do it, because I assume that you anwered them with care at the time. I just wanted to give you that opportunity.

Mr. ROWLEY. No; not at this time.

Mr. DULLES. May I ask a question there?

You consider that the criteria as now furnished by you to the FBI and other investigative agencies would cover a case like Oswald's?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they would?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DULLES. You think they understand that?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, as we stated in the covering letter when we sent this out—we haven't gotten any reaction—we asked for their cooperation and suggestions in connection with such guidelines.

Mr. DULLES. Defectors are not specifically covered, are they, by your criteria?

Mr. ROWLEY. Well, they are given to us now. We are being furnished the names of defectors, and they are being investigated, so that their background and history will be furnished to us, and we will be in a position now to determine whether they represent a risk or not.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley——

Representative BOGGS. May I ask a question there?

Would you have any notion as to why names of defectors were not provided to you prior to November 22?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; under the broad picture, Mr. Congressman, there was no

13-00000

indication that they had made any threat toward the President or members of his family. Whenever there was a threat made, we were furnished promptly by the different agencies the information on the individual's name. And this was done in voluminous reports by the FBI, and the other agencies. When they got any information, they would notify the local office, notify their liaison, who notified us by telephone, and confirmed by memorandum. The same obtained with respect to the CIA.

Representative BOGGS. This fellow was interviewed by the FBI several times—he was interviewed in New Orleans when he allegedly had his Fair Play Committee. If my memory serves me correctly, Mrs. Paine was interviewed about him shortly before the visit of the President, after he had gone to work at the Texas School Book Depository. I agree that there had been no indication of a threat on the President's life. But, obviously he was a person in the FBI files who was under some degree of surveillance. It would seem to me strange that the FBI did not transmit this information to the Secret Service.

Mr. ROWLEY. The FBI, Mr. Congressman, are concerned with internal security. And I think their approach was internal security as it related to this individual, whether or not he was a potential recruit for espionage, intelligence, or something like that.

Their concern was talking to him in this vein, in the course of which there was no indication that he bore any malice toward anyone, and particularly to the President of the United States. If someone said that Henry Smith didn't like the President, and we got his file, we would get to the point where you have 3 million names in the file. How effective are you going to be then?

Representative BOGGS. Well, that is right.

Mr. ROWLEY. And then you get in the area of civil rights and all, if you start going into individuals——

Representative BOGGS. And if I remember correctly, there has never been—we have had no testimony from anyone that Oswald ever threatened the President of the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. RANKIN. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. That was the only question I had.

Mr. DULLES. Along that line, I just raise the question as to whether maybe too much emphasis is not put on the threat angle, because a clever fellow, if he is going to assassinate the President, the last thing he is going to do is go around and talk about it and threaten it.

Mr. ROWLEY. That is right. Well, this has been so with loners, too.

As you say, you read the assassinations. Some of them just kept to themselves, and traveled, and the next thing you know they confronted their victim. Sometimes they were successful, other times they were not.

Mr. DULLES. I recognize the difficulty of working out adequate criteria. But I just think you ought to do some more seeking, and there is more work to be done on that.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. May I ask this question: It hasn't been clear to me. Is it correct that now a defector does come within the scope of your Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; we are furnished the names of defectors by the FBI. And they investigate these people. And then in their report, if it shows that the individual has emotional instability or propensity for violence, we pick it up from there. But all the reports on the known defectors in this country are submitted to us, and then we evaluate from the case history of the report whether or not he would be a risk for us subject to investigation.

Senator COOPER. I understood that was the procedure before. But my question is now, is the defector per se classed as one of those against whom you would take protective measures?

Mr. ROWLEY. No, no, sir; not unless we had——

Senator COOPER. Since the assassination?

Mr. ROWLEY. Not unless we had these three categories of factors we just enunciated.

Senator COOPER. I would suggest—first, I understand there are not many defectors who have returned to the United States.

Secondly, it seems to me a man who has defected from the United States to

13-00000

go to Russia or a Communist country indicates that he has pretty strong convictions against the United States, or else there is something questionable about his mental processes.

I would think that fact alone would make it important to watch his activities when he came back.

Mr. ROWLEY. It would. And I think the FBI properly conducts the investigations, from the standpoint of internal security, and furnishes us a report. And then if there is something in the report that indicates he could be a risk to the President or the Vice President, we could take it from there.

Representative BOGGS. Mr. Rankin, I have to go to a meeting in 2 or 3 minutes. There is just one question I would like to ask before leaving.

Is it not a fact that probably the greatest deterrent that you have is the very fact that the public knows that there is a Secret Service?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Representative BOGGS. That you do guard the life of the President. And that the chances of an assassin escaping with his own life are pretty remote. So this psychological weapon is one of the things you rely on?

Mr. ROWLEY. That is correct.

Representative BOGGS. And you must necessarily keep a degree of secrecy about the methods you employ.

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes, sir; otherwise they could develop countermethods, to thwart anything we might set up.

Representative BOGGS. Exactly. Thank you very much.

Mr. RANKIN. Chief Rowley, do you in the Secret Service obtain the benefit of cooperation with other governmental agencies in the protection of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. We receive cooperation from every agency. If I may name a few—we were scheduled to visit Puerto Rico in 1948 or 1947—I am not quite certain—with President Truman, who was then vacationing at Key West. We had no office in Puerto Rico at the time. We did not know the situation other than that it could be sticky because of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.

(At this point, Representative Boggs withdrew from the hearing room.)

Mr. ROWLEY. Our advance man called me and asked me if I would not talk to Mr. Hoover to see whether or not we could have the assistance of some of their agents who were down there in an office established there. And I communicated then with the Assistant Director, who said, "I will get back to you" and got the approval. That was an example of the beginning of the cooperation, when I was at the White House, with the FBI.

Now, in the years subsequent to World War II, anytime we were abroad, I made personal contact with Mr. Dulles, and I think for national security we should go off the record on this, because this is something that pertains today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, Chief Rowley, are you familiar with the provisions in the appropriation act with regard to the FBI concerning their protection of the person of the President?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes.

Mr. RANKIN. You know of that, do you?

Mr. ROWLEY. Yes; I do. Historically, that was first passed in 1910. It stated that because of the limited number of Secret Service men at that time, that appropriation—a certain given figure—was to be used by the U.S. marshals to assist the Secret Service.

Mr. RANKIN. Was the Secret Service opposed to that provision in the appropriation act for the FBI?

Mr. ROWLEY. No; it has never opposed that provision over the years. I started to say, Mr. Rankin—subsequently, after the founding of the FBI, this was transferred, apparently, from the marshals to the FBI, and it has been in the appropriations as long as I can remember. We have never objected to that appropriation.

Mr. RANKIN. Now, there is some language in H.R. 4158, I understand, which deals with the permanent organization of the Government that you are objecting to; is that right?

SECRET

21 MAY 1982
US/82/71

Dear Anthony,

Regarding your letter 6/705 of 10 May 1982, our records indicate that Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov traveled to Mexico, France, Spain, the U.S. and Cuba during the period 1959-61. In 1961, he was assigned permanently to Mexico City as a consular officer and served there until August 1965. He was variously described as a translator, vice-consul, and attache. During this tour he attempted to cultivate a U.S. Government employee assigned to our embassy in Mexico City.

201-

In September/October 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald approached the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in an attempt to get a visa allowing him to return to the USSR. Kostikov, as a consular officer, handled this visa request. We have no information which indicates any relationship between these individuals other than for the purpose of Oswald's making his visa request.

Kostikov returned to Mexico City for a second tour of duty in July 1968. During this tour he was again assigned to the consular section and was a second secretary. It appeared that he was tasked with following the activities of the Central American communist parties and left-wing groups, and he met often with members of these groups, reportedly providing them with funds and technical guidance. In July/August 1969, Kostikov made an unusual TDY trip to Moscow lasting three weeks. (His family remained in Mexico.) In July 1970 he made a four-day trip to Havana.

Kostikov's tour in Mexico ended unexpectedly in September 1971. Our information indicated that he was not due to leave for another three to four months, and at the time of his departure, there was some speculation that the suddenness of his departure was due to the fact that he was known to Lyalin.

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21 MAY 82

SECRET

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While in Mexico he was considered by some to be the most effective and dangerous of intelligence officers in Mexico. He has been described as being without morals, education, and manners. Shortly after his arrival in Mexico in 1968, he was arrested in front of a house of prostitution after becoming involved in a fist fight with some locals. It appears this incident did not affect his position in Mexico City, despite the fact that it received a good deal of press coverage.

We are aware only that Kostikov arrived in Beirut in June 1978. We are unable to confirm his presence there now.

Although our file indicates that Kostikov may have been a member of Department 13 (Executive Action) (Department V's predecessor), we have been unable to confirm this. Also, to the best of our knowledge the KGB has not engaged in such executive action since 1959.

Sincerely,

/s/ David

David H. Blee

Mr. Anthony C. M. DeVere

PHOTO ATTACHED

DDO/CI/RA/Joan Paxson (21 May 1982)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
E/BC 4C 20 Hqs	1413 7220	DATE 3 APR 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. CI/R+A				This is the ACTION/INFO copy of a communication received on from MI- 5 in Washington.
2. Hausman	4 APR 1978			Another copy is being held in E/BC.
3. Russ Holmes				Any reply should be directed to E/BC for forwarding to Liaison.
4. 3 D 57				Processing by IP is to be determined by__________.
5.				Coordination with E/BC is required prior to any dissemination of this information outside the DDO.
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				NB: Richard A. SPRAGUE, Chief Counsel and Director of HSCA, saw a copy of attached document. See his attached letter to Sergyj CZORNONOH, 04 December 1976.
10.				RBH
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Our ref: GEN 1

Dear Art,

30 March 1978

Please find attached correspondence received from one Sergyj CZORNONOH who claims that he provided information about Lee Harvey OSWALD to the American Vice Consul (presumably Tom Blackshear) in Sofia, Bulgaria, in August 1963.

2. I have sent copies of these letters to the FBI and to my Head Office in London.

D H Jones
for G M L Blackburne-Kane

Mr A H Stimson

Enc.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13-00000

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA
95814

M. Waller

SACRAMENTO STATE CAPITOL MAR 15 1978

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

REGISTERED
NO. 257254

201-289248

SERGYJ CZORNONOH
1106-11TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, 95814
MARCH 15, 1978

TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR
BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR SIR,

I WROTE LETTER ON FEBRUARY 15, 1978
TO MR. JAMES CALLAGHAN PRIME MINISTER
I ENCLOSED REGISTERED MAIL NO. 251067.

ON JULY 18, 1963 I WAS IN LONDON ENGLAND
AT THE AIRPORT IMMIGRATION OFFICER NO. 175
I HAD NO VISA IMMIGRATION PLACE ME UNDER
HOUSE ARREST, MR. SMITH IN POLICE UNIFORM
SECRET SERVICE BROUGHT ME STEAK DINNER
AND POLICE OFFICER INTERROGATED ME, HE
ASKED ME WHAT THE EMBASSY OF U.S.S.R. SAY
WHAT DID YOU HEARD IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA,
I SAID I HAVE HEARD THAT ONE AMERICAN
DEFECTOR (MR. LEE HARVEY OSWALD) TO RUSSIA
AND HE RETURNED TO UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA THIS MAN HE PREPARING TO KILL
TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,
MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER ASKED ME
DO YOU KNOW HIS NAME, I SAID HIS NAME
START ON "O" HIS NAME WAS PUBLISHED
ONE TIME IN NEWS PAPER IN WASHINGTON
POST, MR. SMITH POLICE OFFICER SAID
IT EASY TO FIND.

13-00000

I DO SEARCHING FOR THIS FILE IN B[illegible]
POLICE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AND
IMMIGRATION, ASKING YOUR EMBASSY
HELP TO FIND THE TRUTH AND I ASK
GOVERNMENT TO FORWARD MY RECOR[illegible]
JULY 18, 1963 TO PRESIDENT JIMMY C[illegible]
AND SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE CH[illegible]
U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IN[illegible]
GENCE I ENCLOSE HIS COPY LETTER TO [illegible]
ALSO I ENCLOSE YOU COPY LETTER I [illegible]
ON FEBRUARY 17, 1978 TO RUSSIAN AM[illegible]
YOUR JUSTICE ALWAYS WILL BE AP[illegible]
MY INCOMING MAIL IS CONTROL BY
F.B.I. AGENTS SOME OF THE MAIL I
GET NOT FORWARD TO ME F.B.I. SUP[illegible]
MY INFORMATION AND TORTURE ME.

RESPECTFULLY
Sergyj Czorn[illegible]

U.S. PASSPORT NO. DO27000

CITY MANAGERS
ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
BRITISH EMBASSY

Sergyj Czornonoh
Regis Hotel
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

February 6, 1978

Mr. John M. Price
District Attorney
Sacramento, California

Dear Mr. Price:

This is a retyped letter. I visited Mr. Ferry , Deputy District Attorney, on August 16, 1977. I told in the office that F.B.I. agents and Secret Service use police department to harass me. Police department do supply pencil of anesthesia gas to the manager of the building I live. The manager do or use certain people to freeze me by anesthesia gas - then push drugs, poison in my mouth to torture me - to take my sleep away - or bleed by rectal and they use many other chemicals to brainwash me to use me in political assassination which I refused. On January 20, 1976 in Sacramento on 8th and I Streets, man came to me from police or post office, U.S. Department of Justice and freeze me by gas and told me to take gun, pistol and we will tell you where to go to shoot - to kill - Mr. Sargent Shriver. I refused. Manager, Mr. Sisel, of Marshall Hotel, call on the man to tell me this on the street. In February 1976, police intelligence told me that assassination will not happen here. How about to move to Maryland state.

In this letter I ask you to get report from Dr. Frederick S. Baker, M.D. - colon and rectal surgery on January 31, 1978. His phone - 452-4095. I do bleed today very much and I am weak. In this letter I ask you to give restrain order or respond to me what could be done. The right wing in America made record to use me in assassination. I refuse. I am human and I like to be treated as human. Police put frame up on me - just to take advantages on me. Police use lie, police use mental case to take advantages on me and tell me that right wing do use such people like me. To prove I enclose copy midnight June 14, 1976. Also I enclose copy letter I sent to Mr. Ted Sheedy, Supervisor, on January 26, 1978 and copy of his reply to me.

Please respond to me. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh
Sergyj Czornonoh

Mr. Sargent Shriver was run for President in 1976.

Sergyj Czornonoh

Legal Center
For The Disabled

1722 J STREET, SUITE 19 • SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
Telephone: 446-4851

March 3, 1978

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Dear Mr. Czornonoh:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter regarding difficulties you have encountered with the police and the FBI.

In the event that there is legal action taken by the police or the FBI to institutionalize you this office will provide you with legal representation.

If you have any further legal problems please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Leslie Kay
LESLIE KAY
Paralegal

CATHERINE HUGHES
Staff Attorney

LK:ab



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American LEGATION
SOFIA, BULGARIA

Amended to AUG. 15 1963

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VICE CONSUL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

IMM. & NATZ. SERVICE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 14
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AUG 17 1963 , 1963
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TO
CO-2-34, 897

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh

5

13-00000

February 17, 1978

COPY TO
BRITISH AMBASSADOR

Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street
Sacramento, California 95814

To Russian Ambassador
Embassy of U.S.S.R.
1125 - 16th Street
Washington, D. C.

This is retyped letter from hand written

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wasilev Consul gave me order to transmit this information to U. S. Government, on August 9, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria. Mr. Wasilev, Consul of Embassy of U.S.S.R., gave me this information about Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald on August 14, 1963. Mrs. Besera Asenova, girl friend of Russian Consul came to my room and repeated that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assassin. He will kill President Kennedy.

On August 15, 1963 in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the airport in embassy car, I told to Mr. Blackshire, American Vice Consul, that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald is assisain. He has a weapon or has ordered one. Mr. Blackshire said it seems like he will kill someone. I said that Mr. Lee H. Oswald is preparing to kill President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. Mr. Blackshire said where will it happen. I said they (right wing) will invite President, criticize him in the newspaper, then kill him. Mr. Blackshire told me he will give the telegram to Department of State and he gave me the address where to report.

At 9 a.m. on August 19, 1963 in Washington, D. C., I went to see (Mr. Kippingan) Director of Special Counselor Service Department of State at 1901 Pennsylvania Avenue-11th floor. I told the Director that I have information about President Kennedy. The Director said do not mention name of President Kennedy, only respond to the questions. The Director said tell us what will happen to Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald then. I said Mr. Lee H. Oswald will be killed after kill Kennedy. I said I will take the truth drug to tell the truth. Director tell us who else get killed in this country. I said as I heard, that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. will be killed. Who will kill Dr. King, Jr. Negro leader? I said a man who is in prison at this time. (Mr. James Earl Ray was in prison at that time.) Director asked where assassination will happen. I said in Dallas, Texas. Director said if someone gave this information here I would expel the man. Director did call on F.B.I. agents after F.B.I. use anesthesia gas to freeze me to drub me to keep amnesia.

I told Director Department of State that Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald have a weapon. Go see him. Director told me you too can have weapon--so what if Oswald got weapon.

Sincerely,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Csornonoh
U.S. Passport 0027000

U.S House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations told me to write letter to Embassy in early 1977.

Sergyj Czornon...
3/15/78

13-00000

Holmes 5 of 6

Sergyj Czprnonoh
1106 11th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814

Registered letter No. 251254
March 15, 1978
Retyped letter from handwritten
of March 15, 1978, which I sent

To British Ambassador
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Phone 462-1340

Dear Sir:

I wrote letter on February 15, 1978, to Mr. James Callaghan, Prime Minister. I enclosed registerd mail No. 251067.

On July 18, 1963, I was in London, England at the airport. Immigration officer No. 175 - I had no visa - immigration place me under house arrest. Mr. Smith in police uniform, secret service, bought me steak dinner and police officer interrogated me. He asked me what the Embassy of U.S.S.R. say. What did you heard in Vienna, Austria. I said I have heard that one American Defector (Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald) to Russia and he returned to United States of America. This man he preparing to kill - to assassinate President John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Smith, police officer, asked me do you know his name. I said his name start on "O". His name was published one time in newspaper in Washington Post. Mr. Smith, police officer, said it easy to find.

I do searching for this file in British police, British intelligence and British immigration. I asking your Embassy to help to find the truth and I ask your government to forward my record of July 18, 1963, to President Jimmy Carter and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I enclose his copy letter to me. Also I enclose you copy letter I sent on February 17, 1978 to Russian Ambassador.

Your justice always will be appreciated. My incoming mail is control by the F.B.I. agents. Some of the mail I don't get. Not forward to me. F.B.I. suppress me my information and torture me by drugs. 27 years anesthesia gas and freeze me - push drug in my mouth.

My U.S. passport No. D027000.

Respectfully yours,

Sergyj Czornonoh

Sergyj Czornonoh

MARCH 20, 1978

REGISTERED NO. 251254		POSTMARK OF
Value $ 1.0	Special Delivery $	CALIF. MAR 15 1978 STATE CAPITOL STA.
Fee $ 2.10	Return Receipt $ .25	
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FROM S. Czornonoh
1106 11 st 95814

237-902

13-00000

ROOM 316
1106-11 TH STREET
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
95814

PM
2 MAR
1975

UNITED STATES WASHINGTON 5c
PROCLAIM LIBERTY THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND USA 13c

TO BRITISH EMBASSY
3100 MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

13-00000

United States Senate
650 CAPITOL MALL
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

316

S.I. Hayakawa
U.S.S.

PM 1978

Mr. Sergyj Czornonoh
1106 - 11th Street, Room 316
Sacramento, CA 95814

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO
Chief

INFO.
Chief

FROM
Chief

SUBJECT
Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

201-760966

Distribution:
2 -
2 - Chief,

COPY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 9 May 1978

1att

201-760966

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

DATE
30 March 1966

59

CLASSIFICATION

HQS FILE NUMBER

SECRET

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in [redacted] to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to [redacted].

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the [redacted] authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

COPY

(59)

att #1 to [redacted]

att 2 [redacted]

13-00000

COORDINATE ~~LAST~~ SENTENCE OF ATTACHMENT WITH FBI

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

TO

INFO.

FROM

SUBJECT

Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache,

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr.

Distribution:

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

1att

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
		30 March 1966
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
		59

13-00000

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. [We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.]

att #1 to

13-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

PROCESSING ACTION
MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief of Station, London

INFO.: Chief, WE

FROM: Chief of Station, Oslo

SUBJECT: 1) Transmittal of Memo to Legal Attache, London

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Please transmit to the Legal Attache the attached memo which is in response to his inquiry of 17 March 1966.

Leon S. TOZALL

Attachment:
Memo re Martin Luther King, Jr. 201-760966

Distribution:
2 - COS, London w/att
2 - Chief, WE w/att

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to ________
by authority of 001829
date 28 Feb 1978

FULL TEXT COPY - DO NOT RELEASE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

100-003-018
~~201-760466~~

CROSS REFERENCE TO

COPY 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: OWOA-19623

DATE: 30 March 1966 (59)

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

HQS FILE NUMBER

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

We have no information that Subject appeared at a rally in Oslo to date, nor does the Embassy have knowledge of a future visit of KING to Norway.

Any future information which becomes available will be forwarded to you. We have also taken due note of your desire that the Norwegian authorities not know of your interest in Subject's activities.

CS COPY

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

100-002-018

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Lou Dube, DDO/PIAG		
2	1-D-4127-Hqs.		
3	HT-1		
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

The first time the Bureau sent these, they combined King-Ray docs with Kennedy assassination docs. After discussion with you, they were sent back to the Bureau asking them to segregate King-Ray docs. Here they are.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Karen W. 5765	11/3

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request) JUN 18 2 00 PM '73

REQUEST NUMBER: 76-382

FROM: ~~A. B. Swider~~ Mary O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION: OPS/ITG 9415

DATE SENT: 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OPS/ITG Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		MC	
2. BK		21 Jun	B	Att.
3.			H	
4. PH		27/7	H	
5.				
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976		JR	
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415				
10.				
11.				
12.				

RETURN TO:

JFK— need to copy some 1/2 sheets that are in here as 1st page for some

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached memorandum

Part I & II

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 1-75 OP-12 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLA

13-00000

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (Martin Luther King, Jr.) Part I

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a three volume sensitive (unofficial) file on the Subject. We no longer maintain 201 file (201-760966); Dr. King's files and documents were closed out on 6 November 1974 and forwarded to IP files on 25 May 1976. A further check of other records in this office revealed the following information relevant to the Subject. While a large number of documents are available which mention King, the majority are dated after his death and in some way are related to world reaction to his assassination which was on 4 April 1968, prior to the implementation of the MHCHAOS program, 4 July 1968.

a. The following overt items (excerpts from books published) are considered releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Black Power/White Resistance, (EX-3283) by Fred Powledge; The Negro Revolt, (EX-3267) by Louis E. Lomax; Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation, (EX-3212) by Claude M. Lightfoot; Is Anybody Listening to Black America, (EX-3573) by C. Eric Lincoln; Martin Luther King, Jr., (EX-3670) by William Robert Miller; SNCC - The New Abolitionists, (EX-2108) by Howard Zinn; The Black Muslims in America, (EX-2109) by C. Eric Lincoln; Negro and Jew, (EX-3573) by Shloma Katz; Chronicles of Black Protest, (EX-3439) by Dr. C. Eric Lincoln; The Black Messiah, (EX-3669), by Albert B. Cleage, Jr.; Black Power and White Protestants, (EX-3211), by Joseph C. Hough, Jr.; The Negro Mood, (EX-2127) by Lerome Bennett, Jr.; Black Man's Burden, (EX-3571) by John Oliver Killens; When Negros March, (EX-3577) by

Doc's 1-23

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

13-00000

Herbert Garfinkel; Black Man's America, (EX-3208) by Simeon Booker; Staff Study by The Committee on Internal Security, (EX-4866) dated 1970; Testimony of Gerald Wayne Kirk, Hearings of the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-7044) 1970; Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, (EX-2131) 1968; Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Investigations, (EX-2169) June 20 and 21, 1968; The New Left, Memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, (EX-3535), 9 October 1968; National Review, 3 May 1967; The Rebel (published in Exile), May-June 1967; The New World of Negro Americans, (EX-3571) by Harold R. Isaacs.

b. The following overt items which mention the Subject and/or his activities are not available in this office.

Washington Star, dated 14 August 1968
Washington Star, dated 4 February 1969
Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968
Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968
Washington Star, dated 20 January 1969
Washington Star, dated 10 November 1968
Washington Star, dated 29 March 1969
Soul Newspaper (EX-3653), 1 December 1969
New York Times, dated 13 April 1967
New York Times, dated 18 August 1968
New York Times, dated 5 October 1969
Time, dated 12 April 1968
Liberation News, dated November 1967
Committee Newsletter, dated May 1967
D.C. Catholic Standard, dated 18 July 1968
Militant (pg. 5), dated 22 November 1968
Ottawa Citizen, dated 17 December 1968
Sepia (pg. 66) (EX-3592), December 1969-destroyed
Jet Magazine (pg. 17) (EX-3594), 7 August 1967-destroyed
The Black Panther (pg. 10) dated 1969
Washington Post, dated 1 September 1967
Washington Post, dated 15 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968
Washington Post, dated 26 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 24 December 1968

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Washington Post, dated 14 December 1968
Washington Post, dated 19 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 22 September 1968
Washington Post, dated 17 August 1968
Washington Post, dated 29 March 1968
Washington Post, dated 20 March 1968
Washington Post, dated 24 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968
Washington Post, dated 5 April 1968
Washington Post, dated 12 May 1968
Washington Post, dated 1 April 1968
Washington Post, dated 14 March 1969

c. The following overt items pertaining to the Assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Look, 15 April 1969; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 24 March 1969; 1 April 1969; 2 April 1969; 4 April 1969; 13 April 1969; 24 April 1969; 27 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 31 May 1969; New York Times, 10 March 1969; 7 March 1969; 8 March 1969; 14 March 1969; 16 April 1969; 23 May 1969; 24 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 1 June 1969; UPI-108, 3 January 1969; Washington Post, 3 January 1969; 18 January 1969; 28 January 1969; 31 January 1969; 8 February 1969; 8 March 1969; 11 March 1969; Tass International Service, 11 March 1969; Daily World, 12 March 1969; Washington Post, 12 March 1969; 13 March 1969; 17 March 1969; 18 March 1969; 20 March 1969; 22 March 1969; 23 March 1969; 26 March 1969; 8 April 1969; 12 April 1969; Item from News Dispatches, 1969; The Sunday Star, 16 March 1969; Item from Associated Press, 8 April 1969; Associated Press, 14 June 1969; Associated Press item, 13 May 1969; Associated Press item, 14 May 1969; Washington Post, 21 May 1969; 23 May 1969; 2[illegible] May 1969; 27 May 1969; 26 May 1969; 25 May 1969; 16 July 1969; 30 May 1969; 16 March 1969; 27 June 1969; 20 June 1969; 26 June 1969; Washington Star; 4 May 1968; Washington Star, 29 May 1968; Time, 13 September 1968; Washington Post, 19 September 1968; Chicago Daily News Service, undated; Washington Star, 18 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 September 1968; Los Angeles Times, 7 August 1968;

125-347 Docs ~~54-151~~
See separate list from OPS/ITG - above is not accurate

13-00000

Washington Post, 16 August 1968; Washington Star, 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, 6 July 1968; Washington Post, 22 July 1968; Time, 26 July 1968; Washington Star, 12 April 1968; Washington Star, 13 April 1968; Washington Post, 13 April 1968; Washington Star, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 14 April 1968; Washington Post, 16 April 1968; Delta Democrat Times, 16 April 1968; Washington Star, 17 April 1968; Washington Star, 18 April 1968; Washington Star, 19 April 1968; undated item; undated item; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Star, 24 April 1968; Washington Post, 6 May 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, undated; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Associated Press, 9 July 1968; 16 July 1968; Reuters, 16 July 1968; Reuters, 9 July 1968; UPI-122, 9 July 1968; UPI-48, 10 July 1968; UPI-129, 15 July 1968; UPI-48, 12 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, 2 July 1968; UPI-30, 2 July 1968; Reuters, 8 July 1968; UPI-21A, 2 July 1968; UPI-125, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 2 July 1968; UPI-8, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; London, 2 July 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, undated, Reuters, 2 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; London, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Associated Press, 18 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; London, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968; Reuters, undated; London, undated; Associated Press, July 1968; Reuters, 17 July 1968; Associated Press, 17 July 1968.

d. The following documents are releasable in sanitized form to the requestor under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt as noted. OIRT-06733, 23 September 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); OIRT-06733, 16 October 1964, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); CSCI-315/02051-64, exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(3)(b); S-19, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); S-20, 5 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); UWCA-3510, 11 October 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); EX-01655, 5 November 1967, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); JMWAVE-1417, 26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Georgetown-5024,

OS referral also

13-00000

26 February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7 March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004, 6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); ~~Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b),~~ (b)(6); ~~Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b)~~; JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~Dir-92664, 18 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memo draft, dated 26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs); ~~FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6);~~ B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); ~~RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a)~~; B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726, 27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67
3/0/QOY/T-58-68
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T413-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67
3/0/QOF/T106-67
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

13-00000

Cables:

(a) Kingston-4005, dated 8 April 1968; according to (RUABBE/1) a Jamaican service four groups are trying to get demonstrations going against the Amembassy, but without success; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(b) Bogota-0654, dated 10 April 1968; (GISOY/GIJAY) unit intercepted propaganda items from Cuban mail pouch. Disclosure to the requestor would identify a clandestine method of the station for obtaining information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) Mexico City-5210, dated 15 April 1968; Para. 3 of this cable mentions an intercepted letter addressed to President Johnson protesting the King assassination. (LITEMPO/12) a member of a Mexican service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(d) Mexico City-5249, dated 17 April 1968; the Legal Attache provided composite photos of suspect in connection with King assassination and asked for check of visitors to Soviet and Cuban embassies; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(e) Bogota-0703, dated 20 April 1968 (GISOY) surveillance team followed an American National with a striking resemblance to Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(f) Paris-9506, dated 22 April 1968; concerns Forman's arrival in Paris, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) Nairobi-3000, dated 14 June 1968; source (TGFLER/1) stated he had an interview with Robert F. Williams. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(h) Director-48988, dated 7 November 1968; concerns a Richard George Perrin, incidental reference to the Subject in a record pertaining to another subject and should not be considered a document responsive to the requestor; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

13-00000

(i) Addis Ababa-1027, dated 18 August 1971; source (JEPYX-1) entertained Hosea Williams in his home during latter's visit to Ethiopia. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

62 Dispatches: UFGT-16828, 15 Jul 66 - OS Referral b1 (OGA) b3

(a) OELA-48626, dated 19 January 1968; forwards a memorandum prepared by (Rufus F. Rodigast) which deals with MHALPHA-related individuals; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

67 (b) FJTA-53902, dated 29 January 1968; forwards a pamphlet (which also contains an article mentioning Dr. King's name) from BEHEIREN Hqs. in Tokyo, obtained by (POFRAGRANCE) a unilateral source still active and sensitive; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) OEPA-982, dated 15 March 1968; forwards a copy of recent correspondence between (QRPHONE/1) and (QRPEONY/1). Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(d) OEPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968; contains operational information submitted by the Station concerning (RODIGAST); contains an incidental mention of the name Dr. Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

?, 68 (e) OEPA-1097, dated 29 April 1968; is a report by (RODIGAST) on SNCC activities in Paris in the aftermath of the Dr. King assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

69 (f) HMMA-34688, dated 20 May 1968; contains items from (LIBIGHT/LIMUD) a sensitive teletap and mail intercept operation coverage; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) FJTA-54934, dated 31 July 1968; Americans Invited to Leftist Conference in Japan. (POFRAGRANCE/1) a unilateral source still active and sensitive provided the information; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Note: An extensive search has failed to locate the attachment for this document. The covering dispatch makes no mention of Dr. King or his assassination.

(h) OCOA-13493, dated 27 September 1968; is a report forwarded by (SMABOVE) a Canadian service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

70

(i) OELA-51949, dated 10 February 1970; (JAGUAR) a British service forwarded press clippings (they contained an incidental mention of the name Dr. King) by or about a Jonathan Power; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(j) FZWA-2412, dated 8 September 1970; Subject: Activities of Andrew Pulley in New Zealand; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; (MLDUST) a New Zealand servvice provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(k) ANLA-4097, dated 16 December 1970; concerns a memorandum passed to (KRHOLLY) a Nigerian security service requesting information on and watchlisting of the MHCHAOS group who were destined for Africa; contain an incidental mention of the name Dr. King; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(l) OCOA-17031, dated 27 June 1972; (SMABOVE) a Canadian service provided a report on the Day of African Solidarity; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

71

Memoranda:

(a) EX-1239, dated 22 August 1967; is a Biographic Summary on Kunstler, William Moses, incidental refernce to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Memorandum S-13, dated 5 October 1967; Subject: Views of the Reverend Daniel Mallette on the Black Militant Situation in Chicago; incidental reference to the Subject; the information was obtained by QRPHONE/1, a sensitive unilateral source in a personal interview with Father Mallette; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(c) B-35, dated 8 February 1968; Black Nationalist Writers in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

13-00000

(d) B-75, dated 9 April 1968; Subject: Attempted Anti U.S.-Demonstrations in Kingston, according to the Special Branch of the Jamaican security service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(e) Memorandum, dated 16 April 1968; Subject: Tentative Plans of Senator Robert Kennedy to Visit West Berlin on 1 May. Incidental referenc to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(f) EX-1623, (rewritten) dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Biographic Summary on Hayden, Thomas Emmett, incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(g) B-88, dated 18 April 1968; FBI provided our representative in Mexico with composite photos of suspected killer; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(h) B-89, dated 22 April 1968; Subject: Radio Messages for Stokely Carmichael during April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C. Incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(i) B-92, dated 23 April 1968; Subject: Arrival of James Rufus Forman in Paris; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(j) B-97, dated 25 April 1968; Subject: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.; concerns a subject who did not appear to be identical with FBI's suspect; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(k) EX-1183 (rewrite of 19 July 1967), dated 26 April 1968; is a Biographic Sketch of Howard Zinn; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(l) EX-1490, dated 14 June 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Mark William Rudd; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(m) EX-2148, dated 4 September 1968; is a Biographic Summary on Szymanski, Albert John Jr; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

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CONFIDENTIAL

(n) B-191, dated 9 October 1968; Subject: Jamaican Special Branch Report - Jamaica/ United States Black Power Ties; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(o) B-308, dated 17 February 1969; Subject: Bahamas/United States Black Power Ties; report of a British service; exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(p) B-618, dated 8 September 1969; Subject: World Council of Peace planned delegates to Paris; a sensitive reliable source revealed a Clarence Fielden Jones as being in contact with Martin Luther King; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(q) EX-9272, dated 21 November 1972; is a summary about Ralph Henry; incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(r) EX-10198, dated 29 May 1972, concerns VB#5 and miscellaneous comments by (MHRUPEE); incidental reference to the Subject; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(s) CSCI-1763, dated 14 May 1968 (201-760966); this file has been closed. — Record on Ray

3. Thirty FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

4. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John J. Reagan
Chief, Internationl Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO: OPS/ITG

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

REMARKS

Pls note which of the SI docs. mention Mrs. King only.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Is NSA the orginating agency for all of these? Yes

* On Dr. King

FROM: MFelton DDO/PIC HT-1

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION 1644

FORM NO. 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

February 1968, exempt under (b)(6); EX-895, 7 March 1968; exempt under (b)(6); Kingston-4004, 6 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(1)5(B)(1); Mexico City-5143, 7 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Tokyo-9443, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b); Dir-90530, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Mexico-5188, 10 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); JMWAVE-2022, 12 April 1968; exempt under (b)(3)(b); Berlin-2149, 15 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Dir-92664, 18 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Memo draft, dated 26 April 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a) (if USIB concurs); FHHT-6444, 7 May 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6); Stockholm-9024, 7 June 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); B-173, 19 September 1968, exempt under (b)(3)(b); RL-188, 13 November 1968, (b)(3)(a); B-2628, 21 May 1971, (b)(3)(a), (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); Budapest-017, 19 May 1971, (b)(3)(b), (b)(6); ~~EX-8726, 27 September 1971, exempt under (b)(3)(b), (b)(6)~~; Memorandum, 28 November 1975, exempt under (b)(3)(b).

not a record

e. The following Top Secret (SI) documents which mention either Dr. or Mrs. King are held in OPS/ITG (SI) vault:

~~3/0/QOY/T-68-68~~
3/0/QOF/T151-67*
3/0/QOY/T-58-68*
~~3/0/GOUT/T269-68~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T88-69~~
~~3/0/GOUT/T92-69~~
3/0/QOY/T57-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T413-69~~
3/0/QOF/T95-67*
3/0/QOF/T106-67*
~~3/0/GOUT/T177-69~~

Refer

2. The following documents are exempt from release; exemptions are as cited.

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

DIRT - 6733, 20 Oct 64	b1, b2, b3
DIRT - 6733, 7 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
CSCI - 316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
Memo, 5 Oct 67	b1, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Oct 67	" " "
UWCA-3510, 11 Oct 67	b1, b2, b3, b6
Memo, 5 Nov 67	b1, b3, b6
WAVE, 26 Feb 68	b1, b3
Georget. 5024, 26 Feb 68	b1, ~~b2~~ b3, b6
Memo-895, 7 Mar 68	? b1 (OGA1), b3, b6
Kngs, 6 Apr 68	b1, b3
Mexi 7 Apr 68	b1, b3
Tokyo 10 Apr 68	b1, b3
DIR 10 Apr 68	b1, b3, b6
Mexi, 10 Apr 68	b1, b3
HDCA 10 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
UFGA, 11 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
WAVE, 2 Apr 68	b1, b3
Berlin 15 Apr 68	b1, b3, b6
DIR, 18 Apr 68	b1, b3, b6
~~Memo Draft, 26 Apr 68~~	
EA-1020 ~~FHHT - 7 May 68~~ not record	b1, b3, b6
~~Hifordued S Icc 9024, 7 June 68~~ "	b1, b3, b6
Memo 19 Sep 68	b1, b3
~~Memo 13 Nov 68~~ " "	~~b1, b3~~
~~Mem~~ Buda, 19 May 71	b1, b3, b6
Memo, 21 May 71	b1, b3, b6
Memo, 28 Nov 75	b1, b3

Deny - 201
CSCI - 316/01703-68, 2 May 68 b1 (liaison) b3, b6
PANA 6180 " " "

Release - 201

UFGA-29884, 11 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
UFGA-29877, 11 Apr 68	" "
HDCA 7012, 18 Apr 68	b1, b2, b3
Coord w/FBI — OUOA - 19623, 30 Mar 66	b1, b2, b3
CSCI -316/02051-64, 30 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
OIRT- 6783, 17 Nov 64	b1, b2, b3
OIRT- 6733, 20 Oct 64	b1, b2, b3

13-00000

4 Aug

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Para C:

I cannot match the documents with the list you provided. Please arrange the articles chronologically and number them lightly in pencil to correspond with numbers in a memo (see attached Memo from the DDA, 26 March 76, para b). It would be useful if you would use that format for all your memos, as the way you have done it is very hard to follow without making errors.) Also clipped documents have parts cut off of them or are almost unreadable. Can you provide better copies?

Para D:

1 First document is a report whose number should be left in. Pls provide another resanitized copy.

2 Please delete dissemination controls in your sanitizations; otherwise we just have to do them over. Also classification was left on one doucment. See XXXXX clips.

3 Please provide sanitized 1st x page of EX-895, 7 Mar X 68.

4 Please delete cite numbers from incoming cables.

Many thanks.

Mary Felton
X1644 DDO/PIC

13-00000

PART II

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request) JUN 18 2 00 PM '76

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: ~~A. B. Snider~~ Mary O/DDO/FIO

EXTENSION OPS/ITG 1415

DATE SENT 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OPS/ITG — Converse ATTN: Mary ~~Moran~~ Tube ES-2	18 JUN 1976		MC	
2. BK		21 Jun	B	Att
3.			H	
4. PH				
5.				
6. C/OPS/ITG	27 JUL 1976			
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/FIO att: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415				
10.				

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached memorandum

Part I & II

Y HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

13-00000

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER: 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swider~~ Mari O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION: 9415

DATE SENT: 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. ~~CI Staff~~ ~~Attn: John Bender~~ 2C29	22 JUN 1976	22 JUL 1976	D
2.			
3. CI/EXO	22 JUL 1976		[illegible]
4.			
5. CI/PA (Graves)	23 JUL 1976		M
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC:

Please see attached comments.

Not a Record

/_/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/X/ See attached ~~memorandum~~ Comments

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 1-75 OP-11 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

22 July 1976

DDO/PIC

Re: Martin Luther King (Request #F-76-382)

In response to this request, CI Staff has no records with the exception of one document, prepared in the Office of Security:

Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 July 1968,
Subject: King, Coretta Scott (#541 487).

A copy is attached for referral.

Dan Roche
Daniel L. Roche, Jr.
CI/PA

Attachment:
Referral Document,
As Above

1 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Record

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT : KING, Coretta Scott
#541 487
AKA: Mrs. Martin Luther KING
nee: Coretta SCOTT

1. Subject, without question, is the Coretta SCOTT referred to in an FBI report on Alfreda ABELL, #355 109, dated 10/29/54, which indicates that on 7 September 1951 ABELL, the Subject of a "Security Matter-C" type investigation, communicated with C. SCOTT, Route 1, Box 158, Heiberger, Alabama, which address was identified as the residence of Coretta SCOTT. According to the postmaster at Heiberger, (in 1954?), Coretta SCOTT was then attending the New England Conservatory of Music. (See attachment A) Mrs. Coretta Scott KING is said to have attended this Conservatory and while there to have met her future husband. (See attachment B)

2. Alfreda ABELL, who was a clerk in the UN Secretariat from 1947 until 6/30/52 when her employment was terminated for security reasons, was said in the New York Times on 2 January 1953 to be one of 25 former employees of the UN ousted as one believed to be a communist or under communist discipline. While employed in the UN, ABELL was reportedly active on behalf of the Pro-Communist group of the UN Staff Committee and was friendly with, and actively participated in giving a party in October 1951 to honor, four persons who had been dismissed by the UN for security reasons. (ie: Jeanne PICOU, identified as a member of the French Communist Party; Mary Jane KEENEY, a CP member active in the Communist Party underground during the late 30's-early 40's; Benedict Soloman ALPER, also reported to be a CP member; and Rajah HOWRANI, who was reportedly a Communist Party member and had received training in the Soviet Union. The individual said to be responsible for ABELL's employment in the UN, and to have been her supervisor there at one time, was Adam TARN, a Polish citizen said to be a Communist Party member. According to the FBI report on ABELL, she registered with the American Labor Party when voting in 1949 and 1952; subscribed to the National Guardian; and attended a W.E.B. DuBois testimonial dinner in February 1951, to which she took Helen KAGAN as her guest.

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SIG/Misc
3401

cy to Mr. R. OBER, 19.7.67
with caveat not to be used w/o check with SIG

3. ABELL and Helen KAGAN, who also was terminated at the UN Secretariat for security reasons, were reported in October 1952 to frequently return to the UN premises where they were said to often be seen in its corridors conversing with certain Russians and alleged Communists. According to a confidential FBI informant, ABELL in March 1952 made a check payable to KAGAN in the amount of $150, and KAGAN had made checks payable to ABELL on a number of occasions. Helen KAGAN is Helen KAGAN-POZNER, AKA: Elena Aleksandrovna Wilga, etc., #348 486, who is suspected of having long engaged in Soviet intelligence activities. Her brother, Vladimir A. POZNER, is an identified KGB officer and her cousin, Vladimir Wolf POZNER, is a known member of the French Communist Party and is suspected of involvement in Soviet intelligence. Her long-time consort, Peter WILGA, a leading figure in the CPUSA, was also suspected of Soviet intelligence connections. Helen KAGAN-POZNER WILGA is of continuing interest to the FBI and to SRS.

4. At a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee hearing in New York City in late 1952, Alfreda ABELL refused on grounds of self-incrimination to say whether she was then or ever had been a communist, whether she tried to organize UN workers, or whether since leaving the UN in the Summer of 1952 she had revisited UN headquarters in the role of a communist organizer. The FBI continued to have an interest in ABELL until at least December 1961, the date of an FBI report in her file.

5. The postmaster at Heiberger, Alabama in advising regarding Coretta SCOTT, as stated above, commented that she had in the past sung on the same program with Paul ROBESON at ROBESON's personal invitation. (Louis BUDENZ has stated that prior to his, (BUDENZ), defection from the Communist Party in 1945, he knew Paul ROBESON as a secret member of the Communist Party.)

M. D. Stevens

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

13-00000

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER: F-76-382

FROM: IPS Vorhis

EXTENSION: 7486

DATE SENT: 17 June 76

SUSPENSE DATE: 24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay				Action
2.				
3. OS/IRG E. R. Duffy				Action
4.				
5. CRS/FIO C. W. Rice 2B-60				Action
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1				
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108				FYI
8. Batch F6-161				OPS/IRG
9. AI/DDA H. G. Bean				FYI 7/8 - 52 hrs. per. P. Cochran 3 Aug 76
10.				
11. DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler 2E-6104				FYI
12.				

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)		REQUEST NUMBER
B-1965 B-1966 Re Martin Luther King, Jr. — Harold Weisberg re: James Earl Ray ~~B-69-127 B-70-11~~		F-76-382
FROM: IPS Vorhis	EXTENSION 7486	DATE SENT 17 June 76 SUSPENSE DATE 24 June 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC F. C. Randall HT-1 Amber; GX-2 pls relay				Action Attached is a copy of the only document we have which is pertinent
2. DCD				
3. OS/IRG E. R. Duffy ~~EX-1~~				Action to the request. It is denied pursuant
4. 6-21-76 p.M.				to the provisions of
5. CRS/FIO C. W. Rice ~~2E-60~~				Action exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)(a+b).
6. FELTON MARY HR-580 DDO/PIC 1D4127 EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1				
7. SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108				FYI HS
8. Batch F6-161				
9. AI/DDA H. G. Bean ~~BX-4~~				FYI Document 61
10.	PM 6-25-76			
11. DDI/FIO T. C. Lawler 2E-6104				FYI
12.				

RETURN TO: IPS Vorhis 2E-50

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER 76- 382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swider~~ MARY O/DDO/FIO Ext. 9415

EXTENSION

DATE SENT 18 JUNE

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OSG/OC Attn: P. Marine	18/6/76	18/6/76	[initials]	
2. 2B16				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette tube: CT-5, 2B1415				/X/ No record of subject /_/ No info identifiable with subject /_/ See attached memorandum
10.				
11.				
12.				

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-10 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Martin Luther King (Weisberg Request)

REQUEST NUMBER: 76-382

FROM: ~~A.B. Swider~~ Marr
O/DDO/FIO CT-5

EXTENSION: 9415

DATE SENT: 18 June

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. FR PLANS Attn: Bob Baker	22 JUN 1976		8
2. BU-6			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9. DDO/FIO Attn: Annette Tube: CT-5, 2B1415			
10.			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

/✓/ No record of subject

/_/ No info identifiable with subject

/_/ See attached memorandum

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 OP-9 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)				REQUEST NUMBER
Martin Luther King, Jr.				F 76-382
FROM: DCO/FIO/PAO Helen Spilman Rm 915 - Key Bldg			EXTENSION 2271	DATE SENT 25 Jun 76 / SUSPENSE DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC attn: Mary Felton				
2. Rm 1D 4125 - Hqs.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
RETURN TO:				

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr. (Harold Weisberg - Requester)	F 76-382

FROM	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271 Sally Weller 6400 R 9581 IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2		26 July 1976 SUSPENSE DATE 31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber			[initials]	The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component.
2.				Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied.
3. OPS/ITG		30/7	[initials]	If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component.
4. ES-2				If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions.
5.				If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA.
6. C/OPS/ITG			[initials]	In both of the above instances please name the denying official.
7.				
8.				
9.				
10. DDO/PIC HT-1				

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. a requested by Weisberg	F76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
DDO/PIC M. Felton 1D4125	1644	5 Aug 76 SUSPENSE DATE XXXX 9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. W. Strubitts SA/LA/EICO ET-3	5 AUG 1976		S	Pls review the attached for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Pls cite exemptions for denials and partial denials. Thanks. MFelton
2. JOE		6 Aug	JL	2 to 8: Have sanitized the attached documents for release to Weisberg.
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. DDO/PIC M. FElton HT-1				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
RETURN TO:				

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,requested by Weisberg	F76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
M. Felton DDO/PIC 1D4125	1644	5 Aug 76 SUSPENSE DATE 9 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. H. Thompson EA/OEM/FOI BU-2	6/8	6/8	[initials]	OPS/ITG proposes we pass the attached document to Weisberg in response to his FOIA request. Do you agree with this and with their sanitization? In particular, do you agree with leaving the address at the top of the attachment to the dispatch? Thank you. MFelton
2. AC/PIA			[initials]	1-2 - I don't think we should agree. Reference to King is incidental. All other names would have to be removed.
3.				
4. EA/OEM/OS			[initials]	2-4: Agree; we do not want the "O.J. Martin" address released. Attachment of little use to requestor anyway.
5. C/OEM		10/8	[initials]	Document FHHT-6444 7 May 1968 - Hawaii Foundations for American Freedoms, Inc.
6.				
7.				
8. M. Felton DDO/PIC HT_1				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Martin Luther King, Jr., requested by Weisberg

REQUEST NUMBER F76-382

FROM: DDO/PIC
M. Felton
1D4125

EXTENSION 1644

DATE SENT 5 Aug 76

SUSPENSE DATE 9 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	5 AUG 1976		cl	Pls review the attached documents for release to Weisberg per his FOIA request. Thanks. MFelton
2.				
3. E/I	9/8		[illegible]	
4.				3-5+8: documents with exception of OWOA-19623 (which has no Italian connection) can be passed after excising ~~[illegible]~~ portions that have been bracketed (for source protection)
5. EXO	9 AUG 1976		a	
6. EUR/EXO GS-69	AUG 1976		cl	
7.				
8. DDO/PIC ATTN: Mary HT_1				
9.				
10.				
11.				8-6 - Pls review last document.
12.				6 to 8: [illegible] last sentence of the attach[ed] [illegible] OWOA-19623 [illegible]

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Martin Luther King, Jr requested by Weisberg	F76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
M. Felton DDO/PIC 1D4125	1644	17 Aug 76
		SUSPENSE DATE: 19 Aug 76

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. LA ET-3		[signature]	[initials]	Pls review the attached document for release to Weisberg per his request. Cite exemptions for deletions or denial. Thank you. MDFelton
2.				
3.				
4.				1 to 8: Document sanitized for release.
5.				
6.				
7.				
8. DDO/PIC HT-1 ATTN: Mary				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
RETURN TO:				

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☒ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)				REQUEST NUMBER
FOI Request - Martin Luther King, Jr. (Harold Weisberg - Requester)				F 76-382
FROM: Donald G. Vorhis 7486 R 9271; Sally Weiler 6400 R 9581; IPS/DDA 2E42 Hqs DX-2			EXTENSION	DATE SENT: 26 July 1976; SUSPENSE DATE: 31 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDO/PIC Mr. Randall GX-2 Pls relay to HT-1 Amber	~~29 Jul 76~~		JS	The attached 7 documents were surfaced by OS/IRG in its search on Subject. The documents originated in your component or predecessor component. Please review the documents to determine if they can be released to Subject in full, in sanitized form, or they are to be denied. If the documents are releasable in full, please have them declassified by an authorized officer of your component. If deletions are to be made, please make them and forward the sanitized version to this Staff to send to the requester. Cite the FOIA subsection which applies to the deleted portions. If the document is denied please cite the appropriate subsection(s) of the FOIA. In both of the above instances please name the denying official.
2.				
3. OOD	29 Jul 76	30 Jul 76	WD	
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9. DDO/PIC				
10. 1D4127				
11. attn: Mary				3 to 9: We do not know anything more about this incident. Inasmuch as it apparently did not appear in the press, I am afraid that the information in these memoranda, if put into the public domain, could jeopardize our relationship with the person who provided it to us. Therefore both documents are ebing denied pursuant to exemptions (b)(1),(b)(2),(b)(3)(a)&(b) and (b)(6).
12.				

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

374 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

LISTING OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

(1) Memorandum from DCS, dated 28 May 1969. # 256

(2) Memorandum to Director, DCS, dated 19 February 1969. # 255

(3) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27362. — 252

(4) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27366. — 253

(5) DDO cable, dated 8 June 1968, IN 27367. — 254

(6) DDO dispatch, UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966. — A-62

(7) DDO biographic data on Martin Luther King, dated 5 November 1967.

13-00000

3 Aug 76

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) Request for copy of CIA Cable from CIA Reference File

FROM: Cable Secretariat/Reference File Mr. Garnett U. Tate Chief, Cable Archives 1A-53 Hqs. Tube CT-7	EXTENSION 6159	NO. DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.				The attached Form 1604, "Archives Cable Service", requests a copy of a CIA cable for which the dissemination is restricted. Would you please:
2.				(a) Forward the attached copy to the requester (shown on Form 1604 or;
3.				(b) Return the attached copy to Cable Archives with guidance in order that we may notify the requester of the disposition of his request.
4. LA/SA				
5.				
6.				
7. DDO/PIC ATTN: MARY FALTON				Deny release based on liaison + sensitive sources + methods. JL
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				2 cables denied
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER Feltham, Mary D.	DATE 3 Aug 76
	DIVISION/BRANCH HT-1 DDO/PIC	EXTENSION 1649

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ________ ________ ________ FOIA

☐ Recall copies from: ________ ________ ________ ________ ________

☐ Change action from: ________ To: ________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ________ (EXT.)

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☑ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE '68	SUBJECT
[illegible]	PARA 6187	April	[illegible]

[illegible signature]

SIGNATURE

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: M D Felton DIVISION/BRANCH: HT-1 DDO/PIC	DATE: 9 Aug 76 EXTENSION: 1644

[ ] It is requested that the dissemination of ______ (IN/DIR NUMBER) ______ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

FOIA

[ ] ADD: ______ ______ ______

[ ] Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

[ ] Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

In coordination with: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

AUG 9 10 15 AM '76

[X] Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have [X] have not [ ] made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

(38)

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 03635 2740	Rome 5861	May 68	RAY

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS CONFIDENTIAL E-2, IMPDET CL BY 007622 (47)

13-00000

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: M. D. [illegible] DIVISION/BRANCH: [illegible] PIC (HT-[illegible])	DATE: [illegible] Aug 71 EXTENSION: 1604

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

______________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

Follow

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ EXT.

In coordination with: ______________ (NAME (type or print)) ______ EXT.

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT

SIGNATURE

3-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER Mary D. Felton DIVISION/BRANCH (HT-1) DDO/PIC	DATE 13 Aug 76 EXTENSION 1644

[ ] It is requested that the dissemination of ____________ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

____________ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

[ ] ADD: ____________ ____________ ____________ FOIA

[ ] Recall copies from: ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________

[ ] Change action from: ____________ To: ____________

Authorized by: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ____ (EXT)

In coordination with: ____________ (NAME (type or print)) ____ (EXT)

[X] Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have [X] have not [ ] made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
IN 25866 2746	COPE 7485	June 68 (19)	MHPASHA
	5525		
	5531		
	5535		

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (47)

13 Aug 76

3-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

REQUEST FOR DISSEMINATION CHANGE OR CABLE REFERENCE SERVICE

TO: CABLE SECRATARIAT BRANCH, OC CABLE REFERENCE SECTION IA-53 HQS. EXT. 6159, TUBE ~~ES-6~~ CT-7	FROM: NAME OF REQUESTER: Mary D. Felton DIVISION/BRANCH: (HT-1) 1SS/PKG	DATE: 28 Mar 7? EXTENSION: 1644

☐ It is requested that the dissemination of ______ (IN/DIR NUMBER)

______ (STATION NUMBER) be changed as indicated.

☐ ADD: ______ ______ ______

☐ Recall copies from: ______ ______ ______ ______ ______

☐ Change action from: ______ To: ______

Authorized by: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

In coordination with: ______ NAME (type or print) ______ EXT.

☐ Please furnish one copy of the cable described. I have ☐ have not ☐ made inquiry of the CS Records control system.

IN/DIR NUMBER	STATION NUMBER	DATE	SUBJECT
99685	ADDIS 2200	Apr 68	J. E. Ray

Sent to C/AF Reg for clearance

Mary D. Felton
SIGNATURE

FORM 11-72 1604 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (47)

1976

SECRET

FELTON MARY HR-580
DDO/PIC 1D4127
EXT. 1644 TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE	IP/FI CONTROL NO.
	784

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE		INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	18	6	
REQUESTER					
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52			3m
REQUESTER					
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20			

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED	THIS REQUEST REFERS TO *(Doc. Ref.)*
4	

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

F

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES
KING	Martin Luther Jr.

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED	201 NO. IF KNOWN
	201-

AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
✓	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.
1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME

181148

1976 JUN 18 PM 1:11

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

13-00000

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
DO AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
IP/ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
COMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
SB BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
TRAVEL PROGRAMS			DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
NAME OF BEARER FILE/OTS					
CIA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL *(WFTU)*			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
COVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
OPERATIONS STAFF: RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
OPERATIONS STAFF: INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
CI OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
E/G PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
WH SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM			DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		

REMARKS

JUN 23 2 43 PM '76

S-E-C-R-E-T

MAIN INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE 181148 034

RGQ NO: 181148A01 REQUESTER: HR580 FELTON MARY DDO/PIC ID4127 1644 HT1

NAME: KING,MARTIN LUTHER YOB: SEX: CIT:
ORIGIN:A DUR: PURPOSE:FDS PRTY:R OTPT:D300 FNU: SPELL: MASK: MAT:

CONTROL CODE 034-MHS-760618-142118-00015 142103

0001 KING, MARTIN LUTHER 201-0024907 ACA
SEX M DBA-0 APERTURE CA...
CIT USA 23APR62
TO BE INTERVIEWED BY PAUL KRASSNER CONTACT OF SUBJ ~~FBI~~
OF 201-24907. P9
FORMERLY: SS NO SOUR
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
DBA-07422 20 JUL 62 06186240

ORIGIN: Miami, Fla
Date: 23 Apr 62
Subj: William Worthy, Jr.
Bufile: 105-20110
Field: MM-105-4750

RECORD COPY AT... RETURN PROMPTLY

0002 KING, MARTIN LUTHER 100-004-
SEX M DFB-80124
MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH 16TH NATIONAL CON- P 732-0
VENTION OF CP, USA. PAGE NO. 316.
FORMERLY: DD NO DATE, SS NO SOUR
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
DFB-80124 20 SEP 72 03527255

28/03/57
Ser - 11

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 6 March 57
Subj: Communist Party USA
Bufile: 100-3
Field: NY-100-4931

S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIGIN: New York, NY
Date: 19 Apr 57
Subj. Johnson Forest Group
Bufile: 100-347390.
Field: nongiven
ACA 15.07

```
0003 KING, MARTIN LUTHER /REV./                               200-009-004
                                                              DFB-82024
                                                              SER-27
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     DFB-82024                             01 JAN 58   08311751
```

25/04/57 Apr SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

ACA 15.07

```
0004 KING, M. L. /REV./                                       074-006-040
                                                              RAKA-00708
                                                              25MAY56
                                                              SER-64
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                      APERTURE CARDS AVAILABL
     RAKA-00708                            01 JAN 58   08049094
```

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

```
0005 KING, MARTIN                                             201-0170954*
     SEX M DOB 14APR24            POB USA, NJER, HOBOKEN      TYPE NAME R
     CIT USA                                                  RCD DATE 75
     RES USA. HUSB OF KING, EVA /201-0170954/
     ***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
                                           23 APR 75   09272198
```

END OF REPLY - 0005 RECORDS LISTED

13-00000

SECRET

FROM		BADGE NO.
FELTON MARY DDO/PIC EXT. 1644		HR-580 104127 TUBE HT1

SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

INDEX SEARCH AND 201 CONSOLIDATION REQUEST

DATE	IP/FI CONTROL NO.
13 AUG 76	590

TO	TUBE	ROOM	DATE	INITIALS
IP/INDEX	DT-5	1B4003	28 JUL 76	
REQUESTER				
IP/FILES	DT-6	GC52		
REQUESTER				
IP/RMS	DW-6	GA-20		

REQUESTER'S NOTES

NO. OF REFERENCES ORDERED	THIS REQUEST REFERS TO (*Doc. Ref.*)
1	

SEARCH INSTRUCTIONS *(TO IP/IN)*

P

SUBJECT OF INDEX SEARCH

SURNAME	GIVEN NAMES
RAY	JAMES EARL

SPELLING VARIATIONS TO BE SEARCHED	201 NO. IF KNOWN
	201-

AKA, ALIASES	OTHER IDENTIFYING DATA *(Occupation, CP membership, I. S. affiliations, etc.)*
	ASSASSIN OF DR. KING.

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP	RESIDENCE
	1928 (?)		USA	

RESULTS OF IP/INDEX SEARCH

	NO RECORDS IDENTIFIABLE WITH SUBJECT
	SURNAME NOT FOUND IN FILES
✓	INDEX RECORDS ATTACHED
	THERE ARE ________ RECORDS OF WHICH ________ ARE FNU'S WHICH MAY PERTAIN TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS SEARCH; THESE MAY BE REVIEWED IN IP/IN. 1B4003.

COMMENTS

no Fm 3

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUESTERS

THERE ARE OTHER INDICES THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER. SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES AND 201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS.

TO ORDER DOCUMENTS

1. REVIEW INDEX RECORDS.
2. DRAW GREEN DIAGONAL LINE ACROSS ITEMS YOU DO NOT WANT.
3. FORWARD TO IP/FILES.

TO EDIT THE INDEX RECORDS

AFTER RECEIPT OF THE DOCUMENTS, EDIT THE INDEX RECORD ACCORDING TO DOI 70-19.

1. TO DESTROY INDEX RECORD: MARK THE INDEX RECORD WITH A GREEN D, AND CITE THE REASON.
2. TO MAKE CORRECTIONS/ADDITIONS: ENTER THE CHANGES ON THE INDEX RECORD IN GREEN INK.
3. FORWARD TO IP/RMS VIA YOUR RECORDS OFFICER

REQUEST NO./DATE/TIME	
1976 JUL 28 PM 3:22 281224	201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE.

FORM 3-74 362 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

E-2, IMPDET CL. BY: 007622 (4-8-38)

SECRET

201 CONSOLIDATION INSTRUCTIONS (See DOI 70-20)

1. IF SUBJECT HAS A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH THE INDEX RECORDS MARKED IN GREEN TO REFLECT THE CONSOLIDATION ACTION TAKEN. **(Documents should then be placed in the 201, by the Researcher).**

2. WHEN SUBJECT HAS NO 201 FILE, BUT MEETS THE REQUIREMENT FOR OPENING A 201 FILE, SEND THIS FORM TO IP/RMS WITH:

   A. A COMPLETED FORM 831.

   B. ALL PERTINENT DOCUMENTS, EXTRACTS, AND PROPERLY EDITED RECORDS FOR CONSOLIDATION OF THE FILE BY IP/RMS.

SIGNATURE OF RECORDS OFFICER	DATE

CHECKLIST OF OTHER INDICES: REQUESTER SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER TRACING THE FOLLOWING SOURCES WHICH ARE NOT SEARCHED BY IP/INDEX *(SEE NAME TRACE HANDBOOK)*.

SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED	SOURCE	DATE REQUESTED	DATE RECEIVED
O AREA DESKS			CENTRAL REFERENCE SERVICE		
P/ARCHIVES			CIA LIBRARY		
OMINT NAME CHECK			OFFICE OF SECURITY		
B BIOGRAPHICS BRANCH			OFFICE OF MEDICAL SERVICES		
RAVEL PROGRAMS			DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION		
AME OF BEARER FILE/OTS					
IA APPLICANTS FILE/OFFICE OF PERSONNEL			DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE		
PECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP-SS/IL *(WFTU)*			DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX		
OVER AND COMMERCIAL STAFF			CENTRAL REGISTRY - EUROPE		
)PERA-TIONS STAFF: RESERVE OFFICERS FILE			FBI		
)PERA-TIONS STAFF: INTERAGENCY SOURCE REG.			I & NS		
I OPERATIONS: CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
/G PROGRAM			SECRET SERVICE		
H SUBVERSIVES PROGRAM			DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY		

EMARKS

AUG 13 1 06 PM '76

281224

SECRET

13-00000

S-E-C-R-E-T

NAME INDEX SEARCH RESPONSE

... ...

RQ: 20122402 REQUESTOR: ... FELTON, MARY DDO/FIC 13112? 1044 ...

: RAY,JAMES EARL YOB: SEX: CIT:
... PURPOSE:FOS ... OTRT:DS00 ...

... CODE ...-750720-192345-00020 192313

RAY, JAMES EARL 201-0332732*
SEX M DOB 10MAR28 POB USA, ILLINOIS TYPE NAME T
CIT USA
REG USA ... GALT, ERIC STARVO ... GALT, ERIC STARVO ...
WILLARD, JOHN ... WILLIARD, JOHN ... LOWMYER, HARVEY ...
... JAMES ... HERRON, ... WALTON, JAMES ...
... JAMES ... SNEYD, RAMON GEORGE ... SNEYA, RAMON
GEORGE
***LOCATOR DATA: FILE PERMANENTLY CHARGED TO DPS/ITG, 680704 , 1758, 19704/68
23 JUL 68 00211839

SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED

RAY, JAMES EARL 050-300
SEX M DOB C28 POB USA HMMW-16350
CIT USA 25APR68
AKA GALT, ERIC STARVO, AKA LOWMYER, HARVEY, AKA
WILLARD, JOHN SUBJ REPORTEDLY SHOT AND KILLED MARTIN
LUTHER KING SUPPOSEDLY VISITED MEXICO
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - GC-52
APERTURE CARDS AVAILABLE
HMMW-16350 01 MAY 68 32723573

ACA
14,04
In Ops ITG
Memo

CONTINUED--- ...

PAGE 0001
281224 033

S-E-C-R-E-T E2 IMPDET CL BY 054979

13-00000

RAY, JAMES
SEX M DOB COMPARED
CIT ITAL
< USA PUB LOS ANGELES TRACE REPLY TO FBI
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - OC-92
316-0175368 23 MAY 83 02131033

100-002-002
316-0175368
14MAY80

0151176 memo

RAY, JAMES
SEX M
OCC DIRECTOR OF COHEN RONABECK TRAINING CO, THE
LATTER BEING AN AIR TRANSPORT FIRM WHICH CARRIES OUT
ILLEGAL CONTRABAND OPS.
***LOCATOR DATA: ORDER FROM IP/CRS - OC-92
PIR-05119 23 NOV 72 02357421

049-007-025
PIR-05119
10NOV49
SER-15

END OF REPLY - 0004 RECORDS LISTED

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES)	DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST		
HR 580			
FROM: (Requester's name) OR AFFIX REQUESTER GUMMED LABEL	DATE OF REQUEST: 27 Aug 76 [initials] 9:00		
Mary Felton	BRANCH: DDO/PIC	ROOM NO.: 1D4125	PHONE NO.: 1644

TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1 IP/FILES DT-6			
2 REQUESTER			
3 IP/FILES DT-6			
4			
5			

SUBJECT (must be furnished): KING

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

☒ Temporary ☐ Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

☐ Document reference from IP/Index.

☐ Document reference from source other than IP/Index.

#564

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/Files)
201-1277	DBC 29138	13 Sep 68	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY

Pg 8 Incidental Reference Not a Record

FORM 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS 2-74

SECRET

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES)

FELTON MARY
DDO/PIC
EXT. 1644
HR-580
1D4127
TUBE HT1
SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 004108

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.

	TO:	DATE RCD.	DATE FWD.	INITIALS
1	IP/FILES DT-6			
2	REQUESTER			
3	IP/FILES DT-6	9075 Mimi Allen		
4				
5				

SUBJECT (must be furnished)
King / Martin

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES. (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362.)
2. Include badge number and tube station in "FROM" block if gummed label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:

- [x] Temporary
- [ ] Permanent

4. Indicate source of reference:

- [ ] Document reference from IP/Index.
- [ ] Document reference from source other than IP/Index.

REC'D IN FILES
16.00
OUT

#701

HQ FILE NUMBER	DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DOCUMENT DATE	DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (To be completed by IP/Files)
	PANA 6180 / W 97566	Apr 68	
201-811911	DBC 9700	4 Feb 68	SEE APERTURE CARDS ATTACHED
19-5-52	DBC-23402	23 Jul 68	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
100-300-26	DBC-25546	19 Aug 68	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
100-120-21	DBC-41496	30 Jan 69	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD
201-1277	DBC-29138	13 Sep 68	Temp Charge See back
100-4-113	DBB-47898	13 May 68	LOST Extensive Search Throughout DDO Has Failed To Locate
100-4-44	DBC-23614	12 Jul 68	RECORD COPY ATTACHED
96-300-7	DBC-63897	30 Sep 69	THIS REFERENCE HAS BEEN ORDERED FROM IP/ARD PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
201-805119	DBC-64858	13 Oct 69	RECORD COPY ATTACHED PLEASE RETURN PROMPTLY
	DBC-3		

FORM 2-74 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET

CL. BY: 007622 (38)

13-00000

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT SERVICE REQUEST

IP CONTROL NO. (Filled in by IP/FILES)

FROM: (Requester's name) OR (AFFIX REQUESTER/DUMMED LABEL)

DATE OF REQUEST

BRANCH | ROOM NO. | PHONE NO.

TO: | DATE | INITIALS

1. IP/FILES DT-6
2. REQUESTER
3. IP FILES DT-6
4.
5.

IP/DMS

SUBJECT (must be furnished)

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Use this form to request files and/or documents from IP/FILES (Not to be used in lieu of Form 362).
2. Include badge number and organization in FROM block if dummy label has not been issued.
3. Indicate type of charge:
   - [x] Temporary
   - [ ] Permanent
4. Indicate source of reference:
   - [ ] Document reference from IP/Index
   - [ ] Document reference from source other than IP/Index

REC'D IN FILES

201-1277

HQ FILE NUMBER | DOCUMENT SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DISPOSITION OF REQUEST (to be entered by IP/Files)

TEMPORARY CHARGE TO:

Name VINCE Ext x1552

Div. Micrographics Subj

Rm Date

201-81911 DBC 9700

201-1277 DBC-28933 13Sep68 Temp Charge

100-4-113

AUG 10 3 45 PM '76

CL BY: 007622

SECRET

FORM 1870 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	OPS/ITG - Mr. Haefner	20/8	H
2	ES-2		
3	P.C. - FOR ACTION	23/8	[illegible]
4			
5	DDO/PIC M. Felton HT-1		
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Pls fill out the attached form so we can report costs to IPS. Note we can only claim the actual search time for the records and not the time involved in reviewing and sanitizing them. Thank you.

(I talked to P. Cochran about this on the phone, but I'd like to get it in writing. Thanks)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
M. Felton	

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

13-00000

FOIA REQUEST MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

DATE

TITLE OF DOCUMENT(S) AND/OR SUBJECT

F[illegible]76-382

WEISBERG request on Martin LUther King and James Earl Ray

SEARCH		COST (To be completed by IRS)	CLASSIFICATION REVIEW		COST (To be completed by IRS)
GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS		GRADE/STEP LEVEL	MANHOURS	
8.7	47 [illegible]		8.7	[illegible]	
				5 hrs. writeup	
TOTAL COST			TOTAL COST		

DO NOT DETACH THIS SLIP RETURN TO ➡

CHIEF, INFORMATION REVIEW STAFF
7 C 28 Headquarters

FORM 1-75 3533 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (13-47)

13-00000

WEISBERG REQUES

	NR	NAI	INFO
IP/IN			X
CCS	X		
CI/OPS			X
DCD			X
FR	X		
OPS/ITG			X
OSG/OC	X		

July 1976

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	C/DDO/PIC		✓
2	C/SS EW-7		
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

If you've no objection, would like to pry out some sort of criteria.

Andy

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
A. F. Addona, C/DDO/PIC/AL HT-1	15 July

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Charles A. Briggs Chief, Services Staff EW-7	1596	DATE 15 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. OGC/FOIA FU-2				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Charles A. Briggs Chief, Services Staff EW-7	1596	DATE 15 July 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/OPS/ITG ES-2 Attn: P. Haefner				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

C/SS
to
OGC

C/SS memo to OGC
(15 Jul 76)
requesting
criteria to
release info
under FOIA as
regards family
privacy rights.

Administrative - Internal Use Only

15 July 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel

ATTENTION : C/FOIA/PA

SUBJECT : Request For Opinion--FOIA (b)(6) & Privacy Act

REFERENCE : FOIA Request 76-382, copy attached

1. Mr. Weisberg has requested under the FOIA information on:

a. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

b. Earl Ray

c. Other individuals involved with the assassination of Dr. King.

2. To ensure consistency in making determinations for release under both the FOIA exemptions (b)(6) and the Privacy Act, of requests such as Mr. Weisberg's, would you please state the current legal criteria to apply to these type cases. Specifically, it would be helpful to the DDO to have a clearly enunciated legal opinion regarding what, if any, privacy rights the family of a deceased individual might have vis-a-vis the deceased individual. Further, what, if any, privacy rights does a convicted felon have.

3. We are aware that each case must be judged on its own facts. Hence, we would be grateful for your opinion regarding the criteria to apply to Mr. Weisberg's request. However, a general rule applicable to the type of request also would be very useful, would expedite the processing of such requests, and would apply some consistency in the decision-making process.

Charles A. Briggs
Chief, Services Staff

Attachment: Reference

cc: Paul Haefner, OPS/ITG

Administrative - Internal Use Only

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30 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Coordinator, DDO

SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

REFERENCE: F-76-382

This office recommends following action concerning the documents referred by OS/IRG:

Ray London-5061, dated 8 June 1968 and London-5062, dated 8 June 1968; concerns Ray traveling in London; source of this information was the FBI, some of the information was received from Scotland Yard; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4) and exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

Ray Ottawa-5446, dated 8 June 1968; concerns travel of Galt; (SMABOVE/9) a Canadian service provided the information; exempt under (b)(1)5(B)(1).

King UFGT-16828, dated 15 July 1966; concerns surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the Dade County/Florida police (Criminal Intelligence); excluded under 1900.3(g)(4).

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Ray LOND 5062 8 June 68 OGA! liaison

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E.2 IMPDET CL BY 058723

13-00000

1976

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

HAROLD WEISBERG FOR MARTIN LUGHTER KING AND JAMES EARL RAY DOCUMENTS

REQUEST NUMBER

FROM:

EXTENSION

DATE SENT

SUSPENSE DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Owen	4 May	4	[initials]
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. Helen 1B 3125			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

These are the documents on Ray only. Please review them and let me know if there are any changes you want made on them.

OGC is currently reviewing them and writing the affadavit. Court date is 22 May.

We will have to incorporate ж your changes into the affadavit.

Thanks

Helen X1313

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray) Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. Life, dated 3 May 1968; New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; UPI, dated 17 May 1968; Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; The Evening Star, dated 1 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, undated, UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; Ramparts, 29 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Post, 28 June 1968; Reuters, London,

Not accurate

E2 IMPDET CL BY 058123

13-00000

dated 18 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, undated; The Washington Post, 9 June 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968; The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968; St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968; Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Washington Star, 27 June 1968; New York Times, 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 18 April 1968; New York Times, dated 19 April 1968; New York Times, dated 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968; Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968; Washington Star, 26 April 1968; Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968; Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969; Reuters, dated 9 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; EX-3438, dated 1969; The Strange Case of James Earl Ray; dated 1969; London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; London, 11 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968; London, 10 June 1968; London, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968; Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968; Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968; Washington Post, 8 May 1968; Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto,

Not accurate

refer to DDI/FBIS

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dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; London, dated 27 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 30 June 1968; UPI-33, London, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-26, London, dated 17 June 1968; UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968; London, dated 18 June 1968; UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; London, dated 6 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Examiner, dated 26-27, April 1968; Associated Press, dated 8 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968; London, dated 5 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969; Los Vegas Sun, 10 May 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, London, undated; Reuters, London, 18 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968; London, UPI-20, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968; London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968; UPI-39, London, dated 12 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; Reuters, London, undated; Reuters, London, dated 13 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-126, Washington, 11 June 1968; UPI-54, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968; Reuters, undated; Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968; UPI-61, 17 July 1968.

Not accurate

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post,

dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

348-DIR 90530, 10 Apr 68 b1, b3, 349 Mexi 5188, 10 Apr 68 b1, b3

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

13-00000

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9600 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-95536), dated 22 April 1968; Director-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16358, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

HMMW-16358 22 Apr 68 23

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

370 (3) (a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

371 (4) (b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

373 (6) (c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

368 (1) (d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

Cindy

372 (5) (e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

374 (7) (f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

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375 (g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1).

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1). 369

3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

381-388 (a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

389 (b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

390 (c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

391 (d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

392 (e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

393 (f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

394 (g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

395 (h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

396 (i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

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397 (j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

398 (k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

399 (l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

400 (m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King. liaison

401 (n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

402 (o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

403 (p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

404 (q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

405 (r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

406 (s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

407 (t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition. liaison

13-00000

(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968;
408 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968;
409 Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968;
410 records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the
411 FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns
412 proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey
413 Lawmyer and John Willard.

414 d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

415 e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

416 f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

417 g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

418 5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

80 6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

13-00000

6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

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27 JUL 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Information Officer, DDO

SUBJECT: Weisberg Request (James Earl Ray) Part II

REFERENCE: 76-F-382

1. This office maintains a two volume 201 file (201-832732) on the Subject. These files and other records in this office revealed the following:

a. The following overt items are releasable to the requestor. There are no exemptions. 1 Life, dated 3 May 1968; 2 New York Times, dated 26 April 1968; 3 Washington Star, dated 8 May 1968; 4 Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; 5 Ray's Odd Odyssey, undated; 6 UPI, dated 17 May 1968; 7 Reuters, Lisbon, dated 9 June 1968; 8 Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968; 9 Reuters, London, undated; 10 Reuters, Lisbon, 9 June 1968; 11 Los Vegas Sun, dated 3 June 1968; 12 The Evening Star, dated 2 July 1968; 13 Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 14 AP London, dated 27 June 1968; 15 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 16 Reuters, London, 27 June 1968; 17 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 18 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 19 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 20 Associated Press, London, dated 27 June 1968; 21 United Press International (UPI-16), dated 27 June 1968; 22 London, dated 27 June 1968; 23 London, dated 27 June 1968; 24 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 25 Reuters, London, undated; 26 Reuters, London, undated; 27 UPI-16, dated 27 June 1968; 28 Associated Press, Memphis, dated 27 June 1968; 29 Associated Press, Washington, dated 27 June 1968; 30 Associated Press, dated 27 June 1968; 31 Ramparts, 29 June 1968; 32 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 33 Reuters, London, undated; 34 Reuters, Memphis, 27 June 1968; 35 The Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; 36 Washington Post Foreign service, dated 8 June 1968; 37 Reuters, London, dated 27 June 1968; 38 Washington Post, 28 June 1968; 39 Reuters, London,

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dated 18 June 1968;[40]Associated Press, dated 17 June 1968;[41]Reuters, London, dated 21 June 1968;[42]Reuters, London, undated;[43]Reuters, London, dated 28 June 1968;[44]Reuters, undated;[45]Reuters, Washington, dated 8 June 1968;[46]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968;[47]Reuters, undated;[48]The Washington Post, 9 June 1968;[49]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 18 April 1968;[50]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 17 April 1968;[51]The Washington Post, dated 8 April 1968;[52]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 16 April 1968;[53]St. Louis Missouri, Post-Dispatch, dated 5 April 1968;[54]Chicago Illinois News, dated 8 April 1968;[55]London, dated 27 June 1968;[56]London, dated 27 June 1968;[57]Associated Press, London, undated;[58]London, dated 27 June 1968;[59]Washington Star, 27 June 1968;[60]New York Times, 18 April 1968;[61]New York Times, dated 18 April 1968;[62]New York Times, dated 19 April 1968;[63]New York Times, dated 23 April 1968;[64]Washington Post, dated 5 July 1968;[65]Los Angeles Free Press, dated 19 April 1968;[66]Washington Star, 26 April 1968;[67]Northern Virginia Sun, dated 25 April 1968;[68]Washington Post, dated 27 April 1968;[69]Washington Post, dated 4 July 1968;[70]Washington Star, dated 30 December 1969;[71]Reuters, dated 9 June 1968;[72]Reuters, London, dated 9 June 1968;[73]EX-3438, dated 1969;[74]The Strange Case of James Earl Ray;[75]dated 1969;[76]London, undated;[77]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968;[78]London, dated 10 June 1968;[79]London, dated 10 June 1968;[80]UPI-7, London, 10 June 1968;[81]Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968;[82]London, dated 10 June 1968;[83]London, dated 10 June 1968;[84]Reuters, London, 11 June 1968;[85]Reuters, London, undated;[86]London, 11 June 1968;[87]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968;[88]London, dated 10 June 1968;[89]Reuters, Washington, dated 10 June 1968;[90]London, 10 June 1968;[91]London, dated 10 June 1968;[92]Reuters, London, 10 June 1968;[93]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[94]London, dated 11 June 1968;[95]Reuters, London, undated;[96]Moscow, (Gevorgyan Report), dated 22 November 1968;[97]Moscow Trud (Gevorgyan Report) dated 22 November 1968;[98]Evening Star, dated 9 May 1968;[99]Washington Post, 8 May 1968;[100]Washington Post, dated 2 July 1968;[101]Reuters, London, dated 11 June 1968;[102]Associated Press, dated 10 June 1968;[103]Reuters, London, dated 10 June 1968;[104]Associated Press, Toronto,

dated 10 June 1968;[105]Associated Press, Toronto, dated 10 June 1968;[106]Associated Press, London, undated;[107]London, dated 27 June 1968;[108]Associated Press, London, dated 30 June 1968;[109]UPI-33, London, undated;[110]Associated Press, London, dated 18 June 1968;[111]UPI-26, London, dated 17 June 1968;[112]UPI-13, dated 18 June 1968;[113]London, dated 18 June 1968;[114]UPI-30, London, dated 14 June 1968; [115]London, dated 13 June 1968;[116]London, dated 6 July 1968; [117]Reuters, London, dated 5 July 1968;[118]Washington Examiner, dated 26-27, April 1968;[119]Associated Press, dated 8 July 1968;[120]Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968;[121]Reuters, London, dated 3 July 1968;[122]London, dated 5 July 1968; [123]Washington Post, dated 30 December 1969;[124]Los Vegas Sun, 10 May 1968;[125]Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[126]Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[127]Associated Press, London, undated;[128]Reuters, London, 18 June 1968; [129]Associated Press, Toronto, 13 June 1968;[130]London, UPI-20, dated 13 June 1968;[131]Reuters, London, dated 12 June 1968; [132]Associated Press, London, 18 June 1968;[133]London, dated 13 June 1968;[134]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968;[135]Associated Press, London, dated 12 June 1968; [136]UPI-58, Lisbon, dated 12 June 1968;[137]UPI-39, London, dated 12 June 1968;[138]Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968;[139]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968;[140]Associated Press, London, dated 13 June 1968; [141]Reuters, London, undated;[142]Reuters, London, dated 13 June 1968;[143]Associated Press, London, dated 11 June 1968; [144]UPI-9, London, dated 11 June 1968;[145]Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968;[146]Associated Press, Toronto, dated 11 June 1968;[147]Reuters, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968; [148]Associated Press, Washington, 11 June 1968;[149]UPI-126, Washington, 11 June 1968;[150]UPI-54, Nashville, dated 11 June 1968;[151]Reuters, London, dated 8 June 1968; [152]Reuters, London, dated 20 June 1968;[153]Reuters, undated; [154]Associated Press, London, dated 20 June 1968;[155]UPI-61, 17 July 1968.

b. The following overt items make mention of the Subject but are not attached. Some cannot be reproduced and others are not available in this office. The Ottawa Citizen, dated 10 June 1968; The Ottawa Journal, dated 10 June 1968; The Gazette, dated 10 June 1968; Montreal Gazette, dated 11 June 1968; The Washington Post,

dated 9 June 1968; The Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 17 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 20 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 28 April 1968; Time, 21 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 May 1968; Washington Star, dated 18 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 21 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 6 May 1968; Associated Press, Toronto, 10 June 1968; Associated Press, London, dated 10 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 June 1968; New York Times, dated 18 November 1968; Time, dated 13 September 1968; The Militant, dated 6 December 1968; Washington Star, dated 13 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 28 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 8 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 3 July 1968; Washington Post, 12 November 1968; Washington Star, dated 24 March 1969; Washington Star, dated 9 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 April 1969; Washington Star, dated 17 March 1969; Washington Post, dated 9 January 1970; Washington Star, dated 12 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 16 April 1968; Washington Post, 26 January 1969; Washington Post, dated 19 September 1968; Washington Star, 23 April 1968; Washington Post, dated 11 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 13 November 1968; Washington Post, dated 12 June 1968; Washington Post, dated 14 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 11 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 19 April 1968; Associated Press, London, 27 June 1968; Washington Star, dated 14 April 1968; Time, dated 26 July 1968; Washington Post, dated 18 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 20 January 1968; Washington Star, dated 25 January 1969; Washington Star, dated 2 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 1 April 1969; Washington Post, dated 30 May 1969.

c. The following agency documents are considered releasable to the requestor in segregated form under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Excised portions are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6). Cables: Director-92664, dated 18 April 1968; Director-93163, dated 19 April 1968; Sao Paulo-8372 (IN-94694), dated 19 April 1968; Director-93162, dated 19 April

1968; Director-93261, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93260, dated 20 April 1968; Tokyo-9660 (IN-94797), dated 20 April 1968; Director-93236, dated 20 April 1968; Director-93538, dated 22 April 1968; Bogota-0707 (IN-95593), dated 22 April 1968; Director-93603, dated 23 April 1968; La Paz-4254 (IN-96327), dated 23 April 1968; Guatemala City-8934 (IN-99192), dated 26 April 1968. Dispatches: ONHA-3982, dated 22 April 1968; HMMW-16353, dated 22 April 1968. Memoranda: Official Routing Slip, dated 22 October 1975; Official Routing Slip, dated 23 October 1975; Memoranda, dated 23 April 1968.

2. The following agency documents are exempt from release. Exemptions are as cited:

(a) Bogota-0703 (IN-95025), dated 20 April 1968; this cable concerns an American National with a striking resemblance to Eric Starvo Galt; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(b) Bangkok-9432 (IN-00056), dated 29 April 1968; Airforce Intelligence advised that a person formerly in Bangkok knew James Earl Ray; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(c) Rome-5861, dated 3 May 1968; concerns a James Ray, DPOB 8 March 1928, information provided by Siena police to (DEPARK/DEGOTIST); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

(d) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards; exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(e) Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968 is a request for preparation of a transmittal to the FBI that deals with King Assassination; exempt under (b)(3)(a).

(f) Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968; Subject: Assassination of Martin Luther King. Subject in this memorandum is a James Ray, born 8 March 1928 in Los Angeles. (CSCI-316/01763-68); the information was provided by an Italian intelligence service; exempt under (b)(1)5B(1).

(g) Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968; Subject: Investigation in Japan of Report of Suspicious Action of Another Subject who was Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin; contains information provided by the Japanese National Police Agency; exempt under (b)(3)(a), (b)(6), and (b)(1)5B(1).

(h) Memorandum for the Record, dated 19 April 1968; Subject: Unknown Subject, possibly identifiable with Eric Starvo Galt; the information was based on clandestine photography of the Cuban embassy in Mexico City; exempt under (b)(3)(a); (b)(6) and (b)(1)(5)B(1).

3. the following documents concern the James Earl Ray case but do not mention the Subject by name. All are exempt under (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

(a) Eight biographic sketches on individuals thought to be associated with the Ray case.

(b) Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968; Subject: Gerald Lee Richards.

(c) The Hague-4137 (IN-94424), dated 19 April 1968; station and liaison traces provided no evidence that Subject had ever been in the Netherlands; exemptions (b)(1)5B(1) also applies.

(d) La Paz-4228 (IN-94482), dated 19 April 1968; La Paz morning papers carried photos of FBI Wanted Posters.

(e) Caracas-9414 (IN-94487), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(f) San Jose-0157 (IN-94496), dated 19 April 1968; requests photo be pouched.

(g) Director-93306, dated 19 April 1968; states that two copies of photo sent 19 April.

(h) Director-92897, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

(i) Director-92895, dated 19 April 1968; states two copies of photos sent.

13-00000

(j) Director-93264, dated 20 April 1968; concerns one Edwin Mason.

(k) Panama City-6150 (IN-95853), dated 22 April 1968; concerns the detention of two Americans who were suspect.

(l) San Jose-0162 (IN-95902), dated 23 April 1968; queries fail to reveal any knowledge of Wolman or Hubbard (subjects of Panama City-6150, above).

(m) Panama City-6180 (IN-97560), dated 24 April 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, Panamanian National, who voluntarily signed a deposition that when his ship docked in Mobile Ala. in October 1962 he was approached with a job offer that might have had something to do with Dr. King.

(n) Panama City-6193 (IN-98420), dated 25 April 1968, concerns material being pouched to the Station (ie the deposition of R. Brown cited above).

(o) Director-94343, dated 25 April 1968; Station sent a request to pouch copy of deposition and letter.

(p) HZPT-10075, dated 26 April 1968; transmits a copy of deposition material as requested.

(q) Lagos-9878, dated 28 April 1968; requests that the Embassy inquire of Wilder Company concerning one J. B. Musgrave.

(r) Lagos-9888 (IN-00793), dated 30 April 1968; reveals subject of Addis Ababa-2200 is not the man we seek.

(s) Director-95641, dated 30 April 1968; is a request that future traffic be sent in Air Force Channels.

(t) Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968; concerns a Roderick Claflin Brown, a Panamanian National; forwarded to the FBI Brown's deposition.

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(u) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 6 May 1968; Subject: JJoe Bailey Musgrave.

(v) Memorandum to the FBI, dated 13 May 1968; Subject: Joe Bailey Musgrave; forwarded passport photos of Musgrave.

(w) Frankfurt-5732 (IN-18095), dated 24 May 1968; records of the Federal Criminal Police provided a negative reply (re Galt); exempt under (b)(1)(5)B(1).

4. Seven FBI reports which mention the Subject and/or his activities; excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment I.

a. Undated Memo, sanitized for release if the FBI concurs; exemptions (b)(3)(a) and (b)(6).

b. Cactus-001, dated 22 January 1973; concerns proposed hijacking of an unidentified aircraft.

c. Photos of Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lawmyer and John Willard.

d. Photo of an unidentified individual.

e. Photo of an unidentified individual.

f. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G.

g. FBI Wanted Poster - FBI No. 405 942G, Identification order 4132, 20 April 1968.

5. Department of State telegram, Ottawa-1813, dated 8 June 1968. Reports of the apprehension in London of James Earl Ray. Excluded under 1900.3(g)(4). See Attachment II.

6. AB Memo, number 9605, dated 24 April 1968 which forwarded information on the Subject is attached for your contact with C/TSD/AB/PDS concerning the releasibility of this information. See Attachment III.

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6. The cited documents are available in this office if needed.

John J. Reagan

John J. Reagan
Chief, International Terrorism Group
Operations Staff

Attachment: a/s

13-00000

OGC
memo
(4 Oct
197[illegible]
to ADDO
re.
FBI
contact
w/CIA
regard.
KING

OGC 76-5403

4 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR : Associate Deputy Director for Administration
Attn: Chief, Security Analysis Group, OS
Director of Personnel
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Attn: ISS/IP/EIS
D/DCI/Intelligence Community
D/DCI/for National Intelligence Officers
Legislative Counsel
Inspector General
Executive Secretary

FROM : Richard H. Lansdale
Associate General Counsel

SUBJECT : Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. At the Attorney General's direction, a task force was established in May 1976 by the Office of Professional Responsibility of the Justice Department to review the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in relation to the late Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., his assassination and the Bureau's investigation of that murder.

2. Pursuant to the Attorney General's directive, Justice is canvassing those investigative agencies of the Government which might have been contacted by the FBI to secure or deliver information for intelligence, for investigative assistance (before or after the assassination), or for any form of counterintelligence action in relation to Dr. King.

3. It is requested that a check be made of your records to determine the extent and nature of any contacts with CIA by the FBI in regard to the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.

4. DoJ has expressed some urgency in responding to their request. Therefore, please advise this Office of the results of your search at your earliest convenience, but no later than close of business, 21 October 1976.

Richard H. Lansdale
Richard H. Lansdale

13-00000

IPS

resp.
to
WEISBERG

2 copies

2 left
1 copy
1 Betty

26 APR 1977

James H. Lesar, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This is in partial response to your request, dated 11 June 1976, made on behalf of your client, Mr. Harold Weisberg. Please refer also to our letters, dated 21 June 1976, 30 November 1976 and 13 January 1977. Per our recent telephone conversation this partial response addresses itself to that part of your letter requesting records pertaining to James Earl Ray.

The materials located thus far have been reviewed carefully, and our determinations are as follows:

Enclosed, Tab A, are copies of the following items which are being released to you in their entirety:

1. One book excerpt.

2-109. One hundred and eight (108) press items.

110-134. Twenty-five (25) UPI wire items.

135-171. Thirty-seven (37) Reuters wire items.

172-223. Fifty-two (52) AP wire items.

Enclosed also, Tab B, are segregable portions of the documents listed below. Deletions in the originals were made under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Information Act subsections which are given with each document cited.

The applicability of these exemptions has been explained to you in our earlier correspondence.

	Documents	Exemptions
224-225.	Two cables, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
226.	Cable, dated 10 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
227-229.	Three cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
230-233.	Four cables, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
234-235.	Two cables, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
236-237.	Two dispatches, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
238-239.	Two cables, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
240.	Memorandum, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
241.	Cable, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
242.	Routing slip, dated 22 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
243.	Routing slip, dated 23 October 1975.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The documents listed below are being withheld in their entirety under the exemption provisions of the Freedom of Informaton Act subsections given with each document.

	Documents	Exemptions
244.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
245.	Memorandum, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
246.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

247.	Cable, dated 29 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
248.	Memorandum, dated 1 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
249.	Cable, dated 3 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
250.	Memorandum, dated 14 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
251.	Memorandum, dated 16 May 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
252-254.	Three cables, dated 8 June 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3)
255.	Memorandum, dated 19 February 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
256.	Memorandum, dated 28 May 1969.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
257-264.	Eight biographic sketches.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
265.	Memorandum, dated 17 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
266-272.	Seven Cables, dated 19 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
273.	Cable, dated 20 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
274.	Cable, dated 22 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
275.	Cable, dated 23 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
276.	Cable, dated 24 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
277-278.	Two Cables, dated 25 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)
279.	Dispatch, dated 26 April 1968.	(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

13-00000

280. Cable, dated 28 April 1968. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

281-282. Two Cables, dated 30 April 1968. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

283. Memorandum, dated 2 May 1968. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

284. Memorandum, dated 6 May 1968. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

285. Memorandum, dated 13 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

286. Cable, dated 24 May 1963. (b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6)

The decisions cited above were made by Mr. Charles A. Briggs, DDO Information Review Officer.

As specified in the Freedom of Information Act, I am advising you of your right to appeal the above decisions, but it would seem to be more reasonable to await the complete results of our processing before you actually determine whether to do so.

We thank you for your patience and consideration.

Sincerely,

Charles E. Savige

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures
IPS/EK/cb/20 Apr 77
Orig. - Adse.
1 - DDO
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS F-76-382 w/cy Tab B
1 - OLC
1 - OGC
1 - Pub Aff/Hetu

13-00000

7/CG

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information and Privacy Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs
DDO Information Review Officer

SUBJECT : FBI Referral re Harold Weisberg Request on Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REFERENCES : A. Request No. F 76-382

B. Referral, Dated 25 March 1977

C. Briggs' Memorandum to IPS dated 26 October 1976

The documents forwarded under Reference B have been reviewed by the responsible DDO components and the following determinations have been made:

a. One CIA originated document may be released in sanitized form (Tab A).

b. Five CIA originated documents are denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab B.

c. Five FBI documents containing CIA information should be denied; they are listed with appropriate exemptions under Tab C.

d. Two FBI documents and one CIA document should be referred to other CIA components for determinations (see Tab D).

/s/ Charles A. Briggs
Charles A. Briggs

Attachments: a/s

cc: IPG/SCB
SA/C/LA
EUR/EXO
AF/Plans

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

TAB A
(PICG 15)

CIA · Originated
Release - Sanitized

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/PA Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
________	(Cable) Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : 11 Apr 68	((b)(1)), (b)(2), ((b)(3)), ((b)(6)) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________
________	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ________ Date : ________	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ________

13-00000

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ENCIPHERED

C.I.A. RELEASE

RR ESV

DE ESC 050 1022137

ZNY SSSSS

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

S E C R E T

CIA NBR 90520

SUBJECT: CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.

1. A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489, ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

16 APR 16 1968

2. ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN DEPARTED MEXICO CITY FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE

76

59APR 22 1968

13-00000

TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL) REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY

GP-1

BT

NNNN

INT QSL PLS GA

EFH FBI REC NBR 5Ø

TOR 11/2155Z KK

C.I.A. RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE
ENCLOSED

C.I.A.
RELEASE

~~RR ESV~~

~~DE ESC 050 1022137~~

~~ZNY SSSSS~~

R 111603Z APR 68

FM DIRECTOR CIA

TO DIRECTOR FBI

BT

~~S E C R E T~~

CIA NBR 90520

SUBJECT: ~~CLAUDE CHESTER MCLAREN, JR.~~

1. ~~A SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT SUBJECT, BORN 12 SEPT 1936 IN TEXAS, U.S. PASSPORT Z 155489, ARRIVED MEXICO CITY FROM HONDURAS ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT ON 8 APRIL. SOURCE NOTED~~ SUBJECT HAD AMAZING RESEMBLANCE TO "PHOTOGRAPHS" OF ALLEGED ASSASSIN OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REC-9 44-38861-860

EX-116

16 APR 16 1968

2. ~~ANOTHER SENSITIVE RELIABLE SOURCE IN MEXICO CITY REPORTED THAT MCLAREN~~ DEPARTED ~~MEXICO CITY~~ FOR HOUSTON ON PANAM FLIGHT EVENING 8 APRIL ~~OCCUPYING SEAT NO. 41. SOURCE SAW PLANE~~

Markin

McGowan 4/28/69

59APR 22 1968

~~TAXI OFF WITH SUBJECT ABOARD. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, CAPTAIN OF THE PANAM FLIGHT (WHO RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY AFTERNOON 9 APRIL)~~ REPORTEDLY SAID THAT SUBJECT ARRIVED IN HOUSTON.

3. THIS OFFICE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SUBJECT.

4. THE INFORMATION IN PARA ONE HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO YOUR BUREAU REPRESENTATIVE ~~IN MEXICO CITY~~

GP-1

BT

NNNN

~~INT QSL PLS GA~~
~~EFH FBI REC NBR 50~~
~~TOR 11/2155Z KK~~

C.I.A. RELEASE

cc: Mr. Papich

13-00000

C.I.A. Documents Denied

TAB B (PIC G'S)
FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
	~~Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch~~ Other: Date :	~~(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:~~
Doc # A-73 King	Cable, (Memorandum) Dispatch L/W Other: Date : 18 Apr 68 Doc. (83) of Briggs Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76	(b)(1), (b)(2), ~~(b)(3)~~, (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
Treated in Initial Review	(Cable) Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 25 Apr 68 based on Doc. 407 #(283) of Briggs memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
KING	Cable, (Memorandum) Dispatch Other: Date : 25 Apr 68 Doc. (74) of Briggs Memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), ~~(b)(3)~~, (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
Treated in Initial Review	Cable, (Memorandum), Dispatch Other: Date : 2 May 68 Doc. 407 of Briggs memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
Treated in Initial Review date: 6 May	Cable, (Memorandum) Dispatch Other: Date : (7) May 68 Doc. 408 of Briggs Memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

SECRET

18 Apr 68

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr, and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

EX-103

REC 11 44-38861-1371

APR 23 1968

248

SECRET GROUP 1

13-00000

CIA info in FBI Documents
Deny per 27Apr77
ISS response to IPS

TAB C
(PICG'S)

FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77

FOIA/PA Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
KING	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Teletype Date : 4/11/68	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY Doc #A	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 17 Apr 68 Based on Doc. 389 of Biggs' Memo to IPS, 26 Oct 76	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY Doc A'	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 22 Apr 68 Based on Doc. 398 of Biggs Memo to IPS	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 4/28/68	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
RAY	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date : 4/29/68	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:
	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: Date :	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other:

13-00000

/__/ UNCLASSIFIED /__/ CONFIDENTIAL /__/ SECRET /__/ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

Document Description: FBI Teletype Dated: 4/11/68

Document Located By : ____________
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: FBI

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
__X__ Release in sanitized form
____ Deny in toto
____ Defer decision to ____
__X__ Coordination with LA/DR prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
(X)	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
(X)	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
(X)	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* ( )	Other, specify:		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

Deny — All CIA info denied. b1, b3, b2

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

D. Hartegard, E/IB Mary C Hogg SA/C/LA
Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ____________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

13-00000

4/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Griffith
1 - Mr. Atkinson

VIA TELETYPE
1232PM
APR 11 1968
ENCIPHERED

TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

REURTELS NUMBERS TWO AND FOUR DATED APRIL EIGHT LAST.

PERTINENT DATA IN RETELS WAS INCORPORATED INTO LHM AND FURNISHED WHITE HOUSE, ATTORNEY GENERAL AND INTERESTED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY LETTER APRIL TEN INSTANT.

IN VIEW OF NATURE AND ENORMITY OF ALLEGATIONS MADE BY HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA CONCERNING THIS MATTER, LEGAT MUST ENDEAVOR TO VERIFY OR DISPROVE SUCH ALLEGATIONS.

PHOTOGRAPH OF ONE HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA, ALSO KNOWN AS HERNAN HENRIQUEZ URENA LORA, BORN OCTOBER TWENTY FOUR, FIFTEEN, AT SAN DIEGO, CUBA, OR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

REC-4 44-38861-498

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

BUREAU FILES REVEAL ABOVE INDIVIDUAL IS DOMINICAN CITIZEN AND HIS PARENTS WERE MAX AND GUARINA HENRIQUEZ.

10 APR 12 1968

~~CIA ON APRIL SEVENTEEN, SIXTY TWO, ADVISED ABOVE HENRIQUEZ LORA WAS CITIZEN OF DOMINICAN REPUBLIC WHO HAD BEEN TRAVELING ON CUBAN PASSPORT NUMBER ONE ONE TWO SEVEN DATED JANUARY TWENTY FIVE, FIFTY NINE. IN ONE NINE SIX TWO HE RESIDED AT ANTONIO MAURA, TEN~~

Delete

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review)

1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (S. Carmichael)
1 - 105-37088 (Hernan Henriquez Lora)

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

WHA:lam (10)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

13-00000

TELETYPE TO LEGAT SANTO DOMINGO
RE: ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

~~MADRID, SPAIN. ACCORDING TO CIA, HE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH PRO-CASTRO AND ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES IN MADRID DURING PRECEDING TWO YEARS AND WAS SUSPECTED OF BEING A MEMBER OF CUBAN G-TWO. THIS INFORMATION WAS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CIA.~~

~~CIA ON AUGUST NINE, SIXTY SIX, ADVISED IT HAD NOT HAD ANY OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN HERNAN HENRIQUEZ LORA AND ITS FILES INDICATED HE HAS "VERY UNSAVORY REPUTATION."~~ [Delete]

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION CONCERNING HENRIQUEZ LORA WILL BE FORWARDED BY AIRTEL.

NOTE:

Legat in retels reported Henriquez Lora had volunteered a third party had over heard a conversation in Santo Domingo between two Dominican communists in which it was alleged that Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown advocated the death of Martin Luther King and King's assassination would benefit the cause of black violence.

13-00000

/ / UNCLASSIFIED   / / CONFIDENTIAL   / / SECRET   / / TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

Document Description: Memo   Dated: 4/29/68

Document Located By : FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ________

RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
____ Release in sanitized form
__✓__ Deny in toto
____ Defer decision to ________
____ Coordination with ________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(X)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
~~(X)~~	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This name is subject of investigation by the USG entities.		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

[signature] AFML
Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET   CL BY 012170

4-29-68

Airtel

To: SAC, Washington Field

1 - Mr. Hudson

From: Director, FBI

MURKIN

On 4-28-68, a representative of CIA advised the Bureau that a German doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4-23-68. The individual was identified as Joe Musgaque, who is reportedly an employee of the Wilder Oil Company (address unknown).

Washington Field, check passport records for any identifying data concerning Musgaque; and also attempt to determine through the Department of State any information concerning the Wilder Oil Company, which reportedly is operating in Nigeria. If no information available in State Department records regarding the Wilder Oil Company, determine whether State Department can obtain this information from the Nigerian Embassy.

Handle immediately.

1 - Memphis (info)

EX-110 REC 5

1-2440

APR 30 1968

APR 30 1968

FJH:jlh
(5)

NOTE: See memorandum from J. A. Sizoo to W. C. Sullivan dated 4-28-68, captioned "Murkin" JHK:brr.

3 1968

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

13-00000

/_/ UNCLASSIFIED /_/ CONFIDENTIAL /_/ SECRET /_/ TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

Document Description: Memo Dated: 4/28/68

Document Located By : FBI
(Office Designation)

Document referred to DDO for review by: ________

RECOMMEND:

- ______ Release in full-text
- ______ Release in sanitized form
- ✓ Deny in toto
- ______ Defer decision to ________
- ______ Coordination with ________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
(X)	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(X)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
(X)	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
(X)	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
* (X)	Other, specify: This memo is already in jurisdiction of other USG entities		

* For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: This

[signature] AT/M
Signature of Reviewing Officer & Office

Document No. ________
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 012170

13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 4/28/68

FROM : J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

Norman Pulin, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised this date that a german doctor, Klaus Steer, German Director, Scientific Department, Africa, E. Merck Aktiengesellschast, Karmstady, Germany, had advised the American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, that he believed he had seen an individual whom he thought to be Eric Starvo Galt at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, Nigeria, on the afternoon of 4/23/68. Because he thought the individual looked like Galt he made an effort to get some information concerning him. He found he was registered at the hotel as Joe Musgaque, Room 403, receipt number D52138, account number 08325. The doctor did not know if Musgaque had registered at the hotel as an American. In conversation with Musgaque the doctor learned that Musgaque was employed by the Wilder Oil Company (adress unknown) and was en route to Warri Oil Field, Nigeria.

Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or the Wilder Oil Company.

Mr. Pulin, CIA, was advised that Bufiles contain no references to Joe Musgaque or Wilder Oil Company.

ACTION:

None. For information. This is being referred to the General Investigative Division.

JHK:brr (8)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sizoo
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Kavanagh

REC- 31

-2461

MAY 6 - 1968

13-00000

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
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Casper
Callahan
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Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 22, 1968

FROM : Mr. J. A. Sizoo

SUBJECT: MURKIN

At 6:35 pm 4/22/68, John Mapother, Clandestine Service, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following information to Night Supervisor James F. McGuire by telephone:

CIA sources in Panama have reported two American citizens are being detained in Panama City, Panama, at the request of the Costa Rican authorities. Allegedly, they are being detained in connection with the assassination of Martin Luther King. These individuals are identified as Tom Wolman, born 7/17/44 in New York. Wolman has Passport Number JO85474, issued 1/29/68, and his permanent residence is shown as 30 Larrys Lane, Pleasantville, New York. The other individual is identified as Douglas Harry Hulbard, Passport Number 330926. Hulbard is described as a former soldier who has returned to Panama to be married. CIA did not have any further descriptive data regarding Hulbard.

These two individuals were traveling in a Chevrolet, License Number 23GH19, Motor Number 13 387 13 113711. The vehicle and license plates could not be further described by CIA. According to CIA, Wolman's passport indicates he had entered and departed El Salvador and Honduras on 4/17/68; Nicaragua on 4/18/68.

Mr. Mapother advised he has no indication why the Costa Rican authorities have requested the detention of the above-described individuals. Further, he does not know of any factual connection of these individuals with the King case. He said CIA sources were trying to develop this matter further. He also advised that CIA would send the FBI a written communication concerning this matter on 4/23/68.

At 9:10 pm 4/22/68, Norman Poulin, CIA, orally advised that a check had been made with the Costa Rican authorities and determined that Costa Rica has no information regarding the above-mentioned individuals; that Costa Rica did not request Panamanian authorities to hold these individuals, that they have no request from any American authorities to detain them; and that they have

REC-48 44-38861-1685

CONTINUED - OVER

JFM:chs (7)
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Helgeson
1 - Mr. J.A.Sizoo
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. J.F.McGuire

APR 24 1968

66 APR 30 1968

DIR 95853

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MURKIN

no knowledge of any connection between these individuals and the assassination of Martin Luther King. Poulin indicated that the entire information may be a complete hoax; however, CIA will advise FBI if any additional data comes to their attention.

ACTION:

The above information was orally furnished to Mr. Helgeson, General Investigative Division.

13-00000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: April 17, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: MURKIN

DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Richard Ober, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the following to the Liaison Agent on April 17, 1968:

A CIA source, characterized as being very reliable, advised that on or about April 15, 1968, an individual identifying himself as Gerald Lee Richards, a U. S. seaman, called at the Tokyo, Japan, office of the National Maritime Union and asked to be signed on a ship as soon as possible. (It should be noted that reference is being made to the office of the U.S. National Maritime Union.) He was asked to furnish his local address in Tokyo, and he refused to do so. He became very agitated and then left. So far he has not returned to the aforementioned office. CIA's source stated that Richards answers the general description of the suspect in the instant case as reported in newspapers.

Richards volunteered information indicating that he applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, on June 16, 1964, and that he registered as a member of the National Maritime Union in San Pedro on February 21, 1968. He has Social Security number 562-46-5078 and U. S. Coast Guard identifying document Z2711-782. He was born April 8, 1937, in Missouri (town not given). CIA's source described him as 5'10"; 155 pounds; brown hair, receding hairline on both sides; a scar, not prominent, about two and one half inches long across the center of his forehead. His most outstanding characteristic was his grin, described as "disconcerting and resembling a grimace."

REC 3 44-38861-2404

Ober advised that this same information has been given to our Legat, Tokyo. CIA is checking through available sources in Tokyo to establish the whereabouts of Richards. If this lead washes out, CIA would like to be advised.

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Civil Rights Section of the General Investigative Division.

SJP:clb (4)

1 - Mr. McGowan (Long)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

13-00000

TAB D
(PICG 15) ?

CIA info in FBI Documents
Refer to other components

(FBI Referral, 25 Mar 77)

FOIA/~~PA~~ Request No. 76-382

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	EXEMPTIONS
______	Cable, (Memorandum,) Dispatch Other: ______ Date : 9 Apr 68 KING Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, (Memorandum,) Dispatch Other: ______ Date : 10 Apr 68 KING Refer to OS or A/DCI	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, (Memorandum,) Dispatch Other: ______ Date : 4/17/68 RAY Refer to OS.	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______
______	Cable, Memorandum, Dispatch Other: ______ Date : ______	(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6) (j)(1)(b, c, d, e, f), (k)(1) Other: ______

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: April 9, 1968

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: MURKIN

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. McDonough
1 - Mr. Long
1 - Mr. Martindale
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Sullivan

This is the case involving the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., 4/4/68.

One of the most promising leads developed so far is the laundry tags appearing on a T-shirt and a pair of shorts apparently abandoned by the subject with the rifle that is believed to be the murder weapon. It has been determined that these laundry marks were made by a Thermo Seal marking machine manufactured by the Textile Marking Machine Company, Syracuse, New York. The manufacturer of this machine has advised that the laundry marks in question are unusual in that they consist of five characters whereas the usual code contains six characters.

These markings are also unusual because the first two characters are in smaller type while the remaining three characters are in larger type. The normal arrangement is for the first three characters to be in smaller type and for the following characters to be in larger type. The Textile Marking Machine Company has stated only a limited number of machines have been manufactured which print laundry marks in this manner. Investigation is proceeding on an expedited basis to locate these machines for the purpose of identifying the laundry marks.

EX-115 REC. 54 44-38861-1174

16 APR 12 1968

Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has furnished the Central Intelligence Agency file on Robert Ervin Kramer, M. D., Berkeley, California, whom Helms considers a suspect because of his resemblance to an artist's conception of the subject and because of the Central Intelligence Agency's experience with Kramer. The Central Intelligence Agency file states Kramer has a long arrest record and contains a Berkeley Police Department photograph, dated 1/27/66, number 22805.

Enclosure sent 4-9-68

54 APR 24 1968

WHH: yea

CONTINUED - OVER

13-00000

He has been a chronic letter writer to the Central Intelligence Agency criticizing them and the Government. By letter of 12/29/67 Kramer requested the Central Intelligence Agency to pay him $100,000 monthly for six months for a paper on geopolitical economy he had previously submitted. He concluded his letter with the statement, "In the event that you fail to acknowledge my request, I can accept no responsibility for any future efforts necessary to gain the combined ends of ideal government and financial recompense."

The only record of Kramer found in Bureau files is a memorandum from the Central Intelligence Agency, 1/18/68, advising us of his letters to the Central Intelligence Agency. No record can be located in the Identification Division but Kramer's fingerprints are being obtained from the Berkeley police.

A. C. Hayden, Intra-Division Information Unit of the Department, advised on the evening of 4/8/68 that Beatrice Rosenberg, a secretary in the Attorney General's office, had received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as Frederick Dunstan who said he resided at Route 350, Whitefield, North Carolina. Dunstan said he was calling the Attorney General to report that a white man was in his house, was drunk, had a gun and said he had killed Martin Luther King, Jr.

There is no Whitefield, North Carolina. There is a Whiteville, North Carolina. Investigation by the Charlotte Division has failed to locate a Route 350, Box 350, or Highway 350 in the Whiteville area and no record of a Frederick Dunstan has been located. No record of Dunstan could be found in Bureau files.

A pair of duckbill pliers was found among the personal effects believed to have been abandoned by the subject. These pliers bear a trademark of the Rompage Hardware Company, Los Angeles. Employees at the hardware company believe this is one of twelve pliers purchased in October, 1966. Employees have no recollection of the sale of these pliers but an exhaustive search is being made of charge sale records.

It is noted that the rifle believed to be the murder weapon was purchased in Birmingham, Alabama, 3/30/68. Binoculars found with the rifle were purchased in Memphis, 4/4/68. A latent fingerprint found on the rifle is identical with a latent fingerprint found on the binoculars. This presents a strong probability that these fingerprints are those of the subject.

CONTINUED PAGE THREE

13-00000

Other major avenues of investigation include checking out white Mustang automobiles, since one was seen leaving at a high rate of speed after the shot was fired; efforts to trace a bedspread or blanket found with the gun, and the immediate processing of all suspects as soon as they are developed.

ACTION:

1. Attached is a memorandum for the White House, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General and the Civil Rights Division.

2. Investigation is continuing on an all-out basis.

OK -
H

13-00000

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: April 10, 1968

FROM : C. L. McGowan

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Long

SUBJECT: MURKIN

This is the matter involving the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Liaison advised of the receipt of information from Richard Helms, Director of CIA, that one Robert Kramer was a possible suspect. According to information furnished by Howard Osborn, Director of Security of CIA, Kramer, who is a doctor, has been a source of trouble to CIA for some time. Only recently Mr. Helms received a very cryptic telegram from Kramer. In reviewing Kramer's file, they noted a photograph which bears a very strong resemblance to recent pictures of artist drawings of the killer which have appeared in local papers. The likeness was so striking that Mr. Helms thought it should be brought to the attention of the FBI immediately.

ACTION:

Senior Resident Agent Jesse Hall, Alexandria, Virginia, was telephonically contacted and instructed to obtain full details from the files of CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia, together with all background information on Kramer, as well as a photograph, so that this matter could be thoroughly checked out.

CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC- 31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

70 APR

Referred PCS/SC 29 Mar 4 1969

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: STAAR, Richard Felix - PHOTOGRAPH
aka: GWIAZDOWSKI, Richard Felix

DPOB : 10 January 1923, Warsaw, Poland

Subject of FBI investigations in 1954 (Voice of America) and 1956 (USIA) - Bureau File 123-15026.

Of possible interest is similarity between his name and that of "Eric Starvo GALT." In that Richard STAAR is similar. GWIAZDA is "star" in Polish. Among STAAR's references on a 1949 PHS is Professor Stanley AULT, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

From 1959 to 1962 (latest information available) STAAR was a Professor of Political Science at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia. His local residence addresses during that period are shown as 303 Vickers Drive, N. E., Atlanta, 7, and 879 Clifton Rd., N. E., Atlanta, Georgia.

EX-114
X-115
REC-19 44-38861-1549
ENCLOSURE
10 APR 23 1968
REC-31
ENCLOSURE
79 MAY 7 - 1968

SECRET

13-00000



13-00000

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Rosen

DATE: April 10, 1968

FROM : C. L. McGowan

1 - Mr. Rosen
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SUBJECT: MURKIN

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CRM:mcs
(5)

101

REC- 31 44-38861-638

12 APR 16 1968

20 APR 1 1968

13-00000

LOG AS APPEAL (F-76-382)

Doesn't he owe us money?

Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77

(Tom O., or successor)

Dear Mr. Wilson,

LOG THIS AS A NEW REQUEST

The news account of your coming release of an additional 4,000 pages on what might be called mind-bending reminds me that my requests seem to me to cover this and that you have not notified me of this release. I do want these. If you interpret my prior requests as not covering them then consider this a new request. My recollection is that my initial requests cover anything and verything directly or indirectly related to this subject. That you have interpreted my requests as I have is evidence from prior correspondence notifying me of releases.

Under the Act there is authority for the remission of all costs and fees. I believe I meet the requirements for this remission and I make the request formally. My work is restricted exclusively to what is now regarded as important historical cases, In one on which I have paid the CIA large sums without compliance, the King assassination, the previous Attorney General so held, formally, confirmed by a federal judge. I have already arranged to give all my records, not just these, to a university system. I believe at an earlier date I reserved the right to recover these fees. I have delayed a formal appeal pending a determination of a judge that there be a ruling by the Department of Justice with regard to me and on this.. The Department provided a bargain-basement response, a 60% remission that I have appealed and will if necessary litigate. I hope the CIA will act favorably on this.

It has been a very long time since I have heard from you about a multitude of requests all long overdue by your own backlog claims. One of these is on the King assassination, In that you may recall you estimated a $1,000 search fee and asked for and received a $500 deposit. What you have sent is ludicrous. In the long time in which I have heard and received nothing further I think you have in effect refused the request after charging fees so this is also an appeal on the King/Ray records.

I am asking again when I may expect to hear from you on all the other requests, including my PA request for the records on me. The appeal is several years old now. My recollection is that your last reference to this stated the processing of the appeal had not been completed. I have rights under the Act to more than copies. I want to exercise those rights. This is impossible without obtaining all copies first. As I have told you repeatedly I would prefer not to have to litigate this. What I am thus really asking you is doe s the CIA want me to suit it on a request that goes back to 1971 and on which it is not in compliance? Not even processed the appeal?

Among the factors making it difficult to keep track of these non-compliances is your failure to respond as well as to comply. I believe I have asked this before. If I have then what follows is an appeal from a refusal. If I have not it is a new request. I would like all records relating to my requests and appeals, including their sequential relationships to other requests, under both Acts and particularly as this relates to compliance with other requests.

Ed K

Sincerely,

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

LOG AS APPEAL (F-76-382) Doesn't he owe us money? Appeal F-76-382

Mr. Gene Wilson, FOIA/PA Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Rt. 12, Frederick, Md. 21701
7/21/77 (Tom O., or successor)

Dear Mr. Wilson,

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Sincerely,

Harold Weisberg

JUL 25 2 55 PM '77

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS F 76-382

FROM: H.G. Bean, Assistant for Information, DDA, 7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION: 5117

DATE SENT: 15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG 1 D 4125 HQ HT-1			
2.	DDO/PIC 16	AUG 1977	
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO 6 E 56 HQ BY-1			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO 2 E 6104 HQ FX-4			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

H.G. Bean

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

LOG (F)

[Acknowledgement drafted]

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

F 76-382

June 11, 1976

OS
DDO
CRS ?
OGC ?

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Freedom of Information Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg of Frederick, Maryland, I request access to the following:

1. All records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

2. All records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

3. All records pertaining to James Earl Ray, under whatever name or alias.

4. All records on any alleged or [suspected] accomplice or associate in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. All collections of published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

6. All analyses, commentaries, reports, or investigations on or in any way pertaining to any published materials on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or the authors of said materials.

7. All records, letters, cables, memorandums, routing slips, photographs, tape recordings, receipts, sketches, computer printouts or any other form of data pertaining to or in any way relevant to the foregoing requests for information, regardless of source or origin.

This request is made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502.

JUN 16 8 31 AM '76

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

21 JUN 1976

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter of 11 June 1976 on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

I shall arrange for a search of CIA files and shall be in further communication with you once the search has been completed and any records found reviewed for releasability under the Act.

As you may know, the heavy volume of Freedom of Information requests received by the Agency has resulted in processing backlogs. If we do not respond within the 10 working days stipulated by the Act, it is your right to construe this as a denial, subject to appeal to the CIA Information Review Committee. It would seem more reasonable, however, for us to continue processing your request and to respond as soon as feasible. Any denials of records could be appealed at that time. Unless we hear from you otherwise, we will assume that this is agreeable to you and proceed on this basis.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of our fee schedule. If the charges seem likely to be considerable, I shall provide you with an estimate and perhaps require a partial payment in advance of processing.

Sincerely,

/s/GFW

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure: as stated
IPS/CES/cb/21 Jun 76Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS (F-76-382)

13-00000

30 NOV 1976

IPS/DGV/cr/29 Nov 76
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - OGC (Strickland)
1 - DDO/PICG
1 - OS/IRG
1 - AI/DDA
(1) - IPS (Weisberg,F-76-382) SPR
1 - IPS (Weisberg Correspondence)
1 - IPS Chrono

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

You will recall that our letter of 21 June 1976 acknowledged receipt of your letter on behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg requesting, under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, access to any CIA records dealing with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and to those dealing with James Earl Ray and any of his alleged or suspected accomplices in Dr. King's assassination.

We find that we are unable to respond to your request as it now stands due to legal and regulatory restrictions on the release of personal information from official records. In that light, please be advised that we can proceed no further with your request unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively. These statements should be quite specific as to what areas of personal information are and are not authorized for release by this Agency to you and your client. If all information in our records is releasable, that should be so stated; if only such information as relates to specific incidents or to specific periods of time is releasable, those caveats should be clearly stated.

Finally, we must ask that you provide a statement of willingness to pay search and duplication fees as required by this request and in line with the fee schedule enclosed. It has been estimated that such charges could approach $1000. Along with the notarized statements above, and the statement of willingness to pay all search and copying charges (or those up to an established limit), we would require a down payment of half the anticipated charges. Payment should be made to this office in the form of a check or money order payable to Treasurer of the United States.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

13-00000

F-76-382
EK

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 3, 1976

Mr. Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Wilson:

In response to your letter of November 30, 1976, Mr. Harold Weisberg has authorized me to state his willingess to pay search and copying charges up to the amount of $1,000 if such charges are required by his Freedom of Information Act request for records pertaining to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and his assassination. Because you require a down payment of half the anticipated charges, I enclose a check for $500.00.

This payment of $500.00 and any subsequent payments made in connection with this request are tendered with the express reservation that Mr. Weisberg does not waive his right to recover them.

DEC 9 11 PM '76

C.I.A. regulations provide:

> Records shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced rate whenever the Coordinator determines that waiver or reduction of the charge is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. The Coordinator also may waive or reduce the charge whenever he determines that the interest of the government would be served thereby. 32 C.F.R. §1900.25(a).

In accordance with this regulation, I call upon you to determine that it is in the public and governmental interest to waive search and copying charges incurred in connection with Mr. Weisberg's request. Enclosed herein is a copy of a letter to Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr. which makes a similar request of the Department of Justice. The reasons expressed in that letter for granting a waiver are incorporated in my request that you grant a waiver.

Should you require it, I will provide you with affidavits by myself, Mr. Weisberg, and others in support of this request for a waiver of the search and copying charges for these records. If you do wish supporting affidavits, I would appreciate it if you would

13-00000

inform me of this as soon as possible. I would also request that you indicate what standards, if any, you have established for determining whether or not a request for waiver should be granted.

You state that you can proceed no further with Mr. Weisberg's request "unless and until we are in receipt of notarized statements of release from Mrs. Coretta King and James Earl Ray, respectively." Because Mr. Weisberg's request undoubtedly comprises records which do not involve any proper claim of privacy, this cannot be true. I do enclose, however, a copy of a notarized waiver by James Earl Ray. I will immediately contact Mrs. King about a waiver by her. In the meantime, I request that you proceed to make available those records responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request which do not involve any proper claim of invasion of privacy.

Sincerely yours,

James H. Lesar

James H. Lesar

13 JAN 1977

James H. Lesar, Esquire
1231 Fourth St., NW
Washington, DC 20024

Dear Mr. Lesar:

Thank you for your letter of 27 December. This will acknowledge receipt of the sworn waiver executed by Mr. James Earl Ray, and to advise that processing of this portion of your request has been initiated. Upon receipt of the sworn waiver from Mrs. King, as mentioned in your letter of 3 December, we will then be able to proceed with all aspects of your FOIA request. We also wish to acknowledge receipt of your check for $500.

Thank you for your assistance and continued cooperation.

This request has been assigned the case number F-76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

IPS/EK/cb/12 Jan 77
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - IPS Chrono
1 ✓ IPS F-76-382
1 - OGC

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FOIA Appeal - Harold Weisberg, for information about Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS F 76-382

Copy of IPS response to Weisberg

FROM: H.G. Bean
Assistant for Information, DDA
7 D 02 HQ

EXTENSION: 5117

DATE SENT: 15 AUG 1977

SUSPENSE DATE:

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Mr. Wells, DDO THRU: Mr. Addona, DDO/PICG 1 D 4125 HQ HT-1			
2.			
3. Mr. Dirks, DDS&T THRU: Mr. Redmond, DDS&T/FIO 6 E 56 HQ BY-1			
4.			
5. Mr. Stevens, DDI THRU: Mr. Lawler, DDI/FIO 2 E 6104 HQ FX-4			
6.			
7. Mr. Blake, DDA 7 D 26 HQ BX-4			
8.			
9. Mr. Ziebell, OGC 6-D-0120 - Hqs. BX-5			
10.			
11. Mr. Biddiscombe, OS/IRG GE 31 HQ FX-1			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Attached is an FOIA Appeal with a due date of 19 Aug 77.

In accordance with IPS procedures, the Chairman has assigned action for this appeal as follows:

Mr. Wells, Mr. Dirks, Mr. Stevens and Mr. Blake

Designated Action Member(s) should contact me within 48 hours should there be any objection to the case assignment.

The OGC attorney assigned to advise you or your Appeals Officer regarding this case is:

Mr. Ziebell

The Action Member or Appeals Officer is requested to ensure that staff work is completed and the case is ready for presentation (should such be required) at the 11 Aug 77 meeting.

[signature]
H.G. Bean

RETURN TO:

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

FBI Referral to CIA
28 Sept. 77 - deletion Kennedy
assassination dec'd

5 docs coordinated w/CIA
2 FBI docs for CIA coordination

13-00000

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

Date: September 28, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

TPS REGISTRY
F77-0854

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REQUEST OF HAROLD WEISBERG

This is in reference to our referral of documents to your Agency dated August 18, 1977, and your response to that referral dated September 9, 1977.
F77-564 closed 9/9/77

We have segregated from this referral those documents which are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's FOIA request. The remaining documents which are being forwarded to your Agency are construed to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request. Should you reach a determination that some of these documents are not responsive to Mr. Weisberg's request, please return those documents which you so consider to the FBI. We would appreciate your processing all those documents which you consider to be within the scope of Mr. Weisberg's request as it is necessary that we resolve the disposition of these documents and so inform the requester without further delay.

Attached are five documents from our files which originated with your Agency. Please examine these documents and if classified, determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted, or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please delete any portion to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

Central Intelligence Agency

Also attached are two FBI documents which contain information received from your agency. The information is being referred for a current classification determination and releasability under the provisions of the FOIA.

If there are any questions regarding the above, please contact Ralph Harp, FOIPA Branch, at telephone number 324-5566.

Enclosures (8)

13-00000

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024
TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE
DEC 29 11 05 AM '75
DEPUTY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

13-00000

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ Stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ Stanton Sr.

8. All correspondence or records of other communications pertaining to the guilty plea of James Earl Ray exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

Rev. Ralph Abernathy
Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

13-00000

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

13-00000

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

13-00000

☐ UNCLASSIFIED ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ SECRET

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
FBI Referral re Martin Luther King, et al

REQUEST NUMBER: 75- 77-322

FROM: [redacted] M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1

EXTENSION: 9532

DATE SENT: 8 Aug 77

SUSPENSE DATE: 15 Aug

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. [redacted]			
2. [redacted]			
3. Mr. C. LaClair EUR/EXO GS-6	8 AUG 1977		cl
4. E/G	18 Aug 77		G
5.			
6. EUR/EXO			cl
7.			
8.			
9. [redacted]			
10. M. Felton ISS/PICG HT-1			
11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Pls review the attached for release to the requester.
Thanks.
MDF

/_/ No record of subject
/_/ No info identifiable with subject
/X/ See attached memorandum

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 3749 1-75 OP-10

☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

REFER TO USAF
(our copy)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report, OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

Extracts of interest taken from the OSI Monthly Counterintelligence Report are as follows:

SYNOPSIS

Former CP member arrives in Alaska. CP member confined in Federal Jail at Anchorage for non-support. Activities of possible subversives set forth. Alaskan Labor Defender starts publication again.

1. An aircraft passenger list from the Juneau Daily Empire revealed ART [illegible] arrived in that city from Seattle, Washington on 3 March 1956 and departed for Anchorage on 5 March 1956. A later list in the same newspaper revealed [illegible] again flew to Anchorage on 29 March 1956. When interviewed by the FBI in 1951, [illegible] admitted being a member of the Ketchikan branch of the Communist Party from 19[illegible] to 1950.

2. Another passenger list in the Juneau Empire revealed a [illegible] D. [illegible] departed Juneau for Anchorage on 27 March 1956. Information at this office indicated [illegible] D. [illegible], a known Communist, was due to return to Alaska from the ZI during the latter part of March 1956. Further inquiry by this office has disclosed [illegible] D. [illegible] was confined in the Federal Jail in Anchorage and charged with non-support of his former wife. [illegible] was released on [illegible] April 1956 when he agreed to pay the stipulated amount and is reportedly planning on working as a self-employed contractor in the Anchorage area.

3. [illegible] ([illegible]) was recently reported as attorney for Anchorage Mayor, [illegible], in the latter's dispute with the City Council over a paving contract. As an indication of [illegible]'s activities, he has recently represented the following companies and/or individuals in highly controversial issues: Chugach Electrical Association, [illegible] Bus Lines, Matanuska Electric Association, Fairview [illegible], Copper Valley Electric Association, and the [illegible] tax case. In connection with the [illegible] case, a local newspaper reported that a [illegible] started a fund raising activity which was termed the "[illegible] Defense Fund."

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REPRODUCTION FROM APERTURE

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO USAF

A-82 (82)

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

OSI COMMENT: The CHARLES PARKER mentioned above is believed to be the same individual as CHARLES LINCOLN PARKER, who resigned a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve because of admitted pro-Russian sympathies. BOYKO's continual agitation, past association with Communists, and apparent association with PARKER, certainly places both individuals in a category which is, at least, highly questionable.

4. Further inquiry concerning ESTHER H. BUCKLEWSKI revealed she recently divorced WILFORD SAVOY and reportedly returned to the Homer, Alaska area.

OSI COMMENT: Liaison has been effected with another government agency in the Ninelchik area in an effort to determine the present whereabouts of SUBJECT.

5. The Alaskan Labor Defender, a monthly news publication, has recently reappeared in the Fairbanks area with its first publication dated May 1956. Previous editions of this newspaper appeared in the Fairbanks area in early 1955, but it was discontinued after publication of two editions due to the refusal of a local printing firm to print subsequent copies. Among editorials appearing in the Alaskan Labor Defender are several articles condensed from the "MILITANT," a publication of the Socialist Workers Party, which is cited by the U. S. Attorney General as subversive. One article quoted a speech made by a Mr. DU BOIS at a rally held at Carnegie Hall in New York on 29 March 1956 which relates, in referring to the Montgomery, Alabama bus protest, * * * "Led by clear thinking, they (the Negroes) have discovered that the race problem was at bottom an economic problem. Unwittingly they have discovered Earl Marx." * * * (In referring to EARL MARX, they were probably referring to KARL MARX, co-author of the Communist Manifesto)

Quoted below are portions of another article under the caption "It's Time to Think" written by ERNEST GRIFFIN, Independent Candidate from Fairbanks, Alaska, for the House of Representatives:

* * * * "Today there seems to be little or no attention paid to the examples made by the founders of this new nation, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, or the Negro people as citizens of these United States." * * * * (In reference to the Constitution of the United States) * * * "Although this Constitution ranks above every other written Constitution for excellence of its scheme, its simplicity, the precision of its language, and its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle, it has become a neglected Constitution." * * *

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* * *"But we can be destroyed when we lose faith or hope and when life itself seems like a story told by a mad man, as it must seem to the members and supporters of the White Citizens Council.....

The Negro people of the South have been marking time, making excuses and accepting conditions that exist in the South. Until a few brave men in Alabama turned what seemed to be a tragedy into an opportunity by having courage enough to challenge the Jim Crow laws." * * *

Quoted below is a portion of an editorial under the caption "The Longest Picket Line in the World", also appearing in the May 1956 publication of the Alaskan Labor Defender:

* * *" 'Every union local, every worker in office, factory or workshop, must make it a personal obligation to take action now! This is no time for passing the buck! This is the time to collect it and send it to the Montgomery Improvement Association, care of the Rev. M. L. King, Dexter Ave. Baptist Church, Montgomery, Alabama.'

The above statement was issued by Farrell Dobbs, presidential candidate of the Socialist Workers Party, and refers to the 50,000 Negroes in Montgomery, Alabama who are in a struggle against Jim Crow on the buses of that city." * * *

* * *"Actually the struggle goes deeper and wider than that. The present wave of race terror and hatred in the South is being fanned by the White Citizens Council. What is not generally known is that this terror is directed against any white workers who dare to solidarize with Negroes. The murderous White Citizens Council are not only rabidly Jim Crow but Anti-Semitic and Anti-Labor. Their aim is to preserve the system of color segregation and discrimination as the foundation upon which rests the open shop structure of the "Right to Work" South". * * *

Also appearing in this issue is an article relating that the Catholic Worker has protested the padlocking of the Daily Worker as a violation of the freedom of the press.

An article appearing under the caption "Auto Workers Take Home Pay Declines" reflects the "demand for a 30 hour week at 40 hours pay" by the UAW, Ford Local 600, and the AFL-CIO. Another article under the caption "Employment Falling Off; Productivity is Increasing", quotes JOHN CLARK, president of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, as stating that his union "intends to do something" about declining employment in the metals industry. Also set forth in this issue of the Alaskan Labor Defender is the "platform" of DONALD W. BOLTON, Independent Candidate for the Senate, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE DOLLINTER, and HILLO KAPOMEN, Independent Candidates for the House of Representatives. Two of the issues listed on the "platform" are "Stop the governments thought-control witch hunt which is pushing America

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The Editorial Staff of the Alaskan Labor Defender is listed as DON HOLTON, ERNEST GRIFFIN, MIKE COLLINTER, CARTER PAGE and EMIL HYYTUNEN. Mailing address for this newspaper is P. O. Box 1915, Fairbanks, Alaska.

<u>OSI COMMENT</u>: Although there is no evidence that this newspaper is associated with the Communist Party or its front organizations, it is interesting to note that in many articles, the paper has quoted publications or officials of organizations which have been cited by the U. S. Attorney General as either subversive or Communist infiltrated and controlled. It is further interesting to note that MIKE COLLINTER, an editor of this newspaper, and ROY BATISTE, owner of the Fairbanks Recreation Center and Cafe, the only advertiser in this edition are both listed as Category I, Alaskan Command Surveillance List.

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74-6-40-2-64

Refer USAF

VIA AIR (Specify Air or Sea Pouch) DISPATCH NO. RAKA-708

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, SR DATE 25 May 1956

FROM : Chief of Station, Anchorage

SUBJECT { GENERAL REDWOOD/Operational
SPECIFIC Transmittal of Extracts taken from AAC Counterintelligence Report - April 1956

Submitted herewith for your information and retention are Extracts taken from the AAC Monthly Counterintelligence Report covering the period 1 - 30 April 1956. The information submitted is only that which deals with CE Activities in the Alaskan Theatre.

Russel T. Arne

Approved: Herbert M. Cavell

Attachment:
Extracts from Report, in dup.

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3-Headquarters w/attach as noted.

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3	w/att
4	
5	

1 Encl.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A

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74-6-462-64

Full text

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Extracts from Monthly Counterintelligence Report, OSI, AAC

SOURCE: DIR OSI, AAC

DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 30 April 1956

DATE OF REPORT: 14 May 1956

Extracts of interest taken from the OSI Monthly Counterintelligence Report are as follows:

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74.6.11-2-64

APERTURE CARD REPRODUCTIONS

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CONFIDENTIAL

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74-6-40-2-64

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. ________

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Document Located By: ____________
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RECOMMEND:

____ Release in full-text
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____ Deny in toto
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____ Coordination with ____________ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

		FOIA	PRIVACY
( )	Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
( )	Information from a foreign liaison service	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
( )	Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
(✓)	Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
(✓)	Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Name of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	File number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
( )	Name of an FBI agent	(b)(7)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
( )	Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
( )	Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( )	Information from another Government agency	(b)(1)	(j)(1)(c)
*( )	Other, specify:		

*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: No objection to release of pages unmarked - but those marked X should be withheld.

[signature] DDO/ECON/0
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

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75-4921
75-4785
75-6669
76-143

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION F

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

Assign to Ed K.

Date: May 10, 1977 BY COURIER

To: Freedom of Information Act Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DDO
L. Ziebell

Attention: Gene F. Wilson
Room 2E 42

CMK

From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director

Subject: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST OF MR. HAROLD WEISBERG CONCERNING
THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

Enclosed herewith are a copy of correspondence from captioned individual and two copies of each document which originated with your Agency.

Please examine these documents and if classified determine if classification is to be maintained. If continued classification is not warranted or if the documents are unclassified and otherwise releasable, please indicate any portions to be withheld under the FOIA and cite the applicable exemptions.

Two copies of each document are enclosed. One copy is to be returned in the same condition as received while the other should be used to indicate deletions directly thereon and returned to us.

While it is recognized that disposition of these documents could be made directly by you to the requester, we request their return so direct response to the requester may be made by the FBI. We have found, from past experience with requests of this magnitude, that such procedure affords a more easily managed system of accounting for released material.

To assist in accounting for this referral, it is requested that you direct your reply to Linda Morcock, FOIA Branch, telephone number 324-5550.

Enclosures (9)

MAY 24 1 00 PM '77

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

13-00000

JAMES H. LESAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1231 FOURTH STREET, S. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20024

TELEPHONE (202) 484-6023

December 23, 1975

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ... 1975

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION REQUEST

Mr. Harold Tyler, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Tyler:

On behalf of Mr. Harold Weisberg, I am requesting that you grant him access to the following records pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:

1. All receipts for any letters, cables, documents, reports, memorandums, or other communications in any form whatsoever.

2. All receipts for any items of physical evidence.

3. All reports or memorandums on the results of any tests performed on any item of evidence, including any comparisons normally made in the investigation of a crime.

4. All reports or memorandums on any fingerprints found at the scene of the crime or on any item allegedly related to the crime. This is meant to include, for example, any fingerprints found in or on the white Mustang abandoned in Atlanta, in any room allegedly used or rented by James Earl Ray, and on any registration card. It should also include all fingerprints found on any item considered as evidence in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

5. Any taxicab log or manifest of Memphis cab driver James McCraw or the cab company for which he worked.

6. Any tape or transcript of the radio logs of the Memphis Police Department or the Shelby County Sheriff's Office for April 4, 1968.

7. All correspondence and records of other communications exchanged between the Department of Justice or any division thereof and:

R. A. Ashley, Jr.
Harry S. Avery

James G. Beasley
Clay Blair
David Calcutt
Phil M. Canale
John Carlisle
Robert K. Dwyer
Gov. Buford Ellington
Michael Eugene
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Roger Frisby
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
W. Henry Haile
William J. Haynes, Jr.
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
George McMillan
William N. Morris
Jeremiah O'Leary
David M. Pack
Lloyd A. Rhodes
J. B. Stoner
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Jr.
Hugh ~~Stoner,~~ stanton Sr.

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Rev. James Bevel
Rev. Jesse Jackson
Mrs. Coretta King
Rev. Samuel B. Kyles
Rev. Andrew Young
Harry Wachtel

9. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any letter, cable, or other written communication from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

13-00000

10. All notes or memorandums pertaining to any telephonic or verbal communications from or on behalf of the District Attorney General of Shelby County, Tennessee, or the Attorney General of Tennessee to the Department of Justice or any division thereof.

11. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever of the following persons:

Judge Preston Battle
Wayne Chastain
Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Gerold Frank
Arthur Hanes, Jr.
Arthur Hanes, Sr.
Renfro Hays
Robert W. Hill, Jr.
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Robert I. Livingston
George McMillan
Judge Robert McRae, Jr.
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
Richard J. Ryan
J. B. Stoner
Russell X. Thompson
Harold Weisberg

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

12. All tape recordings and all logs, transcripts, notes, reports, memorandums or any other written record of or reflecting any surveillance of any kind whatsoever on the Committee to Investigate Assassinations (CTIA) or any person associated with it in any way.

This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

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13. All records pertaining to any alleged or contemplated witness, including any statements, transcripts, reports, or memorandums from any source whatsoever.

14. All correspondence of the following persons, regardless of origin or however obtained:

Bernard Fensterwald
Percy Foreman
Robert W. Hill
William Bradford Huie
James H. Lesar
Albert Pepper
Carol Pepper
James Earl Ray
Jerry Ray
John Ray
J. B. Stoner
Harold Weisberg

15. All letters, cables, reports, memorandums, or any other form of communication concerning the proposed guilty plea of James Earl Ray.

16. All records of any information request or inquiry from, or any contact by, any member or representative of the news media pertaining to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. since April 15, 1975.

17. All notes, memoranda, correspondence or investigative reports constituting or pertaining to any re-investigation or attempted re-investigation of the assassination of Dr. King undertaken in 1969 or anytime thereafter, and all documents setting forth the reasons or guidelines for any such re-investigation.

18. Any and all records pertaining to the New Rebel Motel and the DeSoto Motel.

19. Any records pertaining to James Earl Ray's eyesight.

20. Any records made available to any writer or news reporter which have not been made available to Mr. Harold Weisberg.

21. Any index or table of contents to the 96 volumes of evidence on the assassination of Dr. King.

22. A list of all evidence conveyed to or from the FBI by any legal authority, whether state, local, or federal.

23. All reports, notes, correspondence, or memorandums pertaining to any effort by the Department of Justice to expedite the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held in October, 1974, on James Earl Ray's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

24. All reports, notes, or memorandums on information contained in any tape recording delivered or made available to the FBI or the District Attorney General of Shelby County by anyone whomsoever. All correspondence engaged in with respect to any investigation which was made of the information contained in any of the foregoing.

25. All records of any contact, direct or indirect, by the FBI, any other police or law enforcement officials, or their informants, with the Memphis group of young black radicals known as The Invaders.

26. All records of any surveillance of any kind of The Invaders or any member or associate of that organization. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

27. All records of any surveillance of any kind of any of the unions involved in or associated with the garbage strike in Memphis or any employees or officials of said unions. This is meant to include not only physical shadowing but also mail covers, mail interception, interception by any telephonic, electronic, mechanical or other means, as well as conversations with third persons and the use of informants.

28. All records containing information which exculpates or tends to exculpate James Earl Ray of the crime which he allegedly committed.

This request for disclosure is made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552, as amended by Public Law 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.

Sincerely yours,

Jim Lesar

Jim Lesar

13-00000

BON-2 (Rev. 10-1-71)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI ( ) DATE: 11/13/72

FROM : Legal Attache, Bonn (105-7501-1779) (RUC)

SUBJECT: BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.
IS-EG
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed is one copy each of one item(s) pertaining to subject received from Bureau Source 300. For details and reporting procedures see Form BON-6 attached to enclosed.

Request enclosure(s) ______ be translated ☐ in summary ☐ verbatim and enclosure(s) and translation sent to interested field division.

FROM	TO
BERNARD FENSTERWALD, JR.	DR. JULIUS MADER
Law Offices	Mauerstrasse 69
Fensterwald & Ohlhausen	1066 Berlin W 66
905 16th Street, N.W.	
Washington, D.C. 20006	

REMARKS:

The enclosed is a form letter directed by JULIUS MADER (Bufile 100-169674), Mauerstrasse 69, East Berlin, to subject soliciting the latter to buy MADER's book, "Yellow List: Where is the CIA?" and furnishing an order blank for this purpose.

Subject encloses the order blank, indicating he wants one copy in English of the above book, and his personal check in the amount of $2 which shows the designation "Committee to Investigate Assassination."

ENCLOSURE

ST-102 REC-79

62-112697-

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 15 1972

3 - Bureau (Enc. 1)
1 - XXX Foreign Liaison Desk
2 - Bonn
1 - 105-7501-1779
1 - 105-4658
MC/jms
(5)

58 DEC 18 1972

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ESP.

Re: in File 62-112697

13-00000

A check of Bonn's indices reflected a reference to the "Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Inc.," 927 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C., which came to attention in connection with Bonn's destroyed file regarding "Committee for 'The Investigation of the Three Assassinations': Information Concerning - Miscellaneous (FPC)" (Bufile 163-26234). Bonn indices are negative concerning subject.

FD-4 (Rev. 8-15-72)

CONFIDENTIAL

Attached is one copy of a communication being sent to an East German address. This item was obtained from Bureau Source 300, which is to be described in communications prepared for dissemination as "another government agency which conducts intelligence investigations." The item is classified CONFIDENTIAL by the originating agency and bears the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved."

Permission has been received from the source to disseminate this information to United States and foreign agencies provided the information is appropriately classified and paraphrased in a manner which will fully protect the nature of the source. Verbatim quotation from the attached material and use of complete, exact, foreign addresses set out in attached material tend to indicate the nature of the source and are to be avoided when preparing communications for dissemination. Permission has been received from the source to withhold the special marking "Warning Notice - Sensitive Sources and Methods Involved" from Bureau communications containing properly paraphrased versions of Bureau Source 300 information.

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AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON indefinite

ENCLOSURE
62-115177

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D.C. 20006

A.M.F. WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Dr. Julius Mader
Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin w 66

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Identification includes
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AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY

OF WORKS PUBLISHED

1963-1970

RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF

JOHN F. KENNEDY

MARTIN LUTHER KING

ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

13-00000

I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

A. GENERAL

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> It's the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man. It works on tapes and other voice recordings

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic*, Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

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polygraph. Standard polygraphs ure four variables: pulse, blood pressure, respiration and perspiration. Some measure additional physiological vari-
The more variables measured, the reliable the polygraph.
i and McQuiston discovered that the encies composing the human voice ot fixed: they shift very slightly from to fourteen times every second. But the speaker is under stress, this nor-requency modulation disappears. remains are the pure component fre-cies of the voice. And a strong indica-that the speaker is lying.
e two men developed a device to t this phenomenon and planned to use an additional "channel" on the poly-. Then they discovered that the new ble was so reliable and accurate a ure of psychological stress there was no need to measure the other poly-variables.
ed from the necessity of strapping the ct into a chair, stretching a pneumo-ic tube across his chest, gluing elec-s to his palms, and clamping his arm blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved much more versatile than the poly-. Because it can work from a tele-e or tape recorder, the PSE can be without the knowledge or even the cal presence of the subject.
ked Colonel Bell to tell me about some things the PSE was being used for, ially cases in which a conventional raph couldn't be used. He mentioned e police in Howard County, Maryland, been using the PSE for two years; they had great success in establishing the ence of suspects who were afraid to t to a polygraph examination because machine's forbidding aspect.
l went on to describe some of his ion's other uses, actual or potential. and the Federal government are ex-g its use as a defense against skyjack-id telephoned bomb threats, and as ns of speeding up customs inspec-Some doctors and psychiatrists are PSEs to study patients' physical and l stress. The National Committee to igate Aerial Phenomena, a private that investigates UFO reports, is sing the PSE to interview witnesses) sightings.
ked Bell if he would lend me a PSE eriment with, in order to write a piece he device. He agreed, with two con-. First, I must take Dektor's three-day in operating the instrument; second, using the PSE, I must review my etation of its output with his staff, in erest of accuracy. This seemed rea-e, so I agreed.
course was held in the meeting room oliday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. ght other students were employees tomers who had purchased the . These included a private detective in Pennsylvania, a New York chain

African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Polish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utterance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15/16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, similar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable connects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accompanies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made during actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, whenever they were present.

That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of polygraph interrogation, which applies to the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph examination, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrelevant stress in some of his answers, and mislead the examiner. Therefore it is necessary for the examiner to interview the subject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner; and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned concerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"
"Yes."
"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"
"No."
"Are you wearing a white shirt?"
"Yes."
"Do you know who took the money?"
"No."
"Are you wearing a ring?"
"Yes."
"Did you take the money?"
"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were unstressed. The question about suspecting

"The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas"

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vearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that accompanied by such stress as I had only once or twice in the class slides. e next morning Kradz called on me. he suspect take the money, he asked. I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did ispect who took the money? Yes, I ht he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did ce anything else about the interroga- Well, yes, there was this business t the ring. Perhaps the suspect had it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't the ring, but he was gay. He had anged rings with another guy. Nobody

about it. The kid didn't really expect asked about it, because Kradz had over all the questions with him. Still, he ring was mentioned, he panicked. e third day of the course, I had begun e some thought to what I might do e PSE. I was particularly interested fact that the device works from a tape ing. Sound-recording technology is t a century old (Edison invented the graph in 1877), and an enormous t of history is stored on phonograph s, sound tracks, and tape and wire ings. I thought how many press con- es, interviews and public pronounce- are stored away in the film and tape es of the world, and how many ques- ould be settled if we knew for certain

situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't. details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-







Voice prints by the Psychological Stress Evaluator of former chief justice Earl Warren in May, 1972 indicating hard stress on the words "no evidence."





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sassination Tapes

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a successful criminal lawyer and tor of the Committee, in a modern building a few blocks from the White e. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense smoker. Both men appeared to be ir forties.

fore we begin," I said. "I think I should on that I used to work for the CIA." ive run across it often, the theory that IA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd . and I don't believe it. I worked there ee years and never saw or heard any-suggesting the Agency was involved assassination. I never met anyone I thought capable of doing it. Still, learned through bitter experience of uspicion which attaches to former in-ence officers. Epidemics of paranoia o accompany us through life. I thought tter get that issue out of the way.

ith and Fensterwald exchanged es and smiled. Fensterwald told me ey did not necessarily believe the CIA sin theory, and they certainly didn't talking to a former Agency employee. ieved, I began to outline my project. d if they had heard of the PSE. Both were dimly aware of it. I described evice and started to detail the way it be used as a research tool. They im-ately understood what I was proposing vere tremendously enthusiastic. Yes, said, there were many key statements e somewhere, and they would be glad mpile specific references for me. ermore, they could, in some cases, de me with the tape. They said they be in contact when they had some-for me.

ile I was waiting, I experimented with SE. I telephoned a friend and told him the device. I asked if he was willing y a little game to test it out, and he d. He picked a number between one en. I asked him, "Is the number one?" e number two?" and so on, and he ered no each time. I recorded his nses, ran them through the PSE and d him back. The number he picked, him, was five.

was dumbfounded. He had not heard PSE and had thought I might be con-g some elaborate joke at his expense. hen I called back and correctly iden-the number he had picked, he realized serious. And he was shocked.

layed the same game several times others and did not always have similar ess. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was only to narrow the answer down to two ers, one of which turned out to be cor- ... problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation, and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and

ator aid, it has not been validated for historical research. Even though familiar with the machine believe an be used in this way, my project first attempt to do so.

s easier to demonstrate with the PSE speaker is telling the truth than to is lying. Stress can be caused by other than deception; but the absence of stress is an extremely reliable on of truthfulness. Of course, the e of stress does not prove that a nt is true, only that the speaker it to be true.

hough I found a great deal of stress s... of the assassination tapes. ngle instance can I say that the in- was lying. I point this out not only ct myself from libel suits but be- am not morally certain any one indi- vas not telling the truth.

netheless, stress in the testimony witnesses to the same event makes ematical probability overwhelming east some of them were lying.

points could not be better illus- han they were by the Jim Gar- lay Shaw Affair.

son, it may be recalled, was the New s District Attorney who, in 1967, to have solved the Kennedy assas- . He presented an elaborate case a local businessman, Clay Shaw, ers, as members of an assassination acy. In one of the hour-long pro- CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw, other people involved in Garrison's ons.

interview, Garrison was hostile and make many firm, factual statements test with the PSE. However, he did ere's no question about it [that he w the assassination had been car-] . . . we know the key individuals . . . there is no question about the conspirators] were there [in Dealy " The PSE showed good to hard n each of these statements. I also oncontroversial statement of Gar- s a control: "Oswald was not killed t the movie theater where he was]," and found no stress. Garrison's nts about his case against Clay rongly indicated deception.

ran some statements by Clay Shaw his involvement in such a conspir- d denying ever knowing or meeting rvey Oswald. I also ran a control nt. Shaw turned out to be heavily d throughout.

vas not particularly surprising. The d been accused of conspiring to the President of the United States being interviewed about it before n cameras. He would have to have pretty cool customer not to show stress, even if he were telling the e truth.

ng that both Garrison and Shaw stress was not an encouraging valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

> Deception is not proved by stress, but given enough witnesses' testimony, the PSE is able to arrive at the truth

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of contestants on "To Tell the Truth"... and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison-Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher-Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher-Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher-Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really

›rable stress in his statements.

atrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he id three spent bullet hulls on the floor eath the window from which the fatal ts allegedly were fired. The PSE showed d stress in his statements.

ne rifle was one of the principal points d by the Warren Commission to link vald to the assassination. The PSE sub-tiated the testimony that Oswald owned fle and that the evidence supplied to allistics expert indicated this rifle was murder weapon. However, the PSE did substantiate the controversial claims of las police regarding the discovery of evidence.

he hospital employee was apparently ng the truth when he recounted finding bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi- but many critics have charged that the et had been deliberately planted there. s is the famous "single bullet" which the rren Report says passed through the lies of both the President and Governor nally, and then lodged in Connally's st. Several researchers have tried to eat this, firing the same type of bullet the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never iained perfectly intact, as the one found he stretcher; they became twisted lumps ead and copper.

he second link between Oswald and the assination is the charge that he killed cer Tippitt, a Dallas policeman, while ing from the scene of the first shooting. umber of eyewitnesses have testified : they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one hem, Domingo Benavides, was inter-wed on the CBS tapes. He was asked nere was any doubt in his mind that vald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt ill." There was absolutely no stress in statement. He was telling the truth.

he killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald fueled the fires of controversy over the rren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual it when he was shot. Some witnesses e alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were n together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. y theorize that the three men were part an assassination conspiracy, and that pitt had been sent to silence Oswald, had been beaten to the draw.

he Dallas police radio dispatcher, icer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ught Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he lied, "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did kson know Oswald? "No," answered kson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed ivy stress in both statements.

erhaps the greatest source of con-ersy over the Warren Report is it's claim : all the shots were fired by one gunman. ne eyewitnesses claim to have heard ts and seen gunsmoke in the area of w hillock ahead and to the right of the sidential motorcade. This hillock has ne to be known as the grassy knoll." e of these witnesses was a railroad ker named S.M. Holland, who observed The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> Chief Justice Warren: "We explored both these theories and found no evidence that either group was involved"

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the shots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counter-claims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

President Kennedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Governor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

sassination Tapes

...ED FROM PAGE 114

...d hard stress on the PSE. Unfortu- ...he made no other definite statement ...the nature of the wound.

...interview with Captain Humes was ...nformative. Just before the interview, ...7, Humes had re-examined the autop- ...otographs and X-rays, and he dis- ...d them at length on the CBS tapes. ...grams drawn during the autopsy, ...d. had not been intended to precisely ...ent the location of the wounds. How- ...e now produced a sketch which, he ...did represent these locations accu- The interviewer asked, "Your re- ...nation of the photographs verify that ...unds were as shown here?"

...s, sir," he replied. No stress.

...e there any wounds other than one ...base of the neck and one up in the ..."No, sir, there were not." Moderate ...not enough to suggest deception.

...there any doubt that the wound at ...ck of the President's head was an ...ound? "There is absolutely no doubt, ...gain stress but again moderate.

...gether, how many wounds were ..."There were two wounds of entrance ...o of exit." At this point the stress be- ...ard.

...where were the entry wounds lo- ..." "Posteriorly, one low in the right ...or scalp, and one in the base of the ...n the right." Hard stress again.

...d he be absolutely certain that what ...d was an entry wound was, in fact, ...'es, indeed we can." Hard stress.

...nterview with Humes was one of the ...st and most detailed on the CBS ...and I charted most of it with the PSE. ...clear to me that he believed much ...he was saying, but the frequent flick- ...of moderate stress and the occasion- ...es of hard stress suggested that he ...nearly as confident of his testimony ...claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had ...l out, sometimes it's not easy to tell ...y wound from an exit wound.

...nterviewer asked him one good "bot- ...e" question:

...you have any different conclusion, ...ferent ideas, any different thoughts ...erseeing [the autopsy photographs] ...han you had at that time?"

..." replied Captain Humes, "we think ...ar up very well, and very closely, ...imony before the Warren Commis-

...tress was hard.

...Specter, one of the Warren Commis- ...rincipal investigators, also spoke on ...tapes. He said that the case against ...fitted together very well, and that ...could one find among actual crim-

... ...the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing, and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this, but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report, he said, "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report, what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview

> "...we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy." There was very hard stress on "no evidence"

which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories, one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing, the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

"... we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything," said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the ...that have criticized the Commission very severely, but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time," he continued, "to change my view, nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell, a member of the Warren Commission, revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example, Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What, given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE, can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now

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...tion by the PSE.

The claim that Oswald's rifle was [found] in the Texas School Book Depository.

The claim that bullet hulls matching [Osw]ald's rifle were found in the same place.

The claim that one gunman was seen [in the] "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book [Depo]sitory.

The claim that two gunmen were seen [in thi]s window.

The claim that a gunman was seen [in a d]ifferent window of that building.

Another claim that no shots came from [the gr]assy knoll, and a claim by the witness [who] saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that [he al]so *heard* a shot from that direction.

A claim by a Dallas policeman that [neithe]r he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.

The claim by the pathologist—the [Warre]n Commission's only source of information about the autopsy—that the X-rays [and au]topsy photographs support his tes[timony] before the Commission.

The claim by a member of the Warren [Comm]ission that there was nothing fraudu[lent a]bout the Warren Report.

The claim by Earl Warren that the [Comm]ission found no evidence of a con[spirac]y; that none of the Warren Report's [critics] ever found anything the Commission [had m]issed; that he had found nothing since [the pu]blication of the Report to change his [mind; a]nd that he knew of no Commission [memb]er who had ever changed his mind [about] their conclusions.

[If the PSE] indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

[...] the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong —we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

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E LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL
:CTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY
BULLETS:

'64 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

68 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

72 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

Γ is the evidence?

ire the fatal shots?

has there been such a concerted effort ithhold the facts?

ras really behind the assassinations?

COME SHARE THE FINDINGS
OF THE NATION'S EXPERTS

AT A TWO DAY CONFERENCE

SPONSORED BY THE COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

TO BE HELD AT

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

GASTON HALL

Nov. 23-24, 1973

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
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DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

1963 - 1973

JOHN F. KENNEDY • SYLVANUS OLYMPIO • ABDUL KARIM KASSEM • MEDGAR EVERS • "NGO" DINH DIEM • JIGME DORJI • ADIB AL SHISHAKLI • PIERRE NGENDANDUMWE • HASSAN ALI MANSOUR • MALCOLM X • VIOLA LIUZZO • MARIO MENDEZ MONTENEGRO • SIR ABUBAKAR BALEWA • J.T.V. IRONSI AGUIYI • HENDRIK VERWOERD • TRAN VAN VAN • GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL • CHE GUEVARA • MARTIN LUTHER KING • ROBERT F. KENNEDY • EDUARDO MONDLANE • TOM MBOYA • A.A. SHERMARKE • GEORGE WALLACE • SALVADORE ALLENDE •

DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS
1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

):00 LATE REGISTRATION –
Early Registrants pick up passes.

):30 WELCOME:
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

0:00 CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 BREAK FOR LUNCH

2:00 MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds In Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 BREAK FOR DINNER

8:30 WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 BREAK FOR LUNCH

2:00 THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –
Question and Answer Sessions

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OURCES AND METHODS INV..VED

SEP. 1972

Dr. Julius Mader
Author and editor
Editor of "Who's Who in CIA"

Mauerstrasse 69
1066 Berlin W 66

Dear Sirs:

I take this opportunity of offering you:

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("Gelbe Liste: Wo ist die CIA")

This book presents for the first time anywhere in the world a documentation in alphabetical order of more than 400 disguised or subsidised organisations and institutions of the US civilian and military intelligence network in North, Central and South America, Europe, Africa and Asia.

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The price per copy, inclusive of air mail postal costs, is $2.00 (or the corresponding amount in other currencies at present exchange rates). The book will be sent to you immediately upon receipt of your order blank and check.

I would be grateful if you would mention this publication of topical interest to others as well.

Yours very sincerely,

Mader

Dr. Julius Mader

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SEP. 1972

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATION NUMB 4

DATE Sept 2 1972 15-511

PAY TO THE ORDER OF [illegible] $2.00

[illegible] 00/100 DOLLARS

The RIGGS NATIONAL BANK of WASHINGTON, D.C.
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1730 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATION

AUTH. SIG. [signature]

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O R D E R   B L A N K

I wish ....1.......copies of the "Yellow List: ~~Where Is the CIA?"~~ in the ....language. (German or English)

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(X)

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Eric Starvo Galt, aka Harvey Lowmyer and John Willard (Eyes drawn in by FBI artist)

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

417A 413

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

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CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY
INTERSTATE FLIGHT - ROBBERY

I. O. 4132
4-20-68

WANTED BY FBI

JAMES EARL RAY

FBI No. 405,942 G
16 M 9 U 000 12
M 4 W 101

ALIASES: Eric Starvo Galt, W. C. Herron, Harvey Lowmyer, James McBride, James O'Conner, James Walton, James Walyon, John Willard, "Jim"



Photographs taken 1960

Photograph taken 1963
(eyes drawn by artist)

James Ray

DESCRIPTION

AGE: 40, born March 10, 1928, Alton, Illinois
HEIGHT: 5' 10" EYES: blue
WEIGHT: 163 to 174 pounds COMPLEXION: medium
BUILD: medium RACE: white
HAIR: brown, possibly cut short NATIONALITY: American
OCCUPATIONS: baker, color matcher, laborer
SCARS AND MARKS: small scar on center of forehead and small scar on palm of right hand
REMARKS: noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending

CRIMINAL RECORD

Ray has been convicted of burglary, robbery, forging U. S. Postal Money Orders, armed robbery, and operating motor vehicle without owner's consent.

CAUTION

RAY IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Ray as Eric Starvo Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241). A Federal warrant was also issued on July 20, 1967, at Jefferson City, Missouri, charging Ray with Interstate Flight to Avoid Confinement for the crime of Robbery (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1073).

IF YOU HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

Identification Order 4132
April 20, 1968

J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C. 20535

415 A417 DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO FBI

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

DOCUMENT AS REFERRED TO

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WANTED BY THE FBI

CIVIL RIGHTS - CONSPIRACY

ERIC STARVO GALT

FBI No. 405,942 G

DOCUMENT AS [illegible] TO FBI 4/4/46

Photograph taken 1968
(eyes drawn by artist)

Photograph taken 1968

13-00000

DESCRIPTION

Age:	36, born July 20, 1931 (not supported by birth records)		
Height:	5'8" to 5'11"	**Eyes:**	Blue or hazel
Weight:	160 to 175 pounds	**Complexion:**	Medium
Build:	Medium	**Race:**	White
Hair:	Brown, possibly cut short		
Occupation:	Has claimed employment as seaman		
Remarks:	Noticeably protruding left ear; reportedly is a lone wolf; allegedly attended dance instruction school; has reportedly completed course in bartending.		

CAUTION

GALT IS SOUGHT IN CONNECTION WITH A MURDER WHEREIN THE VICTIM WAS SHOT. CONSIDER ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 17, 1968, at Birmingham, Alabama, charging Galt with conspiring to interfere with a Constitutional Right of a citizen (Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 241).

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE NOTIFY ME OR CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

J. Edgar Hoover

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535
TELEPHONE, NATIONAL 8-7117

Wanted Flyer 442
April 17, 1968

13-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

11 December 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Mr. William A. Branigan

SUBJECT : Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973

1. Herewith a report containing partial coverage on the events during the first session of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, together with material (which is overt) made available on the floor of the conference.

2. We would be interested in anything you develop on any of the other sessions of the conference.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

REC-64 62-112697-33

EX-104

James Angleton

14 JAN 3 1974

Enclosure:
Report w/atts

CIR-316/03107-73

ENC. BEHIND FILE

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Attachment to CIR-316/03107-73

SUBJECT: Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Report on Proceedings 23 November 1973

1. The Committee to Investigate Assassinations claims to have been established in 1969. The headquarters are in Washington, D. C. (at 1520 16th Street, N. W.). In the four years of its existence the Committee has done research and has become a kind of clearing house for the study of assassinations. It maintains contact with other groups engaged in similar activity, of which there seem to be at least two, one of which is located in the Boston area.

2. In addition to research, the Committee acts to help individuals interested in the investigation of assassinations. It thus files suits for private persons demanding access to classified information. It sponsors the publication of books and articles relating to the field of its interest, and sponsors the production of movies. It publishes a newsletter.

3. The conference of November 23-24, 1973, is the first of its type to be held by the Committee. The Georgetown University was helpful by placing Gaston Hall at the disposal of the Committee free of charge. By agreement with the University, the Committee will also be able to use the services of the University Library as a repository and research center.

4. The Conference opened on November 23, 1973, with a delay of about half an hour. The delay may have been due to the installation of recording equipment which literally covered the premises with a tangle of wires of every kind. The Washington Post reports an attendance exceeding 300. This is a generous estimate. After deducting official speakers, recording personnel, and press representatives, the audience probably numbered no more than 150, if that many.

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5. Beards and long hair prevailed, and others stood out like a sore thumb. There was not a single Negro in the audience, nor, that morning, on the platform. Even the speaker who spoke on the case of Martin Luther King was white.

6. Not all the speakers preannounced were present. The chairman announced the absence of Richard Sprague. Another speaker, a lawyer from Los Angeles whose name was drowned out in the noise, was also absent. They were replaced by Dr. Robert Forman and someone whose name sounded like "Ed Kirkley".

7. The chairman announced that all the speeches would be tape recorded for subsequent publication. He further invited the audience to attend movies to be shown that night. One of these, "Burn", was to be shown at the University. Others by prearrangement would be shown at local movie theaters. The latter were connected with the Kennedy assassination. The case of the President's murder was in the center of the conference and, as noted by one of the organizers (Smith), one half of the speakers were to center their attention upon the Oswald case.

8. The chairman adhered strictly to the program and every speaker mentioned in the program for the morning session of November 23 spoke as specified. Of those who spoke, Norman Mailer, Robert P. Smith and Ronald Van Doren deserve particular attention. Their speeches in summary are reviewed below.

9. A table at the back of the audience presented recommended literature. The books included H. Weissberg's Whitewash and Peter Noyes' Legacy of Doubt. For some reason there was a copy of one paper only, that of George O'Toole's "Assassination Tapes". There was also a bibliography of political assassination; the foreword to which lists the persons most actively collaborating with the Committee.

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10. A publication circulated during the conference was the November, 1973 issue of Computers and Automation which is to be renamed, starting January 1, 1974, Computers and People. The publication of articles such as "Nixon and the Mafia" which concludes that Richard M. Nixon seems to be the embodiment of a prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House, seems somewhat curious in a magazine devoted to the profession of data processing and the use of computers. The magazine was established in 1951 by Berkeley Enterprises in Massachusetts. Alger Hiss is among its contributors and an abundance of articles by Richard Sprague on the subject of Watergate published in the past year.

11. Another organization which received publicity at the Conference was The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

12. A representative of Computers and Automation handed out this publication free of charge to members of the audience. He took notes with fantastic speed and apparent accuracy of everything said during the proceedings.

13. The lights gave out at one point and did not come on again during the morning session. The absence of current may have affected the tape recording.

14. The morning session, due to close at 12:30, ended after 1:30 p.m. By this time the audience was impatient to have lunch, and the resumption of the proceedings was therefore postponed to a later hour.

15. No document of any kind was issued to the persons who paid $15.00 to enter. Instead their hand was stamped with the name of the organization which gave them access to all further meetings that day and the next (the members of the audience were apparently not supposed to wash their hands during this time). Names were taken down, but no questions asked other than one's initial. No information on address, occupation, etc. was required.

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16. Speech by Norman Mailer. This was beyond a doubt, the most striking presentation during the Friday morning session. Mailer spoke briefly and left the conference shortly after the speech.

17. Mailer said that political intelligence as a subject was as powerful as "peace". Interest in assassination is obsessive. The obsession arises from the fact that a solution to the problem is not found, and attention is constantly drawn back to the unanswerable question.

18. He said that we have here the most powerful nation in the world which cannot come to grips with a question which seems as amazingly simple as the Kennedy assassination. The result has been that this nation has decided to shut down investigation and has thus alienated itself from its own history. This alienation has brought apathy, a trait noticeable in the reaction to investigations which bring no wide response.

19. A nation which rejects its own history is on the path to a totalitarian regime. Facts, meanwhile, have a peculiar ability to change when they are investigated, and investigators must therefore rely upon hypothesis. The history of the last ten years has been made unendurable by the abundance of hypotheses. They range from the opinion that an assassination is an accident lacking any particular sequence to the hypothesis that secret police forces are engaging in a world conspiracy.

20. The present conference must help us to learn whether there are possibilities, and what possibilities exist, to solve these questions.

21. Speech by Robert P. Smith. Mr. Smith was described as the director of research of the Committee, but he seems to be one of the major motive forces in this organization.

22. Mr. Smith pointed out that he had spent the last three years studying the Kennedy case. Much research had been done, but nothing had changed, so far as practical action was concerned, in the last nine years.

27. Speech by Ronald Van Doren. Mr. Van Doren seems to be a follower of Governor Wallace. He began by commenting on the sad situation in a country with a judiciary where individuals have to make conjectures regarding a case as obvious as that of Bremer. There is no doubt that Bremer pulled the trigger. But one should examine the political situation at the time of his action. Wallace was by far the leading candidate in the election campaign, a threat to other candidates, and he was winning the nomination. He represented a challenge to both parties. Nothing he said could be interpreted as racist, and in the economic sense he carried wide appeal. The question which faced the other candidates was how he could be stopped from disrupting the two parties and from preventing the re-election of the President. History will show how he was stopped and why this occurred.

28. The case in defense of Wallace's civil rights was quietly dropped. No proper investigation was conducted. As usual in assassination cases there was a diary. It showed that Bremer was acting alone and was deranged. Read as a piece of literature, the diary presents Bremer as a non-person, an illiterate unable to spell. There is nothing regarding the people he worked with. Meanwhile, if one examines Bremer's background, he appears an entirely different person. Why did he travel repeatedly to Ottawa? How did he manage to carry guns on planes? What was he doing in New York? Why was he in Washington? And where did he get his funds? The apartment he rented exceeds his annual income. His mother could not afford to visit him in prison, yet he dressed well. With whom was he involved?

29. All this should be looked into. Watergate brought the electoral campaign to the fore. Why has discussion of the Bremer shooting been excluded from the investigation? Bremer was a part of the 1972 campaign, yet there is no mention of Wallace or of Bremer. Two years from now Wallace will be back.

30. Speech by Ms. Meredith Rode. Ms. Rode was very brief. She said she became interested in the killing of George Lincoln Rockwell in 1970, and that the case was built on circumstantial evidence exclusively. The case is still open, for the police believe that there was an accomplice. No funds are available for defense.

23. Although the National Archives are the repository for the Kennedy assassination documents, the FBI and the CIA are responsible for restricting research. Much of the 300 cubic feet of documents have been printed, a reclassification in 1971 has released 3,000 pages, and the CIA later released more, but none of the material released has created any sensation. The Freedom of Information Act is not as liberal on assassination material as on other matters. Some material was not even turned over to the Warren Commission. The FBI and the Justice Department are alone in knowing the results of some tests.

24. In the non-governmental area, much has been published, and the book by Peter Noyes must be singled out particularly.

25. Speech by Mr. Robert Hanson. Mr. Hanson has become the counsel for Sirhan Sirhan. He studied to become an engineer and then shifted to law. (To judge from the number of cases which he says he has lost, he should have remained an engineer instead of becoming an attorney.)

Mr. Hanson said that the Sirhan case is pretty hopeless. The trial was based on a 100 per cent belief in Sirhan's guilt. Therefore important witnesses were not called, and no attention was paid to ballistics. Scientific study, however, indicates that Sirhan Sirhan may not even have been the person who committed the crime. But even if it is proved that his gun did not kill Robert Kennedy, this discovery may have no influence upon Sirhan's case. California officials have no desire to reopen the case and funds to handle the proceedings are lacking. A book by Tiger on the case is worthy of note. Tiger claims that Sirhan Sirhan was acting under hypnotic influence.

26. Speech by James Lesar. Mr. Lesar, who spoke on the Martin Luther King assassination, declared that Ray was innocent, and that the FBI and the Justice Department were responsible for wrongly solving the crime. Ray was framed by conspirators. The persons presently involved in Watergate played a role in the Ray case investigation. No private agency - only a government agency - can solve the Ray case. All depends on whether the judiciary acts honestly or with political consideration in mind. As it stands today, we see Ray's rights having been abominably violated; we see lawyers who did not do their job; and we see nothing approaching an open hearing.

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31. There was also a speech by Robert Salzman who was long-winded and technical. No useful coverage available.

32. Copies of materials which were available at the Conference are attached.

A. American Political Assassinations: A Bibliography of Works Published 1963-1970 Related to the Assassination of John F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert F. Kennedy. Compiled by The Committee to Investigate Assassinations, Washington, D. C., 1973.

B. "Decade of Assassinations -- 1963-1973". Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 1973.

C. "Don't Read This Out Loud!" Intelligence Report. The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC).

D. Announcement. The announcement states that Senator John Stennis will begin hearings on his Bill to amend the National Security Act, in regard to the clarification of the authority of the CIA.

E. Assassination Tapes by George O'Toole. Published by Penthouse International Ltd., 1973.

F. Computers and Automation (Computers and People), November, 1973, Volume 22, No 11.

13-00000

ANNOUNCEMENT

Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, will begin hearings early in the New Year on his Bill No. S.2597 -- to amend the National Security Act -- in regard to clarification of the authority of the CIA.

The bill recently introduced by Senator Stennis resulted in part from correspondence with Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee. To some degree, these hearings were inspired by the Watergate developments.

People with knowledge in the areas which might be fruitful for investigation should be in touch with Senator Stennis' Committee. For further information, contact the Task Force For A Nuclear Test Ban, Betty Lall and Jo Pomerance, Co-Chairmen, care of the Project on Budget Priorities, 1620 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

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• PUBLICATIONS

CARIC publishes a bi-weekly INTELLIGENCE REPORT and a quarterly named *COUNTER-SPY* featuring various articles examining the structures and operations of U.S. Intelligence. In addition, CARIC publishes occasional pamphlets on various concepts in the craft of intelligence. CARIC also provides reprints of selected articles on intelligence which have appeared in other publications.

CARIC is preparing a guide to U.S. Intelligence which will serve as a citizen access device to the hidden world of government operations. We hope that any controversy raised by this guide or any other CARIC publication will lead to public debate and resolution of the issues involved. Our analysis is based in a firm belief that no human being should be denied life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness by our government or its agents. CARIC publications aid the public effort to insure the veneration of this concept by those in our government.

• IN-FROM-THE-COLD HEARINGS

CARIC will sponsor In-From-The-Cold Hearings featuring public testimony by individuals intimately involved with U.S. Intelligence. The hearings will focus on American intervention abroad, domestic repression in this country and the effects of secrecy on the individuals' personality. Former intelligence workers and those who have been victimized by the intelligence community will publicly relate their participation in activities of our government which can no longer be ignored by good citizens.



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Join with us in our effort to end "illegal, unconstitutional and gross acts" by our government. CARIC is entirely supported by donations from American citizens. Donate and become a sponsoring member of the Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community. Sponsoring members receive our bi-weekly *INTELLIGENCE REPORT* and our quarterly *COUNTER-SPY* as well as additional information on government operations. CARIC actively seeks the advice and viewpoints of all sponsoring members in our activities. Write to CARIC, Box 647, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, or call (202) 785-8330.

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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Don't Read This Out Loud!

The Committee for Action Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC)

13-00000

The headlines in American newspapers have for years told of Army surveillance of civilians, U.S. spy planes being shot down over other countries, attempted coups and intrigue initiated by the CIA and unrestrained FBI wiretapping. We all know that Big Brother is watching, but no one in our government has taken the time to explain who is being spied upon, and *why* we are being watched. Too often, we American citizens don't even know who Big Brother *is*.

In 1955, President Eisenhower accepted the report of the Hoover Commission on U.S. Intelligence. Among other recommendations, the Commission emphasized the need for two "watchdog" committees on intelligence within the executive and legislative branches of government. Although a Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) was established to serve the President, Congress by an overwhelming majority has refused to establish a committee within the legislative branch. Now, in the midst of the Watergate scandals, there is some movement within Congress to establish committees on the separate intelligence agencies. The result will be divided oversight with no assurance that Congress will be able to stop illegal and unjustified spying. With Congress abrogating its responsibilities, there is no agency of government, directly responsible to the public, monitoring the United States Intelligence Community.

Now former intelligence workers and concerned citizens have formed a national association to provide the vital information an aware public needs to know about government operations. The Committee for Action/Research on the Intelligence Community (CARIC) is an independent "watchdog" on the government spy apparatus. CARIC, sponsored entirely by donations from American citizens, serves as an alternative source of analysis and information on the practices, organization and objectives of U.S. Intelligence. What clandestine operations are being carried out in the name of America? Is the CIA preparing to entangle us in another war similar to the Indochina War? What information is going into Federal, State, local and private data banks on innocent American citizens? Is the FBI becoming a "secret police force?" Whose phones are tapped in America? These are some of the questions CARIC is answering.

CARIC knows that all conscientious Americans are closely watching the events that have unfolded since the arrests made at the Watergate building. We share the hope of most Americans that the illegal espionage practices that have now been exposed will no longer be a part of American political life. However, the dismantling of one espionage apparatus loyal to one group of politicians does not insure that this abuse of power will not be repeated by future politicians.

Who knows what future political espionage will occur under the guise of so-called "national security" or loyalty to an administration? Only time will tell, but through diligence and your help CARIC will anticipate and bring to your attention situations within the government that are likely to produce a new "Watergate."

Although CARIC does believe that a massive government spy apparatus is at work in the world, we hope to dispel some of the paranoia citizens naturally feel when there is talk of spies and wiretaps. We know that the FBI does not have agents behind every tree, but there are agents in every major community in this country who have spied on innocent private and public citizens. Only a full and undisguised look into this hidden world can displace unwarranted fears, and guide the public effort to end this illegal and unjustified espionage. *The secrecy with which the government surrounds itself must end.*

CARIC knows that tens of thousands of American citizens from all walks of life were mobilized over the past decade to help bring an end to the government's war in Indochina – a war that has taken new forms under the direction of U.S. Intelligence agencies. CARIC hopes that these same concerned citizens will continue to oppose the policies of our government which bring this new form of *covert war* and the Watergate scandals. It is now time for thousands of Americans to mobilize to stop the spying as we stopped the dying. *Please join us in our effort.*

THE COMMITTEE FOR ACTION/RESEARCH ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (CARIC)

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

• CARIC ORGANIZATION

CARIC is organized to reflect the operating procedures of a typical intelligence organization. Our research process involves collecting information from a wide variety of sources both public and private. Our analysis is the collective product of CARIC participants and eliminates any compartmentalization of knowledge. The information and our analysis is then disseminated through CARIC publications and separate works by CARIC participants. In addition, CARIC provides information to other journalists and qualified researchers.

• INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTATION CENTER (IDC)

CARIC is continuously collecting information on intelligence from a variety of sources including official government publications and documents, previous investigations, public accounts and interviews conducted with hundreds of former intelligence and police agents. The information forms the data-base of the Intelligence Documentation Center maintained by CARIC. The IDC is a library of information on U.S. Intelligence available upon request to journalists, qualified researchers and members of CARIC.

• SPEAKERS BUREAU AND WORKSHOPS

CARIC maintains a listing of members available to speak before groups on a variety of subjects ranging from the foreign intelligence programs of our government to the problems of criminal justice in this country. Our speakers include former intelligence workers, police agents and informers and others familiar with American intelligence.

CARIC will periodically conduct workshops for church, labor, school or community organizations. Workshop topics include:

- OPERATION PHOENIX – CIA assassination in Vietnam
- SALEM HOUSE – Preparation for the coup in Cambodia
- The CIA in Laos
- OPERATION BOULDER – An introduction to the next American war
- Right-wing terrorism in America
- Federal Planning for civil disturbances: Riots and demonstrations
- The Internal Security apparatus and Watergate

• MULTI-MEDIA BRIEFING

CARIC will soon augment our workshops with a multi-media briefing on U.S. intelligence featuring films, video tapes, displays and recorded interviews. The exhibit will dramatically illustrate Intelligence as practiced by our government. Our hope is to creat a super-conscious realization by our audience of the concepts presented in the display.

The first element of the multi-media briefing is a slide show tracing the growth of the internal security apparatus of our government and demonstrating how this apparatus influenced the Watergate scandals. The slide show terminates with suggestions for limiting future growth of the internal security apparatus.

13-00000

November, 1973

Vol. 22, No. 11

UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1973

computers and automation

STARTING JANUARY 1, 1974

computers and people

WORKING TOGETHER

13-00000

Here is the start of the most famous article that we ever published — excerpted from the May, 1970, issue of *Computers and Automation.* If you would like to read this article, and look at the eleven photographs it contains, send us $2 (prepayment is necessary). This issue is RETURNABLE IN 7 DAYS FOR FULL REFUND (IF IN SALABLE CONDITION). How can you lose?

Computers and Automation, 815 Washington St., Newtonville, Mass. 02160

THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY:

THE APPLICATION OF COMPUTERS TO THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE

by
Richard E. Sprague
Hartsdale, New York

Part 1. Introduction

Who Assassinated President Kennedy?

On November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, President John F. Kennedy, while riding in an open limousine through Dealey Plaza and waving to the surrounding crowds, was shot to death. Lee Harvey Oswald, an ex-Marine, and former visitor to the Soviet Union, was arrested that afternoon in a movie theatre in another section of Dallas; that night he was charged with shooting President Kennedy from the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository Building overlooking Dealey Plaza. This act Oswald denied steadily through two days of questioning (no record of questions and answers was ever preserved). Two days later while Oswald was being transferred from one jail to another, he was shot by Jack Ruby, a Dallas night-club owner, in the basement of the Dallas police station, while millions of Americans watched on television. The commission of investigation, appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, and headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren of the U. S. Supreme Court, published its report in September 1964, and concluded that Oswald was the sole assassin and that there was no conspiracy.

In view of the authority of the Warren Commission, that conclusion was accepted by many Americans for a long time. But the conclusion cannot be considered true by any person who carefully considers the crucial evidence — such as the physics of the shooting, the timing of a number of events, and other important and undeniable facts. In other words, Oswald was not the sole assassin, and there was a conspiracy.

This article will develop that thesis, prove it to be true on the basis of substantial, conclusive evidence, and in particular some analysis of the photographic evidence.

There was in fact a conspiracy. Oswald played a role in the conspiracy, although there is conclusive evidence that on November 22, 1963, he did no shooting at President Kennedy, and that, just as he claimed when he was in the Dallas jail, he was a "patsy." At least three gunmen (and probably four) — none of whom were in the sixth floor easternmost window of the Texas School Book Depository building where the Warren Commission placed Oswald — fired a total of six shots at President Kennedy.

One of these shots missed entirely; one hit Governor John B. Connally, Jr. of Texas, riding with Kennedy; and four hit President Kennedy, one in his throat, one in his back, and two in his head. (The bulk of the undeniable evidence for these statements about the shots consists of: (a) the physics of the motions of Kennedy and Connally shown in some 60 frames of the famous film by Abraham Zapruder; (b) the locations of the injuries in Kennedy and in Connally; and (c) more than 100 pictures, consisting of more than 30 still photographs and more than 70 frames of movies.)

More than 50 persons were involved in the conspiracy at the time of firing the shots. These persons included members of the Dallas police force (but not all of the Dallas police — and that ac-

(continued in the May 1970 issue of Computers and Automation)

Contents

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THE PURSUIT OF IMPORTANT TRUTH

The magazine *Computers and Automation* has for more than three years followed an unusual publication policy:

- The pursuit of truth in input, output, and processing, for the benefit of people,

and an unusual belief:

- That computers are too important to be left to computer experts and must be integrated into a socially responsible profession of information engineering.

Where this policy has operated most is in publishing information, articles, and reports on subjects which a great many liberal and progressive newspapers and periodicals have left unexplored or unmentioned:

- The political conspiracies which have led to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, and others – and their coverups
- The conspiracies, coverups, and lies in connection with the pursuit of war in Indochina and dictatorship by the Saigon regime
- The connections of President Richard M. Nixon with organized crime and the Mafia
- The Watergate crimes

If you believe in the value of truthful, frank reporting on the most important topics for the welfare of the people of the United States today, we urge you to subscribe to our magazine, and buy our back copies (almost every one is in print). Please help us pursue the important truth and report on it, by buying our products.

Edmund C. Berkeley

Edmund C. Berkeley, Editor

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical ...

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
- The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

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Vol. 22, No. 11
November, 1973

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UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1973

computers and automation

STARTING JANUARY 1, 1974

computers and people

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The magazine of the design, applications, and implications of information processing systems — and the pursuit of truth in input, output, and processing, for the benefit of people.

World Affairs and Social Policy (continued)

Corrections

For changes in "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of *Computers and Automation,* see page 23 of this issue, or page 24 of the July issue.

For changes in the reprinting and the indexing of "Communication — Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" published in the July issue.

Front Cover Picture

Three eighth graders - each from a different continent - are working together to solve complex mathematics problems. They are at the new United Nations International School, and are Laurence Ling May, a Chinese-Thai American; Catharina Nilson of Stockholm, Sweden; and Arun Alagappan of India. The minicomputer system is a gift from Digital Equipment Corp. For more information, see page 43 of the July 1973 issue.

Departments

Key

[A] — Article
[C] — Monthly Column
[E] — Editorial
[F] — Forum
[NT] — Not Technical
[R] — Reference
[T] — Technical

NOTICE

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13-00000

EDITORIAL

The Understanding of Natural Language by Computers

Proposition: Computers are making long strides towards understanding natural language as used by human beings, and will eventually understand such language as well as many human beings do.

What do we mean by: computers? understanding language? natural language? And what is the evidence for this proposition?

The word "computers" here refers to powerful computers that have appropriate programs written by human beings plus the programmed capacity to improve their programs by using experience. An example of such improvement is Dr. A. L. Samuels' famous checker-playing program, which can learn from experience, and which plays far better checkers than Dr. Samuels himself can play.

The experience may consist of the following at least:
- Answers from human beings to questions posed by the computer;
- Differences between computed results and *a priori* specified results;
- Signals from the environment, such as instrument readings;
- Information obtained by "looks" at the environment, as for example recognition of the character A, as in optical character recognition;
- The interpretation of words, as with FORTRAN expressions.

Probably there are even more categories of experience which a powerful computer program can use to modify itself to become even a better program.

In regard to "understanding language", there are over 500 languages which computers have been programmed to understand, when written precisely according to stated rules: among them, BASIC, FORTRAN, COBOL, many kinds of machine language, etc.

"Natural language" is the ordinary language used by human beings, subject to the requirement that for a computer implicit understandings must be stated. For example, when a speaker exclaims "Ouch!", a great deal of the meaning comes from the listener's observations of the speaker. But a computer, like a blind man, cannot "see" the situation, and must be told more than the ordinary listener.

With some definitions taken care of, let us consider evidence for the main proposition stated above. This evidence includes the information published in several recent articles in *Computers and Automation.*

The article "'Do What I Mean' – The Programmer's Assistant", by Warren Teitelman, in the April 1972 issue, described a "programmer's assistant", called "DWIM"; this was a "front end" or preprocessor to an interactive program for operating with LISP expressions. The front end was tolerant of the programmer's mistakes in typing, in low-mistake occurred, it would inquire of the human programmer what he meant, suggesting the correctly spelled alternative, and so on. In this way the human programmer was relieved of much of the burden of expressing himself exactly and correctly the first time, and his efficiency in using the LISP interactive program greatly increased.

The three articles "Computer Programming Using Natural Language" by Edmund C. Berkeley, Andy Langer, and Casper Otten, in the June, July, and August 1973 issues, demonstrated the understanding by a computer program called GENIE of at least some sets of instructions in ordinary natural language. The vocabulary though small was free, and there was unlimited freedom in putting the words together, with about a 90% chance of complete understanding. The computer program that did this could be called 15% GENIE, because, as the authors emphasized, it was still in an early stage of development.

The article "Latest Computers See, Hear, Speak, and Sing – and May Outthink Man" by David Brand, in the October 1973 issue, enumerated many instances of computers (and robots equipped with computers) which could deal with concepts expressed in natural language. One of the programs mentioned could for example decipher natural language commands dealing with the stacking of blocks of various shapes, sizes, and colors.

The main tasks for understanding natural language appear to be the following:
- Recognition of the framework of a sentence;
- Recognition of the common meaning of groups of synonyms, the collection of words that "say the same thing";
- Knowledge of context: the context is regularly specified to the computer, so that it does not have to deduce the context from "what is being said";
- Knowledge of a limited vocabulary consisting of perhaps 300 to 500 words – knowledge in the sense that the computer program can attach meaning to the words either by themselves or in phrases, as for example it may attach the meaning of doing something three times to the numeral 3;
- Capacity to accept variation in the way something is stated by a human programmer.

The three articles referred to above show instances of the achievement of all of these tasks separately. Combining all the achievements should not be too hard, especially since children as young as four years old show complete capacities to listen to many kinds of natural language, understand, and respond.

Edmund C. Berkeley

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Cooperative Facilities to Obtain the Advantages of Computers

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"Because of general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus."

Computer Use

A recent study of 2,500 companies conducted by the Research Institute of America, revealed that 55% of the firms regularly use computers in conducting their business. Further breakdown of the study shows that an average of 32% own or lease their own computers, and 23% use an outside service bureau for processing data.[1]

While a majority of the companies surveyed do use computers in some form, a significant 45% of the respondents do not use any type of computerized data processing service. Those companies cited the following reasons for not using computers:[2]

	Per Cent
Operation too small	50
Too costly	35
Looked into and tabled for the present	31
Present methods satisfactory	21
Plan to install a computer within a year	8
Plan to begin using a service bureau within a year	8
Other	13
Total (multiple answers)	166%

Service Bureau Use

In addition to the non-users, another recent study revealed that most service bureau clients are not effectively using their service bureau and, as a result, are receiving few, if any, of the advantages of electronic data processing (EDP). Most of the surveyed service bureau clients were:[3]

1. Receiving routine services which do not save them money.
2. Not planning to expand into more sophisticated, higher-payoff applications.
3. Not receiving indirect benefits and savings, such as improved information for decision making.
4. Not satisfied with current services.

The study also disclosed that because of the general dissatisfaction, 30% of the surveyed service bureau clients planned to discontinue using service bureaus and purchase in-house computers.[4]

Cooperative Service Bureaus

Both non-users and dissatisfied service bureau clients, therefore, offer a ready market for a newer approach to obtaining the advantages of EDP — the formation of a cooperative service bureau. A cooperative service bureau consists of several sponsoring firms who jointly own a computer and share in its operating costs at a much lower expense than individual ownership of a computer. If carefully planned before operations begin, a cooperative service bureau will provide its sponsors with all the advantages of EDP plus many other advantages unique to jointly-shared facilities and personnel.

Among these additional advantages are:

1. The sponsors would purchase a computer tailored to their specific needs.
2. They would have exclusive use of the computer.
3. Their computer would be available for use at any time.
4. They could share the costs of any computer programs developed.
5. They could share the costs of any package or canned computer programs purchased.
6. They would have available for their exclusive use a staff of data processing experts and a computer — at a fraction of the cost of individual ownership.

Factors Insuring the Success of the Cooperative

The first step in forming a successful cooperative service bureau is to enroll an appropriate number of comapnies. Ideally the cooperative should be limited to five or six sponsoring firms. A larger number may create unmanageable problems involving operations, communications, control, scheduling of computer time, and so forth. A smaller number may make the venture economically unfeasible.

Lack of Interest

At the present time, widespread lack of interest in joining a cooperative is more of a problem to potential organizers than too much demand. The author contacted a number of public accounting firms about the feasibility of forming cooperatives and found that three firms who had already made such an attempt could not interest enough firms to join. Their comments were:

— We tried to organize one several years ago; the firms contacted were not interested.

— We would like to explore this possibility but we can't get anyone else interested.

— At present there appears to be a tragic lack of interest locally by other CPA firms.

Unquestionably, one reason for the lack of interest is a misunderstanding of the true nature of a cooperative. Interested companies must therefore be prepared to sell the idea to others. As more published material becomes available in the field, this problem should be alleviated.

Confidential Information

A second major reason for lack of interest is that companies fear for the control and security of their confidential or sensitive information. Such a concern is certainly legitimate and underscores the need for a cooperative that is to be successful, to devise an adequate system for quality control and security. A committee responsible for such a system should be established at the outset by the sponsoring firms.

Protection

One of its duties should be to adequately safeguard the sponsors' records and documents against fire, theft, water, and other hazards and disasters. Statistics compiled by the Safe Manufacturers National Association show that about one-half of companies whose important records and documents were destroyed through some catastrophe never resumed business or were permanently closed down within six months; an additional 13% suffered serious economic impairment and were able to remain in business only under severe operating handicaps.[5] For this reason the quality control and security committee must see that the cooperative service bureau maintains:

- protective devices
- fireproof vaults
- a method of reconstructing any destroyed records
- adequate insurance to cover loss of important client records or documents

The committee must also take measures to prevent one client's records from becoming commingled with another client's records — a not-unlikely occurrence in such an environment.

Preventing Disclosure

Finally, the committee should determine how to prevent disclosure of confidential information. For example, no member of any sponsoring company should be allowed in certain strategic parts of the computer center. Likewise, each company's records should be coded and the code number known only to key computer center personnel. In cases requiring utmost security, the actual processing of data should be monitored by a key employee of the computer center or possibly by a representative of a disinterested third party, such as a firm of independent public accountants.

Sharing of Expenses: Startup Costs

With an adequate number of sponsoring firms lined up and a sound security system worked out, the third necessity in establishing a successful cooperative is to determine methods of sharing the expenses. There are two categories of costs to consider:

1. Startup costs. These include all costs incurred prior to the time that the cooperative commences operations. Startup costs are either directly traceable to a particular firm or are joint or common to all firms. An example of a direct cost would be that of analyzing, modifying, and redesigning of systems prior to conversion to the computer. An example of a joint or common cost would be the cost of computer housing, including air conditioning, engineering supervision, false floors, ducts and pipes, tranformers or motor generators, cabling and wiring, and overhead racks and supports.

Each sponsoring firm should pay for its own direct costs. Joint costs should be shared equally or apportioned among the firms according to some equitable formula.

Operating Costs

2. Operating costs. These include the monthly hardware and software costs to operate the cooperative. Hardware costs refer to the periodic rental or purchase charge for the computer equipment. As a minimum the computer equipment consists of an input unit, a central processing unit, and an output unit. Software costs include personnel costs, programming costs, testing and debugging costs, magnetic tapes, disc packs, punched cards, paper, paper tapes, repair parts, power, telecommunication lines, and so on.

Operating costs that are directly traceable should be paid by the using firm. Joint or common costs can be shared equally or can be allocated to each firm based on the number of transactions processed or the actual computer processing time used during the period. In addition, if so desired, a sponsor could be required to pay a minimum or maximum monthly charge.

Management

Fourthly, the sponsoring companies should decide how to manage the venture. It is advisable to form a committee to oversee the management and operation of the cooperative. A decision must be made whether each member regardless of size should have one vote or whether another basis of voting should be used. This decision should assure participants that no one firm will dominate or control the cooperative.

Common Line of Business

A factor not to be overlooked when forming a cooperative, one which will avoid frustrations, complications, and extra expenses, is to see that each member is in the same industry or business category. Thus all sponsoring firms will have similar operating problems that can be simultaneously solved by the computer personnel, resulting in the allocation of smaller costs to each firm for each problem solved. Also computer programs developed or packaged programs purchased can be shared by all sponsors with minimum modifications, thus resulting in considerable programming cost savings.

(please turn to page 13)

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Control in Time-Sharing Systems

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"A time-sharing installation (like every computer environment) is exposed to the seven major dangers: fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, equipment malfunctions, and human errors."

Introduction

This article has as its main objective to furnish and define some methods and provisions for control and security in a computer time-sharing environment.

It is evident that computer time-sharing has become very popular during recent years. More and more confidential information is being handled by these systems, creating an urgent need for strong measures of control and security.

Description of the System

The service provided by a single computer to many telecommunications terminals has been called "computer time-sharing". With this type of service each user shares simultaneously in the processing capabilities of the central processor. This new computer facility makes this service available to small companies and/or other users who have little need for their own computer.

Computing services that may go under the heading of time-sharing include:

> Commercial computing; text editing; databank information retrieval services; application services such as colleges' records, inventory control, payrolls of small companies, and account receivables; administrative messages; switching and collection services; and more.

Among the great number of time-sharing users are hospitals (Welch Hospital, one of the biggest in Europe, has acquired the large ICL 1904S computer with 7020 terminals), banks (Gosbank, the national bank of the USSR, has ordered two large-scale Honeywell series 600 with 100 terminals), schools and colleges (British schools and colleges have started using terminals), airlines (Continental Airlines uses the Sonic 360 reservation system with 550 on-line terminals).

Trends

The growth in computer time-sharing has been phenomenal in recent years in spite of a short business recession between 1970 and 1972. Time sharing was a broker's dream in the '60s; many companies realized its potential, entered the market, and failed because of: one, strong competitive pressure, and two, because of the countless thefts and violations suffered. The highly competitive situation benefited the user in regard to pricing, but the offsetting consequence of lower profits caused a high casualty rate among these companies. As a result, the number of time-sharing firms dropped from 150 to 50 between 1969 and 1972.

A few of the companies which survived and which account for most of today's time-sharing business are Rapidata Corporation, Teletype Corporation (a subsidiary of AT&T), Tymeshare Incorporated (the largest independent firm and second only in size to IBM and Honeywell time-sharing operations), and IBM

Jerry Dreyer, executive president of ADAPSO, an association of data processing service organizations estimates that one time-sharing company out of three was profitable in 1971, two out of five in 1972, and probably three out of six in 1973. Nowadays, this computer facility is coming back to its original trend, and it is expected that the number of computers with terminals will grow from 32% at the end of 1971 to 45% at the end of 1975, with the average central processing unit driving 15 to 20 terminals.

One consultant, Creative Strategies of Palo Alto, California, predicts that time-sharing sales by 1976 will increase to 2 billion from 331 million last year. By 1975, says ADAPSO's Dreyer, time-sharing will account for 1/3 of the $4.5 billion computer services industry.

Technological Advances

Most important technological advances have been achieved recently on on-line terminals linked to central processors. Some of the improvements made include solid state keyboards, which have greater reliability and lower cost; visual display methods, which incorporate more capacity, economy, and aesthetic appeal; non-impact printing techniques, which provide faster, quieter and more reliable operations; improved lower cost memories; more powerful logic capability; and faster and more accurate modern techniques and improvements in central processor software.

This is only the beginning. It is foreseen that in the future the equipment itself will change in nature and will probably not be recognizable as terminals per se. Rather, terminals will be modular systems consisting of the required input/output functions for specific jobs, built around basic controller and communication interfaces; in many instances, terminals will become special purpose devices.

Hazards

A time-sharing installation, like every computer environment, is exposed to the seven major dangers of fire, water, theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors. Fire is considered to be the greatest threat to magnetic tapes. Water does not constitute an important hazard to magnetic tapes, but it does to computer installa-

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tions. Theft, fraud, sabotage, EDP equipment malfunctions, and human errors are considered the most common dangers.

On-line terminals connected to central processors from remote points are more exposed to violations and thefts. The increasing popularity of time-sharing systems among large corporations and service bureaus has given rise to even more potential security breaches. Data transmitted over a communication line could be subject to wire tapping and a number of other hazards such as piggyback entry, whereby the intruder intercepts and compromises communication between a terminal and the processor while a legitimate user is inactive but still holding the line open. The intruder can even cancel the user's sign-off signal and continue operating in his name. A knowledgeable person could enter program changes from a terminal and play havoc with the system.

Need for Protection

Due to the increasing popularity of computing services, the issue of control and security protection has become more important. It is evident that time-sharing systems present few obstacles to unauthorized parties. The security problem has been made much more critical by the growing number of people trained in computers and by the fading of the computer mystique. In addition, communication by means of time-sharing systems has no more protection than telephone conversations or Morse-coded methods, since the technological skills necessary to interpret computerized data are widespread. More and more companies are appointing security monitors from their EDP staffs to centralize security matters. Trade organizations such as the American Management Association and the Bank Administration Institute, computer firms, and research firms such as Advancement Management Research, Inc. find their seminars on computer security overcrowded by data processing managers and security officers from business and government.

Target of Attacks

Computers have become an important source of information and, as a result, the target of many attacks. Some of the general information targets for industrial espionage are sales and service information, market analysis strategies, bid prices, corporate finance, stockholder information, legal negotiations, planned policy changes, expansion plans, product developments, personnel changes, payroll data, general administrative matters; and the list could be expanded even more.

Threats

The case of an 18 year-old Cincinnati youth who used long distance telephone to tap the lines of a time-sharing system firm in Louisville, Kentucky, and extracted data from its ledgers, as well as records of its customers, is representative of the type of risk to which computer installations are exposed.

Accidents can have serious consequences such as the incident in which income tax return records for 1970 were erased by energy emitted from the radar of a nearby airport in Austin, Texas.

Safeguards

It is important to consider that too much control and too many security safeguards can become bothersome and costly. The measures to protect data from unauthorized access vary from one system to another. According to Richard F. Cross, Security Office for the Bank of New York, security systems should include each of the following segments: physical security; personnel security; procedural security; audit control; insurance; and any needed interfacing.

The quality and level of protection required depends on the sensitivity of the data handled. Nevertheless, control and security in a time-sharing environment should encompass the whole system, since it is well known that even the strongest control measures can be violated at the weakest point. These measures should be taken in the central processing unit, software, personnel, communication lines, the terminal, and its users.

Methods and Provisions — Central Processing Unit

The central processor is threatened mostly by sabotage, fire, water, theft, EDP equipment malfunctions, human accidental errors and environmental problems.

The computer center of any company is the heart of the organization, and protection of the equipment against these threats can be provided by a carefully planned computer room. Luis Scoma, President of Data Processing Security, Inc., recommends that the computer center be located out of the main traffic areas. It must be fireproof, dustfree, and waterproof and provided with temperature and humidity control and carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Water lines should not run through the computer room. A separate, fireproof storage area should be provided for data files, documentation, and operating supplies. It should also have alarm devices sensitive to magnetism, humidity, heat, pressure, dust, theft, power blackout, etc. There should be strong access control including armed guards, fenced areas, TV monitors, personnel identification (visual, voice print, fingerprint, badge, passwords, etc.), well-performed maintenance service, and a number of extra provisions for protection.

Data Processing Security, Inc. has developed, for high security necessities, an electronically operated double door entry system for access control into the computer room. When a person enters the buffer zone, the door locks behind him while he is subjected to electronic search. If something is detected, the system freezes and automatically alerts the security guard. The second door can be opened only with a special badge key.

A carbon dioxide (CO_2) fire extinguishing system, such as the one installed at the Chase Manhattan Bank's New York City headquarters, has proved useful. Engineered by Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., this system uses a battery of remotely located cylinders containing the liquid gas. When activated by smoke detectors, the gas discharges and builds up an inert atmosphere in the immediately surrounding area, extinguishing the fire without damaging equipment or data files. Employees can go back to work within five minutes after the fire has been put out and the ventilation systems restarted.

Another fire-fighting system which has been developed by the Ansul Company uses Halon extinguishing agents which are discharged in the form of a colorless, odorless, and non-toxic gas. Since Halon agents do not work by diluting oxygen, they are well-suited for areas where humans are present.

The Guaranty Bank and Trust Co. of Worcester, Mass., has adopted another approach to fire-fighting, a system installed by Security Control Systems which detects fire, smoke and excessive temperatures and humidity fluctuations and causes a monitoring and

reporting device to alert four pre-selected phone numbers for help.

Software

Protection of data files, whether in the form of punch cards, magnetic tapes, or discs, is the key element in any computer facility.

Some specific examples of software security control measures are audit trails, access regulations, strong supervision of computer operators, the use and control of programs utilizing program documentation methods, the use of a log for all significant events (such as user identification, file use and attempts of unauthorized use), regulations to prevent unauthorized personnel from browsing through the files, and the use of a semi-automatic data inventory control system.

Personnel

Physical control as to who is allowed near the computer and the files is advisable. Note that this does not mean "employees only"; it implies a careful screening of employees, repairmen, and visitors to determine which of them should be allowed this proximity to the system. Intimately involved with time-sharing installations are three types of personnel: operators, programmers, and maintenance engineers.

According to Dennis Van Tassel, mathematician and head programmer at San Jose State College, all operators must understand that there exists a protection philosophy. If personnel are expected to help enforce and to comply with this protection philosophy, it must be clearly defined and specified.

It is advisable to use the following provisions for personnel control: control of logs and monitor, division of responsibilities, rotation of duties, adequate supervision to reduce the risk of losses caused by accident or error, careful handling of data files, cleanliness regulations, control access to private files, and appropriate instruction in case of disasters.

Terminals

Some of the most common pitfalls encountered when using terminals are frequent communication interruptions, risk of communication interception, difficult access control, and noisy lines.

Among the greatest disadvantages of time-sharing services are those in connection with the communication lines which link the terminals to the central processing unit. Telephone lines are designed for voice communication rather than data communication, and the results have been that such lines are too noisy and have too many interruptions for appropriate handling of data communication.

There have been some recent developments in the improvement of data transmissions. Bell System has developed its Digital Data Service (DDS), a data transmission system which has been introduced early this year in five cities (New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, and Chicago); and, by the end of 1974, twenty-four cities are expected to have it. Bell further plans to provide continuous monitoring of their DDS channels. When errors of transmission are detected, DDS will notify the customer. Decision on retransmission will be the customer's responsibility. Another development in data communication is DUV (data under voice). By late 1973 this technique will be in service between New York and Chicago; consequently, communication problems should become virtually nonexistent within the near future, and this system will become even more popular.

Telephone lines are vulnerable to three types of security problems: wire tapping, piggyback, and user's sign-off signal cancellation. These common threats may be avoided by the use of a privacy transformation method (also called scramblers or cryptographic techniques). This is a non-singular (reversible) operation which conceals the original message either by the substitution of new characters, rearrangement of the characters, or by the adding of strings of digits to the original message.

Some new techniques for encrypting data have evolved, such as high speed transmission and signal scrambling. In spite of all of these new techniques, it is still possible to intercept and tap the information. According to Tuckerman, unauthorized users (intruders) who possess only limited material and information with which to work, can readily extract the original text of enciphered messages by making use of the speed, capacity, and computational abilities of the computer.

The greater the efficiency of the privacy transformation, the more difficult it becomes for unauthorized copying of files.

Access Control

Access to the system throughout the communication lines should be controlled by the central processing unit and by the user's own procedures. This is possible by cryptographic and scramble techniques, personnel regulations, user identification, appropriate terminal location, or by ciphering and deciphering hardware.

Computer software packages have been written to cipher data transmissions. Ciphering software is an attractive technique because it can be done automatically by the program which creates the data and at a very low cost. Only programs using the matching deciphering technique are able to use this data. These special hardware cipher devices can be located at the terminal and at the computer to protect transmitted data.

Scramblers or voice privacy devices are currently being used by people who readily acknowledge the insecurity of transmitted information. Scramblers are used by large corporations such as the oil industry as well as by union representatives during contract negotiation time. (Scramble phones are currently a 20 to 30 million-dollar business, excluding law enforcement and military purchases). Scramble devices are now being built for time-sharing operations. These devices offer protection similar to encryption. Scramblers convert data into something resembling channel noise or a malfunctioning circuit.

Other features for terminals include print inhibit, security keylock, operator identification card reader, and the use of a terminal identifier. With print inhibit the terminal operator can enter data, such as security passwords, without its being physically displayed. A physical keylock can be attached to the terminal which will not allow the entry of data. The operator identification card reader reads magnetically encoded information on a magnetic strip card. The card can be used to supply the user's password and/or name.

Direct access device security features include file mask, volume detection, and write-exhibit switch. The file mask controls or allows read-only

of read-write access to data sets. The volume detection switch alerts the control program when the volume is increased; this protects data from being written upon. This switch provides additional protection for read-only volumes.

Insurance

If data security measures fail, the use of EDP insurance can back-up or soften the blow. Every business or person who now has an in-house computer, operates or is a user of a service bureau, or transmits data to a data center should be computer-security conscious. Insurance is one of the back-up measures if prevention fails. However, not all business can afford or even need an elaborate and expensive security system; thus, evaluation of the information becomes necessary to determine those sections of the system which require this protection.

The subject matter of ordinary insurance coverage is physical damage to tangible property. In this case, software and data are not covered. Business interruption insurance protects you in the event of fire or other interruptions to normal business but does not cover the consequences. Boiler explosion policies which also insure other heating mishaps do not cover computer operations. Theft and employee dishonesty are also insured in terms of general risk. Valuable papers and records' coverage provides protection in the event of destruction of such intangibles as notes and account receivable records but does not include such computer media as valuable papers. Public liability insures the company for its acts or omission of acts which give rise to claims by outsiders against the company.

Insurance can prevent an unfortunate event from becoming a catastrophe. When a person buys an insurance policy, he knows that he will be indemnified if a loss does occur.

Some of the insurance companies which write EDP policies are the Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Insurance Company of North America, The Home Insurance Co., and Royal Assurance of America.

Insurance premiums generally correspond to the regular fire policy rates plus an added loading factor for the additional EDP perils.

Undoubtedly any computer installation, regardless of the quality and level of its security system, cannot approach the state of no risk of loss. Security is based on a "cost-benefit" concept; in other words the cost of violating the system should be greater than the gain derived therefrom.

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Cerullo — *Continued from page 9*

Procedure for Withdrawal

Sixth, a procedure should be established for withdrawal from the cooperative. If the withdrawing firm has not been a member for a predetermined time, perhaps one or two years, a sliding scale penalty fee for withdrawal should be established.

Procedure for Admission

Finally, procedures must be determined to govern the admission of new members into the cooperative. Perhaps a unanimous affirmative vote by current members should be required to admit a new member. The current members should also decide if a newly admitted member should be required to pay a predetermined portion of the cooperative's startup costs and if the cooperative should limit membership to firms of the same approximate size as current members.

Conclusion

With due care taken in following the above steps, establishing a successful cooperative service bureau should be relatively easy. Companies would be well advised to consider the idea seriously, for cooperative service bureaus offer a viable and in many ways superior alternative to the more costly inhouse computer and the less satisfactory outside service bureau.

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13-00000

Alienation and the Systems Analyst

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"Systems analysts ... must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm."

A Wall of Managerial Attitudes

In most large organizations, the systems and data processing departments are separated from the rest of the firm by a wall of managerial attitudes. While employees in most jobs are encouraged to gain a wide variety of experience in various departments as they rise through various management levels, it is rare that a systems analyst or a programmer is given an equal opportunity. The general attitude is "He's a computer man, not a manager (or a businessman, or a banker). He wouldn't fit in. Besides, he's doing a good job where he is."

As a result, the analyst has exactly no motivation to think of himself as an insurance man or a businessman, or a banker, or an accountant. He is made to feel like a consultant. He can serve the organization, but he isn't free to move within it. To make matters worse, some firms rotate the people in their management development programs through a stint in the systems department. It is little wonder that there is a high turnover in systems analysts. The company does very little to make him feel like a member of the family.

Potential Source of Talent

But beyond the problems brought about by the personnel turbulence, the firm is ignoring a potential source of fine managerial talent. Many analysts joining major corporations hold degrees as Master, Business Administration. Their educational backgrounds, when combined with their ability to objectively define problems and see solutions, and the detailed working knowledge of the company gained in the system design process, should put them in the management spotlight. Instead, the system analyst finds that he has been given the indelible label of "computer person" and that his upward mobility is limited to the systems department. As a result, systems analysts leave the firm, and often leave the systems profession.

If companies hope to attract and hold talented personnel for their systems activities, they need to offer them an equal chance to develop to their full potential. They must be seen as full-fledged members of the firm — not as consultants who are here today, but who could move on tomorrow.

Experience in Systems

As businesses come more and more to depend upon data processing to support their operations, it will be desirable for a significant number of management team members to have experience in systems. Yet, by their actions, managements have forced many talented people to avoid beginning their careers in data processing for fear of becoming stereotyped.

So it would seem that a number of the problems that businesses face in their systems activities are a result of a regrettable but widespread management attitude.

Only when systems analysts are regarded as having a potential for advancement to positions in general management, and are given an equal chance to rise in the organization, will the systems man lose his alienation and see himself as a member of the company team. □

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Strategy and Action on World Trade

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"What we [the United States] have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do."

The theme of my remarks is the intensifying controversy over the conditions that influence our well-being here in the United States — particularly the threat of another unfortunate experience with protectionism.

I am well aware that I cannot go deeply into this subject in a short space. This I know because I was privileged to serve on the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy. For over a year we studied every way in which this and other countries are affected by international trade and investment policies.

Protectionist Attitude

Let there be no doubt where I stand on the principal issue. I believe that the threat of the protectionist attitude in America is far more than an issue involving business and jobs. I sincerely believe that this issue embraces many powerful forces that will have an important bearing on whether or not all the peoples of the world make the most of their opportunities in the years to come.

I recognize that there are strong and honest differences of opinion on the proper direction of our nation's foreign trade policies. There are many persons and suppliers who have been adversely affected by foreign competition. It would be unrealistic not to acknowledge this fact of life.

Complexity

These differences of opinion, and these dislocations of people's lives, point up the complexities of the problem. Who among us can honestly say he understands all of the ramifications involved in the balance of trade? Where is there an unchallenged expert on monetary policy? What type of restraints, if any, could or should be made on the world-wide transfer of technology? What is the proper level of East-West trade relations, and are the national defense implications of yesterday still appropriate today? Should the United States government be supporting broad research and development to match the funds that foreign countries are investing in their industry? Can we preserve the rise in productivity that underlies the American miracle — which is the production of goods at low cost while wages, taxes and dividends all rise steadily?

These are just some of the questions which must be asked in the discussion now developing, particularly in the halls of Congress, but also at various other governmental and community levels.

Facing these and still other complexities, we know that Congressional hearings soon to begin could result in new laws and regulations which could be detrimental.

Action

Because this is so, it will not do for anyone with a qualified viewpoint backed by experience, to be simply an observer. I am convinced that this present controversy can be resolved positively, but it will require action.

What kind of action will be most effective? the kind of action which is in the public interest? — not special pleadings based on the experience of a single company, or a single industry, or even a single community.

It is, of course, important to gather this supporting information and be aware of all the facts that bear on our needs, our experience and the options that governments can take to effect them. But going beyond this, we must be prepared to discuss with everyone who will exert influence on our elected lawmakers the more important question — what do all these statistics and contentions mean to me?

The Concerns of U.S. Citizens

The concerns of the great body of United States citizens are how to assure and enhance their jobs and living conditions and be involved in what was once unashamedly described as "the pursuit of happiness".

Based on a talk before the Board of Governors of the Electronic Industries Association, Phoenix, Ariz., January, 1973.

Let's look at just one major concern: about 1.3 million new American families are formed every year. Approximately eight million people change their jobs every year. About 3.7 million people join the labor force and 2.1 million leave it. By 1980 full employment in the United States will require jobs for 100 million people, 18 million more than were employed at the end of 1972. These, quite clearly, are the priority considerations in the minds of millions who do not clearly understand how the enterprise system meets their needs.

If they and the representatives of large numbers of voters do not understand, how can we expect their support?

I would like to review the arguments for their support in as familiar terms as I can muster.

The Days of U.S. Preeminence are Gone

First, let's examine one portion of the real economic world we inhabit.

Of primary importance is the fact that the days of almost total U.S. preeminence since the close of World War II are gone.

We must learn to live and work in a world where forevermore we will be dependent on other portions of the globe for some of our more basic needs — and some portions will be dependent on us. The U.S. is not self-sufficient in materials, nor does it have a corner on the world's technology, the world's innovative ability, the world's marketing savvy, the world's production know-how. What we have is a little corner of the world, and we must find a way to live in it harmoniously with our neighbors, many of whom are every bit as good as we are at almost everything we do.

The Energy Crisis

I hesitate, somewhat, to use the energy crisis as an example of this dependency, because I recognize that there are those who question whether the crisis really exists, or who maintain that new technology will solve the problem before it reaches crisis stage. I can say at this point that there is an energy shortage, if not a crisis; for example, the fuel oil allotment for our Minneapolis operations has been cut by 25 per cent for January and February, and similar cutbacks have been imposed on other companies, our schools, our common carriers.

Let's look at the dependency which is developing in the oil industry. In the past, the repatriated earnings of oil companies have exceeded the value of imported oil and were a favorable factor in our international balance of payments. By 1985, however, our needs for oil and natural gas could create for us a trade deficit approaching twenty billion dollars a year.

As no doubt you know, we currently import 10 to 15 per cent of both crude oil and copper, 30 per cent of our iron ore, and more than 80 per cent of our bauxite needs. We must import all or most of our tin, natural rubber, nickel and chrome.

Trade with the World

We cannot go it alone. We must trade with the world — and to trade, you give something to get something, with the hope that both traders get what they want and need. Unfortunately, we have not yet been able to fully realize this goal, and much of the controversy over this nation's foreign-trade policies revolves around the best way to achieve it.

There is a strong and vocal body of opinion which believes that protectionist measures will achieve what is best for American workers and companies in the arena of world trade. One of their principal targets are companies like Honeywell — multinational companies with substantial investments, employees and sales outside the United States.

"Exporting Jobs"?

It is claimed that U.S. multinational corporations are "exporting jobs" overseas; that U.S. companies invest overseas to take advantage of lower wages; that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies cause unemployment here at home; that if U.S. companies were prevented from investing and manufacturing abroad these companies would be forced to expand their operations in the United States, creating more jobs here; that multinational companies invest abroad in order to avoid paying taxes; that American corporations are exporting U.S. technology and therefore are helping non-U.S. companies compete in our own and other countries.

The Burke-Hartke bill has been proposed as the solution to these problems; and protectionist sentiment also underlies other proposals which may emerge for the consideration of Congress.

At this point, there may be those who will accuse me of making a tactical blunder by even mentioning the allegations of our critics. But I'll go one step further. If someone could prove to me that these allegations are factual, I'd be one of the major supporters of moves to inhibit the growth of multinational companies.

The Opposite is True: Making Jobs

Thanks to various companies, government agencies and trade associations who have accumulated the facts and published them, I know otherwise.

I am convinced, thanks to these studies, and my experience with Honeywell, that multinational companies do not export jobs, but create jobs in the United States faster than other U.S. companies. I am convinced that U.S. companies invest abroad to gain participation in markets in other countries, not to take advantage of lower wages or so-called tax loopholes. I am convinced by these studies that imports from the overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies have not been a major factor in U.S. unemployment.

To be more specific, I'd like to give you some information taken from a survey conducted by the Emergency Committee on American Trade, of which I am a member. This committee researched the domestic and international operations of 74 U.S. corporations representing a broad group of large multinational corporations. This survey reveals that in the years between 1960 and 1970, when these companies were increasing their overseas operations, they also provided 900,000 new jobs in the United States. They also increased their sales from American facilities — work performed in this country — from $58 billion to $113 billion — nearly doubled, in fact. Their exports from the United States nearly tripled in this period, rising from $4.3 billion to $12.2 billion. In the all-important balance of payments category, they increased their net surplus of exports over imports from $3.2 billion to $6.6 billion — more than doubled.

International Investment Activities of Multinational Companies

These figures, and other results of the survey, lead to one major conclusion: That the international investment activities of these representative multinational companies played an important role in their rapid export growth and consequently made a major positive contribution to their domestic — and I emphasize the word domestic — sales, investment and employment growth.

Double Taxation

I have tried to speak in familiar language; so I have some misgivings about discussing the issue of taxes. But the tax issue is an important one, and I'd like to cover some specific areas which are coming more and more into public discussion.

At issue is the section of U.S. tax law which allows American corporations a tax credit for the income taxes they pay to foreign countries on income earned in such countries. The purpose of this tax credit is to avoid taxing the foreign earnings of U.S. corporations twice — once in a foreign country and again when the earnings are remitted to the United States.

Opponents of this tax credit argue that since domestic firms are not allowed a federal tax credit for the state taxes they pay, the current method of taxing income from foreign sources is inconsistent with the way domestic income is taxed.

Taxation by U.S. States

A major fallacy in this argument is that it is based on the incorrect assumption that the taxation of domestic income by city, state and the federal government is analogous to the United States taxing the foreign earnings of American subsidiaries which have already been taxed by the host country.

The proper analogy is between the way states treat corporate income earned in two or more states and the way the U.S. government treats income earned in two or more countries. Every state which has a state income tax provides a method of allocating the income of a multi-state company among the various states in order to avoid duplicate taxation of the same income. As a matter of fact, the constitution requires this. Thus the current methods of taxing foreign and domestic income are consistent.

Further, where one domestic corporation in the United States has an ownership position in another domestic corporation, the federal income tax law quite properly prevents duplication of corporate income taxes. The parent company is taxed on earnings of the owned company only when such earnings are distributed as a dividend — and then at no more than a nominal rate. What logic can there be in the Burke-Hartke proposal that earnings of an overseas subsidiary — in most cases earnings already taxed in the foreign country at rates comparable to or higher than U.S. rates — should be immediately re-taxed at full U.S. income tax rates?

International Competition by American Industry

Another fundamental element of the issue is the tax credit's relationship to the ability of American industry to compete internationally. According to a recent survey by the National Association of Manufacturers, if the United States were to repeal the tax credit for foreign taxes paid and tax all foreign subsidiary income before it is paid out in dividends to the parent company, U.S. firms with foreign operations would be forced to pay an average effective tax on their foreign earnings of over 70 per cent.

Given this added tax handicap, few American firms could continue to compete with foreign-controlled companies for world markets.

You can appreciate how useful it is to have these facts for presentation where contradictory allegations are being made. Let's keep the record straight!

Also useful to the undertaking on which we must all embark is the factual story of what imports and exports do, beneficially to <u>create</u> jobs.

Imports Produce One Million U.S. Jobs

Labor Department figures document the finding that one million jobs in the United States are dependent on imports — jobs for food processors, ship and dock workers, truck drivers and railroaders, warehouse employees and retail clerks. And it's equally impressive to consider that every billion dollars worth of <u>exports</u> creates 60-to-80,000 jobs in the United States.

As we assess the situation, let us not forget the dilemma our government faced in August 1971. As Mr. Peter Peterson wrote, the New Economic Policy announced that month was not, and I quote, "a one-shot reaction to a one-time crisis. It marked the beginning of a new era of more flexible, enduring, and viable economic relationships among nations. The years behind us were by and large an era of success, but an era based upon a system which had become outgrown, outworn — and increasingly crisis-prone."

Tariffs and Free Trade

Mr. Peterson was referring to the tremendous impact that international trade and monetary factors were having on our people. We have since come to learn the difficulty of achieving universally approved corrective action. And now we must reckon with this reality: U.S. negotiators are preparing to enter economic talks next fall that could shape future international relationships for many years to come. Our government can and should strive in these talks to put an end to present attitudes and trends that point ominously to another "balkanization" of world trade.

It can and should seek agreement to reduce, and if possible end, all tariffs on industrial trade by the end of this century.

It can and should try to create far freer trade conditions for farm products.

It can and should seek the harmonization among nations of the present hodgepodge of non-tariff trade barriers and preferences.

But these objectives will remain forlorn hopes unless our negotiators can go into these hard bargaining sessions with the clear backing of the American people and their Congress. We <u>must</u> give them that.

Spurring Internal Transition to Successful Competitive Enterprise

Meanwhile, we face and must do something about the undeniable tolls and grievances resulting from

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Computer Art: The Search Beyond Manipulation

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"Computer arts are still in the highly experimental stage of emergence."

In present computer art, the naive onlooker could readily misconstrue that mathematical processing of data and manipulation of design represent the total modus operandi of this new form, rather than just the initial phases of exploration. A review of the varied computer arts reveals diverse input of patterns and subsequent manipulation or transformation, creating a series of new, perceptual audio or visual images. There appears a similarity of approaches and some variation of the techniques utilized by practitioners of the cybernetic arts: graphics, sculpture, film, dance, music, textile design, weaving, poetry, and architecture.

There is a tendency to forget that the computer arts are still in the highly experimental stages of emergence, and although some attractive and very pleasing works have been accomplished, this new medium has generally not progressed much beyond its mathematical and scientific origins. At times, in viewing or hearing the output of the computer arts, one would relegate the resultant art form to the category of interesting sound or visual patterns, experimental/initial exercises, or mathematical and scientific visualization, rather than as works of art per se. (This latter statement is equally true of contemporary manual experimental art.) There is, at the present time, a tendency for the computer arts to relate to an elite coterie, made up of scientists and intellectuals, rather than the public at large. However, as this new art medium is given greater space in the mass media, this audience should enlarge greatly, as exposure acquaints the general audience with the potential of this new art form.

This article is reprinted by permission from the *Proceedings of the Invitational International Exhibit of Computer Arts*, T-5, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, June-July 1973. Grace C. Hertlein is Assistant Professor in the Computer Science Department at California State University—Chico, Chico, Calif. 95926. Her computer art has been published for many years in *Computers and Automation* and currently some of her computer art is being exhibited at an art exhibition in Bordeaux, France.

Pattern Manipulation

Manipulation of design by the computer may be deliberate, (or at times highly experimental) as change or transformation of the original pattern is achieved via a host of techniques developed within the past twelve years. However, in attempting to see precedent in manipulation of design, one observes ample evidence of a growing interest by artists and critics in combining (manually) mathematics and art. Since the turn of the century, such techniques and philosophy have been practiced and even more verbally expressed by electronic and concrete musicians. Further, the concept of pattern manipulation is as old as man's art, and one finds ample evidence of this concept throughout art history. A few such examples are: Offset X/Y patterns in Persian sculptural reliefs; repetitions of design in serial imagery from early Greek vases; reversals of pattern in the compositions of Bach; mirror images and mathematical progressions of design in the Foundation Course exercises of the Bauhaus School; juxtaposition and superposition of musical patterns throughout musical history; and randomization of musical variations via throwing of dice, as practiced by Mozart. The world was quite ready philosophically and mathematically for further explorations in such transformation of pattern, yet it was not until the speed of the computer afforded this electronic manipulation, that it became feasible to such a degree. (Alteration, change, and transformation of pattern is revealed in other technological systems that may or may not use the computer as an aid in creation: synthesized video, sound, and the film.) In other words, science and technology now afford further exploration of ideas and techniques that have been practiced by experimental artists for years.

The philosophy and practice of twentieth century music shows a very great similarity between the manipulative techniques used by musicians since the early 1900's and the present-day computer procedures. Examination of the philosophy of the Bauhaus and study of the works emanating from this revolutionary school, also reveals great similarities in the approaches to creation, and in the final works of art of this school and present-day computer arts.

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The computer artist is manipulating patterns, because this is an inherent potential of the computer medium. The manual artist (or scholar), by contrast, is bound to laborious manual processing of data and pattern, and thus generally discovers to a lesser degree, further sources of innovative and perceptual changes, i.e., manipulation as practiced in the computer arts is not feasible manually. When perceptual change is accomplished manually (many of the works in Graphis afford excellent examples), such change is not only excessively time-consuming, but represents a manual tour de force. It could be more readily accomplished via the computer.

The manual artist is generally not concerned with perceptual change or alteration of the original image. On the other hand, since the computer readily affords such changes, the cybernetic artist may literally exploit component designs, taking them through what may appear to be unlimited design changes. The more abstract the component design, the more readily it lends itself to mathematical variation and processing, termed design state variation.

Design State Variation

This is a term devised by the writer, adapted from given "state" variations used in printmaking, in which one may revise a plate or stone, and alter it by additions and/or changes of pattern, resulting in a series of new works. The term denotes known variations of pattern that are possible, which may be used as sub-routines or stored on the computer library and merely called by the user, who defines the values of the given parameters of the specific algorithms being utilized. One of the most provocative concepts emerging in computer art is that of being to literally predict innumerable design state variations, in which a basal component will be visually or auditorially pleasing. The artist may use only those design states that reflect personal expression of design. (One might compare design state variations to the many kinds of chisels the sculptor may use in execution of a work of art, each giving unique effects.) Further, this library of manipulative design state variations is constantly being enlarged by experimenters in the computer arts. A brief listing follows:

- Offsets of pattern on the X, Y, X/Y (progressions in music)
- Mirror images or reversals on the X, Y, X/Y
- Scalar variations or duration of pattern in superposition of form
- Rotation, in open or closed forms
- Irregular radiation of images and forms with growing scalar values
- Redundant serial imagery in closed form
- Polygon serial imagery, with circular, square, or varied final form
- Positive and negative variations of repeated or design-related patterns
- Disintegrating variants of images and sounds in redundant or transform pattern
- Metamorphic variations of images or sounds in predetermined sequences
- Transformations of pattern, in which one design becomes another
- Alterations of design by mathematical algorithms
- Pseudo-randomizations of patterns with artist-imposed parameters
- Overlays of images and sounds in dimensional forms
- Combinations of related patterns, using any of the above design states
- Multi-media combinations, using any of the aforementioned

Prior to design state variation, the artistic idea is stated in coherent, sequential steps. It may be flow-charted before translation into a computer program. Thus the art idea is transformed into analyzed data, using synthetic machine languages, and is then subject to processing and manipulation via the computer using design state variations, revealing innumerable new, final works. Examples include:

- The warp and weft patterns in weaving
- Classical ballet positions, with designations of the head, arms, and feet
- Structural modules in sculpture and architecture
- Derivations of design from art or musical history, including the archaic, the classical, or the contemporary
- Formulae and transformations from science or mathematics
- Stylistic analysis of a given artist's style, with designation and statement of a specific set of definitions describing the style
- Artistic composition of a given musical era, with parameters of such rules

Thus the art idea is initially expressed in the manner of science, but it does not end there. The choice of the art idea or problem should express the personal philosophy of the originator, whether it is mathematical formulae, natural derivations from the environment, or analyses of prior styles of artists. The personal focus of the original idea, ensuing variation and execution cannot be too strongly stressed! The design state variations allow the artist to choose the given direction of psychic expression. Further, selection of specific computer systems and art materials affords a highly individual element within cybernetic creation. And lastly, the varying techniques of execution, which may be preplanned or participant, add a unique and personal opportunity to spontaneously participate within the formation of the work of art, or to maximize the capacities of the computer in artistic execution, using preplanned or heuristic modes.

Diverse Philosophies of Computer Art

Stylistic analysis and resultant design derivation are highly visible in the computer arts and possess decided benefits: these techniques allow one to analyze more thoroughly the subject under study, and in addition, they allow the artist to gain perceptual variations and permutations of the original source not obtainable by manual methods. (The writer and many others have often found these newdepartures from the design source to be as or more aesthetic than the original input source.) There is, however, a great tendency among humanists to concern themselves with past styles and subject matter, as being more "pure" aesthetically than the present. On the other hand, there is an equal tendency among scientists to exploit mathematical manipulation, disregard art totally, and to have the computer and its peripheral devices accomplish the work of art, without intervention by man. Here one finds two extremes, with beginning dogmatic statements by artists of varying capacities and philosophies. The insightful computer artist, however, seeks to unite personal philosophy and expression with the highest level of computer usage.in a statement of artistic unity. However, one is conscious of new visions emerging throughout history, which are subsequently categorized and "cast in bronze," as "the way." Computer art appears to be no exception to this great

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Computers in Science Fiction — II

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"In science fiction writing, non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use."

In "The Computer and the Poet," Norman Cousins emphasizes that the role of poets, "those who have respect for and speak to the human spirit," becomes even more important as computer usage increases (32). Science fiction writers should indeed be included as poets in our technological age. All too often in our society, problems arising from technology are left to technologists because others are too unsure of their own knowledge to question or criticize. The science fiction writings directly involving computers are one of the few places where non-specialists attempt to involve other non-specialists in the human questions arising from computer use.

Emphasis on Man

Perhaps the most recurrent science fiction theme is the difference between computers and man. These raise the question of the proper role for machines versus the proper role for humans or emphasize the aspects that make man unique. In one story (Asimov, "Someday") children in a society where reading and writing are no longer needed form a secret society to learn just for the joy of it; in another (Weir, "What Happened to the Teaching Machine") where all learning is by machine, only uneducated children still know how to pose questions. A super-computer is defeated by a human because he can bluff or "lose to win" and it cannot (Caiden, The God Machine); another super-computer is robbed of its control because of a group of humans whose main desire is freedom (Pohl, Starchild); and to others (Dick, "The Variable Man"; Sheckley, "Fool's Mate") human unpredictability continues to be a problem. This distinctive aspect of man is very directly stated by the computer builder in a French science fiction story (Boulie, "The Perfect Robot"). In trying to make the computer more like man, he progressively adds to its ability to deal with data, the ability to play chess, language, concepts of love, the ability to engender new machines, concepts of good and evil, and finally what he considers to be the crucial missing element — "I have unhinged them". Mike, a super-computer capable of running an entire revolution (Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress), cannot understand why a joke is funny, and the computer AM (Ellison, "I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream") hates people because unlike them "he could not wander, he could not wonder, he could not belong, he could merely be".

Science fiction writers persist in confronting their readers with a question that receives little direct discussion but is of current concern. As expressed by the historian Bruce Mazelish (33), just as continuities were established with the material universe, the animal kingdom, and our subconscious, we are faced with transcending the 4th discontinuity — of harmonizing our existence and those of machines in a technological society. Or, as expressed by Weizenbaum ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society") the insights of science such as those provided earlier by the work of Galileo, Darwin, and Freud, and now provoked by the advent of the computer, shake man's self-esteem because, when viewed superficially, they seem to diminish man.

Mechanistic View of Man

We diminish man and in our anxiety grow more disdainful of ourselves and ambivalent towards computers if computer usage is predicated on a mechanistic view of man and this mechanistic view becomes our self-image. Too many statements made by systems analysts or computer scientists display that a computer-usable view of man is being substituted for the whole man. Keep in mind the above list of human attributes contrasted to computers by science-fiction writers as you read the following statement from the widely read and much discussed book Limits of Growth written by well-motivated systems analysts:

> Some considered the model too 'technocratic' observing that it did not include critical social factors, such as the effects of adoption of different value systems. The chairman of the Moscow meeting summed up this point when he said, 'Man is no mere biocybernetic device'. This criticism is readily admitted. The present model considers man only in his material system because valid social elements simply

could not be devised and introduced in this first effort. Yet, despite the model's material orientation, the conclusions of the study point to the need for fundamental changes in the values of society. (34, p. 191)

Admission that the world model has a minor flaw of omitting "critical social factors" followed so blithely by conclusions about fundamental value changes surely conveys to the reader that the factors that have been dealt with are the more essential and more significant.

Again recall the human attributes as you read:

> By the same token since the thinking human being is also an information processor, it should be possible to study his processes and their organization independently of the details of the biological mechanisms — the 'hardware' that implement them. (Simon and Newell, "Information-Processing in Computers and Man", p. 256)

That the theories

> . . . are mechanistic — that they postulate only the processes capable of being effected by mechanism — is guaranteed by simulating the behavior predicated by ordinary digital computers. (ibid. p. 258)

To reemphasize the contribution of science fiction, let us trace through one well-written and popular book, Stand on Zanzibar (Brunner). In the 21st century over-populated world, there is a very advanced computer Shalmaneser owned by General Technic, a company large enough to be contemplating the subsidization, modernization, and management of a small underdeveloped country Beninia. Beninia is unique since it alone has retained peacefulness and trust and humane behavior. Computer analysis is undertaken of the feasibility of the G.T. project and for alternative plans of carrying it out. With regard to the possibility of computer analysis of what makes Beninia attractive, one sensitive character in the book says " ... when they get love down to a bunch of factors you can analyze with a computer, there'll be nothing left of whatever makes it worth being human". Shalmaneser eventually rejects the data on Beninia because it is inconsistant with reality. Mulligan, a cynical sociologist, gets the computer to process the data by adding the additional assumption that an unknown force is active in that population. Mulligan points out that the scientists who have been working toward consciousness for the super-computer have been successful because the rejection of the data was a display of its first human characteristic — "orneriness" or "bloody-mindedness". When faced with something different, it chose to reject it instead of broadening its view of the possible. Mulligan sets out to find what makes Beninia different and traces it to a genetic mutation which produces a body odour that surpresses in others the territorial-aggression reaction. Mulligan's hope is that a world-renowned biologist who is working on modification of human genetic maps can use this to better mankind. His hope is shattered when he learns that this biologist has been murdered for political reasons. The decision is that the machine will work on finding an external synthetic spray. Mulligan is led away crying for lost humanity " ... what in God's name is it worth to be human, if we have to be saved from ourselves by a machine?" The now conscious machine has the last word and the last sentence of the book "Christ, what an imagination I've got". The irony of the book is that Mulligan, who represents and speaks for those characteristics which are human, falls into another part of the prevalent mechanistic trap — aggression is in our genes; the solution to our problems will be via a specific scientific breakthrough.

Superstates and Sypersystems

A concern for the use of computers in politics and government is seen in numerous stories. Opinion polling in a political campaign is involved in The 480 (Burdick), and the writing of campaign literature in The Novel Computer (Escarpit). The prediction of elections is carried to an extreme in "Franchise" (Asimov) where only one vote is needed to determine the election, and Counterfeit World (Galouye) describes an entire synthetic society (an "electromathematical model") made up for purposes of opinion surveying. Of greater concern, however, are the super-states dependent on or replaced by super-computer systems. Many of these stories describe the process by which men gradually gave away self-determination in exchange for material well-being, or in the belief that a larger something was needed to protect them from each other (Anderson, "Sam Hall"; Cole, The Funco File; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix; Pohl, Starchild). Often, no one really understands any longer how the system works (Cameron, Cybernia; Cole, The Funco File; Delany, The Fall of the Towers; Dick, Vulcan's Hammer; Fairman, I, the Machine; Mason, Matrix). In most cases, the vast destructive power of the system is realized when, for some reason, it is no longer serving human ends. One computer overemphasizes the goal of protecting itself (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer), one gets carried away by its goal of avoiding thermo-nuclear war (Cardin, The God Machine), two become lonely and hence mad (Fairman, I, the Machine; Pohl, Starchild), another becomes psychotic because of what it learns from men's minds (Delany, The Fall of the Towers), others are under the control of selfish people (Cameron, Cybernia; Sladek, The Reproductive System). Most of these systems are destroyed by man's more flexible intelligence. However, in one story (Miller, "Dumb Waiter"), the system goes on even after there are no more people, and in another (Dick, "Autofac"), without the knowledge of the people.

Loss of Control

Some ten years ago when discussing views of computers in science fiction, I pointed out that few contemporary stories could be viewed simply as man's worries about his machines getting beyond his control. I noted that most of the stories focused on extensions of specific current uses and emphasized man's responsibilities as technology advanced (30, 31). While there are some stories in which computers turn on their makers (Dnieprov, "Siema"), the stories just cited have two significantly different characteristics. The stories do not begin with the construction of a machine motivated by curiosity or scientific naivetée, but instead, they begin with the populace agreeing to control by the machine. We read, for example, that in 1993 after a large world war, all nations agree to "subordinate themselves in a realistic manner ... to a common supranational authority ..." which is a machine so that it won't put "interest over reason, emotion over logic" (Dick, Vulcan's Hammer p. 19); or that another machine is built to control the world because with stone axes men could be free as they could do only limited damage before they were stopped but with advanced technology men could do damage so much more quickly they cannot be free to start (Pohl, Starchild). In A Tale of the Big Computer (Johannesson), a history of life until the "computer age," we learn that man

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is a part of the evolution leading up to computers and that the basic cause of his failure was the inability to organize a complex society. In the very enjoyable Funco File (Cole), when the question is raised, "Has it become your ruler, your god ..."?, the response is, "Well, no. Not exactly. It's more like where our technology triumphs have finally got us to. I guess you might say our real ruler was always an idea of what's normal or not. Conformity, I guess you'd call it ... I suppose the Machine — plus the F.D.I. — working together — have sort of externalized it once and for all." In the stories where there is a struggle between man and the computer, it is not a struggle to retain control but to get it back once it has knowingly been given away or unwillingly allowed to slip away.

Consequences of Bigness

The persistent theme in these stories is that of Bigness — big states and big computer systems — and its consequences. This bigness is well described in an article by Weizenbaum. This article is important because it is one of the few expository statements of this serious theme.

> These often gigantic systems are put together by teams of programmers, often working over a time span of many years. By the time the systems come into use, most of the original programmers have left or turned their attention to other pursuits. It is precisely when gigantic systems begin to be used that their inner workings can no longer be understood by any single person or by a small team of individuals. ... This situation, which is now upon us, has two consequences: first that decisions are made on the basis of rules and criteria no one knows explicitly, and second that the system of rules and criteria becomes immune to change. ("On the Impact of the Computer on Society," pp. 612-613).

What is the effect of this situation on individuals and on society? Two side effects are discussed by Weizenbaum.

> First of course, there is the psychological impact on individuals living in a society in which anonymous, hence irresponsible, forces formulate the large questions of the day and circumscribe the range of possible answers. ... But even worse, since computer-based knowledge systems become essentially unmodifiable except in that they can grow, and since they induce dependence and cannot, after a certain threshold is crossed, be abandoned, there is an enormous risk that they will be passed from one generation to another, always growing. (Ibid., p. 613)

Computers Are Not Gadgets

The reader may argue the degree to which these side effects are already present in our society, but, if he reads sicence-fiction, he cannot ignore them. While the first theme of the differences of man and machines may be the most repeated, this second theme is probably the most important. The science-fiction writers maintain their importance as poets of the "computer revolution" by redirecting our attention from the computer as "gadget" to the computer as an integral part of the modern configuration of government-academe-industry-management which shares skills, resources, techniques, personnel, and goals. Just as our image of the scientist has changed from the man standing lonely vigil over a bubbling retort to prove his scorned hypothesis, the isolated computer with a programmed quirk, asked the wrong question or fed the wrong data, is no longer hero. Frankenstein's monster, or the more recent, Karl, Emmy, and Siema, for example, are very limited creations with identifiable creators, circumscribed environments, and restricted effects. We now have instead Shalmaneser, Project 79, Vulcan 3, Allied Mastercomputer, or simply, The Machine. The new computer-hero has remote access, varied input and output devices, processes large amounts of data supplied by different agencies, works in real-time, makes policy decisions based on quasi-mathematics, commands vast resources, and affects large numbers of people.

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Binger — *Continued from page 17*

our world trade. These weights must be removed and this need must be attended to by Congress and ourselves. We must endorse, broaden and actively support the steps that adjustment assistance can take to alleviate human distress, cushion the impact of change and spur internal transition to successful competitive enterprise.

When we become more familiar with the great influence wielded by exports and the creative capabilities of companies that operate in many lands, we will do a lot more to overcome, where they exist, the penalties we pay for the benefits we enjoy. I firmly believe this.

If I have reminded you of both the pluses and minuses that world trade produces, ask yourself how much of this your family knows and understands. See how skillful you can be in finding ways to make this vital topic really interesting to your family, your neighbors, your associates and the other thinkers, teachers and decision-makers in your community.

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CORRECTION

In the article "The Path to Championship Chess by Computer" by Professor Donald Michie published in the January 1973 issue of "Computers and Automation," the following corrections should be made:

Page 7, second column, third paragraph, lines 1 and 2: replace "the Rand Corporation mathematician" by "the professional philosopher".

Page 8, the chess position for Figure 1B should be:

1b



Page 9, the graph in Figure 2 should be as follows (containing one more connecting link):



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Once there was a Fox who lived on the lower slopes of Mt. Etna, the great volcano in Sicily. These slopes are extremely fertile; the grapes that grow there may well be the most delicious in the world; and of all the farmers there, Farmer Mario was probably the best. And this Fox longed and longed for some of Farmer Mario's grapes. But they grew very high on arbors, and all the arbors were inside a vineyard with high walls, and the Fox had a problem. Of course, the Fox of Mt Etna had utterly no use for his famous ancestor, who leaping for grapes that he could not reach, called them sour, and went away.

The Fox decided that what he needed was Engineering Technology. So he went to a retired Engineer who lived on the slopes of Mt. Etna, because he liked the balmy climate and the view of the Mediterranean Sea and the excitement of watching his instruments that measured the degree of sleeping or waking of Mt. Etna. The Fox put his problem before the Engineer. ...

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EDITORIAL

(an updated version of an editorial first printed May 1973)

Burying Facts and Rewriting History - II

One of the efforts of this magazine is to pursue truth.

One of the ways in which truth is pursued is not to let statements of the utmost importance be buried and forgotten in the pages of daily newspapers, nor unreported and lost because they are no longer well covered in national news magazines.

Among those statements are two of permanent interest in connection with the Watergate Caper (this phrase is establishmentese for "the Watergate Crime").

— The statement by Bernard L. Barker, one of the convicted operatives, which explains his motivation and background (see November 1972, *Computers and Automation*).

— The statement by Alfred Baldwin, 3rd, ex-FBI agent, an employee of the Republican Committee to Re-elect the President, telling what he did and saw while five men burglarized the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1972, about 2:30 a.m. (see December 1972, *C&A*).

In addition, we have published seven installments of reports on the Watergate Crime by our contributing editor, Richard E. Sprague (a computer professional of 25 years standing) who as an avocation has studied for many years dirty political operations in the United States, including the assassinations by conspiracies (not "lone assassins") of President John F. Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, and Reverend Martin Luther King.

Three years ago in May 1970, when we began to publish this type of article, we could not have spoken confidently of "the assassination by conspiracies" of two Kennedys and one King. But the articles we have published — which are listed and characterized on the following pages — have together a remarkable impact.

Taken together, the information published May 1970 to October 1973 in *Computers and Automation* effectively destroys a large segment of the beliefs, the rewritten history, that the establishment in the United States has arranged for people in the United States to believe. I do not assert that the establishment is a conscious organism or organization; perhaps the best description is this: a loose confederation of overt conspiracies, silent conspiracies, and biased wealthy persons, with very intelligent orchestration stemming from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Presidency, and with assists from organized crime and the Mafia.

We challenge any fairminded person to read this column (which may be ordered from us), and after reading them, to still believe that the assassinations are actually the actions of "lone psychopaths," instead of fitting together into a plan to install a certain kind of autocracy in the United States.

This kind of autocracy claims to be democratic, to stand up for "national security," "executive privilege," "separation of Constitutional powers," etc. It offers appearances of democracy, but it seizes the realities of money and power. It cuts programs of social benefit; but it allocates $80 billion a year to be paid to the military-industrial-Pentagon complex.

In the 1940's there was a name for this kind of autocracy. Its name was "fascism," effectively a dictatorship in the interests of big business. What is now appearing in the U.S. is "fascism" in the form of a dictatorship by the military-industrial complex.

Here in a nutshell is an example of the present uneven contest: it takes the form of two sentences in a report by E. Drake Lundell, Jr., in *Computerworld* for April 22, 1973:

- The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is "outmanned and outgunned" when it comes to prosecuting cases like the current action against IBM, Senate investigators were told last week.
- In addition, witnesses before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee stated that often the division cannot do its job properly because of political pressure from the White House. ...

These two statements contain a world of implications.

Essentially, the Department of the United States Government which is charged with enforcing certain U.S. laws against monopoly, can no longer properly function because of (1) the enormous power of just one business, IBM, and (2) political pressure from the White House (this phrase is establishmentese for "President Richard M. Nixon").

We must dig up facts, remember them, and write history the way it is.

We must take action to compel the persons who deceive us and lie to us to leave the government of the United States, such as Spiro Agnew, former Vice President.

Edmund C. Berkeley

The Watergate Crime

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* August 1972 to September 1973
Inventory of Titles, Authors, and Summaries

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Political Assassinations in the United States

Articles Published in *Computers and Automation* May 1970 to October 1973
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F. Irving Dymond, attorney for the defendant, in the February 1969 trial of Clay Shaw in New Orleans; Clay Shaw was charged by the grand jury with "having conspired with David W. Ferrie and Lee Harvey Oswald to murder President John F. Kennedy" — in regard to which the trial jury found Clay Shaw "not guilty".

Hertlein — *Continued from page 19*

human failing. Even the most broad-minded practitioner is bound by his or her capacities and philosophy, and it requires a deliberate and concerted effort to remain open-minded, and to appreciate varied approaches that are not in accord with one's own temporary aesthetic parameters. One discerns computer artists who prefer natural or man-made patterns and sounds, vs. those who desire only mathematics, electronic and computer sounds, sans the human touch. There are those who exploit two or three-dimensional static images, vs. the creators who prefer moving permutations in flux, declaiming that the computer is a perceptual medium, and therefore should not be imprisoned in static form, i.e., cybernetic art is "pure idea," ad infinitum. Ironically, even the newest of the arts appears destined to hardening within specific schools of thought, with separatist camps warring in "vs." expression and debate.

Summary

It is obvious that the concept of manipulation and processing via the computer is merely the first stage of cybernetic creation. Even now, far beyond the statements of the artistic problem and aesthetic, personal variation, is a vast, open territory that is being explored by questioning, hardy intellectual pioneers, as they seek to perceive the inner anatomy of art and philosophy:

What is style?
What constitutes the aesthetic? How may this be accomplished?
What is art? Music? Sculpture? Dance? Poetry?
What is science? Mathematics?
Is art purely the man-made: The sound of the human voice, or playing music upon man-made instruments? The painting and sculpting of man with hand-held tools?
Is art a part of life, embracing: The ordinary, the animal and natural sounds? The patterns carved by the winds, sands, and the water?
Is art perceptual, a mere fleeting moment or experience in time, or is it permanent, enduring?
What is the optimum role of man in a cybernetic society?
What is the role of art in a technology-oriented world?
What is the symbiosis of man-and-the-machine?
What is thinking?
What is creativity?
Is man the measure of all things?

When man uses the computer as an aid in creation, or when he attempts to create heuristic art, his mind finds new questions to explore and to answer. It appears highly possible that a renewed perception of life and the arts awaits present and future generations of man, and that this may be partially accomplished by eliminating the boundaries of compartmentalized disciplines, and by walking freely between art and science, by combining interdisciplinary practices and materials, to hopefully bring forth the ideal of an open, growing, and dimensional perception of art/life for the human race. □

Editor's Note: This paper is published in accordance with a new editorial policy of allowing writers freer expression, with no editing by the editors, in the hope that greater variety of expression and ideas will result for the benefit of readers.

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CORRECTION

In the July 1973 issue of Computers and Automation, a single article entitled "Communication — Three-Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer" was published. Part 1 was authored by Larry B. Dendy of the Public Relations Office of the University of Georgia and Part 2 was authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld et al of the University of Georgia and the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center of Emory University.

In compliance with the authors' wishes, the two parts of that article have been reprinted as two separate articles. The first article is authored solely by Larry B. Dendy and is titled, "Communication — Three Way: Chimpanzee, Man, Computer." The second article is authored by Ernst von Glasersfeld and his colleagues from the Yerkes Primate Research Center and Georgia State University and is titled, "A Computer Mediates Communication with a Chimpanzee." Also, and in compliance with the authors' wishes, all figures and tables of the article as published in the July 1973 issue have been included in the second of these articles.

In the 1973 annual index Computers and Automation will enter the two articles in this manner, which serves to separate a regular article from a formal scientific and technical report.

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Virtue, in Spite of Erroneous Conceptions

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"We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue (if the answer is yes) as doing-it."

In this article, I mean virtue in a much narrower sense than the theologians, and I mean erroneous conceptions in a much broader sense than planners of parenthood.

Let me first speak of virtue.

We think of knowledge as knowing how-to-do-it, wisdom as knowing whether-to-do-it, and virtue as doing it. In this sense, at least in the universities, we think of scientists as knowing, the humanists as wise, and the engineers and other technicians (doctors, nurses, social workers and the like) as virtuous, that is, the do-ers.

The World is Full of Problems

Now the world is full of problems where we need to know how to do it, whether to do it, and (if the answer is yes) to do it. Each of us can make his own list of pressing social problems: pollution, arms limitation, or population growth. Fortunately we are reasonably well supplied with scientists, humanists, and technicians. To understand why we still have these urgent problems, let us turn to erroneous conceptions.

The erroneous conceptions I wish to deal with here are:

That it is within the power of scientists and engineers to choose to work only on projects "in the public interest," and
That the market place is where one discovers the public interest.

Choice of Projects to Work on

Critics seem to assume that scientists and engineers are free to choose their projects, and complain that they fail to consider the real public interest. Scientists may be free to choose their work, but they have no more to say about how their discoveries are used than Christopher Columbus did.

As for the engineers, they have more to say about the uses of science, since they are the ones who choose which of science's ideas will be applied, but they in turn have almost no way, at present, of identifying the public interest, and even less in determining which products or processes should be produced to serve it.

A Moratorium on Science?

We will return to this matter of choice, but first let's eliminate from the list of reasonable alternatives facing society, the silly and dangerous notion of a moratorium on science.

The key notion in the moratorium idea is that if you can't control it, you shouldn't do it. Therefore, we are urged, don't do any more science until (presumably) the humanists devise suitable controls. The trouble with this kind of conceptual contraception is two-fold. In the first place, as Paul Saltman has pointed out eloquently, you can't forbid knowing any more than you can forbid writing poetry. Science can be slowed down, of course, by driving it underground, but even if we slowed it way down, there is no evidence that we have either knowledge or wisdom enough to control its application, unless we change some of our habits.

Ignorance and Fear Lead to Irrationality

One habit that needs correction has to do with the thinking and feeling processes of the humanists — the philosophers, if you will — who presumably are to show us how to behave. Too often they are ignorant or fearful of science and engineering. What one is ignorant or fearful of, he cannot deal with in a rational way. There is no possibility that we can learn to control what we do by some non-rational process, such as satori, using mystically-fashioned playing cards, etc. Control over what we do will

Based on remarks delivered on Joseph C. Wilson Day, November 10, 1972, at the University of Rochester, Rochester, N.Y.

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have to be done rationally. I also believe that it will have to be done by humanists, and that before they can do it, we have somehow to lower, or at least make more permeable, the barrier that separates the Two Cultures. We will come back to this point later. Before that, let us return to the notion that engineers choose what they will work on.

The Choices of Engineers

Most engineers do not make cosmic choices. They do not decide that this product will be built and that one won't be. Practically all engineers, I suspect, work for other engineers, who work for others, who work in companies where the products are determined not by science or philosophy, but by market analysis. Now market analysis has come a long way since the days of the Edsel,' and it often guesses accurately, although not always so, what the public is interested in buying. But what the public buys is not necessarily what it needs.

The Market-Place Guessing Game

We buy those things that are offered for sale that are better (in some vague way) than the alternatives available to us. Except for advertising or other ways of influencing public opinion, the basic mechanism of the market-place is a guessing game. Try this product, see if it sells. If it does, figure out what it was about it that sold, and push a little harder. If this one does not sell, retrench a little, or gamble on another change — and so on. Advertising and public opinion do play important roles — how else explain so many different labels on the same bar of soap, the same automobile? — but the decision as to how the engineers' skills will be used has, in the past, been largely determined by the instantaneous outcome of the market game.

Major Civil Problems

Now please do not misunderstand me. The market-place mechanisms are important for determining soap or automobile styles. I believe that criteria of risk-and-return of investment are elements of our decision-making processes that we could discard only at great peril to our society. What I am saying is that the major civil problems: pollution, poverty, and population density, for examples, are not likely to be defined by market analysis.

These problems, for which acceptable solutions are needed, share these characteristics:

First, they cross product classification lines, and involve more than one sector of the economy. They are not just problems of the auto industry, or the mining companies, or manufacturing-but-not-service-industries — they involve all of these. All the skills that all these sectors employ may have to be applied to these problems. The cement plants in the country and the transport companies in the city have pollution problems that differ only in detail. To expect them to do the necessary research and development separately, each with his eye on his own segment of the market, is to postpone until much too late, if not forever, solving even the smaller parts of our problems. The problems, so to speak, are too big.

These Problems are Hardly Separable

In the same way, the major civil problems are not readily separable. One can reduce the amount of air pollution caused by internal combustion engines by using electric autos, for example. If so, we may replace polluted air in the cities with polluted streams out in the country where the new massive power plants are. Or we can replace with solar energy the fissionable materials or fossil fuels we now use for power; however, at least in the near future, we would then have either much less energy or much more costly energy, and fewer jobs and more poverty. (Some among us tend to paint even blacker pictures. They point out that our society gave up slavery only when our technology developed to the point where machines were cheaper than slaves. Is it possible that we could deliberately reverse this process and end up with clean air, but with slaves?)

This characteristic of tight linkage, or inseparability of the big problems, also suggests that we cannot rely upon the ordinary market-place mechanisms to determine how we employ our technology to solve our problems.

Very Difficult Problems

The third characteristic of our problems that forces us to reconsider the mechanisms of choice, is that our problems are so very difficult. The technical solutions do not exist outside of social considerations. The social costs outweigh such usual factor costs as materials, labor, and capital. Our cities present much tougher problems than putting man on the moon. As someone smarter than but unknown to me, has said, "We couldn't have put a man on the moon if the moon had been inhabited".

World-wide and Nation-wide Problems

All these characteristics, and others that I've left out, such as geographical diversity — some problems are not local, nor even regional or national, but world-wide — suggest that the organizations needed for these new problem-solving teams differ considerably from those of even our biggest, most diversified companies, or else that we need some super-industrial team of coordinators, who are to be responsive not to the elements of the market-place, but rather to the public interest. Whether that public is regional, or national or world-wide, someone who has thought this problem further through must tell. My own thoughts, tempered by a certain sourly pragmatic view of the interactions of various national governments, suggests that the approach most likely to succeed in the near future is the national one.

The National Science Policy and Priorities Act

The essentials of a first step in a national plan are contained in the National Science Policy and Priorities Act, which, among other things, sets up procedures for contracting out to universities, companies and other organizations, the research and development necessary for solution of the major civil problems, including the design of civil science systems. Whether an agency like NASA should be set up, as the Act says, or whether an existing agency should supervise new programs, is a matter of debate. The importance to our discussion is that some federal funding agency, not the various product market-places, should establish the priorities and fund the solutions to our civil problems.

As you see, this bill or Act or plan makes a first approach to nationalizing the solution to national problems. At the same time it utilizes local

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collections of scientific, humanistic and engineering talent, that either already exist in the aerospace companies, universities and think tanks, or can be collected there. In essence, this bill solves one aspect of the problem. It replaces small or local or single-commodity market-places with a national market-place based on national needs. I suspect that the new agency will find that big aerospace companies usually do not have the necessary mix of talents, although they probably do have the necessary organization. The universities, on the other hand, probably do have the necessary mix of talents, but probably do not have the proper organization. It seems, however, to be a logical first step, and the sooner the bill becomes law, the sooner we can begin to solve our problems.

International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis

An example of the international approach is the recently established International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Vienna as a joint venture of our National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy, among others. Since they will operate on about three-and-a-half million dollars a year (the Civil Science part of the National Science Policy and Priorities Act allots an average of 270 million per year for three years) it is unreasonable to expect anything more than papers for publication to come out of Vienna. The international effort will result in more knowledge and wisdom; on the proposed national budget we could become virtuous as well.

In Order to be Virtuous One Must be Wise and Knowing

One final caution. I hope you have not heard me suggest that only scientists and engineers are capable of leading us out of the thicket of difficulties we are in. I am not advocating technocracy, that totalitarian philosophy which says that only engineers can lead us. I do not believe that for one moment, nor does anyone who knows enough engineers and scientists. There is no reason to believe that they, as a class, are any more capable of leading our people than, say, the lawyers.

I would rather that you heard me say that no longer is it virtue merely to do it, but rather that in order to be virtuous one must also be wise and also knowing.

Our Leaders Must Be Part Scientist, Part Humanist, and Part Engineer

We will need new kinds of agencies and organizations to define "the public interest" and to find ways of organizing the talents that may solve some of our problems. But organizations — universities and corporations and public agencies — are built by people, led by other people. So our leaders must be part scientist, part humanist, and part engineer, and they must use what they have, not in response to some particular market-place, but in the true public interest. Not nearly enough people will be born with these characteristics. They will have to be educated.

If this sounds like a very tall order to put to an education system — it is.

But we should be encouraged to redesign our education systems to help produce such people, not only because we have to (God knows we do) if mankind is too survive — but also because we know it is possible. □

NUMBLES

Neil Macdonald
Assistant Editor
Computers and Automation

A "numble" is an arithmetical problem in which: digits have been replaced by capital letters; and there are two messages, one which can be read right away and a second one in the digit cipher. The problem is to solve for the digits.

Each capital letter in the arithmetical problem stands for just one digit 0 to 9. A digit may be represented by more than one letter. The second message, which is expressed in numerical digits, is to be translated (using the same key) into letters so that it may be read; but the spelling uses puns or is otherwise irregular, to discourage cryptanalytic methods of deciphering.

We invite our readers to send us solutions, together with human programs or computer programs which will produce the solutions.

NUMBLE 7311

```
          I F Y O U
        x   G I V E
        -----------
        Y L U Y I T
      Y O T R U O         GV = CU
    E U E U U E
  T Y C U O R
  -----------------
= C T U I O U O V T       327897972
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Solution to Numble 7310

In Numble 7310 in the October issue, the digits 0 through 9 are represented by letters as follows:

O = 0	W = 5
I = 1	P = 6
E = 2	T = 7
S = 3	R = 8
H = 4	A = 9

The message is: Eat what is ripe.

Our thanks to the following individuals for submitting their solutions – to **Numble 7310**: Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J. – to **Numble 739**: Edward A. Bruno, N. Bergen, N.J.; T. P. Finn, Indianapolis, Ind. – to **Numble 738**: Nihan Lloyd-Thurston, S. Nutfield, Surrey, England.

Nixon and the Mafia — Conclusion

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"Organized crime will put a man in the White House someday, and he won't even know it until they hand him the bill."

— Ralph Salerno

Part 1 of "Nixon and the Mafia" was published in the September issue of "Computers and Automation"; Part 2, in the October issue. Part 3 begins here with further information about the relation of President-to-be Richard M. Nixon with shady transactions in the Bahamas.

Shakeup in the Bahamas

By the middle Sixties there was a storm brewing. Internal friction had forced out a few people like Lou Chesler, while a wave of public investigations were blaring the role of underworld figures like Meyer Lansky. The 1967 Royal Commission of Inquiry also dredged up another familiar name — Richard Nixon.

Testimony before the Royal Commission by Max Courteney, a Lansky lieutenant, detailed a long bookmaking career and brought out the names of a large clientele, including the then ex-Vice President Richard Nixon.

Mary Carter Paint

The Royal Commission also bared a deal which implicated Richard Nixon far more deeply than passing mention by an underground bookie.

In 1967 Lyndon Pindling became the first black premier ever to serve the almost one hundred percent black citizenry of the island. Pindling was hardly a revolutionary, however, for among the people instrumental in putting him in office was a gambler close to Lansky named Mike McLaney. The Royal Commission branded McLaney a "thoroughly dangerous person" and accused him of maneuvering Pindling into at least one deal involving a questionable gambling concession.

Part of the post-election controversy was a company based in Tampa which bore the innocuous name of "Mary Carter Paint Company".

In 1965 Lansky's front-man (and former Key Biscayne landowner) Wallace Groves, filed a joint application with the Mary Carter Company to open a casino on Paradise Island in the Bahamas. The ubiquitous Sir Stafford Sands handled the legalities. Knowledgeable observers looked for the mystery man, and a Justice Department memo, dated January 18, 1966, predicted that "the atmosphere seems ripe for a Lansky skim".

After Pindling's election, Groves was forced out and the Mary Carter Paint Company had itself two new casinos. At the 1967 opening of one of them — the Nassau Bay Club — the honored guest was Richard Nixon.

The following year — 1968 — the other Mary Carter Club, the Paradise Island Casino, opened for business. The owners felt close enough to Nixon to offer him use of their facilities during the 1968 Republican Convention. Nixon felt more comfortable at Key Biscayne, but some of his staff took up the offer.

Mary Carter Becomes Resorts International

In 1969 Mary Carter — now called Resorts International — reluctantly "released" one Dino Cellini, claiming that while he "had a relatively unsavory background, he had no criminal record, no criminal associates". Cellini hopped across the water to Miami, where, according to Dade County Sheriff Intelligence Reports, he continued to work in conjunction with Paradise Island Casino. The reports allege that Cellini was an almost daily visitor to Resorts International's Miami office, where he checked credits and worked with a company booking junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

There are those who maintain that Cellini's connections with Resorts International symbolize the influence of Lansky. In a 1971 editorial, the Las Vegas Sun concluded an eleven part series on organized crime — some of which centered on Resorts International — by charging that "however cloaked and cleverly concealed by the guardians, gambling in the Bahamas is controlled by Meyer Lansky and it has been established in police intelligence reports that the fee is fifteen percent of the gross income". The now defunct Toronto Telegram reported in 1970 that "observers believe that the resourceful Lansky is still managing to get his cut from the Bahamas".

Resorts International, through its ninety-one percent owned subsidiary, Intertel, has denied all allegations of involvement with organized crime. It

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was Intertel that ITT hired in 1972 to snoop on columnist Jack Anderson.

The latest and possibly most damaging charge in the Resorts International battle came in June 1972 in an IRS inspired indictment of Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini. The indictment reads in part:

> On or about May 17, 1968, unindicted co-conspirator Vincent Teresa met with defendants Meyer Lansky and Dino Cellini in Miami and had a discussion wherein defendants Lansky and Cellini gave Teresa permission to conduct gambling junkets to the Paradise Island Casino.

Thus government agents allege that in 1968 Lansky maintained at least some control in running junkets to Resorts International's Paradise Island Casino. The junket racket is an integral part of the casino operation, and as recently as 1971 Lansky's cohort Eddie Cellini was reportedly still arranging junkets for the Paradise Island Casino.

Enter Nixon and Rebozo

It was in 1967 — with Lansky still okaying junkets and Cellini still running the Paradise Island Casino — that Richard Nixon and Bebe Rebozo became friends with the head of Resorts International.

It should be no surprise that James Golden, the recently (1969) hired "deputy director of security" for Resorts International is a good friend of Nixon's. As a Secret Service guard for Nixon when he was Vice President, Golden made a good enough impression to be appointed staff security chief for Nixon in 1968. Golden was also security director of Nixon's convention headquarters in Miami that year, and was security director for his subsequent inauguration. Later that year he moved to Resorts International. Golden is just one of a long string of interesting Nixon security appointees, among them Watergate indictees James McCord, Gordon Liddy, and Howard Hunt.

There are rumors, some of which have been aired in the press, that Richard Nixon owns stock in Resorts International. Former Republican Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey does own stock in the company, and, according to organized crime investigator Hank Messick among others, there are reports of Lansky buying stock as well. Nobody has proved anything one way or another about the stock connections, but that Nixon is connected to Resorts International, at least through Golden, is indisputable.

Perhaps more disquieting than rumors of Nixon stock ownership in an underworld holding company for Bahamian casinos are the reports of his meddling in Bahamian affairs. In 1969 a proposed tax increase on gambling profits to provide money for Bahamian schools was slashed in half by the Minister of Finance. The Minister refused to explain the cut, and told opposition members to "use your imagination" for an explanation.

The advice was taken literally by some Bahamian papers who speculated that pressure came from "outside sources connected with casinos". One Bahamian paper asked openly if "a telephone call from the White House was not responsible?"

Whereas our investigation into Cuban politics brought evidence to light possible violations of the Neutrality Act, we now have the possibility of an American President who has spent a significant amount of his vacation time in the Bahamas also meddling in the affairs of that country.

Richard Nixon, a man with both visible and invisible links to the underworld and politics of pre-Castro Cuba, turns up in the Bahamas with very similar links, bringing some big names along with him.

Enter William Rogers

Two men with histories both in Bahamian politics and in the finances of organized crime have made frequent use of the legal services of a firm whose most prominent partner is Richard Nixon's old friend William P. Rogers, one-time Secretary of State.

The two men are Mike McLaney, charged by the Royal Commission in 1967, and a business cohort of his named William Colusardo. McLaney and Colusardo were investigated in 1967 by the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with a blueberry plantation that McLaney sold to a company controlled by Colusardo. The subsequent corporate jugglings implicated (among others) newly elected Bahamian Premier Lyndon Pindling. Among Colusardo's "favors" for Pindling were the use of his airplane during the election campaign, and a $127,000 contribution in the form of an "interest payment". The law firm that defended McLaney and Colusardo against the SEC was that of William P. Rogers. Rogers had been a close friend and political associate of Nixon's for twenty-five years. He accompanied Nixon on many of his Bahamian jaunts and also made frequent stops with him at the Key Biscayne Inn and Villas. In addition to being an "R & R" sidekick, Rogers was the man Nixon turned to for counsel amidst his personal crises in the Checkers affair and Eisenhower's serious heart attack.

Rogers served the Eisenhower/Nixon team for eight years in the Department of Justice, first as Deputy Attorney General, and then, by 1957, as Attorney General. The Justice Department's record against organized crime in the years following the Kefauver Commission was lackluster, to say the least. It was Rogers who personally rejected the recommendations of the specially constituted Wessell Committee on organized crime set up in the wake of the infamous Appalachian raid in upstate New York that revealed a Mafia summit conference. The Committee's proposals for a concentrated and coordinated war on organized crime were only implemented some years later by Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

A footnote in the Justice Department files was a report by IRS Special Agent Josph Delfine, dated October 19, 1953. The IRS recommended to the Justice Department that "criminal proceedings be instituted against Meyer Lansky in the Southern Judicial District of New York for the willful attempt to defeat and evade a large portion of his income taxes for the years 1945 and 1947 under section 145b of the Internal Revenue Code". The Justice Department — with William Rogers second in command at the time — respectfully declined to prosecute.

Lums Hot Dogs

Upon leaving his post as Attorney General in 1960, Rogers became a member of the New York firm of Royal, Koegel and Wells. In 1969, with its leading partner about to become Secretary of State, Royal, etc. moved with its clients wholeheartedly into the world of gambling casinos and organized crime.

A year later Royal took on the account of the Miami-based hot dog chain, Lums Inc. What did a hot dog chain have to offer a prestigious New York law firm? The answer may lie in where the firm took its client.

In 1969 Lums purchased the Ceasar's Palace Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas for $60,000,000. A month later the Nevada state gambling authorities were looking into the hotels' "catering to twelve underworld figures from Kansas City".

A few months after the purchase the SEC filed suit charging Lums and Ceasar's Palace with "false and misleading" statements. The SEC wondered how Ceasar's managed to lose $1,000,000 in five months when the previous year (before Lums bought in) there was a $2,200,000 profit for a comparable time period.

The SEC also questioned Lums concerning the $3,500,000 Lums paid one Jerome Zarowitz, a convicted professional sports fixer who wasn't even listed as an owner of the casino. Top officials in both Ceasar's and Lums have been under investigation by IRS intelligence in Miami and by Nevada gaming authorities in cases involving organized crime ever since Rogers' firm took on the Lums account.

There is also the question of the 1971 Lums acquisition of a North Miami housing resort development called Sky Lakes. Both Sky Lakes and Ceasar's Palace have received large sums of money from the Teamsters — $12,000,000 for the Miami project and more than $16,000,000 for Ceasar's Palace.

With things going slowly, Lums announced plans for a new $22,000,000 casino next door to Ceasar's Palace. In December of 1971 the company decided that the whole restaurant idea was no longer worth the trouble. In a classic climax to a classic American success they changed their name to Ceasar's World Inc. and sold their hot dog stands.

Meanwhile the Secretary of State's old law firm reaped a bundle with their new-found involvement in the Las Vegas underworld. With such stunning successes at home, one wonders what a firm with a link to the Secretary of State could do abroad, in places like the Bahamas or Vietnam, for example.

Nor do the underworld implications of big names surrounding Nixon end with the Secretary of State. Murray Chotiner, a long-time Nixon aide and architect of his early smear campaigns, has past links to the underworld. In 1962 Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson wrote that "Chotiner ... besides representing the top gangster of Philadelphia, Marco Reginelli, represented a long and amazing list of hoods, concession peddlers, income tax violators and others needing influence in high places ..." It was Chotiner who brought Frank Vitale, "once involved in the biggest bootlegging conspiracy on the West Coast," onto Nixon's special plane to Moscow in 1959.

Nixon's recent appointment of Walter Annenberg as Ambassador to England also echoes the themes of underworld involvement. Annenberg and his father were indicted in 1939 for "aiding and abetting" in connection with their wire service operation in Chicago, an operation run with the protection of Al Capone, for which the Annenbergs paid $1,000,000. The Annenberg family was also a major contributor to Nixon's 1968 election campaign.

Further back in the Nixon saga, and closer to his southern California birthplace, lies San Diego financier, C. Arnholdt Smith and his bookmaker partner John Alessio. In 1946 Alessio and Smith introduced Nixon to another bookmaker named Lew Lipinsky. Lipinsky, who was convicted for bookmaking in 1938, served for three decades as a go-between for the Smith/Alessio interests to their syndicate connections.

Some of the dealings of the Smith/Alessio combine were brought to national prominence by a recent LIFE magazine article which accused Attorney General Richard Kleindienst of "tampering with justice" in a case involving Alessio. According to the Wall Street Journal, Smith raised $1,000,000 for Nixon's 1968 campaign. He and his wife took the first position on the receiving line behind the President at the White House inauguration.

More of the Same in California

Nixon's other favorite resting place besides Key Biscayne is the area near his birthplace in southern California. Here the underworld pattern of his Florida involvements repeats itself — in a strikingly similar pattern.

One story there involves Nixon's multi-millionaire backer, C. Arnholdt Smith, and the Del Charro Hotel in La Jolla, just north of San Diego.

The Del Charro was a favorite stopover for Nixon in the Fifties. Owned by the Murchison brothers, who also owned the nearby Del Mar race track, the hotel played host to numerous Detroit and Las Vegas gangsters. Alan Witwer, a former manager of the hotel, has alleged in statements to this reporter and others that the hotel served as a secret meeting place for politicians and assorted business interests, some of them from the underworld. Witwer specifically cited a 1954 meeting attended by Nixon and chaired by a leading member of ITT. He also claimed that there was a bookmaking operation at the hotel, but has offered no documented proof.

Mrs. C. Arnholdt Smith is a permanent resident of the Del Charro, and the hotel's visitors have included John Connally, Barry Goldwater, and J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover's $15,000-a-year bills were picked up by the stockholders of the Murchison interests.

The fact that certain of Hoover's good friends rubbed elbows, rather warmly, with Meyer Lansky, and the fact that the nation's leading crime fighting agency — the FBI — has come up almost blank in its fight against organized crime may not prove anything about Hoover. On the other hand, these facts don't make it any easier to dismiss questions which might arise about the influence of organized crime at the highest levels of government.

North of the Del Charro and thirty miles south of the San Clemente White House, lies the mammoth La Costa land resort development. The development is tied to both Smith (his daughter is a director) and to the Teamsters.

LaCosta was originally developed by Cleveland syndicate reliables Allard Roen and Moe Dalitz. The development was reorganized in 1968 to bring Teamster control more in line with their investments, which already exceeded $18,000,000. Like Sky Lakes, its Florida counterpart, La Costa attracts a whole range of figures from organized crime. La Costa visitors have included Willie "Ice Pick" Alderman, a St. Louis mob cohort Morris Shenker, and Wallace Groves and Lou Chesler of Bahamas fame.

According to eyewitnesses, when Groves' helicopter sets down, the red carpet is rolled out. It may be because Groves bought a home in La Costa, but more likely it's because, as government agents put it, "where Groves appears, Meyer Lansky will not be far behind".

Another mob frequenter of the La Costa development is Jake Arvey, an organizer of the Republic

National Bank in Miami, the bank through which Bernard Barker channeled funds for the Watergate crime.

The Teamsters Again

A recent visitor to La Costa was Frank Fitzsimmons, a key to Nixon's new-found support in organized labor. Fitzsimmons is president of the Teamsters Union. This summer he stopped in La Costa on his way to see Nixon at San Clemente. Fitzsimmons had just come from dinner in Detroit with a local Mafia figure and soon after his Detroit-La Costa-San Clemente excursion, Fitzsimmons announced his support for Nixon. One wonders whether the Teamster decision to stay on the Pay Board and to support Nixon is somehow related to what the Detroit Free Press has been hinting strongly as of late: that the administration has stopped prosecution of Frank's son Richard Fitzsimmons — the business partner of a Detroit mobster — on charges of missing union funds, in exchange for Teamster support of the Republican President.

Whatever deals Nixon and Fitzsimmons did make, the Teamsters have a long working relationship with organized crime. Their marriage goes back over twenty years, where Jimmy Hoffa was introduced to the Detroit underworld by Paul Dorfman, in exchange for some multi-million dollar insurance business. Dorfman's son, Paul, has residences at both Sky Lakes and La Costa and was recently convicted of taking kickbacks on a Teamster loan.

The Teamster tradition of labor racketeering and corruption made for a ready alliance with the mob. Early government investigations of the Teamsters, such as the Bobby Kennedy-led McClellan Permanent Committee on Investigations, centered on labor racketeering. As Attorney General, Kennedy continued his pursuit of the Teamsters and their boss, Jimmy Hoffa. At one point Kennedy had twenty-nine grand juries simultaneously investigating Hoffa's activity — one of which led to a conviction for mail fraud and jury tampering.

.In 1969, two Oakland Tribune reporters concluded a six-month investigation with the charge that "the $628,000,000 Teamsters Central States, Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund headquartered in Chicago, has become a bankroll for some of America's most sinister underground figure".

Nowhere does the relationship between this fund and the mob surface more dramatically than in Las Vegas, where Teamster trustees have approved loans between $50 and $70,000,000, some shakily secured by second mortgages and subordinated notes. A high-ranking Federal official has commented that "the Teamster fund is a sort of open bank to people well-connected in Las Vegas and well-connected to organized crime".

It was Hoffa's desire "to have [his] own bank in every city" that brought on the Teamster takeover of the Miami National Bank. The Bank in turn is just one of a long list of ventures, suchas Ceasar's Palace, Sky Lakes, La Costa, Worldwide Realty, International Airport Hotel Systems, Truesdale Estates, in which Teamster money amounting to over $60,000,000 figures prominently alongside the social and business partners of Richard M. Nixon — a line of investments that leads from Nixon's three White Houses to a Federal clemency for Jimmy Hoffa and back to organized crime.

The current head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division saw enough evidence in 1967 to say that he "knew for a moral certainty [that] in the upper echelons there is an amalgamation between the Cosa Nostra and the Teamsters Union". In 1971, when a Federal Grand Jury probing the activities of Meyer Lansky questioned Jimmy Hoffa, many wondered whether the links between the two giants were more direct than the numerous transactions between mutual friends.

A few months after his testimony, Hoffa was granted clemency after serving less than five years of his thirteen-year sentence. The freeing of Hoffa and three co-defendents of the 1963 wire fraud pension case is the latest and most crucial event in Nixon's longstanding friendship, a friendship with some clear public benefits for both. Jack Anderson documents, for example, that as early as 1960, then Vice-President Nixon and Attorney General Rogers intervened to halt an indictment against Hoffa in exchange for Hoffa's support in the 1960 election.

ANICO — More of the Same in Texas

In recent years the Teamster fund has been superseded by a giant Texas insurance company as a major source of finance for Las Vegas casinos tied to the mob. The company is the American National Insurance Company (ANICO) of Galveston, Texas. ANICO is close to the heart and pocketbook of the two ranking Texans in the Nixon administration — former Treasury Secretary John Connally and former Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson.

As well as floating more than $40,000,000 to Las Vegas casinos and $13,000,000 to premier mob attorney Morris Shanker, ANICO has made loans to two Florida companies close to Richard Nixon — $1,750,000 in 1966 to the Mary Carter Paint Company, and $3,000,000 in 1970 to a subsidiary of Worldwide Realty.

That year a group of disenchanted stockholders filed a multi-million-dollar suit, charging ANICO officials with having taken control of the company and using it as a private preserve as well as a source of funds for the mob.

The defendants in the suit hired Nixon's New York firm to handle the case. Connally's Houston law firm has also been used by ANICO. The First National Bank of Houston, of which Connally was a director and in which some of his law partners were officers, has provided an interest-free account of more than $1,000,000 for ANICO. Connally was also a director of a savings association which was purchased recently by ANICO.

Will Wilson was "general" of the Justice Department's "war" on crime from 1969-1971. He was head of the Criminal Division until October 1971, when his resignation was forced by disclosures tying him to the scandal-rocked financial empire of Texas wheeler-dealer Frank Sharp. Wilson has been charged by dissident ANICO stockholders of helping to drag ANICO into the twilight zones of finance with such deals as the 1963 absorption of a defaulted $450,000 mortgage held by Sharp. Sharp's attorney and "financial advisor" on the deal was Will Wilson.

While Attorney General of Texas, Wilson sued the foundation which controlled ANICO to bring three new trustees onto the foundation's board of directors. Wilson has no visible ties to the new trustees, whose votes were instrumental in shaping the company's new financial course. But dissident stockholders have charged that the "negotiations" that

brought on the shift of control in the foundations were handled by a Galveston law firm linked to the mob. The stockholders also claim that John Connally played a role in these negotiations, albeit a "backstage" role. The ANICO case is part of a long history of Wilson's involvement with the Galveston underworld.

When he came to the Justice Department in Washington, Wilson discovered the organized crime division looking into the affairs of ANICO. Since then there have been no indictments in the case and there are reports that Wilson had the ANICO files locked safely in his personal office. One source of those reports is Stewart Hopps, a former Justice Department investigator.

Some serious conflict-of-interest charges concerning ANICO remain:

- The officers of ANICO who were later represented by Nixon's law firm, made a loan to a company whose top officers are long-time friends of Nixon.
- The criminal division of the Justice Department has been headed by a man with direct links in a company the division is supposedly investigating.
- The company also has clear ties to Nixon's former Treasury Secretary, a man mentioned for the Vice-Presidency, the national chairman of Democrats for Nixon, and a key figure in the President's re-election scheme.

Whose Justice Department?

The ANICO case takes us to a fitting endpoint to the story of Richard Nixon's involvement with the underworld — the Department of Justice. It is an old saw that criminal and criminal-chaser eventually become involved in the same business, but in Richard Nixon that old saw has become more of a reality than perhaps ever before in American history. For Richard Nixon is a man whose name has been synonymous with "law and order" in America for three decades.

Yet the four-year "war" on organized crime by the Nixon administration bears more resemblance to the "peace" in Vietnam than a sincere effort to get at the mob.

In a recent interview in U.S. News and World Report (September 11, 1972), Attorney General Richard Kleindienst hailed "about 1600" indictments of underworld figures brought by the Nixon administration in the past three and half years. The Justice Department claims that many of these indictments involve top mobsters.

Those outside the Nixon administration, however, have charged that the government's prosecution has been both partisan and selective, aimed exclusively at mobsters linked to big-city Democrats such as in Newark, and at the "little fish" who are always in abundance and who make little difference in conducting mob business. *Time* has reported that quotas have been established (i.e. one hundred hoodlums a month for New York City) and that arrests are "being delayed so that future quotas can be filled". *The New York Times* has editorialized about the ease with which petty gamblers can and have been rounded up, and wondered aloud if the Justice Department isn't conducting more a publicity war than one on organized crime. A *Times* report this year found the government was building up a backlog of gambling indictments, saving them for a crucial time during the election campaign.

Indeed, while the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell team has used the spectre of "CRIME" to keep the fear level high and to guarantee large budgets and expanded powers for their Justice Department, the actual "attempts" of the Nixon administration to cope with organized crime have resembled a somewhat sinister update of the Keystone Cops.

For example, up to 1,000 of Kleindienst's vaunted 1600 indictees in gambling and organized crime may have their cases thrown out for somewhat dubious "improper procedures" technicalities. A Miami attorney named James Hogan has "discovered" irregularities on signatures required for electronic surveillance authorizations. Court-approved wiretaps require written authorization by the Attorney General of a designated representative, in this case Will Wilson. Instead of being signed by John Mitchell or by Wilson, the authorizations in question were signed by aides, thus rendering thousands of wiretap authorizations — and the indictments based on them — useless.

Hogan himself is a long-time syndicate attorney and a partner of Ben Cohen, a former political boss of Miami Beach who figures prominently in the Forties' takeover of Miami by organized crime. The case in which Hogan made his discovery involved the busting of the largest heroin/cocaine ring in Miami, many of whose members were Cuban refugees. Inspection of various court papers, including wiretap authorizations, confirmed "irregularities" in the signature — Will Wilson's signature. While resembling his actual handwriting, the signatures appeared as "Wil" instead of "Will".

While it may seem strange for an aide to misspell his boss' name, it seems even stranger that Hogan took the case. His normal fees start in five figures but he has been working on behalf of his court-declared indigent client for more than two years with minimal compensation. While Hogan is known as a "very thorough" attorney, it would be interesting to find out more about the circumstances in which he discovered the "irregularities".

Even more interesting, perhaps, are the circumstances under which Richard Kleindienst was offered a bribe of $100,000 to quash several mob indictments In sworn testimony in November 1971, Kleindienst admitted to being offered the $100,000 bribe (which would be paid in the form of a contribution to Nixon's 1972 campaign) in exchange for stopping prosecution against several underworld figures caught in a stock fraud case. The bribe was offered by an aide of Senator Hiram Fong, a Republican from Hawaii. The aide had worked previously with Kelindienst through Fong's position on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Kleindienst said he refused the offer but he also said he did not realize it was a bribe for an entire week!

In cross examination, the prosecutor asked Kleindienst, "If you had regarded the conversation as something regarding a bribe offer you would have immediately report it, would you not?"

"Yes sir," replied Kleindienst, "I would have."

Kleindienst admitted he reported the bribe a full week later, upon learning from J. Edgar Hoover that Federal agents were investigating the case.

One would expect the Attorney General of the United States to be more alert. But what is more troubling are reports aired in the Washington Post

shortly after the indictments in the stock fraud case in question (and ten months before Kleindienst's testimony on the bribe). Those reports quoted "sources at the U.S. Attorney's office in New York" and indicated that after the meeting between Kleindienst and Fong's aide, "Kleindienst immediately contacted Justice's Criminal Division [then headed by Will Wilson] and ... an FBI agent was assigned to infiltrate the group of alleged conspirators".

Do we now believe Kleindienst's story that he "didn't realize" he had been offered a bribe, or do we believe the U.S. Attorney's office in New York? Did Will Wilson and the Justice Department hold off a week while Kleindienst "made up his mind" that he had been offered a bribe, or was the decision whether or not to take it? And did Hoover and the FBI somehow interfere?

Perhaps the answer comes in the final outcome of the actual prosecution involved. The defendants in the stock-fraud case included Meyer Lansky's son-in-law, a former director of the Bank of Miami Beach and Johnny Dio, a notorious racketeer long associated with Jimmy Hoffa. They were acquitted, while the messengers who offered the bribe were convicted. One wonders if that $100,000 did not find its way into the Republican secret treasury after all.

The Tip of the Iceberg

> "The organized criminal relies on physical terror and psychological intimidation, on economic retaliation and political bribery, on citizen's indifference and government acquiescence. He corrupts our governing institutions and subverts our democratic processes."
>
> — Richard Nixon, April 24, 1969

Someone should tell President Nixon that resisting the power of organized crime demands, above all, a President with a clean slate.

Nixon's life is like a complex jigsaw puzzle, the pieces of which have been shuffled so as to defy complete reconstruction. Some of the crucial pieces have been removed, so a full picture cannot be achieved. It is no accident that no other politician has been so much written about, yet so little understood.

Indeed, much has been made of the "enigma" of Richard Nixon, his tight-lipped bearing in relation to his personal life, his unwillingness to divulge what's really on his mind.

But maybe the answer to the enigma lies in his old poker-playing instincts, in the unfailing ability to keep quiet when he's sitting on cards best hidden from the table.

For there is one indisputable fact about Richard Nixon's career — his ascendancy to the pinnacle of American power has required twenty-five years of care and feeding by some very wealthy and very reactionary men, and an extraordinary number of them have maintained connections with the world of organized crime.

During Nixon's years in office the underworld empire in the United States has prospered almost unrestricted by the Federal government. From its base in the gigantic resources of heroin traffic, gambling, prostitution, "protection," and a host of other enterprises of violence against society, organized crime has moved like a bulldozer into the world of legal, "respectable" business.

Every link between Richard Nixon and organized crime, however marginal, is of significance, if for no other reason because he is President. And there are people all over America, from government intelligence agents to hotel waiters, who have Nixon stories to tell. He covers his tracks well, but not well enough.

The full extent of Nixon's involvement with organized crime is just beginning to surface. The evidence in this article is merely the top of a dirty iceberg that will slowly become visible over the coming years.

The milieu in which he has traveled for three decades, and in which so many of his friends, associates, and appointees have been related to the mob, throw a long and permanent shadow over everything Richard Nixon the "public servant" has ever said, and over everything his political life has ever meant.

For in light of his career, both past and present, Richard M. Nixon seems to be the factual embodiment of Ralph Salerno's prediction that organized crime would someday put its own man in the White House. □

The information in this article was gathered during a six-month investigation carried out in many cities, primarily Miami, New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, San Diego, Las Vegas, Dallas, Austin, Galveston, Tallahassee, and San Francisco. Sources included interviews with over a hundred people; court documents (including deeds, mortgages, etc.); research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.; organized crime intelligence files (both private and government); and newspaper clippings.

Unsettling, Disturbing, Critical . . .

Computers and Automation, established 1951 and therefore the oldest magazine in the field of computers and data processing, believes that the profession of information engineer includes not only competence in handling information using computers and other means, but also a broad responsibility, in a professional and engineering sense, for:

- The reliability and social significance of pertinent input data;
- The social value and truth of the output results.

In the same way, a bridge engineer takes a professional responsibility for the reliability and significance of the data he uses, and the safety and efficiency of the bridge he builds, for human beings to risk their lives on.

Accordingly, Computers and Automation publishes from time to time articles and other information related to socially useful input and output of data systems in a broad sense. To this end we seek to publish what is unsettling, disturbing, critical — but productive of thought and an improved and safer "house" for all humanity, an earth in which our children and later generations may have a future, instead of facing extinction.

The professional information engineer needs to relate his engineering to the most important and most serious problems in the world today: war, nuclear weapons, pollution, the population explosion, and many more.

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ACROSS THE EDITOR'S DESK

Computing and Data Processing Newsletter

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APPLICATIONS

NATIONAL AMERICAN BANK INSTALLS COMPUTER-BASED SECURITY SYSTEM

Tom Burbank
National American Bank
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New Orleans, La. 70130

A computer-based system designed to prevent unauthorized access to high security areas has gone into operation at National American Bank here — one of the first U.S. banks to install such a system. The IBM Controlled Access System (CAS) at National American is based on the use of magnetically encoded, wallet-sized identification cards similar to bank credit cards.

Each person authorized to enter a security area is assigned a card coded with his own security number. Employees seeking entry to an area covered by the system simply insert their cards into compact reading devices on entrance doors, and the information is transmitted to an IBM System/7 computer for identification.

Stored in the computer's memory is a list of employee numbers and building areas these numbers are designated for. If the number of the card entitles the bearer access to that area, the computer signals the door to unlock. If the person is unauthorized to enter, the door remains closed and a security guard is notified. The elapsed time is approximately one second.

If a card is lost or stolen, a new card (with a new number) is issued and the system is alerted to deny entry to the original card. If the old card is used, the guard is alerted.

As an additional safeguard, the system can automatically log all entrance activity by individual security code, door number, date and time of day. This helps track who is where and for how long. National American can now analyze the number of times an individual enters and at what time of day or night this activity occurs. The system also has built-in failsafe mechanisms which insure security in the event of a power failure.

"Unfortunately, we are doing business in a time when public and private institutions are increasingly vulnerable to lawless elements," said National American President Louie J. Roussel III. "By adding the IBM Controlled Access System to our current security procedures, we are taking a major step to insure that our customers and employees are protected. And, by controlling access to the collateral instrument storage areas, we can make it very difficult for unauthorized people to gain access to valuable assets stored in the bank."

NOVA COMPUTER CHECKS STRENGTH OF ROOF IN COAL MINE

Edgar E. Geithner
Data General Corp.
Southboro, Mass. 01772

Data General's minicomputers track hurricanes from airplanes for the U.S. Air Force; the Army has mounted them in helicopters; Scripps Oceanographic Institute has one on a ship; a scientist bounces over Canadian glaciers with one mounted in his tracked vehicle; and an oil company uses one of the computers to control an oilfield in the Libyan desert. Now engineers at the University of Texas (Austin) have a minicomputer in the bottom of a mine.

Dr. A. L. Podio, an assistant professor in the university's Department of Petroleum Engineering, and a team of researchers from the Center for Earth Sciences and Engineering, use a Nova 820 computer to detect possible weak spots in the roofs of mines. The computer system, developed for the U.S. Bureau of Mines, has been on the job on the floor of Kaiser Corporation's York Canyon coal mine in New Mexico. "One of the most frequent causes of mine accidents is roof collapse," Dr. Podio said. "This system was designed to use the principles of seismic explorations to identify failure planes and fracture zones in the rocks overlaying the mine roof. If tests

show the area around a roof is weakening, it can be supported by beams or roof bolts."

In seismic exploration, a high energy explosion is set off, and sensitive instruments determine the structure and makeup of surrounding land by recording how fast the shock waves travel through the ground. The waveforms can be interpreted to pinpoint probable deposits of oil, and to describe rock formations. "Using a large energy souce like an explosion in a mine is out of the question," Dr. Podio said, "so a manually controlled impact device was designed to generate the shock waves." The impact device, which works like a BB gun, uses air pressure to shoot a round projectile at a striker plate mounted at the end of the barrel.

When the striker plate is pressed against the wall or roof of the mine and the device is triggered, shock waves are sent through the surrounding rock. The shock waves are picked up by wideband transducers, digitized by a fast transient recorder, and processed through the Nova 820 for waveform enhancement. The waveform is then displayed on an oscilloscope, with the results of velocity and depth calculations. Permanent records of the waveform can be made on paper tape, or by transmitting the data to a large scale remote computer.

"A mine could make daily checks with the system to detect changes in rock strata as the working face of the mine advances," Dr. Podio said, "or the system could be transported throughout the mine to make daily checks on the condition of roofs at predetermined key locations." Dr. Podio noted that similar systems could be used to predict the quality of rock in rapid excavation projects or could be used in nondestructive tests of large concrete structures.

PHONE BOOKS BY COMPUTER

Peter A. Cassels
Bell Telephone Laboratories
Mountain Ave.
Murray Hill, N.J. 07974

The Bell System is using computer technology to modernize production of the White Pages telephone books. A system designed to improve customer service, control costs and streamline massive recordkeeping operations is now being implemented. The system — called DIR/ECT (for DIRectory projECT) — was developed by Bell Laboratories, the research and development unit of the Bell System. Michigan Bell Telephone Company recently issued its first directory containing listings produced by the system. Michigan Bell also is using the system to produce some of its directory assistance records.

DIR/ECT is a more sophisticated outgrowth of its prototype, PHOTAC, a similar process developed by the New York Telephone Company under sponsorship of the nationwide Bell System. The first directory produced by the PHOTAC system was distributed in 1966. Since then, New York Telephone has converted some 4.5 million listings to the process. Currently the 12 major downstate White Pages directories are produced by PHOTAC.

The DIR/ECT system stores in a computer memory directory information such as the customer's name, address, telephone number — even telephone book delivery instructions. The information in the computer memory then is fed into a device called a photocomposer, which provides ready-to-print listings for White Pages. Besides the annual White Pages directories, DIR/ECT produces daily updates of new listings and monthly reprints for the telephone companies' directory assistance operators.

Although customers may see no obvious differences in the computer-produced directory, listings are easier to read and pages cleaner looking. The directories also have uniform abbreviations. The system has built-in cross-checks for consistent spelling of street names and for obvious errors in street and telephone numbers. There also is provision for massive directory listing changes, caused by renaming of streets and buildings.

Today, listings for phone directories are generally set line-by-line in metal type. Changes in listings must be reset and inserted by hand. With the new system, changes can be made quickly (because information is stored on magnetic computer tape and not metal type), the need to store tons of lead type will end, and the growing cost of publishing directories will be lessened.

EDUCATION NEWS

M.I.T. MUSIC PROJECT USES DEC COMPUTER

News Office
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Mass. 02139

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has begun work on a project aimed at making the Institute a major center for the study and composition of electronic music. Barry Vercoe, assistant professor of music, working with a computer given to the Department of Humanities' music section by Digital Equipment Corp. of Maynard, is in the early stages of developing a major electronic music production facility at the Institute.

Professor Vercoe said the computer facility "will be a tool both in the hands of the teacher and the composer that will greatly aid the development of creativity. The facility also will provide an excellent tool in the teaching of musical composition for conventional instruments.

"This is definitely not a scientific project. I'm not interested in merely getting a computer to sound exactly like a trumpet. The technological application, however, will interest some students who might not approach music otherwise and some of these will be drawn into its aesthetic considerations, through the back door as it were," Professor Vercoe said.

Why compose music for a machine at all?

"I suppose someone asked that very question when man first composed music for what are now traditional instruments, instead of for the human voice alone," Professor Vercoe said. "Electronic music merely expands the forces available to the practicing composer."

The PDP-11/45 computer — coupled with music input — also will lend itself to other forms of music research, such as syntactic analysis of music structures.

Professor Vercoe is the author of the widely used Music 360 language for digital sound synthesis. He has taught at M.I.T. for two years and is director of the Experimental Music Studio. His work, "Metamorphoses for Orchestra," was given its Boston premier early this year by the M.I.T. Symphony and was performed by the orchestra on its subsequent nation-

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wide tour. Working with Professor Vercoe on the project are Richard J. Steiger, a graduate student, and Stephen Haflich, a recent M.I.T. graduate.

COMPOSING BY COMPUTER AT ISU

Information Service
Iowa State University of Science and Technology
Ames, Iowa 50010

Music composers at Iowa State University may turn from their piano keyboards and hand-written scores to a more efficient instrument for composing music — a computer. ISU faculty members are building a computerized electronic music studio — a system that will technologically simplify composing electronic music. The studio is being designed and built by an interdisciplinary group from Iowa State's music, computer science, and electrical engineering departments, under the direction of Stefan Silverston, assistant professor of computer science, Terry Smay, professor of electrical engineering, and Gary White, associate professor of music.

Electronic music is produced by purely electronic means and the Iowa State Computerized Music System (ISMUS) will be doing just that — generating music with computer equipment. A composer will sit at the computer and write a musical composition using an electronic keyboard.

The new system, which was expected to be operable this fall, should be an easier method of modifying and editing a musical piece. The normal hand operations of changing notations on a printed score or splicing tapes of recorded music are "more time-consuming and inaccurate" processes for correcting a composition, according to Gary White.

The computer composing process begins when the composer inserts introductory instructions into a teletype machine. On an electronic keyboard he then begins to compose his piece. The computer records all musical instructions which are transformed through a digital-to-analog sound converter and loudspeaker into sound. This immediate feedback system enables the composer to hear what he is composing simultaneously. The computer also allows the composer to automatically play back and edit what he has written simply by striking another key.

The musician has now completed one "layer" of music. If he wants to add further musical instructions to the composition, he repeats the entire process again. All layers merge together to obtain the product — a completed electronic composition.

The music instructions which the composer inserts into the system are a special electronic music notation — a "computer language." The English words it uses can be compared to musical notation found on a conventional score — treble and bass clefs, notes, rests, and the like.

Electronic music has been used in commercial recordings, and as background music for television, radio and film. The Iowa State system will be sophisticated enough for use in serious compositional study, the production of background music for various media, and for the demonstration of sound properties.

The ISMUS presently being built is a protytype of a full-scale model. If the "test-system" proves satisfactory, "we will look for funding to build a full-scale model," says White. The project is presently supported by a $1,170 grant from Western Electric and a National Science Foundation institutional grant of $8,698. The prototype employs a mini-computer that is owned by Iowa State.

The studio will be used as a teaching tool for the ISU music program. Computer software, the programs (sequences of operations to be performed by the computer) written for the system, will be developed so a composer can use the studio equipment without having prior knowledge of computer programming. Students will be able to learn basic acoustical concepts and principles of electronic music synthesis and to develop sensitivity to timbre with the ISMUS. Also contributing to introductory computer science courses, the system will be a novel example of computer application in a non-scientific field.

STUDENT PROGRAMS COMPUTER FOR REMEDIAL INSTRUCTION

Edward J. Canty
Digital Equipment Corp.
Maynard, Mass. 01754

Using programs developed by a local high school student, School District 91 in Idaho Falls, has put its newly-acquired computer to work as a "super tutor" in remedial studies for disadvantaged children in this southeastern Idaho community. Designed to improve the arithmetic and language arts skills of children in grades 2 through 6, the project was introduced by director of curriculum Dr. Wallace Manning with federal Title 1 aid during the district's 1973 summer session for children largely from rural farm families. According to John A. Christensen, computer sciences coordinator, the project proved so successful in its initial application that it has been continued in the fall semester.

The student programmer is Robert Huntsman, 18, a June graduate of Idaho Falls' Skyline High School. Using the district's PDP-11/20 timesharing computer system installed last December by Digital Equipment Corporation, Huntsman developed programs for arithmetic and language drill to serve between 40 and 50 pupils on each of two teletypewriter terminals situated in local elementary schools.

In a typical arithmetic routine, the computer types a problem and waits for the pupil's response — ten seconds if the problem is a memory exercise, longer if it involves several columns for addition or several digits for multiplication. If the student's answer is correct, Huntsman's program directs the terminal to ring a bell in congratulation; if incorrect, the computer supplies a hint on where the mistake occurred and encourages him to try again.

Answers to English and social studies workbook questions have been entered in the computer memory, allowing students to do their homework at a terminal and receive immediate response. The computer keeps score of right and wrong answers to produce reports for teacher guidance. Spelling-recognition exercises are also in use and Huntsman has undertaken development of an arithmetic program involving fractions

"One of the computer's major advantages is its ability to pay attention to individual children," Christensen said. "Every child enrolled in the regular summer session was able to get experience at a terminal and benefit from these interactive programs." He said high school laboratory assistants will continue to write instructional programs for elementary and junior high levels, expanding the library begun by Huntsman. For future summer ses-

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sions, he added, the district hopes to make such computer assistance available at a nearby rural elementary school attended by children of migrant farm workers.

RESEARCH FRONTIER

"TALKING" BALLPOINT PEN UNDER DEVELOPMENT

Ronald I. Deutsch
Stanford Research Institute
Menlo Park, Calif. 94025

A prototype model of a simple, inexpensive "talking" ballpoint pen, under development at Stanford Research Institute (SRI), could reduce massive paperwork and delay in routine business transactions. The pen is similar to an ordinary pen in size and shape except that it is wired to a computer system. The computer is programmed to receive signals generated instantaneously as a person hand-prints characters with the pen to record information.

"Such instantaneous and remote processing of data might be invaluable to large businesses engaged in daily consumer-oriented services, such as banks, insurance companies and utilities," says staff scientist Dr. Hewitt D. Crane, the inventor. For example, the pen could be used by a bank teller crediting a savings or checking account. In this case, according to Dr. Crane, the data would not have to be retranscribed from a piece of paper by another employee, or the paper itself put through expensive automatic reading equipment. Thus, costs and delays could be reduced in crediting accounts or establishing cash requirements.

In another case, a meter reader making his rounds for a utility could use the pen in combination with a cassette recorder. When he returned to his office, the cassette tape would be programmed into the system, thus eliminating the need for manual retranscription of a day's worth of data.

In the present laboratory version, the pen is hooked to an audio unit as well as a teleprinter, so that as a person writes, the characters appear on the teleprinter and are spoken by the audio unit.

SRI holds a patent on the pen and is currently seeking financial support for further development, Dr. Crane says. He estimates that the pen itself might cost about $25 to $50. A central computer unit would be extra but could serve many pens.

MISCELLANEOUS

ICCP NAMES DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Paul M. Pair, Secretary & Chairman
Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals
P.O. Box 1442
Chicago, Ill. 60690

At a meeting in late September, the incorporators of the Institute for Certification of Computer Professionals, Chicago, Ill., adopted bylaws for the newly-formed organization and named a board of directors which, in turn, held its first meeting and elected officers. The ICCP is the outgrowth of over two years of intensive preparation and study by representatives of major computing societies. Its primary focus is the enhancement of certification ac-

tivities in the computing industry. It was incorporated August 13, 1973.

Elected as officers by the board of directors were:

President — John K. Swearingen, Computer Sciences Corp., Las Vegas, Nev., representing Data Processing Management Association (DPMA).

Vice President — Fred H. Harris, University of Chicago, Association for Computing Machinery.

Treasurer — William S. Eick, Alexander Grant & Co., Chicago, Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts.

Secretary — Paul M. Pair, Control Data Institute, Chicago, Association for Educational Data Systems.

Ten professional societies participated in the organization of ICCP and are eligible for charter membership. Of these, seven have exercised their right to such membership, and are entitled to two members on the ICCP board. The seven charter members are: Association of Computer Programmers and Analysts; Society of Certified Data Processors; Association for Computing Machinery; Association for Educational Data Systems; Society of Professional Data Processors; Data Processing Management Association; and Automation 1 Association.

The other three associations eligible for charter membership are: Canadian Information Processing Society, the Computer Society of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Society of Data Educators. They are expected to act before the end of 1973.

(please turn to page 47)

NEW CONTRACTS

TO	FROM	FOR	AMOUNT
Sanders Associates, Inc., Nashua, N.H.	CAE Electronics, Montreal, Canada	Display system segment of Canadian Joint Enroute Terminal System (JETS) Program: first phase consists of seven Enroute and two Terminal Systems for air traffic control	18.6 million
ITT Creed Limited, Great Britain	British Post Office	6000 machines — teleprinters and associated equipment — to be used mainly for Telex customer-to-customer teleprinter system	$11 million
Univac Div., Sperry Rand Corp., Blue Bell, Pa.	Auto Tell Services, Inc., Villanova, Pa.	1100 Univac DCT-515 Data Communications Terminals to be used by automobile dealers who subscribe to ATS services on-line computerized services	$7 million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Computer services support to Simulator Computer System Branch at Ames Research Center, Mountain View, Calif.	$6.7 million
Honeywell, Inc., Wellesley Hills, Mass.	State of Arizona, Phoenix, Ariz.	A Honeywell Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing Service) system, for use by 13 state agencies	$5+ million
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Engineering and related services to NASA's Wallops Station, Wallops Island, Va.	$5 million (approximate)
Philco-Ford Corp. Willow Grove, Pa.	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J.	Improving computerized communications network, identified as '73 AEP for AUTODIN Enhancement Program, at 10 overseas AUTODIN sites, Ft. Monmouth, N.J., and Fort Detrick, Md.	$4.6 million
Raytheon Data Systems, Norwood, Mass.	Eastern Air Lines, Miami, Fla.	Data display terminals and associated equipment as part of expansion of EAL's Automated Passenger Processing and Reservation System	$2+ million
National Cash Register Co., Dayton, Ohio	Publix Super Markets, Inc., Lakeland, Fla.	30 NCR 255 supermarket checkout systems involving a total of 357 NCR 255 terminals and 30 NCR 726 in-store minicomputers plus 120 NCR 250 free-standing electronic cash registers	$2 million (approximate)
Computer Sciences Corp., El Segundo, Calif.	National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)	Analysis and programming services to Langley Research Center, Hampton, Va.	$1.2 million
Interdata, Inc., Oceanport, N.J.	DATRAN (Data Transmission Co.), Vienna, Va.	Dual processor Model 55 data communications concentrators, with software and technical support, for an information network DATRAN is designed and installing on a turnkey basis for International Brotherhood of Teamsters	$1+ million
McDonnell Douglas Automation Co. (MCAUTO), St. Louis, Mo.	Buffums' Southern California	Computer processing of all company data; includes accounts payable, receivables, sales analyses, payroll, inventory control and statistics	$725,000 (approximate)
Informatics Inc., Western Div., Canoga Park, Calif.	Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Chicago, Ill.	Design and applications programming support for a new payroll/personnel system	$500,000+
Logicon, Inc., Torrance, Calif.	U.S. Air Force	Verifying and validating (V&V) critical missile flight safety (MFS) software used on western test range of Space and Missile Test Center (SAMTEC), Vandenberg AFB, Calif.	$365,000
TRW Inc., Redondo Beach, Calif.	Los Angeles County Road Department (LACRD), Calif.	Designing Integrated Information Management (IIMS); 10 subsystems cover accounting; billing; budgets; management of contracts, and projects, inventory control, production and performance, and road inventory information	$365,000
Systems Engineering Laboratories, Inc., Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	Singer Simulation Products, Div. of Singer Co.	Central control and simulation element of a Nuclear Plant Simulator for Carolina Power & Light Co., Raleigh, N.C.	$330,000
Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., Renton, Wash.	Manufacturing Technology Div., A.F. Materials Labs., Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio	Developing Air Force Computer Aided Manufacturing (AFCAM) master plan	$251,000
Atlantic Research Corp., Alexandria, Va.	Arkansas State Educational Television Commission	Engineering studies and detailed plans for four new ETC (Educational Television) stations, and an interconnecting microwave network	$37,000
Bunker Ramo Corp., Trumbull, Conn.	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	31 BR 2001 Universal Teller Terminals for equipping teller stations in all nine Reliance offices; terminals will be tied by highspeed communications circuits to a Univac 9480 computer	——
Collins Radio Co., Dallas, Texas	U.S. Air Force	Continuing development of systems and equipment for the U.S. Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM); eventual production awards, depending upon Air Force requirements, could total more than $125 million	——
Diablo Systems, Inc., Subsidiary of Xerox Corp. Hayward, Calif.	Wang Laboratories, Tewksbury, Mass.	Series 40 disk drives to be incorporated into Wang's new line of mini computer systems	——
MRI Systems Corp., Austin, Texas	U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. and New	Lease of SYSTEM 2000 for Farm management applications; at least nine SYSTEM 2000 data	——

NEW INSTALLATIONS

OF	AT	FOR
Burroughs B 4700 system	Computer Management Group (CMG) Ltd., North-west London, England	The first of two B4700 systems (which are included in a five-system order) to be installed at CMG's North-west London, England center (entire 5 computer system order valued at $4.3 million)
	Walter E. Heller & Co., Chicago, Ill. (2 systems)	Providing internal processing speed to keep pace with continued growth of data processing operations; system will allow expansion without reprogramming or recompiling; replaces two Burroughs B3500 systems
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 74 system	Century Research Center Corp. (CRC), Tokyo, Japan	Increasing CRC's processing capabilities to include remote batch data processing services via high speed communication line control devices, and offer a wide range of services to various types of users; system will be connected to a previously installed CDC 6600 computer (system valued at $3 million)
Control Data CYBER 70 Model 76 system	Atmospheric Environment Service of Canada, Montreal, Canada	Upgrading weather forecasting facilities throughout the country; system installed at Canadian Meteorological Center in Montreal, Canada (system valued at $6.3 million)
Control Data 3150 system	Ingalls Iron Works Co., Birmingham, Ala.	Expanding automated design activities; system will operate in conjunction with a previously installed CDC 3150 to support CONSTRUCTS, an automated engineering design software package
IBM System/370 Model 155 system	Educational Information Services (EIS), Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.	Linking with university's IBM System/360 Model 91 to significantly expand a variety of data processing services
IBM System/370 Model 168 system	Datacrown Limited, Willowdale, Ontario, Canada	The first of two systems that will more than double current batch processing capacity and increase its capability to provide for transaction-oriented terminals; replaces Model 165 currently in use (systems valued at $12 million)
Interdata Model 70 systems	U.S. Army Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, N.J. (2 systems)	Use in experiments involving automated tactical surveillance and target acquisition
NCR Century 101 system	Radyne Limited, Great Britain	An advanced inventory management and control system (system valued at $6.3 million)
NCR Century 200 system	Green Shield Trading Stamp Company of Edgware, Colindale, England	Expansion of automated stock control system for its gift houses and new Argos chain of catalog showrooms
NCR Century 251 system	Columbia EDP Centers, Inc., Columbia, Mo.	General data processing services to a variety of customers including several banks
Univac 1106 system	British Gas Corp., Hinckley, England	Assistance in controlling National Grid pipeline by performing forward simulations on a real-time, round-the-clock-basis; in addition, system will act as a service bureau to scientific and engineering departments within the Corporation
	University of Connecticut Medical Center, Farmington, Conn.	All aspects of Medical Center's work including patient care, monitoring patient care, scheduling outpatient appointments, support of library information and research statistical programs, and general accounting and payroll processing chores (system valued at $1.3 million)
Univac 1110 system	Pacific International Computing Corp., Gaithersburg, Md.	The first of two systems whose primary applications include project management, engineering and business data processing; the system will also include time-sharing capability as well as remote job entry from terminals in the field
Univac 9480 system	Reliance Federal Savings & Loan Asso. of New York, Jamaica, N.Y.	Faster customer service at any bank branch

Across the Editor's Desk — *Continued from page 45*

IFIP CONGRESS '74 TRAVEL GRANTS

P. E. Welch
U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress '74
Box 426
New Canaan, Conn. 06840

The National Science Foundation will support a travel grant program for attendance at IFIP Congress 74 to be held August 5-10, 1974, in Stockholm. The triennial IFIP (International Federation for Information Processing) Congresses have become the major international media for exchange of information among developers and users of information processing techniques and technology.

The Division of Mathematical Sciences of the National Research Council will administer the program and award grants to qualified people from the United States whose accomplishments in and potential contributions to the field of information processing are most noteworthy, regardless of the formal labels for their specialties.

Younger members of the information science community are urged to apply. William F. Atchison of the University of Maryland, Financial Support Chairman of the U.S. Committee for IFIP, said that special efforts will be made to support their attendance.

Applications may be obtained through the Math Division, National Research Council, Washington, D.C. 20418. Applications must be received on or before December 31, 1973.

13-00000

MONTHLY COMPUTER CENSUS

Neil Macdonald
Survey Editor
COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION

The following is a summary made by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION of reports and estimates of the number of general purpose digital computers manufactured and installed, or to be manufactured and on order. These figures are mailed to individual computer manufacturers quarterly for their information and review, and for any updating or comments they may care to provide. Please note the variation in dates and reliability of the information. A few manufacturers refuse to give out, confirm, or comment on any figures.

Part 1 of the Monthly Computer Census contains reports for United States manufacturers, A to H, and is published in January, April, July, and October. Part 2 contains reports for United States manufacturers, I to Z, and is published in February, May, August, and November. Part 3 contains reports for manufacturers outside of the United States and is published in March, June, September, and December.

Our census seeks to include all digital computers manufactured anywhere. We invite all manufacturers located anywhere to submit infor- that would help make these figures as accurate and complete as possible.

The following abbreviations apply:

- (A) — authoritative figures, derived essentially from information sent by the manufacturer directly to COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
- C — figure is combined in a total
- (D) — acknowledgment is given to DP Focus, Marlboro, Mass., for their help in estimating many of these figures
- E — figure estimated by COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
- (N) — manufacturer refuses to give any figures on number of installations or of orders, and refuses to comment in any way on those numbers stated here
- (R) — figures derived all or in part from information released indirectly by the manufacturer, or from reports by other sources likely to be informed
- (S) — sale only, and sale (not rental) price is stated
- X — no longer in production
- \- — information not obtained at press time and/or not released by manufacturer

SUMMARY AS OF OCTOBER 15, 1973

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS In U.S.A.	Outside U.S.A.	In World	NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
Part 2. United States Manufacturers I-Z							
IBM	305	12/57	3.6	40	15	55	-
White Plains, N.Y.	650	10/67	4.8	50	18	68	-
(N) (D) (Oct. 1973)	1130	2/66	1.5	2580	1227	3807	-
	1401	9/60	5.4	2210	1836	4046	-
	1401-G	5/64	2.3	420	450	870	-
	1401-H	6/67	1.3	180	140	320	-
	1410	11/61	17.0	156	116	272	-
	1440	4/63	4.1	1690	1174	2864	-
	1460	10/63	10.0	194	63	257	-
	1620 I, II	9/60	4.1	285	186	471	-
	1800	1/66	5.1	416	148	564	-
	7010	10/63	26.0	67	17	84	-
	7030	5/61	160.0	4	1	5	-
	704	12/55	32.0	12	1	13	-
	7040	6/63	25.0	35	27	62	-
	7044	6/63	36.5	28	13	41	-
	705	11/55	38.0	18	3	21	-
	7020, 2	3/60	27.0	10	3	13	-
	7074	3/60	35.0	44	26	70	-
	7080	8/61	60.0	13	2	15	-
	7090	11/59	63.5	4	2	6	-
	7094-I	9/62	75.0	10	4	14	-
	7094-II	4/64	83.0	6	4	10	-
	System/3 Model 6	3/71	1.0	8	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 10	1/70	1.1	5	-	-	-
	System/3 Model 15	-	-	-	-	-	-
	System/7	11/71	0.35 and up	15	-	-	-
	360/20	12/65	2.7	7161	6075	13236	1780
	360/25	1/68	5.1	1112	759	1871	1287
	360/30	5/65	10.3	5487	2535	8022	-
	360/40	4/65	19.3	2454	1524	3978	1363
	360/44	7/66	11.8	109	57	166	39
	360/50	8/65	29.1	1135	445	1580	662
	360/65	11/65	57.2	604	144	748	562
	360/67	10/65	133.8	65	6	71	99
	360/75	2/66	66.9	50	17	67	12
	360/85	12/69	150.3	11	1	12	55
	360/90	11/67	-	5	-	-	-
	360/91	-	-	1	-	-	-
	360/190	-	-	13	2	15	-
	360/195	4/71	232.0	-	-	9	48
	370/115	-	-	-	-	-	-
	370/125	4/73	8.2-13.8	1	-	-	-
	370/135	5/72	14.4	13	-	-	-
	370/145	9/71	23.3	2	-	-	-
	370/155	2/71	48.0	2	-	-	-
	370/158	-/73	49.5-85.0	1	-	-	-
	370/165	5/71	98.7	3	-	-	-
	370/168	-/73	93.0-170.0	1	3	-	-
	370/195	6/73	190.0-270.0	-	-	-	-
Interdata	Model 1	12/70	3.7	244	75	319	-
Oceanport, N.J.	Model 3	5/67	13.1	-	-	200	X
(A) (Oct. 1973)	Model 4	8/68	8.5	274	115	389	32
	Model 5	11/70	X	70	20	90	X
	Model 7/16	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 7/32	-/74	-	-	-	-	-
	Model 15	1/69	20.0	40	24	64	X
	Model 16	5/71	X	1	6	7	X
	Model 18	6/71	X	2	7	9	X
	Model 50/55	5/72	-	75	10	85	115
	Model 70	10/71	-	466	116	582	107
	Model 74	2/73	-	41	8	49	126
	Model 80	10/72	-	15	3	18	20
	Model 85	6/73	-	1	-	-	-

NAME OF MANUFACTURER	NAME OF COMPUTER	DATE OF FIRST INSTALLATION	AVERAGE OR RANGE OF MONTHLY RENTAL $(000)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS In U.S.A.	Outside U.S.A.	In World	NUMBER OF UNFILLED ORDERS
Microdata Corp.	Micro 400/10	12/70	0.1-0.5	139	0	139	-
Irvine, Calif.	Micro 800	12/68	0.2-3.0	2927	810	3737	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	Micro 1600	12/71	0.2-3.0	914	95	1009	-
NCR	304	1/60	X	5	2	7	X
Dayton, Ohio	310	5/61	X	8	0	8	X
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	315	5/62	7.0	255	200	455	-
	315 RMC	9/65	9.0	55	35	90	-
	390	5/61	0.7	160	325	485	-
	500	10/65	1.0	1100	1750	2850	-
	251	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Century 50	2/71	1.6	580	0	580	-
	Century 100	9/68	2.6	1175	783	1958	-
	Century 101	12/72	3.7	50	1	51	-
	Century 200	6/69	7.0	575	335	910	-
	Century 300	2/72	21.0	5	5	10	-
Philco	1000	6/63	X	16	-	-	X
Willow Grove, Pa.	200-210,211	10/58	X	16	-	-	X
(N) (Jan. 1969)	2000-212	1/63	X	12	-	-	X
Raytheon Data Systems Co.	250	12/60	X	115	20	135	X
Norwood, Mass.	440	3/64	X	20	-	-	X
(A) (July 1973)	520	10/65	X	26	1	27	X
	703	10/67	12.5	(S) 179	33	212	0
	704	3/70	7.2	(S) 300	100	400	40
	706	5/69	19.0	(S) 75	17	92	1
Standard Computer Corp.	IC 4000	12/68	9.0	9	0	9	2
Los Angeles, Calif.	IC 6000-6000/E	5/67	16.0	3	0	3	-
(A) (June 1972)	IC 7000	8/70	17.0	4	0	4	1
	IC-9000	5/71	400.0	(S) 1	0	1	-
Systems Engineering Laboratories	SYSTEMS 810A/810B	6-66/9-68	1.8/2.6	382	30	412	-
Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.	SYSTEMS 71/72	8-72/9-71	0.9/1.0	19	5	24	-
(A) (Sept. 1973)	SYSTEMS 85/86	7-72/6-70	6.0/10.0	47	3	50	-
Texas Instruments Inc.	960	6/70	X	-	-	-	X
Houston, Tex.	960A	11/71	0.2-2.7	-	-	-	-
(A) (June 1973)	980	5/68	X	-	-	-	X
	980A	8/72	0.3-2.7	-	-	-	-
UNIVAC Div. of Sperry Rand	9200	6/67	1.5	1360	616	1976	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	9300/9380	9/67	3.4	795	675	1470	-
(A) (Aug. 1973)	9400/9480	5/69	7.0	212	228	440	-
	9700	-	-	3	11	14	-
	418 III	6/63	11.0	40	77	117	-
	494	-	-	62	46	108	-
	1106	-	-	61	143	204	-
	1108	9/65	68.0	163	92	255	-
	1110	-	-	11	17	28	-
	I & II	3/51 & 11/57	X	23	-	-	X
	File Computers	8/56	X	13	-	-	X
	LARC	5/60	135.0	2	0	2	-
	1107, UIII, 490/1/2, 418II, 1004/5, 1050, SS80/90	-	X	2063	1442	3505	X
UNIVAC - Series 70	301	2/61	7.0	143	-	-	-
Blue Bell, Pa.	501	6/59	14.0-18.0	17	-	-	-
(A) (Feb. 1973)	601	11/62	14.0-35.0	0	-	-	-
	3301	7/64	17.0-35.0	74	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/15, 25	9/65	4.3	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/35	1/67	9.2	95	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/45	11/65	22.5	265	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/46	11/68	33.5	30	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/55	11/66	34.0	10	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/60	11/70	32.0	18	-	-	-
	Spectra 70/61	4/70	42.0	7	-	-	-
	70/2	5/71	16.0	63	-	-	-
	70/3	9/71	25.0	7	-	-	-
	70/6	9/71	25.0	24	-	-	-
	70/7	12/71	35.0	7	-	-	-
	EMR 6020	4/65	5.4	15	1	16	0
	EMR 6040	7/65	6.6	6	0	6	0
	EMR 6050	2/66	9.0	15	2	17	0
	EMR 6070	10/66	15.0	7	8	15	0
	EMR 6130	8/67	5.0	34	13	47	0
	EMR 6135	-	2.6	36	5	41	4
	EMR 6145	-	7.2	-	-	-	8
	EMR 6140	-	-	-	-	-	0
Varian Data Machines	620	11/65	X	-	-	75	X
Newport Beach, Calif.	620i	6/67	X	-	-	1300	X
(A) (Mar. 1973)	R-620i	4/69	-	-	-	80	-
	520/DC, 520i	12/69;10/68	-	-	-	500	150
	620/f	11/70	X	-	-	207	X
	620/L, 620/L-OOC	4/71;9/72	-	-	-	740	101
	620/f-100	6/72	-	-	-	100	43
	620/L-100	5/72	-	-	-	200	235
	Varian 73	11/72	-	-	-	40	39
Xerox Data Systems	XDS-92	4/65	1.5	43	4	47	-
El Segundo, Calif.	XDS-910	8/62	2.0	170	10	180	-
(N) (R) (Oct. 1973)	XDS-920	9/62	2.9	120	12	132	-
	XDS-930	6/64	3.4	159	14	173	-
	XDS-940	4/66	14.0	33	3	36	-
	XDS-9300	11/64	8.5	25-30	4	29-34	-
	XDS-530	8/73	7.6	-	-	-	-
	Sigma 2	12/66	1.8	163	36	199	-
	Sigma 3	12/69	2.0	21	1	22	-
	Sigma 5	8/67	6.0	32	14	46	-
	Sigma 6	6/70	12.0	3	-	-	-
	Sigma 7	12/66	12.0	31	7	38	-
	Sigma 8	2/72	-	5	-	-	-
	Sigma 9	-	35.0	7	-	-	-

CALENDAR OF COMING EVENTS

Nov. 28-30, 1973: 1st Annual Systems Engineering Conference, Statler-Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Dec. 4-5, 1973: 1973 Vehicular Technology Conference, Sheraton-Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio / contact: Robert Wylie, Motorola Communications, Inc., 12955 Snow Rd., Cleveland, OH 44130

Dec. 6-8, 1973: National Symposium on Computer Applications in the Juvenile Justice System, Marriott Motor Hotel, Atlanta, Ga. / contact: Lawrence A. Boxerman, Project Dir., National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Univ. of Nevada, Box 8000, Reno, NV 89507

Dec. 9-11, 1973: Computer Architecture, Flagler Inn & Reitz Union, Gainesville, Fla. / contact: G. Jack Lipovski, 229 Larsen Hall, Univ. of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32601

Jan. 16-18, 1974: 3rd Annual AIIE-MHI Seminar, Marriott Motor Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Technical Services, AIIE, 25 Technology Park/Atlanta, Norcross, GA 30071

Jan. 16-19, 1974: Internepcon/Japan '74, Harumi Convention Center, Tokyo, Japan / contact: Industrial & Scientific Conf. Mgmt., Inc., 222 W. Adams St., Chicago, IL 60606

Feb. 12-14, 1974: Computer Science Conference, Detroit Hilton, Detroit, Mich. / contact: Seymour J. Wolfson, Computer Science Section, Wayne State Univ., Detroit, MI 48202

Feb. 13-15, 1974: International Solid State Circuits Conference, Univ. of Penna., Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa. / contact: Virgil Johannes, Bell Labs., Room 3E331, Holmdel, NJ 07733

Feb. 19-22, 1974: 3rd Annual National Communications Week Convention, Chase-Park Plaza Hotel, St. Louis, Mo. / contact: David C. Brotemarkle, Communications Systems Management Assoc., 1102 West St., Suite 1003, Wilmington, DE 19801

Feb. 26-28, 1974: Computer Conference (COMPCON), Jack Tar Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: Jack Kuehler, IBM Corp., P 35, Bldg. 025, Monterey & Cottle Rds., San Jose, CA 95114

Mar. 25-29, 1974: IEEE International Convention (INTERCON), Coliseum & Statler Hilton Hotel, New York, N.Y. / contact: J. H. Schumacher, IEEE, 345 E. 47th St., New York, NY 10017

April 3, 1974: Minicomputers – Trends and Applications, Nat'l Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg, Md. / contact: Harry Hayman, 738 Whitaker Ter., Silver Spring, MD 20901

April 8-11, 1974: Computer Aided Design, Int'l Conference & Exhibition, Univ. of Southampton, Southampton, England / contact: Inst. of Civil Engrs., Great George St., Westminster, London SW1, England

April 9-11, 1974: Optical Computing Symposium, Zurich, Switzerland / contact: Samuel Horvitz, Box 274, Waterford, CT 06385

April 21-24, 1974: International Circuits & Systems Symposium, Sir Francis Drake Hotel, San Francisco, Calif. / contact: L. O. Chua, Dept. of EE, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley, CA 94720

April 21-24, 1974: 1974 Annual Assoc. for Systems Management Conf., Dallas Convention Center, Dallas, Tex. / contact: R. B. McCaffrey, ASM, 24587 Bagley Rd., Cleveland, OH 44138

May 5-8, 1974: Offshore Technology Conference, Astrohall, Houston, Tex. / contact: Offshore Tech. Conf., 6200 N. Central Expressway, Dallas, TX 75206

May 6-10, 1974: 1974 National Computer Conference & Exposition, McCormick Place, Chicago, Ill. / contact: Dr. Stephen S. Yau, Computer Sciences Dept., Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201

May 13-17, 1974: European Computing Congress (EUROCOMP), Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England / contact: Online, Brunel Univ., Uxbridge, Middlesex, England

May 13-17, 1974: International Instruments, Electronic and Automation Exhibition, Olympia, London, England / contact: Industrial Exhibitions Ltd., Commonwealth House, New Oxford St., London, WC1A 1PB, England

June 24-26, 1974: Design Automation Workshop, Brown Palace Hotel, Denver, Colo. / contact: ACM, 1133 Ave. of the Americas, New York, NY 10036

June 25-28, 1974: 1974 Annual International Conference & Business Exposition, Minneapolis, Minn. / contact: Data Processing Management Assoc., 505 Busse Highway, Park Ridge, IL 60068

July 15-19, 1974: 1974 Conference on Frontiers in Education, City University, London, England / contact: Conf. Dept., Institution of Electrical Engineers, Savoy Place, London, England WC2R 0BL

July 23-26, 1974: Circuit Theory & Design, IEE, London, England / contact: IEE, Savoy Pl., London WC2R OBL, England

Aug. 5-10, 1974: IFIP Congress 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: U.S. Committee for IFIP Congress 74, Box 426, New Canaan, CT 06840

Aug. 5-10, 1974: Medinfo 74, St. Erik's Fairgrounds, Stockholm, Sweden / contact: Frank E. Heart, Bolt Beranek and Newman, Inc., 50 Moulton St., Cambridge, MA 02138

Aug. 21-23, 1974: Engineering in the Ocean Environment International Conf., Nova Scotian Hotel, Halifax, Nova Scotia / contact: O. K. Gashus, EE Dept., Nova Scotia Tech. Coll., POB 100, Halifax, N.S., Canada

ADVERTISING INDEX

Following is the index of advertisements. Each item contains: product / name and address of the advertiser / name of the agency, if any / page number where the advertisement appears.

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING"

EDITION 5.2 = 5th EDITION + 2 SUPPLEMENTS ALREADY ISSUED

THE MOST ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING ARE

PEOPLE

Who are they?
What do they do?
Where do they do it?

Consult

"WHO'S WHO IN COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING" jointly published by *Computers and Automation* (Berkeley Enterprises, Inc.) and Quadrangle / New York Times Book Co.

"Who's Who in Computers and Data Processing" has been changed to a periodic subscription basis as follows:

1. The latest Cumulative Edition (the 5th edition published 1971, containing over 15,000 capsule biographies, over 1,000 pages long, 3 volumes, hardbound) PLUS
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This reference is particularly useful for:

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Libraries
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❝ It's the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man. It works on tapes and other voice recordings ❞

by George O'Toole

Assassination Tapes

The rulers of the state are the only ones who should have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad; they may be allowed to lie for the good of the state.
—Plato: *The Republic,* Book Three

It's a little frightening. The machine can listen to what you're saying and tell, with a high degree of reliability, whether or not you are lying. It's called the Psychological Stress Evaluator, and it is, in effect, a lie detector. Unlike the polygraph, it needs no physical connection to the subject; therefore it can be used without his knowledge. It works from recordings of his voice, so anything on tape, sound track or phonograph record is fair game for the machine. It is the first lie detector that can be used on a dead man.

Early this year, one of these instruments came into my hands. I resolved to use it to probe one of the darkest mysteries of recent history, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I set about collecting every recording I could lay my hands on of anyone who had any direct knowledge of the affair. Soon I had compiled the tape-recorded testimony of twenty-two persons—eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, the pathologist who conducted the autopsy, members and staff of the Warren Commission, Jim Garrison, Clay Shaw, and even Earl Warren.

I ran the tapes through the PSE systematically, taking each controversial point in turn. Did the rifle which belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald kill President Kennedy? Was Oswald the killer? Were others involved? What of those mysterious autopsy photographs which the Warren Commission never saw—do they support the Commission's lone-gunman, single-bullet theory? And what about the Warren Commission itself? Did its members conspire to cover up the truth?

Slowly a picture emerged. It is blurred, and it is not the picture I expected. Not all the details are there, but I guarantee this: you may believe the lone-gunman theory of the Warren Report, or you may believe the government-conspiracy theory of Mark Lane, Jim Garrison and others, but either way you are wrong.

The PSE is not a crystal ball. It was invented as an interrogation aid, a function it performs well. To my knowledge, this was the first instance of its use as a tool for historical research. To understand what I did with the PSE, one should know something about the device itself.

I first heard of the Psychological Stress Evaluator last year, when I met two of its inventors, Allan D. Bell, Jr., and Charles R. McQuiston. Bell and McQuiston, both former lieutenant colonels, retired from Army Intelligence several years ago to form a company called Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc. It was a logical second career for the two men. Both are experts in the technology of espionage. Either one could pick the lock on your front door in less time than it takes you to find your key. Colonel Bell wears a Black Belt in karate, is an accomplished swordsman and small-arms expert, and has a dozen inventions to his credit, from anti-bugging devices to a miniaturized microdot camera. Colonel McQuiston is one of the foremost polygraph experts in the U.S., a specialist in radio and audio surveillance, and a qualified locksmith.

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·The PSE grew from an effort to improve ? polygraph. Standard polygraphs ?asure four variables: pulse, blood pres- re, respiration and perspiration. Some to measure additional physiological v... les. The more variables measured, ... re reliable the polygraph.

Bell and McQuiston discovered that the quencies composing the human voice ? not fixed: they shift very slightly from ght to fourteen times every second. But ien the speaker is under stress, this nor- il frequency modulation disappears. ıat remains are the pure component fre- encies of the voice. And a strong indica- n that the speaker is lying.

The two men developed a device to tect this phenomenon and planned to use as an additional "channel" on the poly- aph. They ... discovered that the new riable was so reliable and accurate a asure of psychological stress there was illy no need to measure the other poly- aph variables.

Freed from the necessity of strapping the bject into a chair, stretching a pneumo- aphic tube across his chest, gluing elec- des to his palms and clamping his arm th a blood-pressure cuff, the PSE proved be much more versatile than the poly- aph. Because it can work from a tele- one or tape recorder, the PSE can be ed without the knowledge or even the ysical presence of the subject.

I asked Colonel Bell to tell me about some the things the PSE was being used for, pecially cases in which a conventional lygraph couldn't be used. He mentioned t the police in Howard County, Maryland, ve been using the PSE for two years; they ve had great success in establishing the ıocence of suspects who were afraid to bmit to a polygraph examination because that machine's forbidding aspect.

Bell went on to describe some of his ention's other uses, actual or potential. ktor and the Federal government are ex- oring its use as a defense against skyjack-) and telephoned bomb threats, and as neans of speeding up customs inspec- ns. Some doctors and psychiatrists are ing PSEs to study patients' physical and ıntal stress. The National Committee to restigate Aerial Phenomena, a private oup that investigates UFO reports, is w using the PSE to interview witnesses UFO sightings.

asked Bell if he would lend me a PSE experiment with, in order to write a piece out the device. He agreed, with two con- ions. First, I must take Dektor's three-day ırse in operating the instrument; second, er using the PSE, I must review my erpretation of its output with his staff, in interest of accuracy. This seemed rea- ıable, so I agreed.

The course was held in the meeting room a Holiday Inn in Falls Church, Virginia. ? eight other students were employees customers who had purchased the vice. These included a private detective ency in Pennsylvania, a New York chain store, and the security service of an East African country. The instructor was Mike Kradz, a criminologist and retired police officer. Kradz projects the tough-cop image, but he is a living rebuttal to the Po- lish joke. There is nothing about forensic science, from fingerprints to polygraphy, on which the man is not an expert.

The first morning of the course was devoted to the physical operation of the PSE. The device is used in conjunction with a Uher tape recorder, which has four speeds and can be manually wound back to locate a particular point on the tape. The testimony to be evaluated is recorded at a tape speed of 7½ inches per second, then played back and stopped at the beginning of the utter- ance in question. The recorder is slowed to 15/16 inches per second and played. The sound, no longer recognizable as a human voice, is a long, low rumble.

The PSE itself is built into an attaché case. The case opens to reveal a chart drive, sim- ilar to an electrocardiograph, and a number of buttons and knobs. A single cable con- nects the PSE to the tape recorder.

As the tape recorder reels slowly turn, and a rumble issues from its speaker, the PSE stylus dances back and forth across the moving chart paper, leaving behind a ragged trail. Then the recorder is stopped, the chart paper is stopped, and that's all there is to it. The result is a strip of paper with a squiggly line. The rest is up to the human eye and brain.

On the afternoon of the first day, Kradz showed us what to look for. The unstressed voice looks like an untrimmed hedge, with stalks of different heights sticking up (and down) at irregular intervals. But add some stress, and that hedge begins to look trimmed. The greater the stress, the smoother the shape. If the subject was experiencing the hard stress which accom- panies deception, the over-all outline of the figure tends to take on a rectangular shape, a concertina as seen by the player. Kradz showed slide after slide of charts made dur- ing actual police interrogations. He told us the background of each case and pointed out the tell-tale signs of deception, when- ever they were present.

> "The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas"

That night each student took a PSE back to his room to practice operating it. Some coordination must be learned to become facile in handling the recorder and the PSE, but clearly the difficult part of the course would be learning how to read and interpret the charts.

The next day we learned the theory of polygraph interrogation, which applies to the PSE. There is, first of all, the matter of the "outside issue."

Most people, Kradz pointed out, have some sort of deep secret they don't want known. When faced with a polygraph exami- nation, a person may be more concerned that this outside issue may come to light than he is about the actual substance of the interrogation. This can produce irrele- vant stress in some of his answers, and mis- lead the examiner. Therefore it is is neces- sary for the examiner to interview the sub- ject before the examination, go over all of the questions he intends to ask, and assure the subject he will ask only these questions.

I had reason to remember this later, when I ran my first real interrogation tape.

The interrogation always includes the question, "Are you afraid that I will ask you about something we have not discussed?" A negative answer with no sign of stress eliminates the outside-issue problem. Also, the examiner always asks some innocuous questions, such as, "Do you like the color blue?" in order to observe the subject's general state of tension. And there is always one "red-herring" question.

The red herring is used to identify the "guilt complex responder." Such a person shows stress when he responds to any accusatory question. The examiner may ask, "Did you steal the watch?" when it is money, not a watch, that is missing. A stressed denial will alert the examiner, who carefully compares this response to the stress produced by questions about the missing money.

That night the class was given tapes of real police interrogations. In most cases, Kradz was the examiner; and in every case, he knew the background and resolution of the matter. One case I was assigned con- cerned a young man accused of stealing money from his father's store. Kradz started by asking the "outside-issue" question. No, the young man replied, he was not afraid Kradz would ask him a question they hadn't discussed. Then the following exchange took place:

"Do you live in Howard County?"

"Yes."

"Do you suspect someone of having taken the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a white shirt?"

"Yes."

"Do you know who took the money?"

"No."

"Are you wearing a ring?"

"Yes."

"Did you take the money?"

"No."

There were a few red-herring questions to check for the guilt complex response. The questions about wearing a white shirt and a ring and living in Howard County had been included to measure the background stress elicited by irrelevant issues.

I ran the tape and charted it on the PSE. All but two of his responses were un- stressed. The question about suspecting

ɔ.took the money produced enough ɜss to indicate deception. The other ɹstion which produced stress was, "Are Wearing a ring?" In fact, his yes to that ɜ accompanied by such stress as I had ɹn only once or twice in the class slides. 'he next morning Kradz called on me. l the suspect take the money, he asked. ɪid I didn't think so. Kradz nodded. Did suspect who took the money? Yes, I ɹght he did. Very good, said Kradz. Did ɔtice anything else about the interroga- ı? Well, yes, there was this business ɔut the ring. Perhaps the suspect had ɪen it. Kradz smiled. No, the kid hadn't en the ring, but he was gay. He had ·hanged rings with another guy. Nobody

that the speaker had told the truth. However, since interrogation with a PSE seemed to require such an elaborate and structured situation, I wondered if it could be used the way I had hoped, as a tool for historical research.

During the lunch break I took Kradz aside and asked him. Could the PSE be used outside interrogations, where the speaker was telling what may or may not have happened? Yes, he said, the PSE could be used for that. Where there was no stress, I could be confident that the speaker was telling the truth. However, when I did find stress, I had to be very careful about reaching conclusions about its cause; it could result from something other than deception. But if I

I hoped that Jim Garrison would prove that he had solved the mystery. He didn't. Time passed, public interest waned, and the details of the controversy dimmed in my mind, leaving only a dull residue of doubt. I had despaired of ever learning the truth. Now I knew what to do with the PSE.

It was all there: the statements made before television cameras by eyewitnesses, policemen, medical examiners, members of the Warren Commission. Somewhere in a network-television vault were the sound tracks, with the tiny, inaudible variations in voice frequency that could settle once and for all the question, "Did Oswald, acting alone, shoot and kill John F. Kennedy?"

My immediate problem was getting







Voice prints by the Psychological Stress Evaluator of former chief justice Earl Warren in May, 1972 indicating hard stress on the words "no evidence."





ɹw about it. The kid didn't really expect ɔe asked about it, because Kradz had ɿe over all the questions with him. Still, ɜn the ring was mentioned, he panicked. ly the third day of the course, I had begun ɟive some thought to what I might do ı the PSE. I was particularly interested ɿe fact that the device works from a tape ording. Sound-recording technology is ıost a century old (Edison invented the ɔnograph in 1877), and an enormous ɔunt of history is stored on phonograph ords, sound tracks, and tape and wire ordings. I thought how many press con- ɜnces, interviews and public pronounce- ɿts are stored away in the film and tape hives of the world, and how many ques- ıs could be settled if we knew for certain

found a stress pattern in the testimony of several witnesses to the same event, I would very probably have uncovered deception.

Encouraged, I reviewed the list of recent mysteries. Watergate was, of course, the first to come to mind. The ITT affair was also of recent interest. The Kent State incident had never been fully cleared up. But one subject seemed to loom above all the rest—the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Like many others, I have found it difficult to believe the Warren Report. When Mark Lane's book came out, I read it carefully. I read much of the other criticism of the Warren Commission's findings. The more I read, the more I doubted the official account of what happened that day in Dallas. I waited for the real story to emerge. It didn't.

access to the recordings. I was certain the television networks would have them, but I wasn't sure exactly what to ask for. There must be thousands of hours of sound recordings relating to the assassination. Where, among all this talk, was the critical testimony?

I started digging and soon discovered the existence of a group called the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, located in Washington, D.C. I called the number listed in the telephone directory and was soon speaking to Bob Smith, the Committee's Research Director. I told Smith that I was a writer and wanted to do a piece on the John F. Kennedy assassination. I asked him for an interview, and he agreed.

We met in the offices of Bernard Fenster-

ssassination Tapes

...NUED FROM PAGE 47

ld, a successful criminal lawyer and rector of the Committee, in a modern ce building a few blocks from the White use. Fensterwald is a small, dapper man h a thin beard. Smith is a lean, intense ain smoker. Both men appeared to be their forties.

"Before we begin," I said, "I think I should ntion that I used to work for the CIA." have run across it often, the theory that CIA killed Kennedy. It seems absurd me, and I don't believe it. I worked there three years and never saw or heard anyng suggesting the Agency was involved the assassination. I never met anyone ere I thought capable of doing it. Still, ave learned through bitter experience of suspicion which attaches to former inligence officers. Epidemics of paranoia d to accompany us through life. I thought better get that issue out of the way.

Smith and Fensterwald exchanged inces and smiled. Fensterwald told me it they did not necessarily believe the CIA sassin theory, and they certainly didn't nd talking to a former Agency employee. Relieved, I began to outline my project. sked if they had heard of the PSE. Both in were dimly aware of it. I described device and started to detail the way it uld be used as a research tool. They imediately understood what I was proposing d were tremendously enthusiastic. Yes, ey said, there were many key statements tape somewhere, and they would be glad compile specific references for me. rthermore, they could, in some cases, ovide me with the tape. They said they uld be in contact when they had some-...ng for me.

While I was waiting, I experimented with e PSE. I telephoned a friend and told him out the device. I asked if he was willing play a little game to test it out, and he reed. He picked a number between one d ten. I asked him, "Is the number one?" the number two?" and so on, and he swered no each time. I recorded his sponses, ran them through the PSE and lled him back. The number he picked, old him, was five.

He was dumbfounded. He had not heard the PSE and had thought I might be concting some elaborate joke at his expense. it when I called back and correctly idened the number he had picked, he realized vas serious. And he was shocked.

I played the same game several times th others and did not always have similar ccess. With Bernard Fensterwald, I was ile only to narrow the answer down to two mbers, one of which turned out to be correct. With others I have been completely unable to identify the right number. The problem with this game is that the player knows that it is just that. He knows that I know he is lying, it is a socially acceptable situation and there is nothing at stake. The stress which accompanies real deception is not always present.

I obtained a tape recording from CBS News of a portion of a *Sixty Minutes* program in which Mike Wallace interviewed Clifford Irving. The interview took place during the height of the controversy, while Irving was still claiming to have gotten Howard Hughes' life story through a series of interviews with the billionaire. It was a consummate job of lying, embellished with such convincing details as Irving's disagreement with his colleague Susskind about whether Hughes kept his organic prunes in a paper or a plastic bag. *Sixty Minutes* re-ran the segment after Irving's confession because the man's sheer virtuosity as a prevaricator was amazing. I was interested in the interview for a different reason: at the height of the controversy, Irving had been given a polygraph examination and had passed it. I wanted to see if the man who had beaten the conventional lie detector could also beat the PSE.

I selected a point in the interview at which Mike Wallace suggested that Irving had not interviewed Howard Hughes, but had happened on some transcripts of Hughes' statements. Irving asked how he could have happened on them. Wallace rejoined, "Where *did* you happen on those transcripts?" Irving replied, "I got the transcripts from Howard Hughes." I charted this statement on the PSE.

It was a perfect example of total stress, horizontally blocked, with the smooth, "trimmed-hedge" wave form. Clifford Irving was a master liar, and he had beaten the polygraph, but he would have been caught by the PSE.

A few days after our first meeting, I received a call from Bob Smith. He had turned up a few things for me. I visited him at the Committee's office in downtown Washington. He gave me a tape recording and a typewritten transcript. The recording was the Louis Lomax television program of Sunday, October 16, 1966. Wesley Liebler, a member of the Warren Commission's staff, was the guest. The transcript was of a CBS News television program entitled *The Warren Report*, which had been broadcast in four one-hour segments on June 25, 26, 27 and 28, 1967.

I examined the transcript. The programs had been narrated by Walter Cronkite and other CBS newsmen. They reviewed every major point of controversy that had been raised by the critics of the Warren Report, interviewing eyewitnesses, Dallas policemen, medical examiners, ballistic specialists and many others who had some inside knowledge of the assassination of John F. Kennedy. For what I had in mind, it was a gold mine. I telephoned CBS and learned that I could get a copy of the program's soundtrack if I would pay for the dubbing charges. I told them to go ahead.

Next I played the Lomax-Liebler tape. Apparently Mark Lane had been on an earlier Lomax program, and now Liebler was on to rebut him. I didn't need the PSE to know that Liebler was stressed. He seemed very agitated, and his breathing audibly indicated his tension. He was angry about the things Lane had said, the questions Lomax was asking him, and the reaction of the studio audience. Given his highly emotional state, he did not seem a very promising subject for the PSE. Nonetheless, I decided to give it a try.

Charting a tape with the PSE is a long and tedious process, and it was impractical to chart the entire program. I ran some of Liebler's statements which were not in dispute and discovered, as I had expected, a great deal of stress. He was pretty charged up.

Most of the exchange between Liebler, Lomax and the audience was argumentative and did not deal with specific factual points. I found two key statements by Liebler, though, and I charted them.

The first statement, in response to a question by Lomax, was, "I have no doubt about the conclusions of the [Warren] Report." Plenty of stress was evident, but not much more than in other statements.

The second statement related to those Warren Commission documents which were not included in the Report—they were locked up in the National Archives. Lomax asked Liebler if there was anything in the documents which would alter Liebler's opinion. Taken literally, it was a strange question, since Liebler had seen the documents and, if they would alter his opinion, they would already have done so. Lomax probably meant to ask if the documents would conflict with the conclusions of the Warren Report. Whatever Liebler thought the question meant, he answered quickly, "Oh, none, none at all." The PSE showed much more stress here than during any of Liebler's other statements.

It was all pretty confused and fuzzy, and it didn't tell me more than I'd already known: Wesley Liebler was pretty upset when he appeared on the Louis Lomax program. I hoped that the CBS tapes would yield more enlightening results.

I finally received a call from CBS's Washington office saying the tapes had arrived. I broke a few traffic laws getting there to pick up the tapes and returning to my apartment. I had already selected the points I wanted to check from the transcript of the program. I mounted the first tape on the recorder, ran it down to the first point of interest, and turned on the PSE.

For the next three days and nights, I ran charts. When I finished, I had a splitting headache, my kitchen floor was ankle deep in chart paper, but I had a much clearer idea of what did and did not happen that day in Dallas.

Before I describe my results, I feel that I must offer the reader a few comments and

. . . ...cation.

. Although the PSE is a well-established ... it has not been validated ... for historical research. Even though ... familiar with the machine believe it can ... in this way, my project the first one not to do so.

It is easier to demonstrate with the PSE a speaker is telling the truth than to ... he is lying. Stress can be caused by ... other than deception; but the absence of stress is an extremely reliable ... cation of truthfulness. Of course, the ... ence of stress does not prove that a ... ement is true, only that the speaker ... eves it to be true.

. Although I found a great deal of stress ... testimony of the assassination tapes. ... o single instance can I say that the individual was lying. I point this out not only ... protect myself from libel suits but be... se I am not morally certain any one individual was ... ing the truth.

Nonetheless, stress in the testimony ... many witnesses to the same event makes mathematical probability overwhelming at least some of them were lying.

... ese points could not be better illus... ed than they were by the Jim Gar... n–Clay Shaw Affair

... arrison, it may be recalled, was the New ... eans District Attorney who, in 1967, ... med to have solved the Kennedy assas... ation. He presented an elaborate case ... inst a local businessman, Clay Shaw, ... others, as members of an assassination ... spiracy. In one of the hour-long pro... ms, CBS interviewed Garrison, Shaw, ... two other people involved in Garrison's ... gations.

... his interview, Garrison was hostile and ... not make many firm, factual statements ... uld test with the PSE. However, he did ... "There's no question about it [that he ... w how the assassination had been car... out] . . . we know the key individuals ... lved . . . there is no question about the [the conspirators] were there [in Dealy ... za]." The PSE showed good to hard ... ss on each of these statements. I also ... a noncontroversial statement of Gar... n's as a control: "Oswald was not killed ... e [at the movie theater where he was ... sted]," and found no stress. Garrison's ... ements about his case against Clay ... w strongly indicated deception.

... ext I ran some statements by Clay Shaw ... ying his involvement in such a conspir... and denying ever knowing or meeting ... Harvey Oswald. I also ran a control ... ement. Shaw turned out to be heavily ... ssed throughout.

... his was not particularly surprising. The ... had been accused of conspiring to ... der the President of the United States ... was being interviewed about it before ... vision cameras. He would have to have ... n a pretty cool customer not to show ... t of stress, even if he were telling the ... plete truth.

... inding that both Garrison and Shaw ... wed stress was not an encouraging development. Of course, both men could be lying. Garrison might have found some valid evidence linking Shaw to the assassination and then, in the time-honored tradition of prosecutors, invented the rest of his case. But Shaw's stress could easily be the result of his predicament, and Garrison's might also be the result of some outside issue. The situation was ambiguous.

I ran the testimony of Lee Odom. Odom, a Dallas businessman, was attempting to explain the mysterious coincidence of the post office box numbers. It seems that the Dallas post office box number 11906 appeared in the notebooks of both Clay Shaw and Lee Harvey Oswald. In his testimony, Odom stated that he could not account for the number appearing in Oswald's notebook, he knew how it got into Shaw's. It was Odom's box number, and he had given it to Shaw, whom he'd met by chance on a business trip to New Orleans. The PSE showed hard stress during his statement. No unrelated control statement was available for me to run for comparison.

This didn't really clear things up. There were several obvious alternative explanations for Odom's stress. For example, there had been a number of rather unsavory allegations in the press about Clay Shaw, unrelated to the Garrison charges. Odom may have felt extremely uncomfortable about linking himself to this man in any way. The coincidence of the box numbers seemed very suspicious, but Bob Smith of the Committee had pointed out to me that both Shaw's and Oswald's notebooks were filled with numbers, so the chance of such a coincidence was not that remote.

At this point I began to wonder if the television camera was the "outside issue" in every case. Perhaps just being on television will so thoroughly rattle the average person that, lying or not, he is going to show stress on the PSE. I checked this out by recording and charting a number of people on television programs—public officials, men in the street, even witnesses to a particularly gruesome accident. There was occasional stress, but it never reached the high level I was finding in the assassination tapes.

I also recalled something else which put my mind to rest on this point: the PSE had been used to analyze the statements of contestants on the television program *To Tell The Truth*, and identified "the real Mr. So-and-so" with an accuracy of better than 94 percent. The problem obviously was not the television camera.

> Deception is not proved by stress, but given enough witnesses' testimony, the PSE is able to arrive at the truth

I ran the testimony of William Gurvich on the PSE. Gurvich had been Garrison's chief aide in the investigation of Clay Shaw until he resigned, charging Garrison with wrongdoing. He said, "The truth as I see it is that Mr. Shaw should never have been arrested." He was asked if Garrison had known of certain illegal and unethical methods Gurvich had alleged were being used by Garrison's staff. He answered, "Yeah, of course he did. He ordered it." There was no stress in Mr. Gurvich's statements. The PSE showed that he believed what he was saying.

Obviously I did not have enough testimony from a large enough number of witnesses to create a detailed picture of the Garrison–Shaw affair, but it seems probable that, at the very least, Garrison did not have much of a case against Shaw (a view later held by a New Orleans jury) and likely that Shaw was completely innocent of complicity in the assassination. The lesson of this episode is twofold. First, stress in any one person's testimony does not prove deception. Second, given enough testimony by different witnesses, the PSE can arrive at the truth.

The first person I ran on the PSE who had any direct knowledge of the assassination was Oswald's widow, Marina. Unfortunately, only one of her statements was on the CBS tapes—that Oswald had owned a rifle. The PSE said she was telling the truth.

The rifle had been one of the major points of controversy raised by critics of the Warren Report. The debate centered on two points: whether the Mannlicher–Carcano alleged to have belonged to Oswald was the rifle found by the Dallas police in the Texas School Book Depository, and whether that particular gun could have been the murder weapon.

On the tapes, Darrell C. Tomlinson, an employee of Parkland Hospital, testified that he had found a rifle bullet on a stretcher which he believed had carried Governor Connally. There was no stress in his statement. The PSE said he was telling the truth.

Dr. Joseph D. Nicol, Superintendent of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation for the State of Illinois, ran ballistic tests on bullet fragments found in the presidential limousine, and on the intact bullet found by Tomlinson. Nicol testified that both the intact bullet and the bullet fragments had been fired by the Mannlicher–Carcano. He, too, was apparently telling the truth.

Deputy Constable Seymour Weitzman of the Dallas police claimed that he found Oswald's Mannlicher–Carcano on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository. However, on the day of the assassination, he had told the press that the rifle he'd found was a German Mauser. The following day he signed an affidavit to that effect. But on the CBS tapes he testified that he had been mistaken about that point, that it had really

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ɜěn Oswald's rifle. The PSE showed considerable stress in his statements.

Patrolman Gerald L. Hill testified that he und three spent bullet hulls on the floor eneath the window from which the fatal iots allegedly were fired. The PSE showed ırd stress in his statements.

The rifle was one of the principal points sed by the Warren Commission to link swald to the assassination. The PSE substantiated the testimony that Oswald owned rifle and that the evidence supplied to ballistics expert indicated this rifle was e murder weapon. However, the PSE did ɔt substantiate the controversial claims of allas police regarding the discovery of is evidence.

The hospital employee was apparently lling the truth when he recounted finding e bullet on a stretcher at Parkland Hospi-l, but many critics have charged that the illet had been deliberately planted there. iis is the famous "single bullet" which the arren Report says passed through the odies of both the President and Governor onnally, and then lodged in Connally's rist. Several researchers have tried to peat this, firing the same type of bullet to the wrist of a cadaver. The bullets never mained perfectly intact, as the one found ı the stretcher; they became twisted lumps lead and copper.

The second link between Oswald and the ssassination is the charge that he killed fficer Tippitt a Dallas policeman, while eeing from the scene of the first shooting. number of eyewitnesses have testified at they saw Oswald shoot Tippitt, and one them, Domingo Benavides, was interewed on the CBS tapes. He was asked there was any doubt in his mind that swald was the man he saw shoot Tippitt. e replied, "No, sir, there was no doubt all." There was absolutely no stress in s statement. He was telling the truth.

The killing of Officer Tippitt by Oswald ıs fueled the fires of controversy over the arren Report. Tippitt was far from his usual eat when he was shot. Some witnesses ıve alleged that Tippitt and Oswald were een together in Jack Ruby's nightclub. ley theorize that the three men were part an assassination conspiracy, and that ppitt had been sent to silence Oswald, ıt had been beaten to the draw.

The Dallas police radio dispatcher, fficer Murray Jackson, was asked if he ought Tippitt knew Oswald. "No," he plied. "I don't think he knew Oswald." Did ıckson know Oswald? "No," answered ıckson, "I didn't either." The PSE showed eavy stress in both statements.

Perhaps the greatest source of conɔversy over the Warren Report is it's claim at all the shots were fired by one gunman. ɔme eyewitnesses claim to have heard ıots and seen gunsmoke in the area of low hillock ahead and to the right of the esidential motorcade. This hillock has ɔme to be known as "the grassy knoll." ne of these witnesses was a railroad ɔrker named S.M. Holland, who observed the scene from an overpass near the knoll. The PSE confirmed that he thought he had seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, but it could not support his claim that he had heard a shot from that direction.

Another witness, Charles Brehm, was quoted by Mark Lane as having said that he had seen a portion of the President's skull flying back over the left rear end of the limousine. Lane offered this as evidence of a shot from the grassy knoll. On the CBS tapes, Brehm stated heatedly that he had been quoted out of context, and emphatically denied that any shots had come from the knoll. Despite his emotional state, there was almost no stress in this statement.

Officer Jacks of the Dallas police, who was riding in the limousine of Vice-President Johnson, denied that any of the shots had come from the direction of the grassy knoll. The PSE turned up a fair degree of stress.

Three witnesses, Mrs. Caroline Walther, Arnold Rowland and Howard Brennan, claimed to have seen gunmen in the windows of the Texas School Book Depository building. Mrs. Walther said she saw two men, one armed with a rifle, the second with a shorter gun. Rowland told the Warren Commission he had seen two men, one an elderly Negro, in the window Oswald is alleged to have fired from, but on the CBS tapes he claimed he had seen an armed man at a different window. The Commission relied heavily on the testimony of Brennan, who claimed to have seen a gunman in the "Oswald window" actually firing the last of the shots. The PSE showed hard stress in the testimony of all three witnesses.

> "Chief Justice Warren: "We explored both these theories and found no evidence that either group was involved"

The PSE analysis of the eyewitnesses' testimony regarding the source of the shots is ambiguous. It supports Holland's claim to have seen a puff of smoke on the knoll, and Brehm's denial that any shots came from that direction, and it raises serious doubts about all other claims and counterclaims. This contradiction seems to result from the notorious unreliability of eyewitnesses, perhaps compounded by a fair amount of fabrication. Deception, if it is present here, may have been motivated merely by a desire for attention. Or there may have been darker reasons.

There is, however, other evidence and testimony that could shed some light on the existence, number and location of assassins other than Oswald. This brings us to perhaps the most dubious and controversial element in the Warren Commission's version of the event—the autopsy.

Within minutes after the shooting, Kennedy had been rushed to the emergency room at Parkland Hospital, where Dr. Malcolm Perry tried to save his life. The physician saw that the President had suffered a massive head wound and a smaller wound in the throat. Perry performed a tracheostomy, cutting through the throat wound in an attempt to open a breathing passage. Afterward, when hope for the President had been abandoned, Perry met with the press and declared that the wound in the front of the neck had been an entry wound.

The President's body was flown to Washington, D.C. There, approximately eight hours after the shooting, an autopsy was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital. Because of the tracheostomy, the nature of the neck wound could no longer be observed and was, at first, overlooked. Later, after consulting the Dallas doctors, the Bethesda pathologists concluded that it was an exit wound. The autopsy report stated that there were two entry wounds, one low in the rear scalp and one at the right base of the neck; and two exit wounds, the throat wound and a large irregular wound on the right side of the head.

The confusion was compounded when two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that a wound had been found in the President's back, and that no corresponding exit wound had been located. Diagrams made during the autopsy seemed to confirm this, showing the lower of the two entry wounds to be below the shoulders, not at the base of the neck. What became of the bullet? The agents reported that Bethesda doctors thought the bullet had dropped from the wound when the Dallas doctors attempted external heart massage. But this was the shot that the Commission claimed had passed through Kennedy and struck Governor Connally.

X-rays and color photographs of the autopsy were made. The brain was removed from the body. Brain and skin tissue slides were prepared for microscopic examination. Remarkably, the Warren Commission never asked to see any of this evidence, relying instead solely on the testimony of Captain James J. Humes, one of the pathologists who conducted the autopsy. Even more incredible is the disappearance of the brain, the slides, and some of the photographs, which were alleged to have been turned over to the National Archives by the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

Both Dr. Perry and Captain Humes were interviewed on the CBS tapes. Perry was asked about the throat wound he'd seen when the President was brought to Parkland Hospital. His answer seemed evasive. He neither confirmed nor denied that he had thought it was an entry wound, talking instead about the difficulty of making such a determination and the fact that his attention had been devoted to saving the President's life. Then the interviewer asked him directly whether he had thought at the time that it was an entry wound. "Actually, I didn't really give it much thought," he replied. He

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owed hard stress on the PSE. Unfortutely, he made no other definite statement out the nature of the wound.

The interview with Captain Humes was ore informative. Just before the interview, 1967, Humes had re-examined the autopphotographs and X-rays, and he dissed them at length on the CBS tapes. diagrams drawn during the autopsy, said, had not been intended to precisely present the location of the wounds. However, he produced a sketch which, he d, did represent these locations accuely. The interviewer asked, "Your reamination of the photographs verify that wounds were as shown here?"

"Yes, sir," he replied. No stress.

Were there any wounds other than one the base of the neck and one up in the ll? "No, sir, there were not." Moderate ess, not enough to suggest deception. Was there any doubt that the wound at back of the President's head was an ry wound? "There is absolutely no doubt." Again stress but again moderate.

Altogether, how many wounds were re? "There were two wounds of entrance two of exit." At this point the stress bene hard.

And where were the entry wounds loed? "Posteriorly, one low in the right sterior scalp, and one in the base of the ck on the right." Hard stress again.

Could he be absolutely certain that what said was an entry wound was, in fact, t. "Yes, indeed we can." Hard stress.

The interview with Humes was one of the gest and most detailed on the CBS es, and I charted most of it with the PSE. was clear to me that he believed much what he was saying, but the frequent flickgs of moderate stress and the occasionlashes of hard stress suggested that he sn't nearly as confident of his testimony he claimed to be. As Dr. Perry had nted out, sometimes it's not easy to tell entry wound from an exit wound.

The interviewer asked him one good "bot- line" question:

Do you have any different conclusion, different ideas, any different thoughts , after seeing [the autopsy photographs] in, than you had at that time?"

"No," replied Captain Humes, "we think bear up very well, and very closely testimony before the Warren Commis-."

The stress was hard.

Arlen Specter, one of the Warren Commis-'s principal investigators, also spoke on CBS tapes. He said that the case against ald fitted together very well, and that dom could one find among actual criminal convictions a case equally persuasive. He added that there was no foundation for the charge that the Commission had been formed to whitewash the facts.

The PSE said he was telling the truth.

John McCloy, a member of the Warren Commission, said much the same thing, and added that he had seen no credible evidence to contradict the findings of the Commission. The PSE backed him up on this, but it failed to do so when, speaking of the Warren Report, he said, "There was nothing fraudulent about it." Here the PSE showed hard stress.

If Specter and McCloy were as confident as the PSE shows them to be in the truthfulness of the Warren Report, what could be fraudulent about it? Perhaps the snipping off of a few loose ends, the suppression of a few pieces of inconvenient evidence which conflicted with a version of events they believed to be essentially true.

The one man who could be expected to have the most informed opinion regarding the work of the Warren Commission is former Chief Justice Earl Warren himself. He had declined to be interviewed on the CBS program in 1967, but he did appear on television in May, 1972, in an interview which was part of a series called *The Brandeis Television Recollections*. Bob Smith of the Committee provided me with the tape.

> "...we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy." There was very hard stress on "no evidence"

The interview was an hour long, but the Kennedy assassination and the Warren Commission came up only once. The interviewer, Abram Sachar, Chancellor of Brandeis University, was friendly and deferential. I charted some of Warren's remarks unrelated to the assassination and found that he was generally unstressed. Sachar raised the subject of the Commission obliquely, and Warren volunteered several rather lengthy statements about it.

Warren said that immediately after the assassination there were two theories, one that Khrushchev and Castro were behind the killing, the other that a group of right-wing Texas oilmen were responsible. He said:

"We explored both of those theories for ten months and found no evidence that either of them was involved in it."

The PSE showed hard stress.

He continued:

"... we found no evidence of any kind that there was any conspiracy."

Again there was stress, and particularly hard stress on the words "no evidence."

"I have read everything," said Justice Warren, "that has come to my notice in the press, and I read some of the documents that have criticized the Commission very severely, but I have never found that they have discovered any evidence of any kind that we didn't discover and use in determining the case as we did."

Hard stress once again. The word "never" was a perfectly "trimmed hedge."

"I have found nothing since that time," he continued, "to change my view, nor have I heard of anything that has changed the view of any member of the commission since that time."

The stress was hard. As I had now come to expect, the word "nothing" seemed a particularly beautiful example of stress. Another word seemed to show even more stress: "member." Could he have been thinking of someone in particular? On January 19, 1970, Senator Richard B. Russell, a member of the Warren Commission, revealed that he had never believed that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone.

I had charted the last of the assassination tapes. Of course, these few thousand feet of recording tape are only a small fraction of the relevant testimony recorded and stored away in the archives of television news departments. There is, for example, Lee Harvey Oswald, as he was led through the Dallas police station, denying that he had killed the President. There are statements by Marina Oswald, Jack Ruby and by others.

I have no doubt that with these tapes, a Psychological Stress Evaluator, and time to work on them, a very detailed picture of the assassination of John F. Kennedy could be reconstructed, a picture that might even reveal the identities of the assassins and their co-conspirators. I hope that sooner or later someone does this. I have gone as far as the private resources of a free-lance writer permit.

What, given the sample of testimony I have processed with the PSE, can I say about the assassination?

We should first examine the testimony in which *no* stress was found, since it is almost certain that these people were telling the truth as they saw it. This strongly suggests the following:

1. Oswald owned a rifle.
2. A bullet fired from that rifle was found on Governor Connally's stretcher at Parkland Hospital.
3. Bullet fragments *alleged* to have been found in the presidential limousine also came from Oswald's rifle.
4. At least one eyewitness believes he saw gunsmoke on the grassy knoll, but another is equally certain no shots came from that direction.
5. Oswald shot and killed Officer Tippitt.
6. At least one member of the Warren Commission and one member of the Commission's staff really believe in the validity of the Warren Report.
7. Jim Garrison had little or no case against Clay Shaw.

Almost all of this tends to support, in one way or another, the Warren Report. But now

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's look at the testimony that is called into question by the PSE:

1. The claim that Oswald's rifle was found in the Texas School Book Depository.
2. The claim that bullet hulls matching Oswald's rifle were found in the same place.
3. The claim that one gunman was seen in the "Oswald window" of the Dallas Book Depository.
4. The claim that two gunmen were seen in this window.
5. The claim that a gunman was seen in a different window of that building.
6. Another claim that no shots came from the grassy knoll, and a claim by the witness who saw the gunsmoke on the knoll that he also *heard* a shot from that direction.
7. A claim by a Dallas policeman that neither he nor Officer Tippitt knew Oswald.
8. The claim by the pathologist—the Warren Commission's only source of information about the autopsy—that the X-rays and autopsy photographs support his testimony before the Commission.
9. The claim by a member of the Warren Commission that there was nothing fraudulent about the Warren Report.
10. The claim by Earl Warren that the Commission found no evidence of a conspiracy; that none of the Warren Report's critics ever found anything the Commission had missed; that he had found nothing since the publication of the Report to change his view; and that he knew of no Commission member who had ever changed his mind about their conclusions.

If we accept that each instance of stress indicates deception, an interesting and unexpected possibility emerges:

Oswald was involved in some way in the assassination, if only as a fall guy. Some of the Dallas police force may have been involved, planted the evidence that implicated Oswald, and covered up the fact that there was a conspiracy. The medical examiner believed his own testimony to the Warren Commission, but later had doubts. The Commission found evidence of a conspiracy but didn't believe it, so they covered it up in order to present a tidy package to the public. Later, at least one member of the Commission changed his mind, but since he didn't know what really did happen, he decided to say nothing. So there was conspiracy in Dallas, and in Washington nothing worse than blundering.

I could say all this with certainty if I knew that stress always equals deception. Unfortunately, I do not know that. But the PSE analysis of the assassination tapes has generated a staggering amount of fresh doubt regarding the Warren Report. This doubt rises not only from specific points the PSE has called into question, but from the very sinister implications of the very existence of deception among policemen, government officials and Commission members. The question remains: did such deception exist or was the stress found by the PSE the result, in every case, of an outside issue?

Obviously, whenever stress is found by the PSE and cannot be cross-checked by a structured interrogation, some probability must be accepted that this stress is caused by an outside issue. No study has yet been conducted to establish what this probability might be, but let us pick, for the sake of discussion, a figure that may seem ridiculously high—70 percent. In other words, we are assuming that 70 percent of the times the PSE finds stress in testimony, it results from something other than lying.

Now, let's ignore the deception indicated in the testimony of the eyewitnesses; even if present, it might have resulted from mere desire for attention. That leaves eight "insiders" who have demonstrated stress when making statements supporting the Warren Report: the Dallas policemen Hill, Jacks, Jackson and Weitzman; the medical examiner, Captain Humes; Commission staffer Wesley Liebler; Commission member John McCloy; former Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Assuming that there is a 70 percent chance that any *single* instance of stress is "outside issue," what is the probability that all eight instances are due to factors other than deception? Elementary probability theory tells us that it is seven-tenths raised to the eighth power, or approximately 6 percent.

In other words, even making some fairly conservative assumptions, there is a 94 percent chance that at least one of these eight men is lying.

My own personal opinion? I don't know. I remember the young man with the ring. He said he was wearing it, and he was, but he stressed. He stressed not because he was lying, but because there was something about that ring that really bothered him, something he didn't want the world to know. Perhaps that is also true of these men who, in one way or another, learned some part of the truth about the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

I suppose I'm not absolutely sure even of that. When I first met Bob Smith of the Committee, I asked him if there was any one thing the government could do to clear up the mystery. Yes, he replied, the one thing that would help more than anything else would be to make available the physical evidence — the detailed FBI lab reports, the X-rays and autopsy photographs, the microscopic slides, the bloodstained clothing, yes, even the President's brain, wherever it has been hidden. These things, he said, would go far toward answering the questions about what actually happened that day in Dallas. Maybe they would even confirm the Warren Report.

So when I say I'm not absolutely certain these men are concealing something, I mean I can think of something that could conceivably change my mind. That is, if the government would open all its files on this matter to us and prove that we are wrong —we, the people who ten years later still believe we haven't yet heard the full account of the events of November 22, 1963.

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THE LAST THREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY BULLETS:

1964 – result decided by the assassination of President John F. Kennedy

1968 – result decided by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy

1972 – result decided by the near-assassination of Governor George Wallace

WHAT is the evidence?

WHO fire the fatal shots?

WHY has there been such a concerted effort to withhold the facts?

WHO was really behind the assassinations?

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DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS

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DECADE OF ASSASSINATIONS
1963 – 1973

PROGRAM

FRIDAY – NOVEMBER 23

9:00 **LATE REGISTRATION –**
Early Registrants pick up passes.

9:30 **WELCOME:**
Mr. Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Executive Director, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
Mr. Norman Mailer, Author and Forwarder of *The Fifth Estate*

10:00 **CURRENT STATUS OF PROMINENT ASSASSINATION CASES:**
JFK CASE – Mr. Robert P. Smith, Director of Research, Committee to Investigate Assassinations
RFK CASE – Mr. Robert Hanson, Attorney, present counsel for Sirhan Sirhan
KING CASE – Mr. James Lesar, Attorney, present counsel for James Earl Ray
WALLACE CASE – Mr. Ronald Van Doren, Newsman, Author, researcher into the background of Arthur Bremer
ROCKWELL CASE – Ms. Meredith Rode, Professor at Federal City College, Authority in killing of George Lincoln Rockwell

11:30 **UNIQUE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES:**
Mr. William Turner, Moderator – Former FBI Agent, Author of numerous books on investigative techniques
Mr. George O'Toole – Former CIA Agent, Free-Lance Writer, expert on the PSE (Psychological Stress Evaluator)
Mr. Robert Saltzman – Computer Engineer, lecturer on the Warren Commission Report

FRIDAY – Continued

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **MEDICAL AND PHYSICAL EVIDENCE:**
Mr. Josiah Thompson, Moderator – Professor at Haverford College, author of *Six Seconds in Dallas*
Dr. Cyril Wecht – Professor of Law and Forensic Medicine at Duquesne University; Coroner of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Ms. Sylvia Meagher – Attorney, UN Official, author of *Accessories After The Fact*
Mr. Roger Hanson – Attorney, counsel to Sirhan Sirhan
Mr. Herbert MacDonnell – Professor of Criminalistics, Corning University; expert in case of Fred Hampton
Mr. Mark Lane – Attorney, author of *Rush To Judgment* and *Executive Action*

6:00 **BREAK FOR DINNER**

8:30 **WARREN COMMISSION REPORT: FACT OR FICTION –**
A slide show and lecture by Mr. Robert Saltzman

SATURDAY – NOVEMBER 24

9:30 **ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MEDIA:**
Mr. John Henry Faulk, Moderator – Humorist and Author of *Fear On Trial*
Mr. Robert Kaiser – Author of *RFK Must Die*
Mr. Donald Freed – Co-Author of *Executive Action*
Mr. Harold Weisberg – Author of *Frame Up*
Mr. Ted Charach – Author of *Second Gun*
Mr. Peter Noyes – Author of *Legacy Of Doubt*
Mr. Fred Cook – Author of numerous books and articles

12:30 **BREAK FOR LUNCH**

2:00 **THEORIES OF CONSPIRACY:**
Mr. Richard Sprague, Moderator – Computer expert and author
Dr. Richard Popkin, Professor at Washington University; author of *The Second Oswald*
Col. Fletcher Prouty – Former Liaison Officer between Pentagon and CIA; author of *The Secret Teams*
Mr. Robert K. Brown – Former Special Services Officer; expert in attempts on life of Castro
Mr. Earl Golz – Reporter for Dallas Morning News; expert on Organized Crimes
Mr. Victor Marchetti – Former CIA Agent; author
Mr. Peter Dale Scott – Professor at Berkeley; Author of *The War Conspiracy*

5:00 **INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS WITH THE SPEAKERS –**
Question and Answer Sessions

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AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS:

A BIBLIOGRAPHY

OF WORKS PUBLISHED

1963-1970

RELATED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF

JOHN F. KENNEDY

MARTIN LUTHER KING

ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Compiled by

THE COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS

WASHINGTON, D. C.
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ASSASSINATIONS
1973

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I. JOHN F. KENNEDY

A. GENERAL

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"Win or lose, the Primary Players." Life, 7 June 1968, pp. 35-41.

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13-00000

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) FOIA IPS 76-382 [WEISBERG LITIGATION]

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
DC/E/G [signature]		DATE 1 MAR 78

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. E/Staff A			[initials]	Cameron: I believe the requestor's inquiry could and should be satisfied with para 3 alone. And recommend deletion of the remaining part of the message on grounds - not relevant - privacy of others - internal procedures/process - cryptos - name of CIA Station abroad. I agree [initials]
2.				
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FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION	IPS-76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
H. Stilson HT-3	1595	28 February 1978
		SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/EUR/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1			Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.
2. 4 B-4406				
3. E/BC	Rtd 8 mar		✓	
4. Eur/F	8 MAR 1978	8	D	
5. Carole Davidson E/Staff A				Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.
6.				
7.				
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9.				
10.				If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.
11.				
12.				Thanks - Helen

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 1 D 4125

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1.			
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. IPA/SCB AB 1907			h
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11.			
12.			

RETURN TO:

H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION	IPS-76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
M. Stilson HT-3	1595	28 February 1978
		SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EA/Staff A att: Ray Smith.	28 FEB 1978		[initials]
2. 5D3113			
3. CEA/JAPAN	1 - MAR 1978		✓
4.			
5. EA/STA/EXO	1 - MAR 1978		[initials]
6. AC/EA/STA	1 MAR 1978		[initials]
7.			
8. EA/STA/EXO	1 MAR 1978		[initials]
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
M. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)	REQUEST NUMBER
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION	IPS-76-382

FROM:	EXTENSION	DATE SENT
H. Stilson HT-3	1595	28 February 1978
		SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DCD/Staff A: att: Ruth Elliff				
2. 913 Key Bldg.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
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12.				

This should be coordinated with FBI + State. Ruth

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. (b)(3) (b)(1)

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE
2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/EUR1/FOIA att: Mr. LaClair	1 [illegible]	[illegible]	✓	
2. 4B-4406				
3. E/I	2/13/78		[signature]	
4.				
5. E/Staff A				
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Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for us please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson HT-3
1 D-4143

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal / Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-5

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT ~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE ~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. EA/Staff B/EXO att: M. Smith	8 - FEB 1978		[signature]
2. 5D-3115			
3.			
4.			
5.			
6.			
7. EA/STA/EXO	15 FEB 1978		[signature]
8.			
9.			
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12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-5 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal / Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: 7 February 1976

SUSPENSE DATE: 16 February 1976

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/AF/Staff A att: Mr. Foy				
2. 3B-17-C				
3. H. Stilson HT-3				

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

4. The documents may not be released.

RS Addis Ababa 2200 (IN 99685), 28 April 1968 identifies the source and does not pertain to James Earl Ray or Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release it would violate the privacy of another U.S. person.

The information contained in paras 1 and 3 of IN 00793, 30 April 1968 was acquired from a liaison source, the Nigerian Special Branch. Paragraph 2 RS identifies a source of intelligence and the information therein does not pertain to James Earl Ray, Martin Luther King, or any known suspect, accomplice or associate. To release the information would violate the privacy of another U.S. person.

RS CSCI 316/01685-68 may not be released since it merely repeats the information contained in the two cables above, and the exemptions applied to them are equally

(please turn over)

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/ Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE
~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A. 4B4406	8 Feb 78		cl
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Done
cl

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg
James Earl Ray

REQUEST NUMBER 76-382

FROM: H. Stelson HT-3

EXTENSION 1595

DATE SENT 17 Feb 1978

SUSPENSE DATE 28 Feb 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. Ray Smith 5D 3115	17 FEB	1978	[initials]	Please do a classification review (and downgrade where possible) the attached docs. Thanks Helen
2.				
3. DC/EA/STA	21 FEB 1978 / 17 FEB	1978	[initials]	
4.				
5. EA/STA/EXO	21 FEB 1978		[initials]	
6.				
7.				
8.				
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11.				
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RETURN TO: H. Stelson HT-1

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: ~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE: ~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. LA/Staff/B att. Mr. F Amer	8 Feb	9	F
2. 3 C-34			
3.			
4. LA/Staff B att: Mr. F. Amer			
5. 3-C-34			
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

These are the King documents

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson IP-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: ~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE: ~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. NE/Staff IA Room 6 D 3113		9 Feb	By	
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Comments:

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the materi for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks.

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson IP-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional) Harold Weisberg Appeal/LITIGATION

REQUEST NUMBER: IPS-76-382

FROM: H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION: 1595

DATE SENT: 28 February 1978

SUSPENSE DATE: 2 March 1978

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. C/EUR/Staff A att: Mr. LaClair	1		
2. 4B-4406			
3. ~~[illegible]~~ E/SC	Do you approve of proposed sanitation?		
4.	Pls return today (ASAP)		
5. E/Staff A		8 Mar	Thanks
6.			
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COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material. OK

Also, please review the material for classification. Downgrade all documents to CONFIDENTIAL where possible. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the Classification Review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL should be stamped with the downgrading stamp.

If liaison is being claimed as an exemption for deletions indicate the part that is from liaison and identify the service for me please.

Thanks -
Helen

These documents cover Dr. King. You have already completed the Ray documents.

RETURN TO: H. Stilson HT-3 1 D 4125

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

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PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Harold Weisberg Appeal/Litigation

REQUEST NUMBER
IPS-76-382

FROM:
H. Stilson HT-3

EXTENSION
1595

DATE SENT
~~7 February 1978~~

SUSPENSE DATE
~~10 February 1978~~

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DeD Room 913 Key	2 Feb	21 Feb	[initials]
2.			
3. DDO/ISS/PIAG			
4. Attn: Helen			
5. 104127			
6.			
7. Both documents have to remain			
8. CONFIDENTIAL. Sanitized			
9. per (b)(1) + (b)(3)			
10. Also (b)(6) for 19 Feb 69 name			
11.			
12.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

Please review the attached documents for release to Mr. Weisberg. Bracket in red that part of the text you believe should be deleted and give the proper FOIA exemption for the deleted material.

Also, please review the material for classification. I recommend that all these documents be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Classification reviews must be done by an officer with TOP SECRET classifying authority. All documents have been stamped with the classification review stamp for you to complete. Documents that you agree should be stamped with the DOWNGRADING stamp.

If Liaison is being claimed as an exemption please identify the service for me.

Thanks,

Helen

These documents only cover that portion of the request concerning JAMES EARL RAY. The King documents will follow.

RETURN TO:
H. Stilson
HT-3 Ext. 1595

PRIORITY HANDLING FOIA REQUEST

FORM 1-75 3749 ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

10 JUL 1978

Mr. Frank Underwood
Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts Branch
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Room 6958
10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20535:

Attention: Connie Fruitt

Gentlemen:

In responding to an FOIA litigation from Harold Weisberg (enclosure 1), we have surfaced reference to 46 documents which originated with your agency. Three of these documents are referred by listing only, and either first pages or full text copies of the remaining 43 documents are enclosed. This information is being forwarded to you for review and direct response to the requester.

We will advise the requester of this referral in our response, which we expect to complete in the near future.

Please note that the documents listed, and those of which just the first pages have been included, have not been reviewed to see if they contain CIA information. In the event that they do, we request that this material be coordinated with us before being released to the requester.

If you have any questions, please contact Karen Wolfe or Allie Falardeau, 351-5615, and refer to our request F76-382.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Distribution:
Orig - Addse
1 - IPS Chrono
1 - IPS Subject (F-76-382) APPEAL w/attach DDO docs
1 1 - OGC (Launie Ziebell)
1 - DDO/IMS/FPG/AL (Helen Stilson)

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated From Enclosure

13-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 MAY 1968

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Assassination of Martin Luther King

1. On 3 May 1968, an official Italian Intelligence Service provided this Agency's representative in Rome with the following information on one James RAY:

> A James RAY, born in Los Angeles on 8 March 1928 (father's name Oliver), arrived at San Gimignano, Siena, in March 1955 and registered as a student at Perugia. In 1956, RAY was confined at San Gimignano Hospital and in 1957, he was in Sant'Antonio de Fiesole Hospital. These confinements were for "osteomyelitical condition causing bone depression in the cranium, on right parietal temple region." RAY returned permanently to the United States in December 1967.

2. The Italian National Police and the Italian Intelligence Service have turned up no other information thus far. All Italian entry posts have RAY and his aliases on their watchlist.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation representative in Rome was advised of the information in paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

CSCI 316/01763-68

REC-23 44 38861 3515

EX 109 6 MAY 16 1968

Jan 10, 78
This CSCI was treated as doc #250 in initial review.
BL

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

13-00000

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S.J. Papich

SUBJECT : Investigation in Japan of Report on Suspicious Actions of Gerald Lee Richards, Originally Described as Resembling Suspected Assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to the report concerning the above subject made by telephone to Mr. S.J. Papich at 0930 on 17 April 1968. Following is a full account of the investigation made in this case:

A. On 16 April 1968 a United States National Maritime Union official in Yokohama reported that one Gerald Lee Richards, who bore a general physical resemblance to the description given of the suspected assassin of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had arrived in Japan about 15 April 1968 and requested a position aboard any ship going anywhere. Richards became agitated when asked for a contact address in Japan and refused to divulge his Japanese residence. The National Maritime Union official described Richards as 5' 10" tall, 155 pounds, with brown hair, a receding hairline on both sides, and a not very prominent scar two and one-half inches long traversing the center forehead, his most outstanding characteristic being a disconcerting, idiotic grin resembling a constant grimace. According to Richards' documents and statements, he was born 8 April 1937, applied for seaman's papers in San Pedro, California, 16 June 1964 and registered there as a United States National Maritime Union member on 21 February 1968 but never shipped out. His Social Security Number is 562-46-5078; his United States Coast Guard Number Z 2711-782.

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B. A subsequent check with the Japanese National Police Agency confirmed the biographic data supplied by the National Maritime Union official. A ward check indicated that Richards originally resided in Japan from 1963 to 1964 and married TAKAYAMA Michiko in 1963. Both Richards and his wife left Japan for the United States in 1964. Richards returned alone to Japan about 15 April 1968. His wife's address in the United States is listed as 160 Hosoi (phonetic) Street, Carpenteria, California, 93013.

C. A photograph of Richards obtained from the Japanese police was shown to the National Maritime Union official and identified by him as the individual in subparagraph 1A above who had applied for a seaman's berth. The photograph of Richards bears no apparent resemblance to photographs of suspected assassin James Earl Ray provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. The above information has been given to the Legal Attache of the United States Embassy in Tokyo.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS:

James A. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-316/01774-68

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.	NEW DOCUMENT RECORD
(FPE)	75 76 77 78				Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in shaded areas only. 2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

1

2 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS)

CABLE
DISPATCH
(MEMO)
REPORT

DAY	MONTH	YEAR
11	DEC	73

3 FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): CIA - James Angleton

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI

4

CLASS	WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS)	REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS)	DDO ?	DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS)
		FBI		CIR-316/03107-73

5 SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): Conference of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations

6

TYPE OF REVIEW	IAL	DATE OF REVIEW	DAY	MONTH	YEAR

7 Recommendations:

____ A. Release in full text
__X__ B. Release in sanitized form
____ C. Deny in toto
____ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)

____ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
____ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
____ G. Release additional information

8

DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS)	COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS)	NEW CLASS
	OS	

Walter J. Kowalski C/RA/I
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9 EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA 5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10 Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

____	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
____	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
____	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
____	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
X	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
X	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	11. Pseudonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
____	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
____	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
____	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
____	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
____	17. Does not pertain to request		
____	18. Information from another Government agency		
____	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

	TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.	
1	FPE	75 76 77 78				Instructions for Divisions and Staffs: 1. Fill in shaded areas only. 2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

2 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS): CABLE / DISPATCH / MEMO (circled) / REPORT — DAY 14 MONTH JAN YEAR 69

3 FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): CIA — TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI

4 CLASS: — WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS): — REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS): — DDO ?: — DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS): CSCI-316/00108-69

5 SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): GARRISON and the Kennedy Assassination

6 TYPE OF REVIEW: IAL — DATE OF REVIEW: DAY — MONTH — YEAR —

7 Recommendations:

- ___ A. Release in full text
- ___ B. Release in sanitized form
- ___ C. Deny in toto
- ___ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)
- ___ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
- X F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version TO FENSTERWALD
- ___ G. Release additional information

8 DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS): — COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS): — NEW CLASS: —

Walter J. Kowalski CI/RA/1

SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9 EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA — J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA — 5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10 Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

	Item	FOIA	PA
___	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
___	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
___	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
___	4. Information which would/could identify the source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	5. Information pertaining to a source	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	6. Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	7. Location* of CIA overseas installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	8. Location* of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	9. Name* of CIA employee	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
___	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
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___	14. Name* of an FBI agent	(b)(7)(c)	(j)(1)(b)
___	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
___	16. Privacy of other individual	(b)(6)	(j)(1)(f)
___	17. Does not pertain to request		
___	18. Information from another Government agency		
___	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

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CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

NEW DOCUMENT RECORD

	TYPE	YEAR	NUMBER	I/I	DOC. NO.
1	(FPE)	75 76 77 78			

Instructions for Divisions and Staffs:
1. Fill in shaded areas only.
2. Additional comments should be written on back of form.

2 DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION (30 CHARACTERS): CABLE / DISPATCH / (MEMO) / REPORT

DAY: 29 MONTH: Nov YEAR: 73

3 FROM/ORIGINATOR (30 CHARACTERS): FBI - Mr. E.S. Miller

TO/RECIPIENT (30 CHARACTERS): FBI - W.A. Branigan

4 CLASS: | WHERE LOCATED (10 CHARACTERS): | REFERRED BY (10 CHARACTERS): FBI | DDO ? | DO FILE NUMBER (20 CHARACTERS):

5 SUBJECT (80 CHARACTERS): Committee To Investigate Assassinations

6 TYPE OF REVIEW | IAL | DATE OF REVIEW | DAY | MONTH | YEAR

7 Recommendations:

- ___ A. Release in full text
- _X_ B. Release in sanitized form
- ___ C. Deny in toto
- ___ D. Defer decision to coordinate with (Specify in Line 8)
- ___ E. Sustain initial denial in toto
- ___ F. Sustain initial release of of sanitized version
- ___ G. Release additional information

8 DEFER DECISION TO (10 CHARACTERS): | COORDINATE WITH (10 CHARACTERS): OS | NEW CLASS:

Walter J. Kowalski C/RA/1
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE OF REVIEWING OFFICER

9 EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED (40 CHARACTERS)

B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7C OF FOIA   J1 J1B J1C J1E J1F K1 OF PA   5B1 5B2 5B3 5B4 OF E.O. 11652

10 Exemptions are being claimed to protect the following:

___	1. Classification	(b)(1)	(k)(1)
___	2. Information from liaison with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
___	3. Information pertaining to a liaison relationship with a Foreign Government	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)(c)
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___	10. File number	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
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___	12. Cryptonym	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(b)
___	13. Internal organizational data	(b)(3)	(j)(1)(e)
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___	15. FBI file number	(b)(2)	(j)(1)(b)
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___	17. Does not pertain to request		
___	18. Information from another Government agency		
___	19. Other (Specify in Line 11)		

REMARKS (IF OTHER WAS CHECKED ABOVE) (40 CHARACTERS)

104-10433-10212 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

319

Tab 1-52 contains Dispatch UFGA-29877 dated 11 Apr. 1968.

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

(x) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
  ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
  ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

(X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b) (3) of FOIA.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
(X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
(X) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 01

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570

[redacted] TELEPOUCH

DISP NO - [redacted]

FILE NO - NONE

DATE - 11 APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO - CHIEF, [redacted]

INFO - CHIEF, [redacted] CHIEF, [redacted]

FROM - CHIEF [redacted]

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION DURING THE PERIOD 5-8 APRIL HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE [redacted]

1. GRANMA /HAVANA DAILY NEWSPAPER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA/, 5 APRIL 68, FRONT PAGE - ''LAST MINUTE NEWS - MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATED IN MEMPHIS, U.S.A. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTS, LUTHER KING HAS BEEN SHOT BY A 'WHITE WELL-DRESSED YOUNG MALE.''

2. GRANMA, 8 APRIL, FRONT PAGE - ''TWENTY-SEVEN PERSONS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING. IN WASHINGTON ALONE THERE ARE 750 WOUNDED AND 4,186 PERSONS ARRESTED. SNIPERS CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN DIFFERENT CITIES IN THE U.S. THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CAPITOL ARE UNDER HEAVY GUARD.'' /FULL INFORMATION GIVEN./

3. GRANMA, X APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' /WASHINGTON, 7 APRIL, ASSOCIATED FRENCH PRESS - AFP, FRENCH NEWS AGENCY AMX LEAFLETS WERE DISTRIBUTED HERE THIS MORNING, URGING THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF WASHINGTON TO GO TO RICHMOND TO LIBERATE RAP BROWN.'' /THE LEAFLETS CALLED ON THE NEGROES TO FORM A MOTORCADE AND LEAVE FOR RICHMOND TOMORROW, MONDAY.''

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 6 Nov 78

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4. GRANMA, 1 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ARTICLE ENTITLED ''PRINCIPAL
JEGRO ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.'', BY JUANA CARRASCO. THE ARTICLE
;AYS THAT NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO TWO GROUPS - THE
'IOLENT ONES AND THE NON-VIOLENT ONES. IT MENTIONS THE FOLLOWING
MONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE THE USE OF VIOLENCE - CONGRESS OF RACIAL
.QUALITY /CORE/, STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE /SNCC/,
LACK MUSLIMS, BLACK PANTHER PARTY, BLACKSTONE RANGERS, THE ALERT
'ATROL, REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MOVEMENT /RAM/, THE BLACK GUARDS, THE
EACONS, AND ''THE U.S.''. THE FOLLOWING NEGRO ORGANIZATIONS ARE
ENTIONED AMONG THOSE WHICH ADVOCATE NON-VIOLENCE - NATIONAL ASSO-
:IATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE /NAACP/, NATIONAL
IRBAN LEAGUE, AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
SCLC/.

5. GRANMA, 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''ATTEMPTS ARE BING MADE TO
LAME CARMICHAEL FOR THE OUTBREAK OF RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE U.S.''

6. GRANMA, 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''RACIAL CLASHES BETWEEN NEGRO
ND WHITE AMERICAN SOLDIERS IN JAPAN.''

7. GRANMA, 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''THE AMERICAN NEGRO PEOPLE.''

8. GRANMA, 8 APRIL, LAST PAGE - ''MARTYRS OF THE NEGRO
TRUGGLE.''

9. RADIO LIBERACION AND RADIO PROGRESO /HAVANA RADIO STATIONS/,
APRIL, 7:30 A.M. AND 12 NOON - ''THE CHIEF OF THE MISSION TO CUBA
F THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT HAS SENT A MESSAGE
O AFRO-AMERICANS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LEADER, MARTIN LUTHER
ING. THIS MESSAGE SAYS THAT THE CRIME WHICH WAS COMMITTED AGAINST
ARTIN LUTHER KING UNMASKS THE EVIL FACE OF THE RULERS AND RACISTS
F THE UNITED STATES.'' ''THE MESSAGE OF THE VIETNAMESE MISSION IN
AVANA ENDS BY SAYING THAT, WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING,
LL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED BY THE RULERS OF THE UNITED STATES
S TO POUR OIL ONTO THE FLAMES OF THE STRUGGLE OF AFRO-AMERICANS,

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ID THAT THESE FLAMES ARE RISING VIOLENTLY TO PUT AN END TO ALL THE PRESSION AND INJUSTICE WHICH IS FOUND IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH INDERS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE IN THE ENTIRE OUNTRY.''

10. RADIO LIBERACION, 5 APRIL, REP P.M. - "STOKELY CARMICHAEL, LEADER OF BLACK POWER, SAID - 'WE NEGROES MUST ARM OURSELVES WITH RIFLES AND PISTOLS AND LAUNCH AN ASSAULT ON THE STREETS OF THE CITIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN REPRISAL FOR KING'S ASSASSINATION.' CARMICHAEL PREDICTED THAT THERE WILL BE EXECUTIONS IN THE STREETS AS A RESULT OF KING'S ASSASSINATION. HE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE VIOLENCE WHICH HAS BEEN UNLEASHED BY NEGROES AS A RESULT OF KING'S DEATH WILL BE PALE AS COMPARED TO WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN AMERICAN CITIES.''

11. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 5 P.M. - "HIS /KING'S/ DEATH SHOWS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE EXPLOITED MASSES CAN ONLY ANSWER REACTIONARY VIOLENCE WITH REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE.''

12. RADIO PROGRESO, 5 APRIL, 550 P.M. - "CARMICHAEL SAID DURING A TELEPHONE INTERVIEW THAT 'A SERIOUS MISTAKE HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSASSINATING DR. KING BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN THE LEADER OF A MOVEMENT WHICH URGED THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO BURN THE CITIES, NOT TO COMMIT ACTS OF VIOLENCE. THIS MEANS THAT IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO START AN ALL-OUT REVOLUTION.' CARMICHAEL ADDED - 'SERIOUS INCIDENTS HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 35 CITIES WHERE THERE HAVE BEEN FIRES, SHOOTING, FIGHTING, AND DEATHS AS A RESULT OF THE CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST DR. KING. NATURALLY, OTHER SIMILAR THINGS WILL TAKE PLACE. GUERRILLA WARFARE WILL RAPIDLY SPREAD THROUGH THE CITIES BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT WE CANNOT OPENLY REBEL AGAINST THE POLICE.' STOKELY CARMICHAEL ENDED THE INTERVIEW BY SENDING AFFECTIONATE REGARDS TO THE REVOLUTIONARY CUBAN PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADER, FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.''

13. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – ''JUAN /MARI/ BRAS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF PUERTO RICO, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW – 'DR. LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRECIPITATE THE REBELLION OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL THE ABUSES OF WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT.' ''

14. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – ''THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION /AALAPSO/ SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO THE SNCC ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUTHER KING.'' ''THE AALAPSO'S MESSAGE TO THE AMERICAN PACIFIST ORGANIZATION ENDS AS FOLLOWS – 'WE BEG YOU TO EXPRESS TO THE FAMILY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING AND TO ALL AFRO-AMERICANS OUR DEEPEST SORROW OVER HIS DEATH, OUR DECISION TO SUPPORT YOUR STRUGGLE, AND OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT THIS TERRIBLE CRIME--WHICH SHOWS US THAT ARMED REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IS THE ONLY WAY OF ACHIEVING GENUINE LIBERATION--WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THE STRUGGLE OF THE AFRO-AMERICAN PEOPLE WHICH IS ALREADY AIMED IN THE DIRECTION OF A TOTAL CONFRONTATION.' ''

15. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – ''AGUSTIN /GONZALEZ/ MARTINEZ, BISHOP OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF CUBA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW – 'MAY THE TRAGIC DISAPPEARANCE OF THIS GREAT LEADER AT LEAST HELP TO SPEED UP THE ARRIVAL OF THE DAY WHEN EVERY MAN IN HIS NATION AND IN ALL OTHER NATIONS WILL BE TREATED WITH THE RESPECT WHICH IS DUE TO THEM AS HUMAN BEINGS.' ''

16. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL, 7 P.M. – ''REVEREND RAFAEL PASTOR, OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN LUYANO, HAVANA, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS IN A SPECIAL INTERVIEW – 'HIS BROTHERS, THE AMERICAN NEGROES, WILL LEARN MUCH FROM HIS DEATH. WE CAN ALMOST ASSURE THAT THEY, THE AMERICAN NEGROES WHOSE DIGNITY AND DECORUM HAS BEEN CRUSHED, WILL COME BACK TO LIFE AFTER CENTURIES OF LETHARGY AND

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'ILL RISE FROM THEIR GRAVES AND FORM AN INVINCIBLE ARMY.' ''

17. RADIO LIBERACION, 5 APRIL, 6 P.M. - EDITORIAL COMMENTS CRITICIZING THE NON-VIOLENT LINE WHICH WAS ADVOCATED BY LUTHER KING, SAYING THAT THIS LINE WAS INOPERATIVE. ''MARTIN LUTHER KING DID NOT PREACH VIOLENCE BUT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF VIOLENCE. HE DID NOT UNLEASH VIOLENCE BUT VIOLENCE MOWED HIM DOWN.''

18. RADIO HABANA, 5 APRIL 68, 530 P.M. - ''JOHNSON POSTPONED HIS TRIP. HE CALLED THE CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS--WHO WERE MORE OR LESS UNDER CONTROL--TO GO TO THE WHITE HOUSE. JOHNSON APPEARED ON TELEVISION. HE EXPRESSED HIS ANGUISH AND HIS SORROW. HE MADE INSPIRED COMMENTS ABOUT MARTIN LUTHER KING. THESE ACTIONS AND THESE WORDS HIDE FEAR OVER THE WAVE OF JUST VIOLENCE WHICH IS STARTING TO SPREAD THROUGH THE UNITED STATES.'' ''AT A TIME WHEN COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE UNDERWAY, UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, THIS NEW CRIME WIDENS THE CHASM WHICH DIVIDES THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INCITES THE PEOPLE TO PROMOTE DISTURBANCES WHOSE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS ARE HARD TO PREDICT.'' ''THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING CONFIRMS THAT THE VIOLENCE OF IMPERIALIST RACISTS IS ONLY ANSWERED EFFECTIVELY WITH THE VIOLENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE.''

DISTRIBUTION

VIA TELEPOUCH

3 A [REDACTED]

2 A [REDACTED]

2 A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TELEPOUCH [REDACTED] PAGE FIVE

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TELEPOUCH

DISP NO -

FILE NO -

DATE - ~~00~~ 11 APRIL 1968

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TO -

INFO -

FROM -

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

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Date 19 AUG 1993

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TO - CHIEF, WH DIVISION

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FROM - CHIEF OF STATION, JMWAVE

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, TAI APRIL 1968

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date 2 March 1978

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MARK F. EFFIELD

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recommended for but not sent to requester by IPS

X Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

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urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

X Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

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) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
) Location of CIA overseas installation
X Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
X File number
X Pseudonym
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ISP NO -

ILE NO - NONE

ATE - QQ APRIL 1968

INDEXING - NONE

MICROFILM - NONE

O - CHIEF,

INFO - CHIEF, CHIEF,

FROM -

SUBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., IAO APRIL 1968

REFERENCE -

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

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WM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT NON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN A VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK REPLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

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Date 6 March 1978

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TELEPOUCH PAGE TWO

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

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UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

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APR 15 1968
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TO -

INFO -

FROM -

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IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED

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WM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJWITH THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING THE IDEOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENCE HAS DIED'' A AN INTERVIEW WITH FLOYD MCKISSICK, NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY /CORE/. JJTHIS SIMPLY MEANS THAT NON-VIOLENCE HAS CEASED AS A MEANS OF FIGHTING. THE PEOPLE CANNOT BE TAUGHT TO BE NON-VIOLENT WHILE WE ARE INVOLVED IN A VIOLENT WAR IN VIETNAM. NON-VIOLENCE CANNOT BE PREACHED TO THE BLACK PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO FACE VIOLENCE EVERY DAY ON THE STREETS OF THIS COUNTRY.'' THIS WAS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN RADIO HABANA AND FLOYD MCKISSICK. WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSASSINATION OF KING, MCKISSICK REPLIED - JJI REPEAT THAT WE ARE MAKING NO PREDICTIONS, BUT THE

57

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10 AUG 1976

AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSINATION OF OUR LEADERS, OUR HEROES, AND OUR PEOPLE.''

EM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A ARTICLE BY JUAN MARRERO ENTITLED, JJTHE AMERICAN NEGROES ARE WRITING THEIR FINEST PAGE OF HEROISM.'' JJAGAINST ALL THAT AND MUCH MORE, THE NEGROES ROSE UP TODAY IN MORE THAN SIXTY CITIES. AND IT IS LOGICAL TO EXPECT NEW PAGES OF HEROISM. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, THE NEGRO LEADER, GAVE THIS WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, O APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS. NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL, MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL, ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

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TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

VIA TELEPOUCH

TELEPOUCH PAGE THREE

3P

ECRET-TELEPOUCH
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ILE NO - NONE
ATE - 11 APRIL 1968
NDEXING - NONE
ICROFILM - NONE
O - CHIEF, WH DIVISION
NFO - CHIEF, WH/COG - CHIEF, WOLIME
ROM - COS, JMWAVE
UBJECT - SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA TREATMENT OF DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 10 APRIL 1968
EFERENCE - UFGA-29877

MICROFILMED
APR 15 1968
DOC. MICRO. SER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUMMARY OF CUBAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION TRANSMITTED IN REFERENCE, THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY FOR 8-9 APRIL HAS BEEN FURNISHED BY THE AMOTS -

QM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE ONE - JJMOBILIZATION OF 55,000 TROOPS TO REPRESS THE NEGROES'' A THE ARTICLE REPORTED ALL THE DISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.

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SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE ONE

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May 2, 78
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AMERICAN NEGRO IS NOT WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE IMPASSIBLY THE ASSASSI-
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WARNING ONE DAY AFTER THE DEATH OF MARTIN LUTHER KING - JWHAT
HAPPENED ON THE NIGHT WE LEARNED OF THE ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING
IS NOTHING COMPARED TO WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN.' JJ

RM GRANMA, 0 APRIL, PAGE 3 A JJTHE WIDOW OF LUTHER KING HEADS
THE MARCH IN MEMPHIS.'' THE ARTICLE TELLS ABOUT THE MARCH AND
SHOWS PHOTOGRAPHS OF IT.

TM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /755 A.M./ A JJA TENSE
CALM REIGNS IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS EVENTS.
NATIONAL MOURNING DECREED BY LYNDON JOHNSON FOR YESTERDAY, U APRIL,
MARKS A LESSENING OF DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO START UP
AGAIN AT ANY MOMENT.''

YM RADIO REBELDE NEWSCAST, I APRIL /955 A.M./ A JJ JFORWARD
WITH BLACK POWER UNTIL CAPITALIST MISERY, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF
HUMAN INJUSTICE, IS OVERTHROWN' SAID THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF CHILE
IN A CABLEGRAM SENT TO THE AMERICAN NEGRO LEADER, STOKELY CARMICHAEL,
ON THE OCCASION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING.''

UM RADIO LIBERACION, I APRIL /1230 P.M./ A THIS NEWSCAST
REFERS TO A DEMONSTRATION IN WHICH 200 LATIN AMERICAN, ASIAN, AND
AFRICAN STUDENTS WERE SAID TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN FRONT OF THE
U.S. EMBASSY IN WARSAW, POLAND, AS A PROTEST OVER THE DEATH OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING.

MARK F. EFFIELD

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SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

IA TELEPOUCH

A C/WHD

A C/WH/COG

A C/WOLIME

SECRET TELEPOUCH UFGA-29884 PAGE THREE

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

321

1. Tab A-71 contains Cable JMWAVE 2017 dated 12 APR 68.
2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

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3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

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      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.
      ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
      ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   (X) Information which ~~would~~/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
   (X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER
6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

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121717Z APR 68 CITE [redacted] 12 [illegible] 88504

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Date 14 May 1978

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

1. [redacted] HAS JUST REPORTED [redacted] RECEIPT [redacted] OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO 6012 HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO [illegible]X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY [illegible] THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

[redacted] ARE ASTONISHED BY THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN [redacted] POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

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INFO

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GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING [redacted] ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE [redacted] LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO [redacted] IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER SUCH PAMPHLET PACKAGES HAVE ARRIVED HERE. THEY ARE ALSO CONTACTING LOCAL [redacted] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

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PAGE 3

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~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL 121717Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2017 12Apr68 IN 90304

PRIORITY DIRECTOR

TYPIC AMCARBON

1. AMCARBON-3 HAS JUST REPORTED TO STATION RECEIPT BY HIS COLLEAGUE, AMCARBON-1, OF ENVELOPE WITH RETURN ADDRESS "RAMON ECHAVARRIA, APARTADO [illegible] HAVANA", CONTAINING TWO [illegible]X15 INCH BLACK WHITE AND RED POSTERS FEATURING BLACK PANTHER WITH LEGEND "BLACK POWER" IN HIS OPEN MOUTH AND BELOW IT IN LARGE LETTERS STATEMENT "RETALIATION FOR CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE" IN ENGLISH FOLLOWED BY APPARENTLY SAME STATEMENT IN SMALLER LETTERS IN SPANISH, FRENCH AND ARABIC. FINALLY LETTERS "OSPAAAL" AT BOTTOM OF POSTER. POSTERS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY MIMEOGRAPHED SHEET WITH FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "ON THE OCCASION OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ASSASSINATION WE HAVE PUBLISHED A POSTER THAT IS NOW BEING CIRCULATED ALL OVER THE WORLD. WE ARE SENDING YOU A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF THESE POSTERS WHICH MAY BE USED IN YOUR COUNTRY FOR THE ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED ON IN THIS REGARD."

2. [illegible] ARE ASTONISHED AT THE SPEED WITH WHICH THESE POSTERS HAVE BEEN PREPARED AND MAILED. ENVELOPE WAS RECEIVED IN AMCARBON-1'S POST OFFICE BOX IN WHICH HE NORMALLY

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by authority of
date 15 mar 1978

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CONDUCTED ON 15 mar 78
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ACTION ☐ RID COPY INFO FILE VR.

PAGE 2 JMWAVE 2017 S E C R E T

GETS VARIOUS CUBAN MAILINGS INCLUDING LASO ITEMS BUT THESE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN VERY SLOW IN COMING AND HAVE USUALLY OBVIOUSLY BEEN SEVERAL WEEKS IN PREPARATION AND TRANSIT. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF PRESENT ITEM BECAUSE AMCARBON-1 WAS IN BAHAMAS COVERING ELECTION FROM 9 THRU 11 APRIL AND LAST SERVICED HIS P.O. BOX ON 8 APRIL. ENVELOPE BORE NO DATED POSTMARK, ONLY METERED "PORT PAYE" IN UPPER RIGHT-HAND CORNER. AT ANY EVENT IT IS CLEAR THAT IF POSTERS ARRIVED AT LATEST ON 11 APRIL, IT TOOK CUBANS LESS THAN A WEEK TO PREPARE AND MAIL THEM TO U.S.

3. WHAT HAS OF COURSE OCCURRED TO AMCARBONS IS POSSIBILITY THAT QUICK CUBAN PERFORMANCE ON THIS SUBJECT MAY INDICATE CUBAN COLLUSION IN ASSASSINATION OR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS TO TAKE PLACE. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE KNOW OF NO OTHER EVIDENCE TO LEND SUPPORT TO THIS ASSUMPTION. THEY ARE CHECKING WITH OTHER LOCAL RECIPIENTS OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA MATERIAL TO DETERMINE WHETHER OTHER SUCH PAMPHLET [illegible] THEY ARE ALSO [illegible] CONTACTING LOCAL [illegible] TO INFORM THEM OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL.

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PAGE 3 JMWAVE 2017 CONFIDENTIAL

4. ONLY JMWAVE TRACE ON RAMON ECHAVARRIA INDICATES

BOX AS A MAIL ADDRESS FOR RECEIPT AND SENDING OF CUBAN

REGIME PROPAGANDA.

S E C R E T

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322

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

322
IN 90561
ab#-53 contains CABLE JMWAVE 2022 dated 12 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
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✓) Segregable portions previously released, excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA.

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) Referred to DDO for review by ________________.

urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________________ of ________.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
) Location of CIA overseas installation
✓) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
X) Cryptonyms
X) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

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T 122103Z APR 68 CITE

Kpd 4 Dec 68

12 APR 68 IN 90561

DIRECTOR

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN (IN 90504) SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN

BT

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Date 7 March 1978

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4 Dec 68

12 Apr 68 IN 90587

DIRECTOR

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED , SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED

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12 APR 68 IN 90561

DIRECTOR

KAPOK TYPIC ZRPERUSAL AMCARBON

IN CONNECTION WITH CUBAN MAILING OF BLACK POWER POSTERS REPORTED IN JMWAVE 2017, (IN 90504) SEE ALSO SHIPMENT ON 7 REPEAT 7 APRIL (I.E., 3 DAYS AFTER DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION) MENTIONED IN 3/O/CUD/T.397-68.

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Tab 76 contains CABLE IN 90377 JMWAVE 2009 dated 12 Apr. 68.

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I RECOMMEND:

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( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________.

(X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(3) of FOIA.

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( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
(X) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
(X) File number/name
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

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12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

HAS HAD PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED (HQS) DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

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SECRET 121438Z APR 68 CITE JMWAVE 2009 — 12 APR 68 IN 90377

DIRECTOR

TYPIC

STATION HAS HAD AMOTS PREPARE TWO SUMMARIES OF CUBAN REGIME COVERAGE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING ASSASSINATION AND RESULTANT DISTURBANCES THROUGH 9 APRIL SENT TELEPOUCH AS UFGA-29877 AND UFGA-29884. WE WILL NOW DISCONTINUE THIS REPORTING UNLESS THERE IS A CONTINUED HQS DESIRE TO RECEIVE IT. PLEASE ADVISE.

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324 Berlin 2149

) 354 contains CABLE IN 91216 dated 15 Apr. 1968.

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) Located during the DDO appeals review.

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rther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

X Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (B)(1)(b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

ie exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
X Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
X Information pertaining to intelligence methods
X Locations of CIA overseas installations
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
X File number/name
X Pseudonym
X Cryptonyms
X Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
X Privacy of other individuals
) OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. [redacted] CI information that does not pertain to the scope of the Request has been deleted under (b)(6) to protect the privacy of the individuals who were the subject of the reporting. All information pertaining to King/Ray has been identified & is recommended for release.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked s SECRET was:

) maintained
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) declassified
) desensitized
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INFO: FILE, VR.

PRECEDENCE

15 APR 68 IN 91216

151351Z APR 68 CITE

DIRECTOR INFO

REF A

B DIRECTOR 49260

IN 70597

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. MEMBERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND PASSING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING ASSISTANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE "POSITIVE" RESULTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO TALK WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER SOLDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICE.

(X) 6

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☐ COPY	INFO: FILE VR.		

GE 2 [redacted]

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED ETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF ROACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL UATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM ELF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER OK PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER VENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART TION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH RE SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE SSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER UDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

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PAGE 3

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER
PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST
BERLIN.

BT

13-00000

15 [illegible] 216

151351Z APR 63

DIRECTOR INFO

REF A

B DIRECTOR 49259

1.

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Date 10 AUG 1976

13-00000

PAGE 2

2.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 5 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

13-00000

PAGE 3

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

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PRECEDENCE

15 APR 68 IN 91216

CONFIDENTIAL 151351Z APR 68 CITE BERLIN 2149 (HIBBERT ACTING)

DIRECTOR INFO BONN

RYBAT MHPASHA

REF A BERLIN 1812 (IN 70597)*

B DIRECTOR 49260 **

1. AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN HAS CONTINUED SINCE REF A. MEMBERS OF US CAMPAIGN CONTINUE TO CARRY OUT THEIR "ACTION NIGHT LIFE," ENTERING GI BARS AND PASSING OUT LEAFLETS ENCOURAGING AND OFFERING ASSISTANCE FOR DESERTION. CAMPAIGN MEMBERS CITE "POSITIVE" RESULTS IN FACT THAT GI'S WILLING TO TALK WITH THEM AND TO PASS LEAFLETS ON TO OTHER SOLDIERS. CAMPAIGN HAS POINTED OUT TO NON-AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS INTERESTED IN "ACTION" THAT THEY MAY ALSO CONTACT SOLDIERS THROUGH US ARMY'S COMMUNITY RELATIONS OFFICE. US CAMPAIGNERS KEITH CHAMBERLAIN AND PETER STANDISH WERE INVITED TO SPEAK AT 23 MARCH VIETNAM RALLY AND CHOSE AS THEME "HISTORY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM." THEY

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by authority of 001829
date 28 Feb 1978

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cc US Campaign

54

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CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
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FILE, VR.

PAGE 2 BERLIN 2149 CONFIDENTIAL

COORDINATED THEIR REMARKS WITH CAMPAIGN LEADER FRANCIS FULLER AND MEMBERS DAVID HARRIS AND SAM WEBER. CHAMBERLAIN ALSO ACCOMPANIED RUDI DUTSCHKE TO PRAGUE IN LATE MARCH FOR MEETING OF THIRD CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE.

2. OTHER RELATED US CAMPAIGN PLANS INCLUDED MEETING WITH LOCAL FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS IN HOPE OF APPROACHING THEM ABOUT VIETNAM WAR, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BERLIN, DRAFT AND FULBRIGHT PROGRAM ITSELF. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS MEETING EVER TOOK PLACE. CAMPAIGN IS ALSO PLANNING THEATER EVENING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 20 APRIL, ART AUCTION AND SIMILAR EVENTS, PROCEEDS FROM WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO GO TO VIET CONG.

3. RADICAL LEFT ELEMENT IN BERLIN STAGED 6 APRIL DEMONSTRATION MARCH ON RATHAUS SCHOENEBERG IN WAKE OF DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. IN VIEW OF THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON LEFTIST STUDENT LEADER RUDI DUTSCHKE ON 11 APRIL, STUDENT ATTENTIONS OVER

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2		7	
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4		9	
5		10	

WEEKEND CENTERED ON FURTHER ATTACKS ON SPRINGER PROPERTY AND DEMONSTRATIONS IN DOWNTOWN WEST BERLIN.

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BT

C/S Comment: *Reported activities of Americans in anti-Vietnam activity.

**Hqs participating in survey of international connections of anti-Vietnam war movement in U.S.

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13-00000

TAB #325

JFK 15
F3

13-00000

[redacted] 325 IN 91393

1. Tab B-65 contains Cable Mex City 5210 dated 15 Apr. 68

2. (✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(liaison) (b)(3), (b)(6). of FOI

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

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( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOI
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

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( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ______

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EYES ONLY

S E C R E T 152215Z APR 68 CITE MEXICO CITY 5210 15 APR 68 IN 91392

DIRECTOR

HALPHA

REF: DIRECTOR-89694

1. LITEMPO-72, ON 12 APRIL 1968, PROVIDED FOLLOWING REPORTS RELATING TO REFERENCE.

2. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRO-ASIAN LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AALAPSO) IN HAVANA, DIRECTED BY RAMON ECHAVARRIA, IS SENDING TO MEXICAN COMMUNISTS LARGE "BLACK POWER" POSTERS, WITH CAPTION "RETALIATION TO CRIME: REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE," IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, SPANISH AND ARABIC. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RECEIPT OF THIS MATERIAL IS TO BE MADE TO M. OSVALDO [illegible]EDES ALVAREZ, SIBISKE NAMESTI, C-1, BUBENEC, PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA. POUCHING COPIES OF POSTER.

3. THE INDEPENDENT PEASANTS' CENTRAL (CCI), ON 5 APRIL, ADDRESSED LETTER TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, PROTESTING AGAINST THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, ATTRIBUTING IT TO THE AGGRESSIVE AND FASCIST POLICIES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT. LETTER DEMANDS ALSO AN END TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

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65

SECRET

13-00000

13-00000 [ ] UNCLASSIFIED [X] CONFIDENTIAL [ ] SECRET [ ] TOP SECRET

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

326

1. Tab B-73 contains Memo B-88 dated 18 Apr 68
2. (X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA
   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.
   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.
3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
   This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 March 1977.
4. I RECOMMEND:
   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
       ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
       ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.
   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
       ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
       ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.
   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ________.
   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:
   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (X) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   ( ) Cryptonym
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER
6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:
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   ( ) classified to ________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

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13-00000

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in [redacted] provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against [redacted]

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative [redacted] 1968 an unidentified white [redacted] the [redacted] but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies [redacted] to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. [redacted] a-

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 mar 1978

A-73
(262)

201-0832732

13-00000

BASIC : [redacted] (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

18 April 1968

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
2 -
1 -
1 -

201-0832732

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

B-88

18 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Junior.

1. Your Bureau representative in Mexico City provided our representative with composite photographs of the suspected killer of Martin Luther King, Jr. and asked for a check against visitors to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City during the recent months.

2. Checks for persons appearing to resemble the composite photographs were negative at both Embassies. On 30 January 1968 an unidentified white male visited the Soviet Embassy but the description did not fit either the composite photograph or the description provided by your Bureau representative. However, our representative passed copies of the photographs to your Bureau representative with the notation that he did not appear to be identical with the Bureau suspect. Our representative further stipulated that any use of the photographs in an investigation should not reveal that the photographs were made in Mexico or by this Office.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON Feb 9, 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 095604
12913

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by authority of 095604 12913
date Feb 9, 1978

248

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201-0832132

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BASIC : Mexico City 5247 (IN 93087)

PROJECT: None

LIAISON: None

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds; jb

18 April 1968

Distribution:
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3-00000

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

327

1. Tab 8-74 contains Memo B-97 dated 25 April 68.
2. (X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
This document was also referred to CIA by the FBI on 25 mar 77.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   (X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   (X) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonym
   (X) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number.
   (X) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

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   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

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( ) UNCLASSIFIED [X] CONFIDENTIAL [ ] SECRET [ ] TOP SECRET

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in [redacted] had passed [redacted] of an unidentified American who visited the [redacted] in [redacted]

2. Forwarded herewith are [redacted] passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these [redacted] were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the [redacted] may be used in the course of an investigation [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 14 Feb 1978

201-0832932

327

BASIC : [redacted]

PROJECT: [redacted]

25 April 1968

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Federal Bureau of Investigation
1 - [redacted]
2 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

201-0832732

285

CONFIDENTIAL

B-97

25 APR 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Death of Martin Luther King, Jr.

1. Reference is made to our memorandum of 18 April 1968 which advised that our representative in Mexico City had passed copies of photographs of an unidentified American who visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

2. Forwarded herewith are copies of the photographs passed to your Bureau representative. As noted in our 18 April memo, these photos were passed to your Bureau representative with the notation that they did not appear to be identical with the Bureau's suspect. The Subject of the attached photos was described as 22-27 years of age, approximately 5 feet 9 inches to 5 feet 11 inches in height, weight, approximately 175 pounds, light brown hair, and slightly ruddy complexion.

3. As noted in our 18 April memorandum the photographs may be used in the course of an investigation so long as it is not connected in any way with this Office, and it is not revealed that the photographs were made in Mexico.

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by authority of
date 9 Oct 1978

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CONDUCTED ON 9 Oct 1978
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201-0832432

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2857

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

BASIC : HMMA-34503

PROJECT: LIONION

25 April 1968

WH/1/Charles M. Bounds;jb

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2 - CI/OPS/DO
1 - C/WH/FI

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

201-0832732

285

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





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328

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

1. Tab 328 contains Press Item for DCI dated 25 April 1968

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

(X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND: Release in Toto

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ____.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ____.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as Unclassified was:

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( ) classified to ________
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( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ________

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PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI

DISTRIBUTION:

Date: 25 Apr
Item: #12
Ref: #

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35

KING- SUSPECT (TOPS 7)

MEXICO CITY (AP)-MEXICAN AUTHORITIES QUESTIONED TODAY A U.S. CITIZEN THEY SAID RESEMBLES THE MAN WANTAD ON A CHARGE OF SLAYING OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THEN RELEASED HIM WITHOUT PRESSING ANY CHARGES.

DANIEL DAVID KENNEDY OF BALTIMORE, WHO SAID HE WAS ON A WALKING TOUR OF THE STATE OF SONORA, DENIED ANY CONNECTION WITH KING'S DEATH. AN FBI AGENT, IDENTIFIED ONLY AS MR. SMITH, SAID THERE WAS NO RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN KENNEDY AND THE SUSPECT, JAMES EARLY RAY, ACCORDING TO POLICE IN THE CITY OF HERMOSILLO.

LT. ROBERTO FLETCHER OF THE JUDICIAL POLICE IN CABORCA, SONORA, HAD TAKEN KENNEDY INTO CUSTODY FROM A CABORCA HOTEL.

IN BALTIMORE, KENNEDY'S MOTHER, PEARK E. KENNEDY,USAID, "THERE IS JUST NO CONNECTION. HE DOESN'T EVEN LOOK LIKE HIM RAY.

CZ1106AES 4/25

Comment:

201-0832732

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.

13-00000

329

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 329

ib [redacted]-60 contains DRAFT MEMO - NO # dated 26 Apr. 1968.

) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

✓) Segregable portions previously recommended for release but not sent to requestor by IRS; excised portions exempted under (b)(1), (b)(3) of FOIA. *

) Located during the DDO appeals review.

) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

urther description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

* Initial review recommended FIRST. Coordinate draft memo w/ Nat'l Foreign Intell. Board (USIB).

RECOMMEND:

) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.

he exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

) Information from a foreign liaison service
) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
) Information which would/could identify the source
) Information pertaining to a source
X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
X) Location of CIA overseas installation
) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
) Name of CIA employee
) File number
) Pseudonym
) Cryptonym
) Internal organizational data
) Name of FBI agent
) FBI file number
) Privacy of other individual
) OTHER

OMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

uring the DDO classification review, this document which was marked
s SECRET was:

) maintained
) classified to ______
) declassified
) desensitized
X) downgraded to confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

X CONFIDENTIAL [ ] [illegible] [ ] [illegible]

DRAFT

26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on ______________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?

2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?

3. Is there any indication that Ray had in the past travelled outside the United States other than the October - November 1967 trip to Mexico as Galt?

4. Is there any indication that Ray had been issued a U.S. passport under his true name or any of his aliases?

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 May 1978

66

13-00000

5. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with any foreign intelligence service? If so, please provide all possible details.

6. Is there any indication that Ray had any connection with foreigners in the United States, especially Cubans and Soviets?

7. Did Ray have any Communist connections?

8. Did Ray ever express any interest in Communism?

9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

10. Does it appear that Ray had any accomplices? If so, have any been identified?

11. Has the FBI identified any of Ray's close friends or associates?

12. Have any contacts made by Ray in Mexico during October/November 1967 been identified?

13. If any accomplices, associates, or contacts have been identified, are any of them Communists or associated with Communists, foreign officials, or foreign intelligence services?

14. Does the FBI think that Ray was hired to assassinate King?

15. If so, is there any indication that Communists or a foreign power were involved?

16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

201-0832733

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT 26 April 1968

KING ASSASSINATION AND USIB

DCI:

A. General:

1. Request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation give a full report to USIB on ____________ (date) on the status of the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

B. Specific:

1. Is there any indication that Ray has left the USA?

2. If so, when, to what country or area, and by what means and route?

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Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 060595
date 28 Feb 1978

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
E 2 IMPDET CL BY 060595

(60)

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CONFIDENTIAL 201-0832732

13-00000

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9. Did Ray ever indicate any interest in Cuba, Castro, or the Cuban revolution?

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13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL

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16. Has it been possible to recover and trace the origin of any of the $20 bills used by Ray to purchase the rifle and make other payments?

17. On 19 April 1968 CIA furnished to the FBI photographs taken in October 1967 at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City of an unknown individual resembling Ray. Has the FBI determined whether or not this person is possibly identical with Ray?

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

201-0833??

13-00000

330

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted] 332.

[redacted] 68 contains DISPATCH OEPA-1097 w/attc (2) dated 29 April 1968

(X) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______________ of ______.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________.
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ______.
- ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______________.
- ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______________.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______________ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) __________ of ______.

(X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which [redacted]/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Locations of CIA overseas installations
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
(X) File number
(X) Pseudonyms
(X) Cryptonyms
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(X) Privacy of other individuals
( ) OTHER

(b)(6) not asserted

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Deletions in this document have been made to protect an operational activity, i.e., the gathering of information on individuals, the reporting of this information and the planning of covert activities based on the reporting.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______________
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to Confidential

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

( ) UNCLASSIFIED (X) CONFIDENTIAL ( ) SECRET ( ) TOP SECRET

DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	PROCESSING ACTION
		MARKED FOR INDEXING
TO Chief,		XX NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO. Chief, ; Chief, Chief		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM Chief,		MICROFILM
SUBJECT		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES		

Reference: , dated 17 April 1968

1. reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris.

... Her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1).

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre

Attachments: 2
1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

/CONTINUED.../

68

Distribution:
1 - w/atts
2 - w/atts
1 - w/atts

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE		29 April 1968
Date 20 May 1978	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER

13-00000

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

13-00000

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING
PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

HYMN No. 429 "For All the Saints" (vrs. 1-5) Sino Nomine

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES - The Hon. Woodruff Wallner, Chargé d'Affaire - U.S. Embassy

OLD TESTAMENT LESSONS - Canon James McNamee - American Cathedral
Psalm 90
Daniel 3:16-25

PRAYERS - Dean Sturgis Riddle - American Cathedral

MESSAGES FROM THE FRENCH CHURCHES

The Rev. Dr. Charles Westphal - Federation Protestante de France
Mgsr. Julien Gouet - Roman Catholic Diocese of Paris
Pastor Henri Vincent- Eglise Baptiste de France

NEW TESTAMENT LESSONS - The Rev. Dr. Clayton E. Williams, Pastor Emeritus - American Church
Romans 8:31-39
Matthew 10:24-39

ANTHEM - The Choir
"Psalm of Penitence" From King David by Arthur Honegger

(Mercy on me, O Lord; pity, according to thy great compassion. Wipe away my transgression; cleanse me unto the depth of my iniquity. In sin was I conceived. In evil was I born. And thou wouldst have a pure soul? I have sinned. Thou hast taught me thy wisdom, and I have failed in my weakness. Mercy on me, O Lord.")

TRIBUTE TO DR. KING - Mrs. Carline Polite - American Author

FROM AN ADDRESS BY DR. KING - Washington, D.C., Aug. 28, 1963
Read by Mr. Neville Aurelius - Actor

PRAYERS - The Rev. Martin v.B. Sargent - American Church

HYMN - "We Shall Overcome" Negro Spiritual

We shall overcome, we shall overcome,
We shall overcome some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall overcome someday.

We shall live in peace, we shall live in peace,
We shall live in peace some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall live in peace some day.

We shall brothers be, we shall brothers be,
We shall brothers be some day.
Oh, deep in my heart I do believe
That we shall brothers be some day,

RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

**** A book of condolences is in the chapel to your right for those who wish to sign it.

MEETING EN FAVEUR DU « POUVOIR NOIR » LE 29 AVRIL À LA MUTUALITÉ

Au cours d'une conférence de presse donnée lundi à Paris, M. James Foreman, ancien président du Comité de coordination des étudiants non violents (S.N.C.C.), aujourd'hui responsable des affaires internationales du S.N.C.C., a annoncé qu'un meeting en faveur du « pouvoir noir » aurait lieu à la Mutualité, le 29 avril à 20 heures. Outre M. Foreman, qui est également « ministre des affaires étrangères » du parti des Panthères noires, MM. Aimé Césaire, Daniel Guérin, Jean-Paul Sartre et Vercors participeront notamment à cette réunion au cours de laquelle deux films seront projetés : *Now*, de S. Alvarez, et *Jazz d'avant-garde*.

Au cours de sa conférence de presse, M. Foreman a évoqué le meurtre du pasteur King, « *exemple du génocide* » que commet contre les Noirs américains « *la société exploiteuse blanche raciste* », et l'adoption par le Congrès américain du projet de loi interdisant la discrimination raciale dans le logement. Ce texte de loi contient en effet un certain nombre de clauses répressives visant, selon M. Foreman, à « *liquider* » les leaders noirs. M. Foreman a également lancé un appel en faveur de plusieurs membres du parti des Panthères noires emprisonnés à Oakland (Californie), à la suite d'une fusillade avec la police le 6 avril dernier, qui a fait un mort — un jeune Noir de dix-sept ans.

13-00000

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION	
MARKED FOR INDEXING	
NO INDEXING REQUIRED	XX
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
MICROFILM	

TO: Chief, WOLIME

INFO.: Chief, WOMUSE; Chief, EUR Division; Chief of Station, London

FROM: Chief, LCPIPIT/London

SUBJECT: MHALPHA/MHPROBE/RODIGAST

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Rcd 9 Dec 68

Reference: OBPA-1058, dated 17 April 1968

1. RODIGAST reports that the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King had a dramatic and profoundly disturbing impact upon the American Negro community in Paris. The young female leader of the SNCC girls in Paris flew to the U.S. several days later in order to be "where the action is." She does not plan to return but was very impressed by her stay in Paris saying that she will try to persuade other SNCC members to avail themselves of the valuable experience to be gained from working with the various revolutionary groups in Paris. As we foresaw in Reference this has left the SNCC group in the joint hands of IDENTITIES A and C of Reference. Invitations have poured in to speak at various meetings and it appears likely that IDENTITY A of Reference will represent SNCC at many of these meetings. Her importance in the Black community in Paris is indicated by the prominent place accorded her in the memorial service for Dr. King. (See under separate cover attachment 1) Needless to say, this renders all the more pressing an early decision on the proposal contained in Reference.

2. We call your attention to the attached clipping from the 24 April Le Monde which reports on a press conference held by James Foreman, head of the International Affairs department of SNCC, to announce a meeting supporting Black Power to be held at La Mutualite on 29 April and to be addressed by Jean Paul Sartre. QRPHOTO/1 told RODIGAST that there had been some

Attachments: 2
1 - Memorial Service Program (u/s/c)
2 - Le Monde clipping h/w

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/CONTINUED.../

Distribution:
1 - C/WOLIME w/atts
2 - C/WOMUSE w/atts
1 - C/EUR w/atts
2 - COS/London w/atts

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978 E2 IMPDET CL BY 001829

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL by authority of [illegible] date 28 Feb 1978

(68)

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
	OBPA-1097	29 April 1968
	CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL/RYBAT	HQS FILE NUMBER: 100-6-148/3

13-00000

confusion regarding Sartre's willingness to speak. He had originally accepted to speak at a culturally oriented "gala" to be held at the Theatre National Populaire and there was a question regarding his willingness to switch to this more political atmosphere. The "gala" (see earlier report, paragraph C of OEPA-918) is now being planned for some time in May.

3. IDENTITY C of Reference is reported by RODIGAST to be working with Foreman in planning for the Mutualite meeting. She is so busy that she has temporarily left her child with her mother. IDENTITY C of Reference is also said to be working on another project—possibly involving travel—which is confidential at this point.

Adrian B. MASLOTT

SEPARATE COVER ATTACHMENT 1 TO:
OEPA-1097

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SERVICE IN MEMORY OF
THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING
PASTOR - CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER - HOLDER OF THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE
8 APRIL 1968

THE CALL TO WORSHIP - The Rev. Robert A. Spencer - American Church
Prayer of Invocation
The Lord's Prayer

HYMN No. 429 "For All the Saints" (vrs. 1-5) Sine Nomine

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"Psalm of Penitence" From King David by Arthur Honegger

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RECESSIONAL - The 23rd Psalm

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13-00000

HERE WITH ATTACHMENT TO: OEPA-1097

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JFK15
F3

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13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

331

Tab A-69 contains DISPATCH HMMA-34688 dated 20 May 1968.
w/ 4 atts (missing)

(✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1) (b)(3), (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
Att C. refers to KING

I RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3)(b)(6) of FOIA
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which ████/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
( ) File number
(X) Pseudonyms
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. This document could be considered an unedited response to Martin Luther King.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

( ) UNCLASSIFIED (X) CONFIDENTIAL ( ) SECRET ( ) TOP SECRET

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL RYBAT

PROCESSING ACTION: X MARKED FOR INDEXING
NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
MICROFILM

TO: Chief, WH Division

INFO.: Chief, WOMUSE

FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico City

SUBJECT: Margaret RANDALL de MONDRAGON

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

RYBAT MHALPHA

Action Required: See paragraph 3.

Reference : HMMW-16296, 5 April 1968

1. The following items from LIBIGHT/LIMUD coverage concern contacts of Subject who are believed to be of interest:

A. Attachment A: A letter from CAW, the magazine of Students for a Democratic Society, signed by Jerry *BODANES, thanks Margaret for her poems which they are using. The magazine is scheduled to be off the press around May 10. The letter clearly indicates that the SDS was behind the student seizure of Columbia University. It says, "Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University--now named Malcolm X University--and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies. The others, faculty, deans, managers, are all scurrying and speaking pious--saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations to resist, our movement has over reached." Enclosed is a check made out against the account of the SDS in the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, 2681 Broadway, New York, for the amount of $50, and signed by Robert M. *SHAPIRO.

Continued....................

Attachments:
As listed (9), h/w

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 2 march 78
E2 IMPDET CL BY 009560 012913

Distribution:
Orig & 2 - C/WHD (w/atts - 1 copy each)
2 - C/WOMUSE (w/o atts)

Downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
by authority of 009560 & 012913
date 2 mar 78

CROSS REFERENCE TO

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: HMMA - 34688

DATE: 20 May 1968

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET RYBAT~~

HQS FILE NUMBER: 201-

A-69

13-00000

B. Attachment B: Letter from Heiner *BASTIAN, 1415 Kearny St., San Francisco, California 94135, signed Heiner & Celine. BASTIAN has made arrangements with the editor-in-chief of AKZENTE to publish works of revolutionary poets, and he asks Margaret's help in collecting them. BASTIAN says that he is going to Berlin about 1 July, to Prague in early autumn for a "group 47 meeting," and to Cuba in early November.

C. Attachment C: Letter from Jaime *CARRERO, Art Department of the Interamerican University in San German, Puerto Rico. CARRERO has apparently sent Margaret a series of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther KING's assassination. He describes them as "poetic...but full with guts and disgust." He says there is a possibility CBS will do a program on his paintings and the work in his Art Department. CARRERO is going to Columbia University in the summer of 1968 to study and plans to distribute El Corno there.

D. Attachment D: Letter from Susan *SHERMAN, 305 E. 6th St., No. 3, New York, N. Y. (see HMMA-33837). She tells of her plans to go to StoneyBrook on 23 April to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. She tells Margaret that there are three people in Cuba she thinks would be interested in "The Hippie Book." They are Jose *BELL Lara, of Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana, who is connected with Pensimento Critico; Cuban psychologist Gustavo *TORROELLA, Ave. 3A #22, Marianao, Habana; and Lohania *ARUCA, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. ONU 516, La Habana.

E. Attachment E: Margaret got a letter from someone associated with CATERPILLAR. He is thinking of getting married to Marie *BENOIT in England this summer when he goes there to work in applied philosophy. Therefore, he tells Margaret he cannot go to Cuba as planned.

2. Attachment F: An interesting development was the fact that Margaret RANDALL received a letter from Moscow from Luis *SUARDIAZ, whose return address was given as the Cuban Embassy, Moscow, URSS. SUARDIAZ asks for Suzan SHERMAN (see paragraph 1D above). SUARDIAZ says he will be working as Cultural Counselor in the Cuban Embassy and hopes Margaret will keep in touch with him and send him things of interest (in a literary line).

3. In attachment G, Sergio MONDRAGON, Subject's husband, indicates that Margaret RANDALL is planning to travel to Venezuela from 15 to 30 June. It is suggested that Headquarters may wish to send Venezuela some background information on Margaret with suggestions for action by the Venezuela Station.

13-00000

4. Attachments H and I concern a book which Margaret is hoping to write on Fidel CASTRO. According to Sergio's letter of April 18, she is planning to go to Cuba in October with a tape recorder, and then, based on these tapes, will write her book. Sergio suggests Doubleday as a publisher; however, on 25 April 1968 Paula McGuire of Pantheon Books (attachment I) wrote Margaret saying that publisher might be interested. It is suggested that WOLIME may have contacts in these two publishing houses.

for Willard C. CURTIS

13-00000

HMMA-34688

att A.



13-00000

CAW!
MAGAZINE OF
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Box 332, Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003 (212) 674-8310

Dear Margaret Randall,

Thank you very much for these great great poems. We are using as many of them as we can. I will let you know exactly which ones. The magazine is coming out around May 10. Right now our glorious brothers have seized Columbia University — now named Malcolm X University — and over which an N.L.F. flag now flies — The others, faculty, Deans, Managers, are all scurrying and speaking plans — saying SDS this, SDS that, while we hold five buildings in joyousness and the most serious preparations,

13-00000

to resist, our movement has ever reached

— Jerry [illegible]

check enclosed

No. 69

MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

April 18 1968 $\frac{1\text{-}12}{210}$

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Margaret Randall $ 50.00

Exactly Fifty — DOLLARS

CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY
2681 BROADWAY
NEW YORK

⑆0210⑆0012⑆ 073⑈00252⑈

13-00000

Heiner Bastian
1415 Kearny St
San Francisco
Cal. 94133/USA

SAN FRANCISCO, CA
APR 10 PM
1968

LAW DAY U.
FREEDOM UNDER
MAY

VIA AIR MAIL

Margaret Randall
editor in chief of EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
Apartado Postal Núm. 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
Mexico

Att. B

Dear Margaret,

I would like to thank you for your letter and the two issues of "el corno". The reason for my late answer is simply that I waited for the definite decision of the editor in chief of AKZENTE about our project. His answer is a total agreement!

I am very pleased about that and I hope that you are too. I would suggest that you collect about 10 -15 revolutionary poets. You should write an introduction or whatever you like.
I also suggest that you and not Sergio should collect as many or less "other" poets. If you don't want to do that, please arrange something with Sergio. It makes things much easier for me)mailings, translations, proofs, etc)

I need all the material in about 5 -6 weeks. If this date will put pressure on you, let me know.

We are going in about 10 weeks to Berlin, in early autumn to Prague (group 47 meeting) and will go to Cuba early november. At this time we should be able to visit you.

MAO TSE-TUNG: In the last analysis, all the truths of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: "To rebel is justified."... According to this principle, stand up and resist, struggle, build sozialism.

EVER ONWARD TO VICTORY

Love to you and your children

[illegible] & Céline

Jaime Carrero
Departmaneto de Arte
Universidad Interamericana
San German, Puerto Rico 00753

Margaret Randall
Editor; EL CORNO EMPLUMADO
apartado postal 13-546
MEXICO DF 13

CORREO AEREO

SAN GERMAN APR 29 PM 1968 P.R.

13-00000

San Germán, Puerto Rico
April 27, 1968

Dear Meg:

I've received Ehe group of Cornos #24 and 25,26. I've also sent a serie of drawings based on Dr. Martin Luther King's assasination. They are poetic as usual but full with guts and disgust. The US will get no where with this killing of the best of their sons. Your work is getting there-here- where it is needed, so keep up the excellent job you are doing- since I know that you are working under a tremendous pressure. Very soon I'll send some money. Again I want ten Cornos 24- if you have any left. These drawings are getting a lot of attention especially in our younger generation which is where it counts.
There is a possibility of CBS doing aprogram of what I am doing in painting and in our Art Department- if it comes through I'll put a word or two about el Corno. This is to happen -if- you know- in the fall.
I'm going to New York during Au june- 'till ugust-and I'll be studying at Columbia. I'll take with me some cornos to distribute. If you want to give any messages or anything that I can do in New York while there-please-let me know.
Bueno, Meg- como siempre-la familia receives my best regards and you my sincere love and efforts.

Jim   Be careful which money.

Susan Sherman
305 E. 6th St. #3
New York, N.Y. 10003
U.S.A.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
APR 25
1968

STRIKE BACK AT CANCER
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY

VIA AIR MAIL

Margaret Randall
c/o El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal #13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

13-00000

78 E. 4
STREET
NYC, NY

TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1968

(#67)

Dear Meg,

Just a note--I'm going this afternoon to StoneyBrook to speak about the conference for their week of protest activities. I finally got most of my things & I have a packet of poetry that I'm sure was meant for you--it was the poems Tania meant for you--it must have gotten mixed up in my things. In any case I'm sending them in a separate envelop Air-Mail.

The Hippie Book is really great looking, thank you for it. There are two people in Cuba I think would be very interested in it if you could send them copies. One works on Pensimento Critico--Jose Bell Lara, Calle J #556, Vedado, Habana--he particularly wanted information about the Hippies. The other is a Cuban psychologist Gustavo Torroella, Ave 3A #22, Marianao, Habana, who was also extremely interested in anything concerning hipppies. Also Lohania Aruca, 99-4722, MINREX-Direccion de Organismos Internacionales, Depto. XXX ONU 516, La Habana.

It seems now as if I also have a small ulcer which showed up on last weeks X-rays. But I'm feeling much, much better now. Just have to try not to get too excited and eat right for awhile. It should go away if I'm good. (but then I dont give myself agrivation so its only partly up to me). That was what was probably causing all the trouble in Cuba. Anyway, I'm much better now. I really have to learn not to take everything so much to heart--but thats a long lesson.

I'm going to try to get the issue in shape the next few days. will give blow by blow descriptions. so you'll probably be hearing from me quite often. Its lousy cold here again, I think Spring took a look at New York and decided to go elsewhere!

Love, & more,

Susan

HMMA-31658

CATERPILLAR
38 GREENE STREET
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10013

APR 29 PM 1968 CANAL ST. STA.

Meg Randall
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.
MEXICO

AIR MAIL

13-00000

13-00000

28 April 1968

dear Meg,

I am sorry to have put the Japanese filmmaker on you; my misjudgement. You were right to send the thing back to me.

Some changes in my life have recently re-determined the summer, and I am doubtful tonight, really doubtful for the first time (tho I have been thinking about this for a couple of weeks, but have not written because Everything was up in the air), about the trip this summer. The thing is that a more important thing has come up, namely going to England this fall to do some very important work in an applied philosophy called Scientology (to go "clear" as they call it), and doing that I must teach all summer to make money and also to do work on the fall issue of CATERPILLAR. Marie Benoit and I are seriously considering getting married in England, and while I could put the trip off until next spring, she wants to do the thing this fall, and we both want to go clear together. So, considering all of this, I think you should scratch my name, and hope I can go to Cuba later as well as hope the Cubans will see fit to invite me later (I have heard nothing from any Cubans about the trip this summer, so I figured it is not completely set). All of the other names I sent you are still to my knowledge good. If I hear otherwise I will write you immediately.

(x) However, if since I'm not going affects the going of others, let me know & I will contact them.

CATERPILLAR 3/4 is out, and 3 copies are on their way to you. I will mail a box of #2 and more 3/4s when I get the time. Sorry not to hv sent more, but only 3 went out to the contributors this time and I forgot about you sending some to Cuba when I mailed yours. Saw Sergio a few weeks ago. It was nice to see him. We had supper in Chinatown and I gave him a new poem.

A number of people have commented on your prose/poem in #3/4. Very impressive is the general word. I hope it looks good to you when you see the magazine. I have a great deal new work; are you open to printing more of my poetry in a forthcoming EL CORNO? I hope you are not upset my change in plans. This Sunday is the first day they have been definite. Hoping your life goes well these days,

affectionately, Clay

HMMA-34658



13-00000

México abril-20-68

"Año del guerrillero heroico"

Mi bella y querida Margaret:

Acabo de llegar. Aquí trabajaré como
Consejero Cultural de Cuba (en México-URSS)
aunque eventualmente viajaré a otros
países. Me trajo los dos últimos
números de "El Corno..." (25 y 26)
y tu libro de poemas muy bella la
portada con la rosa de la canción
protesta. Tú ¿cómo estás? He escrito
bastante últimamente aun cuando no he
publicado mucho. Trabajaré en Cons-
aquí, ahora que la muerte ya no
enfría la inspiración. No dejes de
escribirme y decirme en qué puedo
serte útil en algo, así como
enviarme números futuros de la
revista y todo lo que te →

parecen interesante. Mi dirección es bien sencilla: Luis Guardia
Embajada de Cuba, Moscú, URSS.

¿Qué sabes de Susan Sherman? Saludos a los compañeros mexicanos.

Un abrazo muy cariñoso para ti

Leí cosas muy ingeniosas de Beltrán Morales ¿puedes enviarme su dirección?
También gusté de Cecilia Vicuña (me refiero únicamente a las gentes que no conozco, por eso no abundo sobre W.C.W., Roque, Sergio, Cardenal, Toru, Sefeiis.....) nunca antes leí nada de Morales. Y quisiera saber más de él. Gracias por anticipado ___

HMMA-34633

Att: 6

Mondragón
Illinois State U.
Dept. of foreign langs
Normal, Ill., 61761

MAY 1 AM 1968

Margaret Randall
El Corno Emplumado
Apartado Postal 13-546
México 13, D.F.
MEXICO

13-00000

SCHEDULE B (Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service

Supplemental Schedule of Income and Retirement Income Credit

(From pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, and estates or trusts)

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1967

Name and address as shown on page 1 of Form 1040

Part I.—PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME

A.—General Rule (If you did not contribute to the cost of the pension or annuity, enter the total amount received on line 6 and omit lines 1 through 5.)

			AMOUNT
1 Investment in contract		4 Amount received this year	
2 Expected return		5 Amount excludable (line 4 multiplied by line 3)	
3 Percentage of income to be excluded (line 1 divided by line 2)	%	6 Taxable portion (excess of line 4 over line 5)	

B.—Special Rule—Where your employer has contributed part of the cost and your own contribution will be recovered tax-free within 3 years. If your cost was fully recovered in prior years, enter the total amount received on line 5 and omit lines 1 through 4.

1 Cost of annuity (amounts you paid)		4 Amount received this year	
2 Cost received tax-free in past years			
3 Remainder of cost (line 1 less line 2)		5 Taxable portion (excess, if any, of line 4 over line 3)	

Part II.—RENT AND ROYALTY INCOME

1. Kind and location of property	2. Total amount of rents	3. Total amount of royalties	4. Depreciation (explain in Part IV) or depletion (attach computation)	5. Repairs (attach itemized list)	6. Other expenses (attach itemized list)
1 Totals					

2 Net income (or loss) from rents and royalties (column 2 plus column 3 less columns 4, 5, and 6)

Part III.—INCOME OR LOSSES FROM PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES OR TRUSTS, ETC.

1 Partnerships (name, address, employer identification number, and nature of income)

2 Small business corporations (subchapter S—name, address, and employer identification number)

3 Estates or trusts (name, address, and employer identification number)

TOTAL OF PARTS I, II, AND III (Enter here and on page 2, Part II, line 3, Form 1040)

Part IV.—SCHEDULE FOR DEPRECIATION CLAIMED IN PART II ABOVE

—This schedule is designed for taxpayers using the alternative guidelines and administrative procedures described in Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 as well as for those taxpayers who wish to continue using practices authorized prior to these revenue procedures. Where double headings appear, use the first heading for depreciation under Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 and the second heading for other authorized practices.

1. Group and guideline class — OR — Description of property	2. Cost or other basis at beginning of year — OR — Cost or other basis	3. Asset additions in year (amount) — OR — Date acquired	4. Asset retirements in year (amount) (applicable only to Rev. Proc. 62–21)	5. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	6. Method of computing depreciation	7. Class life — OR — Rate (%) or life	8. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below)							
Total cost or other basis							

2 Total depreciation (Enter here and in Part II, column 4 above)

SUMMARY OF DEPRECIATION

	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Additional first year (section 179)	Other (specify)	Total
1 Under Rev. Proc's. 62–21 and 65–13							
2 Other							

Part V.—RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT

A.—General Rule

If separate return, use column B only. If joint return, use column A for wife and column B for husband →	A		B	
Did you receive earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967? (Widows or widowers see instructions, page B–3)	☐ Yes ☐ No		☐ Yes ☐ No	
If answer above is "Yes" in either column, furnish all information below in that column.				
1 Retirement income for taxable year:				
(a) For taxpayers under 65 years of age: Enter only income received from pensions and annuities under public retirement systems (e.g. Fed., State Govts., etc.) included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040				
(b) For taxpayers 65 years of age or older: Enter total of pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule				
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation	$1,524	00	$1,524	00
3 Deduct: (a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income				
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over):				
(1) Taxpayers under 62 years of age, enter amount in excess of $900				
(2) Taxpayers 62 or over but under 72, enter amount determined as follows: If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700, enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or if over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450				
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)				
5 Balance (subtract line 4 from line 2)				
6 Line 5 or line 1, whichever is smaller				

7 (a) Total (add amounts on line 6, columns A and B). If line 7(a) is less than $2,286 and this is a joint return and both husband and wife are age 65 or over, complete the Alternative Computation in B below which may result in a larger credit.		
(b) Amount from line 7 of part B below, if applicable		
8 Tentative credit. Enter 15% of line 7(a) or 15% of line 7(b), whichever is greater		
LIMITATION ON RETIREMENT INCOME CREDIT		
9 Amount of tax shown on page 1, line 12, Form 1040		
10 Less: Credits claimed for foreign taxes or tax-free covenant bonds		
11 Subtract line 10 from line 9		
12 Credit. Enter here and on page 2, Part V, line 1, Form 1040, the amount on line 11 or line 8, whichever is smaller		

B.—Alternative Computation (after completing lines 1 through 7(a) above)

This method available if:
- a. You are married and filing a joint return
- b. Both husband and wife are 65 or over, AND
- c. Either one, or both received earned income in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 1967.

Furnish the information called for below for both husband and wife even if only one answered "Yes" in column A or B above.

1 Retirement income of both husband and wife from pensions and annuities, interest, and dividends included on page 1, line 9, Form 1040, and gross rents from Part II, column 2 of this schedule		
2 Maximum amount of retirement income for credit computation	$2,286	00

3 Deduct:	A—WIFE		B—HUSBAND	
(a) Amounts received as pensions or annuities under the Social Security Act, the Railroad Retirement Acts, and certain other exclusions from gross income				
(b) Earned income received (Does not apply to persons 72 years of age or over): If $1,200 or less, enter zero; If over $1,200 but not over $1,700 enter ½ of amount over $1,200; or If over $1,700, enter excess over $1,450				
4 Total of lines 3(a) and 3(b)				

5 Total (add amounts on line 4, columns A and B)		
6 Balance (subtract line 5 from line 2)		
7 Enter here and on line 7(b) of part A above, the amount on line 6 or line 1, whichever is smaller		

115

SERGIO MONDRAGON
1012 SOUTH MAIN 129
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

May 1st 1968

70-1499
711

PAY TO THE ORDER OF Margaret Randall $150.00

(one hundred and fifty dollars, no/100) DOLLARS

FIRST NATIONAL BANK of normal
NORMAL, ILLINOIS

Sergio Mondragón

FOR

⑆0711⑉1496⑆ 815⑉736⑈

13-00000

Querida Meg: Aquí te va este dinero para Mayo. Meg, he hecho una encuesta entre varios poetas hispanoamericanos acerca de la poesía. todos prometieron contestar las preguntas por estos días. He estado esperando esas respuestas, y por eso hoy, 1o. de Mayo, todavía no te envío mi Corno; pero seguro el viernes 3, te lo mando. (aunque no incluya esas respuestas de poetas). Ojalá tuviera

(2)

tiempo de ponerme una carta. Cómo están ustedes? cómo fue con tus padres? Mañana voy a dar una conferencia sobre Cuba, en inglés. Espero que no haya dificultades. Yo estoy bien. Gracias por los 2 libros que me enviaste. Me gustan mucho ambos. Estoy de acuerdo en lo que dices de los Hippies. Enteramente de acuerdo. Y tus

(3)

poemas son muy bellos. Enhorabuena! Pareces muy activa, muy despierta, muy poeta. Parece que nos hizo bien la separación, no? Dime si vas a ir a Venezuela del 15 al 30 de junio, para hacer mis planes. Creo que llegaré allí el 15 ó 16 de junio. Saludos! Sergio

13-00000

HW 54-31653

Att. #

Mondragón - Dept. of foreign languages.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

NORMAL, IL
APR 18
5 PM
1968
61761

AIR MAIL

margaret randall
el corno emplumado
apartado postal 13-546
méxico 13, d.f.

13-00000

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY
NORMAL, ILLINOIS 61761

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
Department of Foreign Languages

Telephone: 309-438-2211

abril 18 de 1968.

querida meg:

acaban de llegarme como seis cartas tuyas juntas, con fotos, cartas de los chics, noticias, etc. -gracias. lástima del pelo de saris. esa es una de las razones -la única razón- por lo cual no me gusta que los chics pasen la noche en tlalpan. por la insalubridad. estoy seguro que los piojos los toman allá muchas veces. en fin. qué mala noticia lo del coche. meg, no te parece que tus amigos -por lo menos dos amigos- están tomando ventajas de ti? primero fue rodolfo, quien desaparece con la grabadora. ya la devolvió? y ahora otro amigo te choca el coche y no te lo paga. dices que te va a costar más de mil pesos. te parece justo? a mí no.

gracias por los ocho dólares de mi nota. cobraste mis 700 pesos de educación? estuve en nueva york para las vacaciónes de pascua. me quedé con leandro y evi. fui también a montreal y visité a los bowering. recordamos muchas cosas, hablamos horas acerca de tiempos felices, cuando tú y yo éramos una pareja llena de amor. allí estaba ~~[illegible]~~ leonel kearns y otro poeta canadiense que hemos publicado y no recuerdo su nombre. dicen que tal vez vengan pronto a méxico. en n.y. vi a los petersen. me trataron muy bien. te mandan muchos saludos y es casi seguro que vengan a méxico en el verano. yo les invité a quedarse en la casa, ya sea que tú estés allí o en venezuela. siendo tan amigos tuyos creo que está bien. pero ellos alquilarán un apartamento, por lo menos la mayor parte del tiempo. vi también a sara blackburn, mujer maravillosa con quien hice mucha amistad. le entusiasmó la idea de tu libro sobre castro que vas a hacer en octubre con la grabadora , y me dijo que ella podría proponer ese mismo libro a una ediotrial grande como Doubleday o otra igual. me parece que te va a escribir. sabes que ella tiene mucha influencia en el mundo literario de la grandes compañías editoriales. quiero pedirte un favor para ella: envíale el libro de o. paz "corriente alterna" a su domicilio, 50 W. 8 st., n.y.c.,10011- cuesta como 12.00 pesos. es urgente. gracias. vi también a clayton eshelman, me invitó a comer. está muy bien, mejor que nunca y muy amistoso. conocí también a su mujer, que me pareció una mujer muy triste, aunque buena. evi y leandro están bien. todos en n.y. te qeieren muchoy te admiran y admiran al corno. la revista se agota en tres días en 8 st. bookshope. andrei codrescu me dijo que debes enviar más ejemplares. tienen en la tienda un aviso de tu libro, anunciado entre las "novedades".

felicidades por tu antología de poesía revolucionaria. y por el manuscrito que te piden en londres. parece que una compañía grande de aquí quiere que les haga una antología de poesía hisp. -vamos a ver. qué sucedió con mi libro en el fondo? la universidad parece que no va a publicar mi libro. mala suerte la de ese aprendiz de brujo. ángela y george están muy bien. parece que se aman mucho. angela y todos, sara, clayton, etc., cuando ~~supieron~~ dije que vas a cuba en octubre, dijeron inmediatamente que tal vez vas a ser mrs. fidel castro, o al menos su amante. sara dijo que se moría de envidia. han salido más cosas del corno en los periódicos? envíame algunos recortes. bueno, ama a los chics y cuídate. te mandé una carta hablándote de los poemas de marco antonio. también envié ya su manuscrito de regreso, y me quedé con unos poemas suyos. escríbeme. dime si crees que los niños están resintiendo mucho la separación, y en qué forma. abrazos y abrazos. Sergio

PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022
A DIVISION OF RANDOM HOUSE, INC.

Paula McGuire

April 25, 1968

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

Dear Miss Randell:

My former colleague Sara Blackburn (who sends her love) has told me that she recently heard through your husband about your plans for a trip to Cuba in order to write a book on Castro. I should be very interested to know more about your plans with a view towards the possibility of publishing your book and hope you'll be able to write me.

Incidentally, we are about to publish Jose Yglesias's In the Fist of the Revolution: Life in a Cuban Country Town. I thought you'd be interested to read it and have sent you a copy under separate cover.

Yours sincerely,

Paula McGuire

PM:ib

PANTHEON BOOKS
437 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022

AIR MAIL

Miss Margaret Randell
Apartado Postal 13-546
Mexico 13, D.F.

13-00000

TAB # 332

NO DOCS ATTACHED

FILE. ONE DOC

13-00000

13-00000

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

[redacted]:333

Tab. [redacted]-55 contains *MEMO* *B-173* *W/ATT-(1) NEWSPAPER* dated *19 Sept 1968*.

( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________

(✓) Segregable portions previously *recommended for* released, *but not sent to requester by IPS* excised portions exempted under *(b)(1), (b)(3)* of *FOIA*.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________________.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ________
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ________________.

(X) Sustain initial [redacted] sanitized version with excised portions exempted under *(b)(3)* of *FOIA*.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ________________.
( ) DROP exemption(s) *(b)(1)*.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ________________ of ________.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________________ of ________.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
( ) Name of CIA employee
(X) File number/ *name*
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
( ) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
( ) Privacy of other individual
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. ~~[crossed-out handwriting]~~

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as *SECRET* was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ________________
(X) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ________________

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012170

( ) [illegible] ( ) CONFIDENTIAL ( ) [illegible] ( ) TOP SECRET

13-00000

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

1. Attached is a copy of an article appearing in the 9-15 May 1968 issue of Clarte, weekly newspaper of the Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) covering an interview with Stokely CARMICHAEL that was published in the 1 May issue of Humanite Nouvelle, newspaper of the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). The interview was conducted when CARMICHAEL was in Paris, France.

2. Also contained in the clipping is a report of an interview on Radio Havana with CARMICHAEL following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther KING. CARMICHAEL was in Havana, Cuba, at the time.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), 9-15 May 1968

Enclosure: as stated (one)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 13 march 78

55

Le peuple soviétique est fidèle à STALINE !

Clarté

Fondateur : Honoré WILLEMS, fusillé par les nazis, le 29 février 1944.

BIEN QUE LA DIRECTION DU PARTI ET DE L'ETAT SOVIETIQUES SOIT A PRESENT USURPEE PAR DES REVISIONNISTES, JE CONSEILLE AUX CAMARADES D'AVOIR LA CONVICTION QUE LES LARGES MASSES DU PEUPLE SOVIETIQUE, DES MEMBRES DU PARTI ET DES CADRES SONT BONS ET VEULENT FAIRE LA REVOLUTION ; LA DOMINATION DU REVISIONNISME NE SERA PAS LONGUE.

MAO TSE-TOUNG.

RÉDACTION
ADMINISTRATION
32, chaussée d'Alsemberg, 32
BRUXELLES 6
Tél. (02) 37.76.06

ORGANE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE (MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE) DE BELGIQUE

HEBDOMADAIRE
NOUVELLE SERIE - Numéro 20
Semaine du 9 au 15 mai 1969
8 pages - 5 Francs
(Tarif d'abonnements : pages 8)

13-00000

Stockely CARMICHAEL : Notre objectif final : Nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes des U.S.A.

Dans son numéro du Premier Mai, l'« HumanitéNouvelle », organe central du Parti Communiste Marxiste-Léniniste de France a publié une interview de Stockely Carmichaël, leader du « Black Power » (Pouvoir Noir)Cette interview a été réalisée par un camarade africain lors du récent séjour de Carmichaël à Paris.

Le Black Power est un mouvement de masse de Afro-américains. Certaines de ces positions peuvent ne pas toujours coïncider avec celles des marxistes-léninistes mais Il est évident que le combat du Black Power est héroïque, courageusement anti-raciste, anti-impérialiste.

C'est cela qui est important. C'est pour cette raison que nous reproduisons ce remarquable document.

La grande vague de combativité qui déferle sur les grandes villes américaines, dressant, en un combat héroïque, les larges masses afro-américaines contre les forces réactionnaires, les victimes racistes et l'ordre capitaliste établi, c'est déjà à l'intérieur de la citadelle impérialiste elle-même, l'amorce de la lutte finale. Elle consacre, par ailleurs, la faillite du mythe intégrationniste lancé par la bourgeoisie américai-

STOCKELY CARMICHÆL — L'aspect principal de la situation du peuple afro-américain est celui d'une nouvelle forme de colonialisme intérieur. Il s'agit d'une situation presque originale qui implique que notre lutte se fixe deux objectifs principaux :

— Objectif numéro 1 : éliminer l'oppression coloniale qui nous vise en tant que Noirs sur le triple plan économique, social et politique.

— Objectif numéro 2 : nous attaquer aux structures capitalistes et impérialistes des U.S.A.

Il est évident que l'objectif n°1 sera essentiellement poursuivi par les seuls afro-américains. Quant à l'objectif n°2, il concernera tous les révolutionnaires [illegible]

[illegible] que la survivance de l'opprimé ne saurait passer par la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples – et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

Mais l'impérialisme, aux abois, tente dans un ultime effort, de jeter le discrédit sur la juste lutte du peuple afro-américain, en l'assimilant grossièrement à une «caravane d'incendies et de brigandage», en présentant ses leaders comme des «psychopates, qui incitent publiquement au meurtre» (New York Times 12-1-68). Mais la mauvaise foi des capitalistes, elle aussi, a des limites. On est donc forcé de reconnaître, en une rage d'impuissance certes, «qu'aujourd'hui, la voix d'un Stokely Carmichael est entendue de plus en plus nettement dans le pays». (L'Economist du 11-1, Londres).

Que dit cette voix. De quelle lutte s'agit-il ? D'une simple lutte entre deux races ou de quelque chose d'autrement important ? Pourquoi les marxistes-léninistes et tous les progressistes doivent-ils la soutenir et la faire connaître ?

Des réponses apparaîtront dans le cours de l'exposé que Stokely Carmichael nous a fait récemment et que nous rendons public pour la première fois. Des réponses parfois [illegible]

[illegible] le problème du racisme
— le problème de l'exploitation.

J'ai indiqué plus haut que l'objectif n°2 était une œuvre d'ensemble ; simplement parce qu'il visait à résoudre un problème qui n'est pas particulier aux Noirs : le problème de l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme. Il n'est pas nécessairement lié à la couleur de la peau.

Quant au problème du racisme, on peut dire qu'il est spécifique à l'homme noir. On peut même poser l'équation [illegible] suivante : Noir = Prolétariat du monde. A cause de sa seule pe[illegible]

L'Occident Blanc ne peut pas nier s'être d[illegible] sur la sueur du Noir. Prenez les Antilles françaises, holland[illegible] anglaises. La même sauce. Prenez les Etats-Unis des siècle[illegible] précédents. Prenez les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui. Prenez l'Afrique. [illegible] histoire est éloquente à ce sujet.

Les Blancs de l'Occident trouvent leur ju[illegible] n d'occidental dans la négation du Noir en tant que Noir. Ils o[illegible] du Noir un être sub-humain pour rationaliser l'exploitation du Noir. Pour ne pas s'humilier en tant qu'hommes.

— Oui, bien sûr, il y a le «Code Noir» de Colbert. Mais tout de même, cette exploitation du Noir ne peut pas être simplement un fait de psychologie appliquée, car en fait, le racisme apparaît bien comme une manifestation de la lutte des classes. Il n'y a qu'à reprendre les exemples.

STOCKELY. — D'abord, il y a un problème immédiat : celui de la prise de conscience de la victime en face du bourreau. C'est en tant que Noirs que nous entendons nous battre.

Il reste qu'aux Etats-Unis, un Noir «bien placé» sur le plan économique n'échappe pas au racisme.

Il n'est que de lire la presse américaine pour s'en convaincre. Le problème du racisme ici n'est pas nécessairement lié au problème de l'exploitation.

Le racisme fait partie de l'arsenal idéologique et pratique de l'impérialisme américain. Les Noirs sont d'autant plus exposés que les Blancs occidentaux ont détruit les cultures africaines de l'homme noir, les Noirs, dans le monde, parlent la langue de leurs maîtres.

Or la culture comme dit Fanon, est une «force cohésive»: Il leur faut donc aussi résister à cette culture d'imposition (le pidgin, le petit-nègre ?).

Dans le cadre des Afro-américains cela transparaît sous la forme du christianisme. Le christianisme est une culture d'imposition, c'est-à-dire essentiellement une culture impérialiste, parce que liée à l'idée de la valeur universelle du maître. Vous devez en savoir quelque chose en Afrique, avec le cortège de conversions forcées.

En fait, la libération culturelle est une chose très importante. Elle doit viser à répéter le système d'éducation du maître (en tant que stade final de l'imposition culturelle). L'éducation capitaliste vise à [illegible]

— De quel ordre est-elle ?

— Elle est nécessairement politique.

— L'une des limites objectives des dirigeants qui nous ont précédés est la suivante : il ont fait appel aux oppresseurs et non aux opprimés. Nous, nous faisons appel aux opprimés. Nous leur disons :

«Si vous voulez être libres, il faut vous battre !» Le président Mao Tsé-toung indique avec raison que «le pouvoir est au bout du fusil». C'est juste. Nous opposerons nos fusils libérateurs aux fusils racistes de l'impérialisme américain, dans ses propres villes.

Nous le forcerons à se battre comme nous l'entendrons. Comme font nos camarades vietnamiens. S'il veut utiliser du napalm et des rockets sur ses propres villes, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénients, mais nous nous battrons, c'est une chose entendue.

— Vois-tu un rapport entre votre lutte et celles des camarades vietnamiens, et des autres peuples en lutte contre l'impérialisme, U.S. en tête ?

Bien évidemment, chaque fois que les bases de l'impérialisme sont minées à l'extérieur, notre lutte s'en trouve proportionnellement avantagée.

Nous voudrions bien par exemple qu'il se trouve un seul pays africain qui se développe par ses propres efforts, et non en allant mendier chez les Blancs occidentaux.

Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquierre le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carmichaël à la suite

[illegible]ncrètes ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en n'est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens durèrent quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

- Les racistes et les impér[illegible] nord-américains maintenant [illegible] Brown en prison et hier soir [illegible] assassiné Martin Luther King. Ils ont commis une grave erreur car il était le seul dirigeant qui exhortait la population noire des Etats-Unis à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne pas [illegible] mettre d'actes de violence. Maintenant qu'ils ont assassiné King, [illegible] dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à ses frères de ne pas brûler les villes, ce qui signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de s'engager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséquence de l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 25 villes, des incendies, des coups de feu, des combats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

13-00000

19 SEP 1968

SUBJECT: Stokely CARMICHAEL

1. Attached is a copy of an article appearing in the 9-15 May 1968 issue of Clarte, weekly newspaper of the Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) covering an interview with Stokely CARMICHAEL that was published in the 1 May issue of Humanite Nouvelle, newspaper of the French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist). The interview was conducted when CARMICHAEL was in Paris, France.

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PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON,

Based on Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist),
9-15 May 1968

Enclosure: as stated (one)

Previously
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976
With newspaper clipping

13-00000

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		DATE 19 Sept 1968

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4.				Based on: Clarte, Belgian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) 9-15 May 1968
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6.				Disseminated to: FBI on 19 ~~20~~ Sept 68
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28 Feb 1978

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Declassified by 060595
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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 28 Feb 1978
IMPDET CL BY 060595

(55)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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Il est évident [illegible]

Désormais, les perspectives sont claires : Memphis a démontré que la non-violence de l'opprimé ne saurait préserver de la violence sanglante du capitalisme américain. Il constitue en cela, un jalon important dans la lutte des peuples – et singulièrement du peuple afro-américain qui a pris conscience que seule la violence révolutionnaire peut véritablement briser le cycle sanglant de la violence contre-révolutionnaire.

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Nous en aurions fait, pour la mobilisation de nos masses fondamentales un modèle psychologique et méthodique à la fois. Mais on ne peut pas dire qu'il y ait un seul pays révolutionnaire en Afrique à l'heure actuelle. C'est d'ailleurs pour cela que l'O.U.A. est paralysée. Aujourd'hui, si des Noirs américains avaient à s'exiler en Afrique, pas un seul pays africain ne les accepterait pour la bonne raison que tous ces pays sont soumis au joug de l'impérialisme américain.

Toutes les petites bourgeoisies contre-révolutionnaires au pouvoir en Afrique sont inféodées à Johnson, et exploitent leur propres frères de couleur.

— **Quelle est votre tâche principale en ce moment. Celle qui requiert actuellement la priorité ?**

D'abord, éliminer nos ennemis, c'est-à-dire tous les mouvements contre-révolutionnaires voulant s'intégrer à la société capitaliste blanche.

Ensuite, organiser notre peuple pour qu'il acquierre le mordant offensif, condition sine qua non pour briser le statut quo d'aujourd'hui.

Car c'est bien cela que signifie la lutte défensive des Luther King et autres.

Pour vaincre, il s'agit d'attaquer. C'est un programme minimum.

Interview téléphonique à Radio-La Havane

Déclaration de Carmi[illegible]

…marades ; mais elles expriment toutes une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale. D'autres naîtront du développement de cette lutte qui n'en est qu'à ses débuts. Nous avons tenu à les présenter comme elles sont venues au cours de la conversation.

Stokely parle en responsable. Rien d'extravagant en lui, contrairement à ce que suggère une certaine presse. Mise très simple. Il n'a pas eu le temps de se peigner : nous l'avons surpris au saut du lit. La veille, nous avons passé la soirée ensemble. Nous sommes, en tout, cinq camarades : nous parlons très librement. Une camarade afro-américaine - vivant à Paris - assure la régularité de la traduction. Les entretiens durèrent quatre heures.

KIMBA.

rétablir et à perpétuer la société capitaliste.

— Pratiquement, comment tout cela peut-il s'agencer ?

En organisant les Noirs. Historiquement, nous venons tous d'Afrique. En nous dispersant dans leur monde, les Blancs occidentaux nous ont appris, par la négative certes, mais nous ont appris quand même à apprécier l'unité. Nous savons aujourd'hui, que l'unité, c'est la puissance. C'est pour réaliser cet impératif d'unité que nous avons arrêté, dans un premier temps, de nous réaliser culturellement, en rejetant le christianisme (culture d'imposition, liée à l'idée de suprématie de la culture des Blancs occidentaux).

— Le problème à résoudre est celui de créer des révolutionnaires noirs. Pour nous, cela signifie 3 objectifs :

1. Adoption d'une langue nationale africaine : le swahili, par exemple.
2. Destruction du christianisme.
3. Redécouvrir l'Afrique, mais d'une manière scientifique, pour y puiser nos propres héros, au lieu d'assumer les héros blancs occidentaux.

En somme, recréer notre culture pour en faire une force de cohésion.

Dégager une idéologie politique commune. A cet égard l'expérience de la Révolution chinoise est riche d'exemples mobilisateurs.

Notre tâche à nous est de lutter pour acquérir une idéologie correcte, capable d'unifier tous les Noirs.

La chose fondamentale à retenir, c'est de contribuer à développer la conscience qui doit amener l'Américain noir à résister. Cette conscience est nécessaire.

de l'assassinat de Martin Luther King

La guerre de guérilla dans les villes

« Les racistes et les impérialistes nord-américains maintiennent Rap Brown en prison et hier soir ils ont assassiné Martin Luther King. Ils ont commis une grave erreur car il était le seul dirigeant qui exhortait la population noire des Etats-Unis à ne pas brûler les villes, à ne pas commettre d'actes de violence. Maintenant qu'ils ont assassiné King, aucun dirigeant noir ne pourra dire à ses frères de ne pas brûler les villes et cela signifie qu'il sera nécessaire de s'engager à fond dans la révolution.

- Hier soir, comme conséquence de l'assassinat de King, il y a eu de graves incidents dans 35 villes, des incendies, des coups de feu, des combats et des morts. Il est évident qu'il y aura d'autres incidents de ce genre qui se convertiront de plus en plus en guerre de guérilla dans les villes, car il est évident que nous ne pouvons pas affronter la police en rébellion ouverte.

- En conséquence le nombre de personnes qui commencent à penser sérieusement à la guerre de guérilla urbaine à grande échelle augmente car c'est l'unique manière non seulement de donner une réponse adéquate à l'assassinat de King mais d'avancer vers une véritable révolution au sein du pays et de mettre à genoux le système impérialiste. Pour nous, la nécessité de la chute de ce système est évidente pour que l'humanité puisse vivre. Et nous donnerons notre vie pour y arriver.

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

334

Tab 0-75 contains MEMO B-191 dated 9 Oct 1968.

(✓) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(Liaison) (b)(3) of FOIA.

( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

RECOMMEND:

(X) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
 ( ) ADD exemption(s) (b)(6).
 ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
 ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
 ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

(X) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
(X) Information which would/[redacted] identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
(X) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
(X) Names of CIA employees
( ) File number
( ) Pseudonym
( ) Cryptonym
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(X) Privacy of other individuals
( ) OTHER

COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
( ) downgraded to ______

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13-00000

[ ] UNCLASSIFIED [ ] INTERNAL USE ONLY [ ] CONFIDENTIAL [X] SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
CI/Ober	5847	B-191
		DATE: 9 October 1968

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
				CI/SO Internal Use Only EYES ONLY Originated by: WH/7/R/PROlson (8 October 68) Based on: HJK-251 a. para 405 b. para 406 c. para 411 d. para 413 e. para 417 f. para 420 Disseminated to: FBI on 10 Oct 68 File: B-Memos (w/att) (record copy) cc: 100-300-44 cc: PROD Kingston PROD EYES ONLY B-191

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS [X] SECRET [ ] CONFIDENTIAL [ ] INTERNAL USE ONLY [ ] UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

9 OCT 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Jamaican Special Branch Report -
Jamaica/United States Black Power Ties

1. Pertinent items from the Jamaican Special Branch monthly report for April 1968, which contains several references to ties between Black Power groups in Jamaica and the United States, are provided, in full, below. A summary of the report, omitting portions concerning the United States or United States citizens, has been disseminated in CS-311/06459-68, a copy of which is attached.

2. The items of possible interest, omitted from the dissemination, are noted below:

a. During April 1968, four meetings of the Wilson faction of the Nation of Islam (NOI) were held. On 3 April, Percy Hayles, the boxer, said that he was impressed with the doctrine and had written to Elijah Mohammed asking for a scholarship to enable him to study in one of the Islam Universities in the United States. Errol Levy said that only a revolution could end the white man's practice of robbing the black people of everything.

b. At the meeting on 24 April, Cecil (Prince Buster) Campbell stated that the premises on 47 Charles Street in Kingston belonged to him and he was willing for it to be used for the assistance of the black race. He called for unity among black people and said that his organization was fighting to rule Jamaica. He told members that they should be prepared to meet the Reverend Sherriffe (aka Thomas View) who would soon be visiting the Island.

c. On the 5th and 8th of April, discussions were held led by George Vassel, leader of the Young Socialist

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CONDUCTED ON 28 Jul 1978
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League and a member of the Jamaican (Caribbean) Workers Movement, on the possibility of holding demonstrations at the American Embassy in Kingston to protest against the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Vassel claimed that there was a United States citizen hiding in Jamaica to escape the draft who had in his possession recordings of speeches made by the late Malcolm X during 1964. One of these was entitled "The Ballot or Bullets". He stated that King's death disproved his theory of non-violence and was bringing into prominence men like Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown.

d. During April, about 40 persons including Winston Monroe, Joseph Christie, Roy Jeffrey, Leonard Solomon and one Hy Survad, who is the American draft escapee referred to in Paragraph c. above, met at 23 Fourth Street, Trench Town (Dallas Corner), where Survad, identified as a Black Muslim and a member of the Black Power Movement (BPM), answered questions put to him by the gathering. It was understood that Survad was in Jamaica to solicit support for the BPM in the United States as well as to establish a branch here. The record "The Ballot or Bullets" was played by Survad and recorded by Monroe.

e. Survad accepted George Myers' invitation to attend a get-together which he was arranging in Savanna-la-Mar on 11 May, and to spend a week or two with him there. They discussed the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the BPM, and it was suggested that a local Steering Committee should be appointed to consider the formation of a group in Jamaica.

f. (Jamaica Service Comment: Survad has subsequently been identified as John Davis, aka Selvyn Grey, a member of CORE and the Black Muslims. He is in touch with Rastafarians at Kintyre, and the leaders of the Viking and Spade Gangs. He is expecting to meet one Corporal James, aka "Jimmy" of the Jamaica Defence Force, who is said to have complained that he was deprived of promotion because of his views. Arrangements were also being made for him to meet Walter Rodney of the University of the West Indies. Survad has stated

that if given the chance he would, within eighteen months, stage a demonstration. He has suggested that if his colleagues can supply marijuana and find a way to export it, he could guarantee an outlet in the United States and the money thus obtained could be used to finance the local Movement. Survad was being supported by his girlfriend, Bernadine Houston, who was expected to arrive from the United States towards the end of the ensuing month. He is now in straitened circumstances.)

WH/7/R/PROlson:mbk (8 October 1968)

Distribution:
Orig - FBI w/att
3 - CI/OPS/DO
1 - WH/7/R/JATS
1 - C/WH/7/JATS
1 - C/WH/FI

Based on: HJK-251
a. - para 405
b. - para 406
c. - para 411
d. - para 413
e. - para 417
f. - para 420

13-00000

TAB #235 NOT INCLUDED

336

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336

APPEALS REVIEW FORM

1. Tab 272- contains Two Letter Intercepts dated Sept 17, 1969.
   A-80381

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.

   ( ) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

   (X) Located during the DDO appeals review.

   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ________.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ________ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ________.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ________.

   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

   (X) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) (b)(6) of FOIA.

   ( ) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ________ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   ( ) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   ( ) Cryptonym
   ( ) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. These two letters talk about [illegible] Dr King in the text. However to release them to Mr. Weisberg would be an invasion of privacy of Mrs King and the individual writing to Mrs King. These documents should be described as "Letter Intercepts"

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as ________ was:

   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ________
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   ( ) downgraded to ________

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AFTER 5 DAYS RETURN TO:

BERNICE ROBINSON
22 DEWEY ST
CHARLESTON SC 29403

PAR AVION

ПОЧТА СССР 6

ПОЧТА СССР 10 КОП.

VIA AIR MAIL

Mrs. Martin Luther King Jr.
230 Sunset Drive N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia
U.S.A.

B

70H03B

(1)

Leningrad, Russia
U.S.S.R.

Dear Mrs. King:
While on this East European Churchmen's Study Tour, I visited a little town in East Germany, called Hernhut.
The Moravian Church (Oldest in Hernhut) officials, hosted our group during our visit there. I saw your husbands books on sale in their one good Bookstore.
A Young man who is head of the youth work in Hernhut, informed us that they are setting up a room in the Youth Center, in memory of Dr. King! He wanted your address so that he could write and let you know what they were doing and the respect they have for Dr. King's Memory. I gave him your address, so I am writing to let you know that, if you haven't heard from him

(2)

yet, you will be receiving Communications from, Dietrich Heise, 89 Gorlitz D.D.R., Bautzener Str. 38, and you will be aware of what is happening in this small Eastern Germany Town, a population of only 2.000.

Respectfully,
Bernice V. Robinson
22 Dewey Street
Charleston, S.C. 29403

Cent
Atlanta

Куда Mrs Martin Luther King Jr
234 Sunset Ave
Northwest Atlanta
Кому Georgia 30314
USA

Адрес отправителя Moscow A319
Krasnoarmeyskaya 21 apt 1
Raya Orlova



Sept 17, 1969

Mrs Martin Luther
King Jr
234 Sunset Ave
Northwest Atlanta
Georgia 30314 !

Dear Mrs King,

Three weeks ago I got the books you so kindly sent me and immediately answered you. Only today — two months and a half — came your letter with a reprint of "Playboy" article. In case my first letter will not reach you permit me to repeat — it was an honor, a joy and some how — a new responsability — to get a letter from you.

I am in correspondence with Martin Luther King Memorial Library, have sent them a copy of a very popular magazine for children "the Pioneer" where last year I published a little essay on the late Martin Luther King. Now I completed a

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new work - Gandhi and Martin Luther King - but I lack material - Dr King's article in "Ebony" - "My trip to the land of Gandhi". It would be of course marvelous to get some articles on the Nobel Price, - how it was...

My long essay on Martin Luther King's "road to the Cross" is still at the publishers. I hope it will be published at last and I will have the possibility to send it to you. If somebody in your country will plan an international symposium on the life, thought and meaning of Martin Luther King, - please let me know. It would be my deepest wish to contribute; I hope you will not consider this wish immodest, - it is very serious, though, of course, I could not be the judge of my own work.

- Thank you again, dear Mrs King, for your letter.

Yours very sincerely
Raissa Orlova

[ ] UNCLASSIFIED [X] CONFIDENTIAL [ ] SECRET [ ] TOP SECRET

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

1. Tab 9-56 contains Cable Budapest 017 dated 19 May 1971.
2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
   (✓) Segregable portions ~~previously released under exemption(s)~~ recommended for but not sent to the requester (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA. Except portions for field info
   ( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.
   ( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.
3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.
4. I RECOMMEND:
   ( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.
   ( ) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
   ( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
   (X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) of FOIA.
5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:
   ( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
   ( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
   ( ) Information which would/could identify the source
   ( ) Information pertaining to a source
   ( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
   (X) Location of CIA overseas installation
   ( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
   ( ) Name of CIA employee
   ( ) File number
   ( ) Pseudonym
   (X) Cryptonyms
   ( ) Internal organizational data
   ( ) Name of FBI agent
   ( ) FBI file number
   ( ) Privacy of other individual
   ( ) OTHER
6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
7. During the DDO appeal classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:
   ( ) maintained
   ( ) classified to ______
   ( ) declassified
   ( ) desensitized
   (X) downgraded to confidential

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19 14 13Z MAY 71

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HEADQUARTERS

MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, [redacted] PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY P E C K, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MEDAL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. W A L K E R "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM D O U R T H A R D AND MRS. ADDIE W Y A T T.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH G A G E - C O L B Y AND SYLVIA K U S C H E R (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT A P T H E K E R AND CARLTON G O O D L E T T REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 10 March 1978

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19 14 13Z MAY 71

191348Z MAY 71 CITE

HEADQUARTERS

.CHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY P E C K, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MEDAL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. W A L K E R "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM D O U R T H A R D AND MRS. ADDIE W Y A T T.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH G A G E - C O L B Y AND SYLVIA K U S C H E R (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT A P T H E K E R AND CARLTON G O O D L E T T REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS.

Previously APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date ....

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HEADQUARTERS

RYBAT MHCURB MHCHAOS

REF: HEADQUARTERS 2789

1. IN FINAL COVERAGE ON 18 MAY OF WPC, WHICH ENDED 16 MAY, LOCAL PRESS HAS MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RE U.S. PARTICIPANTS:

A. SIDNEY P E C K, IDENTIFIED AS "USA PROFESSOR," SPOKE AT CONGRESS ON VIET NAM WAR.

B. WPC HAS AWARDED JOLIOT CURIE GOLD MEDAL POSTHUMOUSLY TO REV MARTIN LUTHER KING. MEDAL ACCEPTED BY REV RALPH ABERNATHY AND REV W. W A L K E R "AN AMERICAN PEACE FIGHTER." PHOTOGRAPH (POUCHED) OF PRESENTATION ALSO PICTURES U.S. DELEGATES WILLIAM D O U R T H A R D AND MRS. ADDIE W Y A T T.

C. U.S. DELEGATES RUTH G A G E - C O L B Y AND SYLVIA K U S C H E R (SIC) SPOKE AT MEETING OF INDOCHINESE AND AMERICAN DELEGATES.

D. AMERICANS HERBERT A P T H E K E R AND CARLTON G O O D L E T T REELECTED TO PRESIDENTIAL BOARD.

2. STATION POUCHING MOST SIGNIFICANT PRESS COVERAGE OF COUNCIL SESSIONS. GP-1

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ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Downgraded to 060595
by authority of 060595
date: 10 May 1978

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APPEALS REVIEW FORM

338

1. Tab 57 contains Memo 75-2628 dated 21 May 71.

2. ( ) Previously denied in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______

(X) Segregable portions previously released; excised portions exempted under (b)(1) (b)(2) (b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Located during the DDO appeals review.

( ) Referred to DDO for review by ______.

3. Further description, identification, comments, and/or referrals, etc.

4. I RECOMMEND:

( ) Sustain initial denial in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

( ) Sustain initial release of sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.
( ) ADD exemption(s) ______.
( ) DROP exemption(s) ______.

(X) Release additional information with excised portions exempted under (b)(1)(b)(3) (b)(6) of FOIA.

( ) Deny document in toto under exemption(s) ______ of ______.

(X) Release a sanitized version with excised portions exempted under ______ of ______.

5. The exemptions cited above are being claimed to protect the following:

( ) Information from a foreign liaison service
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship
( ) Information which would/could identify the source
( ) Information pertaining to a source
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods
(X) Location of CIA overseas installation
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation
(X) Name of CIA employee
(X) File numbers
( ) Pseudonym
(X) Cryptonyms
(X) Internal organizational data
( ) Name of FBI agent
( ) FBI file number
(X) Privacy of other individuals
( ) OTHER

6. COMMENTS and/or SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. Names of Americans and their file #'s have been deleted + exemption (b)(6) claimed. To release the information to Mr. Weisberg that the CIA collected, reported + disseminated info regarding these individuals + their activities with the WPC would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of their privacy. The info contained in the memo were all reported in the press. However, prior to Hq's dating of this document

7. During the DDO classification review, this document which was marked as SECRET was:

( ) maintained
( ) classified to ______
( ) declassified
( ) desensitized
(X) downgraded to confidential

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B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

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DATE 10 MAR 78

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B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to [redacted] dated 14 May 1971, Subject: [redacted] and [redacted]

Please transmit reply via [redacted] channel

Originated by: [redacted]
Based on: [redacted] 18 May 71 [redacted] and [redacted] 19 May 71 [redacted]
Source: [redacted] Hungarian Press
Distribution:
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via [redacted] courier
1 - B memo chrono
1 - extra copy
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - KING/Sens/ID (201-760966)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Production [redacted]
1 - Production [redacted]

B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

Previously ^ APPROVED FOR RELEASE
Date 19 AUG 1976

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B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

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4.

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Originated by:
Based on:

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Original - FBI via courier
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B-2628
21 MAY 1971

SUBJECT: Americans Attending the World Peace Council (WPC) Conference in Budapest, Hungary, 13-16 May 1971

1. A reliable source has reported that the following Americans spoke at the indicated committee meetings of the WPC Conference:

A. Stanley FAULKNER, Committee on European Peace and Security;

B. Sylvia KUSHNER, Committee on Indochina Aggression;

C. John GILMAN, Committee on the Near East;

D. Mary Angie DICKERSON, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination;

E. Luis GARZA, Section Meeting Discussing Discrimination; and

F. Ruth GAGE-COLBY, Committee on Disarmament.

All of the above-named persons were identified specifically as members of the U.S. delegation.

2. According to the same source, S. FAULKNER, "Vice President of the American National Lawyers' Association," functioned as President in a meeting of lawyer delegates to the Congress and the American delegate Albert KAHN translated a message from the widow of artist Rockwell KENT to the Conference.

3. In its final coverage on 18 May of the WPC Conference, which ended 16 May, the Hungarian Press made the following additional observations regarding United States participants:

A. Sidney PECK, identified as "USA Professor," spoke on the war in Vietnam;

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CONDUCTED ON 1 Sept 78
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GROUP 1
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B. The WPC awarded the JOLIOT-CURIE GOLD MEDAL posthumously to the Reverend Martin Luther KING. The medal was accepted by the Reverend Ralph ABERNATHY and the Reverend Wyatt T. WALKER, "an American peace fighter." A photograph of the presentation ceremony also included William DOUTHARD and Mrs. Addie WYATT as U.S. delegates to the Conference;

C. U.S. delegates Ruth GAGE-COLBY and Sylvia KUSHNER spoke at a meeting of Indochinese and American delegates; and

D. Americans Herbert APTHEKER and Carlton GOODLETT were re-elected to the Presidential Board of the WPC.

4. For previous information on Subject, please refer to our teletype 3216, dated 14 May 1971, Subject: Ralph David ABERNATHY and Dr. Carlton GOODLETT. ✓

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

Originated by: CI/SO:GMKline:jm
Based on: BUDAPEST 016, 18 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW) and BUDAPEST 017, 19 May 71 (WPC/Sens/BW)
Source: JKLANCE/Hungarian Press
Distribution:
Original - FBI (Mr. Wannall) via CI/SO courier
1 - B memo chrono
1 - extra copy
1 - WPC/Sens/BW
1 - FAULKNER/Sens/GMK (201-354414/GK)
1 - KUSHNER/Sens/BW (201-878516/BW)
1 - GILMAN/Sens/BW (new)
1 - DICKERSON/Sens/BW (201-854982/BW)
1 - GARZA/Sens/BW (new)
1 - COLBY/Sens/GMK (201-053968/GK)
1 - KAHN/Sens/EC
1 - KENT, Mrs./Sens/GK (201-221724/GK)
1 - PECK/Sens/BW (201-830466/BW)
1 - KING/Sens/JD (201-760966/JD)
1 - ABERNATHY/Sens/JD (201-853022/JD)
1 - WALKER/Sens/JD
1 - DOUTHARD/Sens/BW (201-857634/BW)
1 - WYATT/Sens/BW
1 - APTHEKER/Sens/BW (201-757176/BW)
1 - GOODLETT/Sens/BW (201-742726/BW)
1 - Production Budapest
1 - Production JKLANCE

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

DATE: 29 January 1964

FROM : M. D. Stevens

SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #351164

1. According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.

2. Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.

3. In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.

4. In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.

5. On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:

> "SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."

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Document Number 1271-1029
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6. Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574, SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on AEACTIVE. /The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State Department

DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States./

7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on AEACTIVE in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.

8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL, during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to project FJALIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.

9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to MUNSELL.

M. D. Stevens

GROUP 1
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